Green Zone Nation: The Securitisation and Militarisation of the 2010 FIFA World Cup, South Africa

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Abstract

This thesis explores the relationship between the safety and security measures for the 2010 FIFA World Cup and the militarisation of urban space and policing in post-apartheid South Africa. In particular, it focuses upon how the South African state and FIFA, the owners of the World Cup franchise, worked to present the World Cup as an event which required exceptional levels of security – resulting in a historically unprecedented joint police and military operation across host cities. However, in contrast with previous research on these security measures, this thesis aims to interrogate the political and commercial forces which constructed security and positions them against a backdrop of intensified state violence and social exclusion in South Africa. Concurrently, the South African case was indicative of an international militarisation of major events, with policing operations comparable to national states of emergency. This is representative of the 'new military urbanism' in which everyday urban life is rendered as a site of ubiquitous risk, leading to the increased diffusion of military tactics and doctrines in policing and policy. While the interpenetration between urbanism and militarism has often been studied against the context of the 'war on terror', in the case of South Africa this has primarily been accelerated by a pervasive social fear of violent crime, which has resulted in the securitisation of cities, the remilitarisation of policing and the intensification of a historical legacy of socio-spatial inequalities. The South African government aimed to use the World Cup to 'rebrand' the country's violent international image, while promising that security measures would leave a legacy of safer cities for ordinary South Africans. The concept of legacies was also responsive to the commercial imperatives of FIFA and a range of other security actors, including foreign governments and the private security industry. However these policing measures were primarily cosmetic and designed to allay the fears of foreign tourists and the national middle class. In practice security measures pivoted around the enforcement of social control and urban marginalisation while serving as a training ground for an increasingly repressive state security apparatus. Security was as much a matter of fortifying islands of privilege and aiding a project of financial extraction as protecting the public from harm.

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List of Abbreviations

ACSA	Airports Company South Africa
ANC	African National Congress
APCO	Association of Chief Police Officers
APP	Advanced Passenger Processing
ATA	Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program
AWB	Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (Afrikaner Resistance Movement)
CBRNE	Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Explosives
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
CSVR	Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
CTED	United Nations Security Council's Counter Terrorism Executive Directorate
DA	Democratic Alliance
DLF	Democratic Left Front
ESKOM	Electricity Supply Commission
FIFA	Fédération Internationale de Football Association
GCIS	Government Communication and Information System
GIS	Geographic Information System
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICC	International Convention Centre
IMEST	INTERPOL Major Event Support Team
INTERPOL	International Criminal Police Organisation
IOC	International Olympic Committee
IPO	International Permanent Observatory (on Security During Major Events)
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
JCPS	Justice Crime Prevention and Security Cluster
JIM	Joint, Interdepartmental and Multinational Exercises
KZN	KwaZulu-Natal
LOC	Local Organising Committee
LOCJOINTS	Local Joint Operational and Intelligence Structure

MCS	Movement Control System
NATJOINTS	National Joint Operational and Intelligence Structure
NED	National Endowment for Democracy
NIA	National Intelligence Agency
OCED	Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development
OIC	Office for Interception Centres
PMG	Parliamentary Monitoring Group
POP	Public Order Policy
POPCRU	Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union
PROVJOINTS	Provincial Joint Operational and Intelligence Structure
ROV	Remote Operated Vehicle
SAAF	South African Air Force
SAS	Special Air Services
SAAS	South African Secret Service
SACAA	South African Civil Aviation Authority
SADC	South African Development Community
SAFA	South African Football Association
SAIRR	South African Institute for Race Relations
SAN	South African Navy
SANDF	South African National Defence Force
SAPA	South African Press Association
SAPS	South African Police Service
SARPCCO	Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation
SIGNET	Signals Intelligence
SOCOM	United States Special Operation Command
SWAT	Special Weapons and Tactics Team
TRA	Temporary Relocation Area
TETRA	Terrestrial Trunked Radio
TRT	Tactical Response Team
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

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State-of-the-art information and communications military technology is being used to secure the tournament. The investments you see today and will be seeing during the tournament will continue to assist the police in their crime-fighting initiatives long after the World Cup is over. Because after all, we still want our visitors to come and experience the beautiful beaches, restaurants, hotels, stadia and the warmth of the people of our land.

– Minister of Police Nathi Mthethwa, May 31, 2010.

Arthur: ... his subconscious has militarised. It should have shown in the research.

– *Inception*. Directed by Christopher Nolan, 2010.

Chapter One: The Construction of Security and Academic Responses to the 2010 FIFA World Cup

Introduction

As Mark Neocleous (2011: 192) argues, the perceived need to 'secure insecurity' is one of the key political tropes of our age and is fundamental to every aspect of contemporary society. 'Security' is a concept which occupies a central place in international, national and local political agendas. Increasingly intersecting and fusing both public and private institutions, 'security' has become a catch-all phrase which refers to a staggering range of activities and policies.

But as this thesis aims to argue, 'security' is not a neutral, explanatory term but is a contested social terrain and a source of considerable political and economic power. This introductory chapter will begin by arguing for a theoretical framework in which security is discussed as a constructed concept used to advance specific political and economic projects. Central to this advancement is the 'securitisation' of issues which are treated by authorities as existential threats which, in turn, are utilised to win public support for exceptional policy measures. This chapter will focus on how the discursive creation of a security 'narrative' is a central foundation in the deployment of these measures, and will use 'terrorism' as the key exemplar of a contemporary existential threat. This will use a 'conflict theory' approach which emphasises the role of security in upholding unequal power relations in society.

The chapter then moves to a case study of how political commentators and security 'experts' interpreted the security measures for the 2010 FIFA World Cup, the international tournament for men's association football held in South Africa between the 11 June and 11 July, and will argue that it is surprising that the security measures for the tournament have inspired relatively little critical academic interest in South Africa. Notably, the security operations in place during the event have not been linked to the on-going militarisation and increased influence of the state security apparatus on public policy. As a comparison point, I will discuss how this absence contrasts with the large body of critical literature on the socio-economic and developmental implications of the 2010 World Cup. Instead, security was presented as a transcendent social good, which was mostly separate from political manipulation and economic exploitation.

As evidence I will use the available research which analysed the security measures surrounding the event. In particular, I will focus on the output of the Institute for Security Studies and the South African Institute for Race Relations, two 'think tanks' often cited as expert sources in both the national and international media. Besides providing a survey of the literature on the 2010 World Cup security measures, this will be used to show how the discursive framework for security is influenced and shaped by political and ideological structures, systems and assumptions. In conclusion, I will argue that the 2010 World Cup security measures demand a greater level of academic scrutiny and, with this in mind, I will formulate a research question which aims to establish a framework for addressing this discrepancy. The chapter is primarily based on journal articles, research monographs, conference proceedings and a statement made to the media, and is informed by secondary literature from political philosophy, urban theory, international relations and history.

Security as Power

Securitisation

Traditionally, academic studies on security have largely been motivated by a set of materialist and instrumentalist assumptions: namely, that 'security' refers to already existing phenomena and that the role of research is to identify manners in which governments and other authorities can better control and combat risks (Edjus, 2009). By contrast, the securitisation model associated with the Copenhagen School of international relations theory focuses on security as a 'speech act', in which actors transform a particular issue into a security matter (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, 1998). Such a model can elucidate how a securitising agent (for example, the South African government) defines an object or event as being threatened (the 2010 World Cup) with the purpose of convincing an audience (the South African public) that an issue needs to be regarded as a security concern. The securitisation of an issue does not necessarily entail a state of crisis or widespread threats to public safety. For example, the state may securitise issues which only effect very limited groups, such as in the efforts to police copyrights and trademark violations. Thus, security becomes 'a self-referential practice, because it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue – not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat' (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, 1998: 24).

It is also important to point out that while the term securitisation is often used as a synonym for militarisation, in its original iteration it was a term meant to denote a 'nominalist signification' (Bernhard and Martin, 2011: 44). Daniel Bernhard and Aaron Martin argue that securitisation goes beyond physical and governmental signifiers, such as the militarisation of urban areas, and into the complex interactions that determine how 'threats' are turned into security matters. They suggest that 'we must look to perceived threats, representations of danger, the thing declared endangered, and the societal consensus that allows governments to take exceptional measures and emergency action' (43-44).

Crucially, in ‘saying security’ or performing the action of securitisation, issues are presented as an existential threat to the state as well as the established social order. In practice, however, this often amounts to the declaration of emergency conditions in order to claim the right to take any available means necessary to control or block an emergent threat. The ‘security move’ is used to frame an issue ‘either as a special kind of politics or as above politics’, with the concomitant effect of presenting the risk as beyond debate or discussion (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, 1998:23). The importance of emergency measures to securitisation overlaps with Giorgio Agamben’s (2005) work on ‘exception’, in which the suspension of established legal, political and social checks on state power are legitimated by reference to their supposedly temporary and conditional nature. Once established, however, these ‘emergency’ powers become normalised as everyday techniques of governance. As security works to redraw and redefine the boundaries of power and to shift the upper limit of what is permissible, politics can then be seen to ‘work towards the production of emergencies’ (Agamben, 2001). The securitisation of an issue does not necessarily mean that the state will push past established political and legal thresholds; rather, the discourse created around a security issue means that enough resonance is created for such emergency measures to be presented as a possible and justified response (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, 1998: 5).

Positioning security in these terms allows for a move from an instrumentalist conception of security – in which the role of academics and theorists is to critique the actions of securitising agents in order to offer advice for more ‘effective’ future policing and military actions – towards a more constructivist approach which argues that security is not an objective area of analysis or development. Security can be reframed as a set of critical questions: which power relations determine how certain issues are securitised, and which actors benefit from this level of securitisation? Such questions become all the more pertinent when we consider the extent to which security serves as a legitimating factor in the power of a range of interlinked social actors.

Two aspects in particular demand attention. Firstly, critical studies of security have moved away from the state-centric focus of the Cold War towards a more multi-faceted understanding of the diffuse alliances and convergences between the state and the private sector. For example, Peter Gill (2006) has traced the contours of ‘global security networks’ which intersect across local, national and transnational scales. These networks link the state, the corporate sector and communitarian actors (such as NGOs) who perform a range of security functions in the contexts of both military actions and civilian policing (30). The ‘broadening’ of security governance is ‘deepened’ by transnational security developments, which can have an immediate impact on the national scale (ibid). For example, the ‘global war on terror’ has had a profound effect on security doctrines and practices internationally, which began almost immediately after the events of September 11th 2001. The globally interlinked nature of security has also been accelerated by the creation of what the Organisation for Economic

Cooperation and Development (OCED) (2004) calls the ‘new security economy’, as risk prevention services become an increasingly prominent motor for economic development. The role of the private sector has sparked considerable controversy due to the extent to which security is linked to private profit.

However, Marcelo Lopes de Souza (2011) has argued for a more expansive definition of the ‘industry of fear’ by linking this industry to three key actors:

a) Political and government groupings such as state security services, the legal system and political parties;
b) The security industry, which Souza defines as including everything from the manufacturers of surveillance equipment to spatial constructs such as gated communities;
c) The mass media, which circulate official security discourse and often rely on sensationalist reporting of risk to increase circulation.

Security is a saleable and lucrative product and increasingly intersects the nation state with transnational bodies and private institutions. In addition, the manner in which aspects and elements of social life are treated as security concerns also has a psychological aspect, as the combined ‘industry of fear’ responds to political and economic anxieties and pathologies.

The production of security

The sheer scope of actors involved in ‘delivering’ security leads to a second key point: securitisation measures do not arise *sui generis* in reaction to objective, given phenomena but are rather identified and shaped by institutions and organisations. This is underpinned by the creation of knowledge, as actors attempt to capture public opinion and popularise security agendas. In a critique of ‘think tanks’, Peter Vale and Jonathan Carter (2008) argue that such institutions aim to market knowledge through framing social issues as security ‘problems’. Such institutions gain a great deal of traction in the media by offering slickly packaged ‘technical’ advice to explain complex issues, from rising crime rates to geopolitical conflict. However, this ‘expert’ advice often conceals ideological bias as well as widespread support from networks of donors and foundations eager to shift the discursive terrain of security in their favour. Vale and Carter contrast the proselytising of the self-interested forms of knowledge produced by think tanks with the ‘serious scholarship’ of ‘mainstream academic work’, suggesting that the public is not readily able to draw distinctions between the work produced by for-profit think tanks and that created by universities

But neither is the position of ‘mainstream’ academia unassailable. In his essay *Objectivity and Liberal Scholarship*, Noam Chomsky (1969) famously argues that the academic intelligentsia is just as often driven by political and ideological motives, citing the justifications used by scholars for US military interventions as evidence. Rather than critically and objectively studying government policy, academics may use specialist knowledge to legitimate autocratic rule, which is further entrenched in some cases by academic proximity to governments and foreign and public policy making. In particular, Chomsky suggests that a fear of direct democracy and public control over decision making is shared by elites, on both the right and the left, who may otherwise appear actively oppositional towards each other. In this sense, ‘security’ provides an umbrella under which competing elites can cohere as similar authoritarian dispositions are folded into otherwise very different ideologies and belief systems. Chomsky cites historical cases such as the Spanish Revolution – where liberal, conservative and Stalinist intellectuals all denigrated and impugned the centrality of the anarchist movement – as an example of this type of convergence.

A more contemporary example can be located in the ‘war on terror’, in which the security measures justified by an ‘existential threat’ have been adopted by governments the world over and reinforced by elements of the media and academia who, in other cases, may appear to share little common ground on other political and economic issues. By adapting William Connolly’s (2005) model of ‘resonance machines’, it can be suggested that the sharing of security agendas by different actors works to sustain and amplify a powerful assemblage of opinion. The continual re-articulation of opinion creates a powerful bulwark to augment official security narratives in serving to present these discourses as existing independently of social and political construction. The presentation of security as an arcane knowledge base that is interpreted and relayed by experts and pundits also performs a powerful control function in delimiting public discourse.

Terrorism as existential threat

As the securitisation thesis highlights, the declaration of emergency is used to present ‘existential risks’ as outside of political causality and understanding. Once again, terrorism provides an example: the post-9/11 panic around terrorism has ensured that commentators who write about the phenomenon with ‘anything less than total horror and condemnation’ may find themselves attacked as ‘conspiracy theorists’ or guilty of ‘moral equivalence’ (Carr, interviewed by Barrett, 2007). But as with ‘security’, terrorism is a fluid and often contentious concept. As Matt Carr (2007) argues in his exhaustive history of terrorism, the political violence used by small groups is often overshadowed by the extreme overreactions of governments. The official portrayal of international networks of terror cells continually working to destroy civilisation, which stretches back to panics about a ‘black international’ of nihilist and anarchist bombers in the late 19th century, has historically been adopted by the state to increase repression, to delegitimise oppositional forces and in some cases to disguise official complicity in political violence.

Since the events of 9/11, the war on terror (or more specifically, the 'war' on Islamic extremism) has become the premier existential threat of our age within global political rhetoric. Politicians and commentators often discuss terrorism as a static concept in which a single entity such as al-Qaeda controls an international network of violence. But Jason Burke (2007:13) argues that the phenomenon of al-Qaeda is actually fluid and protean, as it refers both to a factitious coalition of competing radical Islamist groups and to a particular world view and set of methods within the 'most extreme end of Islamic militancy'. However, the official portrait of a linked international conspiracy has been used by governments to garner international support for internal repression through claiming that their opponents are linked to al-Qaeda (15). The securitisation of 'terror' transcribes specific acts of violence into a cosmic narrative of menace in which often unrelated phenomena are woven together. Political violence in Chechnya, Israel, Columbia and Sri Lanka are presented as flashpoints in a continuous global battlefield. Although this violence is, in reality, bounded by specific historical and social contexts, the idea of a transnational menace to civilisation allows security actors to package their own agendas into a global security narrative. The apparently boundless nature of terrorism also legitimates threat assessments which are grounded in speculation and imagination (Furedi, 2007).

Official claims that security must be used to protect against unknowable future threats serves to underline and reinforce narratives of fear by communicating the signal that exceptional measures are required to deal with 'serious' yet speculative dangers (Lipschutz, 1999: 11). This often results in a flattening of 'all violent challenges to established states into one-dimensional condemnation of insurgencies against the "civilised" norm' which 'are pathologised, ripped from context or reason' (Smith, 2005: 159). In turn, this is used to justify exceptional measures and to pre-empt criticism by placing the burden of proof on accounts which challenge official narratives. The concept of security may therefore serve a vital role in the maintenance of political and economic power relations.

Security as social conflict

Increasingly, this politically constructed understanding has led critical scholars to question the idea of security as a discrete entity which can be separated from other aspects of state power and governance. For instance, Mariana Valverde (2011) has argued that even literature which is highly critical of the repressive uses of security has treated the concept as a singular, if polysemic entity. As a result projects which seek to ensure security are often unstable and contradictory. For example, the increased use of home security technology creates insecurity in other areas as criminals move their activities to less guarded targets. As a result, different kinds of security are visible in different temporal and spatial scales and these projects may actively work against each other. In turn, Valverde (5) argues that 'all we can know about security is what people do in its name' and that research should focus on the practises of governance which are used to ensure security in different contexts.

In an on-going series of works, Mark Neocleous (2000, 2006, 2007, 2011) has developed a critique of the very concept of security. Neocleous argues that 'security' is not a composite term to describe a universal human need for protection from risk and danger but is rather a political technology central to the construction of both the modern state and capitalism. Liberal political philosophy has often presented a dichotomy between liberty and security, as evidenced by contemporary debates about how much civil liberty society should be prepared to sacrifice to attain security in the context of the war on terror (Neocleous, 2007). Neocleous suggests that rather than being in conflict, security and the liberal idea of freedom are two sides of the same coin. Liberty (in the sense of higher production, maximisation of profits and the creation of new opportunities for accumulation) is reliant on security (in the sense of maximising state control, communications and surveillance). Security performs linked functions as it works both to reorder society and to contain the inherent insecurity created by the ever changing nature of capitalist production and accumulation (Berman, 1983). From this standpoint, 'police power' is a mechanism for securing class society (Neocleous, 2000). As a result, liberal thinkers have often readily accepted the necessity of absolutist power to ensure both the order and the social subjectivity of capitalist society.

To develop this radical claim, Neocleous argues that the central thread of security since the beginning of European colonialism in the 15th century has been 'pacification' (Neocleous, 2011). Although drawn from the terminology of US military planners during the Vietnam War, Neocleous deploys it as a euphemised term that includes the brute force of the colonial wars, which accumulated the resource base for the emergence of capitalism, modern military interventions and the violent suppression of domestic dissent. However, other forms of more subtle coercion are as important to the maintenance of capitalist order, particularly policies which attempt to enforce self-regulation, such as in social security and welfare programmes which attempt to instil thrift and 'self-reliance'. In practical application, security straddles the boundaries between the domestic and the international as warfare abroad becomes linked to the maintenance of order at home, as can be seen in the extension of internal police powers legitimated by current 'wars' on drugs and crime. These become wars where the real battleground is everyday life, in which on-going 'pacification security jobs' (2011: 203) are the mechanism for the reproduction of social order. These interlinked security measures – which attempt to maintain order across a range of scales and contexts – suggest that security politics is itself underpinned by structural violence, both overt and inconspicuous, which is central to the maintenance of class society. Security both enforces and orders political and economic power relations.

In doing so, it may expose these power relations as well as the ideas, beliefs and anxieties which underlie them. At the urban scale, for example, Francesc Muñoz (cited in Marcuse, 2007) argues that security becomes:

> … a strategy for making visible, through security infrastructure and regulations, which spaces of the city are more valuable and which other spaces are less important or appreciable. In other words, which spaces are economically successful and deserve to be inhabited, visited, consumed and remarked on the city map.

At the same time, the intensity and ferocity with which such containment measures are applied also highlights the role of security as a reaction to popular resistance and struggle. In other words, this is not simply a top-down imposition of control but rather an on-going civil war played out through a range of linked operational theatres (Neocleous, 2011). As Peter Hallward (2010:130) argues: ‘ever since the revolutionary upheavals in late eighteen-century France and Haiti, the history of the modern world has been shaped above all by the determination of our ruling classes to pacify the people they rule’. Securitisation reveals profound anxieties on the part of elites as efforts to exert greater control over social order correspond with the pre-emption of political upheaval.

Using the rubric of class power, Neocleous argues that the conception of security as a transcendent goal mystifies the social processes which create instability and fear. For example, ‘environmental security’ obscures the role of the capitalist system in creating environmental degradation (Neocleous, 2000). Securitisation is inherently depoliticising in the way it frames issues in terms of ‘risk’ and ‘countermeasures’ and shifts discourse away from the political and economic roots of threat and crisis. The ring-fencing of an issue as ‘beyond’ or ‘above’ politics may then be used as a tool to create political docility (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, 1998). From this standpoint, Neocleous (2000) suggests that recent academic attempts to replace the dominant paradigms of national security with a more representative framework of ‘human security’ replicate many of the authoritarian discourses which they attempt to supplant, and he maintains that critical scholarship should aim to repoliticise issues which have been securitised. This, in turn, accords with the emerging critique of ‘police fetishism’ in critical criminology, which positions security services as a constituent part of societal violence rather than as purely ameliorating institutions (Reiner, 2007).

The pacification model provides a useful point of departure for further research. As Neocleous (2011: 192) argues, distinct conceptual appropriations of security within different disciplines often leads to a theoretical log-jam, as seen in the ‘range of work which starts with crime-fighting and war-fighting as distinct processes – that is, the “criminological model” and the “military model” – and then struggles to work out how they might be connected' . In other words, scholars sense that phenomena such as the militarisation of urban space, the privatisation of security, penal forms of social welfare and regulation, the increased use of surveillance systems and the expansion of punitive state powers at the domestic scale are linked to global processes but have struggled to articulate the exact connections.

Academic Responses to the 2010 World Cup

I will leave these points in the background for the time being, turning instead to a representative case study of how the security measures for the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa were interpreted, discussed and criticised by private security 'specialists' and within academic literature and the research output of security think tanks.

In May 2004 Nick Buckles, CE of Group 4 Securicor (G4S), claimed that his company refused to work at the 2010 FIFA Soccer World Cup on the basis of concerns about the tournament's organisation (Bowker, 2009). Buckles said that his company considered South Africa as the most dangerous country for its employees to work in, ahead of war zones in Afghanistan and Iraq:

> South Africa … is a tough, tough place to do business. The whole society is different from anywhere else in the world. We do what we can in terms of protecting the crew, but they get attacked by 16, 17 people at a time sometimes. That's just the kind of culture they have there … people don't really think that security is that key and it should be. It will get better … it's about educating the market.

Buckles's dramatic claims were quickly picked up by the international media, which, in the lead-up to the first football World Cup held on African soil, circulated stories of South Africa as both exotic and dangerous (Hammett, 2011). This fearful portrayal was immediately denied by representatives of the South African government and the Local Organising Committee (LOC), who suggested that G4S's position was motivated by hidden interests. Indeed, G4S's 'refusal' to work in the 2010 World Cup may not have been a matter of choice. In 2007, trade unions around the world called for a protest against the company due to its labour practices in Africa. According to reports, their transgressions included the disregard of labour laws, abusive and unsafe conditions for employees and the refusal to recognise worker organisations (Alliance for Justice at Group 4 Securicor, 2007). As a result of this, unions called for the LOC to boycott the G4S bid to provide stadium security during the 2010 World Cup, with the contract eventually being granted to Stallion Security, a South African-based firm (Bhoola, 2009). Nevertheless, G4S has been successful in winning a 100 million pound contract to provide guards for the 2012 London Olympics (Gibson and Taylor, 2011). However, Southern Africa is not the only region in which the company has been followed by controversy. As a result of the companies close links to government figures, G4S was awarded lucrative contracts for the detention and deportation of asylum seekers and 'terror suspects' by the UK government. Their tenure was characterised by the hiring of inexperienced prison guards, the brutal handling of suspects, losing defendants during transfer to trial, the falsification of records about suspect movements and the failure to monitor individuals they were contracted to keep under surveillance (Hughes, 2007: 25-37). More recently, the company acquired further unwanted publicity as a result of the death of Angolan deportee Jimmy Mubenga while in custody, which G4S whistle-blowers attribute to a 'macho corporate culture that ostracised staff who showed compassion towards detainees or questioned the safety of their treatment' (Lewis and Taylor, 2011). Despite such 'shortcomings', G4S is a private security behemoth, which is the second biggest private employer in the world and the largest in Africa (Careers in Africa, 2011). This incident highlights how the concept of security can be used, and distorted, to pursue economic or political strategies. But while this would appear to provide space for critical research which dissected and exposed the political and economic forces behind the securitisation of the tournament, this was not to be the case.

Critical perspectives on the 2010 World Cup

Much analysis and discussion has been done on the political and economic underpinnings of other aspects of the 2010 World Cup preparations. Since the tournament was awarded to South Africa in 2004 (after a failed bid in 2000), the government maintained that the World Cup would be a seminal event for both the country and for the African continent. More pertinently, it was claimed that the tournament would leverage major developmental and economic opportunities for host cities. In addition, the 2010 World Cup was pictured as a symbolic victory for Africa. As former president Thabo Mbeki (cited in Desai and Vahed, 2010: 154) wrote in 2003:

> This is not a dream. It is a practical policy … the successful hosting of the FIFA World Cup™ in Africa will provide a powerful, irresistible momentum to [the] African renaissance. … We want, on behalf of our continent, to stage an event that will send ripples of confidence from the Cape to Cairo – an event that will create social and economic opportunities throughout Africa. We want to ensure that one day, historians will reflect upon the 2010 World Cup as a moment when Africa stood tall and resolutely turned the tide on centuries of poverty and conflict. We want to show that Africa's time has come.

Such claims inspired a range of critical interventions which discussed the socio-economic impacts of the event. In the edited volume *Development and Dreams: The Urban Legacy of the 2010 Football World Cup* (Pillay, Tomlinson and Bass, 2009) – the only academic collection to focus exclusively on the tournament prior to 2010 – three main viewpoints emerged on the legacy offered by the event). As with other mega-events around the world, it was argued that direct contributions of the tournament to economic development were overstated. In particular, serious doubts were expressed about the long-term sustainability of the stadiums built or upgraded for the 2010 World Cup. Secondly, however, it was suggested that government spending on transport and communication ahead of the tournament could create economic benefits for the host cities. Finally, despite the questionable claims made about the financial opportunities, the intangible legacy offered by the 2010 World Cup offered an opportunity to reduce ‘afro-pessimism’ and to improve South Africa’s global standing: ‘the measure of success will lie not only in being able to manage the 2010 World Cup to world class standards, but also in the ability to assert and embrace a contemporary African culture and identity both at home and on a global stage’ (15).

However, as Du Plessis and Maennig (2009) note in the same volume, the flow of benefits associated with a World Cup are overwhelmingly determined by the contracts which host nations sign with FIFA. This means, in effect, that public money was being used to finance a private project. The role of FIFA in determining the nature of 2010 World Cup preparations is highlighted in the book by a telling incident in 2007, where the organisation claimed that as a result of delayed ‘construction times due to strikes’, cities which had not finished stadiums by ‘required deadlines’ would not be included in the event (Davies, 2009: 37). While *Development and Dreams* acknowledges the hyperbole which accompanied government claims about the benefits of hosting, the political significance of FIFA’s ability to continually extract concessions from the South African state is never fully explored. Indeed, the dichotomy between the public expenditure and the profits posted by FIFA is assumed as an inevitable component of mega-events. This raises the question of whether the failure of the 2010 World Cup to deliver on many of the initially stated benefits was not so much a matter of missed opportunities as it was an outcome predetermined by the underlying ownership structure of the event.

A range of other work has focused on this relationship and argued that the 2010 World Cup was a characteristically neoliberal project in which sport and non-sport related corporate actors are able to determine the trajectory of public policy. For example, Scarlett Cornelissen (2010) argues that the lack of economic benefits for South Africa was predetermined by the proprietary structure of the FIFA World Cup. The political and economic structures of international sport mean that it is difficult for national authorities to negotiate developmental gains. Brij Maharaj (2011) argues that the corporate domination of mega-events prevents any direct government intervention that could potentially restructure tournaments to provide wider societal benefits. In the case of South Africa, he suggests that FIFA was subliminally presented as a philanthropic organisation, which disguised the fact that socio-economic benefits for the majority of South Africans were deliberately exaggerated (see also Du Plessis and Maennig, 2010). This is echoed by labour expert Eddie Cottle (2010:12), who argued that FIFA’s ‘sport exploitation complex’ results in the misuse of public resources and the mistreatment of stadium construction workers. In the case of South Africa, benefits were ‘greatly exaggerated to legitimise a major rip-off and profiteering by FIFA, its corporate partners and local monopoly capitalists’ in particular the construction industry (ibid).

As a result, it has been argued that South Africa incurred a substantial loss from hosting the tournament and that the exertion of more control over hosting arrangements could have leveraged far more direct economic benefits for the state (Sylvester and Harju, 2010). Significantly, all these works portray the South African state as being controlled or directed by FIFA and its corporate partners, rather than an autonomous participant in the planning and implementation of the 2010 World Cup.

The apparently skewed nature of the 2010 World Cup hosting agreements also inspired several polemical accounts, in which FIFA was presented as an essentially criminal organisation which used the government as a vessel for exploitation. Ashwin Desai and Goolam Vahed (2010: 163) claimed that the LOC and the ANC-led government had been steamrolled by the combined power of FIFA and an alliance of local 'old white capital and the new politically connected black elite who have joined hands in securing lucrative contracts' and that the state's opportunity to challenge the unequal power relations of international football had been missed. Putting it more bluntly, Patrick Bond (2010) claimed that FIFA were '*tsotsis*', a colloquial South African term for a criminal or street thug.

By contrast, political commentator Andile Mngxitama (2010:2) argued that the 2010 World Cup was the high-water mark of a neo-colonial transition in which '1994 was a mere change of the drivers of the same state system that was designed to serve a white minority settler population' and where the apparent submission of the state to FIFA and its partners is a pragmatic 'ritual' that is necessary for an elite project of 'acceptance' into the 'white world' of geopolitical and economic power . Following this, 'the ANC government, FIFA, our local media, the commentators, academics, and even our own artists ganged up against the people to produce the most elaborate dispossession in modern times' (ibid).

Critical scholarship has dissected much of the official rhetoric around the 2010 World Cup and concluded that many of the stated benefits were used as a sheath for a project of corporate accumulation. However, this literature has paid little attention to the safety and security measures. Although the advertising restrictions enforced as a component of the security measures have been cited as an example of FIFA's overweening influence over the state (Bond, 2010), even accounts that maintained a pronounced scepticism about the developmental impacts of the 2010 World Cup have presented security as one of the few tangible achievements of the tournament (Cottle, 2010: 6).

Research on security measures

By contrast, direct research on the security measures took an almost entirely descriptive and non-analytical approach towards the unprecedented police and military mobilisation. While studies of the socio-economic impacts of the 2010 World Cup focused on the question of which power groups benefited from the event, the literature addressing security measures pivoted around how the government could secure the event and whether this could make South Africa safer in the future. While there were critical voices around the negative socio-economic impact of the 2010 World Cup, the established mainstream of academic security research failed to provide a deeper analysis of the causes of mega-event securitisation.

In the build-up to the tournament, research focused on how the South African government could best implement security measures to allay the fears of tourists and change the international perception of the country as crime-ridden. Ronnie Donaldson and Sanette Ferreira (2007:368) argued that surveys of foreign tourists found that they generally possessed negative impressions of crime in South Africa prior to visiting the country but, by the end of their visits, their perceptions had grown more positive. Through 'merging' safe and secure environments with tourism and leisure spaces, government could capitalise on the economic opportunities offered by tourism (ibid). It was imperative that security was ensured throughout the country during the event in order to create a 'platform for a complete transformation of the tourism industry, if dealt with effectively' (369).

Writing in 2009, Andre Horn and Gregory Breetzke (21) speculated that, while impressive in scope, the 'iron fist' security measures that were then in the planning stages had to be constrained by considerations of international branding, as an overly militarised approach may 'spoil the fun of the tournament for football fanatics and team supporters'. Focusing on the area around the Loftus Versveld stadium in the Tshwane metropolitan municipality, they contended that police measures could be improved by a more localised focus on crime prevention around stadiums rather than the replication of national plans in all host cities. Towards the end of their paper (31), an intriguing speculative point is raised: 'the crime security plan for the tournament is merely a "strong arm" tactical plan following the iron fist approach of the existing National Crime Combating Strategy. Is such a police-state approach sustainable after 2010 and is it befitting a democratic society?'. This is presented as a uniquely South African problem due to a perceived inability of the state to formulate an effective crime fighting strategy. However, this significant question about the possibly negative implications of the security measures is not developed further in the paper. Instead, the 2010 World Cup is assumed to be a pivotal opportunity for South Africa. The primary focus for Horn and Breetzke is the extent to which organisers had incorporated specific locational and spatial knowledge into planning in order to create the conditions for the 'best' World Cup ever.

The negative portrayals of South Africa which circulated through the international media and questioned the country's ability to host a secure World Cup also inspired research which aimed at proving the efficacy of government security measures. The South African branch of the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation (2010) – a research group associated with the German Left Party – aimed to combat perceived stereotyping by producing a research document highlighting the level of preparations. Citing government and think tank information, the report suggests that despite high crime rates, tourists have historically been insulated from violence when in South Africa. It does, however, raise the speculative possibility of violence aimed at capitalising on the media attention created by the 2010 World Cup:

> [although] terrorism is a remote and almost unreal threat [for most South Africans] … terrorism as a potential menace to the World Cup could be vastly underestimated. According to studies, both criminals and terrorists could use the symbolic value of the event to attract or achieve their goals by either carrying out direct attacks, targeting citizens of specific nations (USA and the UK and Denmark and the Netherlands), or setting their sights on less popular venues such as Rustenburg or Nelspruit (3).

The report concludes on an optimistic note by suggesting that many of the security concerns expressed by the media were exaggerated. As a guide to further reading, the report suggests information from two primary sources: the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) and the South African Institute for Race Relations (SAIRR). These two institutions both produced a substantial amount of literature on the security measures for the 2010 World Cup. In particular, the media traction held by both the ISS and SAIRR meant that their representatives were continually cited in media reports on the 2010 World Cup security measures. Due to their prominence in publicly disseminating, criticising and interpreting policing preparations to the public, their output demands a specific focus.

The ISS and the 2010 World Cup

The ISS is an applied policy research institute with offices throughout Africa. Its self-proclaimed mission (ISS, n.d) is to influence ‘decision makers’ through ‘providing timely, empirical research and contextual analysis of relevant human security issues to policy makers, area specialists, advocacy groups, and the media’. The ISS produces a formidable output of books, monographs, reports and magazines covering the entire range of security issues in Africa. Notably, its personnel are often asked to comment on security concerns in the South African media. The ISS is registered as a non-profit trust, and its funding partners (as of 2009) include the European Union, the governments of China and Japan, and the United Nations (ISS, 2009). The ISS was founded by ex-members of the former South African Defence Force (SADF) in the early 1990s: originally called the Institute for Defence Policy, it changed to its current name in 1996 (Cilliers, 2009).

The ISS maintains strong institutional links to the South African security services, and their conferences on security in South Africa are often attended by high ranking police and military officials. As a result, the ISS is often privy to insider information which is not available from other sources. For example, in the period before the 2010 World Cup, its 2007 ‘Policing in South Africa Conference’ saw detailed presentations on operational planning and strategy by SAPS officials, while a follow-up conference in 2010 was addressed by the Minister of Police Nathi Mthethwa and the Deputy National Commissioner of the South African Police Service (SAPS), Andre Pruis. This level of access also entailed that ISS researchers were able to detail many of the problems accompanying security planning. While the government and the LOC would publicly claim that their coordination on security was seamless and that all role-players were totally committed to success, one ISS monograph (Omar, 2007: 66) recorded that the original liaison committee between the security services and the LOC's security directorate 'fell away' due to officials not attending meetings and a lack of follow-up on agreements. This candid admission was communicated directly by the South African Football Association's (SAFA) national head of safety and security.

As early as 2006, the ISS held a seminar on safety and security during the 2010 World Cup, which was addressed by the divisional commander of the SAPS's operational response services (ISS, 2006). Johan Burger (2007) – an ISS researcher and former assistant commissioner in the SAPS – argued that the 2010 World Cup was a 'golden goal' for South Africa. While confident that the security services would be successful in light of their past record of deployment around events such as the 2003 Cricket World Cup, he warned that internal restructuring within the SAPS 'should not be allowed in any way to impair the ability of the police to perform according to their proven ability' (6). In a follow-up seminar, Burger and fellow researcher Bilkis Omar (2009: 9) concluded that while there was some concern about the capacity of the SAPS to deal with crime as well as 'the protests, strikes and the xenophobic violence which breaks out from time to time', the planning and success of security services during the 2009 Confederations Cup boded well for the following year. Burger was cited as an expert on World Cup security by major international media outlets such as the BBC (2010a), where he maintained that the 'impressive' policing measures put in place would, for the most part, contain criminal violence within specific, poor 'social context[s]'.

In 2007, the ISS organised a conference on key issues in South African policing ahead of the 2010 World Cup with the full participation of the SAPS, including presentations by international and national police officials. Superintendent Helmut Bayerl (2007) of the Munich Police addressed the audience on the security experience of the 2006 World Cup in Germany. In particular (9), he claimed that security preparations and exercises which tested 'the limits of feasibility' prior to the event ensured the success of the coordinated police and military measures. These policing measures focused on crime, hooliganism and terrorism. Notably, this included pre-emptive surveillance on 'persons classified as dangerous in terms of Islamic extremism/terrorism' (10). According to the presentation given by SAPS director Frans Gibson (2007:11), the government had already compiled an operational plan 'based on FIFA's standards' and were determined to use security to 'change the image of the country' .

ISS researchers also produced specialist studies on South Africa's vulnerability to terrorism. In an online article Anneli Botha (2010) claimed it was prudent to 'rather overestimate than underestimate' the threat of terrorism, as attackers often target 'the event and not the country'. Botha speculated that ethnic communities within South African society could become an internal breeding ground for terrorist organisations, such as Tamil communities sympathetic to violent separatist groups in Sri Lanka or Afrikaners who support white supremacist groups. Specifically, she expressed 'concerns' about South Africa's Muslim community and suggested that 'pro-Palestinian' sentiment 'could be exploited by extremists'. In addition, South Africa's 'soft stance' on counter-terrorism and its commitment to 'principles associated with a liberal democracy' raises the possibility that 'sleeper cells' have identified the country as an easy target. Botha suggests that people with close relationships to 'potential suspects' should attempt to identify tell-tale signs of terrorism, which include 'isolation and detachment from friends and family members … sudden change[s] in behaviour' and 'irritability'. Spectators at venues are urged to notice suspicious individuals exhibiting 'nervous behaviour' and wearing 'excessive clothing'. While Botha presents her piece as a pragmatic, albeit speculative, guide to potential risk, it reveals the racism and paranoia that often accompanies the discourse of counter-terrorism. Entire groups, and in particular South African Muslims, are presented as a potential enemy within. The unexamined assertion that 'pro-Palestinian' sentiment is some form of precursor to supporting al-Qaeda reflects how the war on terror has been used to delegitimise certain political struggles. In this case, armed Palestinian resistance to the Israeli occupation is falsely conflated with an apparent 'pan-Islamic' conspiracy to 'impose a Taliban style theocracy on the Western World' (Carr, 2007:320). Botha also recycles the claim that civil liberties may undermine counter-terrorism methods. These suppositions are based on admitted over-estimation, using unsubstantiated claims legitimated through an appeal to expert knowledge.

However, other ISS research alluded to the gap between fear and reality which accompanies securitisation, and how this ambiguity can be exploited by particular interests groups. Chandre Gould and Marlise Richter (2010) argued that the several anti-sex trafficking campaigns which had started ahead of the 2010 World Cup were based on an exaggerated projection of risk. In the case of the 2006 German World Cup, the media claimed that 40,000 women and children would be trafficked into the country for the event, but researchers were able to find evidence of only 5 actual cases of trafficking. Similar claims were cut and pasted into the South African context with the 'STOP 2010 Human Trafficking Campaign', whose glossy internet advertising claimed that 100,000 people would fall victim to trafficking as a result of the tournament. Although the concerns about sex trafficking may have been well-intentioned, Gould and Richter argue that such inaccurate claims distort the public perception and discourse surrounding crime. This specific case raises a significant point about how security knowledge serves as a commodity, as the exaggeration of threat may be used to achieve legitimacy for the projects of institutional actors. If this can be applied to NGOs attempting to gain attention, then it can reasonably be assumed that this also holds true for state and corporate projects. In particular, security ‘facts’ released by governments and the private sector should be treated with circumspection, as they may employ the same level of exaggeration and dissimulation to advance their institutional agendas.

Towards the end of the 2010 World Cup, the ISS hosted a conference called ‘The Sum of All Fears: Crime, Security and the World Cup Crisis That Was (n’t)’ which featured contributions from its researchers and the then Deputy Minister of Police, Fikile Mbalula (Spector, 2010). The researchers on the panel concluded that the event had been a security success but that this approach needed to be reconfigured into everyday policing. This corresponds with the stance taken by the ISS towards the 2010 World Cup, as researchers aimed to contribute towards the national effort by suggesting areas of the security strategy which could be improved, while also offering counters to negative portrayals of the government’s preparations. However, as seen in Botha’s piece on terrorism, such a technocratic approach to security, which focuses exclusively on issues of practical implementation, may disguise the power structures which create security and serve instead to further justify and reinforce accepted political wisdom. The proximity of researchers to state institutions may also circumscribe the parameters of accepted discussion.

The SAIRR and the 2010 World Cup

While the ISS generally presents itself as an information clearing house which assists the South African government, the South African Institute for Race Relations has a much a more overt and confrontational ideological standpoint. The SAIRR describes itself as an ‘independent think-tank…[who] seek to use a small amount of private donor money to influence the more effective spending of much larger amounts of public money’ (SAIRR,2011a). Unlike the ISS, it focuses exclusively on South Africa and produces information on the spectrum of local political and economic affairs: ‘We benchmark ourselves on telling our subscribers today what they will read in the media in two or three years’ time’. Its local donors include foundations set up by powerful business and industrial interests including the Anglo-American Chairman’s fund and the Oppenheimer Trust (SAIRR, 2011b). International funders include the US-based National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and one of its beneficiary organisations, the International Republican Institute (NRI). The NED is funded by the US Federal government and was set up by the Reagan administration to channel funds into influencing elections and civil society in developing countries, which was part of a diplomatic shift away from overtly supporting military dictatorships and client regimes (Robinson, 1996). The NED both funds and promotes advocacy groups and political parties sympathetic to US political and corporate interests. The SAIRR has received funding from the NED since 1994 (Hearn, 1999: 8). In addition, its NRI sponsor is affiliated to the Republican Party and has been accused of fomenting and funding the 2004 *coup d'état* against the democratically elected government of Haiti (Blumenthal, 2004). Interestingly, for a non-profit 'democracy advocacy' group, the NRI spent $17 million a year on hiring guards from the private military firm Blackwater/Academi to protect its employees in Iraq (Scahill, 2009).

The SAIRR maintains a neoliberal stance on South African politics and advocates the lowering of corporate taxation, the reduction of the social welfare system and labour rights, the privatisation of state assets and the abandonment of the minimum wage (Jeffery, 2010). The SAIRR is particularly critical of the ANC, which in its publications is often described as corrupt, racist and incapable of managing a liberal democratic society. Indeed, SAIRR analysts have a tendency to describe South Africa as perilously close to social and economic collapse and advocate greater power for the private sector to avoid this dystopian scenario (Cronje, 2010a). Fundamental to this analysis is a polarisation between the roles attributed to the state (which is assumed to be bureaucratic and inept) and the corporate sector (which is presented as dynamic and self-regulating).

This was reflected in its employees' commentaries on the security situation ahead of the 2010 World Cup. According to John Kane-Berman (2006), Chief Executive of the SAIRR, the ANC has exhibited a callous indifference to security and it was 'a pity that the world soccer authorities did not make a drastic reduction in violent crime a condition of awarding the 2010 World Cup to South Africa'. In another opinion piece (2007), Berman predicted that while policing measures would be successful for the event this would result in the 'redeployment' of crime elsewhere, thus adding to the impression 'that the safety of visitors to the country is of more concern to the authorities than the safety of South Africans'. Ironically, this observation seems closely connected to the left wing critique of the 2010 World Cup as a raid on public spending. After the tournament, however, Berman (2010) praised the safety and security measures for ensuring 'bobbies on the beat' and the expeditious assessment of 'what might undermine the World Cup and [the] steps … taken to minimise the threats'. This success is not attributed so much to the South African government but to the positive 'colonial rule' of FIFA, which Berman depicts as enforcing a regime of high standards which had to be adhered to. What this analysis does not make clear is the extent to which FIFA's 'regime' was itself dependent on state planning and resources. Berman echoed a comment made by controversial politician Julius Malema, who the SAIRR has often described as the *bête noire* of decency and stability in South Africa. Malema labelled the tournament as an 'imperialistic activity [by] which people the people come here to exploit the resources of our country' but added that this was 'no problem' as it highlighted South Africa's capacity to host major events (IOL, 2010a).

In the aftermath of the January 2010 machine gun attack on a bus transporting Togo's national football team by a separatist militia in Angola, in which the driver, assistant coach and team media liaison were killed, deputy CEO of the SAIRR Frans Cronje (2010b) produced a widely disseminated piece on the threat posed to South Africa by terrorism . According to Cronje, porous and unguarded national borders and a 'corrupt' intelligence service meant that South Africa was an attractive target for an attack. Furthermore, the 'strong Islamic influence' running along the African coastal belt from Somalia to Cape Town 'provides ample opportunity for the concealment of terror cells'. Cronje is quick to qualify that this should not be taken to imply that South African Muslims are complicit in terrorism and that 'in almost every respect the factors that South Africa can control in arranging the World Cup appear to be well under control'. His conclusion reveals an underlying security logic in which the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence:

> That is not to say that such an attack will occur or that it is even likely …. But international terrorism is not something over which we have the capacity to exercise much control. In addition, one of the most effective assets that any terrorist group can possess is to convince its next target that they are no longer at risk. South Africans should therefore be a little less hasty to dismiss the risk of the World Cup being targeted and realise that the scourge of global terror applies to all societies and particularly under circumstances such as those pointed out above.

As a result of this piece, Cronje was cited as a 'security expert' in media reports on terrorism and the 2010 World Cup. For instance in May 2010, Saudi born Abdullah Azam Saleh al-Qahtani was detained by the Iraqi police. The Iraqi security services revealed that a note found in his house detailed plans for an attack on the tournament and al-Qahtani claimed that 'We discussed the possibility of taking revenge for the insults of the prophet by attacking Denmark and Holland. The goal was to attack the Danish and the Dutch teams and their fans. If we were not able to reach the teams, then we'd target the fans' (Abdul-Zahara, 2010). However, al-Qahtani also said that the plan had not been presented to al-Qaeda leadership, while the Iraqi police noted that no steps had been taken to organise for an attack. South African police officials claimed that the Iraqi authorities had not contacted them about any possible attack, while FIFA deferred comment to the South African security services. Essentially, the plans appeared to be nothing more than a wish list, and the highly fantastical nature of the threat undermined the credibility of an al-Qaeda-related security scare at the tournament (Chulov, 2010).

Despite this, Cronje maintained that South Africa was under threat compounded by its apparent pariah status in the international intelligence community due to corruption, as well as former Intelligence Minsters Ronnie Kasril's public criticism of Israel's occupation of Palestine (Kirk, 2010). In particular it was suggested that the public displays of security readiness which were being held simultaneously in tournament host cities played into al-Qaeda's hands:

> One does not fight terrorism by abseiling down buildings with machine guns and playing cowboys. One fights terrorism in back rooms in operations that are never made public. Once an attack or hostage situation is under way it is already too late. The terrorists have won. …

> These demonstrations would be closely watched by them or other terror groups. Every weapon, tactic and minor movement they see in the demonstrations gives them an edge. They will count every stun grenade and magazine that is carried. Thanks to these childish public displays, any terror group knows what they are up against.

As a security 'expert', Cronje's pronouncements on the inner workings of both intelligence services and Al-Qaeda were relayed through the media as unassailable, objective knowledge. At the same time, he also claimed that terrorism is 'not something over which we have the capacity to exercise much control' (Cronje, 2010b). Indeed, in the case of the 2010 World Cup, security commentators used this *lack* of knowledge to argue for ever more radical and comprehensive government policing measures (Lipschutz, 1999). As a result, 'security' is presented as a hermetic body of knowledge which is interpreted for the public. More often than not, this interpretation will result in dire predictions of risk and arguments for greater securitisation. As the case of the SAIRR shows, however, this is not neutral knowledge but is conveyed through specific political and ideological biases. In particular the Institute's researchers focused exclusively on the role of the state and presented its capacities to deliver security as being highly debatable.

However, as Berman's panegyric to FIFA betrays, the private sector was by no means an absent constituency in the construction of security during the 2010 World Cup. Instead, the ideological standpoint and institutional links of the SAIRR entail that the government must invariably be painted in a negative light, while the private sector is valorised. As can be seen in the case of Cronje's (2010b) references to continental 'terror belts', this approach is informed by a neoconservative view of global security, which configures the world in terms of a fundamental struggle between the 'West' and 'Islam'. But crucially, and despite their inherent pessimism about the ANC-led government, SAIRR researchers cohered with the idea that the 2010 World Cup was an exceptional event which required the utmost level of policing.

The post-2010 implications of security measures

The small amount of research conducted on the security measures was also constrained by temporal factors. As this was produced before the tournament took place, it took on a speculative bent and often focused upon worst case scenarios. Furthermore, these were often partial and focused upon specific threats or areas of preparation. However, since the end of tournament van der Spuy (2010) and Cornelissen (2011) have both produced surveys which attempt to provide an overall synopsis of the security governance of the 2010 World Cup. Because of the difference in focus and scope, these two studies will be assessed in greater detail in Chapter Six of the thesis.

But what is clear is that the research cited above presented security as an unquestionable public good. This stands in stark contrast to an on-going public debate about the trajectory and consequences of state security and policing in post-apartheid society. Notably, the World Cup was presented as somehow separate from many of these developments. However, this is an omission which is not exclusive to academic research. In a filmmaker's statement accompanying the release of the documentary *The Uprising of Hangberg*, which records the police violence accompanying the attempted eviction of the titular Western Cape community in September 2010, Aryan Kaganof and Dylan Valley (2011) wrote:

> The extent of the atrocities perpetrated by the police is entirely out of kilter with the "Proudly South African" image of the country that was displayed to the world during the recently held World Cup. The mask has been lifted. Naked terror is now the order of the day. This tendency must be stopped at all costs.

The 'tendency' to which they refer shows the extent to which civil society in the post-World Cup period has become increasingly concerned with a perceived epidemic of police violence and state repression. Most notably, efforts to remilitarise the South African Police Services (SAPS) have been regarded as a sinister return to the systematic abuses of the recent apartheid past. For example, after the fatal shooting of protester Andries Tatane in Ficksburg in April 2011, the Democratic Left Front (DLF) (2011) – a national umbrella group for social movements – issued a statement condemning the 'securitisation of South African politics'. Discussing the increased influence of the security services in government decision making, the statement argued that:

> The DLF believes that this restructuring of the security cluster has taken place because the Zuma administration came to office on delivery promises that it is unwilling or unable to keep. They realised that protests would increase: hence the need for a cluster that is more effective at crushing dissent. Unless the security cluster is brought under democratic control, rather than the control of the ruling party or even a faction of the ruling party, the killings will continue, as they are not simply a result of rogue police, but an inevitable consequence of the securitisation of the state.

As the documentary statement above suggests, this concern regarding a heightened climate of state repression due to an increasingly securocratic turn within government was often countered with the image of South Africa displayed during the 2010 World Cup. In particular, the SAPS aimed at projecting an appearance of competent but 'hands off' policing which stood in stark relief to the pictures of policing relayed to the South African public in the preceding year, most notably the disturbing footage of Tatane being beaten to death by crowd control officers which was shown on national television the same night. Tatane's death was seen by many in civil society as the logical outcome of the militarisation of the police, in which crowd control methods become a lethal expression of state power (DLF, 2011).

When the size and scope of the security measures for the 2010 World Cup are taken into account, however, it would seem surprising that the event would be regarded in isolation from other developments within government's security services. The 2010 World Cup was marked by the largest state security mobilisation in the post-apartheid period. Notably, in light of concerns about the increased militarisation of civilian policing, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) assisted the SAPS under the auspices of 'Operation Kgwele' [a SeSotho word for ball], which was the largest internal deployment of the military in the post-apartheid period (Makwetla, 2010).

Within a wider discussion of the state control of protest, Jane Duncan (2010a) cites the government's attempts to issue an unlawful blanket ban on public protests during the 2010 World Cup as one example of this repressive turn. This has both national and international dimensions. At a global level, security measures which control protests during mega-events have become at once more sophisticated as well as more overtly paranoid, as states are prepared to go to extreme lengths to police the image of stability which dissidents are assumed to undermine (14). At a national level, Duncan (23) frames the 'blanket ban' against the context of the militarisation of police, a government 'obsession' with national security and the increased power of the state security apparatus on policy making.

Conclusion

The approach taken by Duncan, which implies that the 2010 World Cup was implicated in a broader authoritarianism within the South African state, contrasts dramatically with the 'consensus' view on security traced in this chapter. Most notably, we can unpack a series of generalised assumptions which were evident within almost all of the literature. Firstly, there was a consensus that the 2010 World Cup was an exceptional event and that this required the highest level of security available to the state. While exception in the sense used by Agamben (2005) has generally been portrayed as leading to a dangerous extension of state power, in the case of South African researchers the beneficial nature of security measures were portrayed as a given. From this standpoint, the research on security served as a 'resonance machine' (Connolly, 2005) which amplified official justifications for both the scope and intensity of security measures. Even groups such as the SAIRR cohered with the belief that security measures could leverage both tangible and intangible benefits for South Africa. Bernhard and Martin (2011) suggest that this is characteristic of much of the academic response to the security operations at mega-events. While scholars may be highly critical about perceived abuses such as overspending or the use of draconian tactics, the idea that mega-events require exceptional measures is assumed as a fundamental, self-evident truth.

Secondly, it was assumed that the 2010 World Cup was vulnerable to existential threats, particularly crime and spectacular terrorist attacks. Security is regarded as separate from context and manipulation and is assumed to be applicable on all scales: global, national and local. Although the low probability of many of these scenarios is acknowledged, the belief that no event can ever be too safe is taken as axiomatic. As Lipschutz (1999:418) argues, these hypothetical tales of threat are authored by the state and are in turn authorised by experts and knowledge sources which are presumed to have a privileged insight into the veracity of risks. This in turn legitimates the extension of legal and material infrastructures of risk prevention.

Thirdly, the political and economic construction of security is not explored. Most notably the role of FIFA and its corporate partners as institutional actors in the securitisation of World Cup is absent. For example, Berman (2010) refers to FIFA's 'colonisation' of South Africa but does not explore the significant implications of such a power arrangement. Such gaps contrast with the literature on the socio-economic impacts of the event, which has attempted to interrogate the implications of such a relationship. Indeed, for the most part, the available literature has treated security as an unproblematic public good which is seen to transcend economic interest and political manipulation. Put more clearly, this ignores how securitisation is intrinsically linked to the self-interest of institutions.

Additionally, the substantial integration of the police and military as a result of the 2010 World Cup security measures has, with the exception of Duncan's piece, been treated in isolation from other developments within the state security apparatus. Indeed, as seen in the statement made by Kaganof and Valley (2011), the 2010 World Cup was contrasted with the aggressive behaviour of the SAPS in the period following the tournament. While Horn and Breetzke (2009) question whether such securitisation is befitting of a democracy, this is simply left as a point of speculation. Indeed, their analysis suggests that the primary danger of a militarised approach was that it may have been off-putting to tourists rather than indicative of autocratic developments within South Africa.

The bulk of literature focused on the procedural question of how security measures could be utilised after the tournament but did not explore the implications of this as a possible radicalising factor for state coercion and violence. Finally, much of the literature alludes to the necessity of implementing 'world class' security measures, but the linkages between the South African and the global context are not pursued. The question of political and economic determinates of the militarisation and securitisation of mega-events at an international level is not raised in the available literature. Rather, the security measures are treated in isolation as a particular response to South Africa's violent international image.

Research Question

In contrast, the aim of this thesis is to examine the political and corporate structures which undergird the securitisation of the 2010 World Cup, and to consider the implications for the future of security in South Africa. Particular emphasis is placed on the role of these structures in creating the spatial and governance regimes utilised in South African cities during the 2010 World Cup. Attention is directed to the relation between security ideas, strategies and fantasies and the material implementation of security measures.

The objective of this research can be expressed in the following research question:

How was the security governance of the 2010 World Cup used to advance elite political and economic interests and what are the long term implications for the militarisation of policing and urban security in South Africa?

The wording of this research question was chosen in order to avoid the sense that the aim of the research is to simply uncover security 'networks'. Rather, the primary aim of the research is to examine how the security governance of major events is used to advance elite political and economic projects under the banner of public safety and the creation of security legacies. In particular, I will consider how the militarisation of urban space which accompanies mega-events is as much about maintaining the pristine image of the event brand and public 'perception management' as it is about responding to threats.

In order to clarify the exact task of this research, the question can be disaggregated into a number of further components, which will be discussed through both primary research and secondary literature.

a) Why did the South African government place such an emphasis upon ensuring exceptional levels of security as part of a project of state branding?

b) What is the relationship between sporting bodies and their corporate partners and host governments? Is this relationship hierarchical or does it involve mutual collusion?

c) How were these measures influenced and supported by transnational policing institutions and non-state actors, such as the private security industry?

d) Given South Africa's authoritarian past and current problems of police and state violence, were the 2010 World Cup security measures a unique phenomenon or did they entrench well-established governmental trends? In other words, did the measures concretise and make visible these trends or were they truly exceptional? How was this reflected in both national and urban security?

e) What were the outcomes of security preparations during the 2010 World Cup? Did security measures create a safety legacy to benefit ordinary South Africans or were they a form of perception management which prioritised image?

The structure of this thesis flows from these questions. Using a wide range of interdisciplinary literature, Chapters Two, Three, Four and Five provide a theoretical platform for the thesis and will establish its research methodology.

Chapter Two discusses the growing body of critical research on the security operations at major sporting events. Although this work focuses upon a wide array of different host nations and cities, the chapter argues that it is possible to identify a set of broad themes which link these contexts. Notably, it will be argued that the security exception of mega-events is as much a product of elite interests as the result of the apolitical dissemination of security practices.

Chapter Three will frame the securitisation of mega-events against the backdrop of transnational developments in urbanism. It will be argued that the fortification of the built environment and the securitisation of urban governance are intimately linked with efforts to create ‘world-class’ spectacular cities.

Chapter Four will continue this debate and suggest that contemporary cities are marked by the increased diffusion of military concepts, tactics and equipment into everyday life. With specific reference to the South African context it will be argued that a historical legacy of military urbanism has been cemented and entrenched by contemporary fears about violent crime. The chapter will conclude by addressing the less explored issue of corporate–state crime and suggest that officially supported practices may be as detrimental to society as other forms of illegality.

Chapter Five will outline the methodology of the thesis.

Chapters Six, Seven, Eight and Nine will focus on the 2010 World Cup and discuss and develop different parts of the research questions.

Chapter Six will outline the security governance of the 2010 World Cup and will identify the different institutions and actors which worked through the state apparatus to police the tournament.

Chapter Seven will discuss how these different actors securitised the tournament in line with their institutional objectives. This was legitimised through the presentation of the 2010 World Cup as a security exception. It will be argued that this worked through an open-ended definition of security to which different actors could affix their aims. In turn, this went beyond issues of public safety and into the enforcement of commercial monopolies and social control.

Chapter Eight deals with how the commercialisation of security measures, and in particular FIFA's perceived dominance over public policy, was interpreted from within South Africa as a kind of 'occupation'. Working through this concept, the chapter will argue that this portrayal of hierarchical domination is inaccurate. In practice, FIFA and the state cohered around the idea of pacifying space to produce spectacular cities. Rather than being a colonial power, FIFA's accumulation strategy was dependent upon the coercive powers of the state. It will be argued that an unintended side-effect of spectacular security was that it renders in stark relief how state security and private interests are increasingly indistinguishable.

Chapter Nine deals with the militarisation of the World Cup. Using Stephen Graham's work on military urbanism as a conceptual basis, it will be suggested that the governance of the tournament embodies the phenomenon discussed in his work. In particular, the state promoted its ability to enforce a technologically advanced command and control system to control the flows of people and capital within host cities. But the chapter will challenge the idea that this represented an enhanced legacy of crime prevention and will argue that the World Cup served to intensify both the militarisation of police and urban space.

Finally, the conclusion of the thesis will argue that the 2010 World Cup exposed the current trajectory of urban governance in South Africa, which pivots around the creation of linked, fortified nodes of wealth and access. It will be argued that the academic focus on legacy is a conceptual dead end which mystifies how insecurity in South Africa is in fact linked to this fortification of privilege amidst inequality. As a result, events like the World Cup may actually serve to reinforce the causes of both urban crime and fear. The conclusion will call for an 'anti-security' (Neocleous, 2011) approach which dissects the political, social and economic causes of fear, rather than offering solutions to aid the war on crime.

Chapter Two: Emerging Critical Perspectives on Mega-Event Security

Introduction

In an opinion piece on the website of news broadcaster Al Jazeera, the political sportswriter Dave Zirin (2011) detailed some of the on-going governance measures being implemented in Brazil ahead of that country's sequential hosting of the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympics. According to the piece, this has included efforts to pacify and evict residents from *favelas*, the sprawling slums which surround Brazilian cities. Zirin describes these actions against an international context in which major sporting events are accompanied by dramatic changes in the host cities and quotes Christopher Gaffney, an academic based in Brazil who has written extensively on mega-events:

> It's like a free-fall into a neo-liberal paradise…. We are living in cities planned by PR firms and brought into existence by an authoritarian state in conjunction with their corporate partners. These events are giant Trojan horses that leave us shocked and awed by their ability to transform places and people while instilling parallel governments that use public money to generate private profits. Similar to a military invasion, the only way to successfully occupy the country with a mega-event is to bombard people with information, get rid of the undesirables, and launch a media campaign that turns alternative voices into anti-patriotic naysayers who hate sport and "progress".

Gaffney's vivid description purposefully deploys military terms such as 'shock and awe' and 'bombardment' to hint at the on-going militarisation of mega-event planning, logistics and operations. But in contrast to the assumed necessity of securitisation presented in the preceding chapter, this is presented alongside a range of antagonistic appellations. There are the concepts of 'invasion', of 'occupation' and of 'Trojan horses'. Notably, he alludes to the forced installation of 'parallel governments' and the pre-emption of criticism extending the parallels between mega-events and the political and psychological manoeuvrings of modern warfare. Finally, the image of a 'free-fall into a neoliberal paradise' echoes a larger body of critical urban geographical studies which has focused on the creation of spaces of consumption and consumerism, which are fortified and securitised to disguise and minimise the presence of inequalities (Davis and Monk eds,2007).

This chapter will argue that Gaffney's quote can be read as a summary of an emerging body of critical and interdisciplinary literature which has attempted both to dissect the political and corporate structures which undergird the securitisation of mega-events and the broader linkages of this process to the increased scholarly interest in the 'militarisation of the urban question' (Souza, 2009:29). Using a survey of the available literature, I will argue for two connected threads which link the studies of specific mega-events. Firstly, critical studies have focused on how the spatial manifestations of mega-event security (at land, air and sea) are themselves emblematic of the political and economic forces, such as state marketing, sporting bodies and multinational corporations, which drive securitisation regimes. Secondly, the literature has problematised the influence of these power assemblages and argued that security measures, while presented as a necessity for protecting the public, are more often structured by an exclusionary and authoritarian logic which results in elite benefits at the expense of public space, spending and civil liberties. Indeed, the exceptional measures installed during mega-events may continue to impact on everyday urban governance long after the events have ended, and serve as experimental sites for dramatic extensions in the power and reach of the state security apparatus.

However, while wary of attempting to force an artificial homogeneity on different hosting environments and terrains, this chapter will argue for a stronger position than simply alluding to some general trends discernible across environments. In particular, it will maintain that mega-event security has become a conceptual template, in that consistent procedures and tactics are applied across contexts and scales. With this in mind, the chapter will not deny the important role of local and practical contingencies. Mega-event security is not static and evolves due to application and context. Indeed, as later chapters will argue, the public relations image of perfect functioning and response described in event propaganda belies the reality of miscommunication, bureaucratic mishaps and human error 'on the ground'.

As argued in the previous chapter, the mainstream academic approaches towards the safety and security measures for the 2010 World Cup were based upon an uncritical and technocratic approach towards the issue of security. Primarily, this body of research focused on issues of how the South African government could best enforce measures which achieved the standard set at previous World Cups. But this approach treated security as a managerial, apolitical good (Boyle, 2011) and ignored how these standard operating procedures are structured by prevailing political and economic power structures. As this chapter aims to highlight mega-event security is as much about the projection of state power and the commercial projects of franchise owners as it is about ensuring public safety against probable risks. Consequently this chapter exhibits a pronounced scepticism towards the security 'legacies' of mega-events.

Killing events

The specific idea of the necessity of mega-event securitisation arguably has a historically determinate origin: September 5, 1972. The infamous 'Munich Massacre', in which the Black September organisation killed 11 members of the Israeli national team, not only overshadowing the 1972 Summer Olympics but also creating a resilient association of mega-events as potential 'killing events' (Tulloch, 2000). The images of masked gunmen holding hostages which were relayed around the world seemed to prove that mega-events were not safe from global conflicts. Prior to Munich, militarism and security had often been side-shows to the apparently ‘apolitical’ celebrations of athleticism. Indeed, repressive regimes had historically aimed to disguise or ‘soften’ the visible presence of their security apparatus during major international events, with the 1936 Berlin Olympics being one of the most notorious examples. The events of 1972 began a process in which event security became increasingly prominent and expensive, as each subsequent host city or nation attempts to outmatch the extent and size of their predecessor’s arrangements (Bennett and Haggerty, 2011:4).

Indeed, prior to the 2010 World Cup, the pre-tournament publicity about several other host nations, was dominated by heightened fears around crime and violence. These include Spain 1982 (concerns about violence from the Basque separatist group ETA), Mexico 1986 (drug gangs) and Italy 1990 (organised crime). The linkage between large sporting events and violence has also circulated through popular culture, such as in the 2002 blockbuster film *The Sum of All Fears*, which depicted the explosion of a nuclear device at the annual American Super Bowl competition. Most recently the cinematic trailer for the 2012 Batman film *The Dark Knight Rises* featured the destruction of a sports stadium by terrorists as its centrepiece. This cultural trope was also recycled in the 2010 British satire *Four Lions*, which parodies an unsuccessful attempt to bomb the London Marathon.

But while security planners have focused on the external threat of terrorism, most political violence which has occurred around mega-events has not actually targeted event venues or tourists, such as the actions of the Greek group, ‘Revolutionary Struggle’, which bombed (with no fatalities) a courthouse and police station in the months prior to the Athens Olympics (Fussey and Coaffee, 2011: 71). However, there have been several recent instances of political violence which have specifically targeted sports teams, such as the attacks on Sri Lanka’s national cricket squad and the Togo football team, in 2009 and 2010.

The post-9/11 context

Arguably, the most crucial catalyst in entrenching and radicalising the securitisation of mega-events was the events of September 11 2001, and subsequent official fears about large-scale terrorist violence aimed at major infrastructure. While the trend towards intensified security measures predates 9/11, panic around terrorism has had the effect of seriously recalibrating notions of security ‘proportionality’ (Bennett and Haggerty, 2011). Increasingly, a ‘total security’ (2) approach, equivalent to a state of national emergency, is implemented for the policing of ‘civilian’ entertainment. The nature of panics about terror means that security planners are concerned with attacks which would have major consequences but have a low probability of occurring. In essence, since 9/11, officials have found themselves in an ‘environment unconstrained by the established likelihood of attacks’ (8). The kind of attacks envisioned by planners in the post-proportionality era are based on the idea that even small-scale or so called ‘lone wolf’ attacks perpetrated by individuals would create ‘considerable mayhem’ (Finoki, 2007a). Cities are regarded as hazardous sites of risk, in which violence could occur at any time, location or context. This looming sense of threat encourages planning based on a perpetual state of anticipation (ibid).

The profound effect that this has had on mega-event security measures was evident in the first war on terror-era FIFA World Cup, in Japan and Korea in 2002, which saw the introduction of stringent counter-terror procedures (Murakami Wood and Abe, 2011). Within the US itself, major sporting events such as the Salt Lake City Winter Olympics and the New Orleans Superbowl (both 2002) were declared ‘National Security Special Events’ (Warren, 2002). In line with the shift away from proportionality, no expense was spared, with over $300 million being spent on securing the Winter Olympics alone. Non-sporting entertainment events also experienced such heightened scrutiny. For example, the 2002 Academy Awards were extensively patrolled for ‘terrorist hiding places’ as the elite of the film world gathered in Los Angeles (617).

The intensification of security governance has led to increased scholarly interest in these procedures and their political and social implications. A growing body of research has dealt with the problems and opportunities associated with the staging of mega-events and how this has been catalysed by broader urban shifts (Yu, Klauser and Chan, 2009: 390). Two kinds of studies can be distinguished within this field. One genre focuses on the role of mega-events as an economic opportunity and deals with mega-events from a developmental perspective while the other tends to be more interpretative and refers to the sociological, political and cultural impacts of these tournaments (ibid). However, it is only recently that specific critical research has gone into the causes and effects of security issues at mega-events.

Mega-events have become enormous security operations, marked both by the adoption of a pre-emptive logic and the ballooning of security budgets. For example, the security costs of the Summer Olympics went from $79.4 million in Los Angeles 1984 to $1.5 billion by Athens 2004 (Coaffee and Murakami Wood, 2006: 513). Security measures draw upon a consistent repertoire of tactics and equipment. These include:

> The increased use of video-surveillance at prominent or vulnerable sites: uses of secure perimeter fencing, criminal background checks for employees, volunteers and athletes, vehicle monitoring, the usage of radio-frequency identification devices (RFIDS) on passes and tickets, biometric identification measures, satellite monitoring, the designation of special fan parks for collective viewing of events, the regulation of protest and dissent, overhead

> unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), mobile fingerprinting identification systems and enhanced controls at land, sea and air borders (Bennett and Haggerty, 2011:1)

For Giulianotti and Klauser (2010), these mobilisations pivot around three major fields of perceived risk. Firstly, the possibility of terrorism encourages militarised forms of planning and pre-emption. Secondly, the congregation of masses of spectators in host cities leads to a focus on crowd control. Crowd controls entails three areas of risk identification and mitigation. The possibility of violence arising from the comingling of rival fans leads authorities to implement measures such as travel bans to reduce the outbreak of hooligan violence. The presence of large groups in host cities has encouraged the emergence of fan parks and public viewing eras, which allows the authorities to focus control measures on areas of mass congregation. Finally, the issues of protest and direct action which aim to capitalise on the international visibility afforded by mega-events legitimates coercive pre-emption and heightened monitoring of activist groups. .

The control of protest is closely linked to the final tier of Giulianotti's and Klauser's taxonomy: attempts to manage the interlinked issues of urban crime and social division. In the run-up to tournaments, hosting authorities are pressured to reduce, or at least minimise, the scope and visibility of urban crime and disorder. For example, it is suggested that security measures adopted for the 2010 World Cup focused on controlling the interactions between local visitors and the local population (53). Giulianotti and Klauser conclude by suggesting that critical theory on mega-events has underplayed the sociological elements of this wide-scale securitisation. In particular, they argue for a more comprehensive appraisal of how risk is constructed, how security actors use risk and how this intersects with the focus of critical urban theory on the linked militarisation and commodification of space. Notably, they suggest that the increased frequency with which Southern countries are hosting major events raises questions about the comparative nature of security issues and procedures between the global North and South (52). This accords with a point made by Klauser, in his earlier collaborative article with Yu and Chan (2009:390-39 1), which is that there is a 'major research lacuna' regarding the question of how mega-events act as a 'catalyst in the making of urban-centred security'. In other words, how do the temporally and spatially bound exceptional circumstances of mega-events shape everyday urban security after the tourists and cameras have left?

Unitary spectacle and exception

Perhaps the most striking aspect of mega-events is the extent to which they have become states of both exception and spectacle (Passavant, 2006). Comparable to the use of crisis to dramatically extend the political power of the state (Agamben, 2001), hosting authorities legitimate temporary measures such as a heightened police presence, the suspension of legal norms and dramatic alterations to the urban fabric with reference to creating a space free from 'threat' of any kind which would include crime and terror, along with the potential disruption of political protest. This twinning of spectacle and exception gives mega-events a unique status, as they exist somewhere between a state of emergency and a festival. On the one hand, planners exhibit a 'total security' approach comparable to war planning: for instance the operations during the 2008 Beijing Olympics were described as the 'combat phase' of planning (Bennett and Haggerty, 2011:2). The war metaphor extends beyond discursive parallels. It has been estimated that over 1.5 million people were forced to move as a result of the 2008 Olympics, leading Stephen Graham (2010:125) to suggest that mega-events have become associated with 'warlike levels of eviction and erasure'.

However, on the other hand, this bellicosity is constrained by the factor of spectacle: while security is intended to create reassurance for visitors, organisers do not want an overly militarised approach to overshadow the event. Indeed, Hinds and Vlachou (2007) caution that the adoption of 'high consequence' aversion, which plans for all conceivable contingencies, can be both financially reckless and result in overly militarised events. As a result, planners adopt a bouquet of combined 'preventative', 'engaging' and 'repressive' security strategies (Yu, Klauser and Chan, 2009). Used alongside preventative measures, such as training and simulation exercises, and repressive ones, such as arresting 'unwanted' elements, engaging strategies include public communication. Authorities prioritise the projection of events as sporting festivals rather than as exercises in security (Fussey and Coaffee, 2011: 77-78).

The mega-event security complex

Despite relying on the state security apparatus, mega-events transcend the parameters of national security. Firstly, mega-event securitisation is about protecting the franchises (Theoderaki, 2009) of global sporting bodies. Secondly, mega-event governance enrolls the participation of 'cosmopolitan roaming armies of specialists' (Graham interviewed by Finoki, 2007b) from the public and private sectors. The security for events involves the participation of local, regional and national government, international and local sports federations, national business, the private security industry and foreign governments. The complex interaction between these actors has led to the emergence of a mega-event 'security complex' (Boyle and Haggerty, 2009) or alternately what Molnar and Snider describe as a 'mega-event security development nexus' (cited in Bennett and Haggerty, 2011:20). For Boyle (2011:330), this complex creates a security 'knowledge network' in which different actors work to exchange and build upon templates and standard operating procedures for mega-events. But rather than circulating in 'flat, apolitical space in accordance with the rational intentions of policy makers' this is a market of ideas and templates structured by prevailing political and power structures.

These networks intersect, overlap and change in march with the mega-event industry, which renders any attempt to map them unavoidably partial (333). Nevertheless, Boyle argues that three key institutional networks are identifiable, namely: state institutional networks, transnational networks and non-state institutional networks. State institutional networks consolidate the efforts to secure mega-events within the boundaries of the nation state, as knowledge is coordinated between a predefined web of state agencies. Transnational networking telescopes outwards, as the agencies of different countries share information and expertise, such as observing mega-event preparations in other countries (336). International governance and non-state organisations are also becoming active players in these networks. For example, the IOC coordinates its own institutional knowledge network, while the United Nations uses the International Permanent Observatory on Security during Major Events (IPO), which offers security planning models for member nations (339). As suggested by Graham above, there is also a roster of experts who serve as consultants based upon their prominent roles at previous events (340). The private security industry is also increasingly asserting its role as knowledge brokers who offer event-specific planning and technology. These companies also deal in human capital by recruiting public officials with mega-event experience, which is consistent with the corporate strategy of using the personal and professional contacts of former government officials (341). Mega-events are also considered as useful points of entry into the security markets of developing countries (349).

The process of knowledge exchange is not seamless. For example, public authorities and sports organising associations may hold divergent views on the organisation of security (344). Institutional rivalries and animosities also play a role. For instance, government authorities may regard the private security sector as ‘opportunists’ who ‘overstate’ their role in previous events in order to procure future contracts (ibid). Furthermore, while the official discourse may stress cooperation and convergence on mega-event models, these processes are hindered and structured by logistical factors (such as the capacity of the host state) and prevailing political relations (such as whether a host country has a centralised or a federalised system of government). However, stressing the incorporation of international practises has a performative and communicative value, as authorities use this to ‘reassure a variety of audiences that all foreseeable risks are being actively minimised’ (346). Asymmetries in global power may also play a role here, as Boyle gestures towards (but does not engage with) the ‘pedagogical function’ (331) played by mega-events in importing security expertise within the cities of the global South.

Despite the role played by institutional tensions and bureaucratic structures in hindering the creation of a homogenous global model of mega-event security, Boyle suggests that policy models that support and consolidate dominant political and economic paradigms are likely to ‘travel easier’ (350). The idea of positioning mega-events as a catalyst for security legacies appeals to a number of dominant interests. For the state, legacy represents an opportunity to maximise returns on expensive outlays for a one-time event. Sporting bodies have an implicit interest in promoting ‘or at least not discouraging’ (351) the legacy approach as a means of identifying positive benefits of expensive security measures for governments and the public. Mega-events also provide a powerful vehicle for expansion by the security market while legacies chime with the developmental and capacity building discourse of institutions such as the United Nations, NGOs and the media. It is this confluence of interests which make mega-events ‘powerful sites in the production and globalisation of security expertise’ (ibid). In contrast to the literature presented in the previous chapter, Boyle argues that security is not a level playing field, in which tested best practice is apolitically exchanged between institutions. Instead, it is moulded and shaped at all times by a variety of political and economic forces.

In practical application, the coupling of the desire to ensure exceptional events with the institutional prerogatives of a floating network of security actors provides scope for ‘ill-conceived buying sprees, deliberately padded budgets and in some cases graft’ (ibid). For example, during the 2004 Athens Summer Olympics, officials claimed that substantial security cost over-runs were the inescapable concomitant of living in a potentially dangerous and interlinked global environment (Floridis, 2004). However, in his analysis of the security preparations, Minas Samatas (2007) argues that exorbitant costs were the result of external pressures and internal political manoeuvring. As the first post-9/11 Olympic host, the financially weak Greek government was subjected to pressure from both foreign governments and the security industry to install a ‘super-panoptic’ (221) experimental centralised surveillance integration system or C4I. The system was intended to concentrate all relevant information into a vast, city-wide network of computers and sensors, which would theoretically allow the security services to gain real-time, 24-hour coverage of all Olympic venues (225). After a competitive bidding war, a $300 million contract was awarded to a consortium of the US-based SAICS and General Dynamics and the Greek/German Siemens conglomerate (228). However, this much vaunted system was plagued by serious software and technical problems. The system was only partially operational during the Olympics and the consortium was unable to make it work even after the Games. The Greek government relied on conventional forces for the Olympics: ‘The more problems that emerged in implementing C4I, the more efforts were made to show off draconian security and surveillance measures to both deter terrorists and pacify the public. Both the public and potential terrorists were ignorant of C4I’s failure’ (230). Amazingly, SAICS has promoted this costly failure as a ‘gold medal security achievement’ (226) for future mega-events.

Samatas argues that the Greek government’s commitment to the expensive and ineffective system was the product of confluence of institutional interests .The Greek state wanted to use the system to recalibrate its position as an international security player, to pacify international anxieties about terrorism at the Olympics and to entrench its position as a security partner of the United States and

NATO in highlighting its bona fides as an ally in the war on terror. The system was also viewed as having long-term internal applicability (223). The government was subjected to pressure by the US, which questioned the suitability of Greek security, which in turn led to the deployment of the CIA, FBI and NATO during the Olympics. The security consortium used concerns about Greece's territorial proximity to a supposed Middle Eastern arc of instability to leverage the purchase of its product (ibid).

In a follow-up interview (Molnar, 2011), Samatas concludes that the Athens Olympics is an example of the potentially negative consequences of mega-event security: in Greece itself, the Olympics was used as a pretext to implement draconian security measures to control a fractious civil society while the 'outrageous' costs of the event were major contributors to the state's current financial crisis and near bankruptcy. The Athens example serves as a cautionary tale: while the cast of security experts and tourists can move to the next venue, it is public services and ordinary people who have to pay the social and financial costs of ill-advised security expenditures.

The political economy of mega-event security

While the above accounts have focused on the general manoeuvrings between governments and business, recent scholarship has attended to the specific role of organisations such as FIFA and the IOC in determining the security agenda for mega-events. In particular, there has been focus on how security measures are used to shape urban space for the benefit of these organisations and their various corporate partners.

Eick (2010:293) argues that FIFA World Cup tournaments have become a paradigmatic example of the 'wedding' (293) of securitisation and commercialism. For Eick (280), the security gurantees signed by host countries are used by FIFA to shape urban form for the duration of the events. In turn, these measures are themselves shaped by the already existing urban and policy factors of host countries (ibid). One of the most crucial aspects of this is the advertising restrictions implemented during World Cups, which use legal restrictions and security deployments to regulate competition for FIFA's benefit (293). These measures include banning orders for individuals deemed to be in violation of advertising prescriptions (289). Eick (291) maintains that while host states retain the monopoly of the use of force, the integration of private security personnel and FIFA volunteers into security measures normalises the perception that private interests determine the trajectory of security governance. For example, the creation of fan parks and fan walks is not primarily intended to create public space for non-ticket holders. Instead, it was introduced to ensure that 'exclusive rights for ground advertisement space are safeguarded for FIFA sponsors' (285).

This has seen urban ‘disorder’ treated as a criminal and security issue (289), which in turn legitimates expensive crowd control measures. For Eick (ibid), FIFA’s regulations accord with this shift as they enforce measures which attempt to filter rules down to the individual level. Security measures are used to enforce crowd behaviour consistent with what FIFA regards as the desirable image of the World Cup. This has also capitalised on other forms of punitive neoliberalism. For example, in the case of the 2006 German World Cup, FIFA benefited from ‘workfare’ forms of welfare as the long-term unemployed were hired as additional security staff (294).

FIFA’s capacity to enforce spatial regimes is bundled into the hosting agreements of tournaments: ‘FIFA forces all applicants for hosting the World Cup (nation states as well as respective host cities) to accept all branding conditions, commercialisation interests and security demands laid down in the so-called FIFA Regulations even before the applicants would know whether they will be allowed to host the World Cup’ (285). FIFA’s ability to take over the control rights of public space from local authorities is presented by Eick (289) as part of a paradigmatic shift towards ‘rowing’ rather than ‘steering’ policy on the part of the nation state. Under the conditions of global neoliberalism, the state manages rather than directs urban space, for the benefit of corporate power. However, an organisation such as FIFA complicates this figuring because, as Eick notes, it has since the 1970s reconfigured itself as a body run along corporate lines (283), which in terms of the Swiss law under which it is registered is legally recognised as a non-profit organisation (287).

Indeed, as Maharaj (2011) observes, this legal status allows the organisation to erroneously present itself as a charitable endeavour. Rather than operating under ‘free market’ conditions, FIFA exerts an ‘exploitation monopoly’ (Eick, 2010: 286) over the World Cup brand. Security measures are central to enforcing this monopoly, both in maintaining the desired image of the World Cup and in ensuring the exclusive rights of its sponsors. Eick (285) thus suggests that FIFA can be understood as a ‘market proxy’ which uses its monopoly to structure urban space and public policy for the interests of its corporate backers, while simultaneously increasing profits for its national member associations. This embodies a ‘neocommunitarian’ (294) variant of neoliberalism, in which state power is used to limit free competition for the benefit of private actors.

FIFA uses this highly regulated process to shape urban form, as is evident in the extent to which its realms of spatial control have extended, since the 2002 World Cup, beyond the perimeters of stadiums and into the wider host city (292). Eick suggests that other stakeholders exploit these measures for their own benefit, such as hosting governments looking to upgrade and increase their security apparatus. However, the influence of FIFA, which Eick argues can dictate to nation-states, results in a new form of ‘contractual relationship’ (294) in which the state is prepared to subjugate itself to a hierarchical relationship in which FIFA is dominant: indeed this subjugation is a precondition for hosting. Finally, the security measures for World Cups may normalise the perception that private stakeholders – both ‘non-profits’ such as FIFA and its commercial affiliates – define and control the terms and uses of urban space (ibid). Using this as an entry, FIFA makes itself a shareholder whose influence can stretch from urban morphology to politics and propaganda. For Eick (ibid), this amounts, albeit temporarily, to the ‘spatialised suspension of democracy’, as the measures enabled by authorities serves as the mechanism for the corporate domination of cities.

The state seems to play a paradoxical role in Eick’s work: on the one hand, it’s judicial and police apparatus is crucial to the regulation needed for FIFA’s spatial regime, but on the other, it is continually involved in a ‘ritual of submission’ (Mnxigtama, 2010:2) as it accedes to FIFAs micromanagement of space. Klauser (2007, 2011) agrees that the contractual, transient arrangements between FIFA and host governments is hierarchical but argues that this security relationship provides scope for interpretation and flexibility. For Klauser (2007), the security operations of mega-events are downplayed by the media during World Cups: the public is shown images of ecstatic fans, not police with semi-automatic machine guns and security fencing. Offstage, however, mega-events are marked by the coming together of security politics and business interests, to impose the desired spatial logic on host cities (1). Much of the mega-event literature has downplayed or ignored the role of business in creating security, which for Klauser, ignores two key aspects of World Cups. Firstly, security risks are seen by planners not only to endanger the safety of visitors but as threats to the carefully constructed marketing image of safe World Cups (3). Secondly, as much as this image campaign is important to host governments, the World Cup is above all the commercial product of a single entity: FIFA. Even though World Cups are financially supported by governments and host cities and organised by local federations, they are officially organised by FIFA. In the case of the German World Cup, the organisation continually reminded the press that the country was effectively ‘FIFAland ’ for the duration of the event: as federation President Joseph ‘Sepp’ Blatter put it: ‘This is not Germany’s World Cup, but FIFA’s’ (1-3).

From this standpoint, Klauser argues that World Cup security measures entail that ‘urban space became invested, differentiated and hierarchically organised by combined security operations and commercial interests with FIFA’s interests prioritised above all else’ (4) . The spatial differentiations of security during World Cups correspond not only to functional and logistical differences, but to different degrees of commercialism. While this was most evident in fan sites and in the security rings around stadiums, these measures are becoming more extensive, penetrating into the management of city centres and even into airspace restrictions (6). World Cup security measures pivot around a reconfiguration of urban governance into small and hierarchically organised spatial entities for both security and commercial purposes, symptomatic of a wider cluster of security preoccupations. Ironically, the measures taken to produce commercially attractive cities can produce new forms of public anxiety and uncertainty. Klauser cites the case of a hoax letter distributed during the 2006 World Cup, which informed residents of the city of Dortmund living within a three kilometre radius of stadiums that they would be required to purchase permits to access their homes and were forbidden from buying any products other than those of official sponsors. The city's helpline broke down because of the massive number of phone calls from residents concerned about not being able to fulfil these conditions. The combination of security and commercialism, dramatically enforced in urban space, seems to assert that 'nothing is impossible' (7) for unaccountable business interests asserting their dominance over both public and private life.

However, Klauser (2011) also argues that the imposition of security measures during mega-events is not the simple outcome of a fusion of government and business interests. Rather, security must be 'positioned within a complex field of agencies, driving forces, motivations and understandings, including a range of international interests and stipulations, as well as a series of converging and diverging national and local predispositions and impulses' (8). Klauser (3) suggests scrutinising the 'security meanings' associated with fan zones and stadiums from the perspectives of three key actors: sporting bodies, local political authorities and the police and security services. Using the concept of 'interpretative flexibility', which stresses the different layers of meaning held by 'socio-technological assemblages' for different groups, he identifies three key areas of meaning (ibid). The circulation of global best practise for mega-event security intersects the multiple purposes of branding, place marketing and security (4). Indeed, while the framework may be dominated by private organisations, it succeeds because it responds to a wide range of institutional aspirations 'leaving little reason ... to suggest that this will be challenged at future events' (12).

Gaffney (2010) argues, however, that the security projects of governments and local authorities goes beyond affixing their political and social aspirations onto the framework laid down by hosting bodies. Although the term 'mega-event' is a useful placeholder, he suggests that the term is something of a misnomer. The actual events are the cumulative product of:

> ... lengthy disciplinary processes that incorporate mechanisms of power into spatial and social forms. These mutually reinforcing mechanisms have economic rationality and social control as their end goals. The multitude of practices and techniques that produce and result from the mega-event process are nearly impossible to describe in their entirety as they encompass multiple layers of governance, massive urban change, staggering sums of public and private money, and function as historically situated festivals that appeal to a global audience. The discursive frameworks that drive this process are also historically contingent. The host city or country adapts the dominant discursive framework of the governing institution (e.g. IOC, FIFA) while adding specific elements that maximize the uniqueness of place while at the same time appealing to the perceived universality of the mega-event and the appropriateness of its articulation in a particular time and place (8).

For Gaffney, the central point of this project aim of this project is to portray a 'neoliberal dream world' (Davis and Monk eds, 2007) to international media and potential investors: festival cities where social antagonism and urban violence are replaced by scenes of mass enjoyment. However, this dream image relayed to the world during mega-events is a false paradise in that the methods used to secure them may be the antithesis of utopianism: the suspension of democratic processes, the militarisation of urban space and the reshaping of cities in the image of global capital (Gaffney, 2010:8). While the production of mega-event security is dictated by sporting organisations and multinational corporations, this combines with the state's project of creating disciplined, consumerist space (27). This accords with the adoption of urban neoliberalism, in which public money is channelled into projects that will attract transnational business elite, tourists and the 'upper strata' of local society (28), often at the expense of social welfare. In effect, governments 'fix space' (26) for the purpose of capital accumulation: while the state channels funds into prestige projects, sporting bodies are effectively 'issued a blank check' (26) for event-related spending. This is leveraged through the creation of various organising associations which function as 'temporary, extra-legal forms of governance' (27). Made up of local political and business elites, these organisations use public money to fund mega-events and to issue tenders and contracts: not only do they keep their own books, but they are dissolved as soon as tournaments end. While cities assume debts, there is no legal option for those displaced or harmed by the mega-event: put bluntly, there is no institution left from which to seek legal recourse.

Inverting the war metaphor used by authorities, Gaffney argues that this has more in common with a military occupation. As Naomi Klein's (2007) concept of the 'shock doctrine' proposes, political, economic and environmental catastrophes are used to forcefully 'neoliberalise' societies. Central to this transformation is the establishment of temporary, extra-legal regimes which dissolve once the crisis is over, such as the Coalition Central Authority (CPA) in post-war Iraq which disbanded only after outsourcing large sections of the country's economy and handing out billions of no-bid contracts to foreign companies (Gaffney, 2010:27). Despite these 'eerily similar' (ibid) governance structures, a crucial difference is the context under which mega-events 'occupations' take place. Rather than being depicted as crises, mega-events are spectacles which are linked to a combination of nationalist pride and civic boosterism in which 'the raiding of public coffers to stimulate private enterprise' (ibid) is presented as a patriotic obligation.

Gaffney concedes that not while not all the developments associated with mega-events are completely negative, such as upgrades to transport infrastructure, for the most part they serve to divert funds and attention away from chronic urban problems and may in turn entrench many of these social ills. The sophisticated manufacture of a nationalist consent around mega-events also creates an amnesiac circuit which aids these rapid, extractive projects. While the media may raise issues of graft and overspending, which invariably occur in the lead-up to mega-events, these scandals are eventually forgotten (ibid), especially once the plans and measures prove successful for the four weeks of spectacle. The exceptional nature of mega-events is used to facilitate these dramatic alterations to cities. Indeed, Hagemann (2010: 735) argues that the 'state of emergency' which accompanies these shocks is not just a rhetorical device contoured to the specific ends which elites wish to accomplish with mega-events, as instead 'this rhetoric has already become an autonomous force to legitimate, practice and establish all possible extraordinary measures under the exceptional circumstances of the event. This strategy provides a basis for the restructuring both of governance and security apparatuses and for the spatial reconfiguration of the cities'.

Mega-event security and state power

Critical accounts of the political economy of mega-event security have argued that these security measures are delivered by a 'security complex' (Boyle and Haggerty, 2011) which consists of transnational corporate and government actors. This depiction of security governance, in which the state is one of a network of actors, accords with the recent academic focus on nodal and networked forms of security (Hallsworth and Lea, 2011). Indeed, the accounts presented above would suggest that governments are often in a weaker position than corporate actors, in that security measures are used to 'row' (Eick, 2010:23) mega-events towards the goals of transnational capital. While Klauser elaborates on how governments package their own projects into pre-existing hosting requirements, it is clear that this is a reactive adoption in that meaning and aspiration are packaged into the criteria laid out by sporting bodies. Gaffney's trope of occupation entails a more central role for the state, in that its apparatus and institutions are the central mechanism for an elite-led project of accumulation.

However, these vast projects of social and spatial 'discipline' (Gaffney, 2010) are performed by the state with the mutually reinforcing goal of instilling an economic rationality through social control. Indeed, the spatial arrangements created by mega-event security would seem to prioritise the interests of foreign capital. While security measures are used to ensure a profit for these private actors, the benefits for the state are more ambiguous: they denude resources from regular policing and are expensive to organise and maintain. Within the media and civil society discourse around mega-event security, the state would appear to be in caught in a double bind: criticised for not spending enough on measures and subjected to scrutiny when the real cost of acquisitions are brought to light. Most notably, it would appear that mega-events entail a partial outsourcing of the state security apparatus for the pursuit of private projects. In many ways these arrangements would appear to substantiate the idea that nation-states have been hollowed out, as security becomes more 'liquid' (Zedner, 2006) and implemented by a diffuse web of public and private governance.

However, as Bernhard and Martin (2011) argue, the size and scale of mega-event security can only be delivered by a handful of relatively wealthy nation-states. Using analogies taken from international relations theory, they argue that hosting mega-events is comparable to building nuclear weapons and space programmes in that it requires the full mobilisation of all the resources a state has at its disposal (57). Furthermore, this requires the state to coordinate activities across a broad coalition of stakeholders from municipal politicians to security companies who support the mega-event aspirations of the host government. From this standpoint, mega-events may serve as a unifying factor for transnational and local political and business elites who under less exceptional circumstances may be in competition. While the urgency of countering mega-event security threats is normally presented as self-evident, Bernhard and Martin (38) use the securitisation thesis to 'denaturalise the claim to exceptionalism'. In order to account for the measures which 'clearly exceed the exigencies of protection' (39), they attempt to extract the security mind-set which underpins planning and operations. These measures go beyond reassuring public anxieties about the state's efforts to guarantee safety and entail dramatic interventions which even surpass requirements for many risk scenarios (51).

However, Bernhard and Martin argue that this is not just the result of paranoia: instead security itself becomes an affirmation of state prestige and modernity, as relatively few states possess the wealth, technological base or organisational resources to deliver a standardised 'world-class' security regime. They argue that mega-event security is treated as a *sui generis* area of securitisation which transcends rational and materialist calculations of the probable threat to people or buildings. In contrast, they problematise the belief that 9/11 changed the entire context of mega-event security. While the idea of a large-scale terrorist attack on mega-event infrastructure or on crowds has been used to legitimate states of mega-event exception they suggest that governments are successful at protecting people and property from such speculative threats in normal times and at a much lower cost (46-7). In its excess and overreach, mega-event security reveals a security mind-set which corresponds to criteria beyond practical and financial considerations.

For Bernhard and Martin, the primary feature of the exceptionality of security measures lies in the role played by mega-events as a mechanism of elite affirmation. The architecture and arsenals of security are prominently featured as a 'as a parallel manifestation of the excellence and competence that the act of hosting ... works so hard to demonstrate' (59). These security demonstrations are monumental: cities are saturated with thousands of regular security officials and volunteers, expensive, high visibility technology and military hardware is put into action and complex organisational acumen is required to coordinate efforts across a range of scales and locations and between an array of institutions. Furthermore, opulence and excess is central to these displays: in the case of the Olympics: 'no security measure is too expensive for the Games. To host an Olympics without Ares, the Olympian god of warfare, would be to miss the point, no matter how much they charge' (54).

The demonstration that a host government can leverage extensive security measures is used for both domestic and international affirmation, as it signals the state's position as a first class 'global citizen'. As with nuclear proliferation, states may forgo some of their direct economic and logistical interests for the sake of prestige, as grand projects, which may have little or no knowable benefits, serve as a spectacular announcement of modernity (58). This works at both domestic and international scales. Within domestic politics, mega-event security can be used to advance political and bureaucratic interest and to reconfigure the state's relationship with political and business stakeholders (57). At the international level, countries use mega-events to assert and formalise their position within global security hierarchies: for example, despite initial concerns about Athens, Greek officials were later incorporated as advisors to the Beijing Olympics (59). Bernhard and Martin concede that owing to the veil of secrecy which surrounds many aspects of mega-event security it is impossible to conclusively identify the main concerns of planners (50). However, they conclude that that the symbolism attached to mega-events is used to necessitate a state of exception which is 'far greater than that provoked by concerns for human safety or the protection of property, both of which are adequately addressed by the security provisions of normal life' (60).

The monumentalism of security operations, which can only be provided by strong governments working in conjunction with other actors, highlights the state-centred dimensions of mega-event security. A potent example of this is provided in the case of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, referenced by Bernhard and Martin throughout their chapter and which has been described by Broudehoux (2007) as the culmination of China's experiment with a new form of authoritarian, state-directed capitalism. The unprecedented scale of Olympic developments and preparations in Beijing signalled China's arrival as a great power committed to marketisation against the backdrop of a police state (88). Indeed, the repressive power of the state enabled the extravagance of the event in facilitating and expediting dramatic dislocations in the urban fabric such as mass evictions to make way for Olympic facilities and the jailing of activists (92-4). However, inasmuch as the highly public display of state power was used to project force, it also revealed the anxieties of China's governmental elites. The Olympics was used to manage and contain the contradictions and social unrest which have accompanied China's meteoric rise to great power status (98). Most notably, growing inequalities have increased social tensions. The Olympics provided a patriotic rallying point around which to marshal a divided population, along with serving as an 'instrument of pacification by mystifying Chinese citizens through a grandiose spectacle' (99).

Security and anxiety

This highlights a profound ambiguity in mega-event security. On one hand, as Bernhard and Martin (2011:57) suggest, these events serve as one of the most overt articulations of contemporary state power, short of warfare and the splitting of the atom. But they also reveal what Murakami Wood and Abe (2011) describe as an anxious 'spectacle of fear'. Mega-events serve as an 'exemplary interface' between local, national and international forms of social ordering and create a 'crucible of governmental anxieties' (137). These anxieties may be temporarily dispelled by the creation of security displays. In their case study of Japan, Murakami Wood and Abe suggest that the internal security discourse about security which accompanied the 2002 World Cup reflected social fears about foreign 'others' and perceptions of Japan's declining global significance. On one hand, the co-hosting of the World Cup with South Korea was meant to reconfigure the historically controversial relationship between the two countries at a formal level, and pave the way for a 'future directed' arrangement which could reduce long-standing historical tensions deriving from Japan's occupation of the Korean peninsula in the first half of the last century (145). This formal relationship did not, however, end the popularity of racist and nationalistic discourses about Koreans (ibid). The fear of foreigners was also present in moral panics, which imagined hordes of European hooligans and illegal traders from neighbouring countries descending upon Japan. In the context of the latter, the government secretly installed facial rejection technology in two main airports: 'although it detected no threats, the face-recognition system was rather more interesting as part of a discursive construction of racial difference: really, it was about whose face didn't fit in Japan' (153). Such authoritarian responses reveal more than just xenophobia because, as Murakami Wood and Abe suggest, the 'foreigner' stands in for a more generalised anxiety about a loss of control and the undermining of the 'socio-cultural conformity of Japanese society' (158) a fear which also comes from other sources such as internal radicalism and non-conformity.

Although the case study is grounded in the promotion of a specific national ethos by the state, the interface between the national and the global that occurs through mega-event security may signal future upheavals in global security governance (161). The security islands which spring up around mega-events are the harbingers of a new security 'package' which accompanies the neoliberal global economy (139). Murakami Wood and Abe imply that the central anxieties evident at both mega-events and international summits are an elite fear of the linked consequences of growing inequality and unpredictable globalisation. This emergent security assemblage is 'not imposed on unwilling states but shared and translated between a transnational ruling class' of which national elites are merely the 'local variation' (161).

Legacies

Boyle (2011) argues that the elite usage of mega-events security measures are legitimated and mediated through the concept of legacies. While legacies are used to justify and excuse what may otherwise be politically unpopular security measures, the lengthy and complex nature of mega-event preparations invariably results in the augmentation and extension of host city security systems and infrastructures.

Giulianotti and Klauser (2010:54) identify six security legacies associated with mega-events:

1) Security technology: this includes the purchase and adoption of surveillance systems, police and military hardware and other equipment, which is piloted and implemented during mega-events.
2) New security practices: new practices and techniques are adopted for mega-events and extended into other areas of policy, such as new partnerships with the host states and other national security forces or private security companies.
3) Governmental policies and new legislation: these are introduced during events and remain in force afterwards, such as restrictions on the movement of individuals who have been put on ‘no fly’ lists.
4) Externally imposed social transformations: these have some mega-event-related security focus, such as the eviction or clearance of ‘undesirable’ individuals or groups.
5) Generalised changes in social and transocietal relationships: these follow after mega-events, such as different relationships between the security services and local communities as a result of strategies used or incidents occurring during mega-events.
6) Urban redevelopment: these have a connection to, or consequences for mega-event security, such as evictions or gentrification of specific localities.

For Fussey and Coaffee (2011), these legacies entail the juxtaposition of globalised security practices with the ‘idiosyncratic geographies’ (70) of the different cities in which they are applied. Although homogenous security strategies attempt to extract events from their contextual geographies and bear remarkable consistencies and commonalties across space and occasion, local contexts mean that these are applied in uneven ways (ibid). Using London’s preparations for the 2012 Olympics as an example, it is argued that national and local hosting measures both accord with and add novel developments to the process of event securitisation. In the case of the English capital, Olympic securitisation has continued a governmental practise of creating fragmented, security islands (such as the ‘Ring of Steel’ around the financial district), using technological strategies, such as surveillance, to combat crime and terrorism, and an institutional legacy of counter-terror policing. Thus the city ‘already exhibits many of the characteristics comprising standardised Olympic security programmes' (ibid). In particular, a combination of counter-terrorism and the adoption of neoliberal discourse about 'dangerous' urban populations has created a security praxis of building high profile enclaves ,which, 'whilst not physically gated, are symbolically and technologically demarcated from their surrounding environments' (82). Central to this strategy is the use of 'distanciated forms of technological control' (90) such as CCTV and facial recognition software. This approach harmonises with the Olympic security template, which encourages discrete forms of security that do not detract from the primacy of the sporting event. In other words, while mega-event security is invariably impacted by localised security practises, the movable state of exception has become standardised, homogenous and transferable (92-93), which leads Fussey and Coaffee to conclude that legacies will invariably be uneven across host settings. In the case of London, they suggest that while some elements of the Olympic 'Ring of Steel' will dissipate, other aspects will be entrenched and accelerate the maintenance of high-tech security enclaves.

Discipline

Although tracing the spatial, infrastructural and legislative legacies of mega-events can be done by tracking the post-event deployment of procedures, laws, institutional relationships and technologies, ascertaining the changes in social relationships created by security measures remain more elusive. However, following Gaffney's (2010) reframing of mega-events as complex, overlapping, lengthy disciplinary processes, it can be argued that mega-events serve a security process above and beyond leaving specific policing and military legacies. In particular, they are used to assert and reinforce order within society, which chimes with Neocleous's (2006) argument that securitisation can be applied to most areas of public policy. Carolyn Smith (2010) argues that mega-event related social disciplining takes place on a variety of scales. On one hand, the intensification of police powers may be used as a tool of political repression during and after mega-events (1.3). The national political, business, media and civil society consensus on the desirability of hosting mega-events ensures that they are elevated as transcendent national goals beyond political and social conflict and antagonism (3.3). Mega-events are presented as a communitarian spectacle which links different strata of society in a celebration of both the actual sport and the national prestige attached to hosting such an event. For Smith, this entails a layered process of depoliticisation and mystification: the citizen is encouraged to identify with the transcendent ideas of both the event and with the nation-state. Through the constant reiteration of this apparently transcendent consent citizens are fixed as spectators, entailing a shift from cynicism towards the state to affirmative support for its capacity to host a mega-event (3.3).

Indeed, mega-events provide a focal instance of the 'morality' (2.1) of the contemporary state: a symbiotic role with corporate power, militarised security and citizens as pacified consumers. Southwood (2011) argues that mega-events are packaged to present a generic experience of participation, 'fake unity and compulsory inclusivity'. This entails a state process of image management and containment in which social antagonisms (Smith, 2010) are disguised with an idealised version of host cities and states. Following Fussey and Coaffee (2011), it can be suggested that security strategies which serve to remove events from the social conflicts within their contextual geographies and contexts are instrumentalised to enforce this idealisation.

The communitarian discourse which accompanies mega-events may also play a part in this wider social disciplining in working to inhibit and restrict public discussion on mega-events and the related issues of private control of public space and policy and the militarisation of security. Gaffney (2010:23) argues that this is accompanied by a deliberately vague and cryptic rhetoric of development in which citizens are assured that mega-events are a necessity in capturing access to the capital flows of the global economy: 'the notion of developmental acceleration is at the forefront of the bid, but the forms of the plan and the requirements is left deliberately vague.' This may serve to obfuscate the real, uneven trajectory of actual mega-event development, which is weighted in favour of private interests. Indeed, Gray (2009) suggests that the paternalistic discourse of mega-event development masks undercurrents such as the stigmatisation of 'problematic' groups and territories and the continued move towards the private domination of urban space.

Security as spectacle and reality management

The extent to which the disconnection between the elite driven and autocratic application of mega-event security and the discourse of development is managed through public relations and sloganeering indicates how mega-events reflect another central dimension of contemporary security and warfare: namely, spectacle. For example, as Gaffney (2010:27) notes in his discussion of 'the shock doctrine', the 'main differences between the selling of public utilities and the hollowing out of state services', which Klein identifies as integral components of 'shock' and the staging of mega-events, is that in the latter, the shock is not perceived as trauma but 'as a *highly securitised festival and spectacle*' (my emphasis). It should also be noted that Klein (2007) includes military invasions, occupation and international policing and peace keeping as additional elements in the shock repertoire.

The concept of spectacle as originally articulated by Guy Debord, the most prominent thinker within the Situationist International in the 1960s, held that political and social life within both the capitalist

‘West’ and the communist ‘East’ had been overtaken by appearance and representation (Debord, 1988). The texture of daily life was subjected to a dissemination and constant bombardment of images, slogans, false promises, images and instructions delivered by a confluence of bureaucratic governments, the media and advertisers (Retort, 2004:8). For Debord, this served as a tool of social control which alienated and distracted people from politics, anesthetised them with representation and eroded the capacity for individual and collective action.

It should be noted here that Debord’s usage of spectacle is contested within academic literature. On one hand, it has been argued that the incorporation of his ideas into post-modern theory has denuded them of much of their political impact by focusing exclusively on the mass media aspects of spectacle (Retort, 2004: 6). On the other, it has been argued that the concept of spectacle is rooted in the historical specifics of post-war European society and has little contemporary analytic value (Aufheben Group, 2009). While acknowledging these debates, the parameters of this chapter entail a focus on the more generalised depiction of how mega-event security embodies many of the features of representation and appearance noted by Debord. Indeed, in his later *Comments on the Society of the Spectacle* (1988), Debord wrote that

> *We should expect, as a logical possibility, that the states’ security services intend to use all the advantages they find in the realm of the spectacle, which has indeed been organised with that in mind for some considerable time: on the contrary, it is the difficulty of perceiving this that is astonishing, and rings false.*

For example, the informational and psychological aspects of security operations have become a central aspect of military and police doctrine. Security operations are aestheticised and calibrated to have the maximum amount of media impact (Graham, 2010:71). Contemporary military doctrine aims to dominate space through a combination of ‘speed, shock, communication, interoperability’ (Blackmore, 2005:105), which is both organised with reference to and incorporates the multiple dimensions of media. For instance, the US military doctrine of ‘shock and awe’ bombing, used to devastating effect during the initial stages of the invasion of Iraq, entails spectacular displays of overwhelming power and force to paralyse an opponent’s will to fight. Graham (2010:71) argues that a similar logic was employed by the 9/11 hijackers, whose attacks were designed to ensure maximum media exposure through the creation of imagery, intended to leave viewers unsettled, awestruck and disorientated

This may create a profound gap between representation and reality. ‘Shock and awe is a carefully staged media event’ in which media attention is diverted to precision bombing rather than civilian deaths and maimings (72). For Klein (2007), this engineering of shock provides opportunities for the reworking of societies. Following Gaffney (2010:27), it can be speculated that mega-events invert this process to the same end. Rather than a theatre of destruction, mega-events are portrayed as a festival of celebration. Rather than a state of exception imposed through crisis, emergency measures are legitimated as the precondition for an affirmative national project. Although achieved through a discourse of participation rather than through the blunt application of trauma, it may be as successful in reorganising urban space for elite interests. This speculation will be discussed in detail in later chapters.

Boyle and Haggerty (2009:259) argue that Debord's notion of the spectacle oversubscribed to the notion of a seamless global spectacle. By contrast, they suggests that spectacle 'involves on-going processes whereby social life is processed and packaged for mass visual consumption in a society increasingly orientated to appearances in the services of capital', entailing 'degrees in the spectacularity of different phenomena' (ibid). Mega-event security entails a paradox: authorities continually detail the minutia of their security preparations while also proclaiming the invisibility of these procedures: 'if we are doing our job, no one sees us' being a common operational motto expressed to the press (263). For Boyle and Haggerty, this apparent paradox is reflective of the tendency for security to become spectacle. The embracing of 'zero tolerance' and 'total security' models is indicative of a 'self-conscious semiotics of policing' (ibid) in which governments shift their focus away from controlling the objective harms of a crime to the control of widely defined 'disorder'.

The regulatory force provided by these 'total' models accords with the interests of sports bodies and their corporate sponsors, as it provides a justification for the policing of a broad array of people and behaviours. Open-ended definitions of disorder mean that mega-event policing is used to ban or remove people who do not conform with the desired image that sporting associations and corporations wish to project. In effect mega-events promote a 'censorship of human kinds' in which a wide range of people, from panhandlers to fans wearing the wrong logos are excluded because their 'presence signifies disorder to preferred clientele' (ibid).

This is accompanied by the adoption of high visibility procedures which convey the control of urban space and aim to foster a subjective sense of safety among the desired audience. The representation of total security is fashioned using media templates such as the use of security liaisons who detail the cost and size of measures (264) and entails the relaying of familiar images of security: armed riot police, buildings bristling with police snipers, bomb disposal units in key sites, etc. As a form of public relations, it is not necessarily important for security systems to work to the proclaimed standard but that rather that they convey the message of reassurance using 'readily available cultural templates' for the audience to draw upon (ibid). However, spectacular security is constrained by the need to ensure that security does not disrupt circuits of consumption or create connections between corporate sponsors and authoritarian policing: security measures are aimed at being reassuring rather than frightening to the people they are intended to attract (265). Indeed, overly repressive policing could create the impression that the event is threatened by extreme danger.

Boyle and Haggerty further argue that officials may risk creating an image of security which resonates with the iconography of fascism, the governmental form which most embraced the spectacular symbolism of security (ibid). Planners aim for mega-event security to be an ‘absent presence’ which is apparent for the purposes of reassurance but which does not undermine the image sponsors and organisers aim to convey (265). Spectacular security has two purposes for mega-events: the actual mitigation of perceived risk and the fostering of a sense of total security (264). Indeed, despite the use of exceptional powers, authorities attempt to create an image of urban space as tamed, homogenous and ‘normalised’.

However, Hagemann (2010) argues that mega-events may provoke a sense of estrangement from this desired image of normalcy. With reference to Debord, she suggests (733) that mega-events represent the ultimate form of commodification, as the diverse experience of urban life is packaged into a consumable form for the benefit of corporate sponsors, presenting an image of urban space which is ‘standardised and robbed of any actual quality’. The ceding of certain parts of host cities to organisers and sponsors, which is in turn managed by a massed display of the security state, may display a highly concentrated version of what are normally ‘subtle and hardly noticed processes’ (735). Ironically, security may present an image of modernity which provides a disturbing contrast to the benevolent discourse of the authorities. Rather than being open-spaces of festival cities are revealed to be fragmented and hierarchical with ‘barricades, fences, velvet ropes, signs or invisible legally defined borders’ (ibid) demarcating the conditions of accessibility for different individuals.

Taking this exclusionary logic to its extreme, the novelist Iain Sinclair (2005) pictures a near future scenario of:

> Airport roads the same everywhere, and highly visible tanks patrolling the perimeter fence. If an English cricket team ventures to Pakistan, it will be accorded, so the relevant diplomat assures us, the highest level of security: “head of state”. That is to say, public roads in Karachi will be entirely cleared between five star hotel and stadium. The city of the spectacle is deserted, crowds under curfew, so that the sport of the people can be performed, at a time suitable to the television networks, in a massively guarded redoubt.

Sinclair’s depiction of an emergent dystopia suggests that mega-event security attempts to manage the gap between the ideal city projected by elites and a diffuse anxiety about urbanism. Butler (2011) suggests that this is the ‘new normal’, in which ‘you can have the glass and dazzle of the Olympics but be wary that the tin smiles and hollow luxury are now so precarious that the only guarantor is an ever more frenzied and powerful state'.

Conclusion

In a world of rapid security developments it is impossible to provide a synoptic overview of all the issues that arise within mega-event security measures (Boyle and Haggerty, 2009: 257). However, the literature described above has noted several linked trends: the adoption of pre-emptive measures; the overlapping of commercialism and security; the move towards transnational governance networks; the entwinement of the international and domestic and the fortification of urban space. At the same time, as the preceding sections have shown, security is seen to apply across an enormous range of scales, activities and policies, from attempts to control individual behaviour to the actions of nation- states.

As a result, mega-events link efforts to shape urban space for the purposes of capital accumulation and political prestige. These measures are produced through wide-scale state and private mobilisations which are comparable to national states of emergency. But, while this may entail security deployments similar in scale to military combat operations, they are both temporary and constrained by the dictates of conveying the desired urban 'brand'. For Bennett and Haggerty (2011:9), the end result is that:

> the factors that became most prominent in limiting the level of security were their costs and the degree of security presence that corporate sponsors were willing to stomach—both of which were ratcheted upwards. Security preparations have now reached the point where they are more appropriate for fighting a conventional war than protecting a soccer match from what most security analysts acknowledge would only be at most a handful of assailants that would be difficult to identify and thwart, even with the most elaborate security preparations.

As this chapter has suggested, the constant intensification of security measures is not necessarily in response to unprecedented dangers. Indeed, the security exceptionality of mega-events appears to have as much, if not more, to do with enforcing transient archipelagos of social control and commercial extraction as with the technical and logistical difficulties of protecting large crowds of people.

Chapter Three: Mega-Events and the Fortress City

Introduction

The previous chapter argued that despite the exceptional scale of mega-event, the accompanying security measures also draw upon (Fussey and Coaffee, 2011) and even project a concretised representation (Hagemann, 2010) of existing security preoccupations within hosting environments. As a result, this chapter will develop this idea and frame mega-events against the backdrop of increasingly globalised forms of urban security which combine metropolitan entrepreneurialism and marketing with militarised forms of containment and spatial control.

In particular, this chapter will suggest that the manner in which similar mega-event security procedures 'pop up' (Warren, 2002:614) in host cities and nations is indicative of how urban security is becoming increasingly decontextualised and homogenous (Coafee and Murakami Wood, 2006). Much focus has been placed on the role of urban neoliberalism in creating more fragmented and exclusionary urban environments. This has been accompanied by state actions which coalesce around projects of securitisation, in which policing, criminalisation and security become paradigms of social policy and control (Hallsworth and Lea, 2011: 144). While it has been argued that the prominence of privatised and exclusionary urban space is indicative of a government withdrawal from planning and a fragmentation of the state's monopoly on security, this chapter will argue that there is little evidence to suggest that the role of the state as the primary enforcer of security has been supplanted. By contrast, it will be argued that neoliberal policy and practise has increased the coercive powers of nation-states, which can be observed in cities throughout the world. In light of this, the chapter will conclude that corporate and business interests cohere with state security through a shared vision of pacified urban space.

The neoliberal turn

Despite the symbolic importance of 9/11 in catalysing the increased securitisation of mega-events, this process must be understood against the wider backdrop of profound changes in urban governance and morphology which have occurred throughout the world. Firstly, mega-events have been shaped by epochal political and economic shifts in which tournaments have become events of global significance both for their commercial viability and for their symbolic promotion of the urban 'brand'. Secondly, security measures have been influenced by the intensified interconnectivity of urban security in which similar procedures, tactics and technologies are visible across regional, national and transnational scales.

The size and symbolic prominence of mega-events is a strategy of 'urban entrepreneurialism' (Harvey, 1989) in which hosting authorities promote their city 'brand' through the management of major sporting spectacles. This is politically legitimated through the assertion that this will create 'trickle down' opportunities for tourism and investment as well as increasing hosts' stature as major commercial and political centres or 'world class' cities (Davis, 2007, McDonald, 2008). Indeed, the importance of mega-events within both inter-urban and national competition provides a significant impetus for security measures which are perceived to transcend the success of their predecessors. The linkage between mega-events and urban redevelopment strategies is indicative of the global dominance of neoliberalism since the late 1970s (Hall, 2006). This has amounted to the reorganisation of political governance and society through the imposition of market relationships and has been characterised by social disruption, economic instability, a massive growth in both national and consumer debt, the decline of social safety nets and the transfer of public funds into private hands through the privatisation of state assets and tax concessions (Harvey, 2005). Swyngedouw (1997) argues that urban policy has become focused on creating space for market-driven economic growth via attracting nomadic capital and investment. However, this strategy of socio-economic development has been linked to increased inequality, polarisation and social tensions between the wealthy and the middle and poor classes (Davis, 2006). It is also noticeable that mega-events are treated as a non-negotiable area of state spending even when other parts of public budgets are viewed as targets for austerity measures and spending cuts. Even in the midst of a global financial downturn, governments' enthusiasm for profligate mega-event spending has not waned, despite the long-term economic and social risks entailed (Butler, 2011).

The increased governmental support of free trade, deregulation, capital mobility and an enabling attitude towards private institutions has also recalibrated the relationship between hosting governments and sporting bodies. Organisations such as FIFA and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) have capitalised on financial deregulation, the mobility of capital flows and the integration of private institutions into public planning and policy. For example, an organisation such as FIFA has been transformed from an 'old boys' network' (Eick, 2010: 279) into a streamlined global business able to impose rules and regulations which host nations are obliged to implement. One of the key areas of regulation is safety and security, as public and private space is managed for the dual purpose of serving certain corporate interests while restricting others.

War all the time

The securitisation of mega-events occurs against a globalised militarisation of urban society and planning at both discursive and operational levels, such as the 'wars' on crime and terror and the adoption of military methods by police forces (Souza, 2010a:458). While fear of both internal and external risks has historically been an important factor in the shaping of cities, many theorists argue that the magnitude and complexity of contemporary securitisation is unprecedented, as urban planning and governance responds to the perception of city life as an on-going 'molecular civil war' (Enzensbeger, 1993). This has been accompanied by a move towards more fragmented urban environments with the proliferation of secure enclaves. As the influential urbanist Mike Davis (1990) argues, the militarisation of urban space merges policing and architecture to both contain and criminalise 'dangerous' classes and spaces and to fortify affluence. Fragmentation and fortification have become global paradigms of spatial organisation (Alsayyad and Roy, 2006) including architectural augmentations and innovations (electrified and barbed-wire fencing, gates, checkpoints and gated communities) the increased use of advanced surveillance and information technologies (CCTV, biometric scanners) and securitised zones within cities (airports, embassies, financial and commercial districts).

The enclave city

While some security features, such as digital surveillance and 'homeland security' measures, are more visible in the global North the process of fragmentation through security is arguably most entrenched in semi-peripheral countries such as South Africa and Brazil (Souza,2011). In these regions, the sense of risk generated by the interconnections between inequality and crime leads to the creation of 'cities of walls' (Caldeira, 2000) segregated and partitioned along security lines. For Giuseppe Campesi (2010) this reflects an interface between internationally circulating doctrines and tactics and locality, and he argues that the importation of what are perceived by officials to be world class measures amplify and stimulate neo-authoritarian pressures, particularly in countries which have undergone recent transitions from police and garrison states into democracies with a strong neoliberal bent. While Campesi grounds his work in Latin America, his conclusions are clearly relevant to contemporary South Africa.

For Abourahme (2009) the result is that the global South has become a spatial laboratory for forms of enclosure and exclusion replicated throughout the world. However, he cautions against reading this as a response to unique cultures of post-colonial violence and instead foregrounds the epochal nature of neoliberalism in spatialising homogenous security tactics and architectures. Despite the extent of the privatisation of some areas of security, such as in the increase of private security contractors and gated communities, Abourahme maintains that the state remains the central enforcer of security.

Pacification

The display of the state's coercive power is perhaps most evident in the adoption of 'revanchist' (Smith, 1996) urban policing which targets the poor and marginal. Neil Smith (ibid) argues that such forms of policing are explicitly linked with neoliberal policies, as the preconditions for the gentrification of cities is state mobilisations which are intended to pacify new ‘urban frontiers’. Wacquant (2008) maintains that the deregulation and diminution of social welfare nets leads states to pursue policies of ‘punitive containment’ to manage dispossession under increasingly polarising socio-economic conditions. The poor are regarded as an internal enemy by authorities, reflected in combative police raids and tactics: the effect of all these measures is that the control of urban marginality is militarised (66).

However, Campbell (2010) suggests that Wacquant paints an over-generalised depiction of the links between neoliberalism and containment, which may be too theoretically abstract to account for the historical, political and institutional variations which mark countries. Furthermore, ostensibly progressive accounts of how poverty is securitised may run the risk of subscribing to an overly bifurcated picture of urbanism relying on totalising visions of mega-shanties fenced off from walled gated communities, entirely disconnected from the enclaves of the rich (Angotti, 2006). Aside from presenting a bleak and hopeless account of urbanism, this dualism may obscure the complex social relations within cities through the depiction of ‘monstrous pictures of huge undifferentiated neighbourhoods filled with hopeless underemployed masses’(962), ironically echoing the same discourses it sets out to counter. Indeed, Rodgers (2007:138) suggests that instead of the withdrawal of islands of wealth within poverty, urban morphology is characterised more by partition and ‘the constitution of … fortified network[s]’ (138) which extend throughout cities. Rather than absolute barriers, urban form is a palimpsest in which new security tactics are adopted and reinterpreted according to historical and social context (ibid). But Rodgers cautions that such networks may encroach on public space in a far more intensive way than enclaves, in subtly removing large swathes of the urban fabric from their wider setting.

However, without denying the specificity of context, it would seem clear that urban security globally has become increasingly bundled with the aesthetic and cultural dimensions of city branding. Particularly in cities with high rates of crime and violence, security policy is used to enforce ‘makeovers’ (Hylton, 2007) in which policing is central not only for improvements in everyday life but its ability to change perceptions – both internally and externally. In effect, security becomes image-conscious and theatrical due to the parallel ‘rise of the fantasy city alongside the rise of the caceral city and the panoptic city’ (Samara, 2010:640). As one of the major platforms for urban branding, mega-events are a key example of the ‘festivalisation’ (Stienbrink,Haferburg and Ley, 2011) of cities, in which authorities highlight their ability to provide reassuring and congenial spaces for leisure, tourism and consumerism.

New borders

Securitisation entails a definition of certain phenomena as potential hazards, and the last few decades have been marked by a host of ideas and practices which effectively portray all aspects of urban life as the object of protection and security operations. As Souza (2010a:457) notes, critical approaches towards urban security are far less influential than the ‘conservative’ policies and ideas which articulate and agitate for the continued securitisation of urban space.

Since the end of the Cold War, concepts of national security have been recalibrated and rescaled, with practices that once focused on protecting national borders penetrating into everyday urban life (Coaffee and Murakami Wood, 2006). Eyal Weizman (2004) argues that the study of contemporary urban securitisation belongs to a more fluid concept of geography than the linear demarcations of nation-state spatiality: ‘The border is in fact everywhere: around every public and private property and infrastructure, taking the form of local and regional fortifications and security apparatuses epitomised by today’s roadblocks, checkpoints, fences, walls, CCTV, safety zones’.

Stephen Graham (2010: 144-145) suggests that many contemporary cities are fragmented into a series of countless borders and passage points which aim to manage the mobility of people and capital flows. Using both architectural and electronic security, secured borders are set up around trading zones, enclaves, entertainment districts, production sites, airports, sports events and political summits. While these zones are connected to transnational market and supply chains they are increasingly detached from the cities around them, marking a combination of global connection and local disconnection (ibid).

Battlespace

Military planning increasingly pivots around conceptions of asymmetric war, which imagine nation states pitted against small groups in low-intensity urban-based conflicts. Rather than fixed battles between states, military scenarios envision technologically advanced standing armies fighting insurgents who use ‘hostage taking, suicide bombing, improvised explosive devices, and fierce, fast, evaporating street battles’ (Blackmore, 2005:37). Concepts and doctrines such as ‘Military Operations in Urban Terrain’ (MOUT), ‘Fourth Generation Warfare’ (4GW) and ‘Command and Control’ pivot around a conception of cities as an open-ended and continuous ‘battlespace’ (ibid). The density and extensiveness of urban space leads security planners to view cities as treacherous and confusing sites whose dimensions need to be exposed and made legible to ensure effective control: battlespace extends the spatiality of security indefinitely. Writing with reference to Israel’s occupation of Palestine, Weizman (2007) describes how contemporary military tactics aim at control of both the horizontal and the vertical dimensions of space. While the airspace is militarised above, natural and built factors on the landscape below are instrumentalised for domination and control. Although the 'battlespace' concept was originally formulated by the US military, it has been adopted by security services around the world (Carr, 2010). Many of these concepts have been imported into the global South as a form of modernist planning which offers 'best practice' to control highly complex urban ecologies (Adey, 2010). The application of militarised rationalities and systems into domestic contexts encourages a forced homogenisation in which cities are viewed as 'security-scapes … reducing variations to functional categories that correspond to the needs and biases of the operators, not the targets' (Wall and Monahan, 2011: 240).

State and corporate security: withering or symbiosis?

Giorgio Agamben (2001) argues that as states have relinquished control of the commanding heights of economic planning, security has become the key yardstick of state power as governments attempt to crisis manage highly diverse and fractured societies. Crisis management asserts itself through the continuous deployment of states of exception, which are presented as central to the maintenance of social order (Peters, 2011). Put more broadly, the state cannot offer the citizenry protection from the dislocation and crises of the global economy but can win plebiscitary support through offering protection from crime and terrorism. However, Jensen (2005:552) suggests that such a model may be reductionist in offering an artificial demarcation between economic development and security, as well as failing to account for how neoliberal policies are appropriated within particular contexts. In the case of South Africa 'security and development have always been intertwined' (568) ranging from the apartheid preoccupation with securing cities from 'invading natives or non-whites' (554) to contemporary government initiatives which coach poverty alleviation as increasing social stability and security (558). Rather than being a reaction to state withdrawal, the promotion of 'zero tolerance' security has occurred alongside increased government interventions in health and welfare: 'the welfare state has not in fact been rolled back: rather fiscal and state resources have been reprioritised and deracialised' (564).

Indeed, as Michael Foucault's (2007) posthumously published lectures on neoliberal 'governmentality' argue security is crucial in managing and harnessing the activities necessary for economic order. The 'neoliberal state' appears to encourage openness and circularity but relies on an archipelago of disciplinary institutions, including both policing and social welfare. Large areas of public policy, distinct from the work of the police or military, may in fact be securitised in that they become necessary to the 'fabrication' (Neocleous, 2006) of economic order. In other words, the freedom of the market is continually dependent on a massed layer of coercive props, both subtle and overt.

In the last few decades, many theorists have decentred the role of the state and have subscribed to more diffuse conceptions of security governance implemented by a host of non-state agencies and groups. One of the most focused upon, and indeed controversial, areas of study has been the growth of the private security sector both at the domestic level of guarding and policing and the incorporation of private militaries into interstate conflicts. The growth of this sector has been interpreted as marking a return to a pre-Westphalian conception of power, in which the state is one amongst a range of security providers (Singer, 2004). However, as Hughes (2007) demonstrates in a study of private sector involvement in the war on terror, the outsourcing of security functions is contingent on such institutions winning access to the state rather than as serving as a parallel source of power. This often operates through a 'revolving door' as personnel move between the public and private sectors, which allows companies to maintain key linkages within the political system.

For Conner O'Reilly (2010), this intersection between public and private security is indicative of the links between the worlds of 'high politics' and 'high finance'. Rather than a dichotomy between public and private spheres, he argues (200) that security actors have zealously embraced neoliberal tenets of outsourcing, ensuring that state and corporate actors view 'their futures through the lens of interconnection'. This entails economic and security reciprocity: while security and intelligence services will work to enhance the competitiveness of key national industries, the state will reciprocally incorporate and harness corporate expertise and technology. O'Reilly argues that transnational policing and security can be viewed as an example of 'state-corporate symbiosis' in which the outcome for one is closely connected with that of the other (197). Within a context of shared backgrounds and informal ties, state and corporate security employees maintain a similar outlook with regards to a 'global discourse of insecurity': as producers of security knowledge, their power stems from defining the future sources of insecurity and creating tactics for managing them (191-2). In terms of the symbiotic relationship, the links between private and state security may often become dysfunctional and parasitic, characterised by private sector overbilling and dependency on the state. However, this relationship for the most part serves to mutually reinforce the insecurity discourse which frames public debates while opening new markets for expansion (203). The security marketplace has also been hybridised, as state and corporate security become active players in the 'security bazaar' (ibid). Most notably, the interests and objectives of the state and corporate sector have 'become progressively indistinct' (ibid), as corporate actors assume increased responsibility within state security and the state prioritises national security as central to ensuring economic growth.

21st Century Leviathan

This cautions against approaches which regard the state as one nodal point in a security network or 'only in the distance as the ultimate repository of legitimate coercion and legal title to property rather than as the central agency of social control' (Hallsworth and Lea, 2011: 142). Indeed, rather than a diminution in power, Hallsworth and Lea argue that the war on terror has been accompanied by a 'massive surge in coercive state intervention' (141). Tracing the contours of this reconstructed 'Leviathan' (141) they identify three mutually reinforcing areas in which this new security state is emerging. These includes the transition from 'welfare' to 'workfare' social policies, which entail greater surveillance and risk management of the poor, and a corresponding blurring between warfare and crime control. The third tier is the debordering of the national and international scales, as policies designed to fight organised crime, terrorism and illegal immigration create a transnational intersection between police and military agencies.

From this perspective, non-state actors have 'tooled up' (146) the state security assemblage. At the urban scale, private institutions facilitate state efforts to create 'safe spaces' for capital through providing surveillance, additional policing forces and 'hardened' architecture (ibid). Problematically, the perpetuation of open-ended (and functionally endless) 'securocratic public safety wars' (Feldman, 2004) on terrorism, crime, drugs and illegal immigration are used to legitimate the gradual hollowing out of access to public space and civil rights (Hallsworth and Lea: 153). Rather than one actor amongst a wider network, Hallsworth and Lea conclude that the security state is the pre-eminent political model of our time, in which the security entanglements between governments and private security companies may lead to dramatic extensions in state power.

In a discussion of Lefebvre's analysis of state form, Brenner (2001) discounts both the instrumentalist conception of the state as a tool of multinational capital and the state decline thesis. By contrast, he argues that state institutions are the essential role player in the production, regulation and reproduction of capitalist space (792). The centralised state's capacity to regulate and channel long-term investments gives it a privileged position within the spatialisation of capitalism. Brenner argues that the idea of state retreat is inaccurate because it ignores the 'hyper-productivist' (799) role of the state in organising and configuring space. However, this has been accompanied by a dissociation of the state from social redistribution and democratic accountability. From this standpoint, 'currently emergent patterns of authoritarian statism entail a significant enhancement of the state's role in mobilising space as a productive force – coupled with a major recalibration of the social power relations mediated in and through the state apparatus' (ibid).

This cautions against reductionist accounts of the state as the vessel (or perhaps vassal) of capital, which may implicitly suggest that popular pressure or partnership on the state apparatus could reverse the repressive aspects of urban securitisation (Souza, 2010b: 320). By contrast, Souza (329) argues that in many cases 'the state is not a 'partner'… the state apparatus as such is an enemy, even if it is sometimes (dialectically) more or less genuinely open to pressures from below as a government' . Indeed, Brenner (2001) suggests that much left-wing discourse narrows the political discussion to the issue of how the state can best promote economic development and growth within a capitalist framework, thus sidestepping the state's constitutive role within an autocratic political economy. For example, a discussion document issued by the Unemployed People's Movement (2011), one of South Africa's social movements of the radical poor, argues that the left in this country has a tendency to put economics before politics. This may result in the application of a technocratic and limited developmental paradigm which ignores issues of popular emancipation and democratisation. For example, the discourse of 'service delivery protests' ignores how community struggles are nestled within deeper battles to achieve popular autonomy (Ibid).

Such perspectives accord with work that has regarded neoliberalism as primarily a political and class-based restructuring of the state apparatus rather than as an externally imposed response to dominant economic forces. The notion of neoliberalism as a global class war entails that measures to 'neoliberalise' society were motivated by a shared perception of political and social crisis among elites (Hall, et al., 1978. Parenti, 2000. Mattelart, 2010). The social turmoil and rise of adversarial forces, from the student and rights movements in the advanced capitalist countries and insurgent forces in the Third World, encouraged the belief among political elites that the post-World War Two Keynesian settlement within advanced capitalist countries had benefited too many people and was leading to a crisis of over-democratisation and popular involvement. The 'planetary challenge to authority' (Mattelart, 2010) created a sense of fear amongst political and economic elites that the fabric of social order was being undermined by popular demands. Combined with a crisis in the global economy, the twinned political and economic states of siege were used to implement dramatic policy interventions which served to reduce many of the social welfare nets regarded as encouraging adversarial popular behaviour. By increasing the market's influence over its citizens, the state also attempted to restore social discipline as increased competition and insecurity simultaneously served to reduce demands for more direct political control. Such policies acted to transmit elite fears about the consequences of challenges to the established order into the everyday lives of the ruled (Robin, 2004).

One of the central political doctrines of the last three decades has been the Thatcherite slogan: 'There is no alternative', in which the supposed external constraints of the global economy are seen to be objective and transcendent forces which are autonomous from political decision making (Brenner, 2001:802). This has profound impacts on the democratic nature of state institutions. The claim to transcendence has been used to roll back democratic mechanisms 'won over a century of popular struggle' (801). Dean (2009) suggests that neoliberalism allows the state to decouple its political legitimations from the rhetoric of democratisation, as the supreme reference point for government interventions becomes an abstracted ideal of the market. For Fisher (2009), the 'naturalisation' of neoliberalism as the supreme political ontology, or reality system, of our era, entails an additional process of disavowal. While neoliberalism presents an escape from bureaucracy and statism, the reality may be that these processes are intensified and less inhibited. As the preceding section has shown, the marketisation and commodification of urban space is contingent not merely on securitisation but on the coercive apparatus of the state. Contrary to the idea of the ossified state withering away under the dynamism of the market, 'ultra-authoritarianism and capital are by no means incompatible ... internment camps and franchise coffee bars co-exist' (Fisher, 2009:2).

Sieges

One of the most dramatic examples of this 'tooled up' (Hallsworth and Lea, 2011:146) security state are the policing and security mobilisations around international political and economic conferences. Since the 'Battle of Seattle' in 1999, when the adoption of confrontational tactics by protesters unexpectedly shut down the World Trade Organisation meeting, summits have been marked by a pre-emptive militarisation of urban space (Smith, 2007). Authorities use similar procedures and tactics to those seen at mega-events, including the creation of temporary security zones, building barricades, and saturation policing (Fernandez, 2008:92-93). However, despite drawing from the same repertoire, one crucial area of difference is that policing is intended to disrupt and hinder the mobility of protesters rather than to facilitate the movement of tourists. Fernandez (15) observes that such policing methods oscillate between 'hardline' and 'softline' tactics. 'Soft' tactics including public relations strategies, laws, codes and regulations are mixed with the 'hard' use of 'non-lethal' crowd control technology, mass pre-emptive arrests and 'overzealous police action' (ibid). Martin (2011) argues that such police displays are indicative of the showcasing of cities, as hosts assert their suitability to hold future events. However, this often entails prioritising elite political and economic interests over civil liberties, thus lending support to the argument that the police are ultimately the armed wing of the state whose central task is 'obediently doing the government's bidding' (43).

In summary, the policing of urban space has undergone drastic shifts in the last few decades. Three key areas stand out. Firstly, the pressures exerted by global neoliberalism leads governments to take measures which maintain the ‘appearance of total security’ (Martin, 2011:29). Secondly, since 9/11, security planners increasingly ‘think the unthinkable’ (Boyle and Haggerty, 2009: 262) and use a total security approach to prepare for worst case scenarios, which in turn leads to dramatic extensions in the powers and capacities of the security state. Thirdly, while these processes are subject to national and local permutations, the interconnectivity of these developments is indicative of a global security ‘style’. Central to this is the blurring of the demarcations of policing and military activities, functions and policies. This has occurred in time with the extension of urban securitisation, as architecture, technology and governance pivot around ‘designing out’ (Coaffee, 2005) crime and terrorism. Such measures reinforce the fragmentation of urban landscapes, ‘creating radicalised and increasingly complex patterns of segregation and displacement, and of inclusion and exclusion’ (449).

Conclusion

Mark Neocleous (2011:203-204) suggests that the array of security assemblages at the urban scale, whether state based or private, combine to create a kind of low intensity social warfare:

> These are wars in which the battleground is the security of everyday life: wars in which the gloomy old everyday practices of some lives must be destroyed and replaced with brighter new lives, wars against suspect communities defined as such by the state itself and said to be making the territory insecure, wars in the form of acts of security in which the state reasserts itself as being a state by insisting on itself as the political mechanism for the fabrication of social order … these are the changes connecting everyday insecurities with the nomos of the earth, changes enabling the production of political docility in the name of security, changes revealing the war on terror to be a war of pacification securing capital accumulation and thus to the insecurity of bourgeois order, changes, that is, for the permanent pacification of us.

As discussed in the opening chapter, Neocleous suggests that pacification is the central security logic of both capitalist order and the nation state. At the urban scale, this can be witnessed in the rise of ‘revanchist’ (Smith, 1996) policing which targets the urban poor, the proliferation of borders and enclaves and the temporary state of sieges which emerge around the conferences of transnational elites. However, this is as much about the creation and sustainment of economic development as it is about control and the ‘destruction’ of suspect communities and ways of life. Under this ‘militarised market regime’ (197) governments and their various private stakeholders work to make cities safe for profit and consumerism. However, the subtext of this vision of urban modernity is the containment and stigmatisation of ‘insecure’ groups and territories.

Chapter Four: Cities of Fear and the New Military Urbanism

Introduction

The preceding chapters have linked two key arguments. Chapter Two argued that the securitisation of mega-events, in which prestigious sporting tournaments are treated as the reference point deserving of exceptional policing operations, corresponds to a series of overlapping political and economic projects. Chapter Three suggested that, despite their unusual scale and intensity, these temporary security measures may be understood as concrete versions of the 'everyday' trajectory of urban governance. By their nature, many of these evolving trends would appear to elude a synoptic overview, but the chapter argued that it is in fact possible to discern a series of security preoccupations which are translated throughout the world. In particular, it asserted that urban entrepreneurialism, festival and spectacle are supported by militarised forms of social policy, surveillance and containment.

However, this requires a clarification of the concept of militarisation. Although 'militarisation' may serve as dramatic shorthand to describe increasingly belligerent or authoritarian forms of policing and social management, an unsubstantiated definition of what is meant by the term runs the risk of diluting its analytic power.

With this consideration in mind, the chapter will turn to the concept of 'military urbanism' as a structuring idea under which to subsume the interlinked phenomena described in the previous chapters. And, with reference to mega-events, it will be suggested that the central organisational preoccupation behind governance measures is combination of restrictions and mobility. However, this chapter will also argue that due to their origins in the global North, many of the critical approaches towards urban studies have tended to focus upon how often exaggerated, and in some cases even phantasmagorical, official fears about violent crime and terrorism are used to extend the 'militarisation of the urban question' (Souza, 2009). It will be argued that this underplays the extent to which legitimate fears about violent crime in the global South may be instrumentalised to the same ends. This idea will then be explored within the specific context of post-apartheid South Africa. Finally, it will argue that while contemporary security revolves around protecting the stability of political and economic systems from crime and disorder, the interactions between the state and corporate institutions in some cases embody forms of criminality. Indeed, it will be suggested that the crimes of the powerful may be as much a cause of social dislocation and deprivation as the more commonly understood variants of risk, disorder and violence.

Mega-events and the new military urbanism

In a wide-ranging body of work, collected in the book *Cities Under Siege* (2010), British geographer Stephen Graham describes the emergence of the new military urbanism, marked by a paradigmatic shift in which the logic of war becomes the one of the structuring forces of urbanism. Catalysed by a host of broader, overlapping trends, this includes the 'stealthy militarisation' (xiv) of policy debates, popular culture and urban landscapes and the diffusion of military ideas, templates and procedures into the management of urban space. For Graham (89), this combines the profusion of 'hard, militarised borders' between states and within cities with the mobility of the 'transnational and urban circulations which surround globalisation'.

The militarisation of urban space is not a new phenomenon. For example, the course of the second half of the 20th century was arguably decided in the ruins of Stalingrad and Berlin, as competing armies used total war to decimate the cities of their opponents. The Cold War was characterised by the fear of nuclear annihilation of cities. Indeed, many of the technologies central to modern cities have their origins in Cold War military research, from the internet and wireless communications to microwaves and containerisation (65). However, Graham argues that the current trajectory is reflective of the 'polarising worlds' (4) within cities themselves as a product of growing inequalities exacerbated by the dominance of neoliberal forms of governance. Power in many contemporary cities is about separating and protecting spaces, privileges, mobilities and 'risk free' individuals and groups from 'risky' surrounding populations and infiltrations (143).

Graham identifies five key features which entrench the 'colonisation' of cities by military doctrine and practice. Firstly, the increased use of militarised techniques of tracking and targeting, such as surveillance and the pacification of 'threatening' populations, which are disseminated into urban security policy in both the 'homeland' cities of the North and the world's 'neo-colonial frontiers' (xiv). This synergy between domestic and foreign security leads to the second key feature, which following Foucault, he calls a 'boomerang effect' in which 'models of pacification, militarisation and control honed on the streets of the global South, are spread to the cities of the capitalist heartlands in the North' (xvi-xvii). These 'boomerangs' are not transferred from a single source but are articulated through sprawling transnational complexes which intersect government agencies, the technology, security, surveillance and entertainment industries and academia who all offer security 'silver bullets' (xxii) to solve social problems. These complexes both police and profit from the management of polarities (9). Inequality and insecurity are mutually reinforcing: perceived risks encourage a security logic based on pre-emotion and speculation and the deployment of institutional and technological 'quick fixes' (67, 74).

However, the efforts to create bordered and totally secure cities belies the increased interconnectivity between the North and South. ‘Western’ cities serve as the primary conduits for the orchestration of forms of acquisition and accumulation which are parasitic on the South: ‘the new military urbanism is thus linked intimately with the neo-colonial exploitation of distant resources in an effort to sustain the richer cities and wealthy urban lifestyles’ (xxiii). This is linked to the increased centrality of cities as the medium for warfare, as both state and non-state actors attempt to target the dense infrastructures which underpin modern life, from electricity utilities to cellular phone networks. Finally, the new military urbanism enrols aspects of popular and material culture. For example, the Sport Utility Vehicles (SUVs) popular with the wealthy all over the world derive from military vehicles and are resold into the civilian market as offering protection against threatening urban environments. In turn, the SUVs’ profligate use of oil is enabled by military efforts to forcibly secure natural reserves in the Middle East.

Graham suggests that the blending of commercial and military practises resonates within a civilian culture in which the mobility of consumer capitalism is perceived to be accompanied by perilous security risks (67). The attempt to secure and manage the proliferation of transnational flows shifts the geographical limits of the nation state. On one hand, borders have been ‘hardened’ and militarised amidst the proliferation of increasingly mobile transnational and urban circulations of people and capital (89). Security within cities has been sustained by complex new borders sustained by security architecture and surveillance. These ‘jittery enclaves’ (100) attempt to create and police a boundary with the urban outside. In extreme cases, this includes foreign trading and export zones, which operate as ‘quasi-autonomous realms bordered off from their host cities and nations’ (101). In a less dramatic variant, the proliferation of gated communities and street closures, as evident in South Africa, creates new forms of ‘passage point urbanism’ (106).

Internally, the overlaps between policing and the military, the quick translation of technology into tools of social discipline and the imperatives of gentrification result in a shift towards an increasingly powerful security state (23). These new spaces of state power go beyond internal control and pacification. The power of the state to reconfigure or erase urban space in the name of security is central to the propagation of wider geographies of accumulation. Following Klein (2007), this uses exception to profit from shock and dislocation. Crucially, military and policing doctrines which subscribe to a ‘seductive geography’ (35) of urban order versus chaos echoes the ‘catastrophic failure of the world’s political and economic elites’ (ibid) to address the root causes of the polarisation and violence created by neoliberalisation and growing inequality. This also entails a shift in the role of the nation state away from guarding defined national borders into ‘internationally organised systems’ which separate people and circulations (89).

Two aspects of the broader trends which characterise military urbanism have a direct bearing on the research concerns of this thesis. As security has taken on an increasingly pre-emptive logic, the line between the police and the military is increasingly blurred. On one hand, police agencies use tactics of urban warfare to manage domestic cities, adopting SWAT teams and automated drones (98). At the same time, militaries are increasingly incorporated into urban policing, notably in the context of 'special event security' at summits and sporting events (ibid). The array of private security providers, which augment the state, add an additional layer of urban securitisation. The upshot is that 'high intensity' or zero tolerance policing merges into a kind of 'low intensity warfare' (96). As the police and military gear up to target risks, the absence of a 'uniform wearing enemy' (ibid) means that urban publics become the primary target. In the global South, the target for state violence often becomes informal settlements, whose residents are considered a threat to the official goal of achieving world class modernity (112). Such spaces are becoming international testing grounds for experiments with new forms of 'securocratic warfare' (113). The upshot is that policing becomes central to managing the boundaries of privilege and power, protecting those who are considered risk free, while also enforcing the 'warehousing' (96) of risky populations.

The enforcement of these 'jittery enclaves' is revealed in spectacular fashion during the pre-emptive militarisation which accompanies major international events. The creation of security islands mimics and adopts templates from both the protection of 'valuable' urban spaces and actual warzones. For Graham (121), the security displays at mega-events are reminiscent of 'Baghdad's militarised "Green Zone" carved to help protect occupying forces and Western journalists from the spiralling violence outside' (121). The overlaps between mega-events and armed conflict also extends to the destruction caused by the evictions and displacements which have characterised some events (125). However, these securitisation efforts are intensely theatrical and spectacular, 'as much about managing global branding and TV imagery as it is about keeping risks at bay' (ibid). Security measures are 'in a sense theatrical, in that their purpose is as much to stage performances of highly visible military and security power as it is to prevent protest, terrorism or unrest' (148).

As Matt Carr (2010) argues, military urbanism is paralleled by the 'military futurism' of the planning scenarios with which security establishments imagine future risks. These scenarios have taken an apocalyptic turn, imagining future threats emerging from resurgent 'populism', environmental collapse, resource wars and 'feral' or failed cities in the global South. Security forces, and especially the military, increasingly present securitisation as the antidote to emergent social and political problems (28). The dark scenarios and fantasies about tomorrow are used as a justification for militarisation in the present. As Graham (2010: xxvi) suggests, these fantasies reinforce the spatial hardening of urban space: cities are not 'passive backdrops to the construction of security ... the way cities and urban space are produced are seen actually to help constitute these strategies and fantasies, as well as their effects (and vice versa)'.

Graham argues that these fantasies are often grounded in a Manichean view of urban life: cities are divided into enclaves of progress and zones of disorder: the valuable versus the surplus. These divisions are seen to exist both between countries and regions and within cities themselves. However, these imaginative divisions ignore both the extent to which urban wealth is contingent on the exploitation of peripheries and the manner in which contemporary urbanism blurs such easy binaries. For example, Alsayyad and Roy identify (2006:17) coexisting modes of 'modern nationalism, mediaeval enclaves and imperial brutality' all within the framework of transnational urbanism. Attempts to ensure 'total security' over cities are inherently permeable and partial, as the mass and density of cities means that notions of absolute security are tenuous 'fantasies of control' (Graham, 2010: 146).

Phobopolis

While broadly in agreement with the military urbanism thesis, Souza (2010a: 461) argues that Graham unintentionally relies on an overly binary distinction between 'North' and 'South', 'developed' and developing. This underestimates the intense divisions which persist within semi-peripheral countries such as Mexico, Brazil and South Africa, which combine advanced capitalist infrastructures with massive social and economic inequality (ibid). And, indeed, linked to these disparities are long histories of authoritarian urban security, control and surveillance. While Graham's work is marked by an effort to escape what he perceives as politically reactionary and dangerous distinctions between North and South, through showing the complex security exchanges and 'transnational architectures of control, power and wealth' (interviewed by Finoki,2007b) which blur such distinctions, his work does tend to focus predominately on the 'homelands' of the USA and Europe. By contrast, Souza (2011:7) suggests that:

> ... from a global North-based perspective, terrorism and the experiences of certain countries such as the USA and UK have been often privileged, although ordinary criminality still is a crucial component of the discursive landscape and a key market for the security market especially in the USA. ... In contrast to this from a global South-based viewpoint, ordinary criminality and its connections with the above mentioned three pillars of the "industry of fear'' has understandably deserved more attention (although terrorism is sometimes not completely absent as a real or potential threat to the existing socio-spatial order).

Despite differences between social, historical and regional context, urbanism is globally characterised by the perception of city life as war. In what Souza describes as the 'phobopolis' [city of fear] (2010a, 2011), urbanisation is decisively influenced by the fear of violence. While Graham argues that attempts to control the mobilities and flows of global capitalism provide the undergirding structure for the various facets of military urbanism, Souza suggests that militarisation within semi-peripheral countries is motivated by the proximate reality of violent crime. The fear of violence and its responses, from self-segregating gated communities to increasing public support for zero tolerance policing, is especially concentrated in semi-peripheral countries and is reflective of a 'socio-psychological atmosphere' (Souza, 2011: 6) of anxiety. Such fear transcends class, particularly as it is the poor who are most vulnerable to predation (Souza, 2009). Souza thus avoids the tendency within some critical literature to overemphasise the security fears of the elite and the privileged. While Graham acknowledges the existence of an often fearful civilian culture, Souza's work expands on how this background of fear is prevalent across societal strata.

However, legitimate concerns for public safety can be 'instrumentalised to reinforce militarisation – as it has largely been by the three pillars of the contemporary capitalist "industry of fear": the mass media, the political system and the security market' (Souza, 2011: 4). Ever radicalising security invigorates anxiety and entrenches the perception of dangerous cities, leading to greater social fragmentation and mistrust, increased violence between the state and criminals and a more overtly hostile and paranoid urban landscape. Indeed, as noted in the previous chapter (Campesi, 2010) argues that these anxieties result in calls for the transfer of security 'best practice' to semi-peripheral countries. In turn, these may meld with and augment long-standing facets of authoritarianism, control and pacification. The transnational exchange of security suggests that the tactics and doctrines of homeland security in the global North are vectored into the global South under the rubric of crime control.

Crime, security and post-apartheid cities

The fear of urban crime has particular relevance to South Africa's hosting of the 2010 World Cup. During the build-up to the tournament, South Africa's notorious reputation for violent crime was viewed by the media as the greatest impediment to the success of security measures. But as some researchers were quick to point out, tourists are proportionally far less likely to experience criminal victimisation (Rosa Luxemborg Foundation, 2010). However, the image of South Africa as a particularly dangerous country has remained powerful. In the following section, I will discuss how this image and the everyday reality of criminal violence (or phobopolisation) have served as a powerful legitimating force for the extension of variants of military urbanism in South African cities.

South African cities are marked by the historical legacy of colonialism and apartheid, which created an exceptionally violent and brutalising urban environment (Kynoch, 2008, Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, 2009). Practising an intensely focused form of internal colonialism, white authorities historically worked to secure the 'European' space of inner cities and suburbs from

‘African’ areas, combining the maximal control and exploitation of blacks as a cheap pool of labour with the minimising of their freedom of movement (Ballard, 2002). Policing was ‘quasi-military’ (Steinberg, 2008:29), deployed almost exclusively as a tool of political repression, including the use of torture, death squads and close links between the police and military (Cawthra, 1993). The police were viewed as an occupying force by many South Africans, leading to a legacy of popular mistrust and resentment (Steinberg, 2008). Along with the deployment of the army during what the government euphemistically called ‘unrest’, township planning itself became militarised, with the building of wide roads to facilitate the fast deployment of military vehicles and floodlights and watchtowers for panoptic surveillance. The apartheid government was prepared to ignore and even tacitly support violent crime as long as it did not encroach into ‘European’ areas, resulting in a situation where, as Steve Biko (2004:82) observed in the 1970s, whites ‘sun tanning on exclusive beaches or relaxing in their bourgeois homes’ were insulated from the true extent of crime.

In other words, as a post-colonial society, South Africa has a long history of many of the aspects of military urbanism identified by Graham, in which security is intimately linked to the maintenance of privilege and the pacification and warehousing of ‘dangerous’ populations. Furthermore, the linkages between state and criminal violence also mean that the disorder of the post-apartheid period cannot be studied in isolation from the political violence which preceded it. As Ellis (1998:296) notes, ‘one of the conclusions we may draw from a survey of the last 30 years of South African history is that politics and crime are inter-connected and are not always amenable to conventional analyses, one in the discipline of political science, the other in criminology’.

The beginning of the official desegregation of space, as apartheid urban controls began to collapse in the late 1980s, saw unregulated access to public space and increased black residence in formerly white areas (Rule, 1996). The transition to democracy in the early 1990s, coincided with a dramatic upsurge in violent crime, exacerbated by the continuation of political violence into the post-apartheid period and the full reintegration of South Africa into the global economy, as the wide circulation of consumer goods became targets for crime and organised gangs consolidated their positions (Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, 2009, Hubschle, 2010). While the pattern of victimisation has been largely determined by a legacy of skewed sociospatial distribution, as formerly white areas are disproportionately affected by property crime while violent contact crime is concentrated in ‘poor black social groups and areas’ (Lemanski, 2004:104), the fear of crime has been used to legitimate the continuation of racist anxieties into the post-apartheid period. As Hansen (2006: 279) puts it, ‘this spectre was completely racialised and the fear had a colour: black’. At the same time the fear of crime is pervasive throughout society, especially as the poor bear the brunt of criminal violence (Zikode, 2007).

Simpson argues (2004) that post-apartheid crime is a continuation of the social dislocations created by colonialism and apartheid, which effectively criminalised a substantial part of South Africa's population and forced them to live in deprived, abrasive settings. South Africa's uneven socio-spatial development has allowed for the flourishing of a range of criminal pathologies, unresolved traumas, alienation and the creation of identities which are grounded in everyday violence as a way of life (5). In turn, this suggests that other forms of political and economic practise cannot be 'cleansed' or absolved of the 'criminal pathologies of South Africa's distinctive social development' (7). The upshot is that crime is not just a policing problem, or even just a socio-economic problem, but is intimately linked to the 'experiences of race, class, gender, and the complex identities and historical traumas of ordinary South Africans' (5). This, in turn, accords with Souza's observation (2009:29) that the roots of 'phobopolisation' are 'much more of a social challenge than a mere task for the police – and by no means is it a military problem'.

Since 1994, the ANC-led government has attempted to negotiate between transforming the police from an iron hand of political repression into a trusted public service, while also trying to robustly reduce rates of violent crime (Altbeker, 2007). Efforts to civilianise the police through inculcating a human rights based approach within the ranks have often been resisted by an institutional culture which regards this as tantamount to allowing criminal impunity, while the militarisation of some crimes, such as cash-in-transit hijackings, which in many cases are orchestrated by former combatants from South Africa and neighbouring countries, has fuelled calls for proportional response (Hansen, 2006). This has been characterised by the incorporation of internationally voguish policing concepts such as 'zero tolerance' and the 'war on crime' (Jensen, 2005). On one hand this has seen the continuation of historically embedded practices within the police service with Legget (2005) observing that since at least 2000 the SAPS has reverted to wide scale militaristic policing. At the same time Samara (2003:37) has argued that ' the elements of the old police, from the carry-over of officers from apartheid to the deeply entrenched culture of counterinsurgency are not going to be removed by the type of influences coming from the United States and other Western powers. Instead they will mutually reinforce each other'.

Efforts to fortify and harden the state's crime fighting apparatus have been used both to manage state–society relationships and to pursue foreign policy objectives. The apparent ineffectiveness of national policing in reducing high rates of crime has become a major policy issue which opposition parties, the media and civil society use to challenge the legitimacy and capability of the governing ANC. In turn, the authorities will often adopt high profile actions and aggressive rhetoric to assert the state's capacity to ensure security. As a semi-peripheral country and aspirant sub-regional world power, policing is also an important mechanism for the South African state to showcase its power, prowess and modernity to the outside world.

Despite the centrality of the war on crime to the national political agenda, it would be an exaggeration to suggest that violence threatens the long term stability of the state. Indeed, 'since 1994 the incidence of crime has remained more or less stable, albeit at an unacceptably high level' (Jensen, 2005, 552). The backdrop of post-apartheid normalisation against which the war on crime is pursued both contrasts and shares similarities with the internal warfare of the recent past. For example, Frederikse (1986) characterised South Africa as being in a 'different kind of war' which pitted mass resistance and guerrilla actions against the apartheid security state and a white population obsessed with the perceived threat of 'urban terrorism'. From the state side, Stiff (2001) discusses how the apartheid government was engaged in 'warfare by other means' during the 1980s and early 1990's including counter-insurgency warfare, biological weapons development and 'destabilisation' campaigns both internally and in neighbouring countries. Crucially this centred on the pursuit of internal foes rather than 'external threats', like terrorists and illegal immigrants (Souza, 2010a:461). In a sense the post-apartheid state has inherited aspects of this internal war, except that it is officially aimed at dangerous criminals rather than political opposition. As Jensen (2005: 568) puts it crime is the 'enemy within': 'this time, however, the enemies are located within the townships, and there is no readily identifiable outside enemy'.

However, the role of the state's security forces goes beyond crime control. Most notably, the police (and increasingly the military) are used to enforce social order. This facet is most explicit in the crowd control tactics and practices which accompany the ever present, and occasionally violent, community protests which occur in South Africa. The state response to the 'revolt of the poor' has often embodied disturbing parallels with the authoritarian practises of the recent past, including the killing of unarmed demonstrators (Bofelo, 2011, Pithouse, 2011). This has been accompanied by government efforts to label radical community movements as criminal, which in some cases has been used as a legitimation for state violence and illegality. State violence against demonstrators occurs against a context of the everyday incidents of police harassment and criminalisation which the urban poor experience. This is especially true at local and municipal levels where policing is often highly corrupt and compromised, as officers serve as the enforcers of local business and political interests.

'Phobopolisation' has a marked impact on the form of post-apartheid cities. Municipal authorities and commercial developers have followed the global trend of building world class cities, marked by the creation of securitised city improvement districts, malls, casinos and stadiums (Buccus, 2008, McDonald, 2008). Gentrification projects which aim to control 'disorderly' (Murray, 2008) cities have often reinforced spatial segregation, penalising the urban poor under the cover of 'development' (Samara, 2010). The built environment has become more fortified and hostile, with the proliferation of gated communities, access control boom gates, electrified fencing and razor wire, replacing apartheid's absolute partitions with a more fragmented and defensive micro-geography of fortified and enclave spaces. As Kempa and Singh (2008: 335) argue, South Africa renders global trends in 'stark relief', as international moves towards enclave urbanism fuses with historical and institutional legacies of spatial exclusion. While the creation of security passage points may be used to manage the fallout from massive levels of inequality, it also dramatises the extent to which South Africa remains a country of two worlds, perhaps best captured by the Ballardian Danifern 'golfing and lifestyle estate' outside Johannesburg, whose faux-Tuscan village simulations border on the densely populated Diepsloot township and informal settlement.

This has been reinforced by the emergence of an often heavily armed private security sector, which has mushroomed in the post-apartheid period and which substantially outnumbers the police (Kempa and Singh, 2008). It is a common sight to see cash-in-transit guards in body armour with sub-machine guns at ATMs, normalising the perception that crime in South Africa is equivalent to a low-level war (Bremner, 1999). The emergence of this sector is often perceived as marking the retreat of the state, due to an inability to reassure the middle and wealthy classes that it can control violent crime. However, as Carr observes (2007:207), this sector predates fears about post-apartheid crime. With its roots in white anxieties about political violence, 'terrorism' and reprisals from black South Africans in the wake of the Soweto uprising, the 1970s saw the emergence of one of the world's first 'homeland' security industries.

Furthermore, within the context of post-apartheid security, the relationship between public and private policing is often porous and symbiotic (O'Reilly, 2011). The two sectors work in conjunction with the state subcontracting functions to the private sector. For example, the 'Red Ants' of the Wozani security company, who have gained a notorious reputation for violence, are used to perform housing evictions and slum clearances (Murray, 2008). In turn, the state has the capacity to provide control functions which the private sector does not have the legitimacy or the desire to perform. For example, Gibson (2011) argues in the context of evictions of informal settlements that private developers often rely on the police power of the state to perform demolitions and removals.

From this perspective, the state is not a neutral agent which provides security but rather acts to enforce an often skewed social order. It would be disingenuous to claim that this is comparable to the police state that existed less than two decades ago or to deny that heavy-handed policing in South Africa often maintains a degree of popular support because of legitimate fears of violent. But it may be equally myopic to deny that this can rapidly transmute into repression and the perpetuation of inequality.

While crime may be viewed as a factor which arrests economic development in South Africa, many facets of the post-apartheid, neoliberal transition have served to augment and reinforce certain fields of crime. The growth of a large-scale, sophisticated consumer economy in the midst of serious inequality has led to the circulation of goods which are a prime target for crime (CSVR, 2009: 8). As recent high-profile cases, such as the linked 'assisted suicide' of disgraced mining magnate Brett Kebble and the imprisonment of former police commissioner and INTERPOL president Jackie Selebi on corruption charges have revealed, organised crime is often closely linked to political and business power, in networks of complicity that problematise the strict distinctions between the legal and illegal (Weiner, 2011). As Standing (2004) argues, mainstream criminological paradigms regard organised crime as a kind of anti-social virus existing in opposition to the legal world of business and government. By contrast, in the context of a study on gangs in the Cape Flats, he observes that the success of organised crime is contingent on gaining strategic access to individuals and institutions within the state (39). Furthermore, such gangs serve as a form of criminal governance in areas where the state has withdrawn or did not exert much authority to begin with. The entrepreneurial strategies of criminals often display, albeit in exaggerated and violent form, aspects of capitalist development within 'mainstream society', such as the assertion of power through the control of urban space and the monopolisation of markets and access to state institutions. Rather than acting as the antithesis of legitimate economic development, Standing (53) concludes that 'insofar as the Cape Flats are characterised by a gross polarisation between power and wealth, between an elite and those they exploit, organised crime can be seen as a form of predatory capitalism, increasingly characteristic not just of South Africa but of the wider global economy'.

State-corporate crime and neoliberalism

Indeed a growing body of critical literature has attempted to link such predatory forms of accumulation to the increased corporate dominance over public policy. At the legal scale of interactions between nation-states and corporate actors, neoliberalism has created opportunities for new forms of 'state-corporate crime in which one or more institutions of political governance pursue a goal in direct cooperation with one or more institutions of economic production and distribution' (Welch, 2006: 263). While these alliances are forged for financial interest, they are sustained by political dynamics which serve to resist the designation of these actions as unethical and illegal, and afford impunity against prosecution (ibid). However, rather than aiming to provide a normative evaluation of this kind of elite criminality, this section will use the literature to provide a conceptual model of how economic projects fuse with political dynamics. Such a model provides a useful framework from which to construct a picture of the governance structures evident in the securitisation of mega-events.

Snider (2000) positions an upsurge in state-corporate crime as a direct outcome of the neoliberal 'counter-revolution' and argues that the state's punitive regulation of the corporate sector has all but disappeared. She argues (171) that the knowledge claims of neoliberalism entail that government regulation inhibits the maximum efficiency of the market. In turn, the state is expected to provide persuasions, rewards, tax breaks and publicly-funded free goods, such as safety and security, to attract capital. This is sustained by the claim of 'trickle down' benefits, in which wealth and development can only be created and maintained through the creation of favourable conditions for private investment. Such knowledge claims provide a legitimation for most forms of acquisition and profit making and leads to a growing incapacity on the part of the state to regulate the behaviour of corporate actors. However, Snider (192) argues that neoliberal ideas have succeeded not because they produced a superior approach to managing economic development but because they were compatible with the concerns of hegemonic interests: these ideas 'had legs propelling them off the computer screens of academics and into corporate board rooms, editorial offices and Parliament because these ideas were useful to the most powerful players in the world'.

This highlights the limitations of approaches to state corporate crime, which 'black box' (Tombs and Whyte, 2009) the state as a conceptual reference point whose role is assumed rather than discussed and analysed. Tombs and Whyte (2009) identify three dominant theoretical approaches to the state regulation of capital: the compliance school, the neoliberal perspective and capture theories. All three approaches treat the state and corporate sectors as distinct and separate from each other. The compliance approach holds that regulation is dependent on the cooperation of the corporate sector. The state has to recognise that it has limited power over business and that overly punitive regulation could be counter-productive and actively harmful to the state. The neoliberal approach inverts this: it is the state whose interventionist tendencies obstruct the rational play of the free market. The neoliberal worldview holds the idea of 'deregulation' and the withdrawal of state intervention as key tenets of socio-economic advancement. In contrast, the capture theory sees the state as being vulnerable to 'hostile takeovers' by business. The influence of corporate lobbying and an elite consensus on neoliberalism serve to institutionalise corporate control of the mechanisms of the state. This view has become popularised through the so-called 'alter-globalisation' literature, which describes the erosion of democratic control of the state by the voracious power of multinational capital. All three approaches, despite their clear differences, share a common view of the state and corporations which is based on opposition and externality – two sets of institutions which, depending on one's views, are antagonistic or beneficial in relation to each other.

However, the externalising of these relationships often relies on an artificial binary distinction between the state and capital. For example, in the case of post-apartheid South Africa, Ashman, Fine and Newman (2010:37) argue that:

> The financial system and the state are bound together by the minerals–energy complex. As we understand it, the complex is a close partnership between the state and private capital, with

> state-owned capital playing a major role… [The post-apartheid South African state] has chosen to adopt neo-liberal orthodoxy in deference to private capital's global goals, rather than coaxing or coercing private capital to invest in order to achieve economic growth and structural transformation. … Capital has disengaged itself quite successfully from the social crisis in South Africa and engaged fairly well with international business trends.

Rather than an external or forced imposition of policies or regulation, this entails state collusion and complicity (Leys, 2005). For example, in the context of state regulation of private security, Zedner (2006: 283) argues that 'reference to the ostensible subjects of regulation as partners and stakeholders firmly disabuses any notion that regulation here takes the form of hierarchical imposition of norms'. The state effectively panders and 'pimps' (267) to the industry. This process also entails direct institutional and personal alliances between governments and the private sector, as evidenced in the 'revolving doors' which exists between state and private personal (O'Reilly, 2010). Bassey (2010:91) argues that 'shock' capitalism circulates through a series of 'slick alliances' which link national political and security elites with external and transnational players. This allows private actors to 'hide' behind the localised military and institutional 'shield' provided by the state (ibid). In turn, this relationship provides substantial opportunities for enrichment by state elites and politically connected local economic players.

Whyte (2007) argues that the contemporary capitalist social order is characterised by a tension between the practical need to enforce a rule of law which preserves the viability of the economic system and ideological criteria which place the values of the 'free market' and accumulation above legal restrictions. The second impulse finds concrete expression during 'shock therapy' experiments which are accompanied by the 'creation of liminal and relatively hidden spaces which provide fertile locations for corruption involving private enterprise' (180). Whyte cites the occupation of Iraq as an example of shock *par excellence*. The US-led CPA issued a series of orders which attempted to refashion Iraq's political and economic structure into a neoliberal 'paradise', including the deregulation of wages and the labour market, the privatisation of state enterprises, the eradication of import tariffs and trade barriers and legal immunity for foreign contactors (181). Not only did this allow foreign companies to extract record profits from the country but the scale and intensity of appropriation, particularly of oil resources, saw an unknown amount of wealth accumulated through embezzlement, bribery and overcharging. Whyte (177) concludes that the attempt to transform Iraq into a massive 'free enterprise zone' was one of the 'most audacious and spectacular crimes of theft in modern history'. The conditions for this 'spectacular' theft were paved by another form of 'shock and awe': the invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq by the United States and its coalition allies. The radical experiment in privatisation was packaged into a dramatic expression of state power by the most powerful military apparatus in human history.

Indeed, Welch (2008) positions the Iraq war within a greater reconfiguration of state power. On the one hand, policing is being fragmented through the greater incorporation of private actors, seen in the mercenary companies who gained such notoriety during the occupation. However, this ‘decoupling’ of policing from governance is accompanied by a greater authoritarianism within the state, as corporate actors are removed from legal obligations via executive decree (361). This suggests that the outsourcing of some aspects of state security actively entrenches the power of governments in reducing the democratic accountability and public visibility of certain policing actions. As Hallsworth and Lea (2011) have argued, the privatisation of aspects of security augments rather than supplants the state, through increasing the number of actors who enforce social order. To return to O’Reilly (2010), it can be argued that the divide between public and private security actors is often an artificial separation, as the relationship between the state and corporate actors is characterised more by symbiosis than opposition.

Writing in the context of the beginning of neoliberal reforms in the early 1980s, Walter Karp (cited in Marcus, 1989:138) suggested that the aim of these policies was to

> ... release capitalism from its republican bondage ... to become what Karl Marx thought it would be by nature – the transcendent force and the measure of all things, the power that reduces free politics to trifling, the citizen to a worker, the public realm to the state, the state to an instrument of repression protecting capitalism from the menace of liberty and equality, with which it grew up as Cain grew up with Abel.

While neoliberal ideology claims to free individuals from the grip of overweening state power, in actual application, the privatisation and commodification of both urban space and policing has been accompanied by a marked intensification of intertwined corporate and state power throughout the world. As Klauser (2007) has suggested, within the context of mega-events, this has been a marked cause of social anxiety, as private interests wield the ability to rapidly restructure and enforce new boundaries upon urban space. The examples provided of corporate–state crime show that this logic is not the exclusive property of sporting organisations but extends even into inter-state conflicts and geopolitics. Political and economic actors may present their actions as public safety measures, from surveillance to paramilitary forms of policing, necessary to protect their citizens from domestic and international threats. However, there are many cases where the collaboration between the state and corporate actors extorts public funds, subverts the law and can leave damaging social legacies. In the most extreme cases, this reduces democracy to a mere procedural sheath for plutocratic enrichment.

Conclusion

This chapter has argued that the governance of mega-events serves as a concretisation of several overlapping themes within urban security. This links the commodification of public space with the increased corporate-state symbiosis on security issues and a global shift toward militarised and pre-emptive forms of policing. Arguably, this is undergird and radicalised by a psychopolitics of insecurity generated by the increased socio-economic polarisation of cities. To return to Neocleous's (2011:292) argument that studies of security are often limited by a reliance on distinctions between policing, militarism and social ordering, I have used military urbanism as a linking device to highlight how these are interconnected at the urban scale. In the case of mega-events, it has been suggested that the accompanying security measures actively bring to the surface many of these interrelated trends. At the same time, these shows of strength actively betray profound anxieties on the part of transnational elites about the social consequences and dangers created by the global political and economic order.

In contrast to the research described in the introduction, these chapters have attempted to problematise the idea of mega-event security as an unmitigated social good. Indeed, it has argued that security is more than just a response to risk but is linked to political and economic projects, representations and perception of dangers and threats and a transnational elite consensus on creating world class cities. These chapters have taken a critical stance on mega-event security, which maintains that governance is constructed to facilitate and fortify privilege and power within host countries. Most notably, it has argued that the corporate influence over security, as highlighted by the ownership structures of mega-events, is aligned with the entrenchment of authoritarian and militarised state security at the urban scale. However, due to the theoretical nature of this section, these developments have been discussed in abstracted and generalised terms. With the international context sketched out, the following chapters will turn to a focused study of the security operations for the 2010 World Cup.

Chapter Five: Methodology

As outlined within the first section of the opening chapter, this thesis adopts an interpretative epistemological approach towards security. Using the concept of securitisation (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, 1998) as a methodological base, the thesis aims to explore how security is constructed by political, economic and social processes. In particular, this contrasts with the 'realist' approach of previous literature on the governance of the 2010 World Cup, which focused on security as 'a political and ontological given, an objective fact and/or desire of all human beings and states' (Neocleous, 2007: 133).

As an emergent, inter-disciplinary field of research, there has yet to be a specific study of the methodological challenges of collecting primary material on mega-event security. Generally, critical research has used a two-pronged methodological strategy. Firstly, (Klauser, 2011:4) this has entailed the critical analysis of official reports, such as parliamentary minutes and police documents, and the collection of archival material from local, national and international media. Secondly, some researchers have been able to conduct interviews with a broad range of security 'stakeholders', such as high ranking police officials and 'on the ground' personal (ibid).

While this thesis has adopted this methodological approach, it has overwhelmingly focused on the first aspect of compiling an archive of reports, statements and media information. This was a matter of necessity due to the persistent difficulty in gaining access to 'stakeholders' in government and the private sector. From August 2009, I attempted to secure a series of interviews and site visits to the then uncompleted stadiums. In most cases, my efforts to organise interviews with SAPS and government representatives were unsuccessful. Although my initial requests for interviews met positive responses, in all cases agreed upon dates and times for interviews were cancelled and indefinitely postponed. As this fieldwork was conducted during the preparations for the tournament, respondents also claimed that various operational details could not be discussed. However, while unsuccessful in obtaining face-to-face interviews, I was able to conduct several interviews via email. Within this time period I was also able to secure a copy of the confidential OA/NATJOINTS security concept document from one of the coordinators of the Durban security preparations. Through a personal contact with a Sony subcontractor, I was allowed to conduct a walk-about of the main public area of the Nelson Mandela Bay stadium but this access did not extend to the operational rooms within the complex.

Similar problems were experienced in attempting to conduct interviews with members of sporting associations and the private security industry. FIFA and SAFA declined interview requests and only one private security contractor replied to my initial questions. After the 2010 World Cup had ended, I filed unsuccessful interview requests with the Minister of Police as well as attempting to use informal channels to interview the Commissioner General of Police. However, I was more successful in gaining an in-depth interview with a POPCRU steward. Finally, I was also provided with the phone number details for one of the stewards hired by Stallion Security for the 2010 World Cup, but after multiple attempts was unable to contact her.

However, according to a researcher from the investigative television programme *Carte Blanche* who I consulted with, getting interviews with police officials is generally difficult, even for well-established media production companies (personal correspondence with Leila Dougan, 22 September 2011). Furthermore, this may also be indicative of increased restrictions on academic and media access to the security services and government documentation (Duncan, 2011). This also created the practical problem of verifying police acronyms and titles, which are sometimes used in a flexible way within official documents, and the difficulty is further compounded by the change in ranking system. For example, from early 2010 some police media statements began referring to the SAPS by its former apartheid name the ‘South African Police Force’ (SAPF). However, this seemed to be only used in some reports and as of early 2012 appears to have been abandoned. As a result, this thesis refers to the ‘SAPS’ throughout.

As van der Spuy (2011: 6-7) suggests, the research methodology of policing and security studies in South Africa is often contingent on gaining ethnographic access to government institutions. This has focused on ‘constructive engagement’ with policy and attempts to create ‘intellectual partnerships’ between the police and researchers (6). In recent years, this has seen the growth of ‘on the ground’ research, which details the ‘raw, actual experiences’ of policing (7). However, while greater access to the police and military would have been desirable, this thesis focuses on the overall securitisation of the 2010 World Cup rather than exclusively on the South African state. Depicting the security governance of the 2010 World Cup requires a study of how this was planned and operationalised at national, provincial and urban scales, which is further complicated by the extent to which security measures are not just confined to a national setting but entail overlapping and multiple spatialities and levels of securitisation. For the duration of the tournament, South Africa’s national security measures were linked up with a ‘global security edifice’ (Cornelissen, 2011:3229), which involved the participation of transnational policing networks and the use of benchmarks applied at prior mega-events. This ‘research terrain’ (O’Reilly, 2010:183) is made even more ‘fuzzy’ by the security interfaces which occur between state security and high-level corporate actors from transnational sporting bodies and their advertising sponsors. Due to the secrecy which accompanies security measures, it may not be possible to identify all the involved parties and institutions.

This in turn, places restrictions on efforts to create a comprehensive survey of the governance process and of the institutional forces and security actors which undergird it. On the one hand, attempting to capture the multi-scalar and transient features of World Cup security may promote a focus on the national scale of tournament mobilisation. However, this may force researchers to rely on generalisations and to downplay the importance of regional and urban contexts. In addition, the secrecy associated with national security results in a situation in which much of the information about operations and deployment is not publically accessible. With regards to the 2010 World Cup, this is somewhat mitigated by the combination of security with state branding , which entailed that many aspects of security preparations, such as police numbers, expenditure and equipment procurement, were not only made public but actively promoted by the government. However, this presents its own problems as the rhetoric of security used by officials and disseminated through the media and academia may entail futher generalisations. In turn, it may simplify complex institutional ecologies, local specificities internal power struggles and underestimate the role of accident and chance, active official dissemination and exaggeration.

While the SAPS were the primary security agency for the tournament, security measures were both internationally ordered (Graham, 2010) and temporary. In order to capture the different nodes of this 'complex', the thesis adopted an investigative methodology (Hughes, 2007. Turse, 2008.), which used primary research to highlight the exchanges, collaborations and 'revolving doors' between the state, private sector and transnational institutions. This approach was used to identify the political economies which undergird security operations at the 2010 World Cup and to signpost the interactions between public policy and security technology and strategies.

As a result, the lack of access to official contacts was an advantage in certain respects. The positioning of researchers as 'partners' to government institutions may encourage an uncritical approach towards 'national security' and identification with the dictates of power (Chomsky, 1969). This thesis is thus intended as a critical analysis of security politics, rather than an in-depth record of the practical experience of policing the 2010 World Cup or as a series of policy prescriptions.

Chapter Six: The Security Governance of the 2010 FIFA World Cup, South Africa.

Introduction

Despite the research constraints noted in Chapter Five, Cornelissen (2011) and van der Spuy (2010) have both produced comprehensive surveys which identify the actors, operational deployments and logistics involved in the 2010 World Cup security measures. But while both of their articles provide a thorough framing of the security measures, and anchor the South African example within wider processes of mega-event governance, their respective analyses raise as many questions as they answer.

Cornelissen describes the World Cup security measures as a political project of fortifying the state undertaken by elites (3222) in a context in which the speed of post-apartheid socio-economic change has been accompanied by high levels of criminal violence and an attendant public mistrust in the ability of the state to provide security. While the South African World Cup occurred against an overarching political and economic structure of mega-event securitisation, the tournament was given an additional significance in that it preceded the staging of mega-events in Southern countries such as Brazil, which have comparable security dynamics and challenges (3222). However, Cornelissen argues that efforts to use the World Cup to fortify the state for the benefit of ordinary South Africans were circumscribed by the institutional framework dictated by FIFA, which served as a constraining factor that determined the parameters of state deployment (3227). The fixed nature of FIFA regulations meant that South African temporarily became part of the aforementioned 'global security edifice' (3229), which included FIFA, foreign security services and private security companies. However, FIFA used a combination of fixed frameworks, which provided little leeway for direct intervention by national and urban authorities, to ensure that security measures derived from its commercial and institutional preferences. Although this echoes some of the critiques of FIFA's role in South Africa outlined in Chapter One, Cornelissen suggests that the association's 'interventions' were marked by a 'desire to ensure adequate logistical and infrastructural readiness' (3228) rather than an focus on securing profits (Eick,2010).

In some cases, this enforced South Africa's skewed socio-spatial legacies by ensuring that World Cup venues were in gentrified and securitised retail and leisure areas (3231). From this standpoint, it remains to be seen whether the security infrastructure of the tournament left a legacy of improved urban security for all, or if it intensified exclusion (3235). Due to the exceptional nature of the tournament, it would be difficult for the state to maintain such a high degree of operational readiness, giving credibility to the argument that security measures failed to provide a durable legacy for ordinary South Africans (3233). Cornelissen suggests that the World Cup may then have long-term implications for the intensification of the ‘privatised securitisation’ of enclaves, access control and surveillance, in which the ‘state has tended to be a bystander’ whose sovereignty is undermined by the involvement of private and international security actors (3235). However, despite these concerns, she suggests that there are grounds to remain optimistic about the ‘accumulated knowledge practices and freshly piloted surveillance practices’ (ibid) of the World Cup leaving a positive security legacy, although conceding that this may have remained in already exclusive and securitised urban areas.

However, the figuring of the South Africa government as a security ‘bystander’ does not square with the ‘hyper-productivist’ (Brenner, 2001) role that the state played in delivering World Cup security. Despite the involvement of external actors, the South African government remained the statutory and operational platform for security, while the human, technological and financial resources deployed during the World Cup would have not been possible without significant state intervention. Put broadly, Cornelissen’s account of the South African government as a ‘politically fragile’ (3235) host serving as a mechanism for FIFA fails to account for the extent to which the security measures during mega-events require infrastructural developments and human resources which only a select number of countries are capable of mobilising (Bernhard and Martin, 2011).

By contrast, van der Spuy (2010:106) lauds the show of state power during the 2010 World Cup, and suggests that it reinforced the state’s political and organisational authority and served symbolically as a ‘bold assertion of the role of the state in the fractured world of modern security’. This broad affirmation of sovereignty was dependent on the role of a ‘centralised and militarised security machine’ (107), coordinated at urban, regional, national and transnational scales. The generous allocation of state resources allowed for the creation of a ‘war machine’ operating at horizontal and vertical levels, which was pre-emptively responsive to a range of threats, from crime to ‘domestic extremism’, including protests and strikes (112). Van der Spuy suggests that the penalties for security failure, and by extension the failure of the government to meet its security guarantees to FIFA, would have had ‘dire consequences’ but does not elaborate on their content and implications. While it is conceded that there were concerns about the extent to which the security measures and criminal justice system appeared to zealously protect the commercial interests of FIFA, it is suggested that the regulatory framework of the tournament maintained a strict distinction between national security and the policing of FIFA’s interests. Van der Spuy acknowledges that while tournament security may have had ‘illiberal tendencies’ (109) such as the displacement of the urban poor and clampdowns on labour action, the ultimate barometer of the success of security measures is the extent to which the institutional legacies of the ‘war machine’’ (112) can be utilised in everyday policing. This, she concludes, is dependent on the question of accountability and the extent to which the security expenditure can be justified, based on long-term applicability. In particular, she argues that the focus created by a shared security project can transcend the ‘sectarian impulses’ (109) which undermine institutional cooperation. More exactly, this would entail ‘political, financial and social accountability for the decisions made regarding the prioritisation of the security concerns of some over others’ (120).

What is not considered is that the securitisation of mega-events itself can be used to justify extraordinary and exceptional measures which provide a legitimation for an official lack of accountability. Indeed the role of an extra-national organisation such as FIFA in influencing the trajectory of national security is unexplored. In contrast to Cornelissen, van der Spuy prioritises the role of the state. However, the role of the government in enforcing commercial restrictions on the behalf of FIFA is sidestepped, or rather, regarded as a secondary concern to the issue of how security measures can be best maximised for post-tournament application. She concludes that the test of the success of security measures will be in their applicability to ‘ordinary’ security governance: it is surprising then that while she describes the measures as a militarised war machine there is no mention made of this being accompanied by parallel efforts to militarise the everyday role of the SAPS. In this sense it may be posited that inasmuch as ‘excessive’ responses are created by special circumstances, these may equally have been indicative of a broader governmental trajectory.

Although Cornelissen and van der Spuy provide detailed and wide ranging accounts of the chronology, extent and scope of the World Cup security measures, their analyses cohere on the idea of security as an unquestionable good (Neocleous, 2000). For the former, the question is how to ensure that security legacies become more accessible to the broader public, while for the latter the ultimate test is how to ensure the best deployment into post-World Cup policing. Essentially, the central question remains of how the state can best be aided in improving security. The presentation of the World Cup as an event which required exceptional security measures is assumed as a self-evident truth. Furthermore, it is assumed that different actors wanted to implement a ‘flat, apoltical’ (Boyle, 2011) form of security practice, centred on protecting crowds against real threats of terrorism and crime. For instance, while Cornelissen acknowledges that the ‘discursive legitimations’ (3225) for mega-events may justify intrusions into the rights of citizens, it is implied that this could be positive if it can be proved to ‘have bolstered the state’ and its ability to fight crime (3235).

Notably, Cornelissen and van der Spuy both adopt a figuring of the relationship between the state and capital which is based on externality and opposition (Tombs and Whyte, 2009). While Cornelissen argues that the state’s efforts to provide durable security for all South Africans was limited by the frameworks mandated by FIFA, van der Spuy suggests that the World Cup served as a bold assertion of state power in the midst of a more privatised security landscape. Despite these differences, they both share the assumption that the state’s role in security has been reduced and superseded by private actors. In this sense, it is implied that the bolstering of the state’s coercive powers are in fact social goods. However, this underestimates the extent to which the state security apparatus can itself be a force of oppression and a cause of social anxiety (Souza, 2010b: 320)

So while Cornelissen and van der Spuy cite some of the research discussed in Chapter Two, they underplay the more critical aspect of this work. For example, Cornelissen (3222) references Giulianotti and Klauser (2010) and Gaffney (2010) as evidence of how countries like South Africa provide a 'complex securitisation terrain'. Van der Spuy (108) alludes to Boyle and Haggerty's discussion of spectacular security (2009) to describe how mega-events maintain an 'expanded logic' of risk prevention.

But neither of them addresses the aspects of these theoretical templates which problematise the normalisation of mega-event exceptionality. In varying degrees, the works cited above argue that the intensification of mega-event security is as much indicative of contemporary political power as it is of a pragmatic response to increasingly dangerous urban environments. The policing measures of mega-events may entail the temporary establishment of extra-legal forms of security governance, dramatic amplifications of state power, the denial of civil liberties, and usage of the rhetoric of exceptionality to leverage social compliance. Cornelissen and van der Spuy hint that these may be outcomes of security governance, but these are presented as unintended consequences rather than structural facets of these temporary security assemblages.

As a result, both accounts underestimate the extent to which the concept of security may be enfolded into a range of institutional agendas and projects which go substantially beyond protecting publics from risk. In turn, this leads to the question of how the 2010 World Cup was securitised or presented as a referent object demanding exceptional protection (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, 1998). As Bernhard and Martin (2011) argue, this requires an overview of the political and societal processes through which security is constructed. However, the size and import of this question requires its own study, which will be provided in the next chapter. While this chapter will present evidence which suggests that the institutions involved in governance are not merely neutral security providers, the focus is squarely on describing the size and scale of deployments. This chapter is intended to create a contextual and historical backdrop against which later, more overtly theoretical chapters can be framed.

This chapter will thus take a different route in describing the security governance of the 2010 World Cup. Although this process did entail differences and conflicts between the government and private actors, these were overshadowed by a far greater degree of collaboration between FIFA and the South African government. It will be argued that the while the World Cup security measures enrolled a multiplicity of agents and organisations, and worked upon a set of security templates and procedures outlined by FIFA, these were actualised through the state security apparatus. Furthermore, it will challenge the idea of this as a politically neutral reassertion of the state's ability to deliver security for its citizenry. While van der Spuy and Cornelissen both omit the remilitarisation of the SAPS from their account of security governance, this chapter will propose that this process was in fact linked into the preparations for the 2010 World Cup. This is intended to begin a repoliticisation (Neocleous, 2000) of the security operations for the 2010 World Cup which will be developed in subsequent chapters.

Chapter Summary

In the six-year lead-up period to South Africa's hosting of the 2010 FIFA World Cup, the issue of security drew more scrutiny than any other area of preparation. Most notably, international media coverage was characterised by scepticism about the state's capacity to successfully orchestrate and manage an incident-free event. Although issues such as terrorism were raised, the bulk of the focus fell upon the country's violent crime situation. This chapter will consider how the South African government, with assistance from FIFA, foreign states and the private sector organised and implemented safety and security measures.

Heightened, and in many cases exaggerated, security risks are common to events of such magnitude and, in the case of South Africa, most of these concerns stemmed from the country's reputation for high rates of violent crime. Although this provided impetus to extensive security operations, this was planned within the confines of a legislative and regulatory framework mandated by FIFA. As a result, the 2010 security measures reflected the spatial and governance characteristics established in previous tournaments.

While the primary statutory policing responsibilities rested with the South African government, the SAPS and the LOC, security measures also enrolled the participation of regional and transnational policing bodies such as INTERPOL. In addition, the South African government worked with the policing and intelligence bodies of other countries, whose representatives were deployed in the country during the tournament. Finally, the security network also extended to the participation of the private security sector, which was active in a variety of capacities.

With the SAPS as the primary operational lynchpin, national government drafted a security plan which was replicated at provincial and local levels. In particular, the creation of the National Joint Operational and Intelligence Structure (NATJOINTS) was used to coordinate the mobilisations of the SAPS, the national defence force (SANDF), state intelligence, metropolitan police services and private security employees. Although initial plans entailed that the LOC was responsible for safety within the 10 designated event stadia, the state took over these duties after a series of wage disputes with the company subcontracted to provide stadium services. Security measures also entailed the cooperation of various government departments, metropolitan emergency and health services and the intensification of security measures around national ports of entry. In practice, this entailed that a wide remit of public policy normally considered distinct from policing, such as health, transport and energy was incorporated into security. Using a militarised command and control structure, government institutions worked to install an unprecedented public–private policing operation throughout designated urban geographies.

Along with the supranational and national factors which determined the security regime implemented during the 2010 World Cup, host cities implemented their own plans. Although these were largely standardised, in accord with the host city agreements dictated by FIFA and national security plans, urban authorities used the resources provided by tournament preparations to augment their existing security and surveillance resources.

The sophisticated, albeit temporary, ‘war machine’ established during the World Cup appeared in tandem with the state’s attempts to remilitarise the SAPS. This chapter will argue that the pre-World Cup ‘war talk’ on the part of the state may have been as much a public relations enterprise as a coherent strategy. However, even if the reasoning behind remilitarisation lacked a coherent articulation at a policy level, a concurrent rise in police violence suggest that the concept of remilitarisation has disturbing ramifications for the role of the police in post-apartheid society, which threaten to roll back the moves made towards civilianisation.

While the months prior to the 2010 World Cup saw concerns raised about the threat of criminal and political violence, owing to events such as the Cabinda terrorist attacks on the Togolese football team and the murder of Eugene Terreblanche, the actual event was characterised by the relative absence of major security incidents. From the perspective of both FIFA and the South African government, the 2010 World Cup was considered a security success. However, at many points this success was reliant on the use of repressive measures such as restrictions on protest.

The research for this chapter is based on interviews, planning documents, parliamentary minutes and news reports. However, it should also be noted that the methodology is restricted by the nature of national security, in which many details of planning are not publicly available as they are considered to be ‘sensitive’ information by the state.

State Branding

Security fears: South Africa and the international context.

As with other mega-events, the lead-up to South Africa's hosting of the 2010 World Cup was accompanied by often highly critical local and international media coverage of the government and LOC's preparations. Not only was South Africa the first African country to host an event of such magnitude but the country's high rates of violent crime meant that much coverage suggested that the country was not a safe destination for prospective tourists. Furthermore, reports exhibited a pronounced scepticism about the state's capacity to secure the event, particularly in light of the stringent security criteria which have come to accompany mega-events.

This negative reporting was given credence by statements made by sporting and political officials who appeared to echo this scepticism. For example, in 2006, Eric Bost, the US ambassador to South Africa publicly suggested that the crime situation would discourage visitors (News24, 2006). A year later, FIFA secretary general Jerome Valcke also claimed to be concerned about the crime situation in the country and said that security was a more pertinent issue for South Africa than with previous hosting countries (News24, 2007). This was accompanied by allegations that FIFA had considered Australia as the 'Plan B' host in the case of a major security incident in South Africa (MacGregor, 2009).

The media prominence attributed to the tournament allowed stories which linked crime to the 2010 World Cup to garner a substantial amount of coverage. For example, in January 2010, the local e-TV network broadcast a clip of two self-described vehicle hijackers announcing their intention to commit armed robberies during the tournament. Later in the same week, much coverage was given to an British-based company Protektorvest, which offered 'stab proof' body armour for prospective visitors. While the LOC denounced the company for attempting to capitalise on fear, one investigative report suggested that the story may have been an elaborate hoax (Mouton, 2010). The impact of the media reporting on security was regarded as an issue of central importance to the organisers of the tournament. City of Cape Town official Richard Bosman, who coordinated the Western Cape Security stream, admitted that the 2010 tournament preparations were conceived of as a trial by media: 'we consistently looked at what the media were saying, and aimed to change some of these negative perceptions… security is not just about crime, it also about ensuring that our streets are clean. Service delivery is also a part of our security planning' (interview, 20 July 2010). In the face of such negative publicity, the organisers were quick to disassemble and question the legitimacy of such portrayals. The Proterktorvest incident was denounced as shameless profiteering from fear, with official police magazine *Rivoningo* claiming that 'the risk of indiscriminate stabbing is very low for an individual who attends a soccer match at a stadium, or at any of South Africa's tourism venues' (Shabangu, 2010: 22).

Former Deputy Minister of Police, Fikile Mbalula, further argued that negative reporting deliberately chose to present South Africa as a 'war zone' (ibid). The characterisation of crime in South Africa as a kind of low-intensity civil war was a trope which gained much media traction in the lead-up to the World Cup and is indicative of how the country has garnered an international reputation for violence. In turn, the extent to which South African cities have been presented as 'phobopolises' (Souza, 2011) was to provide a powerful impetus for a stringent security regime.

Organisers also maintained that many negative media reports were reflective of underlying racist stereotypes about Africa as a continent defined by violence, war and immiseration. For example, when reports emerged which claimed that political violence in Angola could disrupt South Africa's security plans, the President of the LOC, Danny Jordaan, argued that such stories were based on a warped colonial geography in which Africa is viewed as a homogenous whole:

> If there is a war in Kosovo and a World Cup in Germany, no one asks if the World Cup can go on in Germany; everyone understands the war in Kosovo is a war in Kosovo. The world must be balanced and must not apply different standards when it comes to the African continent. Our World Cup is secure and we are confident because we have employed a lot of resources to safeguard the event in our country (Smith, 2010a).

South African organisers cited a prior institutional record of hosting major events such as the 1995 Rugby World Cup and the 2003 Cricket World Cup. Indeed, the SAPS was able to plan and implement successful security measures for the 2009 Indian Premier League (IPL) cricket series in a matter of weeks after the tournament was hastily moved to South Africa from India owing to concerns about terrorism. During the bidding process for the World Cup, South African organisers brought attention to this record and in particular cited the case of the security measures for the 2002 UN World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, which were subsequently adopted as a blueprint for UN summits (SAFA, 2003a:9:0). However, as Yasmin Sooka (2003:58) described it, 'One would have thought that South Africa had gone to war during the Summit'. The police using stun grenades to disperse a candlelight procession and armed soldiers performed crowd control during a march by the Social Movements Indaba from the Alexandra Township to the convention centre in upmarket Sandton (ibid). However, while Sooka describes this policing exercise as echoing apartheid-era practices, it can also be argued that such tactics also reflect a globalised repertoire of reactive crowd control at major political events (Martin, 2011).

Indeed, the implementation of national security measures during mega-events cannot be separated from a wider transnational context of mega-event securitisation. In the case of the 2010 World Cup, the state's institutional experience in enforcing national security was combined with procedures applied at previous mega-events throughout the world. In this sense, mega-events governance stands as an example of 'debordered' (Coaffee and Murakami Wood , 2006) security, in which a broadly homogenous set of policing procedures are implemented at regional and urban scales, although institutional and resource factors may result in substantive differences in deployment within different contexts.

Security and Commercialism

FIFA's security frameworks and legislation

As a consequence of this, the nature of policing operations was profoundly impacted by a fixed legislative framework, mandated by FIFA. Furthermore, this incorporated standardised operational templates and arrangements employed at previous mega-events rather than wholly created by national and local conditions. In particular, the security framework which the government implemented as per its guarantees as a host country paid specific attention to the commercial and intellectual property rights of FIFA and its business partners. FIFA is the owner of all World Cup-related marketing, media, ticketing and licensing rights. FIFA's sponsors are divided into tiers. The top tier 'FIFA partners' are at the highest level of sponsorship: Adidas, Coca-Cola, Emirates Airline, Hyundai, Sony and Visa. These six were granted certain exclusive marketing rights during 2010: for instance advertising boards inside stadiums, having their corporate logos appear on TV screens as background to the score line during actual matches, etc. The other sponsors who had limited rights during the 2010 World Cup include Anheuser-Busch (the maker of Budweiser), Electronic Arts (creators of the popular official FIFA video game series) and McDonalds. The South African national corporate supporters were First National Bank, Telkom SA, BP Africa, NeoAfrica and Prasa.

The 2003 Bid Book

Prior to the awarding of hosting rights in 2004, the official South African Bid Book (SAFA, 2003a) outlined how the specific security provisions for the event would align with FIFA criteria. Security measures detailed in the Bid Book range from counter-terror protocols, such as emergency provisions for the discharge of chemical, biological and radiological weapons, to the designation and restriction of commercial activities.

The Bid Book promised an exhaustive security approach to the World Cup and details how the NATJOINTS (National Joint Operation and Intelligence Structure) structure would be used to organise policing at ports of entry, aerial and maritime defence, inner city and stadium security, close protection of FIFA delegates, football teams and political dignitaries and overall crime prevention.

The book lists the SAPS as the primary operational driver and co-coordinator of World Cup security, but notes that this was intended to be a collaborative process with the LOC. In turn, the LOC security directorate was to be made up of representatives from state security, organised labour and representatives of the private security industry (9.2). The security operations outlined in the Bid Book provide a good example of the post 9/11 mega-event planning environment, in that it details an exhaustive series of counter-measures to prevent urban terrorism and crime while proposing that these were to be undertaken in a 'people friendly' environment (ibid). However, the Bid Book leaves the exact size and scale of national security measures undeclared.

The proposed measures also incorporated the 'protection of FIFA property rights' (9.3.5) through the spatial 'sterilisation of non-official advertising' (9.3.15). Furthermore, the safety and security section of the Bid Book concludes with the acceptance of liability from any safety and security incidents arising from the 2010 World Cup by SAFA and the relevant government departments (9.6). This was accompanied by the concurrent extension of indemnification to FIFA and its commercial affiliates (ibid).

The Organising Agreement

Security was included as one of the 17 guarantees which the South African government signed with FIFA in July 2003, prior to the awarding of hosting rights (9.3.5). In turn, this was mirrored by the signing of host city agreements after the bid was awarded in 2004. The contractual obligations of the state security services were codified in the Organising Agreement between FIFA and SAFA (FIFA/OA, 2004). Under the agreement, SAFA was required to establish a local organising committee, whose primary role was to act as FIFA's agent in negotiating and lobbying for the collaboration of national and local government in ensuring infrastructural, administrative and legal support (28). In terms of security measures this entailed that:

> The Organising Association, in accordance with the respective governmental guarantees shall at all times be fully responsible for and guarantee the general security, safety and personal protection especially of the FIFA delegation, media and spectators, as well as all people involved in, participating in and/or attending the Championship throughout their entire stay in the host country. This shall at all times include the security of people at airports, inside and outside controlled access sites, hotels, stadiums, official training sites, the international broadcast centre, media centres, any official areas and other areas where they are present in the host country before, during and after the championship (87).

The LOC was further delegated the responsibility of drafting a security plan by 30 June 2009 based on FIFA guidelines and prior mega-events to ensure the 'highest possible level of security at all times' (88). In addition, the Organising Agreement ensured indemnity for FIFA and its commercial affiliates and stipulated that all security costs were to be borne by the Organising Association and the South

African government (ibid). While government's NATJOINTS structure was given the responsibility for providing a national security plan, the LOC's safety and security directorate was responsible for the safety plan of the event. This utilised joint planning to ensure the integration of national security and event safety (OA/NATJOINTS, 2008:9). In terms of practical deployment, this was supposed to entail a delineated spatial separation of security duties. The government was obligated to provide national security, a spatially and conceptually widely-framed definition which included the creation and activation of joint structures for the event alongside ordinary law enforcement duties. The LOC was responsible for event-related safety and access control in and around stadium precincts, fan parks and walks and other FIFA designated venues.

In other words, while the state maintained an official monopoly of the use of coercive force, such as the powers of arrest and access to weaponry, the LOC was allocated the duty of performing the monitoring and regulation of tournament-related commerce and crowd behaviour. This also entailed that FIFA became the primary authority within stadium exclusion zones, a temporary arrangement which only lasted for the duration of the World Cup. According to the Bid Book, the LOC was to ensure that stadiums were handed over to FIFA for a period of exclusive use after meeting a series of agreed upon security regulations. For example, while the Bid Book notes that South Africa has not had a history of spectator violence, making it 'unnecessary to install the oppressive permitted fencing used elsewhere in the football world' it promised that 'applicable fences or moats would be installed for the tournament' (SAFA, 2003a: 10.1.5).

However, despite this demarcation, the original government guarantee included a security 'trapdoor'. The guarantee stipulated that the state was to ensure 'all security measures necessary for the World Cup' including at 'stadiums' and 'any official area and other areas where accredited persons and/or spectators are present' (4.5), implying that the government would be expected to perform inner stadium duties in the case of the LOC defaulting. Indeed, this would prove to be the case during the actual tournament, when the SAPS took over stadium policing at half of the World Cup stadiums.

2006 Special Measures Act

The guarantees were formalised in 2006 with the promulgation of the 2010 FIFA World Cup Special Measures Act (Republic of South Africa, 2006). In addition, under the terms of the Merchandise Mark Act of 1941, the 2010 World Cup was declared a 'protected event' entitled to an exceptional level of commercial protection by the state. The Special Measures Act brought into law both proscriptions and suspensions of regulations, which FIFA indicated as being essential to the successful purveyance of the championship. The Act allowed the LOC, in conjunction with the SAPS National Commissioner, to declare stadiums, public viewing areas and other 2010-related facilities as designated areas which could not be accessed without accreditation (16), and allowed the LOC to identify exclusion zones which prohibited unlicensed commercial activity (ibid). The Act also created 'traffic free zones' within exclusion zones and enabled 'peace officers' search and seizure powers for vehicles and persons within these zones (19).

The Act's creation of a legal framework for the establishment of an archipelago of exclusion zones was accompanied by the temporary suspension of certain restrictions. These included suspensions of some of the marketing and distribution restrictions on liquor within stadiums and on some of the prohibitions on unregistered medicines. While the former was for the benefit of commercial affiliates, the latter was intended to facilitate the accreditation of the medical contingents accompanying host teams.

In practice, the Act laid the framework for the commercial restrictions which were spatially enforced by state security. By the time the tournament began, the initial exclusion zones laid out in the Act were accompanied by commercial restriction zones. Exclusion zones pertained to the area within stadium precincts that were strictly the domain of FIFA and its partners and in which no unofficial trading was allowed (Cape Town Partnership, 2009). Commercial restriction zones were 'invisible but nonetheless demarcated areas' (Ibid) outside of stadiums, including areas in and around fan parks, fan walks and public viewing areas. The SAPS worked in conjunction with FIFA's rights protection team to look for examples of counterfeit goods, unauthorised traders around stadiums and ambush marketing (Joburg Host City, 2009). Ambush marketing restrictions defined a large swathe of activities as illegitimate including:

> branded, private fan parks and amusement areas (for example, no branded beer gardens – unless it's Budweiser!), branded hospitality areas (eg: branded in plain public view – as in visible to the street), branded hospitality areas (eg: branded in plain public view – as in visible to the street), aerial advertising (blimps, balloons, or other airships), unauthorized street trading or vendors, any political and religious demonstrations (Cape Town Partnership, 2009).

OA/ NATJOINTS General Security Concept 2008

The confidential LOC and NATJOINTS General Security Concept (GSC) (2008), which was presented to all 'stakeholders' as a preliminary to the detailed deployment plan of 2009, clearly illustrates that government's conceptualisation of security for the tournament identified the institutional agendas of FIFA and its commercial partners as one its key priorities. Planning for the South African context used prior FIFA security 'traditions' and 'international best practice' as a benchmark (5). Based on integrated planning between the LOC and NATJOINTS and consultation with provincial and urban authorities, the GSC promised to coordinate 'cooperation' and 'support' for the World Cup in which 'maximum security will be planned for, but proportionally implemented' (10).

In turn, FIFA requirements functioned as the mitochondrial base for security planning. Each host province was required to produce a detailed operational plan which reflected the minimum standards outlined in FIFA's list of requirements and the guarantees which government had signed with the organisation in 2003 (13). At a national level, the SAPS identified cooperation with the LOC on the enforcement of FIFA rights and the protection of its delegates as one of its key national priorities, alongside crime prevention and law enforcement (16). An entire section of the GSC is dedicated to the safety of high-ranking members of the FIFA 'family', with the president, vice presidents and secretary general each being allocated officers from the SAPS Protection and Security Service Division , which provides security for government officials, visiting politician and national strategic sites and installations.

Host city by-laws

In addition, each of the nine host cities was obligated to enact a series of FIFA-driven by-laws. These dealt with a range of issues, from city beautification drives to advertising restrictions, and were adopted prior to the World Cup and remained in effect until two weeks after the tournament had ended (eThekwini Municipality, n.d.). The by-laws were used to enforce the spatial and advertising restrictions mandated by FIFA and gave legal force to each cities establishment of exclusion zones and controlled access areas around stadiums. Notably, this entailed substantial restrictions of advertising around stadiums, fan parks, and around airports and train stations: these prescriptions also extended to private property (25-6).

In effect, security by-laws extended throughout host cities, including the demarcation of special lanes on public roads for emergency use by the FIFA delegation and participating teams (40). The beautification requirements included were exceptionally stringent and included the prohibition of visible signs of major construction near tournament venues, major transport centres and entertainment areas (31). Under the by-laws, municipalities were empowered to suspend construction work, without compensation, for the duration of the tournament.

Cornelissen (2011:3228) argues that while the legal agreements were standard operating procedure for FIFA events, the association took a more overtly intrusive stance towards the South African government's preparations than during past tournaments. For example, she cites the case of FIFA's attempts to forestall the implementation of the Safety at Sports Events and Recreation Events Bill, which aimed to enforce standardised stadium security in South Africa in the wake of the 2001 Ellis

Park stadium disaster in which 43 spectators died. FIFA asked the government to defer the implementation of the Bill, which they claimed would place overly stringent constraints on the organisation of the tournament. Although the Bill was passed in early 2010, the World Cup was granted a special exemption.

In other cases, FIFA intervened in the selection of match venues against the initial preferences of host cities, such as insisting that Cape Town move its main venue for the upgraded Athlone stadium to a new stadium in the wealthier Green Point area (ibid). According to a report in one South African newspaper, FIFA had objected to the initial plan because the low-cost housing around the Athlone venue did not provide a suitable media backdrop for the tournament, with one delegate allegedly claiming that 'one billion television viewers do not want to see poverty on this scale' (The Antidote,2007).

Although the government worked to publicly present a unified and seamless working relationship with FIFA, there was at least one instance where a high-ranking police official expressed frustration with how the sporting body dealt with security issues. In May 2010, National Police Commissioner Bheki Cele claimed in parliament that, in the wake of the Cabinda shootings:

> On 27th January we received an SOS call from FIFA. We were a bit annoyed that they were calling us like a schoolboy called by the principal, but understanding the seriousness of the World Cup we complied and met the secretary general of FIFA at OR Tambo Airport. The secretary general was almost in tears because of the pressure he was under to withdraw the World Cup from South Africa (IOL, 2010b).

Urban authorities were faced with the difficulty of patterning local security planning into the wider FIFA framework. For example, the Mangaung Muncipality, which was responsible for preparations in the host city of Bloemfontein, said that their communicative strategy with the media was constrained by having to get permission from FIFA before it could publicly release details to the press (PMG, 2006a).

There also appeared to be lack of clarity as to the ramifications of many of the commercial aspects contained in security measures. While concerns were raised about local business being excluded from capitalising on the tournament during the parliamentary deliberations on the Special Measures Act, this occurred after the host city agreements had already been signed, thus committing urban authorities to the implementation of commercial restrictions (PMG, 2006b). Host cities and institutions such as the Defence Force claimed that they had not been informed of the scope and ramifications of commercial security restrictions and that they were obliged to plan for their enforcement without prior consultation (PMG, 2006b). Gaps in institutional communication also occurred within the South African government. As late as March 2010, the parliamentary defence portfolio committee had yet to be briefed on the role of the military during the World Cup (Jordan, 2010). Furthermore, committee members claimed that they had not been given access to the security guarantees which the government had signed with FIFA.

While the organisation did appear to take a directly interventionist stance with regard to issues such as stadium venues, in other cases it appeared to leave the operational details up to the relevant hosting authorities, as per the hosting agreements. For example, all inquiries into security matters were automatically referred to the South African government and the LOC (automatic email response by FIFA, 18 March 2010). Furthermore, while planning documents promised continual coordination between the LOC and NATJOINTS, in practice there appeared to be significant gaps in communication between the two bodies. As Omar (2007:68) notes, the original liaison committee between NATJOINTS and the LOC's security directorate 'fell away', owing to officials not attending meetings and a lack of follow-up on agreements. In particular, the LOC's outsourcing of private security for stadiums proved to be highly problematic. During the Confederations Cup in 2009, the SAPS had to perform stadium duty after Stallion Security withdrew, alleging that the LOC was only paying R300 for 12 hour guard shifts (Basson and Tolsi, 2010). However, Minister Mthethwa claimed that the LOC had performed an exceptional job during the Confederations Cup (Gabara, 2009). Despite concerns from NATJOINTS, the company was again contracted to perform inner perimeter duty for some stadiums during the 2010 World Cup.

In September 2010, Mthethwa claimed that the SAPS would seek remuneration from the LOC for the additional duties performed during the World Cup, and blamed the committee for not concluding proper security contracts (The Star, 2010). However, this was complicated by the fact that Mthethwa was himself a member of the LOC's board of directors (Who's Who SA, 2010). Indeed, the individual composition of the LOC board problematises the idea of a strict distinction between the LOC and the government. Joining Mthethwa were the Ministers of Justice and Constitutional Development, Home Affairs, Human Settlements, Transport, International Relations and Cooperation and the Deputy Minister of Finance. Also on the board were Zwelinzima Vavi, the General Secretary of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), three former cabinet ministers and prominent figures from soccer administration, business and the media. In addition, the head of the LOC's security directorate, Linda Mti was the former Commissioner of the Department of Correctional Affairs, who had left government in 2006 amidst allegations of tender irregularities. While the initial agreements stipulated that the role of the LOC was to 'lobby and/or petition the government' (FIFA/OA, 2004:28) as directed on FIFA's behalf, the actual composition of the LOC executive blurred this distinction, through actively enrolling the participation of state officials directly responsible for security measures during the 2010 World Cup.

Transnational Policing and the Private Security Sector

Regional and continental cooperation

The security measures also involved state centred forms of cooperation, including intelligence exchanges, observer missions and training. The Southern African Development Community (SADC), which coordinates relations between fifteen Southern African states, held meetings of its respective security services to better coordinate efforts through the creation of a regional security plan (All Africa, 2010a) while an undisclosed number of policeman from member states were deployed in a support capacity during the World Cup. In addition, the annual meetings of the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (SARPCCO) were used as a platform for cooperation and information sharing in the lead-up to the tournament (SARPCCO, 2010). The Southern African Standby Brigade, consisting of troops and police officers from SADC states, was also placed on alert during the World Cup (Department of Defence, 2010: 81). South Africa maintained close operational links with adjoining states during the World Cup. For example, the government established joint operating centres with Zimbabwe, Botswana and Mozambique to monitor activities at national borders (IOL, 2010c).

INTERPOL

At the international scale, policing cooperation involved the direct participation of INTERPOL. As part of the security arrangements, the South African government was given access to INTERPOL's Stolen and Lost Travel Documents Database, to 'identify security risks' at national points of entry (Mail and Guardian, 2010). INTERPOL liaised closely with both the SAPS and FIFA, which included a security meeting at FIFA headquarters in Zurich 'the first of its kind in FIFA's history – bringing together INTERPOL, Chiefs of Police, Heads of Security and police liaison officers from all 32 participating nations, providing a vital opportunity to share a comprehensive planning approach and coordination of security' (INTERPOL, 2010).

In the lead-up to the tournament, INTERPOL coordinated raids on illegal soccer betting syndicates in several Asian countries, and has subsequently strengthened its relationship with FIFA, with the football body providing the largest ever private donation in INTERPOL's history to establish an anti-match fixing unit (FIFA, 2011a). During the World Cup, INTERPOL was actively involved in joint operations with the SAPS through the biggest ever single deployment of its Major Events Support Team (IMEST). This included screening passengers at airports and transnational borders, conducting

600,000 spot checks against INTERPOL databases and providing criminal intelligence to the SAPS which led to the arrests of individuals on INTERPOL's wanted lists (INTERPOL, 2010).

IMEST was stationed at the 'world first' International Police Coordination Centre at Burgers Park Hotel in Pretoria, which included 225 foreign police officers from the 27 participating teams (defenceWeb,2010a). Although these officers had no arresting powers, they were deployed in both uniform and plain clothes in and outside stadiums, performing support roles such as liaising with their national spectators and identifying disruptive behaviour (NATJOINTS, 2010a). Collaboration with international institutions extended to the United Nations. South Africa's counter-terrorism strategies and capacities were reviewed by the United Nations Counter Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED) (Botha, 2008). The government also consulted with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the detection of 'dirty bombs', which use conventional explosives to disperse radioactive material (Global Security Newswire, 2010).

Policing support and exchanges

In addition to the use of foreign police officers in a support capacity, the national teams of Brazil, the USA, Denmark, France and Brazil were accompanied by their own security staffs. For example, the British team was shadowed by undercover agents from the Special Air Services (SAS) and the Control Risk security company, itself made up of former South African special forces soldiers (Potgieter and Powell, 2010:1). These team-specific detachments were complemented by additional contingents of intelligence officials for foreign dignitaries (ibid). The presence of high-profile political officials created additional security challenges for the SAPS. Bheki Cele publicly alleged that the FBI was vacillating on the question of whether President Barack Obama would attend the World Cup, claiming that 'our famous prayer is that the Americans don't make the second round. We are told that if it goes to the second or third stage, the US president may come. At the moment we have 43 heads of state provisionally confirmed. That 43 will be equal to this one operation' (TimesLive, 2010). In any case, Obama would ultimately not attend the tournament, although Vice President Joe Biden was present at the opening ceremony.

In the build-up to the World Cup, South African observers were also dispatched to major sporting events in Korea, Japan and Brazil (van der Spuy, 2010:111). Police officials were represented at the 2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany, 2008 UEFA tournament in Austria and Switzerland and the 2008 Beijing Olympics (Mthethwa,2010a).

At the inter-state level, security expertise was brokered through a host of linkages with other national governments and urban authorities. The SAPS maintained close links with the British police throughout the preparatory stages of the 2010 World Cup, including sharing information on counter-terrorism, crowd management and hooliganism. Aspects of the City of London's Project Griffin model were incorporated into security planning (Timeslive, 2007). Originally designed as a counter-terrorism strategy to protect London's financial district, the project has since been given wider use in crime prevention and crowd control through coordinating police and private security. In addition, SAPS officers received training from members of New Scotland Yard's counter-terrorism command (SAPS Journal Online, 2009a). South African experience of security planning during the 2010 World Cup may have been of particular interest to British police owing to its proximity to the 2012 London Olympics.

In the lead-up to the 2010 World Cup, the SAPS received training from the French gendarmes in crowd control 'methodology' (Metswamere, 2009). This was motivated both in terms of the specific French experience of policing the 1998 World Cup tournament and a general 'experience' with rioting and social upheaval. This transference of skills is part of a wider agreement between the South African and French governments which aims at reinforcing the SAPS's capacity to 'respond to terrorist threats and tackle international criminal networks' through the 'training of members in specialised fields, procurement of specialised technical equipment, as well as the sharing of expertise in the field'(Ndawonde, 2009a). The collaboration extended to the presence of French officers at a series of exercises outside of stadiums during which, 'The SAPS Public Order Police Service and members of the TRT [Tactical Response Team] effectively dealt with the riotous behaviours using SAPS recruits as the pawns in the simulation exercises' (SAPS Journal Online, 2010a).

The government also maintained a series of security relationships with the United States. The Federal Bureau of Investigation assisted in training police on issues of terrorism financing and money laundering (McKenzie, 2008). Although not widely reported in the South African media, joint police and military exercises were conducted with SOCOM (Human, 2010), which coordinates the various Special Operations Forces of the US military. SOCOM's responsibilities includes secret and specialised 'black op' missions, such as assassinations and the 'rendition' of high priority terror suspects (Turse, 2011). The series of simulations which accompanied 'Exercise Monastery' included elements of the SANDF, SOCOM, SAPS 'counter-assault' teams and Public Order Police units. This rehearsal exercise aimed to test the 'interoperability' of military and police special forces ahead of the World Cup (Human, 2010:16-17). Monastery tested a range of major event 'storylines' from a hostage situation to maritime operations and focused on 'grouping of forces' at 'urban, airborne and maritime scales' (17).

Although the transnational exchanges which were made publicly available appeared to have been primarily state-centric, it is reasonable to assume that the World Cup generated interest amongst international homeland security companies and defence contractors. For example, SAPS officials attended several of the annual ‘Sports Security Summits’ held in London by the sports management company Rushmans (2007, 2008). Organisations which have been represented at the summits include sporting organisations such as FIFA and the IOC, security companies such as G4S and SAIC, and the major defence contractors BAE systems (who are alleged to have bribed South African officials during the controversial 1999 arms deal) and Northup Grumman, the fourth largest aerospace and defence company in the world (Rushmans, 2008).

Private security

According to Terry Scallan, the chairman of the South African Institute of Security, an industry regulatory body, the involvement of private security in the World Cup security measures was limited to support functions for the SAPS (interview, 1 April 2010). Overall national safety and security remained the statutory function of the state. Private security guards were deployed at stadiums, fan parks, fan walks and other key sites, but were not granted powers of arrest or access to weaponry. According to one security company spokesperson, their role during the World Cup was to provide support in maintaining the enjoyable atmosphere of the tournament: ‘If one of our guys sees a chip packet lying on the ground that could potentially house an explosive device, he has to be diplomatic and gently move the danger out of the way without the fans even knowing it’ (The Event. 2010).

While this accorded with the proportional implementation ethos espoused by NATJOINTS and the LOC (2008: 10), it also ensured that the signature of coercive force and violence, such as weaponry, would remain the preserve of the state. Indeed, as early as 2006, the SAPS informed FIFA officials that while they would be allowed to bring personal security to the tournament ‘they would not be allowed to carry any weapons and would have no power whatsoever’ (PMG, 2006a). The private security industry was particularly involved in providing stadium safety and in the close protection of ‘VVIPS’. In one trade industry publication, the Dynamic Alternative groups, a specialist ‘in third world environments’ lists its activities as authoring the initial training package used by the LOC to train stewards, providing intelligence to ‘international organisations’, security for two of the primary event sponsors and the deployment of close protection services for VVIPS ‘including people on the Forbes 10 richest list’ and entertainment celebrities (Schneider and Sinclair, 2010, 32-3). The company was joined by several other operations offering similar services to wealthy and anxious tourists (Plantive, 2010). In addition, four of the security teams contracted to visiting teams were allowed to obtain temporary firearm licences after negotiations with the police (Potgieter and Powell, 2010).



Figure One: Safety hard hats in the boardroom of the Nelson Mandela Stadium, 2009


POLICE
POLICE
Coca-Cola

Figure Two: SAPS officers inside the Cape Town Exclusion Zone

National and Urban Security

The War Machine

The South African government promised a World Cup 'war machine' which consisted of:

> ... 41,000 police officers specifically to ensure the safety of visitors to the country during the 2010 World Cup. There will be one police officer for every 10 foreign tourists expected for the duration of the event. Government plans to increase the number of police officers in the country to 192,000 by the end of 2009/10. To maintain safety and security during the 2010 World Cup and comply with FIFA requirements, an additional amount of R665.6 million was allocated to the Department for Safety and Security in the 2007 Budget for the procurement of operational equipment such as helicopters, CCTV, radio communications, roadblocks and riot and other technical equipment …. The plan is to make available police escorts for teams, referees and members of the FIFA delegation; and to provide security at land, sea and air borders, routes and venues namely stadiums, hotels, events and tourists attractions. The SAPS also plans to patrol routes to and from the airports, and into the cities and to provide video feeds to the operational headquarters in Pretoria using command vehicles and helicopters equipped with cameras (Republic of South Africa, 2010).

According to Police Lieutenant General Andre Pruis, this was to be enforced by a series of spatial cordons in the ten kilometres around stadiums with a 'focus on preventing domestic extremism, including strike actions and service delivery protests' (World Cup 2010 South Africa, 2010). In addition, fighter aircraft would be used to patrol airspace ahead of matches, national borders would be monitored by military satellites, while cruise ships would be escorted by naval frigates from twelve nautical miles out to sea, alongside the navy conducting underwater sweeps of host city harbours. Several special emergency management points were set up along major national highways while perimeter security was prioritised at ports, airports and military airbases. Particular attention was placed on participating teams, with implementation of security protocols at hotels, the application of 'match day' security procedures at publicly open training matches and the demarcation of special emergency transport routes. The cost of these security operations substantially inflated during the preparatory period. While the Bid Book claimed that safety and security measures would cost R94 million (SAFA, 2003a: 7.7), by 2010 President Zuma announced that what he called the security 'war chest' cost over R1 billion (Ndlangisa, 2010).

To ensure coordination and the exchange of 'real time' date between government departments, private security companies and foreign intelligence and security agencies, security measures operated through the establishment of the NATJOINTS system, which was based on the NATO C3 (command, communication and control) model of coordinating forces across horizontal and vertical scales (OA/NATJOINTS, 2008:11). Under the chairpersonage of the SAPS, the NATJOINTS structure was filtered down and replicated at provincial (PROVJOINTS), local (LOCJOINTS) and venue (VOCJOINTS) levels. In terms of the security structure, NATJOINTS was responsible for strategy, PROVJOINTS allocated operational resources and LOCJOINTS enforced tactical application (Ibid). During the tournament NATJOINTS operated out of the 'war room' at Air Force Headquarters outside Pretoria (Makhubela, 2010).

The SAPS

As the main operational locus for the 2010 World Cup, the SAPS embarked on major recruitment and acquisition drives. In particular, this focused on the improvement of its crowd control apparatus, including joint training missions between the police and the French gendarmes. Other purchases included six Robinson Raven 2 helicopters linked to mobile command centres, sniper rifles, new cameras for the SAPS Air Wing, flexible body armour and water cannons and eight bomb disposal remote operated vehicles (ROVs) 'used extensively by US forces in Iraq'(Nel, 2009:39) However, attempts to purchase unmanned aerial drones (UAVs) were unsuccessful: while it appears that the SAPS were adamant that they would be buying a fleet for surveillance purposes, opposition from the South African Civil Aviation Authority (SACAA), owing to concerns about the legality of automated drones in civilian airspace, scuppered the plan (Africa, 2009). Mechanised equipment was also complemented by the use of horse and sniffer dog units (City of Johannesburg, 2009: 332).

The importation of new security hardware served to support a massive deployment of police 'software'. Highlighting the exceptional status of the tournament, all police leave was cancelled for the duration of the World Cup, allowing for a boosting of the force levels available to the state (van der Spuy, 2010:116). As one internal government report (Public Service Commission, 2010) describes it particular attention was paid to augmenting police resources in the police stations closest to host venues and ensuring that the areas around stadiums saw a reduction in the 'trio' crimes of vehicle hijacking and residential and business robbery.

However, the same report (ix) found that as planning had been centred at a national level and that many of the local police stations did not have access to the SAP's internal 'Integrated 2010 Soccer World Cup Strategic Plan', and had inadequate personnel numbers, budgets, vehicles and functioning CCTV equipment to 'meet the demands of the 2010 World Cup' . For example, in terms of the much publicised equipment drive, the report noted that:

> The inspection team that visited the SAPS National Head Office found that specific kinds of vehicles have been purchased for the 2010 Soccer World Cup and these include high speed vehicles, highway patrol cars and luxury cars. The findings suggest that police stations were not briefed about the vehicles that were being procured to handle the demands of the 2010 Soccer World Cup (ibid).

At the national level, preparations also paid close attention to the incorporation of specialised and elite units from the SAP's SWAT-style Operational Response Service (SAPS, 2011a). These included the paramilitary Special Task Force, responsible for counterterrorism and hostage situations and the National Response Unit. Notably, the World Cup marked one of the first public deployments of the new Tactical Response Team (TRT), an elite squad piloted by then National Commissioner Cele. Such special forces blur the line between policing and military combat as they are trained for high risk situations and may be provided with access to more powerful arsenals than ordinary civilian law enforcement officers. In addition, specialised units such as bomb disposal and the SAPS air wing were deployed around stadiums.

SANDF

An additional blurring of the line between civilian law enforcement and preparations for urban warfare was evident in the involvement of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). Under 'Operation Kgwele', the four tiers of the defence department, the military, air force, navy and medical services, were tasked with offering support to the SAPS. Through the NATJOINTS structure, the SANDF also worked in tandem with national government and INTERPOL, using its Geographical Information System (GIS) to provide mapping and satellite imagery along with deploying 'the latest technological devices' to screen visitors at national points of entry (Rakoma, 2010: 19). Indeed, Operation Kgwele marked the 'most extensive and biggest deployment on home soil' (Makwetla, 2010) of the Defence Force since the transition to democracy in 1994. The SANDF's duties during the World Cup included patrolling outer perimeters and guarding roadblocks with the SAPS, putting aircraft on standby, joint deployment with the SAPS Special Task Force and aiding emergency services with chemical, biological and radioactive reaction teams trained for 'detection,casualty evacuation and mass evacuation' (Tlhaole, 2010:21). As with the SAPS, the Department of Defence used the World Cup to leverage additional resources from national government. In 2009, the SANDF received additional funding from the government after claiming that resources were being ring fenced by the SAPS and that the military needed R335 million for tournament-related 'command-and-control, maritime situational awareness, airspace control, no-fly zone enforcement, aerial surveillance, airlift, landward reaction forces, infrastructure and specialist support including biological and chemical defence teams' (Engelbrecht, 2009a).

State intelligence

While the role of the intelligence services during the World Cup was publicly acknowledged by the government, the exact parameters and extent of this involvement is for the most part inaccessible. However, the annual report of the parliamentary Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence (Republic of South Africa, 2011), gives some idea of the contours of this involvement. The committee oversees the various entities which constitute South Africa's domestic and foreign intelligence services. As of 2012, the State Security Agency includes the South African Secret Service (SASS), which is responsible for non-military foreign intelligence, the former National Intelligence Agency (NIA), which runs domestic intelligence, and the National Communication Centre, which performs signal intelligence (SIGNET) or surveillance and eavesdropping.

While the report does not go into any operational specifics, it concludes that 'working toward a successful World Cup must be the main focus of the country … all the intelligence agencies have prepared well and will be actively involved in the security of the country and its people' (40). With the SAPS as its main client, the state-run Office for Interception Centres (OIC) was enrolled to monitor telephonic and cellular conversations, text messages, e-mails and IP addresses (13-4). Although South African law entails that judicial warrants are required for intercepts, the state does not divulge the contents of these intercepts: therefore, while the report list 416 intercepts in the 2009-10 financial year, it does not list their targets. However, the report does note that the NIA used the OIC for the World Cup draw in December 2009 (23). It can therefore be assumed that SIGNET functions were used as part of the World Cup security measures. The role of intelligence services added additional measures to the efforts to implement spatial control of land, airspace and water by monitoring the electromagnetic spectrum.

The report also reveals that the NIA was actively involved in the planning and coordination of security measures for the World Cup and that it shared intelligence with all 'relevant' role players, which presumably included FIFA and foreign governments (20). The report also notes 'the support' and assistance of the SASS in providing foreign intelligence (21). Domestically, state security claimed that the biggest internal 'concerns' which needed to be addressed ahead of the tournament were the country's capacity for disaster management, border security, monitoring of criminal syndicates, 'foreign nationals from neighbouring countries', electricity provision and 'mechanisms to control possible strikes and protest actions' (31). Indeed the report also claims that in a 'global world that is intertwined into a small village' intelligence support was instrumental in ensuring domestic 'stability' and 'border safeguarding' for the World Cup (33).

Departmental involvement

The NATJOINTS structure further entailed the involvement of other government departments. Departments represented as 'stakeholders' within the structure included Home Affairs, Communications, International Relations and Cooperation, Justice and Constitutional Affairs, Health and Sports and Recreation. The Department of Justice was instrumental in creating a punitive apparatus for the event through its implementation of a special dedicated courts system which was designed to expedite the arrest and court appearance of tournament-related offences (van der Spuy, 2010:114). This fast-track justice system was also targeted against violations of FIFA's commercial restrictions.

Preparations included the implementation of security measures by departments outside of the security and criminal justice tiers of national government. For example, the Department of Home Affairs (2010) implemented an electronic Advance Passenger Programming (APP) system to bar 'undesirables' such as tourists on INTERPOL's football hooligan list from entering the country and installed a Movement Control System (MCS) database at 34 priority points of entry to track the movement of visitors in and out of the country .The state-owned electricity supplier ESKOM, applied heightened security measures to energy infrastructure. An ESKOM spokesperson told a parliamentary committee that 'security would be provided to national key points. Power lines to neighbouring countries would be secured. Security personnel would be deployed one week before the start of the World Cup' (PMG, 2010a). The spokesperson did not reveal which lines had the highest priority, as 'this could give information to potential saboteurs'.

State of spectacle

The state's rollout of a centralised war machine through the medium of NATJOINTS was also planned with aesthetics in mind. According to the OA/NATJOINTS Security Concept, the image of South Africa enabled by security measures was as important a yardstick of success as the pre-emption of risks. For example, the document stresses that the first impression of the country created by visitors entering the country was crucial: 'operational planning shall concentrate on the security operations at all airports to ensure that the all-important first impression that is created is one of a safe, secure and stable country and region' (OA/NATJOINTS, 2008:30).

The centrality of image also extended into the actual logistical and operational preparations for the tournament. In the years prior to the World Cup, the police and military engaged in a series of preparatory exercises in and around host cities, which tested their capacity to respond to scenarios from hijackings to hostage situations. The media was actively encouraged to witness these operations with the idea of providing positive coverage for the security measures. For example, the press release for one of the 'Operation Shield' series in Bloemfontein issued a call for registrations to:

> The media briefing will take place at Tempe Airbase. The media will then be moved outside to witness one of many spectacular displays of the security forces' competence. These simulations are not practiced in advance. Scenarios are confidentially scripted and 'renegades' enact possible threats to which teams made up of experts from various units within the security services must react and neutralise. It is imperative to RSVP as security around the airbase is strict during this exercise (NATJOINTS, 2008a).

During ‘Operation Shield 3’, two media personalities became active participants in the exercise, which in addition provides an idea of how the government imagined a successful response and resolution to a worst case scenario:

> 5fm radio presenter Gareth Cliff and Maurice Carpede from 94.2 Jacaranda FM were dragged out of a briefing by two armed masked men and forced into a South African Police Service’s (SAPS) Cessna Sovereign Citation jet at Swartkops air force base outside Pretoria. During the drama, the South African Air Force (SAAF) scrambled two Hawks which intercepted the hijacked plane and forced it to the ground where police vehicles and emergency personnel were waiting to assist the injured. The hijackers had no option but to give in and land the plane. Fully armed Special Task Force and the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) members cautiously and strategically surrounded the plane and negotiations began. After the intensive hostage negotiations, victims were freed and the hijackers were immediately arrested with the help of members of the National Intelligence Agency (NIA). To avoid unanticipated explosions, police deployed trained dogs to search bags and parcels for any explosives. An armed robot, operated via remote control, was also sent in to thoroughly search the parcels. Despite the bad weather, the joint exercise between the SAPS, the SANDF, NIA, SAAF and government departments left international reporters, Cabinet ministers and visitors [sic] stunned as it revealed South Africa’s security skills and readiness… The thrilling exercise was part of honing security-related skills to ensure a safe environment in host cities and other areas during major events, including securing the national airspace (Ndawonde, 2009b).

On the verge on the tournament, ordinary South Africans were exposed to the spectacle of security. In a May 2010 operation, the police and army, accompanied by a large crowd of onlookers and a police marching band, ‘occupied’ the Sandton financial district in Johannesburg, with ‘a convoy of dozens of vehicles and staged mock operations by elite security forces, including a helicopter drop of commandos onto a car hijack and abseiling down the side of a media building’ (Potwela, 2010). Finally, South Africans were offered a chance to participate in the security ‘experience’ through the FIFA volunteer programme and assisting the security services in offering translation and direction services for tourists, informing spectators of prohibited items and directing fans around stadiums. However, after the tournament, volunteers struggled to receive the daily stipend they were owed by the LOC (Morkel, 2010). Indeed, the lack of payment may have created an unexpected breach in FIFA’s ticketing system: during field research I found that on the 14 June 2010, the day of the match between Italy and Paraguay at the Cape Town Stadium, volunteers were openly touting their match tickets around the stadium precinct.

Urban governance

Under the umbrella of the national security plan, host cities created their own institutional set ups while linking national plans into ‘city-specific programmes and longer-term visions’ (Cornelissen, 2011:3230). At the planning level, cities based their deployments on NATJOINTS approved ‘responsibility matrixes’ and the various safety and security agreements between the government, LOC and FIFA (interview with JP Louw, 2 March 2010). This entailed a parcelling of security responsibilities between national, provincial and urban authorities. As explained by JP Louw, an official with the City of Cape Town:

> SAPS are the lead agents and the City supports the safety and security plans. The Provincial Priority Committee was established, which the City's safety and security forms part of. The priority meeting is chaired by SAPS. The City is responsible for traffic, enforcement of the bylaws, fire and rescue, and disaster risk management, which forms part of the overall safety and security plan.

Provincial measures were organised by safety and security committees headed by the SAPS. This meant that the security footprint of the World Cup extended beyond host cities. For example, in the case of the Western Cape, the SAPS established a 'blanket of security' for teams staying in Knynsa and George, which are both situated substantial distances from Cape Town (SAPS Journal Online, 2010b). In turn, each host city created interdepartmental reaction teams, which included the 'national security forces' of the SAPS, SANDF and the NIA along with local metro police, traffic, health and emergency services (Tlhaole, 2010:20).

National, provincial and local funding was utilised to augment existing security resources. For example, The City of Cape Town:

> ... procured various additional vehicles and equipment as well as appointing additional safety and security staff which will be utilised during as well as post World Cup, e.g. we have procured 7 new fire agents, appointed 122 fire fighters, 70 additional traffic officers, etc. All these new equipment's [sic] will be available post-World Cup (Interview with JP Louw, 2 March 2010).

The City of Port Elizabeth in the Eastern Cape established joint operation centres to coordinate activities with authorities in the non-host cities of East London and Mthatha, established a terrestrial trunked radio system (TERTA) (or walkie-talkie) system for use at its harbour and airport, launched a special investigation group to reduce crime before the World Cup and purchased new cameras for its CCTV network, and new breathalysers and traffic patrol vehicles (Barry, 2010). However, Cornelissen (2011:3231) argues that the deployment of city security measures throughout the country overwhelmingly kept to the spatial legacy of security created by apartheid, in that it tended to keep away from poorer areas and focused on increasing the security footprint around already securitised and gentrified spaces, such as Cape Town's Atlantic seaboard.

Furthermore, the FIFA access control and commercial restriction by-laws which had been implemented by host cities reduced the opportunities for informal traders to capitalise on their proximity to stadiums. However, after the city of Johannesburg attempted to evict traders from around the Soccer City venue in February 2010, informal traders began a campaign of marches and protests which prompted the city to allocate selected traders with designated vending areas outside of exclusion zones (Lopes-Gonzalez, 2010). While this still marked substantial restrictions on trading, it did allow informal venders to capitalise on the influx of personnel around stadiums; ironically, one trader noted that police and emergency medical staff provided the bulk of their customer base (ibid).

The remilitarisation of the SAPS

The resemblances between the security measures and a state organising for war were paralleled by efforts to remilitarise the SAPS. The civilianisation of a militarised and repressive policing system was a major policy objective for the government after the transition to democracy, but from 2000 onwards the SAPS began to take on the increasing semblance of a paramilitary force, which the police claimed was necessitated by high rates of violent crime (NPC, 2011:355).

Beginning in 2009, police and government officials began to make bellicose public statements about how the SAPS needed to fight 'fire with fire' when confronting dangerous criminals (IOL, 2008). Government officials proposed an amendment to Section 49 of the Criminal Procedures Act, which would increase the parameters of the SAPS's ability to use deadly force, claiming that the original Act put the lives of officers at risk by placing too high a discretionary burden on police. This was accompanied by the use of an overtly martial rhetoric, which described policing as a form of combat. For example, Deputy Police Minister, Fikile Mbalula, said in parliament that the war on crime would invariably result in collateral damage: 'When you are caught in combat with criminals, innocent people are going to die, not deliberately but in the exchange of fire' (Ferreira, 2009). This stance was verbally linked with the preparations for the World Cup, with Police Minister Nathi Mthethwa (2010b) remarking that:

> As we continue to feel it, we caution those who want to distract our jovial moods, that indeed they will feel the police fire, for it is already burning. For those criminals who want to put us on a litmus test, we dare you and you will find us ready. And mind you, these are just simulations, but for those who ignore our warnings and are later found engaging in criminal activities, they will not experience simulations but the wrath and real *umlilowamaphoyisa* [police fire].

The discursive focus on a newly intensified prosecution of the on-going 'war on crime' was complemented by the total security approach proposed for the 2010 World Cup. In late 2009, Bheki Cele suggested that an aggressive stance towards crime would reinforce the state's ability to assert spatial order throughout the country:

> South Africa must be safe for 2010 and beyond …. We will keep the structures to make sure we chase the *tsotsis*. We chase them in the houses. We chase them in the hills, in the mountains, in the valleys, in the rivers. And I've been told we will be chasing them in the churches too (Mouton, 2009).

In particular, the funerals of SAPS officers who had been murdered in the line of duty became emotive spectacles, as Cele used his eulogies to call for extensions to the legal parameters of police force and lethality.

The increased discursive focus on fighting criminal ‘enemies’ was formalised in the announcement that the SAPS would be returning to the military ranking system which had last been used under apartheid (for example the National Commissioner was referred to as ‘General Cele’ under the new ranking system). The Minister of Police claimed that this was in line with international trends. ‘Police forces around the world are referred to as the Force and their ranks are accordingly linked to such designations’: instead of a service, the SAPS would become a force, with an accompanying ‘change in attitude, thinking and operational duties’ (SAPS, 2010a). A central tenet of this conception of the police ‘force’ was a focus on ‘re-igniting discipline’ within the ranks through the application of the military concept of ‘command and control’ (Mthethwa,2010c). Faull (2010) argues that the focus on creating more forceful, militarised SAPS was partly a public relations exercise as it inferred that a ‘disciplined’ police force would win public support for an organisation which has developed a reputation for corruption and inefficiency.

However, SAPS management were equivocal about the planned extent of militarisation, with Mthethwa claiming that these moves had been:

> … misinterpreted as merely the militarisation of the police … [rather than] as part of our new approach of being fierce towards criminals, while lenient to citizens’ safety and maintaining good discipline within the Force. This is a people’s war against criminals. For any Force to discharge its tasks effectively there needs to be a commander because wars are led by commanders (SAPS, 2010a).

Cele made the link between the SAPS and the military more explicit in the official letter which informed SAPS staff of the new ranking system:

> ... [f]or protocol, command and control purposes including the need to ensure mutual respect between members of the South African Police Service and the South African National Defence Force, who are on a regular basis involved in joint operations, it was deemed appropriate to adopt some of the military ranks utilised by the South African National Defence Force, which ranks are also used by some police forces across the world (cited in Burger, 2010).

However, these proposals were met with much apprehension and criticism, both from within the service and in civil society. The Police and Prisons Civil Union (POPCRU), the main union within the criminal justice system, presented an official memorandum totally rejecting the new ranking system. POPCRU (2010) argued that the imposition of a military management structure marked a return to an apartheid-era conception of policing, in which 'command and control' reflected an institutional culture of blind obedience to authority and violence against the public. Indeed, the union suggested that the proposed ranking system would make the job of the SAPS more difficult in 'reducing the scope for innovative, community and socially-based crime prevention strategies' and would reverse efforts to turn the police into a 'respectable' public service (ibid).In turn, the promotion of annihilationist rhetoric against internal criminal enemies occurred against the backdrop of a substantial recorded increase of deaths by police shooting and torture, along with allegations of extra-judicial execution of so-called 'cop killers' (NPC, 2011: 356).

Throughout the country, civil society groups claimed that the policing of municipal protest and dissent in the lead-up to the World Cup became more overtly hostile and authoritarian, including allegations that ANC local government officials in Durban were involved in planning violent attacks on the Abahalali baseMjondolo shackdwellers' movement (Tolsi, 2009). While it remains debatable to what extent violent clampdowns on grassroots social movements were merely local or part of a wider strategy, one round-table discussion on the attacks in the Kennedy Road informal settlement concluded that the government's promotion of bellicose war talk created a national tone which gave a 'green light' to local state repression (Churchland Program, 2011: 5). For some activists, this was reminiscent of the apartheid government's adoption of 'counter-insurgency' and 'low-intensity conflict' strategies during the 1980s (10).

The World Cup may have provided a further legitimation for repressive policing. Duncan (2010b) argues that the proximity of the World Cup provided the state with an impetus to brand dissent as a national security threat. In turn, the SAPS's promotion of a martial rhetoric against loosely defined criminals raised worrying signs of a concurrent criminalisation of political dissent. Indeed, some of the security rhetoric used by the state in promoting its World Cup preparations explicitly labelled potential 'strike actions and service delivery protests' as 'domestic extremism' (World Cup 2010 South Africa, 2010). The term 'domestic extremism' has become a common phrase among police services in the US and the UK since the 9/11 attacks, but rather than having a set official or legal definition it appears to be vague catch-all for 'individuals or groups that carry out criminal acts of direct action in furtherance of a campaign' (Evans, Lewis and Taylor, 2009). However, activists in the UK have argued that this open-ended definition provides the police with a widespread licence for surveillance and intimidation of organisations whose activities remain within the bounds of the law and carries echoes of the Cold War era monitoring of the anti-apartheid movement in the UK, which was legitimated by the alleged presence of 'subversive' individuals within activist groups (ibid).

For Mabake Masweneng (interview,12 October 2011), a former stop steward for POPCRU, the proposed militarisation of the police was an elite project, intended as much to reassert hierarchy within the ranks and to manage public image as it was to fortify the crime-fighting capacity of the SAPS . While rank and file officers supported efforts to increase the use of force, as 'criminals are allergic to the blue uniform' and present a daily threat to the safety of officers, he said that the changing of the ranking system '... came out of nowhere. POPCRU began to hear rumours about it at the end of 2009, but we were never consulted. They went and told the media before us … The ranks just changed'. According to Masweneng, the idea of restoring discipline was used to 'instil a sense of fear and to undermine the influence of unions within the SAPS'. In turn, this had made station commanders 'arrogant'.

Much of the impetus behind the militarisation was driven by international marketing as the SAPS hierarchy attempted to assert its 'world class' status: 'That is why Cele's units [referring to the Operational Response Service] are dressed in soldier's uniforms; they want to be like the Americans'. Alongside this international influence, private actors may have played a role in the changing of the ranking system: 'Everything goes with a tender. Look at the new emblems that came with the new ranks. Management kept their lapels. But the rank and file kept got new ones … that's thousands of people. There's a lot of money in that'.

He was equally sceptical about the World Cup:

> Police weren't getting properly paid for overtime. Some commanders were using it for divide and rule. At OR Tambo airport they were paying some officers but, others weren't. The working class members of the SAPS were excluded from benefiting from the World Cup… I think that it was a useless exercise. They did it out of self-interest, so that Cele could look good to police in the rest of the world. Things took a nasty turn with him. The police mentality against strikers, for example, it has got worse. The idea of militarisation is still very dangerous.

The issue of police remilitarisation has proved to be contentious long after the World Cup has ended. Many of the proposed changes seem to have done little to improve the SAPS's domestic image. Between 2010 and 2011, the SAPS paid out R106 million in civil costs arising from assaults, shootings and unlawful arrests (Mashaba, 2011), while Bheki Cele became the second consecutive police commissioner to be suspended for allegations of corruption. In November 2011, government's National Planning Document (2011), which charts its long-term developmental plans until the year 2030, called for a return to the civilianisation of the police. The report claimed that militarisation had both increased police violence and eroded professionalism: in other words, militarisation had proved to be an ineffective response to the war on crime. Indeed, some of the commentary on remilitarisation criticised its perceived ineptitude as much as its attendant violence. For example, Stokes (2011) compared the SAPS' handling of social unrest unfavourably with the UK government's clampdown on the August 2011 riots: 'That's what swift justice should look like! And that's the kind of response we'd like to see from local police. … Trouble makers rounded up – without a shot being fired – and having their day in court almost immediately!'

By contrast, de Vos (2011) argues that the militarisation of the police is part of a wider continuum of state violence, in which for many ordinary South Africans, and particularly the black poor, the SAPS is already in effect a paramilitary force, in that some of its members' use of violence, assault and intimidation amounts to a 'war with the very community they are supposed to serve'. For de Vos, institutional lawlessness, the serving of political factions within local government through clampdowns on protests and the legitimation of a militarised outlook toward civilian policing threaten to turn the SAPS into an institution which serves specific elite political goals rather than the South African public.

The issue of remilitarisation proves especially contentious in South Africa's case because of a recent history of militarisation in which the police, army and intelligence services cooperated as instruments of oppression. The remilitarisation of the police appears to bear some resemblance to the militarisation of society under the apartheid government of the 1980s. However, a crucial element missing in the debate about policing is that the official war talk and the changes in the police ranking system were accompanied by the security measures for the World Cup, which saw joint deployments of the police and military and the utilisation of a national command and control structure. While the upper management of the SAPS were attempting to inculcate a military mind-set within the service, they were simultaneously engaged in the creation of a nationwide, if temporary, 'war machine' (Van der Spuy, 2010: 112) for the 2010 World Cup.

Outcomes

In the months prior to the tournament, the reports about South Africa's crime situation were joined by media claims that the World Cup would be targeted by terrorist attacks, both international and domestic, and repeats of the xenophobic riots which occurred in several provinces in May 2008. In the wake of the criminally motivated killing of Eugene Terreblanche, the leader of the far right Afrikaner WeerstandsBeweging (AWB), which in the early 1990s had posed a substantial risk to the transition to democracy and were responsible for a significant amount of political violence, one UK tabloid predicted that the 2010 World Cup would become better known as the site of a 'Machete Race War'.

In addition, the Iraqi police reported that they had captured al-Qaeda fighters who were planning to attack World Cup matches: however, these reports were quickly rescinded as Iraqi authorities announced these threats as being highly fantastical claims made under police interrogation (Chulov, 2010).

In stark contrast to some of the circulating dire predictions, the tournament proceeded with few major incidents. The SAPS final crime statistics for the World Cup (Mthethwa, Mbalula and Cele, 2010) focused on crime levels within a 1, 5 km radius around tournament related venues. According to the figures, 704 crime-related incidents were reported in the area around stadiums during the 25 match days of the tournament, the majority of the cases being petty theft. This meant that of the estimated 3,082,514 people who attended matches only 0.02% were affected by crime on match days. In the stadiums, there were 290 reported incidents of crime, meaning that only 0.0009% of fans were affected by criminal incidents within stadiums. Although the specific nature of these incidents was not listed in the official figures, these statistics presumably included ambush marketing offences, as stewards were obliged to report these to the SAPS.

Furthermore, the statistics listed all criminal incidents reported to the police, meaning that not all resulted in a police docket being opened, which suggests that many of the reported incidents were not of a serious criminal nature. 1,712 incidents were reported in the areas around fan fests, while 76 incidents were reported inside the various venues, representing 0.0005% of the 1,271,500 fans listed as attending the stadiums and various fan sites. Nationally, the SAPS opened 1,002 case dockets for World Cup-related crimes, which led to 447 arrests being made: 266 arrestees were South African and 181 were foreign nationals. The majority of these arrests were for non-violent theft (Cele, 2010). 106 people were arrested for FIFA rights protection offences and the SAPS claimed to have seized R45 million in counterfeit goods. However, the overall effect this had on national crime rates is difficult to determine. The SAPS 2011 crime statistics, which covered the period of April 2010 to March 2011, reflected an overall reduction in the reported rates of violent crime and continued a downward trend for crime rates (ISS, 2011). However, because national, provincial and police station statistics only list overall annual figures, it is not possible to disaggregate the exact statistical impact of the month-long World Cup. The SAPS (2011b) report which accompanied the release of the national statistics suggests that reduced rates of armed robbery could ‘probably’ (19) be linked to high visibility policing as a result of the World Cup, but also notes that ‘these high levels of visibility may not have had any noticeable effect on social contact crime’ (9).

Serious crimes were swiftly and quickly punished. For example two ‘lunatic scoundrels’ (NATJOINTS, 2010b) who robbed the hotel rooms of foreign journalists shortly before the tournament began were arrested, convicted and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment within 48 hours of the robbery, although no force was involved in the crime. A similar zero tolerance approach applied to infringements on FIFA's commercial rights. For example, a Nigerian citizen received a three-year sentence for attempting to sell thirty match tickets (BBC News, 2010b). Police clampdowns during the World Cup were also used to display interdepartmental interoperability and precision. On June 16th, the SAPS conducted a dawn raid on a hostel in Pretoria to arrest 17 Argentinean fans who had been identified as trouble makers during match day surveillance and who were subsequently handed to the Department of Home Affairs for deportation (NATJOINTS, 2010c). Security measures were also incorporated into the production of entertainment spectacle. For example, the SAAF both patrolled airspace and provided air displays as part of the opening and closing ceremonies at Soccer City.

However, some aspects of security measures drew criticism for being 'overzealous'. The extent to which security measures appeared to prioritise FIFA's commercial interests gained much attention when 36 female Dutch supporters were arrested for wearing orange dresses (the colour worn by Dutch football supporters) which allegedly promoted a rival beer company. The women also claimed that they had been manhandled and threatened by stewards and the police (Laing, 2010). This led the German Ambassador to South Africa to express his concerns about 'judicial overkill' accompanying the security measures (van der Spuy, 2010: 120).

de Voss (2010) argues that while the special World Cup courts did highlight how the criminal justice system could be streamlined and run more effectively, the penalties for theft and commercial restrictions were excessive and out of step with proportional sentencing. However, the sentences also may have reflected some of the long-standing class biases within the criminal justice system: for example, while one Johannesburg man was sentenced to five years for stealing a celluar phone from a tourist, after the American heiress and media celebrity Paris Hilton was arrested for drug possession, FIFA officials were allowed to bring her fast food in court, where all charges were dropped (ibid).

The most prominent security incident during the World Cup did not involve any criminal or terrorist outrage, but in fact occurred because of the preparations made by the LOC. In a larger-scale repeat of what had occurred during the Confederations Cup, stewards from Stallion Security went on strike a week after the World Cup began, over a wage dispute. As a result, the stewards were fired by the LOC and the SAPS had to rapidly deploy student constables from police training colleges to stadiums in Cape Town, Durban, Port Elizabeth, Johannesburg and Soweto. The SAPS spun this event in its favour, with officials citing the institution's ability to secure stadiums without advance warning as evidence of the depth of its security training and preparations (Mthethwa, Mbalula and Cele, 2010). However, this 'security training' also extended to running battles between riot police and the striking stewards in Durban with the SAPS using rubber bullets, teargas and percussive grenades to disperse the stewards (Libcom, 2010). According to the stewards, the strikes were provoked by legitimate grievances over wages, as the LOC had promised R1,500 for daily shifts but were only giving workers R205 a day. (Figure Three).



Figure Three: Stallion Security guards preparing to go on strike, Cape Town

Van der Spuy (2010: 106) describes this as further evidence of the state's capacity to respond to 'labour threats… In doing so, the state re-asserted its political authority and organisational capacity to take charge of security '. However, Cornelissen (201: 3231) notes that while this helped to resolve a potential security crisis, it left an additional security cost, resulting in a 'war of words … between the police and the LOC and FIFA over whose responsibility it was to pay extra expenses'. But while Cornelissen acknowledges that this created additional security costs, she does not account for the fact that while Nathi Mthethwa was allegedly engaged in a 'war of words' with the LOC, he was simultaneously a member of its executive committee. Not only does this imply a potential conflict of interest but it also occurs against the backdrop of security guarantees (OA/NATJOINTS, 2008:8) which compelled the government to take over LOC responsibilities in the case of the body defaulting. The LOC may then have had little motivation to resolve the on-going security dispute, as it was aware that the legal structure of the event ensured that the state would provide a windfall in the event of a walkout.

After the stewards' strike, the World Cup continued without major incident. Indeed, the most serious event which occurred in connection the 2010 World Cup was in Uganda, where suicide bomb attacks by the Somalian extremist group al-Shabab killed over 60 people as they were watching a live feed of the final match. The apparent success of security planning within South Africa though, led Sepp Blatter to publically announce that South Africa had achieved a near perfect, ‘9 out of 10’ World Cup (BuaNews,2010a).

Conclusion

Although the draconian sentencing regimes of the dedicated courts system and the aggressive response to the stewards’ strike revealed a less congenial aspect of policing and the criminal justice system, these events were mostly footnotes to the barrage of international coverage. Therefore, from the state and FIFA’s perspective, the World Cup was a success because the media and the public focused on the unfolding team rivalries and impressive displays of athleticism which occurred on the stadium pitches rather than the ‘war machine’ in operation throughout the host cities (Boyle and Haggerty, 2009).

While the funding, logistics and human resources were provided by the government, this was structured around new by-laws and guarantees to FIFA. In addition, governance measures became an international security project which saw the deployment of foreign officials, training exercises and the sharing of expertise. What is immediately striking is the sheer magnitude of these operations, which entailed years of preparations, involved almost all tiers of the South African government and a substantial, indeed inflationary, financial expenditure.

NATJOINTS functioned as the main operational locus for governance measures which promised an unparalleled degree of security in host cities. The South African government promoted its capacity to secure against ‘every conceivable threat’ (Interview with Trevor Teegler, 28 October 2009) as NATJOINTS planned measures which ranged from the minutiae of individual behaviour to the apocalyptic spectre of nuclear attack. In both conception and operational planning, security measures blurred the divide between war and civilian planning: deployments were coordinated through a NATO inspired ‘command and control system’ to ensure ‘interoperability and integration’ between the police, military and government departments. Further emphasising this comparison, a dedicated ‘war chest’ (Ndlangisa, 2010), funded pre-emptive measures against a range of anticipated threats from terrorism to ‘domestic extremism’.

The militarisation of World Cup logistics occurred in tandem with attempts to officially remilitarise the SAPS. Cornelissen (3235) suggests that the ultimate test of success of the World Cup security measures is the extent to which they have 'bolstered the state'. However, as the remilitarisation of the SAPS has shown the fortification of state capacities is not an apolitical social good. Indeed, evidence suggests that the remilitarisation has been used to achieve explicitly political goals, such as violent clampdowns on dissent. Furthermore, even voices from within government have suggested that the entire exercise has been futile and impractical, increasing police violence towards the citizenry while eroding the SAPS's capacity to effectively reduce crime rates. Attempts to militarise the ranks also appear to have been an elite prerogative within the SAPS, which has been used to enforce internal order within the service and to increase the institution's international status.

Van der Spuy (119) argues that 'political, financial and social accountability for the decisions made regarding the prioritisation of the security concerns ' is central to ensuring the long term legacy of the 2010 World Cup. However, the security legislation for the 2010 World Cup entailed a non-negotiable prioritisation of FIFA's security concerns as the precondition of hosting the tournament. The series of guarantees, laws and special measures ensured that national and local security services were contractually obliged to enforce FIFA and its sponsor's intellectual and commercial property rights. These obligations were a mandatory component of hosting the World Cup. Indeed, this framework was already established before South African gained hosting rights in 2004, through the signing of a series of government guarantees in 2003. In turn, this left no space for a public discussion on the ramifications of government departments enforcing private contractual security measures. It is surprising that van der Spuy does not explore the issue of how the government's non-negotiable obligations to FIFA impacted upon the form of security deployment.

Despite their differences in approach, Cornelissen and van der Spuy both conclude that the ultimate barometer of the success of this 'war machine' will be measured in its contribution to a durable security legacy for ordinary South Africans. Cornelissen rightly questions whether an elite-led project which seems to prioritise spaces of wealth and privilege can be turned to the benefit South Africa's poor majority, but suggests that security expertise and technology can be deployed to public benefit after the World Cup. While van der Spuy (2010: 107) is more optimistic about the durability of security measures she also notes that it may result in the extension of the security 'panopticon… In the name of event security, as we have witnessed in the run up to the 2010 World Cup, the homeless may be swept off the streets, street vendors displaced to peripheral locations, and the fires of domestic labour unrest quickly smothered – at least for the duration of the event'(although the final qualification of 'at least' makes it unclear whether she thinks that this is wholly negative outcome). Despite these significant differences in conclusion, both share a perspective on the governance of the

2010 World Cup which regards security as an inherent good, which through proper forms of management can be filtered down to ultimately make the country safer.

However, while this approach may be well-intentioned in trying to identify how security governance can be improved in the future, it runs the risk of uncritically subscribing to the official security narrative. Albeit with different degrees of emphasis, both accept the idea that ‘labour unrest’ and protest were parts of a continuum of security threats which the state was obliged to respond to. As a result the exceptionality of the tournament is assumed as a given fact and as a product of the security pressures of governing an event of such magnitude.

Cornelissen and van der Spuy focus upon securitisation as the process of organisation and deployment around palpable threats. However, this omits how securitisation is not just about the staging of police actions but entails the societal process through which ‘referent objects’ are deemed worthy of emergency measures (Bernhard and Martin, 2011: 43-4). In leaving out this process, the security interests of the actors identified in this chapter are flattened to a shared agenda of ensuring the maximal level of public safety. However, can the sudden criminalisation of commercial activities or restrictions on the democratic right to protest exclusively be understood as politically neutral, managerial necessity? Furthermore, can the role of commercial interests really be seen as an issue which had little bearing upon the form and practices of policing? It is with these questions in mind that the following chapter will argue for a revision of how the security governance for the 2010 World Cup has been understood by focusing upon how security exception is used to pursue institutional agendas.

Chapter Seven: Manufactured ‘Exception’ and the Securitisation of the 2010 World Cup.

Introduction

The securitisation of mega-events, or the process through which different institutions and actors, cohere around a framing of events as a referent point which demands unique measures of protection, works through a shared idea of exceptionality. Bernhard and Martin (2011:39) argue that governments, sporting bodies, the private security industry and transnational policing and military networks share a mind-set which holds that mega-events require policing measures which far exceed normal ‘exigencies of protection’. For Boyle (2011) the exceptionality of mega-events is further consolidated through a paradigm of ‘security legacies’ translated between the public and private actors which constitute mega-event ‘knowledge networks’. The security templates which govern mega-events ‘travel easier’ because they support domestic political objectives while also servicing the commercial interests underlying mega-events (350). For example, legacy presents an opportunity for the state to capitalise on the expenses which accompany mega-events, while sporting bodies promote legacies as a public spin off from their private projects (351). Legacies also cohere with the developmental discourse of domestic governments and transnational bodies as security measures can be justified as a form of long-term capacity and institution building.

As a result security budgets for mega-events have an inherent tendency to inflate due to ‘exceptional’ circumstances (Samatas, 2007, Bernhard and Martin, 2011:54). Firstly, mega-event security assemblages become part of a ‘self-conscious’ (Boyle and Haggerty, 2009) display of security which aims to highlight a host city or countries ability to respond to any number of contingencies, regardless of their likelihood. Secondly, Bernhard and Martin (2011) suggest that mega-events are as much about elite psychologies of power as about sustainable security legacies. While mega-events are used by host states to pursue economic goals, such as attracting capital, they also function as a form of ‘elite affirmation’, a psychological goal which defies explanation in terms of an economic calculus of direct financial benefit and loss. As mega-events serve to demonstrate a host state’s competency, merit and capability, national political elites may be prepared to forgo direct economic or developmental interests for the sake of short term prestige. Furthermore, the international nature of mega-events entails that hosting arrangements are marked by a crucible between national and international anxieties (Murakami Wood and Abe, 2011) providing an interface which gives momentum to efforts to ensure total security (Bennett and Haggerty, 2011).

However, Klauser argues that an exclusive focus on the projection of state power (2007) underplays the role of business and more specifically within the context of the World Cup, FIFA, in security politics. Such an omission can neglect the relationships between massive state security efforts and the association's business interests which are mediated through their ownership of the World Cup brand.

Along with Klauser (2007, 2011), Eick (2010) and Gaffney (2010) have also explored the role of corporate ownership in structuring the securitisation of mega-events. Their discussions propose conceptual models which range from the 'wedding' of security and commercialism (Eick, 2010), the idea of 'interpretative flexibility' between the state and private actors (Klauser,2011) and comparisons between mega-events and the application of neoliberal 'shock therapy' (Gaffney, 2010).

Eick (2010) argues that the mega-event governance represents the 'wedding' of security and commercialism. While measures can provide opportunities for participating security services to replenish their arsenals and experiment with new procedures, the terms and usage of mega-event governance are defined and controlled by private stakeholders. Indeed for a period, public security policy is explicitly managed to benefit these actors. Eick suggests that this is characteristic of the neoliberal 'turn' as the role of state security forces has increasingly been informed by attempts to 'steer' or manage urban space for business interests. But rather than opening spaces for transnational capital, the World Cup is marked by efforts to restrict free competition for the exclusive benefit of FIFA and its corporate partners. Within this dominant framework, host governments affix themselves to a 'contractual relationship' (294) hierarchically managed by FIFA.

While Klauser (2007) agrees that mega-events may enforce the idea that business interests determine the form of security measures he argues that this is successful because its contours into the specific agendas and projects of local security authorities (2011:3). It is suggested (11) that mega-event security models maintain an interpretive flexibility which is highly responsive to the aspirations of a range of actors. The intersection between commercial branding, place marketing and crowd control entails a shared interest in creating security measures which can maintain the 'carefully constructed marketing image of an enjoyable, safe and secure World Cup' (2007:3). For example, from a security perspective, the creation of commercial fan zones not only serves as a site for advertising but becomes a security feature in its own right (Klauser, 2011) as it provides an opportunity to focus policing measures in high density public areas. As a result, while security measures may be externally governed their form is locally adopted.

However, Gaffney (2011) argues that the relationship between the private sector and state forces is more intimate in that they share comparable, reinforcing security objectives. He argues that mega-events are characterised by the scale and density of state interventions and depicts mega-events as 'lengthy disciplinary processes' (8) which combine economic extraction and the enforcement of domestic social control. Working within a dominant governance framework dictated by sporting organisations the state use security measures to ‘fix’ urban space, in which public funds are directed into expansive projects that attract transnational capital, tourists and local elites. While this may be a project initiated by domestic governments it functions to remake cities into an image which is desirable to the interests of transnational capital. The size, expense and multi-scalar levels of the changes which ‘produce and result from mega-event processes’(ibid) overlap with efforts to restructure economies, political systems and urban space in the wake of political and economic crisis (Klein, 2007).

In particular, Gaffney (27) suggests that sporting associations, working through organising committees, ensure that the host state establishes ‘temporary, extra-legal forms of governance’ which are issued ‘blank checks’ for event spending comparable with the creation of similar structures in war zones and disaster areas. This is accompanied by the deployment of a developmental discourse which keeps the ‘forms and requirements of hosting deliberately vague’ in order to legitimate (or to disguise) extraordinary security measures which simulate private enterprise at the expense of public spending (23). In turn, the invocation of nationalist benefit and shared opportunity is used to side-line potential criticism. But rather than fear being used to enforce political and economic power relations, through the implicit threat of coercive action or punishment, (Robin, 2004) this project relies on invocations of socio-economic development. Hagemann (2010) argues that this rhetoric becomes an autonomous force in its own right, which can be used to justify a range of interventions, from sweeping concessions to franchise owners to extensions in the power of security forces which would be less permissible under ‘normal’ conditions.

Despite identifying different hierarchies, all these accounts cohere on the idea that exceptionality (Agamben, 2005) is central to the security governance of mega-events. At the same time the impact on spatial and scalar relations reflects broader processes which have realigned the nature of urban security. From the work listed above we can identify such issues as the relationship between commercialism and security and the linkages between spectacular cities and the policing measures adopted to secure the urban ‘brand’. This is indicative of broader debates within critical urban theory and criminology. For instance while some argue (Eick, 2010) that governments have become the administrators of global capital who manage urban space for the upwards benefit of economic elites, others (Boyle, 2011) identify a convergence on policy models between the ‘security state’ and commercial partners. For Smith (2011) the security operations for various Olympiads reveal the outline of an authoritarian, neoliberal state form in which efforts to regulate consumerism are accompanied by the roll out of police and military interventions.

These debates indicate a broader question about the power relations within security governance which will be addressed in the next chapter. Following Klauser (2011) this current chapter aims to unpack and identify the various 'meanings' of security for the implicated state and private actors. As a result, this chapter will argue that a combined discourse of exceptionality and legacy was used to legitimate an elite project of securitisation in the lead-up to the 2010 World Cup. Rather than an 'apolitical' (Boyle, 2011:330) response to risk it will be argued that the security measures were adopted because they serviced a series of intersecting political and economic goals. More specifically, the declaration of exceptionality allowed these political and economic goals to become security issues.

FIFA, the South African government and other security actors cohered their institutional projects around the deployment of 'no expenses spared' and 'no holds barred' security measures. Instead of exclusively revolving around tropes of insecurity, this was projected as an opportunity for socio-economic development. In particular this chapter will propose that the 2010 World Cup can be understood as a 'national security spending spree' organised and subsidised by the South African government. While this was litigated with reference to the concept of security 'legacy', this chapter will propose that there is little evidence to suggest this was in fact an outcome of the 2010 World Cup. Instead, it will suggest that legacy can be understood as a form of public relations used to justify massive public expenditures on a costly, one-off project.

Chapter Structure

The first section will begin by assessing how the security measures, and more specifically there key role in governing the 2010 World Cup were discursively framed by the government. The World Cup was defined as both a national security event and as a transcendent national goal. This was deployed through an open-ended developmental discourse which promised to respond to public aspirations for improved security and policing. At the same time, the fluidity of these justifications was also used to pre-empt criticism and to frame political grievances against the government as a potential security risk.

But while the government utilised an expansive rhetoric, FIFA had a far more narrow understanding of security. Along with the protection of the World Cup brand, FIFA defined commercial violations of its brand as security threats. Furthermore, it will be argued that from an institutional perspective FIFA regards the protection of itself and its corporate partners from liability and risk as a 'security' issue. While the association deployed developmental tropes to frame its aspirations for the 2010 World Cup, this chapter will argue that this public stance is incompatible with its organisational practice.

Foreign security agencies also used their participation in World Cup planning to advance their institutional agendas within South Africa. This involvement was accompanied by various tiers of the global security industry. But while some bodies worked to align their interests with the exceptional measures of the World Cup, others attempted to capitalise on fears about the government's perceived inability to enforce these measures.

At the national and local scale, the proximity of the 2010 World Cup was used to pursue a variety of projects under the banner of preparations. For example, some security institutions used it as an opportunity to circumvent tensions within their ranks. Urban authorities also used the World Cup as an opportunity to fast track long-standing infrastructural projects and to replenish security arsenals. However, despite the developmental discourse, host city preparations may have actively capitalised on existing socio-spatial inequalities.

Finally, this chapter will suggest that while this worked to secure the World Cup, the often bombastic security rhetoric sharply contrasts sharply with the far more limited immediate legacy of the event.

State Branding

The World Cup as exception

The security preparations for the 2010 World Cup were integrated into a political narrative which presented the tournament as an unparalleled opportunity to showcase South Africa. For example, Commissioner Cele said that for the duration of the tournament 'the rest of the world will almost cease to exist – South Africa will be the world' (NATJOINTS, 2010a). While technically remaining a FIFA-owned event, the government defined the tournament as a national security issue. Cabinet declared the World Cup as a 'major event' as 'the success of the event is of international interest' and required exceptional levels of interdepartmental cooperation (Kempen, 2010). More specifically the SAPS (SAPS Strategic Management, 2005:37) listed the World Cup (and the securing of major events in general) as an issue of 'national intervention'. Under its National Crime Combating Strategy this was listed as a situation which required coordinated national deployment as part of a continuum of special circumstances including violent civil disorder, 'high crime areas' and disaster management (ibid).

The figuring of the World Cup as an exceptional event was aided by a party political consensus about the necessity of ensuring the conditions for a successful tournament. ANC MP B Komphela (PMG,2010b) said that 'security is ready in this country… and I want to say this today as we close this chapter, that there was never a dissenting view, from the opposition, for it being right that that the tournament was given to South Africa because it was judged and adjudicated on a fair basis'. This was accompanied by a wider elite consensus about the importance of hosting a world class event which entailed substantial support from domestic business. Anglo-American, SAB Miller and Vodacom were official supporters and suppliers of the hosting bid (SAFA, 2003a: 6.8). These companies were joined by the local subsidiaries of Adidas and Phillips, which are both FIFA commercial partners and who provided sponsorship for the hosting campaign (6.5). The privately owned broadcasters Supersport and the publically funded SABC were also enrolled as official media partners (ibid). Notably, the LOC also included media mogul Koos Bekker on its board of directors. Bekker is the CEO of Naspers, a major South African based multinational media company, which owns seven of the country's major daily newspapers and Media24, the largest online and print publisher in Africa.

The substantial support of major corporate players projected the image of the World Cup as an unprecedented and indeed exceptional societal mobilisation. One DA Member (PMG, 2010b) of parliament explicitly compared the World Cup to the national mobilisations which accompany war:

> Now, however, comes the biggest spectacle and biggest opportunity to achieve a common national identity. As South Africans, we are destined to achieve great things and that togetherness must be forged in the burning excitement which is the World Cup. Never mind the costs that we will have to carry, we as South Africans can use sport to achieve what other nations have done through war.

This presents a paradigm of conflict as an opportunity for social cohesion and vaguely defined 'great things': a functionally open definition which could presumably include socio-economic development. Rather than an appeal to a sense of national endangerment or of crisis, security measures were presented as aiding a project of national construction and reconstruction, prestige and future benefit (Neocelous, 2011:197). In turn such projection revolved around a 'touchy feely' (Ibid), affective sense of national cohesion.

Legacies

Explicitly this framed issues of budgets as unimportant when contrasted with the opportunity for national renewal. Indeed, this same argument was utilised when the SAPS had to take over stadiums. According to Cele, under such an 'emergency' the priority of the SAPS was to 'first do the work, and then discuss how do we deal with those matters [of payment].... The money issues, we are discussing them... For now, allow us to serve and protect' (Sapa, 2010a).

Furthermore, these expenditures were presented as part of a wider developmental project in which the World Cup would leave a tangible legacy of improved policing and equipment upgrades. SAPS management adopted a wide ranging definition of legacy and claimed that while 2010 was exceptional it was planned in accordance with an on-going strategy of combatting crime. For instance, during parliamentary questions the police minister described the equipment drive for the tournament as pertaining to an almost inexhaustible range of improvements in technical, operational and human capital (SAPS Journal Online, 2010c). This extended from an increase in available officers to crowd control and surveillance equipment. It also included less visible procurements such as headlight units, cartridges and ammunition ‘to mention but a few’ (ibid).

International rebranding

Security operations were also packaged into the pursuit of a range of interlinked domestic and international objectives. Most prominently, preparations were utilised to signal the safety of South African cities to the international community. In the short term security measures were intended to create the organisational conditions for an incident free World Cup, while it also aimed at installing a lasting positive impression for potential tourists and corporate investors. For example, President Zuma used his official state visits abroad to reiterate the official message that government had proactively worked to implement a comprehensive security plan, which would ensure that the World Cup would ‘come and go without any bad event’ (Gibson, 2010). The security services promised to maintain an exceptionally high standard of policing with Police Minister Nathi Mthethwa claiming that ‘South Africa will host the safest and most secure FIFA World Cup.... That is the message we shared with South Africans over the past year and that we will be articulating to our 2010 visitors. Police will be everywhere, ready to respond to any eventuality’ (Shaw, 2010).

Security was thus linked into a wider communicative effort in which the authorities aimed at being seen to visibly manage both the country’s crime situation and ‘wild cards’ such as terrorism or hooliganism. The ability to prepare for prospective internal and external threats was viewed as an opportunity to reframe the lingering international perception of South Africa as a dangerous country for tourists and investment. In particular this was packaged as a ‘total security’ (Bennett and Haggerty, 2011:2) effort which was prepared for all eventualities, including those which may have had a low probability of occurring. A comprehensive planning approach was offered as the best means of defeating scepticism in the international arena about the state’s ability to manage the complex security requirements of the World Cup.

This also offered a chance for the state security apparatus to recalibrate its international standing. The high visibility of the tournament provided a media platform for the SAPS, as the primary operational locus of World Cup security, to highlight its ability to implement first rate procedures for a mega-event. Furthermore, government spending provided an opportunity for the state to restock the weapons and technologies available to the national security services. The exceptional circumstances of the event facilitated procurement for equipment which would be harder to purchase under other conditions, by leveraging funding which went above government’s routine security budget. The resources made available by what President Zuma described as the security 'war chest' (Ndlangisa,2010) for the tournament allowed government institutions to catch up with developments in wealthier countries. For example, according to a representative of the Airports Company South Africa (ACSA), the preparations for 'every possibly known eventualities that have been identified with the global aviation industry through its history' were intended to allow South African airports to 'compete on a global level with airports in developed countries without having to rely on external expertise' (Interview with Trevor Teegler, 28 October 2009). The World Cup therefore provided an opportunity to fast track security development.

Following Bernhard and Martin (2011), this suggests that security technology and practices have become bound up with international perceptions of modernity. In leveraging resources to provide an increase in both the police arsenal and security at key infrastructural points, the state was highlighting its status as a Southern country which can compete with the North in the deployment of world class security. Successful security measures would allow the government to present its mobilisation as an operational benchmark for future mega-events, thus winning the security services a greater prominence within international policing circuits. Indeed, government's Justice, Crime and Security cluster (JCPS), an interdepartmental structure responsible for streamlining the criminal justice system, has identified 'special operations' at future public gatherings as one of the capital projects of the SAPS (GCIS, 2008: 202).

The government also publicly strove to present the 2010 World Cup as a defining moment for the entire African continent. The government funded International Marketing Council (2009:2), responsible for running the international 'Brand South Africa' campaign, listed the reinforcing of the 'position of the hosting of the 2010 FIFA World Cup as a Pan-African project' as one of their key communication exercises ahead of 2010. Security therefore offered an additional opportunity to rebrand negative perceptions about the African continent as atavistic, violent and backward through highlighting a Sub-Saharan state with the capacity to implement the rigorous security measures associated with mega-events. At the same time, it also served to underscore South Africa's status as an emerging regional power within the global South, as the largest economy on the continent and as a gateway for accessing other African markets. The marketing of security measures was used to signal South Africa as a favourable and safe environment for the launching of commercial ventures into the continent. Policing measures aimed at capturing capital by highlighting the state's ability to safeguard transnational passage points and economic mobilities (Graham, 2010:132). However, there was ambivalence at play in the public image of the World Cup as a Pan-African event. On the one hand, the government instituted special procedures to facilitate the entrance of visitors from Africa at the border posts with Lesotho, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, and Botswana (AllAfrica, 2010b). On the other, the lead-up to the World Cup saw an increased fortification of the physical borders with surrounding countries, including the phased transfer of border patrol and security from the SAPS to the Defence Force.

Domestic goals

From the domestic standpoint, security had several interlinked state building goals. The security measures were used to reinforce the state's capacity and ability to fight crime to a domestic audience. Cornelissen (2011) argues the World Cup was firstly a 'political mega-event' which was undertaken by national elites to fortify the state. Crime and the apparent insufficiency of national security services, and in particular the SAPS, have been a persistent image problem for government. Most prominently it has been a continual policy challenge for the ruling ANC. The World Cup offered a chance for security services to assert their capacities to the public and for the state to project its sovereign power as the central public mechanism for national security and policing.

The access to resources provided by the World Cup 'war chest' was also used to finance a procurement drive for new equipment, training and recruitment. World Cup security operations were a 'capital project' for the JCPS which served to coordinate actions between the security services with the aim of establishing a 'new, modernised, efficient and transformed criminal justice system' (GCIS, 2008: 197). The coordination of the military and police during the World Cup provided a stage for testing and strengthening joint operational capacities.

World Cup security preparations were packaged into a wider communicative effort in which the SAPS has identified 'crime perception management' as central to building a positive domestic image of the service (Department of Police, 2010). One of the pivots of the governments 'perception management' [originally a US military euphemism for psychological warfare but now widely used by governments and business throughout the world- see Guma, 2005] strategy is the concept of 'visible policing' which relies on the announced presence of officers to increase public feelings of safety and to create 'crime free zones'. In the case of the 2010 World Cup, the government identified the tournament as its largest visible policing operation to date (GCIS, 2009: 408).

The image of its officers which the SAPS aimed to project combined what Fernandez (2008: 15) describes as the 'hard' and 'soft' aspects of policing. For example, a series of posters which were produced ahead of the tournament by SAPS Corporate Branding and Design (2010) as part of the 'Security Readiness and Good Ambassadors Campaign' exemplify this combination (See Figure Four A and B). One set of posters emphasised community policing in picturing a desk officer assisting a member of the public and urged officers to be 'good ambassadors for the 2010 FIFA World Cup and beyond'. The other depicts police in full riot gear pointing guns and brandishing batons, the high pursuit vehicles purchased for the World Cup and officers in new body armour. It also shows a picture of members of the military's Special Forces Brigade preparing to jump off an SAPS helicopter's landing struts. Such imagery focused on the SAPS as a paramilitary force, including the incorporation of military weapons and personal, with the intention of foregrounding the strength and capacity of the service. Faull (2010) argues that the focus on creating more forceful, militarised SAPS was a project of perception management, intended to create a new image for the service. In turn, this accorded with the government's emphasis on highlighting police professionalism and capacity during the World Cup.


South Africa
is READY to deliver
a Safe and Successful
2010 FIFA World Cup™
– Ke Nako!
POLICE
POLICE
2010
The South African
Police Service
Together pushing back the frontiers of Evil
SAPS Emergency number: 10111
Crime Line sms number: 32211
www.saps.gov.za
CRIME LINE
YOUR ANONYMOUS CRIME TIP-OFF LINE
SOUTH AFRICA 2010
FIFA WORLD CUP


Be a Good
Ambassador
for the 2010 FIFA World Cup ™
and Beyond!
POLICE
2010
The South African
Police Service
Together pushing back the frontiers of Evil
SAPS Emergency number: 10111
Crime Line sms number: 32211
www.saps.gov.za
CRIME LINE
SOUTH AFRICA 2010
FIFA

Figure Four A and B: Two faces of policing

Securitisation can also be applied beyond policing and military actions and into state efforts to ensure social cohesion and consent (Buzan, Waever and Wilde, 1998). The act of securitisation entails that powerful actors move to present a key issue as transcending politics (23). From this perspective, mega-events can be seen to enrol patriotic discourses and the additional promise of future developmental benefits to leverage societal consensus. Alongside material upgrades to policing and security infrastructure, the government aimed to use the World Cup to promote national identity among South Africans. According to a parliamentary briefing on the '2010 World Cup and Social Cohesion' (PMG, 2008) the tournament offered an opportunity to reduce the 'social fragmentation' which has manifested 'itself as domestic violence, crime … and declining levels of social solidarity'. The basic premise of this was that non-tangible aspects of the World Cup mobilisation, such as patriotism, could protect and fortify South African society by challenging the social underpinnings of violent crime.

As reflected in the security landscape of post-apartheid South Africa, the country remains divided along a series of racial and class lines (Kempa and Singh, 2008). Under these prevailing conditions, the creation of a shared sense of citizenship has proved difficult. World Cup security measures were aimed at bridging this gap by increasing a popular sense of safety, winning greater support for government institutions and creating enthusiasm for the tournament as a shared national project.

The SAPS discursively linked the security mobilisation to the wider government project of creating domestic enthusiasm for the event. Police Minister Mthethwa (2010d) called on all South Africans to participate in the 'Football Friday' programme of wearing the regalia of the national soccer team and 'to create buzz and show support for the soccer spectacular'. The official slogan of 'Feel it, it is here' used to encourage domestic excitement ahead of the World Cup was further incorporated into policing, with Mthethwa (2010b) saying in May 2010 that 'The police leadership is feeling it. Police management is feeling it. All the 190,000 police members are feeling it. It is here'. However, the discourse of inclusivity may also have been used to disguise antagonisms within South African society and to delineate the boundaries of acceptable political protest and opposition. In April 2010, the Minister said that the SAPS would 'show "no mercy" to criminal acts that are disguised as service delivery protests or labour related demands …. We will unapologetically deal with such criminal acts decisively and we require no permission with [sic] anyone' (Biyela, 2010).

The conflation of political protest with security risks reflects how the securitisation of mega-events attempts to enforce a suspension of social antagonisms under the guise of preventing 'criminal actions': the World Cup was presented as an exceptional national project above 'normal' politics. Such statements saw the deployment of patriotism to justify exceptional measures, with the underlying subtext that South Africa's internal social conflicts should not be allowed to interfere with the World Cup. Immediately prior to the tournament, President Zuma visited several areas which had experienced particularly intense community protest to 'investigate' conditions on the ground. But according to Balfour based community activist Lifu Nhlapo (2010), these official visits to the 'most militant and dissatisfied areas' were intended to:

> ... make sure that, come the World Cup tournament, marginalised people don't protest and embarrass South Africa in front of an international media spotlight. What he is doing is like locking your children in a room so that they don't cry that they are hungry in front of a guest. He actually just wants service delivery protests not to erupt when the rest of the world is in our country.

However, it remains to be seen if this was motivated by the practicalities of managing an event of such magnitude or if it was an attempt to enforce an image of social harmony for the benefit of the state' s branding exercise. What is notable is that security measures were linked to broader political goals rather than being exclusively applied to the management of risk. The definition of protests as a threat to national security also entailed that security operations took on aspects of a state of emergency. As Duncan (2010b) notes within the context of restrictions on protest, 'Only under a state of emergency can derogable rights like the right to assembly, demonstration and picket be suspended, which lend credence to the argument ... that there is an undeclared state of emergency in force for the duration of the World Cup'.

Commercialism and Security

What FIFA wanted

Although the government adopted an all-encompassing definition of security, which intersected development, image making and social cohesion, FIFA adopted far less expansive criteria for security 'success'. In particular, the association's assessment of South Africa prior to the awarding of hosting rights reveals the underlying organisational meaning of security. According to the report of the 2004 inspection team, which concluded that South Africa would make an excellent host:

> General information indicates that South Africa shows a lack of security, but the Inspection Group was not aware of any such claims during the visit, although it was possible to read press reports on some violence in marginal areas during our visit. Despite this fact, we can say that the people of South Africa were always friendly, very boisterous and constantly celebrating during our visit to the country. We therefore came to the conclusion that as long as people attending the 2010 FIFA World Cup (FIFA family and spectators) keep within certain boundaries, they should not encounter any trouble. With regard to organising security for a possible 2010 FIFA World Cup in the country, the Inspection Group received an excellent, comprehensive work schedule from one of the high commanders of the national police, covering stadiums, media centres and main hotels, that will doubtless satisfy every requirement for the event. After the presentation we concluded that they have enough experience with this kind of event to handle them without difficulty. We must say that the security business is a flourishing industry in the country (FIFA, 2004a).

This reflects a security preoccupation with creating and fortifying boundaries around World Cup-related venues, rather than securing the entire country. Along with its ability to safeguard urban borders, the government also promised commercial security to FIFA. According to the Bid Book, 'South Africa offers FIFA security through its commercial strength and advanced infrastructure and the prospect of a joyful, happy and emotional World Cup' (SAFA, 2003a:1/6). This wording suggests a functionally open definition of security: it is a concept which could be applied to the general focus on ensuring safe hosting venues and also to the protection of FIFA's commercial rights.

In order to protect FIFA's commercial security, the government signed a raft of agreements and legislation which provided sweeping concessions to the association under the rubric of exceptional circumstances. Hosting requirements stipulated that the South Africa government provide a comprehensive tax exemption to FIFA and its subsidiaries to ensure that revenue from the World Cup would not be subjected to the laws relating to income tax and profit (SAFA, 2003a:4.4). This extended to the suspension of customs duties and taxes (4.3) and made allowances for the untaxed import and export of foreign currency in and out of the country (4.6). Under the guarantees, FIFA and its subsidiaries did not constitute a permanent establishment in South Africa, thus legally exempting them from any form of taxation (4.4). Furthermore, the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development signed a guarantee:

> To indemnify FIFA and defend and hold it harmless against all proceedings, claims and related costs (including professional advisors fees) which may be incurred and suffered by or threatened against others against FIFA in relation to the organisation and staging of the 2010 World Cup (4.15).

The guarantee of legal indemnity had profound implications for the role of the national security services in World Cup governance. Under the guarantees, the government undertook to provide 'all security measures necessary to guarantee the 2010 FIFA World Cup [sic] general safety and protection' (4.5). More specifically, the police and judicial system were tasked with providing laws and enforcement measures which would affirm FIFA's unconditional legal ownership of marketing and property rights (4.13). FIFA presented these guarantees as an administrative necessity for establishing the exceptional 'conditions required for organising and staging the World Cup': all requisite 'special laws, regulation and decrees' were to be enacted and enforced, 'irrespective of any change in government or its representatives' (4: Conclusion). For example, under less exceptional circumstances, such commercial violations as ticket touting would be considered as civil offences and would result in fines. However, during the World Cup this was further enforced by the threat of arrest and prison sentences.

While the security services were mandated to ensure that World Cup related venues were protected from crime and disruption, the guarantees also protected FIFA from any changes within the political system itself. Gaffney (2010) argues that such arrangements serve to establish temporary and extra-legal forms of governance, but the guarantees appear to have been even more extensive: in effect they mandated that the World Cup was 'extra political'. For example, despite resigning from government when former president Thabo Mbeki was 'recalled' from office in 2008, former cabinet members Essop Pahad and Jabu Moleketi retained their positions on the LOC board. This temporary 'suspension' of the political resonated with the discourse being used by South African politicians and their business partners. Indeed, FIFA secretary general Sepp Blatter claimed that South Africa's domestic politics had proved a challenge to the association 'What we maybe forgot at the beginning is that it's a very, very young democracy… There was a change of presidency, there were up to eight ministers within the organising committee. It was… a very, very political board' (Blitz, 2010).

FIFA regulations stipulated that the LOC was responsible for ‘ensuring that order and safety is maintained in cooperation with the government of South Africa, particularly in and around stadiums’ (FIFA, 2004b: 7). However, this was effectively an artificial distinction, as the same regulations (6) state that:

> The Organising Association is subject to the supervision and control of FIFA, which has the last word on all matters relevant to the 2010 FIFA World Cup™. The decisions of FIFA are final ... The Regulations and all guidelines and circulars issued by FIFA are binding for all parties participating and involved in the preparation, organisation and hosting of the 2010 FIFA World Cup™.

As a result, security plans made by the government had to be vetted and approved by FIFA. This has two significant impacts on the nature of South Africa’s security measures. Firstly, the wide-ranging definition of creating successful conditions involved the government in providing a comprehensive security scheme with a scope ranging from likely risks, such as contact crimes, to more diffuse threats such as terrorism. Throughout the Bid Book (2003a:9:3), South Africa’s proposed model is presented as ‘integrated, seamless and well-resourced’. At the same time, as described in the GSC (OA/NATJOINTS, 2008:41) the deployment of the national security apparatus was considered as a support initiative to the FIFA owned event. While policing was utilised to pursue domestic and international objectives by the state, this was intended to remain in the background: ‘the approach therefore is one of football being the main focus with law enforcement present to facilitate the event and not the other way around’ (ibid).

Secondly, FIFA prioritised its commercial interests throughout the initial agreements, thus ensuring that its intellectual property rights were included in security measures from the genesis of planning. Alongside the specific commercial restrictions, other aspects of the national security plan were instrumentalised to provide an additional layer of policing against ambush marketing. For instance, the enforcement of restricted flying zones around stadiums was used as a countermeasure against ‘the possibility of the utilisation of aircraft for ambush marketing and terrorist attacks’ (OA/NATJOINTS, 2008: 47).

This also allowed FIFA to meet the security requirements of its corporate partners. The exact nature of FIFA’s obligations towards its official partners and sponsors is not publicly available, although it is clear that the association offers ‘maximum return on investment for the sponsors’ through opening up hosting environments for its partners’ logos and signage (FIFA, 2012). Through its commercial rights programme, a complex series of interactions lead to the policing of its partners’ brands. With FIFA guaranteeing the protection of corporate interests, the LOC with the host state as its primary backer works to ensure a legislative and policing environment which promotes certain brands. The combination of laws and enforcement uses security agencies and customs officials as part of a set of 'tools' against infringements on commercial property rights (FIFA Rights Protection Programme, 2010:7).

Furthermore, hosting agreements entailed a sweeping definition of security which promised to 'set up every possible safety and security measure' (SAFA, 2003b: A12). As Boyle and Haggerty (2011) have argued, it is this concept of total security which is characteristic of the planning environment of mega-events, in which authorities promote their ability to counteract all risk. Under the conditions stipulated by the guarantees, the government agreed to draft a detailed and comprehensive security concept, at its own cost, and to enforce all national security measures relevant to the 2010 World Cup. This functionally open definition of security chimed with the rhetoric of South African politicians who suggested that the World Cup transcended issues of cost or restraint (PMG, 2010b). However, it also allowed FIFA to align the protection of its commercial interests with an overarching definition of national security.

FIFA's developmental rhetoric

The association also cultivated a public image as a philanthropic organisation which aimed to benefit both South Africa and the continent at large (Maharaj, 2011:51). Sepp Blatter felt empowered to claim that: 'The FIFA Soccer World Cup in Africa is a love story and I am happy that this love story is coming together and is becoming a real wedding party. Africans have waited for a very long time; the dream is now a reality' (BuaNews, 2010b). Blatter (2010:27) also publically misrepresented the role of FIFA in South Africa through claiming that the association was in some way funding public works developments in South Africa:

> It was a historic moment. Over the past few years projects of this kind have been implemented throughout Africa to ensure that the 2010 World Cup leaves a lasting legacy. While the construction of new stadiums and training pitches, the introduction of modern telecommunications systems and the improvement of traffic infrastructures are vital, our work does not end there.

Such statements belied the fact that the World Cup was effectively bankrolled by South African public spending but Blatter also argued that the intangible benefits of the 2010 World Cup transcended cost: 'what do people need in a situation like this? As the ancient Romans used to say give them bread and give them entertainment. Football is modern entertainment and provides the emotions we need ... leave a legacy by showing the world you are capable of organising such a competition. You have the confidence and trust ... of FIFA' (Skymedia, 2009:35). FIFA's rhetoric was given further legitimacy by the support afforded by such iconic public figures as Desmond Tutu, who told the association's official magazine: 'The country has come so far. We were once a country with apartheid, but we are now the proud hosts of a FIFA World Cup. The children who died or were wounded during our struggle will now be smiling – wherever they are. This is all the fruit of their work. Their blood was not spilt in vain' (FIFA World Magazine, 2010a:41).

However, FIFA's self-presentation as a philanthropic sporting body is at odds with the organisation's actual practices. Much of its 'faith' in South Africa was bound up with the governments' ability to provide an environment for profit maximisation. At the same time it, is also arguable that any sports legacy which FIFA contributed towards in Africa, through channelling funds back into member associations, is substantially outweighed by the amount of profit it extracted due to the government measures which supported the 2010 World Cup. According to FIFA's (2011b) post-2010 financial report, the football association earned a tax-free $3 billion from the marketing and branding rights of the 2010 World Cup. By contrast, the South African government, who funded the venues in which the tournament took place and provided the logistical and administrative support which ensured a controlled and safe environment, made a far more modest return. Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan admitted that the tournament had directly added R38 billion to the national economy, roughly breaking even with the direct national state expenditure (Finance24, 2010). Gordhan did not include the spending of provincial and municipal governments, but claimed that the long-term impacts of infrastructural improvements and the increased international esteem of South Africa were ultimately worth the expenditure (ibid). But, leaving the issue of intangible benefits aside for the time being, this appears to present a striking disparity between public expenditure and private profit.

Blatter's Pan-African rhetoric also stands in stark contrast with the alliances FIFA has formed with despotic regimes on the continent. For example, Blatter personally accepted a medal of honour from Charles Taylor, the former president of Liberia who in April 2012 was convicted of crimes against humanity (The New Democrat, 2011). After his official visit to Zimbabwe in 2011, photos emerged of Blatter warmly holding hands with President Robert Mugabe (The Zimbabwean, 2011). Indeed, during the bidding process for the 2010 World Cup, FIFA's assessment report concluded that prospective hosts Libya, Tunisia and Egypt had 'good' to 'excellent' internal security (FIFA, 2004a). But by the end of 2011, governments in all three of these countries had been overthrown in revolutions which exposed the nature of this 'internal security', which was achieved through the systematic use of torture, the suppression of dissent, and rule by overbearing national security apparatuses. While FIFA promotes vaguely defined concepts of legacy within host countries, hosting arrangements actively work to distance the organisation from the content and wider ramifications of security plans. Although FIFA cannot be blamed for the authoritarian and brutal policing practices of governments, it can be argued that through its choice of hosting applicants it may give unwarranted legitimacy to regimes with poor human rights records. It could also be speculated that when it comes to a choice between business security and human rights, the association is much more likely to err on the side of the former.

Transnational Policing and the Private Security Sector

The international exception

The involvement of foreign security services and transnational institutions signalled the status of the 2010 World Cup as an exceptional event. Because of the event's status and profile, in which South Africa, was 'hosting the world' (Mththewa,2010b), officials claimed that the country was more exposed to international security challenges than in normal circumstance, requiring the cooperation of transnational institutions.

As a self-consciously 'African' event, the involvement of SADC structures and regional neighbours was used to convey the image of continental cooperation and prestige. In turn, neighbouring governments used the World Cup to call for a tightening of their internal security. For example, the Mozambican police claimed to be on high alert for armed gangs attempting to migrate north ahead of police clampdowns within South Africa (AllAfrica, 2010b). Namibia used the opportunity to upgrade its passport management system and installed new radar surveillance to monitor the country's airspace (Mulubwa, 2009).

The involvement of foreign police agencies accorded with both FIFA's commercial plans and with the government's security strategy. Along with sending observers to the 2006 German World Cup, members of the SAPS were briefed by Helmut Bayerl (2007:18) of the Munich police. Among the topics discussed was ensuring that 'conceptual preparations' were in place for enforcing commercial restrictions on ticket sales and product piracy (18). While these exchanges were not organised by FIFA, they did increase the exposure of the South African authorities to the forms of policing used at association-owned events. At the same time, these forms of collaboration accorded with the official SAPS discourse of capacity building through importing conceptual security expertise. FIFA (2010) also played a direct role in facilitating transnational policing links through organising the 2010 World Cup security workshop at its headquarters in Zurich in March 2010, which was attended by Bheki Cele, Danny Jordaan and police delegates from the countries participating in the tournament. While the details of the workshop were not made public, the subsequent press conference eschewed the issue of FIFA's commercial restrictions and instead focused on how the 2010 World Cup presented an opportunity to strengthen and enhance international law enforcement (ibid). However, it can be speculated that such events increased both personal and institutional bonds between FIFA and police agencies within their member nations, consolidating a shared set of security interests and reference points.

While security exchanges worked to share institutional knowledge and practices on concerns such as terrorism, illegal betting and hooliganism, they may also have served as a platform for participating countries to transfer domestic policing models into the South African context. It also presented an opportunity for the South African security services to further entrench their institutional standing within ‘transnational security networks’ (Gill, 2006).

Through collaboration with host governments, INTERPOL promotes its capacity to assist in securing against potential crisis and disruption during international sporting events. In the case of South Africa, this offered an augmentation to national security measures while giving additional surety to the state’s guarantees to FIFA through increasing the exposure of the SAPS to security practices honed at previous FIFA events. The prestige afforded by managing an event as large as the FIFA World Cup provided a chance for the higher echelons of the SAPS to publically recalibrate their personal positions within international policing circuits. For example, in the lead-up to the tournament, Bheki Cele conducted several site checks of key infrastructure with INTERPOL president Ronald Noble (Times Live Multimedia, 2010). At each of these stops, with Cele at his side, Noble assured the gathered press contingents that the preparations demonstrated that the SAPS had become a respected security player through its demonstrable expertise in policing major events. Such testimonials aided the SAPS’s attempts to define itself as a police force from the global South which can provide world class logistics and planning.

For example, at the level of crowd control techniques, SAPS experiments with the practices of the French gendarmes resonate with Graham’s description of security ‘boomerangs’. However, this was not necessarily marked by the ‘flat’ (Boyle, 2011) circulation of best practise. In the case of France, Graham (2010, xx) suggests that domestic security has been influenced by an ‘orientalism’, which views policing in the *banlieues* [which directly translates as suburb but has come to be a euphemism for low income housing projects outside of French cities] as a kind of internal colonialism over potential domestic ‘insurgents’. This becomes a self-reinforcing logic, as heavy-handed and aggressive policing generates social upheaval thus providing a justification for even ‘tougher policing’: ‘The 2005 riots were only the latest in a long line of reactions towards the increasing militarisation and securitisation of this form of internal colonisation and enforced peripherality’ (ibid). The linkage to the 2010 World Cup would suggest that French government may be attempting to market aspects of its own security strategies in other countries, marking an example of an exchange of Northern security procedures to the global South.

Joint preparatory operations, such as the training simulations between US and South African forces also served to advance strategic objectives. The involvement of US Special Operations highlights a broader strategy of US military power, in which SOCOM uses its linkages to foreign governments as a platform from which to perform ‘rapid response’ and often highly clandestine missions (Turse, 2011). Furthermore, as the one of the largest and best equipped military forces in Africa, the SANDF provides an important security link for the United States. In turn, the exercises focused on using specialised response teams which can be rapidly deployed in urban terrain, which accords with internal SANDF military doctrine. Although the military's 'Vision 2020 Strategy' is not publicly available, selected quotes from the document used within an in-house army journal (Olivier, 2010:35) note that this strategy is focused on 'joint, interagency, departmental and multinational (JIM) operations' within 'complex' urban environments.

The exceptionality associated with the World Cup also provided opportunities for private operators. However, this was utilised in different ways. While some companies affiliated their projects with the wider manoeuvrings of the state security services, others promoted fears about the inadequacy of government preparations. For example, the local security contractor Nicholls Steyn & Associates (2010), whose director Rob Steyn is the former section head of the SAPS VIP Protection Division, performed 'executive protection' for representatives of three of FIFA commercial partners. According to the company's report on the World Cup, these services were conceptualised as an adjunct to the government's preparations: as 'good ambassadors for South Africa' they 'developed an excellent working relationship with the South African Police Force' (8) in changing 'the reality and perception of threats to safety' (7). While the report suggests that the LOC was ineffective in providing security planning and information, it is effusive about the SAPS's 'perceptible presence' (6) and concludes that: 'the NSA [company] is particularly proud of the manner in which South Africa hosted the World Cup. We were gracious and magnificent hosts' (8).

The discourse of exceptionality and legacy also provided an entrance point for international security technology firms, whose local distributors provided the security hardware purchased as part of the SAPS' procurement drive. For example, the surveillance and IT technology used in mobile command centres was purchased from the domestic branch of the Taiwanese company GeoVision (2010). According to a press release, the company was proud to offer its support in assisting the SAPS sustain 'full coverage of the event' and offered the assurance that its products would 'serve valiantly' during the World Cup (ibid). The US-based company Robinson (2008:4) claimed of their equipment that 'While the R44 Raven II Police Helicopters will play integral roles in the security effort for the World Cup, they are also part of a sustained effort to create a safer environment that will continue to benefit the citizens of South Africa long after the World Cup concludes'. However, there was an underlying ambiguity in private security's alignment with the government's preparations. While the World Cup was used to showcase the government's capacity to enforce security, these operations were augmented by private institutions whose success is dependent on anxieties about the state's capabilities.

As a result, other companies attempted to capitalise on the fears about crime which surrounded South Africa's hosting. For example, along with donating vehicles to SAFA, the local subsidiary of Mercedes Benz used the tournament as an opportunity to promote its latest ranges of luxury armour-plated vehicles:

> ... [the] Mercedes-Benz S600 Guard and Mercedes-Benz E-Guard, which provide occupants with protection from attacks by firearms and explosives. The Mercedes-Benz S600 Guard has armour to resist military standard small-arms projectiles that have almost twice the velocity of bullets fired by a revolver, and provides protection against fragments from hand grenades (IOL, 2009a).

Furthermore, there is at least one case of security contractors distorting and exaggerating their involvement in security operations. In early 2010, a report in the *Jerusalem Post* (Lappin, 2010) claimed that over 30 Israeli homeland security firms were providing equipment to the South African government, ranging from 'rocket-proof shields' to automated cameras that 'can climb up poles'. According to Marc Kahlberg, a former police official and current president of MK Security Consulting, he had been personally approached by SAPS officials in 2006:

> In June 2006, I was approached by the South African Police (A special unit tasked with the initial security preparations for the Soccer World Cup) and asked to assist them with preparing a complete plan of action in providing the Loftus Stadium in Pretoria with a comprehensive security solution for an event where the local soccer champions Kaiser Chiefs would play the famous English team Manchester United. Integrating the existing security infrastructure (which was really minimal), with amongst other things, the unique technology that I was able to import to South Africa, I put into place the exact Secure Zone Concept that I used in the City of Netanya, Israel after the Park Hotel terror attack, which cut the crime rate by over 70% for a period of a year and prevented any further attacks in the sensitive area, which was constantly targeted by terror groups at the time ...There is no doubt that since 2006 the South African security infrastructure has gone from strength to strength. Millions have been spent on technology and training, manpower has been beefed up and international cooperation with other countries is in place. The initial Secure Zone Concept has been implemented and even though I slightly changed the format because of a different culture and different problems, such as extreme violent crime, it is really working in those places that it has been implemented. The stadium security plan that I passed on to the South African Police in 2006 and 2007 is in place and working (the Secure Zone Concept with various layers of proactive defence and a simple Detect, Delay and Deter concept which has also been integrated into the contingency plans and well as policy and standard procedure of the authorities) (Interview, 9 March 2010).

In effect, Kahlberg suggested that his security plan for the Loftus stadium had provided the conceptual blueprint for national security plans. These claims were vehemently denied by the LOC, whose spokesman Rich Mkhondo asserted that comprehensive security measures had been implemented by the government and the LOC: 'We do not need any help from any security companies, including those from Israel' (Sport24, 2010). However, after the World Cup, one list of police acquisitions revealed that the SAPS did in fact purchase 10 Israeli-made water cannons (defenceWeb, 2011). The LOC's denunciations therefore seemed to have been partly based on asserting the government’s capacity to implement security measures through refuting claims that it would be outsourcing its security functions to foreign companies.

However, it seems that Kahlberg lied about his own involvement in drafting security planning and misrepresented the actual structure of policing measures, in implying that it would primarily be run by private security firms. Indeed, at a 2011 counter-terrorism conference in Massachusetts, Kahlberg claimed that ‘the success of the security concept throughout the 2010 soccer world cup [sic] in South Africa is a prime example of the concept’s accomplishments’ (International Security Consulting, 2011). While the SAPS may have consulted with Kahlberg and others, security plans were based on prior event templates from other FIFA tournaments and previous events in South Africa. It is therefore suspicious, to say the least, that the ‘Kahlberg plan’ was never publically referenced by government and FIFA officials or cited within the available planning documents. As a result, it seems likely that Kahlberg’s statements betrayed a tendency on the part of contractors to deliberately overstate their involvement in mega-event security (Boyle, 2011:344). At the same time, the reaction by the LOC also reveals sensitivity about maintaining a public focus on the security measures as a state-centred project.

National and Urban Security

Within national, provincial and local government, the wide-ranging definition of national security was used to pursue parallel projects. Although the previous chapter discussed how World Cup preparations were used to augment existing security resources, this section will provide a few examples of how different authorities affixed additional meanings onto the security preparations.

SANDF

SANDF officials were vocal in suggesting that their role in security preparations had been underfunded. For example, the Air Force publicly stated that it wanted the government to adjust the delivery of jet fighters purchased as a result of the controversial 1999 arms procurement deal to include Saab JAS39C advanced light fighter jets in its World Cup deployment (Engelbrecht, 2009a). This was in addition to the Saab manufactured Gripen fighters, which alongside ‘cannon-fitted Hawk advanced trainers and gun-toting Rooivalk attack helicopters’, were used to secure airspace during the tournament (Wingrin, 2010). In July 2011 the Saab company publicly admitted that it had paid R24 million in ‘secret payments’ to one of the SANDF advisors consulting on the procurement: a revelation which in turn contributed to the government’s reopening of an investigation into the deal, an on-going political scandal in which both President Zuma and former President Mbeki have been accused of receiving bribes from defence companies (Sole and Brummer, 2011).

Defence Minister Lindiwe Sisulu (2010) has maintained that SANDF is ‘woefully underfunded’ and that current defence spending undermines the military’s capacity to be a ‘critical and credible partner in influencing events in our region, and the international community’.

At the same time, Sisulu has attempted to blame unionisation within SANDF as a major cause of decline and has gone so far as to suggest that the South African National Defence Union (SANDU) is a threat to national security through encouraging a ‘mutinous’ influence within the ranks (Duncan, 2010a). In the build-up period to the tournament, relationships between the government and the union deteriorated to the extent that at a march to the Pretoria Union Buildings in 2009, protesting soldiers broke through a barricade and were pushed back by riot police using tear gas. The result was running battles between the police and military on the edge of the verdant lawns of the official seat of government. However, SANDU has argued that the Minister is attempting to institute a draconian clampdown on soldiers’ basic labour rights. Indeed, after the World Cup, the SANDF attempted to withhold back-pay owed to soldiers for tournament deployment, but was forced to release these funds after public pressure from the union (News24, 2010a). The security preparations coincided with these struggles within the military and were used by its leadership to leverage greater funding as part of a wider vision of resupplying national defence.

Prestige projects

At the urban scale, the World Cup also provided a rationale for authorities to fast-track long gestating development projects, such as the Gautrain mass rapid transit system between Pretoria, Johannesburg and the Oliver Tambo International Airport as well as the construction of the King Shaka International Airport outside Durban. Both of these major infrastructural projects were designed with prominent security features, which were presented as long-term urban legacies arising from World Cup spending. Furthermore, the exceptional conditions of the World Cup provided an impetus for these projects to be rapidly planned, resourced and completed before the event. Security and communications systems at the new airport were installed by the South African branch of the Saab defence group (defenceWeb, 2010b). The King Shaka airport was also used as a showpiece for the SAPS, who deployed tactical teams during the tournament to further highlight the police as the ‘leading agents’ in security operations (Mthethwa, 2010e). Indeed, Minister Mthethwa suggested that the newness of the airport made it a ‘leap forward’ in the policing of ports of entry (Ibid).

The Gautrain was rolled out with a network of CCTV cameras and ‘Israeli-developed military-grade thermal imaging equipment to protect its assets … imported from and endorsed by the Israeli Defence Force’ (Venter, 2010). However, the launch of the Rea Valley bus rapid transit system (BRT) in Johannesburg in 2009 saw the SANDF deployed alongside the SAPS, owing to violent resistance from the minibus taxi industry, who regarded the BRT as a threat to their monopoly on public transport. Indeed, in the months before the World Cup, shots were fired at buses and one BRT driver had his house petrol-bombed (Berger, 2010). At the same time, the Defence Force declared the SANDU march on the Union Building illegal because it diverted force numbers needed to protect the rollout of the Gautrain (Duncan, 2010a). The rollout of such prestige projects added an additional seam of security to host cities through creating heavily guarded and monitored entry and transport points, which applied defence technology to the maintenance of everyday urban infrastructure (Graham, 2010).

Evictions?

Internationally, the security measures adopted by mega-event hosts have been accompanied by beautification measures which overtly target the urban poor and homeless. As a result, there was a significant amount of media and NGO speculation about the possibility of forced removals in the lead up to 2010. In South Africa, government worked to maintain the image of a ‘developmental’ World Cup which would benefit all South Africans. For example, in 2009 Housing Minister Tokyo Sexwale claimed that there would be no evictions of informal settlements as a result of the 2010 World Cup (Ndawonde, 2009). However, a report conducted by the UN Human Rights Council (2009:9) argued that the KwaZulu-Natal provincial government had in fact tried to eliminate slums and put the residents of informal settlements in ‘transit camps’ ahead of the World Cup through the adoption of the Elimination and Prevention of Re-Emergence of Slums Act. After a sustained legal campaign by the shackdwellers’ movement Abahlali baseMjondolo, the Act was struck down by the Constitutional Court in September 2009.

But while the press was eager to link evictions to the World Cup, many of the removals which were undertaken in cities in the lead-up period were not directly connected to the tournament. As Richard Pithouse argued, ‘people were being evicted long before we got the World Cup, and they will be evicted for a long time afterward’ (interviewed by Werth, 2010). However, at the local level, the proximity of the World Cup appears to have provided an impetus and accelerator to on-going gentrification projects. For example, the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign (2010) noted that localised evictions increased in Cape Town ahead of the tournament, particularly around the Green Point stadium and transport hubs. Long-term projects were fast-tracked by the proximity of the World Cup, such as the N2 Gateway housing project, which aimed to reduce the presence of slums near the Cape Town international airport (Newton, 2009). However, it is unclear if this was imposed by the external pressures of the World Cup rather than being incorporated into long-standing plans. As a result, this question will be more thoroughly addressed in the next chapter.

However, there is some evidence which suggests that existing spatial inequalities were viewed as having positive security ramifications by organisers. According to *Destination 2010* (2009:28), an LOC endorsed publication covering planning and preparation a year prior to the tournament, tourists had little to fear from a ‘high violent crime rate and safety issues ... most analysts blame crime on poverty and unemployment and point to the fact that the bulk of cases occur in teeming, poverty stricken townships’. Although this contrasts sharply with the promoted image of a developmental World Cup, such a statement aligns with some of the observations the FIFA inspection team (2004a) made about the spatial dispersion of violent crime in South Africa. In particular, the team noted that one of the attractive features about prospective host cities was that criminal violence was overtly concentrated in ‘marginal areas’ (ibid).

Outcomes

For the South African government and its security partners in FIFA, tangible augmentations in the policing apparatus were only one among several objectives which the security measures aimed to achieve. While the World Cup was used to increase the resources available to the police and military and to fast-track the installation of security technology at key infrastructure, the main focus was on ensuring that the government was able to promote an image of total security during the tournament itself.

The SAPS (2011b) has conceded that this visible policing strategy was probably a factor in reducing some areas of the national crime rate, which is a far more limited policing legacy than the one promoted ahead of the World Cup. Furthermore, in the official remarks which accompanied the release of the National Crime Statistics in 2011, Minster Mthethwa (2011a) made no reference to the World Cup security measures, which is a surprising omission considering how the tournament served as a major platform for the SAPS to display its security prowess to the international community. The official ANC statement on the tournament also did not make any mention of the World Cup as a contributing factor to a reduction in crime rates (Polticsweb, 2011). This silence was contrasted by the statements made by opposition parties like the Democratic Alliance, Freedom Front and Inkatha Freedom Party, who all lauded the World Cup security measures as an operational template which should be extended into everyday policing (ibid). That the SAPS and the ruling party did not mention the World Cup at all, may suggest that many of the publicly-made assertions about the security legacy of the tournament were scaled back in the ensuing period, hence its disappearance from official security rhetoric.

Government officials presented the security measures as part of a heroic struggle to reclaim South Africa from out-of-control criminals (Mouton, 2009). However, the actual success of security measures was arguably contingent on factors other than the mass mobilisation of state forces. Notably, as Cornelissen (2011) observes, tournament venues were spatially centred in urban areas which are already gentrified and heavily policed by both the state and private security. This ensured that the tournament-related events were kept away from urban and peripheral areas which experience far higher rates of crime. Furthermore, the extent to which tourists have to a large degree been insulated from victimisation (Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, 2010), would suggest that urban authorities drew upon an institutional experience of ensuring that foreign visitors and prestige sites are kept well-guarded and secure. Indeed, as the SAPS (2011b) annual report on crime figures shows, the preparation and staging of the World Cup occurred against an on-going reduction in rates of violent crime.

Despite all the rhetoric of an exceptional national project and logistical preparations comparable to war, the 2010 World Cup ultimately amounted to various teams playing football for a month. However, for supporters of the government's efforts, the precise lack of any 'security story' served as proof of the necessity of exceptional measures. According to John Carlin (2011:37), who wrote the book upon which the Hollywood film about South Africa's victory in the 1995 Rugby World Cup *Invictus* was based:

> Those most disappointed were the foreign media, who had predicted that to stage a World Cup in SA was an exercise in criminal irresponsibility. They waited for the bloodbath to materialise, for the lights to go out, for the games not to start on time, for stadiums to collapse, for the Gautrain to crash, for the epidemics of killer diseases, for Julius Malema and the AWB to ignite a race war. And then what? Nothing happened. There was no bloody story. Not off the field, anyway…Least disappointing of all was South Africa and its people. We gave the world our best in 2010, and the world was impressed. A fabulous platform has been provided for prosperity and social peace.

Conclusion

The securitisation of the 2010 World Cup involved a public/private 'complex' (Boyle and Haggerty, 2009) which was coordinated around a specific goal: to ensure that the World Cup was the most secured and policed to date. While not denying that security planners did work to ensure a high level of safety for attending publics (Bernhard and Martin, 2011) this chapter has argued that security has flexible institutional meanings for the mega-event security complex. In particular, this prioritised the image of national security and social cohesion. The discursive framing of preparations by the South African government presented this as a goal which went above 'normal' politics. Security operations were presented as having a meaning far beyond the exigencies of policing a large event. Using often bombastic, feverish language, the governance preparations were portrayed as an unprecedented platform to boldly assert South Africa's excellence and modernity. As a result, this saw official calls for a full social mobilisation, as in times of war, to capitalise on this once-off opportunity.

But the FIFA World Cup is also a commercially owned franchise. FIFA, in particular, used the wide-ranging definition of national security to outline the framework for measures which thoroughly incorporated the protection of their financial and symbolic interests. Although they used their ownership of the brand to approve and vet security measures, it appears that the open-ended definition of tournament-related security included within hosting guarantees and by-laws ensured that they would not have to maintain a vigilantly interventionist stance on preparations. Instead, as a national security event and a source of considerable international prestige, the association could safely leave the enforcement of a massive, inter-urban policing regime up to the South African government.

From this perspective, it may be speculated that the open-ended definition of security outlined in FIFA World Cup hosting requirements caters to the interests of both the association and police and military establishments. The wide-ranging requirements of creating 'secure conditions' for the tournament provided scope for substantial policing expenditures and equipment purchases. This may also make the financial concessions to FIFA more palatable to host governments. While authorities are obliged to sign away possible revenue streams, they are also able to leverage additional funding for tournament-related projects which can be used after the event has ended. Indeed, it may be further speculated that FIFA is emboldened in obligating such comprehensive concessions from host governments because they are aware that this will be adapted for additional projects by its government 'partners'. FIFA is also experienced in capitalising on the symbolic potency of the World Cup brand. Because governments have demonstrated their willingness to agree to the bid conditions for hosting rights, the association has scaled up its requirements in response. Years of institutional experience have created a successful template for ensuring the *securitisation of commercialism* with each World Cup cycle.

The resultant 'complex' resembles the often cited idea of the 'military-industrial complex' in which the state and private sector perpetuate an economy based upon permanent war and crisis mobilisation (Turse, 2008). As with that complex, the mega-event variant also uses the concept of national security to pursue projects which the public has little choice in or say over. In the case of the 2010 World Cup, this was used to legitimate both wide-scale state funding of a privately owned event and the transference of billions of dollars of untaxed revenue out of the country.

The manufacturing of security exception combined two built-in legitimations for these projects. Firstly, as a national endeavour, the issue of cost was presented as a banal consideration, outweighed by the symbolic importance of South Africa's hosting. Secondly, this was discursively attached to the concept of legacy. As a communicative strategy, security measures were presented as laying the foundation for an exhaustive overhaul of state institutions. However, the apparent ambivalence about this legacy displayed by the SAPS in the post-World Cup period suggests a different conclusion.

Charitably, it could be argued that police management overestimated the benefits of the tournament. However, it could also be suggested that the diffusion of an enticing, but vaguely defined idea of legacy, worked as a public relations endeavour that was used to convince South African's of the absolute necessity of the securitisation of the World Cup.

Chapter Eight: The 2010 World Cup – Occupation or Convergence?

Introduction

As suggested in the previous chapter, the construction of security at mega-events is indicative of wider debates about the relationship between government power and commercialism and the ways in which this is reflected through urban space. Recent decades have seen various academic models which argue that the 'neoliberalisation' of security has seen the creation of more 'fragmented' (Welch, 2008) forms of governance in which the state is only one of the forces in society which 'steers' security. Eick (2010) identifies this as a key factor in the relationship between host states and FIFA. While governments administer and subsidise World Cups, the real power – albeit for the period of hosting – lies elsewhere, as it is FIFA who exerts the final authority over security measures. In contrast, Klauser (2011) argues that there may be a temptation to place too much focus upon the idea of powerful, shadowy, transnational sporting bodies imposing their will on nation states. As a result, he proposes that event models are translated into different contexts because of their adaptability to on-going institutional concerns.

However, both of these accounts downplay the political aspects of security. Although Eick positions FIFA's increased power as a product of the neoliberal turn in global political economy, it is unclear how the idea of 'steering security' for corporate interests squares with the 'hyper-productivist' (Brenner, 2001) role played by the state in organising World Cups. This is doubly surprising, because Eick's article (279-280) starts with a discussion of how FIFA's current rise to political and financial influence began at the same time as the neoliberal experiments of the Pinochet military dictatorship in Chile. While this is not to suggest that FIFA requires the assistance of authoritarian states to ensure its revenue stream, Eick does not convince that neoliberalism entails the subjugation of state power to external forces.

At the same time, Klauser (2011:8) appears to narrow the 'meaning' of security for participating police forces to the question of concentrating and regulating fans within defined security zones. While he does not claim to offer a comprehensive model of security meanings (9), this gap begs the question of how security may also entail additional aspects of social regulation, control and repression. These omissions may also reflect something about the nature of mega-events: how do we square the apparent dominance of private institutions over national governments with the accompanying displays of the power of the security state in full mobilisation? Or to generalise the question, how do we reconcile the perception that commercial interests control urban space with increasingly extensive, even militarised, state policing apparatuses? (Graham, 2010:89)

From within radical criminology, some scholars have argued that framing these relationships in terms of imposition and hierarchy underestimates the collaborative nature of security governance. O'Reilly (2011:29) suggests that contemporary security governance can be positioned within the nexus between 'high politics' and 'high finance'. This 'state–corporate symbiosis' entails a shared outlook towards a global discourse of insecurity, which pivots around the conception of an increasingly risky future, which in turn is used to increase the power of both the state and private security in the present. However, this relationship is often characterised by dysfunction and parasitism (191) as egregious behaviour on the part of the private sector is hidden behind the institutional 'shield' of the state (Bassey, 2008). Snider (2000) argues that the knowledge claims of neoliberalism have created a built-in set of legitimations for such security relationships through the deployment of a developmental rhetoric which argues that governments can only create economic growth through sustained concessions to big business. Under this dominant 'reality system' (Fisher, 2009), states may pursue elite projects which are presented to the public as being forced by the 'supposed external constraints' (Brenner, 2001: 802) of the market. Indeed, the idea of corporate actors as 'partners' or 'stakeholders' in security (Zedner, 2006:83) is indicative of how the state is no longer in the business of 'the hierarchical imposition' of regulation on private actors.

In practice, the alliances between governments and sporting associations may thus use state power to leverage 'liminal and relatively hidden spaces' (Whyte, 2007:180) which provide locations for both private enrichment and extensions in government power. While this model of state–corporate alliance draws upon the theoretical taxonomy of criminology, as Gaffney argues (2010:27), such forms of temporary governance also bear a striking resemblance to the structures of mega-event governance. In particular, the US led invasion of Iraq and the post-war rule by the CPA, have been cited as an exemplar of 'shock' governance (Klein, 2007) as a result of a 'reconstruction' process that was characterised by extra-legal forms of governance which portioned off substantial parts of the Iraqi economy to corporate actors.

While more historically specific and more focused on economic restructuring, Klein's concept of the 'shock doctrine' echoes the 'state of exception' (Agamben, 2005) in that it proposes that times of perceived crisis are used to radically alter societies. Moreover, what is notable is that most of the historical examples she cites – from the Thatcher government's conflict with the miners in the United Kingdom to the rise of the homeland security industry in the United States – have paired deregulation and privatisation with dramatic augmentations in the power and reach of state security and surveillance.

As a result, we do not necessarily have to turn to the extreme end of inter-state conflicts to find comparisons between mega-events and the logic of warfare. In particular, mega-event governance has parallels with the more quotidian ‘public safety wars’ (Feldman, 2004), or ‘pacification security jobs’ (Neocleous, 2011) which increasingly characterise domestic policing throughout the world. These are also reflective of an ‘insecurity discourse’ which is shared and translated between political and economic centres of power (O’Reilly, 2011) and finds its expression in open-ended ‘wars’ on drugs, crime and terror. And unlike the exceptional circumstances of mega-events, these are permanent, on-going conflicts. For Hallsworth and Lea (2011), this tendency to securitise social policy combines to produce an increasingly powerful state ‘Leviathan’, which enforces both political and economic order. This is accompanied by developments in the global economy, such as the growth in the security industry and the increased computational power of digital surveillance, which augment the arsenals of governments.

The adaptability of security models, in which sporting associations push for the creation of ‘clean sites’ (Klauser, 2011:12) throughout host cities is increased by its resonance with an on-going set of security preoccupations which involves the creation of differentiated and highly securitised urban spaces that are used for both branding and security. The state security apparatus serves to enforce the walls, barricades and security zones used to make urban space safe for capital. From the perspective of a sporting authority, access-controlled security sites ‘temporarily re-territorialise particularly attractive parts of ... host cities in the interest of visibility and branding for its commercial partners’ (Klauser, 2011: 6). Weizman (2007:9) suggests that the ubiquity of walls and fortified enclaves can be understood as part of a continuum of global developments, from gated communities in the USA to illegal settlements on the West Bank, which extend physical and virtual borders set against ‘poverty and violence’. From this, it is possible to trace techniques, technologies and geographies of ‘occupation’ (ibid) throughout the world. This may be especially pertinent in the case of mega-events, as domestic policing and security is aligned with international processes. In particular, the planning for mega-events may pivot around a rendering of host environments as ‘security-scapes’ (Wall and Monahan, 2011) which entail an official perception of broadly homogenous threats and which demand comparably similar counter-measures.

For Graham (2010:xxiii), this is characteristic of the attempts to manage flows of people and capital through enclosures and exclusion zones as part of a broader accumulative geography in which the exploitation of resources in the global South sustains wealth in the North. The deployment of security measures in aid of a process of neocolonial extraction echoes many of the criticisms levelled against FIFA’s relationship with the South African state, which depicted the organisation as a latter-day colonial power engaged in the 21st century plunder of an African country. However, in the case of South Africa, this is complicated by FIFA’s reliance on the power of the South African state. Furthermore, it can be argued that World Cup security measures were aligned with a project of state marketing which actively tried to recalibrate South Africa’s international status as an emergent power.

Indeed, as Abourahme (2009) implies, post-colonial and third world elites may be pioneers in managing forms of exclusion and 'occupation' which are later translated and replicated in Northern countries.

This raises a wider question about the philosophical nature of security. Eick (2010) argues that mega-events represent the outer point of the neoliberalisation of state security in which policing measures are wedded to commercialism. This implies that security and commercialism can be separated and distinguished from each other. However, another approach may hold that at a fundamental level, the politics of security is itself a product of capitalist order. For Neocleous (2011:192), this need to 'secure insecurity' is the mechanism for structuring, administrating and controlling disruptions, disturbances and the 'constant revolutionising of production' inherent within capitalism. In this sense, rather than distinct areas of mega-event security being captured or instrumentalised for commercial purposes, they are intrinsically constitutive in the fabrication of capitalist order: the war machine and consumerism in tandem.

Finally, the interzone between national security and spectacle may also entail another series of exchanges between policing and commerce. While security measures work to preserve the symbolic image of a mega-event, security services deploy policing tactics which seek to project a desired image of competency and strength (Debord, 1988, Martin, 2011) and embrace a 'self-conscious semiotics of policing' (Boyle and Haggerty: 2009:259). As commercial bodies exert a greater influence upon state security, this suggests another exchange, as policing and military institutions incorporate techniques associated with commercial advertising within their governance repertoires. However, as Hagemann (2010) has argued, the alignment of security and spectacle can also serve to produce a concentrated version of security preoccupations which exposes processes and tactics which are less overt than in 'normal' conditions.

As this chapter argues, the relationship between FIFA and the South African state has often been understood in terms of invasion, occupation and colonisation. However, in contrast, this chapter will argue that this perception was in fact enabled and leveraged by state power. Rather than serving as an operational platform for an assault on South African sovereignty, FIFA's institutional objectives complemented the security preoccupations of the South African government. This was in turn reflected in the spatial governance of the tournament, which revolved around creating a mobile security apparatus (Rodgers, 2007) across host cities. Rather than being a novel imposition, it will be argued that this represented an intensification of a well-established security trajectory within South African cities. While the concept of 'occupation' provides a useful axiom (Weizman, 2007) through which to frame security governance, it will be maintained that not only was this internally managed but that it has its origins in 'everyday' security practices. Finally, developing the concept of spectacle as articulated by Hagemann (2010) and Martin (2011), it will be suggested that the display of dual state/corporate power also exposes facets of security which are less than complementary to the branding initiatives of its organisers. In particular, it will be argued that the World Cup revealed how, under the conditions of exception, the state security apparatus becomes a force for the entrenchment and fortification of power and privilege. The implication for South African society may be that this convergence goes beyond 'interpretive flexibility' (Klauser, 2011) and presents an image of national security *in extremis*, in which corporate interest and state policy are increasingly indistinguishable. While the knowledge claims of neoliberalism present this arrangement as harmonious and beneficial to the public, in practice this symbiosis has become parasitical and dysfunctional (O'Reilly, 2010).

Chapter Structure

The chapter will begin by discussing how FIFA's role in the governance of the World Cup was perceived by the media and civil society as a kind of imposed regime. This was given further credence by the statements of political officials which presented FIFA as a colonial power. In reaction, the state was quick to present itself as an equal stakeholder with FIFA and depicted the enforcement of its obligations to the association as an assertion, rather than subversion, of national sovereignty.

It will than turn to a discussion of the political nature of FIFA and suggest that the framing of the association as a 'shadow government' is misleading. While the organisation reserved the right to approve security measures, it will be suggested that much of its popular status as a globally dominant football 'mafia' is leveraged through the concessions provided to it by host states.

In turn, the involvement of foreign policing establishments and private security companies will be discussed as adding an additional layer of security to the state's plans. This was linked into the broader spatial strategy of the South African state, which worked through the creation of a series of linked, temporary 'green zones'. While this was aligned with FIFA's financial strategy, it was also used to pursue a series of additional measures, not specifically mandated by FIFA. However, it will be argued that the functionally open definition of World Cup 'security' was used to intensify continued efforts to sanitise urban space.

Finally, it will be argued that, in practice, host cities were for a brief period the ultimate expression of the convergence of commercialism and security, in which saturation advertising blurred into saturation policing.

State Branding

The occupation of South Africa

In May 2010, the parody news site *Haiybo* (2010) ran an 'article' with the headline 'FIFA buys South Africa for R750 million'. According to the satire:

> Danny Jordaan announced that Sepp Blatter will be inaugurated as President during the closing ceremony on July 12th, with the country's name to be changed to The Bureaucrats' Republic of Fifania®… The governmental seat of power in Fifania® will be transferred from Pretoria to Camps Bay, where Blatter is building a "cosy little lock-up-and-go president's crib" spanning 17 blocks. All current governmental departments will be disbanded except for the Ministry of Defence. The armed forces are to be expanded to accommodate the 44 million men, women and children over the age of seven who will be conscripted to serve in Blatter's elite defence corps, the Soccer Soldiers (SS). The SS's primary function will be to "seek out and destroy" people infringing FIFA copyright the world over. Children under the age of seven are expected to be put to work in state-of-the-art production facilities manufacturing FIFA-branded clothing, pens and cups.

While humorous, this absurdist piece is also indicative of some of the negative sentiments expressed throughout the media and civil society towards FIFA's relationship with the South African government. These criticisms became particularly noticeable as the police and judicial system began to implement FIFA's commercial restrictions in the lead-up to the tournament. By April 2010, FIFA was investigating over 50,000 cases of alleged ambush marketing in South Africa, and filing interdicts for a range of cases, from the advertising campaign of the budget airliner Kulula to keyring holders which allegedly breached marketing rights (Seale, 2010).

The enforcement of the commercial measures was often framed as draconian and suggestive of how FIFA was using the state machinery to advance its own internal agendas. The enactments of host city by-laws also became controversial and led some commentators to suggest that spatial restrictions only served to benefit FIFA and its corporate sponsors through creating citadels of profit extraction (Rangongo, 2010). Sophie Nakueira (cited in Tolsi, 2010a) argued that the creation of commercial zones and restrictions on public space inhibited people's constitutional right to freedom of movement. FIFA's apparent influence over the lives of citizens was even seen to extend to issues of health, with the emergence of allegations that the emergency preparations of the KZN Health Department involved keeping designated public hospitals half full for the duration of the tournament (Ndaliso, 2010). The extent of security measures was thus often perceived as evidence of a private institution imposing its imprint over host cities and asserting its capacity to shape and micromanage urban form according to its interests (Klauser, 2007:7).

FIFA was thus presented as an invasive force which had captured the state and turned the country into a temporary colony or fiefdom, with one editorial column concluding that 'we have surrendered national sovereignty to a gang of old, white men in Geneva who conceive of South Africa principally as a sound stage on which a month-long commercial for their sponsors is to be filmed' (Dawes, 2010). Popular depictions of FIFA described the association as capable of overriding the autonomy of the state, which included representations of the body as the 'masters of the universe' (Eliseev, 2010) and claims that 'for most football fans the World Cup will take place in FIFA-land and not South Africa' (Curnow, 2010).

Even politicians who were involved in the implementation of restrictions appeared to be critical of the organisation, with the Premier of the Western Cape Helen Zille claiming, 'I should have flexed my muscles in response to FIFA's demands a long time ago. They are not a colonial power' (Tolsi, 2010b). Along with the imperialist connotations, FIFA was also depicted as a quasi-criminal organisation, with one widely disseminated article in the *City Press* newspaper quoting an unnamed 'senior government official' as saying 'FIFA are a bunch of thugs. Not even the UN expects you to sign away your tax base. These *mafiosos* do' (Rademeyer, Prince and Lombard, 2010). This metaphor appeared to resonate with the public. For example, during a march in Durban on June 16 2010, which included former stadium stewards, protesters' chanted 'Get out FIFA mafia' (Veith, 2010). After the World Cup itself, other officials claimed that security planning had been constrained by the conditions demanded by FIFA. The head of 2010 strategic planning for Durban, Julie-May Ellingson, said that the greatest challenge of hosting the tournament was

> accepting that while we would be held accountable for the hosting, we in fact had no control or say over what FIFA did. In the build-up, there were too many role-players with conflicting agendas, lack of clarity as to who was responsible for what and who would have to pay for what (Dardagan, 2011:10).

At the same time, the government and the LOC were presented as betraying the developmental aspirations of ordinary South Africans through pandering to FIFA's demands. An exposé on the hosting arrangements in one national newspaper was titled 'FIFA called the shots and we said yes' (Tolsi, 2010a), suggesting that the state had failed to limit the organisation's demands and had committed public funds to a wasteful private project. Indeed, such criticisms became so pervasive in the build-up to the World Cup that Danny Jordaan publically denied that South Africa had been 'sold out' and stated: 'The fact of the matter is that more countries are making bids ... If you make a bid then you accept the terms and conditions of the event' (Sapa, 2010b). Indeed, not all commentary saw FIFA's 'colonial' rule as negative, with Kane-Berman (2010) arguing that the government would have been unable to create the conditions for a successful World Cup without external control.

The criticisms of FIFA's role in South Africa particularly focused on the contrast between the developmental rhetoric used by the government and the practical implementation of governance mandates, including the security measures, which appeared to aggressively ring-fence financial benefits for FIFA. Implicit within these critiques is the idea of the ‘rollback’ of state sovereignty, in which private bodies can rapidly transform political institutions into platforms for the purveyance of their own economic objectives. Cornelissen (2010: 141) argues that, as a result, the political aspirations of the South African government had to navigate around the proprietary framework established by FIFA, which limited the opportunity for development. In effect, South Africa’s nation branding initiatives had been overwritten by a wider process in which ‘the larger forces of commerce and politics of global football steer the agenda’ (ibid).

FIFA, the state and alignment

According to the security concept, the main objective of joint planning was to ‘ensure integration of the national security plan and event safety plans’ (OA/NATJOINTS, 2008:9). The regulatory framework for security measures was ‘informed’ (ibid) by a combination of existing security legislation, the government guarantees and city and stadium use agreements. The national security component of World Cup measures meant that this was aligned with the constitutional obligations of the security forces to maintain domestic safety within South Africa.

As Bheki Cele claimed, the exceptional size and scale of the tournament made it a responsibility of government regardless of the hierarchy of ownership (SAPA, 2010a). While the World Cup remained a privately owned event, its international status and the large concentrations of crowds in host cities effectively translated into a matter of public safety. This approach entailed a wide-ranging definition of the government’s overall security mandate, which according to the Deputy Minister of Police (Mbalula, 2009) entailed that the SAPS would work to ‘prevent and combat crime, to maintain public order, even to protect and secure the inhabitants of the Republic and visitors and protect their property; and uphold and enforce of the [sic] law’.

From this perspective, the management of a privately-owned event was incorporated as a declaration of state power and prowess. The police’s proclamation of total protection during the World Cup can be regarded as a public assertion of sovereignty in that it publicised the security services’ capacity to enforce territorial dominance over South Africa’s land, sea and airspace. For example, Bheki Cele was quick to claim that the takeover of stadiums by the SAPS did not entail a clash between public and private interests and argued that government’s response met both the guarantees to FIFA and the constitutional obligation of the SAPS to protect South Africa’s citizens (Sapa, 2010a).

Because these resources were available to the SAPS after the tournament, it is undeniable that the procurement drive did result in a legacy of increased armaments. For example, at the local scale, the traffic vehicles purchased for the World Cup are still in use. However, what makes them noticeable is that they include FIFA's official 2010 World Cup slogan alongside the host city emblem (Figure Five).



Figure Five: Metro police vehicle purchased for the 2010 World Cup

The criminalisation of ambush marketing through government guarantees and the Special Measures Act meant that commercial restrictions became part of the state's overall 'war on crime'. For example, a series of clampdowns on unofficial World Cup merchandise in June 2010 was described as both protecting the copyright of World Cup sponsors and the local manufacturing industry through preventing the importation of illegal goods (Barnes and Luhanga, 2010). Commercial restriction and exclusion zones in host cities were said to be informed as much by functional security concerns as an exclusive focus on protecting intellectual copyright. According to a briefing produced by the City of Cape Town (2010a), restrictions were necessary to 'avoid uncontrolled distribution or vending which may disturb spectator flows, operational activities as well as safety and security', while measures against unauthorised street trading, signage and 'any political and religious demonstrations' were pivotal to the 'smooth functioning and running of FIFA World Cup matches'. In terms of the actual enforcement of commercial restrictions, there is some anecdotal evidence which suggests that it accorded with parallel efforts to militarise the police. The accounts of supporters who were arrested for alleged ambush marketing offences claim that SAPS officers involved used heavy-handed tactics and threatened them with jail sentences (Laing, 2010, Cwilich Gil, 2010). Arrestees noted that they were surprised to be treated as serious criminals, and in fact were unsure of what restrictions they had broken, which suggests that some individual officers internalised the idea of 'zero tolerance' during their stadium duties.

According to SAFA's head of risk management, Mlungisi Ncame, security measures used the '2010 Special Measures Act, a law which specified the expectations of FIFA from the South African government and the commitments that we're making', in conjunction with the special courts system to 'send a strong message to international visitors ... the purpose of that was to arrest, prosecute, and effect a sentence within a 24-hour period, and that was a major deterrent to deal with any incidents that were committed in the official event' (Roller, 2011). This combination is significant, as it suggests that security planners regarded commercial restrictions and national security measures as mutually compatible. The special courts system allowed for rapid administration of FIFA's commercial rights while aligning with the government's project of projecting South Africa as the safest World Cup 'ever'. Commercial prescriptions against other activities, such as political demonstrations, also serviced the government's security strategy of reducing the visibility of protest actions.

Indeed, SAPS management suggested that the specific policing of intellectual property rights was only part of the wider continuum of showpiece security: 'We have an obligation and we will ensure we protect all the people, from the ordinary people who will be at homes, fan parks, stadiums to the very, very important people (VVIPs)' (Ministry of Police,2010). But while the Minister suggested that policing would not be 'influenced by one's political stature or one's economic stature', throughout the accompanying press release the tournament is referred to as the '2010 FIFA World Cup ™' (ibid). The addition of an official trademark within a police press release may reveal the extent to which FIFA aims to place the stamp of its ownership on the World Cup (Klauser, 2007).

FIFA as validation

In his post-World Cup national address, President Zuma (2010) said:

> It truly is an emotional moment for a nation that had doomsayers warning football fans to avoid coming to South Africa ... We thank FIFA, under the leadership of President Sepp Blatter, for the confidence shown in our country and people over the past six years. Our hosting of this historic first FIFA World Cup on African soil vindicates Mr. Blatter's strong conviction that we were capable of delivering a spectacular and successful event.

FIFA’s choice of South Africa as a host country was presented as a validation for South Africa’s security services in that it proved their ability to secure such a ‘prestigious’ event (Mbalula, 2009). The capacity to enforce security measures which accorded with FIFA’s criteria was highlighted as evidence of the state’s adherence to international ‘best practice’ (OA/NATJOINTS, 2008:5). And in line with the discourse of building long-term security capacity through World Cup spending, one SAPS (SAPS Strategic Management 2010:60) report singled out the provision of ‘FIFA rights protection’ as a training legacy, although the applicability or relevance of this to everyday policing is not explained.

In parliamentary discussions on the preparations for the World Cup, political representatives also described security measures as part of the state’s ‘contractual obligations to FIFA’ (Hansard, 2009). This presented the image of government as a ‘service provider’ offering security as a product to its primary customer, FIFA (Weizman, 2007: 143). The idea of service provision appears to draw upon the ideological claims of neoliberalism in which pliability and openness to transnational capital is regarded as one of the central criteria of a state’s modernity (Snider, 2000). In effect, South African politicians suggested that enforcing its guarantees with FIFA would project the country as a ‘responsible’ global citizen capable of enforcing its obligations to big business. While the government acknowledged that it was engaged in policing FIFA’s symbolic assets, this was welded to tropes of nation building and social advancement. The paired discourse of legacy and exceptionality attempted to collapse distinctions between private and public interest through presenting security measures as a national project which superseded issue of ownership.

Commercialism and Security

FIFA: A new world power?

FIFA was founded as a relatively loose series of national football associations in 1904. As an organisation, FIFA has grown dramatically since the 1970s when under the tenure of former president Joao Havelange it began to pursue the wide-scale commercialisation and professionalisation of international football (Darby, 2003, Galeano, 2003). Using its ownership of the World Cup brand, FIFA began to attract sponsorship from multinational companies through selling lucrative broadcasting and marketing rights. As one the most widely televised international sporting events, the FIFA World Cup offers major opportunities for corporate marketing, entailing an audience of billions of potential customers. While FIFA remains listed as a non-profit organisation under Swiss law, it presides over a revenue stream which is in the billions of dollars. The majority of FIFA’s expenditure is ploughed back into its 208 member associations and confederations. In particular, this benefits less wealthy football bodies, as FIFA provides a windfall to subsidise their operational expenditures. It also increases their loyalty and dependency on the FIFA ‘family’ (Darby, 2003).

However, FIFA's financial success has been accompanied by serious allegations of corruption, bribery and interference with the voting for World Cup hosting rights (Jennings, 2006). Indeed, FIFA's reputation has been increasingly tarnished by such allegations, with even some of its corporate partners expressing serious reservations about the association's administration and negative international image (Al Jazeera, 2011). In operation, FIFA appears to combine the legal benefits of both a corporation and a non-profit organisation. Its ownership of branding rights results in earnings which are greater than the nominal GDPs of some of the world's most impoverished nations. At the same time, its non-profit status protects it from taxation and other financial liabilities. FIFA maintains a profoundly ambiguous political status. While the association claims to be neutral in political and religious matters, the social and cultural significance and geographical reach of international football (FIFA has 208 national member associations, while the UN represents 192 members) means that it invariably does become involved in some aspects of the politics of member nations (Goldblatt, 2006).

But historian of international soccer David Goldblatt (2011) argues that it is this publicly apolitical stance that allows the association to function with a lack of accountability. As a result:

> The organisation is legally constituted as the equivalent of a village angling society in Zug, Switzerland. The Swiss criminal code on embezzlement and corruption doesn't apply, the organisation pays almost no taxes and FIFA's obligations to disclose its accounts and workings are pitiable. ... Imagine, for a moment, that FIFA were a publicly traded company or a government department or a prominent national charity. Imagine that one-third of its board had been subject to these kinds of allegations: Would it be acceptable for the boss to be blithely re-elected or reconfirmed in his post? Would it be possible to keep the matter out of the courts or away from the police? Could any elite in even the most minimally democratic polity shrug off so much scandal, strife and dubious behaviour? (ibid).

For Eick (2010:283), FIFA's success is a product of its international 'conquest' of the cosmopolitan, civil society activity of football. Its dominance over the rules and brands of international football creates the impression that FIFA can dictate terms to nation-states. But this conquest has not been enabled by state withdrawal or failure so much as 'shaped by the neoliberal market logic and the respective state restructuring underway' (ibid). In turn, the corporatisation of FIFA did not emerge exclusively from institutional prerogatives but was informed by 'demands of the media and market partners who insisted on reliable administrators for their respective contracts' (ibid).

At the same time, commercialisation has not altered the symbolic association of the World Cup as a nationalist event and a sign of prestige for host countries (ibid). Eick (284) argues that FIFA's economic success and political influence are the results of a 'neocommunitarian' strategy which combines deregulation of its internal practice with efforts to ensure state regulation which favour its commercial interests. On the one hand, FIFA sets internal rules for international football such as threatening to expel national associations if their governments are perceived to be interfering in administration. On the other, FIFA uses the state to regulate competition, as well as using Swiss non-profit legislation to minimise taxation within its base of operations.

FIFA under the state shield

State intervention serves to enforce the commodification and commercialisation of public space for FIFA interests in a 'self-aggrandising' (294) display of a 'non-profit' sporting association's ability to determine the form and outcome of security policies. This intervention does not just directly benefit FIFA but also creates opportunities for the commercial expansion of its corporate sponsors. On FIFA's official website, the page on marketing promises that the association will 'ensure maximum return on investment for its sponsors' through ensuring a 'consistent and aspirational brand image' (FIFA, 2012). The enforcement of security measures through government guarantees therefore creates an attractive investment for corporate partners. While this allows FIFA to offer the assurance that their commercial rights will be policed without additional cost, it includes the additional cachet that participating corporations' symbolic association with the World Cup will not be tarnished by any 'incident'.

FIFA's ability to enforce its pecuniary objectives upon hosting arrangements is most apparent in the government guarantees, which, as noted above, were alleged to have 'signed away' the country's tax base (Rademeyer, Prince and Lombard, 2010). As outlined in previous sections, this entailed a suspension of normal taxation and foreign exchange restrictions. Furthermore, it entailed a criminalisation of ambush marketing offences. More specifically, the government was obliged to commit substantial police resources to buildings, infrastructure and areas which hosted matches or were used in the administration of the tournament, such as at FIFA's temporary headquarters in Johannesburg. These obligations and regulations worked to create an all-encompassing state 'shield' which immunised the association's event from social volatility (Bassey, 2008). The upshot for FIFA was a double layer of state insurance. The exhaustive and spatially concentrated security measures which the government promised for the World Cup pre-emptively reduced the risk of any security incidents which may have negatively impacted upon the tournament's international image. Under these agreements, FIFA was able to socialise the costs of risk management to the state, while ensuring an almost certain return on its branding rights. This was further buffered by government regulation which both wavered taxation and offered pre-emptive immunity against unforeseen externalities, such as potential legal costs.

The audacious suspension of normal legal restraints and conditions bears parallels with economic 'shock therapy' (Klein, 2007). Most strikingly, this echoes the various legally binding administrative orders issued during the CPA's rule of Iraq which included the eradication of import tariffs, allowed foreign firms to move income out of the country and granted legal immunity to foreign contractors (Whyte, 2007). This particular ‘experiment’ entailed the removal of regulatory controls and the rapid creation of a new set of rules which gave structural advantages to Western firms looking to privatise Iraq’s oil industry, facilitated by the use of military force (191). For Whyte (ibid), economic re-regulation and political violence combined to establish a ‘neoliberal colonial order’.

The ‘economic occupation’ of Iraq was achieved at the barrels of guns and through the targeting sights of F-18 fighter jets and relied on the initial destruction of the administrative and coercive capacities of the state, such as the disbandment of the Iraqi military. By contrast, FIFA relied on the centralised power of the South African state, rather than regime change to facilitate its accumulation of World Cup profit. Instead of attempting to impose permanent re-regulation through reforming the state, FIFA stipulations were intended to be temporary and exceptional. Instead, FIFA used the suspension of certain legislation as a mechanism for ensuring that the organisation would in fact have no permanent legal status within South Africa.

However, many of the criticisms which emerged of FIFA from within South Africa pivoted around concepts of occupation and invasion, citing the enforcement of marketing laws as evidence of the ‘takeover’ of national sovereignty (Dawes, 2010). From this perspective, it appeared that FIFA had effectively invaded both public policy and urban space, using state mechanisms to enforce an otiose set of rules which penalised local enterprise. During my field research at the time of the tournament, I overheard a notable comment by a person who made a joke about their fear of suddenly being arrested and carried away in a FIFA van for unknowingly transgressing ambush marketing restrictions. This Kafkaesque aside reveals a more profound sense of anxiety engendered by the apparent ability of private bodies to rapidly reconfigure urban space (Klauser, 2007). The lack of effective public communication about the content of restrictions entailed that these revelations came as a kind of shock, adding impetus to the perception that cities were being placed under the rule of a shadowy international cabal. Notably, while the commercial restrictions were planned before South Africa gained hosting rights, the nature of the prescriptions outlined in the Bid Book were only made public through media reports in the months before the tournament. Indeed, it appeared that the Bid Book and the contained guarantees had been unofficially embargoed by host cities (Tolsi, 2010a). For Robin (2004), fears about the consequence of such arrangements are not necessarily the product of an irrational, hyperbolic panic but are informed by the very real threat of coercion which waits in the background. But in the case of the World Cup, the agent of coercion was not FIFA but the government: one could be arrested by SAPS officers and tried in South African courts rather than by imagined FIFA mercenaries.

Symbiosis

Indeed, the reliance on state security services is arguably central to FIFA's profit-making model. Using the state to administer the World Cup avoids the costs which would arise if the association was required to install its own policing measures, had to lobby for the right to arm private security companies, had to pay contractors and so forth. From a cost-saving perspective, the administrative and operational fortifications offered by the state provide a platform to maximise income through minimising expenditure. And from the wording used in the letters of ministerial support (SAFA, 2003b) which accompanied the guarantees prior to the winning of hosting rights, it would appear that the heads of state security had no hesitation about such a relationship. On the 16th of July 2003, Charles Nqakula, the former Minister of the Department of Safety and Security (now the Department of Police), wrote that he was personally aware of the need for the 'peaceful and orderly running of the 2010 World Cup' (SAFA, 2003b: A12) and that the department was 'delighted to contribute towards efforts to promote South Africa's bid to host the 2010 World Cup'. The SAPS commissioner offered the personal assurance 'that all necessary arrangements will be made... [to] ensure sufficient security measures' (A13) and promised to share security intelligence with FIFA.

The Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development offered indemnities against future claims in support of 'the country's efforts to secure the opportunity to host the Soccer World Cup in 2010' (A27). All of the letters presented guarantees as a procedural necessity to achieve the goal of winning the hosting bid for South Africa. It would appear that from the ministerial standpoint the guarantees were not forced upon them by FIFA but were the price of access for the opportunity of hosting the World Cup, signed as a patriotic contribution towards a wider national project.

During the World Cup, these initial agreements translated into the policing of internal borders which became a pivotal mechanism for an accumulative geography (Graham, 2010: xxiii) which moved billions of dollars, taxation free, out of the country. In the exclusion zones, authorities enforced 'sterilised' (SAFA, 2003a:9.3.15) advertising space for FIFA and its commercial partners. This was accompanied by the creation of commercial restrictions zones around host cities. For example, in the enforcement of the Cape Town (2010a) rights protection programme, a FIFA 'rights protection manager' was assigned to a designated police group of 38 officers. From one perspective, this may appear like a private actor dictating the mobilisation of law enforcement personal, but it also cohered with the SAPS strategy of deploying concentrations of officers around tournament venues to highlight the country's safety.

The state's enforcement of commercial restrictions which prioritised FIFA linked into another aspect of security, as close protection services were provided to executive members of the FIFA 'family'

(OA/ NATJOINTS, 2008). This so-called ‘VVIP security’ was intended to offer 24 hour protection to ‘football teams, the delegations from participating nations, the officials and the FIFA Leadership, Heads of State and VIPs’ (Chikunga,2010). Priority treatment for FIFA delegates began at the country’s borders, as the Department of Home Affairs established special dedicated express lanes within King Shaka, Oliver Tambo and Cape Town international airports (Apleni, 2010). Physical safety for FIFA delegates was provided by the Security and Protection Services of the SAPS, while NATJOINTS registered their movement details for ‘coordination and threat assessment purposes’ (OA/NATJOINTS, 2008:27). Executive members were also offered ‘blue light’ cavalcades of SAPS vehicles when travelling around the country (ibid). Such services are normally reserved for high-ranking government officials such as the State President, cabinet members and foreign dignitaries and heads of state. From a symbolic perspective, VVIP security reinforced the idea that FIFA was a kind of state without borders through affording members the diplomatic prestige usually reserved for political elites. Practically, the operational deployment of policing prioritised the individual safety of the executive, creating a continuous security cocoon from possible danger.

The ultimate green zone?

It would appear that from FIFA’s perspective the barometer of an aspirant host state’s security is its ability to ensure that the World Cup can take place in a sanitised environment and that government will comply with its commercial requirements. Rather than a genuine concern for the wellbeing of ordinary citizens, FIFA interprets security as the capacity to throw up temporary borders and restrictions around its events rather than the social consequences of these measures. In effect, FIFA uses security arrangements to ensure that both the association and its officials are constantly protected through a multi-scalar set of state interventions. As a condition of organising agreements, the association effectively exists above the law and under a taxation bubble.

Furthermore, close protection ensures that its senior personal move through host nations and cities under a continually watchful security ‘blanket’. It could be suggested that this entails an additional parallel with the occupation of Iraq. Graham’s (2010:121) argument that the security rings and roadblocks which spring up around host cities are reminiscent of the Baghdad ‘Green Zone’ has a dual applicability to FIFA. As a result of security agreements, FIFA has created what we can perhaps call the ultimate ‘mobile Green Zone’ (121). But instead of just protecting its hierarchy from violence outside, this flexible, continuous zone is more durable, as it creates walls against laws, taxation and accountability to the citizens of the countries whose governments are ever-eager to contribute to the profitability of the World Cup.

In its enforcement, this meant that South African police officers and military personal were also prioritising and guarding the interests of Coca Cola, McDonalds, Adidas and the other officially recognised partners. This worked on two mutually reinforcing levels. Firstly, through the criminalisation of ambush marketing, security forces enforced the primacy and visibility of official trademarks. Secondly, national security measures protected the association of corporate groups with the World Cup through minimising the chances of security incidents. To put it another way, security enforced the association of brands with football and festival, rather than globally relayed images of crowd stampedes or the bloody aftermath of a car bombing (Figure Six).

At the same time, these advertising initiatives were accompanied by the state's branding strategy. A fan entering a stadium through the exclusion zones would not only have seen well recognised corporate logos but massed elite units of the SAPS and SANDF. This opens two other issues which call for further study. Firstly it suggests that the host state's embrace of 'self-conscious' (Boyle and Haggerty, 2009) mega-event security overlaps with forms of corporate marketing and in fact may serve as its own form of advertising. Secondly, it also alludes to wider questions about the fusions between consumerism, policing and militarism. This phenomenon has been studied within the context of what Nick Turse (2008) describes as the US 'military-industrial-entertainment complex', such as in the involvement of the Pentagon in the production of Hollywood films. In the case of South Africa, this opens up new terrain about the overlaps between policing and entertainment. For the time being, this question will be left open as I return to the issue of non-state security actors' involvement in building 'sanitised' environments.



Figure Six: Security checkpoint at Cape Town stadium

Transnational Policing and the Private Security Sector

The varying degree of private sector involvement has been discussed in the previous chapters. Instead of repeating this material, this section will offer one brief observation. Rather than capitalising on a state withdrawal from security functions, private companies linked their own projects into the wider affirmation of state power. And while this aligned private security with a nationalistic project, it also did little to restrict the scope of their activities. While the government could hone in on high profile actions such as protecting crowds and stadiums, private companies focused on more discrete areas of security through personally guarding corporate elites. The exceptional requirements of the World Cup security measures established a further point of convergence. The array of security organisations which explicitly catered to perceived needs of the very wealthy provided an 'added layer of securitised protection' (Graham, 2010:96) to the government's operation, while the event provided growth opportunities for this specialist sector. In this sense, it appears that for the duration of the World Cup private groups, partnered with the state, served to extend the coverage of security within host cities.

National and Urban security

The South African government's measures centered on two primary security preoccupations. Visible deployments of the police and military in host cities were intended to both fulfil the state's guarantees to FIFA and to counteract scepticism about South Africa's viability as a suitable host. At the same time, security measures were used to support a major sporting event rather than as the primary area of focus. In other words, it was intended that spectators should remember the sport and not the complex security systems arranged around and above them. This focused on strategies which were 'effective but unobtrusive' and kept within 'an acceptable level of public exposure' (SAFA, 2003a:9.3.11).

For Klauser (2011), these dual preoccupations are indicative of ever-strengthening alliances between security politics and commercialism which are mobilised around the predominant imperatives of sporting bodies. But the case of South Africa's security measures disrupts the idea of an imposed hierarchy. While the use of governance frameworks to facilitate both urban and state branding is a global phenomenon, this was arguably more prominent than usual in the South African context because of negative international perceptions about the country's safety. The government discursively packaged the security measures as part of a broader national security exercise. As a result, it is possible to argue that most urban policing in the six-year period between the awarding of hosting rights and the event linked into security measures through working to facilitate the desired image of safe, controlled cities.

Accredited space

Under the hosting agreements the state was obliged to 'guarantee ... general safety and personal protection, especially at airports, inside and outside hotels, stadiums, training, the international broadcasting centre, media centres, any official areas and other areas where accredited persons and/or spectators are present' (SAFA, 2003a:4:5). This was abetted by an additional guarantee of close protection services for FIFA delegates and other accredited 'VVIPS'. But what is striking about the guarantee is that rather than stipulating the exact form of security measures it required the government to draft its own plan with reference to benchmarks and guidelines 'gained at previous major sporting events, as well as national security guidelines' (ibid). While the guarantees include explicit stipulations about enforcing commercial rights, ensuring that stadiums met FIFA security requirements and reserved the right to approve all government measures, the actual planning and implementation of security measures is presented as the prerogative of the host state.

The 2008 General Security Concept thus describes the security measures as a 'joint planning initiative' (5) between the organising committee and NATJOINTS 'developed and agreed to by senior role players of both entities' rather than an imposed framework. It lists the organising association agreements, FIFA safety and security guidelines and the 'major events security model of South Africa' as the basis of the security measures. The document makes a further planning distinction between 'national security' as the responsibility of government and tasks event safety at stadiums to the LOC. According to the publicly available version of FIFA's security guidelines (2004b), stadium regulations, for example, about the level of access control and fencing, only apply to its member associations. However, this distinction is complicated by national and local government's subsidising of stadium construction, which followed these guidelines. For example, during a research trip to the almost completed Nelson Mandela Bay stadium in August 2009, it was evident that the stadium had been designed to include the requisite fencing, turnstiles and CCTV equipment.

Although the scale and characteristics of the 2010 World Cup may have made planning more extensive, SAPS management depicted the measures as a continuation of national security procedures at previous major events (Kempen, 2010). In particular, this referenced the security measures established at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg. While the actual documentation of the event's 'security model' is not publically accessible, media reports from that time show substantial continuities with the measures promised for the 2010 World Cup. These included joint operations between the SAPS, Johannesburg Metro Police and SANDF, airspace restrictions, the cancellation of police leave, the establishment of barricades and the declaration of traffic restriction zones (SAFA, 2002). As with the World Cup stadiums, a security zone was established around the Sandton Convention Centre, and hotels where delegates were staying were put under guard. The convention centre itself was handed over to the United Nations for exclusive use, which included access control accreditation and a ban on protests within the 'security zone' (Aydin, 2002). SAPS management also announced that they were on high alert for 'militant anti-privatisation demonstrators' and other 'extremist groups' (Sebelebele, 2002). Even official statements about the exceptionality of security measures appear familiar:

> All security measures are geared towards ensuring that the Summit takes place in a tranquil atmosphere and peaceful environment where delegates can participate freely. We aim to change misperceptions about safety and security in South Africa in general and in Gauteng in particular and hope that our efforts will help to attract the attention of foreign tourists and investors (News24, 2002).

The notable difference between this security array and the World Cup measures was in the nature of the event being protected. While the World Cup was a sporting and commercial event, the Summit was a political gathering. Indeed, the presence of police was intended to be more overtly intimidating, due to the presence of a large number of protesters. But despite this difference of emphasis the model implemented seemed to be a harbinger of the security measures for 2010. As with the World Cup, policing created pacified spaces for accredited delegates, while deterring potential 'trouble makers'. Spatially, this focused on creating a series of temporary enclaves through the host city of

Johannesburg. And, as with the World Cup, this was communicated to the public as a development necessity.

What is notable is the apparent contextual durability of the security model. While initially planned and implemented for an international political summit, it could be readily adapted for use at a commercial event. In both cases, security was bundled with the projection of South Africa as an attractive opportunity for future investment. For Martin (2011), the controlling of protest at political events and the creation of peaceful environments for spectators at mega-events are based around the same structuring logic of 'selling' host cities. In both cases, security provides the logistical support to create such environments while becoming a showpiece of state power in its own right. This proves to be a readily applicable organisational model. As the example of the WSSD shows, commercial restrictions could be rapidly assimilated into forms of institutional governance and police mobilisation already existent in South Africa.

In the case of South Africa, planners actively aligned guarantees to FIFA with an overall project of marketing the safety of host cities. Under the initial agreement, the state was obliged to enforce a set of concentric security rings around stadiums, while maintaining various restriction zones and 'island sites' throughout participating metropolises. In addition, the host city by-laws empowered municipalities to designate any area within their territorial jurisdiction as 'controlled access sites' (eThekwini, n.d.: 7) for the duration of the tournament. While the initial guarantees stipulated the necessity for protection of 'official areas', such as stadiums, fan parks and training venues, the GSC document presented a far more geographically comprehensive approach. This aimed at creating simultaneous layers of security at borders and within 'land, air, rail and maritime domains' (OA/NATJOINTS, 2008: 11).

In effect, this promised a continuously linked security environment between host cities, venues and 'the geographical area linking' them with the 'border environment' (ibid). Using a series of concentric security zones, this enforced barriers and fences which radiated from stadiums outwards. Zones 1-6, which were also the areas of FIFA exclusive usage, extended from the inner stadium bowl to outside the entrance of stadiums (24). Zone 6 was referred to both as the 'traffic free zone' and the FIFA outer perimeter. This was partly fenced off from the surrounding environments and on match days included a large contingent of officers from the various state security structures. Zone 7, the 'traffic warning zone', moved substantially beyond the perimeters of the stadia and into surrounding roads. According to public information sheet released in Port Elizabeth, this was enforced by security control points in operation from five hours before a match to six hours after kick-off (Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality, 2010). In order to enter this zone, residents and businesses had to apply for vehicle access permits, further exposing how these sites created temporary, micromanaged borders throughout host cities.

The final demarcation, zone 8, or the ‘city security zone’, referred to the entire metropolitan area of host cities. Although this implies that the state was attempting to ensure total spatial control over hosting environments NATJOINTS proposed a model that would apply full-time visible policing within a series of ‘smaller managerial areas’ (27). The following sites were identified as arenas of deployment: ‘accommodation (official and public), tourist attractions, restaurants, bars, routes, railway stations, taxi ranks, markets, event sectors, shopping complexes, entertainment venues, red light districts’ (26).

This operational strategy focused on using space as a ‘pre-emptive security element’ through securitising particular parts of host cities (Klauser, 2011:8). As a result, designated areas such as fan parks become a medium of security through ensuring that concentrations of fans were corralled into specific sites, which allowed the security forces to focus their activity. Along with the fan park model, inherited from previous FIFA events, the national security strategy focused on other key areas of public activity. In particular, the targeted deployment of security officers at designated areas reduced the chances of tourists becoming victims of crime. As the reference to ‘red light districts’ suggests, this may also have entailed protecting tourists from risks incurred by *breaking* the law.

Marketing security

Operational deployment reflected the perception management ethos of security measures. According to the security concept, state marketing began at border entrances where the first impression of safety was considered ‘paramount’ (OA/NATJOINTS, 2008: 30). In this vision of security, tourists would enter world class airports with a reassuring presence of police before being whisked across highways guarded by traffic police and into city centres. Some transport routes into host cities were declared ‘high risk areas’, such as the N2 from Cape Town International Airport, in the wake of attacks on motorists, and were allocated additional contingents of anti-hijacking units (Jones, 2010). But rather than attempting to restrict the flow of tourists, such interventions aimed to direct and facilitate their movement through cities. For example, the City of Durban instituted a ‘people mover system’ of buses within the inner city, ‘linking all event venues and facilities with city attractions’, such as the beachfront (Durban Host City, 2010). Notably, in a city where public transport infrastructure is poorly funded, the people mover system was air conditioned and provided with security guards at each of its stops. This dichotomy was noted in a memorandum of grievance issued by civil society groups which argued that the system was a cosmetic endeavour which catered exclusively to tourists (Durban Social Forum, 2010).

The establishment of these zones aimed to instil an idealised vision of South African cities. Equally, these focused sites of visible policing also served as a platform to display an idealised version of the police and military (Figures Seven and Eight). For example, the deployment of officers in and around stadiums displayed a self-conscious focus on the symbolism of policing (Boyle and Haggerty, 2009). Based on his experiences at matches in Johannesburg, the journalist David Durbach wrote that (2010):

> For those attending a game, some of the most eye-catching police officers have been those clad in Robocop-style riot gear. 8,500 of these 'crowd management' types were trained by the French police to be the first line of defence should anything go wrong at the game. Those not intimidated by their insect-like body armour would've been subdued by the humour in it all, particularly when watching some of the less athletic cops trying to walk with these unwieldy exoskeletons strapped too tightly to their legs. One can see why most of these guys would rather just stand around looking tough. … One night I even got pulled over while driving home from a game by cops with sirens and automatic weapons. They threatened to search my car for no discernible reason, beyond letting me know that these guys mean business.

Besides police officers, stadiums were also surrounded by the full police and military arsenal available to the SAPS and SANDF. This included mechanised units such as police pursuit vehicles and motorbikes, Casspir armoured personal carriers, Ratel infantry fighting vehicles, mobile command centres, emergency ambulances and helicopters. Practically, this concentration of 'humanware' and hardware created a staging post for an expeditious response to any incidents. The high visibility of these displays was complemented by the adoption of less overt high-end security technology. For instance, the Moses Mabhida stadium in Durban became the first sporting venue in the world to install a quantum computer encryption system (Hennig, 2010). The Bid Book went even further in proposing security innovations, including the euphemistic 'community processing centres' for 'non-compliant match spectators', which were ultimately not utilised (SAFA, 2003a:9.4)

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

Figure Seven: SANDF armoured personal carriers outside Soccer City


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Figure Eight: SAPS officers in 'Robocop' body armour

For Graham, these densely policed deployments are 'theatrical' by constructing 'new highly saleable, exemplars of state of the art security solutions' to 'snare global media exposure for particular brand cultures' (2010:148). But while it mobilised forces to protect the brands of FIFA and its associated commercial partners, the government was also projecting its own 'brand culture': state security. While Durbach (2010) notes the humorous incongruity of some of the officers struggling with their body armour, it is clear that the overall impression was one of efficiency, power and an undercurrent of intimidation.

Although this was constrained by the considerations of maintaining an acceptable public appearance for the benefit of the fans, the image created resonates with the official discourse which was being used to legitimate the concurrent militarisation of the SAPS. In particular, the World Cup was used as public stage to reiterate the image of the service as a hierarchically organised, disciplined force. Cele made this connection explicit when he addressed crowd control officers, their armour gleaming in the sun, outside the Soccer City stadium on the day of the final match (*When Duty Calls*, 2010). In his speech to the column of police he suggested that the display of state power at World Cup stadiums would not end with the conclusion of the tournament but would be applied to everyday crime control.

The adaptation of security measures at the local scale

The scale of security measures enlisted the national, provincial and local tiers of government into an overall programme of securitisation. This, combined with the length of preparations, makes it impossible to maintain a synoptic view of how 'exceptional security' was applied in all hosting environments and in participating state institutions (Gaffney, 2010).

With this restriction in mind, the following section will illustrate how World Cup security mandates, and in particular the declaration of controlled sites throughout host cities, gave an impetus to on-going local security projects in the cities of Cape Town and Durban.

Besides applying specific World Cup-related security restrictions, each host municipality used the event as an opportunity for place marketing. In particular, this focused on highlighting the world class status of cities by displaying first-rate tourist attractions, such as stadiums, and infrastructure, including security systems. This accorded with a well-established development path of creating ordered and upmarket prestige spaces, such as major sporting venues and international convention venues. The underside of these developments, however, has often been the stigmatisation of certain groups and spaces. In many cases, developers and planners regard spaces such as informal settlements (Gibson, 2011) or groups such as the homeless (Samara, 2010) as security risks. This may have as much to do with aesthetics as with the threat of violence: such visible signs of poverty are regarded by administrators as a chaotic intrusion into the image of the ‘fantasy city’ (Samara, 2010). Housing evictions and removals are often accompanied by aggressive and confrontational police tactics (McMichael, 2008). Of course, this cannot be described as an exclusive ‘symptom’ of the ‘world class’ mind-set (McDonald, 2008). In different cities, police actions against the urban poor are also embedded in particular institutional cultures, micro struggles between developers, local state brokers and communities and other specificities, which may be legitimated through security discourses used throughout the world. In particular, this bears trace of revanchist style policing (Smith, 1996), which treats the problems that arise from unemployment and poverty as matters of law enforcement calling for security solutions.

The 2010 municipal by-laws (eThekeweni, n.d) reflected this ethos in providing an open-ended definition of beautification and access control, which could be interpreted as a call to minimise the presence of the poverty. Most overtly, this included provisions against begging in ‘public open spaces controlled or managed by municipalities’ (32) and placed incredibly stringent restrictions on street trading (43). In a more subtle manner, it also employed a wide-ranging definition of prohibited ‘nuisances’ near access controlled and special event sites. These included any ‘public building which is so situated, constructed, used or kept so as to be unsafe or to be injurious or dangerous to health’, ‘any occupied dwelling for which no proper and sufficient supply of pure water is available under a reasonable distance’ and ‘any area of land kept or permitted to remain in such a state as to be offensive’ (13). While this responds to legitimate public health concerns it also implies that squatter camps and illegally occupied buildings, which often lack on-site amenities, could be defined as nuisances, as has often been the case with other urban redevelopments (Samara, 2010).

Cape Town

As a result, the security preparations for the 2010 World Cup displayed an undercurrent of coercive exclusion, as host cities rushed to install world class measures. As early as 2007, street children marched against their perceived criminalisation ahead of the World Cup, claiming that the police and private security guards were attempting to push them out of Cape Town’s CBD (Majid and York, 2007). In the lead-up to the tournament, activists from Cape Town civic movements linked evictions in Woodstock, Gugulethu, Salt River and around the stadium in Green Point to the preparations for the World Cup (Western Cape Ant-Eviction Campaign, 2010). Furthermore, people occupying run-down houses near the Athlone stadium, which was used as a training venue for the World Cup, were informed that their houses would be bulldozed for the tournament to make way for a parking lot extension (Inter Press Service, 2010).

The issue of evictions in Cape Town garnered unwanted attention for city management. In particular, activists and journalist began to label the N2 Gateway Housing Project, which was a joint project between the national government, the DA controlled Cape Town municipality and a private company, as a beautification initiative which was attempting to disguise poverty near the international airport. In particular, media scrutiny fell upon the Symphony Way Temporary Relocation Area (TRA) in Delft, a transit camp connected to the N2 Gateway project. According to residents, who referred to the camp as 'Blikkiesdorp' [Afrikaans for Tin Town] in reference to the government built corrugated iron shacks, the area had become a dumping ground for poor people ahead of the World Cup (Smith, 2010b). While the city claimed that this was only a temporary settlement, residents argued that while the camp itself was surrounded by barbed-wired fencing, they were subjected to regular police raids and beatings, access control by the SAPS, regular patrols by apartheid-era Casspir armed carriers [the same vehicles displayed outside stadiums] and curfews (Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign, 2009). As a result, many media outlets compared the area to the titular camp in the South African science fiction movie *District 9*, which had become an unexpected international hit in the year before the 2010 World Cup (Smith, 2010b).

But while people in Symphony Way claimed that the camp was being filled with newcomers in the months before the tournament began, City spokespeople denied that there was any correlation between the World Cup and these displacements. For example, the proposed 2010 'Readiness Plan' for street people was criticised as at attempt at social warehousing by civil society groups, but when I raised this question in an email correspondence with the acting head of 2010 operations for Cape Town, Pam Naidoo, she claimed to have no knowledge of any controversy (Interview, 17 March). Thereafter, all my follow-up questions went unanswered.

City officials maintained that there was no World Cup clampdown. However, the city's annual Winter Readiness Plan for Street People was activated earlier than usual because of the World Cup (City of Cape Town, 2010b). Although the plan was presented as a philanthropic drive to reunite indigents with their families and to offer them protection from the harsh winter climate in the Western Cape, many homeless people claimed that they had been rounded up from visible areas of the city and removed to far-flung locations such as Blikkiesdorp (Jooste and Johns, 2010. Ntsaluba, 2010). An internal security document of the cities 'improvement district' project also repeatedly stated that vagrants were being removed from certain areas (Bosworth, 2010: 18). Furthermore, community activists alleged that the World Cup was the pretext for a 'hasty cleaning up campaign' (Ntsaluba, 2010) while Bosworth (2010:19) argues that city officials were vocal about strict enforcement of nuisance by-laws in proximity to the event.

Durban

Comparable allegations about removals were levelled against the municipal government in Durban. In 2005, City Manager Mike Sutcliffe (2005) claimed that media stories about street children being rounded up and removed to areas far outside of the city before major events were ‘tabloid trash’. However, when the World Cup preliminary draw was held in the city in 2007, allegations emerged that street children had been rounded on charges of loitering and sent to Westville Prison on the suburban outskirts of the city (Packree and De Boer, 2007). While Sutcliffe again denied the validity of these reports, Metropolitan Police officials told journalists that removing children from visible areas such as the beachfront was a ‘routine operation’ (ibid). In a 2009 reversal, Sutcliffe confirmed that removals had been taking place: ‘When the heads of state are going to appear at conferences, the first thing that security does is move the street children out of the way so they can’t be seen. Four years ago we used to deal with it that way, but we are not going to deal with it like that anymore’ (Comins, 2009).

Despite the assurances that these operations would cease, in early 2010 new evidence emerged that they were still occurring, with one teenager saying that ‘[The police] say we can’t be here [in the city] for the World Cup’ (Tolsi, 2010c). However, in 2011 the spokesman for the Durban Metro Police inadvertently confirmed that removals had taken place as a result of the 2010 World Cup (The Mercury, 2011). In the light of round-ups ahead of the COP 17 climate talks, Eugene Msomi said: ‘We often remove them from the streets when there are big events like the World Cup and major conferences, because some of them mug tourists and damage the image of the country’ (ibid).

Street children were not the only group of people targeted by security preparations. For example, street traders at the Warwick Junction early morning market alleged that the city was attempting to fast-track a mall ahead of the World Cup, which would have deprived them of their livelihoods. Despite the Durban High Court ruling that vendors were allowed to trade in the area, the Metro Police attempted to forcibly evict them, which left several traders injured by rubber bullets (Daily News, 2009). The city also attempted to ban marches by social movements such as Abahlali baseMjondolo in the lead-up to the tournament. Although they rescinded on this position and allowed marches, this was accompanied by the imposition of restrictions which kept these marches out of city centres (Abahlali baseMjondolo, 2010).

While such restrictive measures were officially legitimated by the proximity to the World Cup, they were not a novel development. In particular, the response of local and provincial government in KwaZulu-Natal since the shackdwellers’ movement emerged in 2005 has often been aggressive and confrontational. The Abahlali movement has made serious allegations of police harassment against city officials, including torture and complicity with the 2009 violence against its membership, and these claims have been sustained by human rights groups. For example, the Freedom of Expression Institute (2006) has maintained that ‘the high-handed police action’ of the municipality has been illegal and unconstitutional. This official hostility has been observed to take on conflict-like dimensions, with one Abahlali (2008) press statement describing police disconnections of illegal electricity cables in these terms: ‘They arrived with the South African Police Services, including the dog unit, and the Municipal security. They were very heavily armed. It was clear that they were prepared for a war’.

FIFA’s stance towards issues of housing evictions and forced removals was characteristic of their official approach towards security: namely, it was presented as an initiative of South African authorities. The organisation did not respond to repeated requests from the United Nations Human Rights Council to cooperate with a report on evictions and mega-events, and told the American magazine *Newsweek* that it ‘never requested any move or cleaning-up of areas in any host city’ (Werth, 2010). This may be true to the extent that clampdowns on social movements in Durban or forced removals in Cape Town drew upon local dynamics and reflected on-going social conflicts. For example, heavy-handed policing in Durban predated the World Cup preparations and continued long after the local authorities had completed its obligations to FIFA.

However, the allegations made by street children (‘we can’t be here [in the city] for the World Cup’) reveals how narrow the difference was between FIFA’s desired image of host cites and the branding strategies adopted by urban authorities. These policing actions were driven by the idea that world class and modern cities do not include protest or panhandling. In particular, the focus on reducing public disorder contained in the special city by-laws provided a legal justification for consequent clampdowns. At the same time, national and municipal government maintained that, as an exceptional event, it was imperative to ensure that all these measures were implemented for the World Cup. This confluence of external frameworks and local security dispositions may have providing a legitimation to local institutional policing cultures which criminalise the poor and political protest.

Outcomes

In its final form, World Cup security combined entertainment and emergency. As Bheki Cele put it an interview with FIFA, ‘[as] security agents we must behave in a way that that ensures a peaceful time for entertainment and enjoyment that visitors enjoy to the maximum’ (FIFA World Magazine, 2010b). Because of the apparent domestic and international risks faced by the 2010 World Cup, the state articulated this as a situation which warranted the establishment of temporary exclusion zones, controlled access sites and other security repertoires to fortify against danger. Furthermore, this served to legitimate localised efforts to control 'dangerous parts' of the population (Neocleous, 2011:202).

The idea of pacification allows a useful conceptual point from which to think through the complex security procedures which accompanied the 2010 World Cup, such as the linkages between commercialism and security and the use of an open-ended security discourse to pursue variegated state projects. However, as a 'broad' (Neocleous, 2011) project, it was not exclusively marked by efforts to enforce social control. For example, if we return to the scale of the deployments around stadiums and other controlled sites, it notable that these combined efforts to secure urban space with the facilitation of mobility. The templates and procedures, which used security at prior FIFA events as a benchmark, echoed many of the spatial controls and fortifications used against crime and terrorism.

Indeed, they also bore parallels to the security 'green zones' found in war zones. Graham (2010:121) argues that these 'mobile' descendent of the Baghdad Green Zone are ubiquitous at high profile events, as urban space is carved up into temporary secure enclaves. In this sense, they are mobile because they can be translated across different national and urban hosting environments, as a security procedure which can be reassembled within multiple contexts.

However, this mobility had an additional meaning within the South African context. The policing deployment was intended to service tourist mobility through host environments and to allow for exploration of host cities under monitored conditions. For example, the map of Durban (Durban Host City, 2010) provided by hosting authorities breaks the terrain of the city into a series of suggested attractions linked by transportation routes. Rather than being promised a series of enclaves fortified against external violence, this promoted the idea of host cities as the ultimate site of festival, in which potential risks had been accounted for and (temporarily) neutralised. Security was thus bound up with the projection of conviviality. Tourists were not only encouraged to feel safe but, to a certain extent, at home. For instance, the deployment of foreign officials was promoted as offering assistance with language and cultural differences by greeting tourists with security officers in familiar national uniforms (GCIS, 2010).

This was accompanied by a conceptual focus on 'saturation policing' at designated routes and venues, with additional panoptic aerial surveillance by the SAPS air wing (ESPN, 2009) According to SAPS Superintendent Vish Naidoo:

> We expect people to go anywhere in South Africa, not necessarily those areas concentrated around stadiums. Whichever areas people want to venture into there would be that saturation of uniformed police officers. To restrict anybody's movements is unconstitutional first and foremost ... We are in the business of making sure people who have to venture into any areas will be safe and secure. (ibid)

Saturation policing was accompanied by an additional form of 'saturation': the advertising signage, logos, billboards and posters of the officially recognised commercial brands. For example, a month before the World Cup it was evident that the area around the Nelson Mandela Stadium in Port Elizabeth had been 'sanitised' as a result of commercial restrictions. In particular, the tea rooms and offices around the stadium were exclusively displaying Coca-Cola banners. During the World Cup itself, it would have been almost impossible for anyone in South Africa to watch television, listen to the radio, read a newspaper or go online without being exposed to official advertisers to some degree.

However, the policing mobilisation also served to project the national 'brand' alongside commercial signs and symbols. The establishment of physical exclusion zones and temporary legal barricades has some parallels with 'quasi-autonomous realms' (Graham, 2010:101) such as export processing zones, in that designated sites were part of a broader political economy in which regular taxation and legal requirements were suspended for FIFA. However, whereas comparable enclaves provide a 'territorial secession' (ibid) from host cities or nations, the World Cup stadiums and fan parks were intended to display concentrated images of South African national prowess and prestige to the rest of the world. The positioning of police officers in slick body armour and the surrounding of stadiums with military and police vehicles was used to showcase the size and capabilities of the state's security apparatus.

But this was not intended as a hyper-militaristic display of South African nationalism. Rather than resonating with the fascist imagery of massed ranks of troops, flags and marches (Boyle and Haggerty, 2009), security measures aimed to offer reassurance about the safety of a civilian event. Indeed, while security planners promoted South Africa as offering the safest and most secure World Cup of all time, this should not be viewed as a chauvinistic assertion of national exceptionalism. Instead the government aligned their security measures with those of previous hosts with the intention of showing a well-established series of imagery and rhetoric that was intended to convey world class preparations: bomb disposal equipment, large numbers of police officers, a discursive promotion of the ability to counter all threats and so forth (Boyle and Haggerty, 2009:264). Indeed, it can be suggested that much of the specific nationalist prestige of security blurred into a homogenous set of procedures and tactics which have come to symbolise 'successful' mega-event governance. In the South African case, this was bundled with government's efforts to showcase security institutions as being able to compete with their counterparts in the global North. For example, an attentive fan may have noticed that security checks and deployments at fan parks and stadiums were comparable to similar arrays at the 2006 World Cup, suggesting that the South African security services could keep apace with its better funded and equipped counterparts in Germany.

Conclusion

However, others argued that the success of these measures were contingent on replicating an exclusionary security logic already existent in host cities. For Tolsi (2010d), the sense of national cohesion which appeared during the tournament was fleeting. Moreover this reproduced an exclusionary security landscape, allowing for ‘the middle classes [to feel] part of a country they are otherwise completely dislocated from with their gated communities, private healthcare and exorbitantly priced schools’.

During the World Cup, the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign held a parallel ‘poor people’s World Cup’ next to Athlone stadium. According to one of the organisers (Cassiem, 2010), this aimed to show the disparity between the government and FIFA’s ‘privatisation’ of the ‘people’s game’ and a reality in which:

> While the poor people in Cape Town and in South Africa as a whole are suffering, the rich are enjoying themselves in the expensive stadiums at the expense of the poor… All the traders and communities – that were negatively affected by FIFA-related urban renewal projects and by the implemented by-laws – were invited to this tournament: a tournament that is FREE [emphasis in original] and open to everybody

Indeed the invitation was extended: ‘To all the tourists: don’t stay only in the controlled spaces bounded by FIFA rules and regulations, but move beyond these areas to experience the true spirit of what the game of soccer is all about!’ (Ibid).

As this chapter has argued, these ‘controlled spaces’ were a reflection of on-going governance fixations within South African cities. While the focus with which the state mobilised to protect a commercial event was unprecedented, the extent to which this relied on police actions to enforce sanitised consumer space was not. Although much commentary depicted the World Cup as an occupation, it is arguable that this was merely an intensification of established processes. The ‘occupation’ is not so much the radical, but temporary alterations to urban form which occurred during the event. Instead, this is *the occupation of everyday life*, in which policing is used to warehouse unwanted parts of the population and to fortify spaces considered valuable.

However, while the South African government and FIFA shared a security outlook, the flow of benefits was not equalised. Security mobilisations worked to fortify an accumulative regime, which removed enormous profits derived from government interventions out of the country. In this sense, FIFA was ‘parasitic’ on the state (O’Reilly, 2010). While the association was totally dependent on the outcome of government planned and enforced measures, it also ensured that hosting conditions protected it from any comparable reciprocity. It seems, however, that domestic political elites were prepared to collude in such an unequal relationship. In particular, the symbolic opportunities provided by the World Cup created a stage set for a massed theatre of the state's security capacity. The government's focus on security as spectacle suggests an addition to the figuring of *the securitisation of commercialism* advanced in the previous chapter. In the case of the World Cup, the extent to which security measures were used to advertise South Africa speaks to an emergent *commercialisation of securitisation*. Packaged like a marketing campaign, focusing on a visual predominance and keeping 'on message', the security forces were presented like the unveiling of a new commercial product. Most specifically, the World Cup served as a chance for the state to highlight its security brand.

However, this official focus on creating spectacle reveals dimensions of state power which may otherwise appear hidden or unconnected. Firstly, following Martin (2011), it can be suggested that the extraordinary pressures of the World Cup expose how, under conditions of exception, security forces become the coercive mechanism which structures power relationships in society. In the case of South Africa, the security services worked as the bailiffs of FIFA's commercial regimes and as the main tool to ensure that cities were governed in line with the image desired by political elites.

The meaning of this is not confined to the domestic context. The World Cup was administered along established security templates which appear globally. In particular, this encouraged national and local officials to govern cities as a kind of 'security-scape' (Wall and Monahan, 2011), protecting valuable spaces by reducing or disguising the visibility of people and behaviour which were considered not to belong. As Hagemann argues (2010), this indicates how world class urban governance pivots around enforcing an access-controlled, fortified urban aesthetic. The upshot may be that commercial interests and the police power of the state are, in times of 'emergency', fundamentally indistinguishable.

Chapter Nine: The Militarisation of the 2010 World Cup

Introduction

The preceding chapters have suggested that the security measures for the 2010 World Cup were permeated by the logic of war. Governance structures used a military command and control structure, while President Jacob Zuma described the spending on security operations as a 'war chest'. As in wartime, South African politicians presented the tournament as a nationalist state of exception and urged all citizens to rally around the flag. The inverse of this sentiment was the perception that the country had been invaded and occupied by FIFA.

The thesis has maintained that this 'emergency' was politically managed and responsive to the interests of a complex of public/private actors and institutions, rather than a predetermined outcome of the extraordinary security challenges presented by the World Cup. Using Graham's (2010) work on a military urbanism as a recurring theme, it has been suggested that this was intrumentalised through security operations which twinned mobility and restriction. Instead of emerging as a novel intrusion into South African cities, the World Cup solidified, in a highly public but temporary form, a series of on-going security methods and prerogatives played out within everyday urban life.

The most urgent, problematic aspect of this overlap with entrenched security developments would appear to be the parallel efforts to remilitarise the SAPS. The security operations for the World Cup were presented by the government, the media and within academic policing studies as a forward-thinking model inspired by international best practise. By contrast, the state's experiments with a new SAPS ranking system and the reinforcement of 'discipline' was often described as an atavistic holdover from the apartheid regime. For example, former government minister Kader Asmal suggested that the return to old policing appellations was indicative of an institutional amnesia about the state violence of the recent past (Graham, 2009). Dianne Kohler Barnard (2010), the DA Shadow Minister of Police, echoed this sentiment and suggested that remilitarisation was a reactive move which failed to take crime combatting in South Africa forward. From these perspectives, it could be argued that remilitarisation was the antithesis of the policing operations at the 2010 World Cup. While the organisational acumen of the event displayed the modernity of the democratic dispensation, parallels developments within the police suggested that the government was readily invoking the practices and strategies of its authoritarian predecessors.

However, somewhat ironically, within critical urban theory South Africa's recent past has become a dystopian metaphor for the future trajectory of urban securitisation. In his seminal *City of Quartz* (1990: 224-227), Mike Davis described the 'militarisation of city life' and the creation of fortified enclaves of affluence in Los Angeles as the 'increasing South Africanisation of its spatial relations'. Extrapolating from 'actually existing trends' he also included an allusion to 'urban Bantustans' (224). More recently, Weizman (2007:171, 123) notes how the concept of apartheid has been associated with the occupation of Palestine and suggests that South Africa is one of the exemplars of 'the global phenomenon of metropolitan sprawl and segregation into ethnically and religiously homogenous communities'. Graham (2010, 49) observes that neoconservative thinkers have approvingly viewed 'apartheid as a model' for 'urban lockdowns' (ibid). He also speculates that South Africa's past could be a conceptual template for developments in global political geography: 'are the three-dimensional archipelagos of apartheid-style splintering, connection, fortification, and militarisation ... a grim exemplar of the future?' (143). It could also be noted that, at the level of popular culture, one of South Africa's [albeit American-funded] most successful film exports has been the aforementioned *District 9*. In the year before the World Cup, the movie appeared to resonate with audiences throughout the world by taking security trends evident in the country to a science fiction extreme, with its depiction of heavily armed corporate mercenaries and the military controlled slum of the title.

Indeed, Hansen (2006) suggests that policing in South Africa was historically influenced both by the need to maintain a harsh, inequitable order and the desire of political elites to appear modern and internationally 'respectable'. The apartheid government was thus a police state in two senses of the word. It was preoccupied with security and repression, engaged in a perpetual war with its 'subversive' population (281) and at the same time this was based on the justification that modernity and prosperity would be ensured through segregation: 'the object of policing was first and foremost to control the reproduction of labour' and movement (ibid). This was reflected in the apartheid state's obsession with maintaining a veneer of legality. As Hansen (282) vividly puts it, 'The dingy interrogation room, the torture chamber and the random arrest' were 'supplemented by the courtroom, the hygienic and monitored detention cell, orderly arrests and so on'.

This suggests that the recuperation of aspects of apartheid identified by Davis, Weizman and Graham has to do with the combination of internal militarisation and sophisticated apparatuses of spatial control and segregation observed throughout the world. As this chapter will argue, the interface between past and future, between local and international is central to the extension of contemporary militarisation. As an intensified site of international security developments and cooperation, mega-events may expose these preoccupations in an especially concentrated and heightened manner. But while Graham (2010), Neocleous (2011) and Souza (2011) agree that architectural fortification and authoritarian social policy converge into the increased militarisation of cities, the origins and extent of these developments remain a matter of debate.

For Graham, the driving force behind the continuous relocation of military techniques and tactics into the governance of urban space is the protection of areas and populations of value from dangerous 'intrusion'. As his use (12) of Foucault's 'boomerang effect' suggests, this draws upon a long-standing back and forth between 'colonial heartlands' and 'frontiers', in which political authorities were engaged in simultaneously fighting insurgencies abroad and rebellions and class conflict at 'home' . However, the current era is marked by an unprecedented militarisation of civil spaces. For Graham (74), the replacement of the Keynesian post-war settlement by 'market fundamentalism' results in polarised cities, and this combines with the technologies made available on the international security market and ideologies of social domestication to entrench urban militarisation. The result is that in many cities security has become a euphemism for protecting archipelagos of privilege, in which dangerous or unwanted sections of the public become a target (96). 'Neoliberal globalisation' rapidly morphs 'into permanent war: the architectures of globalisation merge seamlessly into the architectures of control and warfare' (78).

The 'paranoia and neurosis' (93) embedded within security policies and architectures reflect the failure of political and economic elites to create an equitable form of globalisation. Security is both self-fulfilling, in that the construction of security zones and islands 'recreates' the perception of danger and threats (150), and illusory, as it draws on 'myths' of technical precision and seamless, 24-7 'surveillance, targeting and killing systems' (177). However, this obsession with control fails to address the real challenges of contemporary cities, such as 'intensifying global interconnections, rapid urbanisation, extreme financial volatility, increasing demographic pressure and resource depletion', or the ultimate challenge of the 'Anthropocene', a new geological era created by the human impact upon the natural environment (382-3).

Military urbanism thus distracts attention and resources away from such pressing problems into fearful projects of pre-emption. And following Carr (2010:30), the linked state–corporate logic of 'military futurism' actively works to impose a bleak 'weaponised' future in the name of preserving the international state system and consumer capitalism. But the attempts to securitise ways of life which are reliant on economic and ecological exploitation are paradoxical as they weaponise a socio-economic system which perpetuates and deepens 'current and future crises and insecurities' (Graham, 2010:310). For Graham, this necessitates 'a radical politics of security' (383) which can deal with these threats and which understands 'the continually deepening transnational and cosmopolitan connections that so mark our age, in all their complexity and ambivalence' (ibid)

However, Graham's proposed solutions to modern environmental and social crisis appear to be politically naïve. While calling for 'a resurgent conception of Keynesian state politics'(382) to roll back the excesses of neoliberalism, he admits that states are 'so woven into the circuits of dominant capitalism, so complicit in their own politics of public spectacle and private secrecy, that such a reworking is unlikely to come from them' (382-3). In response, *Cities Under Siege* concludes with a call for unified challenges to the status quo by 'the Left' (381), organised through 'global civil society'. But as Graham's use of capitalisation suggests, this implies that 'the Left' is a homogenous block, which clearly collapses vast differences in ideologies, tactics and world views , as well as fault lines of race, gender and class. Furthermore, self-consciously left-wing governments in countries such as Brazil and South Africa have embraced 'technocratic and authoritarian' (Souza, 2011:14) forms of security and governance, while civil society is not immune from its own anti-democratic tendencies. Indeed, Souza (2010b:318) suggests that the call for 'resurgent' Keynesianism is effectively a reformist strategy for the continuation of capitalism with 'minimum horror'. However such efforts to 'tame' the social and ecological destruction of capitalism ignores how it is 'mode of production' that is 'intrinsically and essentially anti-ecological' and crisis prone (316).

For Neocleous (2011), the attempt to offer a more cosmopolitan conception of security glosses over the militarism inherent in the very concept of 'security'. More exactly, 'wars' of various kinds are the structuring logic around which the state and capital organise and sustain bourgeoisie order in the 'work' of security, which oscillates between different countries and back again (2011: 201). From this standpoint, contemporary militarisation is the latest ratcheting up of a historical lineage stretching from colonial manhunts with 'mastiffs and knives' (198) and the creation of pacified labour forces (194) which fuelled the 'primitive accumulation' of capital, through to contemporary wars on drugs and terror. Whether through knives or drones, dogs or night-vision scopes, the underlying impetus behind increasingly 'elaborate security systems targeting civilian populations in general and suspect communities or the enemy within in particular' is ordering the political relations necessary for accumulation by 'facilitating a functional integration of the pacifying powers of the modern state' (200).

From this standpoint, the militarised spatial assemblages which 'pop up' (Warren, 2002) in such spectacular fashion during mega-events are a particularly concentrated 'front' in the on-going class war that shapes capitalist society. The call for measures to protect sporting events from external threats such as terrorism is not a reaction against pressing dangers but is part of a broader, continuous strategy of remodelling and extending police powers in order to manage 'problem subjects' (204). To extend Neocleous' critique of security politics into Graham's work, it can be argued that military urbanism is not so much the product of the world-historic urban changes wrought by neoliberalism but is instead the latest configuration of 'police power'. Indeed, it could be further speculated that neoliberalism has served to strip the state of its social democratic façade, revealing the endoskeleton of the 'war machine'. And, from the perspective of the global South, this may not even appear a novel development, as the Keynesian post-war settlement was never strongly installed in most parts of the world (Abourahme, 2009).

The concept of 'pacification' suggests that there is no incongruity in the militarisation of civilian mega-events. As a central articulation of the ethos of capitalist society (Smith, 2011), mega-events are sites of densely concentrated value. Because they contain such vast financial and symbolic prestige, it would seem logical that they would be governed with extraordinary security displays which make visible their political and economic worth (Munoz, cited in Marcuse, 2007). From the perspective outlined by Neocleous, it is not that the logic of war has redefined urbanism so much as that the ever-present wars of pacification and class are more overt under the conditions of neoliberalism.

In contrast with Graham, Neocleous argues that militarisation is not a distraction from real security concerns but is part of a larger repertoire of policing actions which support bourgeois order, a repertoire which also includes welfare and other governmental efforts to manage society. To attempt to find a cosmopolitan, alternative conception of security, as Graham proposes, is to fall into the 'trap' of security and replicates the same inequitable politico-economic system which is the real base of anxiety and fear.

Neocleous focuses upon how security works as a projection of elite power, and particularly on the use of the often phantasmagoric and exaggerated threat of terrorism. But he has little to say on the issue of public safety and violent crime. This underplays the lived and situational fear of violence which Souza (2011) identifies as the driving force behind 'phobopolisation'. In Southern countries, violence is a socially complex but real threat. For instance, in a discussion of drug gangs in Brazil Souza (11) identifies the tense interactions between these groups and the other residents of *favelas* .While these gangs may be the targets of state-led pacifications, they are themselves implicated in violence against residents through exerting their own forms of 'tyranny' (ibid). Souza (2) resists the ahistorical tendency to present our era as uniquely violent, citing the fear of urban violence found in Ancient Rome and eighteenth-century London, but argues (2009:29) that what stands out today is the intensity and omnipresence of security concerns throughout differing urban contexts.

In particular, he (2011:2) identifies three crucial aspects which combine to entrench such a 'quasi-Hobbesian' view of urban life. Unlike Neocleous, who suggests that elites have long viewed the 'domestic' and the 'frontier' as one continuous colony, Souza argues that the contemporary period is marked by the obsolescence of long standing borders between policing and warfare. Firstly, the 'traditional conservative' (3) idea of policing as an internal practice and warfare as carried out abroad against defined enemies has been supplanted. Political establishments talk about their foreign military engagements as variants of international policing, while internal policing uses 'military methods and personal' (4). Secondly, this is entrenched through the linked coordinates of the political, commercial and media 'industry of fear' (ibid). Finally, while military and police planners often view capitalism as being threatened by toxic miasmas of crime and terrorism, he suggests that this perception of chaos is really the 'emergence of a new order, or of new orders, both legal and illegal one and at many scales' (5). Within contemporary capitalism, this includes the erosion of the welfare state in the global North, the 'collapse' (ibid) of the developmental state in parts of the global South, increasingly precarious employment, and the flourishing of trade in illegal commodities and money laundering, which have been aided by deregulation.

Mirroring Standing's (2004:53) comments on how organised crime functions as a form of predatory capitalism Souza (2009:47-8) argues that capitalism contains its own 'criminogenous' tendencies. These include the propagation of desires, which many people cannot afford to satiate through legal means; the dissemination of competitive, individualistic values which entrench the perception of social life as a continuous war; and a culture industry which feeds off lurid narratives of violence and the belief that 'everything can be transformed into a commodity and that everything has a price' (ibid). In turn, this propagates the idea that individual self-worth is dependent on property and wealth, which in the South African context has been viewed as a major motivating factor for criminality (Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, 2009). The cumulative product is the perpetual reinforcement of a widespread sense of fear, both through physical violence and the continual turbulence of the economy. And this is a fear which permeates society: referring to gated communities, Souza (2011:6) uses the metaphor of the prison to observe that 'middle class citizens live in prisons and it is only in prisons that they feel themselves free ... this kind of statement gives us a taste of the socio-psychological atmosphere in a phobopolis' .

This makes the 'militarisation of the urban question' (2009) an increasingly common phenomenon. Souza suggests that the only way to replace this with a less fearful politics is to combine egalitarian urban development with a progressive public safety strategy (2011:16). But he remains sceptical about what the state can achieve in this regard: 'structurally seen the state apparatus is ultimately always a heteronomous instance of power, no matter how sincerely committed to (re)distributive measures and popular participation particular governments can be' (ibid). At best, under the current conditions of capitalism, public policies can mitigate certain problems but as a product of the local, national and international challenges arising through the criminogenous dynamics of the geo-political and economic order: 'phobopolisation is a challenge that the capitalist state is very probably not able to overcome… The state apparatus seems to be part of the problem rather than the solution' (18).

Finally, as an international challenge, Souza (2010a:461) suggests that Graham inadvertently simplifies the asymmetries between North and South and oversubscribes to distinctions between rich and poor, frontier and metropole. Most particularly, this underestimates how ‘semi-peripheral’ countries such as South Africa, Mexico and Brazil are sites of both great wealth and poverty. While profoundly unequal, they are by no means poor (ibid), with advanced capitalist infrastructures and strong states existing amidst structural underdevelopment.

What this suggests is that semi-peripheral countries like South Africa represent the ultimate example of military urbanism’s twinning of movement and control. With First and Third world conditions continually overlapping within the territorial boundaries of one country, security may serve as the political technique which manages the tension and fractions incubated by constant social contradictions. Rather than being neocolonial war zones, countries such as Brazil and South Africa are major political and economic forces in which sophisticated consumer societies flourish amidst on-going crime ‘wars’. As a consequence of this, it may be the case that South Africa is a pioneer in the ‘crisis management’ which Peters (2011) observes in increasingly polarised societies in the global North.

Despite differences in approach, focus and proposal, the work detailed above shares a material conception of security. Rather than a transcendent good, arising from the urgent need for public protection, it has been argued that the ‘militarisation of the urban question’ (Souza, 2009) is a product of broader political and social processes. This clearly extrapolates into wider questions of economy and power far beyond the parameters of this thesis.

With the aim of identifying a track through this complex terrain, this chapter will focus upon how military urbanism works through the interface between the domestic and international, the past and future, and is undergirded by a dark imaginative rendering of urban space. Samara (2005) suggests that the influence of internationally used doctrines and tactics on the post-apartheid government’s war on crime may reinforce a localised culture of militarised policing and security. The chapter will develop this argument in a different direction and suggest that the policing of South Africa’s complex social environment also provides a concrete example of the tensions and anxieties embedded throughout transnational security developments, an international dimension especially pertinent to the security operations at the 2010 World Cup. Finally, Souza (2010:461) suggests that, despite local and national differences, the international dimensions of urban militarisation require a global focus. This chapter aims to go some way towards developing this kind of critique.

Chapter Structure

The chapter will begin by discussing how the government offered a technologically advanced security apparatus for meeting the presumed challenges of the 2010 World Cup. However, it will be suggested that this inadvertently revealed paranoia about urban space which contrasted with the desired image of South African cities that the state worked so hard to project. The chapter will than discuss how FIFA's own security concerns reflect a 'weaponised' (Carr, 2010) view of the future, with an emphasis on how the association regards commercial violations as an existential threat akin to terrorism. Moving to transnational and private security collaboration, it will be argued that such involvement further highlights the normalisation of military urbanism through both policing exchanges and private sector involvement. The chapter will than discuss how the state's militarisation of the World Cup reflects a broader strategy of applying military solutions to crime and social control. While this was less overtly violent than many of the abuses which have been linked to the remilitarisation of the SAPS, it will be argued that the World Cup can be understood as a significant event in the 'tooling up' (Hallsworth and Lea,2011) of the security 'forces'. In conclusion, it will be speculated that this reveals emergent developments within both domestic and international security.

State Branding

Assurance/Anxiety

Throughout the build-up to the 2010 World Cup, officials reiterated the stance that the exactitude of security operations ensured that tourists had nothing to fear when in South Africa. The Deputy Minister of Police told the press that 'We are not Afghanistan or Baghdad. South Africa is a peaceful country and people coming here for the Cup will enjoy themselves' (Moholoa, 2010). Such assurances began at an early stage of planning. In 2007, the Deputy SAPS Commissioner predicted that crime would be a fairly minor issue at the tournament 'Where the soccer is going to take place, where the stadiums are, where the police are, there will be low crime levels', due to crime being spatially concentrated 'in areas really still suffering from the past of our country, in underprivileged areas' (Westall, 2007). Closer to the onset of the event, Jacob Zuma said at the World Economic Forum in Davos that 'South Africa has a clear plan in terms of security. Our police force, aided by the army and other security elements, are very clear and ready. Nothing will happen' (Reuters, 2010a).

As Zuma's statement suggests, this strategy of assurance was underpinned by the precautionary deployment of 'security elements'. One of the planning mantras articulated by various police officials was that 'South Africa was hosting the world' (Westall, 2007), entailing that security plans had to account not only for domestic risks but also for transnational threats. For example, the Minister of State Security (Cwele, 2010), told a parliamentary committee that:

> Once more, we want to reassure the world that we are ready to host the 2010 FIFA World Cup. Our assessment to date does not indicate any security threat to the event including the cancer of global terrorism. However, we are not lowering our guard. We are grateful to our partners in the Southern African Development Community, Africa and the rest of the world who continue to share intelligence regarding the security of the tournament. As the

> intelligence community, we are conducting daily threat assessments including the appraisal of routes, base camps, hotels and screening of service providers. This information is fed into the National Joint Operations Centre to guide operations.

A similar stance was reiterated by Police Lieutenant General Andre Pruis, who said that ‘SA is not a terror target, but as many playing countries will be represented, we have various contingency plans in place to counter any real or potential threat’ (Delano, 2010). But this reveals a paradox in security planning. On the one hand, as a country ‘hosting the world’ the government proclaimed that the threat of terrorism, a ‘cancer’ which could erupt at any scale or place, necessitated vast resource allocations. This implies that terrorism is a profoundly unknowable threat requiring a continual, anxious posture of pre-emption. But simultaneously, officials claimed that robust intelligence coordinated with international authorities allowed the state to confidently assess that there was no security threat to the World Cup.

For Graham, this combination of anxiety and confidence is indicative of one of the key security preoccupations of military urbanism: the merging of assurance with ‘the seeding of anxiety’ (Graham 2010: 147). While ‘theatrical’ (ibid) security measures are used to assure publics about their safety, such dense assemblages also reinforce the belief that mega-events are sites of exceptional danger. This combination was embodied within the various operations and displays held before the World Cup. As suggested in Chapters Six and Eight, these exhibitions were used for both practical and marketing reasons. While they allowed the police and military to test their response to various imagined scenarios, they were also used to showpiece the extent of preparations to the media and the general public. For Brigadier Sally De Beer, the simulations were necessary to ‘allow our security forces to merge their expertise to ensure that we can deal with any crime or terror related threat, as well as any natural or non-crime related disaster, during major events’ and allowed ‘some of the most elite members and units within the security forces [to] engage in simulated scenarios and enact certain aspects of our emergency contingency plans in order to neutralise any form of ... threat’ (Ndawonde, 2009d).

But while these exercises were intended to demonstrate that South Africa was a congenial environment for hosting, the simulated scenarios pivoted around images of social chaos and violence. A crowd management exercise in 2009 showed what specially trained officers could do ‘... during unrest at soccer matches scheduled to be played at the Green Point and Athlone stadiums during the soccer tournament. Blue lights flashed, sirens blared, smoke billowed into the air, stun grenades shook onlookers and armed members of all ranks ran in all directions during a simulation of drills and exercises ... [in preparation for the police] to display their ability at the right time’ (Joseph, 2009).

While officials were presenting these security operations as unobtrusive support to a civilian event, the aesthetic of the displays was notably violent and confrontational.

In what an official release described as an 'action packed' display (Ndawonde, 2009e), an anti-hijacking/ counter-terror training simulation in 2009 entailed the following:

> Heavily armed criminals tried to flee the scene, but no sooner had the thought emerged when they stopped in their tracks thanks to an armed response team, with one arrested and another fatally wounded, all in the space of ten minutes. Armed criminals were then chased as they fled their vehicle, into a building, where a shootout ensued as members of the Special Task Force intervened – but the criminals refused to surrender. It was time to call in the members of the National Intervention Unit. Fully armed and protected they arrived on the scene by helicopter, as well as parachutes, to assist the officers on the ground. Live ammunition lit up the sky while the SAPS units apprehended the criminals who surrendered after one was shot dead on the scene (ibid).

The same exercise included 'members of the Special Task Force, together with the Intervention Unit, cracking down on the terrorists by firing live missiles .... After a gun battle ensued, all suspects were shot and arrested within 15 minutes after refusing to cooperate'. And, according to the press statement, 'Mthethwa, Cele and Mbalula looked clearly blown away by the end of the morning's drama' (ibid).

The dramatised depictions of crime and terrorism were accompanied by preparations which assessed everyday life as the breeding ground of urban apocalypse. Phillip Coleman, head of a subsidiary of the state owned defence manufacturer Armscor, claimed that off-the-shelf industrial chemicals could be used to launch a chemical or biological attack during the tournament (Global Security Newswire, 2008). In preparation for this, the military introduced scanning and detection protocols at stadiums (ibid). The perceived risk of weapons of mass destruction led the government to promote a range of exotic countermeasures alongside the more common details about securing against crime and hostage situations. In 2007, the SANDF conducted an emergency chemical response exercise with several other African countries (Global Security Newswire, 2007), which was overseen by Ben Steyn, former head of the apartheid government's notorious 'Project Coast' biological weapons project (Child, 2011). According to Steyn, the threat of WMDs was made more likely by ordinary commercial transactions: 'This is because of the huge amounts of chemicals transported throughout Africa at any given time; you have to know what to do long before the incident occurs.' (Global Security Newswire, 2007). In response, the exercise taught:

> ... principles of command and control and the management of a disaster area. In the beginning, the emphasis of the exercise was on the battlefield, but then we moved to the civilian area, which is where terrorists could or would strike (ibid).

Abroad, the government discussed its ability to avert ‘dirty bombs’ built from stolen fissile material (BBC Sport, 2006), while officials told *USA Today* that despite South Africa having no ‘known adversaries’ they were ready for ‘biological, chemical and radiation strikes, while hospitals have prepared to deal with a surge of victims of an attack’ (Bryson, 2010).

Worst case scenarios

While foreign tabloids claimed that tourists were threatened by ‘low-tech’ machete-wielding mobs and natural threats from ‘killer pythons, spitting cobras, puff adders and black mambas’ (Daily Mail Online, 2010a), the South African government was actively promoting its capacity to respond to high-tech, scientifically advanced menaces. In particular, this was based upon the perception that terrorist groups would use tools already available in cities to launch attacks (Graham, 2010:135). Contingency planning for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive (CBRNE) attack was intended to communicate the message that the state was ready for all possibilities. But as Dan Hancock (2011) has noted with reference to the London Olympics, the application of such protocols are

> ... designed not for protesters, or football fans, but for the Britain of *28 Days Later* [a 2002 post-apocalyptic movie]. The reason they look so terrifying, is they were designed to be used in genuinely terrifying situations. Here is your state of exception, already in place: steel cordons which were purchased to deal with the unthinkable, to deal with a nuclear holocaust.

This kind of planning indicates how preparing for the ‘unthinkable’ (Bennet and Haggerty, 2011) is underpinned by an apocalyptic and dystopian vision of the future (Carr, 2010). For instance, while promoting its security operations, the South African government liberally used metaphors drawn from the science fiction genre to convey the futuristic nature of its equipment and technological resources. However, the choice of reference unintentionally conveyed an ambiguous message about the security measures. In 2008, the SAPS described the body armour purchased for the tournament as a

> ... Robocop protective outfit [which] will be used in riot situations, and is made of black plastic. The hardened plastic shin guards, arm guards and gloves, together with helmets and bullet-proof vests will help protect police in the worst crowd control situations – even when criminals pelt them with petrol bombs (Joseph, 2008).

While this was intended to display machine-like precision, the 1987 film *Robocop* which inspired the SAPS appellation is a violent satire of Reagan-era corporate greed and political bellicosity. Ironically, in light of criticisms of the government’s relationship with FIFA, in the film’s narrative the titular character is a product of a corporation which attempts to privatise the city of Detroit’s police department. In the Western Cape, the SAPS also piloted ten ‘war rooms’ designed to coordinate Cape Town’s CCTV systems in ‘places at risk’ (News 24, 2009), which unironically (Graham, 2010:70) used a term derived from *Dr Strangelove*, Stanley Kubrick’s 1963 black comedy film about Cold War militarism and nuclear annihilation.

To promote the augmentation of its existing CCTV network, local government in Cape Town issued a press statement titled 'Big Brother is making our City safer' (Hamilton, 2010), while another communiqué noted, 'Criminals beware: Big Brother is watching' (City of Cape Town, 2010c). The reference to 'Big Brother' comes straight from the pages of George Orwell's *1984* (1949), a nightmarish vision of a totalitarian state which is arguably the most famous literary dystopia of all time. But while the term 'Orwellian' has become cultural shorthand for the dangers of mass surveillance, the city's press releases used one of the book's central images as a positive term to refer to its ability to control crime.

Security and Commercialism

The previous chapters have argued that FIFA's commercial interests were well served by the logic of war. Along with legitimating a political state of exception which protected the association's branding rights, FIFA's extractive project was complimented by existent techniques of urban pacification. As this section will argue, the policing operations at the 2010 World Cup display a further element of convergence as the association's security preoccupations reveal a paranoid, anxious reading of urban space which mirrors wars on terrorism and crime.

Dangerous platforms

In South Africa, FIFA's international management and its domestic representatives presented commercial violations as an invasive threat to the stability of the World Cup. While the police and military were testing out scenarios of criminals and terrorists hijacking planes and VVIPS, FIFA's rights protection manager Mpumi Mazibuko said that 'We plan to have teams in each of the cities looking out ... for brand hijackers. We protect the brand that is FIFA' (Business Day, 2010). In order to prevent efforts to dilute the centrality of the FIFA brand, measures at stadiums included a ban on newspaper sales and restricted food and beverages to 'neutral, clear' packaging (ibid). FIFA marketing director Thierry Weil claimed that such measures were necessary to make sure that ambush marketing was not 'harming anyone. ... We need to be strong. We need to protect our brand' (ibid).

FIFA representatives therefore presented commercial infringements as both opportunistic and criminal, with General Secretary Jerome Valcke telling a press conference that 'You are in or you are out. ...We can send people to jail if they try and profit from the World Cup when they have no right to do so' (Bloomberg News, 2010). Owen Dean (2007), of the domestically based Spoor and Fisher legal firm which represented FIFA's intellectual property rights, wrote that:

> The main objective of Federation Internationale de Football Association for the 2010 World Cup Tournament is to make it a success not only for the players, the football fans and the game of soccer, but also from a financial point of view and in particular for the sponsors of

> the event. Sponsorship is an integral and essential part of a World Cup tournament and without the funds provided by sponsors the enormous costs involved in running an event such as a Soccer World Cup could not be met. FIFA therefore sets itself the goal of giving its sponsors value for money so that sponsors will continue to support the event in the future and thus make it viable. ... In consequence it behoves FIFA to strictly control and police the use of the Soccer World Cup as a promotional platform. FIFA must ensure that non-sponsors do not ride on the back of the World Cup and bask in its limelight to the detriment of the sponsors.

At a later press conference, Dean also said that infringements would ‘be shown no mercy’ (Barnes, 2010). Donovan Neale-May, executive of the director of the Chief Marketing Officer Council, which has offered to assist FIFA in ‘doing away with foul play in sports marketing’ (CMO Council, 2010) suggested that ambush marketing could have the same negative consequences for FIFA-associated brands as violent crime or terrorism:

> Connecting with consumers through passion-brands like sports franchises and events can have huge repercussions on brand image, value and promise should brand hijackers diminish or destroy customer trust. The goal of this programme will be to sensitise marketers to these threats and challenges.

Moreover, the South African public was urged to be ‘sensitised’ to the ‘threat’ posed by ambush marketing. According to FIFA (2007:17), it was not the association’s responsibility to ‘illustrate every possible scenario of acceptable use’ and as a result local businesses were asked to ‘respect’ FIFA’s exclusive rights: ‘we trust that you will cooperate with FIFA’s requests’. The calls for societal vigilance were combined with the presentation of ambush marketing as an intrusive presence which could emerge at any size or scale, from large billboards to labels on bottles.

FIFA’s fear about how the World Cup could be used as a platform for unlicensed commercial displays replicated the belief that political extremists would use the World Cup to ‘market’ their causes. As noted in Chapter Seven, Minister Mthethwa warned that groups aiming to use the World Cup as a platform to express political grievances could expect a harsh reaction: ‘any type of deviant behaviour be it criminality or terrorism will be dealt with swiftly and with no mercy’ (SAPS, 2010b). President Zuma also told striking public sector workers and taxi operators to not use the event as a political stage: ‘That is why I made the point [that] if you have visitors in your house you don’t start fighting in the house, particularly if you know the visitor is just here overnight’ (Reuters, 2010b).

Security think tanks offered a similar rationale for the perceived susceptibility of the 2010 World to spectacular acts of terrorism. For Frans Cronje (2010b) of the SAIRR, the threat of terror revolved ‘around the possibility that an al-Qaeda aligned movement may use the tournament as a platform upon which to launch a massive strike against a Western target in South Africa’. The NEFA foundation, an American based ‘terror research group’, offered that because of the ‘huge attention even a small attack would get during the tournament’ there was an ‘80 percent chance’ of ‘strike teams’ targeting the hosting venue (Reuters, 2010c). Pundits even referred to the danger posed by al-Qaeda and ‘other franchises’ (Bryson, 2010).

Although the intentions and effects of ambush marketing and violent political attacks are clearly very different, FIFA’s rights protection programme was based on a rendering of urban space comparable with counter-terror procedures. Both the association and the South African government viewed the World Cup as a potential site of risk, because it could bring attention to the causes and products of both commercial ‘enemies’ and dangerous political groups. Under this logic, the event was in an existential ‘condition of vulnerability ... perilously transparent and facing unprecedented assault by a proliferating range of mobile incursions, threats or ruptures‘(Graham, 2010:93). And, as with efforts to ‘educate’ the public about the risks of ambush marketing, this sense of threat was used to keep local businesses in a state of vigilance. But rather than looking for an elusive, ‘ill defined’ (ibid) enemy, they were asked to ‘respect’ FIFA’s (2007:17) intellectual property rights by policing their own behaviour and commercial aspirations. For example, an official fact sheet on ‘understanding’ commercial restrictions gave suggestions on the approach the public should adopt: ‘Most often, if you think that something you are planning may be considered ambush marketing, it probably is’ (City of Cape Town Partnership, 2009). This approach mirrored the police logic of the war on terror, in which ‘because the suspect communities are always already among us, we are all under suspicion, all potentially guilty’ (Neocleous, 2011:204).

However, it seems that even such exhaustive measures do little to prevent ambush marketing by large, well-funded corporate rivals. For instance, Nike the main footwear and apparel rival of official partner Adidas, garnered more online mentions on social networks and blogs in the lead-up to the tournament than official partners through a successful campaign which included sponsoring the kits of nine of the participating teams and using soccer icons such as David Beckham and Cristiano Ronaldo in its advertisements (Nielsen Wire, 2010). Furthermore, no amount of policing measures could insulate sponsors from negative publicity brought about through internal corporate practice. BP Africa reduced its tournament advertising due to the public fallout from its parent company’s responsibility for the Gulf of Mexico oil spill, the largest human-caused environmental disaster in US history: at the time of the tournament, millions of gallons of oil a day were leaking into the Gulf from the Deepwater Horizon rig (Notte, 2010).

Contingency events

The previous chapter observed that the security measures represented the cross-pollination of commercial and governmental interests, as policing operations and spatial restrictions responded to a consensual state-FIFA vision of idealised cities.

But while the micromanagement of mobile security zones served to fortify FIFA’s revenue stream, it simultaneously revealed the association’s institutional paranoia about both the potential loss of profit and violence from crowds. Under the host city by-laws, the association was empowered to declare all the routes to and from airports, training venues and designated hotels as ‘exclusion zones’ (The Mercury, 2009), thus effectively imposing commercial restrictions on all the major transport arteries of host cities. However, there appears to be no evidence to suggest that such a complete commercial ban was implemented during the World Cup. Instead, practical measures focused on the finely honed spatial control of FIFA-managed spaces within host cities. These cordons and restrictions around stadiums and other venues were geared for worst case scenarios. For example, the creation of remote search parks prevented unlicensed commercial material from entering the exclusion zone, but these were also used for the deployment of vehicle checks as countermeasures to improvised explosive devices (IEDs) (SAFA, 2003a: 9.4.7) (Figure Nine)



Figure Nine: Security stop and search at the Nelson Mandela Bay Stadium, May 2010

This was managed through a stringent, colour-coded perimeter system which required accreditation for drivers to move into different protection zones within stadium complexes (Berrong, 2010). FIFA also mandated an automated accreditation system which controlled access to 'sky boxes' and other executive suites. These restrictions were finely detailed so that for instance, emergency vehicles that had been 'retained privately' were not allowed to enter certain parts of the stadium (ibid). As one private security contractor explained,

> So if someone were to become ill, for example, and they're in the general seating area of a 95,000-person stadium or even in the sky boxes that are going to be available in some of the larger stadiums, that immediate response will be provided by the security and the [government's] emergency medical services in the stadium. We have people that we're providing protection for, if they become ill at some point, we are going to want to take control of that and get them to the hospital that ...we feel is most appropriate. That might not match up with what the government feels is most appropriate (ibid).

FIFA included security warnings and lists of prohibited items and behaviour both on printed tickets and on signs outside stadiums. These included weapons and fireworks, interference with broadcasting equipment, 'racist or xenophobic material', umbrellas which could be used as missiles during crowd violence, unlicensed commercial materials, ‘standing on seats’ and a general prohibition on all objects ‘that could compromise public safety’. (Figures Ten and Eleven).

Figures Ten and Eleven: Security checklists on official tickets and outside stadiums



Please note that having been successfully allocated Tickets, you and your guests have irrevocably agreed to adhere to the full terms of the Stadium Code of Conduct. The Stadium Code of Conduct can be found on page 16 of this booklet.

Partial List of Prohibited Items:

Fireworks
Helmets
Weapons
Hammers
Bottles, Cups, Jugs or Cans
Alcohol or Drugs
Flammable Spray Cans
Laser Pointers
Megaphones or Gas Horns
Umbrellas
OFFICIAL TICKET GUIDE

Prohibited Items at FIFA World Cup Stadiums
Stadium conduct

In particular, the security warnings parallel the 'passage points' found at airports throughout the world. In the wake of 9/11, this has seen both the 'hardening' of airport architecture, with sophisticated surveillance and scanners, and increased disciplinary warnings which attempt to 'immobilise' threats before they can travel (Graham, 2010:137). As with the list of prohibited items found at ticket check-ins, this 'encourages' costumers to police their individual itineraries for dangerous and banned materials. In the same way in which everyday items, such as scissors and aerosol cans, are prohibited as potential weapons, FIFA's restrictions included umbrellas, key ring laser pointers and helmets as instruments easily mobilised for crowd violence.

FIFA's anticipation of emergency is also suggested by the evidence that it pursued contingency plans for alternate hosting countries. While Sepp Blatter claimed that this would only be activated in the case of a massive natural disaster, LOC chairperson Irvin Khosa revealed the association was also prepared to relocate the event in the case of wide-scale civil unrest (Project 2010, 2008). As a pre-emptive measure, the association identified three undisclosed countries as relocation sites (ibid).

Along with regarding urban space as a hazardous concentration of risk, FIFA also presented its 'war' on commercial violations as part of a global struggle for security in an increasingly dangerous world. In the lead-up to the tournament, FIFA hired INTERPOL's operation manager Chris Eaton as their new head of security. According to Eaton, the 'criminal incursion' of match-fixing syndicates has reached endemic proportions, which include syndicates planting a 'double agent' within the association during the World Cup: 'In the worst case scenario, he would have had access to FIFA's early warning system, or he would have known which games were being watched by FIFA investigators' (Yusof and Singh, 2011). Eaton's hiring was intended to signal that the association was adopting a tougher stance towards match fixing (Radnedge, 2012), but by 2012 he had left FIFA to join a mega-event security consulting firm in Qatar. His rapid hiring and exit prompted speculation among soccer journalists that match fixing was being used to detract attention from corruption within FIFA itself, but before leaving, Eaton claimed that the association needed to adapt a counter-terror approach to illegal betting: 'We'd still be investigating 9/11 if we had investigated it internationally. You have national police operating within national confines but these are international activities which are very complex' (Bloomberg News, 2012).

Transnational Policing and the Private Security Sector

Endless borders

This international approach was also evident in the participation of foreign security services. As part of the shared state/FIFA project of controlling and monitoring mobilities in and out of South Africa, security procedures at the urban scale were joined by global interventions. Rather than a 'blockading' of borders (Graham, 2010:132), participating foreign services linked pre-emptive measures within their territorial borders into the operations around and within South African cities. In January 2010, the UK government issued an order for 3,000 'soccer hooligans' to hand in their passports (BBC, 2010b), while immediately prior to the tournament, five 'troublemakers' were arrested in dawn raids in the English Midlands (Daily Mail Online, 2010b). The Department of Home Affairs posted 'airport liaison officers' at international hubs in Europe, Asia and Africa, and only six days into the tournament had already barred 79 'undesirables', including registered sex offenders, from entering the country (BuaNews, 2010c).

Neighbouring countries became part of a World Cup-related 'energy security' network, with neighbouring SADC countries agreeing to reduce electricity use in order to provide surplus power to South Africa during both the Confederations Cup and the main tournament (Mogakane, 2009). Namibia reduced its electricity imports from South Africa and agreed to provide additional power in the event of a generative emergency (Weidlich, 2010).

Such bilateral programmes worked to extend the security borders of the World Cup beyond South Africa's territorial space and were intended to make foreign points of demarcation and key infrastructures the first line of defence in identifying and pre-empting risks. These security operations included efforts to 'extend US homeland-security initiatives through world-wide systems' (Graham, 2010:135) through such key mechanisms as the Container Security Initiative which is intended to create rigorous screening and security zones at foreign harbours before shipping reaches destinations in the United States. In 2003, Durban became part of the initiative, which substantially reduced public access to the harbour, and in the lead-up to the World Cup the South African Revenue Service created a Customs Border Control Unit modelled on the US Antiterrorism Contraband Enforcement Team (US Department of State, 2011). According to the US State Department, the efforts to improve monitoring within the Department of Home Affairs, such as the tracking systems implemented during the tournament, made South Africa a more effective partner in counter-terrorism initiatives (ibid). Such preparatory measures intensified South Africa's links to the Department of Homeland Security's attempts to create a US directed 'global security envelope' (Graham, 2010:135).

Sharing pre-emption

Simultaneously, the South African government used its greater integration into the US-initiated war on terror to strengthen its own capacities in the domestically situated war on crime. During the preparatory stage, the SAPS and SANDF received training from the State Department's Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) Programme (Engelbrecht, 2010a). These included joint training operations in which South African officers:

> ... received certificates of participation in a three-week training programme designed to enhance their ability to respond to incidents involving chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive (CBRNE) materials in the run-up to the June-July World Cup. This course prepares the students to execute fundamental hazardous material and emergency management and response procedures that can mitigate loss of life in a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or hazardous material incident....Course topics and activities included a focus on human rights, trends in terrorism, explosive device awareness, toxic industrial chemicals and materials, CBR risk assessment and awareness, crime scene issues, chemical hazard detection and prediction, triage, search and rescue operations and equipment maintenance (ibid).

The US also contributed $10,000 to the purchase of World Cup equipment, donated two CBRNE 'Rapid Response Trailers' to the SAPS and specialised diving equipment to the Navy and orchestrated a 'Tactical Management of Special Events' training mission in February 2010 (ibid). Since the World Cup, regular training missions have continued with SAPS Special Task Force commandos practising 'crisis response skills for an urban environment' in the USA, aimed at simulating 'high risk confrontations with criminals and possible terror situations' (ibid).

These exchanges were part of broader efforts within the SAPS to create elite, paramilitary units. As noted in previous chapters, this has included a long-running series of training mission and exercises with the French gendarmes. In particular, the TRT units established by Bheki Cele were strongly influenced by the 'gendarmerie ... model' (Mthethwa, 2009). According to a draft Ministry of Police report on public order policing (Tait and Marks, 2011: 19), the French model was adopted because it allowed for a more confrontational response to public 'disorder'. In particular, this offered 'closer contact', allowing for the 'opportunity to restrain forward movement of the crowd and the possibility for snatchers to pick on certain individuals who are thought to be most provocative within the crowd' (ibid).

The SAPS sought foreign assistance in pre-emptive social surveillance and enrolled British authorities to share experience on distinguishing between acceptable and 'undesirable' crowd behaviour. British experts on hooliganism were deployed to assist SAPS officers monitor the behaviour of fans: according to Andrew Holt of the UK based Association of Chief Police Officers (APCO) their role was 'not to police the English fans per se but to assist our South African colleagues to interpret the behaviour and mood of the English fans. They have different ways of celebrating and if you are not used to that, you might not know how to interpret it' (Eaton, 2010). The LOC contracted the UK based Events Stewarding and Consultancy Ltd. to provide 'international training qualifications in spectator security' to stewards (Emita, 2010:3).

Finally, the large-scale presence of private security companies in South Africa provided the LOC with a range of operators who could deliver the material and equipment necessary to secure venues against potential disaster. A LOC (2009) advertisement for the Confederations Cup a year before the World Cup highlighted some of these requirements and called for tender applications by:

> ... established service providers in the security industry; service providers with ability to provide large quantities of speed fence, mobile fence and crowd barrier equipment; service providers with a comprehensive access control equipment rental solution and service providers to provide the services of static and VIP protection services .

National and Urban Security

The World Cup and the war on crime

However, while the government promoted its efforts to secure against all conceivable threats, the zero tolerance rhetoric used by politicians and police officials gained some unwanted press. In 2009, foreign media outlets claimed that so-called 'shoot to kill' policies were being adopted because of the proximity of the World Cup. This was given credence by Kohler Barnard who suggested that the 'great fear that visitors will be harmed' influenced an increasingly aggressive official stance on the use of violent force (Smith, 2009).

But government officials had an inconsistent public position towards the controversies about 'shoot to kill'. For example, after Fikile Mbalula told parliament that bystanders would be killed in 'combat' with criminals and added, 'Shoot the bastards. Hard nut to crack, incorrigible criminals', President Zuma said that:

> No police officer has permission to shoot suspects in circumstances other than those provided for by law. The law does not give the police a licence to kill... We have stated our position very clearly. It is the duty of the police to protect all people against injury or loss of life. But when their lives or the lives of innocent civilians are threatened, police sometimes have no choice but to use lethal force to defend themselves and others (IOL, 2009b).

In response to the same statement, the Secretary of Police suggested that the media was misrepresenting SAPS violence: 'Those shootings haven't just started in the last couple of months. Over the last three years the Ministry has noticed an increased number of shootings of civilians by police officers. So I don't think you can attribute those to what is being printed quite sensationally in the media' (ibid). On the one hand, the government claimed that the use of deadly force was exclusively reserved for extreme circumstances in which officers and the general public were threatened by dangerous criminals. But on the other, officials presented 'civilian' loses as an acceptable consequence of 'combat' (ibid). Indeed, the Secretary of Police's statement appeared to confirm that such 'collateral damage' had become an inescapable component of the war on crime.

Conscious of the negative connotations that the publicity around 'shoot to kill' had for the World Cup, General Cele said that 'The security forces will be supporting players, participants, fans and everyone to enjoy the tournament as much as they can with the understanding that they are not there to fight a war', and added that the SAPS were ready for 'better and brighter' preparations (Eaton, 2010). According to the SAPS, crowd control and contingency preparations were motivated by a 'people orientated' approach (Joseph, 2009). Minister Mthethwa also suggested that the media was overstating the significance of remilitarising the ranks, which he described as only one aspect of a broader strategy of being 'fierce' on criminals:

> Our approach in the fight against crime is anchored by and large in intelligence work, partnerships with communities, review of the Criminal Justice Systems and what we have done over the past few months and years. This is not aimed at alienating the police from the community, because we cannot win the war against crime without the community (Momberg, 2010).

Mthethwa's comments suggest that the change in the ranking system was a 'fierce' and highly public component of a wider state project which also utilised penal sentencing, surveillance and intelligence gathering. Souza (2011), Graham (2010) and Neocleous (2011) all suggest that militarisation is not exclusively about the application of military tactics or ideas to urban governance but is constituted through a pervasive blurring of civil/military boundaries. The statements provided above show how this metaphorical importation has been normalised in South Africa: citizens become 'civilians', policing becomes 'combat' and public governance becomes 'war'. While the SAPS admitted that this has been an on-going development (IOL, 2009b), the following section aims to demonstrate that the governance measures for the World Cup, designed to ensure that 'nothing would happen' (Reuters, 2010a), played an active part in entrenching the role of the police and military as linked 'forces mobilised for internal securocratic wars' (Graham,2010: 113).

The 'war' for urban space

Firstly, the proximity of the tournament gave officials an impetus to appear 'tough' on violent crime. In October 2006, the Gauteng provincial MEC for Safety and Security claimed that his province aimed to decrease crime by '7 to 10% a year ... this accumulative process will make a significant difference by the time of the World Cup' (Daniels, 2007:59). In the same year, the government allocated an additional R3,5 billion 'anti-crime budget' to law enforcement agencies, which Finance Minister Trevor Manuel said would aid towards police recruitment and increasing 'appropriate security' during the tournament (ibid). According to the director general of government's World Cup unit, Joe Phaahla, the event provided a 'focused deadline for project completion' (South Africa-The Good News, 2007:8) while Vish Naidoo, Senior Superintendent of the SAPS, promoted a 'stronger police force ... we will have a significantly larger police service that is properly trained and ready to tackle the crime challenges that hosting the event will present' (19).

Throughout the preparation and hosting periods, police officials maintained a publicly 'uncompromising' stance. Cele said that 'SAPS members will leave no stone unturned during the World Cup tournament to safeguard our visitors and fellow South Africans. We will continue to squeeze the space for criminals to zero hence we are ready to deliver a safe and secure World Cup not today, not tomorrow but yesterday' (SAPS, 2010b), and the Minister of Police promised that aggressive policing would 'smoke those who commit crime' (Hosken, 2010).

After the event, the police attributed the success of security preparations to their strategy of accelerating the on-going war on crime. The Deputy Minister of Police said that the World Cup was,

> ... a catalytic imperative to transform the faces and facets of this country. … The legacy of this Word Cup will live with us forever. South Africa will never be the same again. … Our people, like the warriors, rose to the occasion … inspired by the spirit of great African warriors, Moshoeshoe, Shaka, Sekhukhune, Cetshwayo and King Sabata Dalindyebo … in defence of the motherland, in defence of mother Africa. … Our people are united as ever. Criminals have learnt that when we say '*Wafa Tsotsi*' [meaning die gangster] we mean business. These factors are contributing favourably towards macro social stability, investment attraction, economic development and poverty busting (PMG, 2010c).

Minster Mthethwa (SAPS Journal Online, 2010c) claimed that the police were aiming to maintain World Cup 'best practices ... to deal a deadly blow to crime'. At a 2011 police rally, General Cele said that policing had entered into 'the beginning of the new era in South Africa where criminals will not have a space, and the time has come for SAPS to show what it stands for .... We are going to embark on a vigorous mission to ensure that we stop criminals in their tracks like we did during the 2010 FIFA World Cup' (Mabotja, 2011).

A central feature of this 'uncompromising attitude' has been the control of urban space. In particular, police officials presented the war on crime as form of urban combat which aimed at locating and eliminating criminals who operated by 'blending in' with the wider society (Graham, 2010:163). Ahead of the World Cup, Fikile Mbalula, told an ANC dinner that armed criminals had lost their rights as citizens and that 'If you are a criminal and you are gun-toting, our message to law enforcement officers is clear, shoot to kill. We are going toe to toe, tooth for tooth, nail for nail. Street by street, corner to corner, we will find you' (Miller, 2009). Along with promising that lunatic scoundrels' would be met with 'police fire', Mthethwa (2010b) said the central message of his ministry was:

> The police force is ready. This is the message we shared with South Africans over the past year and we shall be articulating to our 2010 visitors. As they descend in our shores, we shall leave no stone unturned to guarantee their safety. Police will be everywhere, ready for any eventuality. This is the epitome of our security plan; we will cover every corner because we do not have any no-go-areas.

The reference to ‘no-go-areas’ referred to political violence in the 1980s and early 1990s. During political conflict between the ANC and the apartheid government-supported Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), parties ‘blamed each other for establishing “no-go areas”, where members of the opposition entered under threat of intimidation, violence and death. This strongly polarized provincial black politics, with the conflict carrying all the characteristics of an undeclared civil war’ (SA History Online,2012), a phenomenon which in some areas of KwaZulu-Natal continued into the post-apartheid period. Mthethwa’s relocation of this historical metaphor into the present implied that contemporary crime amounted to a comparable crisis, requiring drastic solutions to enforce spatial order. For Minister of Human Settlements, Tokyo Sexwale, inner cities had to be ‘taken back’ from criminals: ‘Johannesburg has to be reclaimed – inch by inch, street by street, block by block, level by level’ with a similar ‘spirit of the World Cup ... that of partnership’ (BuaNews, 2010d).

The attempts to leverage a ‘combat’ model which could use space to control and pre-empt risks and disruptions thus became a central point of conceptual focus within government security planning. According to an SAPS presentation, operations aimed to create the ‘safety and sterility’ of tournament-related infrastructures and transport nodes by ‘implementing uncompromising security measures and limiting the probability of critical incidents occurring, and if they do, limiting the impact of such incidents through contingency planning by a multi-agency integrated approach by all relevant role players’ (Joint Oversight Report of the Portfolio Committees on Tourism and Home Affairs, 2010). At the specific level of airports, the NIA stated that ‘security in all areas required constant focus’ but, in particular, anticipated problems within these border spaces as including ‘possible targeting of customs and immigration officials by syndicates, labour issues, loitering and passengers targeting by criminals’ (ibid).

Enforcing pre-emptive control extended beyond the built environment of host cities and into nautical and aerial space. Under air defence protocols, ‘rules of engagement’ were established around stadiums allowing SAAF and SAPS aircraft to intercept and force down ‘aggressors’ (Kriegler, 2008:44). Security measures stretched even into the biological interstices of urban life. For example, the City of Cape Town spent over R200,000 in rat poison in one month, ‘targeting’ breeding areas around the stadium and fan sites (Cape Argus, 2010), while Port Elizabeth issued restrictions to ensure a clean supply of drinking water during the event (Sunday World, 2010) and distributed two million condoms to ensure ‘ultimate safety at the tournament’ (IOL, 2010d). Attention was also paid to fortifying electronic communications, evident in the supposedly ‘hacker proof’ quantum encryption system installed in Durban (Hennig, 2010). The spirit of pre-emption even crossed over into spiritual concerns, with the City of Cape Town hosting a ‘Cape Town for Jesus’ rally at the newly built stadium:

> [The rally] will be attended by the Premier of the Western Cape, Helen Zille, and the Executive Mayor of Cape Town, Alderman Dan Plato. The City of Cape Town is however, not involved in the event. It is an initiative of the Body of Christ in Cape Town, and will focus on important issues surrounding the city and the World Cup™. It will involve prayers and blessings for the stadium, city, province, country and its leaders, as well as all those involved in the World Cup™, such as the emergency services and youth (Pollack, 2010).

While the governments operations focused primarily on densely policed security zones, the national and local state marketed their ability to 'leave no stone unturned' (Mthethwa, 2010b) and to manage cities as a continuous 'battlespace of linked operations (Blackmore, 2005). Pre-emptive measures permeated, from the transmission of disease to pest control to counter-measures against weapons of mass destruction: these initiatives had 'no front and no back, no start and no end' (Graham, 2010:31). Or as SAPS commanders put it ' there are no static borders' (Pruis, 2011: 13). Graham (2010:175) argues that the US military has a 'technophilic' fascination with surveillance and targeting systems which appear to offer omnipresence over the urban battlespace. In the case of the World Cup, the government exhibited a comparable fascination with the importation of high-end security products into host cities.

Safety through technology

The press releases and media statements which accompanied the unveiling of security systems were infused with depictions of seamless functioning, total control and omnipotence. According to Lieutenant General Andre Pruis (2011:13) technology created a feeling of 'police omnipresence' and allowed the police to 'make South Africa a very small country'. The King Shaka airport opened with the 'best, latest security technology' including X-ray machines 'capable of detecting everything from drugs to bombs' (News24,2010b), while in the wake of 2009 fears about a global 'swine flu' pandemic, new thermal imaging scanners were purchased for other airports (Ashbaugh, 2009). A particular focus was placed on automated technology, which included the purchase of remote-operated bomb disposal equipment that 'had proved itself in Iraq' and 'shows no fear' (Smillie, 2008), which the SAPS unveiled at a shopping mall demonstration.

Surveillance systems were upgraded and implemented through host cities as a pre-emptive measure. For example, according to the Limpopo MEC of Safety and Security, Dikeledi Magadzi,

> Criminals will have no place to hide. We are ready. The state-of-the art surveillance and monitoring system installed at the stadium will assist a great deal, as law enforcement agencies at the Venue Operation Centre will be able to detect potential crime even before it occurs and act decisively (Limpopo Business, 2010).

An SAPS publication claimed the cumulative effect of these purchases was to provide 'safety through technology' (Nel, 2009: 39). Equipment such as the infrared cameras purchased for the SAPS air wing, were touted as being as ‘effective as 25 police members operating on the ground in tracking a suspect’ (ibid) and capable of being operational ‘24 hours a day, seven days a week’ (Erasmus,2008). These were seen to offer perpetual surveillance and monitoring of host cities and to provide ‘a close-in, continuous, always-on support’ (Graham, 2010:165) for policing operations.

The belief that technology would create a seamless and pre-emptive ‘security blanket’ (SAPS Journal Online, 2010b) for the World Cup was encouraged by private security companies. One trade website claimed that as an international event, tourists would expect a wide diffusion of CCTV in host cities (ICT World, 2007) while the director of a domestic firm offered that ‘the international community expects South Africa to have CCTV surveillance in place ... CCTV is as vital to the success of the World Cup as the country’s plans for transportation, stadia and telecoms’ (Russell, 2009).

Interoperability

According to the government, the operation of such systems was intended to ‘link up with all nine provinces, ensuring real-time monitoring, collating and reporting on the roll out of ... [the security] plan as well as the occurrence of any incidents’ (SA Military Health Service, 2010:39). A key concept within the mobilisation was the ‘interoperability’ of different government departments. A defence report by the government funded Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (Le Roux, 2008) suggested that simulation missions ahead of the tournament demonstrated how interoperable functioning was expected to work. These missions coordinated practices for both civilian and defence air control, which included the Air Force using the same radar sites as commercial air hubs (ibid). The air exercises were coordinated with off-shore frigates and security ‘elements on the ground’:

> In addition to air situation awareness, tracking of land-based mobile resources are also done by the police, army and emergency services. These include tracking of individuals by the police, army and emergency services, both within vehicles or dismounted, or vehicles themselves ... virtual threats have been injected into real world systems, to prepare and refine systems for coordinated, complex exercises (ibid).

Military and police management both described interoperable missions at the World Cup as a testing ground for future operations. According to a SANDF Brigadier General:

> So far, Operation Kgwele has been a huge success. People want to feel safe in the knowledge that somewhere someone is taking care of their well-being. They want to know that the SANDF as their shield has the capacity, technology and know-how to control who enters our country at harbours, airports and border posts (Rakoma, 2010:18).

For Lieutenant General Andre Pruis of the SAPS:

> The joint interoperability of the security organs of the State and Government Departments is a moment in our history that demonstrated our ability to come together to put the country’s interest first. ... The vast majority of our security forces deployed for the soccer spectacle

> were trained to deal with unruly crowds, hooliganism as well as specialised units responsible for airspace control, counter terrorism and maritime safety (19).

Referring to the apartheid government's wars in Angola and Nambia, one member of the SAAF told a defence conference that the World Cup was to be 'the biggest command and control deployment in the history of the Defence Force…That's inclusive of the Bush War' (Szabo, 2009). However, this was described as a 'security rather than a defence operation', in which SANDF supported the police in 'non-traditional' tasks, such as transporting SAPS personal in the incident of civil unrest, disaster management and preventing ambush marketing and 'people with a cause' from disrupting the event (ibid).

This evidence suggests that interoperability during the World Cup went beyond streamlining communications and deployments. The use of the SANDF in the support capacity of internal security rather than external defence is indicative of a convergence of law enforcement and military operations, in what Graham describes as the parallel militarisation of the police and 'policisation' of the military (Graham, 2010:96). With reference to World Cup operations, police officials referred to the SAPS, SANDF, state intelligence and the emergency services as combined 'security forces' with integrated tasks (NATJOINTS, 2008b, Mthethwa,Mbalula and Cele, 2010) while preparatory exercises saw the police and military operate in tandem.

The SANDF identifies such joint, interdepartmental and multinational (JIM) operations and exercises as one of its key areas of strategic focus. The army describes internal deployments such as World Cup operations as part of an on-going 'partnership' with the SAPS through its 'Support the People' sub-programme (Department of Defence, 2010:81). In particular this has focused on deployments at major events. In the build-up to the World Cup, SANDF was used in a support capacity at the 2009 Presidential Inauguration, the IPL tournament, the Confederations Cup, the World Cup final draw and the opening of Parliament in 2010 (81).

Subsequent to the World Cup, the Minister of Defence (Sisulu, 2011:7) has suggested that 'non-traditional forms of insecurity' such as cross-border crime requires a future repositioning of the internal role of the military (6). She has argued that the military must take a more assertive role in ensuring the conditions for economic and social development, 'alongside the traditional primary and secondary functions of defence' (7). Furthermore, Brigadier General Les Lombard of the SAAF, claimed that the example of the World Cup indicates that military personal and equipment can serve as a major asset in the police's war on crime:

> The police force do not have the ability to troop and rapidly place the reaction forces, whether it be the task force or the national intervention forces in numbers, their helicopters don't have the carrying capacity, so the [SAAF] Oryxes play a huge role in rapidly locating these forces

> to a crime scene or as a prevention to a crime scene or roadblocks or whatever the case may be. ... And then there's the Koiler aircraft with its reconnaissance capability. For poaching, for activities in the game reserves, for crime, even traffic management, you name it. With such ability to video footage in the different formats and to downlink it in real time to a ground station is brilliant, it really gives a commander a very strong capability. What we learnt was the close cooperation with the different state departments. You cannot supply safety and security as a single state department. You have to work very, very closely with the South African Police force, the intelligence services, Home Affairs, SARS [South African Revenue Service] and ACSA. All those role players had to work in an integrated manner and during this World Cup we showed what could be done if those departments worked together (Szabo, 2010).

Within the SAPS itself, much of the World Cup preparations focused on training paramilitary units to respond to 'medium to high risk' situations. Falling under the Operational Service, these units are used to 'stabilise tense situations when normal policing is not enough' and to carry out dangerous 'operations that fall outside of the scope of classic policing' (SAPS, 2011a.). The TRT, which was established in the lead-up to the World Cup, was trained in 'weapons phase, urban phase, rural phase, operational simulations, unarmed combat (every day during training), advanced crowd management' (SAPS Journal Online, 2009b), to engage in 'crime combatting', restoring 'public order' and policing at major sporting events (ibid). The TRT was intended to be a permanent legacy of the World Cup preparations and by the end of 2009 units were established in Johannesburg, Pretoria, Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, Nelspruit and Durban (LOC, 2010). According to the police the TRTs were intended to serve as paramilitary 'boots on the ground' to ' hunt down criminals' and to maintain public order: 'These teams are important because the criminals must know we are coming for them hard and fast, and residents and visitors to our city must know they will be safe ' (Hosken, 2009).

But while these operational forces are designed to operate in civil spaces, their tactics and weaponry are military orientated. At a joint training mission with the army, which simulated a World Cup hostage scenario, members of the Special Task Force and TRT used army Inyala vehicles, stun grenades and Heckler & Koch MP5 submachine guns to 'assault' a terrorist 'target' (Engelbrecht, 2010b). Police management were reticent about divulging the exact calibre and size of weaponry accessible by these elite units: 'some weapons and tactics were not being publicly displayed to retain security and surprise ... it was taken as granted that potential adversaries would be studying media reports and pictures of such events to gauge their opponents' (ibid). (Figure Twelve).



Figure Twelve: Joint SAPS and SANDF training mission

Targeting inward

But the post-World Cup period shows the attendant dangers of applying such assault tactics in ordinary policing. Video evidence captured the Gauteng TRT engaged in a military style campaign after civil unrest in a township near Johannesburg, including torture and door-to-door raids (Sobiso, 2011), while the media also acquired CCTV footage of TRT members attacking bar patrons in the city (Van Wyk, 2011). The Mpumalanga division has also faced a lawsuit for allegations of severe brutality (Moselakgomo, 2012). According to a witness from the province, 'this TRT is treating every member of the community as a criminal and they have harmed even the innocent' (ibid).

This mounting evidence suggests that such units can rapidly be targeted inward, with urban publics as the main enemy (Graham, 2010: 96). While the police have justified both the preparations for the World Cup and the wider militarisation of the service as a response to the dangers posed by armed criminals and terrorists, the rhetoric and preparatory tactics used by officials reflected a pronounced fear about the public as a potential threat. Such statements as Nathi Mthethwa's claim that the police would 'show no mercy' to criminal actions 'disguised' as demonstrations (SAPS, 2010b) ominously implied that the 'security forces' would determine the legitimacy of political protest. Furthermore, the violent crowd control scenarios tested out ahead of the event (Joseph, 2009) imagined the public as enraged mobs, ready to fight tooth and nail with the police. While the tournament's security acquisitions were explained as augmentations to the war on crime, much of the itinerary list, which included body armour, water cannons and surveillance equipment, is explicitly geared towards quelling public disturbance. For example, water cannons were equipped with a special blue dye used for the identification and arrest of 'hooligans' (Liebenluft, 2008). In 2011, the police unveiled a new Public Order Policy (POP) which cited the event acquisitions as providing the equipment base for 'meaningful and aggressive implementation' (Lukani, 2011).

This also suggests that the SAPS are anticipating a future in which controlling 'dangerous' public demonstrations is an increasingly central task of policing. In 2005 (SAPS Strategic Management: 23-24), the police drafted a series of future scenarios aimed at 'thinking the unthinkable' and 'neutralising and/or preventing the prospects of the undesirable scenarios taking root' .While it imagined positive scenarios in which the country experienced economic growth and social cohesion, it also anticipated increased political tension, inequality and conflict 'placing a high burden on the SAPS to maintain public order' (ibid). Another scenario foresaw a major international depression, characterised by domestic marginalisation of the poor, a 'high crime wave and lawlessness' (ibid). The plan also rejected a scenario in which the country was less economically wealthy but more socially unified as 'tolerable but undesirable' (ibid). Notably, these imagined futures suggest that the chief role of the SAPS is to protect the current capitalist model from social disorder and 'lawlessness'.

Outcomes

The war on crime continues

However, it would appear that in the period the following the World Cup, it is the SAPS who have gained a popular reputation for lawlessness, as the service has increasingly been beleaguered by corruption scandals and mounting evidence of systemic violence and brutality. As a result, incidents which reveal epidemic police violence throughout the country presents many of the 'people centred' World Cup preparations and operations in a new light.

For example, in early 2010, the provincial government in KwaZulu-Natal launched an 'offensive against Durban criminals' (Mchunu, 2010). According to the MEC for Safety, Willies Mchunu:

> We want Durban to be a liberated zone as a host city for the 2010 Soccer World Cup. Our approach will be focused and targeted. .... What I can safely say is that life is going to be very tough for criminals. All key elements of the plan have been finalised. We have enough resources, and abundance of political will. We will win this war in as short a time as possible. As criminals feel the heat in Durban, we will be waiting for them in Pietermaritzburg. As they go into hiding in the rural areas, they will find us there. There is no room for error. No room for complacency. Criminals must surrender or face the fire (ibid).

Notably after the attacks on the Abahlali movement in 2009, Mchunu also claimed that the Kennedy Road informal settlement in Durban had been ‘liberated’ (Mchunu, 2009). Furthermore, apart from the apparent official sanction for political violence against the perceived enemies of the local state, policing in KwaZulu-Natal has very recently come under increased scrutiny over allegations of extrajudicial executions. In early 2012, the Cato Manor Organised Crime Unit was shut down, and several high-ranking provincial police officials were suspended, due to an on-going investigation which has implicated the Unit in at least 51 ‘suspicious’ deaths going back to 2009, including the execution of murder and robbery suspects (Hofstatter, Wa Africa and Rose, 2012). While the SAPS initially claimed that these deaths were the result of high risk standoffs with armed criminals, evidence presented in a national newspaper suggests that in most cases the victims were killed in custody or at home. Witness have even alleged that the Unit fabricated evidence of a shootout after ambushing ‘taxi boss’ Magojela Ndimande with assault rifles (Hofstatter, Wa Afrika and Rose,2011). While national police command has maintained that the incidents were the work of a ‘rogue elements’ within the SAPS, these killings occurred simultaneously with the promotion of ‘fight fire with fire’ rhetoric.

The allegations about the Cato Manor ‘death squad’ came alongside a series of unfolding scandals which have linked the remilitarisation of the SAPS to a systemic problem of police violence against the public. In the period leading up to the World Cup, deaths in police custody and registered complaints of assault and torture reached their highest levels in over a decade (Rawoot, 2011). In April 2011, the SAPS gained international attention when footage of Ficksburg community activist Andries Tatatane being beaten and fatally shot by officers during a municipal protest was screened on national television. The police ministry again blamed the killing on ‘rouge officers’ in the service, while Minister Mthethwa warned ‘civilians’ to ‘not provoke or insult the police’ (Keehn and Peacock, 2011). This suggests that the promotion of a militaristic and hyper-masculine institutional culture in the police has served to estrange and set the SAPS in opposition to the public (ibid).

The SAPS’s reputation has also been further damaged by the 2011 suspension of Bheki Cele on allegations of maladministration of public funds, which made him the second consecutive commissioner to be removed from his position as a result of corruption charges. The violence which has been associated with remilitarisation is paralleled by other post-tournament developments in the ‘security forces’, which suggest that the government is moving in an increasingly authoritarian direction. Under the Zuma administration, the intelligence services have attempted to increase their powers of surveillance and control, which has included attempts to pass a sweeping Protection of State Information Bill, which under the rubric of ‘national security’ would substantially restrict public access to government information and documentation. Activists have also claimed that they have been subjected to increased surveillance by the SAPS crime intelligence division, including the creation of a national list of identified individuals whose presence at marches results in a heightened police presence (Unemployed People's Movement, 2012). Internal deployment of the military has also increased, with soldiers going on joint patrols with the SAPS and performing crowd control at protests (de Vos, 2012).

President Zuma has defended his administration's policing policy, citing a victimisation survey conducted by Statistics South Africa which suggests that 40% of surveyed households believe that levels of crime have decreased since 2008 (Hartley,2012). However, while the same report indicates that 60% of respondents were satisfied with the conduct of police in their residential areas, 66% of households felt that social and economic development is a more effective way of reducing crime than increased law enforcement (Statistics SA, 2011:1-3).

In the wake of Tatane's death, and several other incidents of fatalities at protests, the Ministry of Police has drafted a new Public Order Policy, which as noted above, is reliant upon equipment purchased for the World Cup. Some commentators have suggested that the experience of the World Cup offers a model for more civil forms of crowd control. At an ISS organised conference on public order policing in October 2011, a former SAPS brigadier argued that the equipment and training received for the World Cup could be used to install a more human rights-based approach to crowd control, speculating that 'South Africa will see Arab Spring type protests within three years' (Martin, 2011). At the same conference, which was also attended by a US diplomat and representatives from the Nigerian national security forces, Mthethwa (2011b) said that in the post-apartheid period the SAPS could no longer act to suppress political opposition. However, his presentation overwhelmingly focused on the potentially violent dimensions of public protest, and cited techniques applied at the World Cup such as 'command and control', road blocks and security cordons as methods of 'ensuring that citizens express themselves without provocations between police and citizens' (ibid).

However, the police interpretation of 'provocation' is open to abuse as authorities may capitalise on accusations of criminality to delegitimise oppositional groups. An example involving the use of World Cup equipment occurred in Cape Town in January 2012, when municipal officials falsely claimed that a 'People's Land, Housing and Jobs Summit' or 'Occupy the Commons' was the pretext for a land invasion of the public Rondebosch Common (Sacks, 2012). The actual event saw a small group of protesters met by a much larger contingent of police in which 'Robocop' body armour and water cannons with the tracking blue dye purchased for the tournament were used together with mass pre-emptive arrests and armoured personal carriers to break up the gathering. All charges were later dropped (Take Back the Commons Movement, 2012). Despite the SAPS's efforts to improve their image, the methods used to manage crowds often undermine the claims made of a citizen centred approach. Mthethwa even suggested that because of historically rooted 'sensitivities', South Africa's population was too sceptical of the police's ability to implement crowd control with 'the human touch. ... People criticise us for using water cannons. We have introduced those techniques because that's not your maximum force. But you'll hear people criticising that, saying these things were used under apartheid' (Ngalwa, 2012:2).

The future

The application of World Cup procedures since 2010 also highlights the international dimensions of what Peters (2011) has described as 'crisis management' in which security forces are instrumental in enforcing order in 'post-growth' economies in the wake of the on-going global financial crisis. The United Nations Cop 17 climate conference, which was held at the International Convention Centre (ICC) in Durban in 2011, illustrates some of the dynamics which link the militarised command and control measures used at the World Cup with wider ruptures in global politics and economics.

The policing measures deployed by SAPS at the conference replicated the previous year's operations. The ICC was declared an accreditation controlled UN 'blue zone' while the SAPS, supported by the SANDF, Metro Police and local emergency services, increased visible policing throughout the city 'red zone' (Yeld,2011), which included the temporary reactivation of the special courts system (IOL SciTech,2011). The NATJOINTS structure was used again with heighted security at airports and harbours and the drafting of contingency plans for CBRNE attacks: according to Minster Mthethwa 'We are under no illusion of the magnitude of COP17, particularly having successfully hosted the 2010 FIFA World Cup, but neither are we under any pressure to prove anything to the world' (SAPS Journal Online, 2011). The SAPS's official press release on security plans even reused statements that had been made by Mthethwa during the lead-up to the World Cup, such as, 'we will cover every corner because we do not have any no-go-areas' and 'Police will not tolerate criminal acts that are disguised as demonstrations, which in some cases include destruction of property and intimidations. We will unapologetically deal with such criminal acts decisively and we require no permission from anyone' (ibid). During the conference, it was alleged that the municipal government had hired agent provocateurs to attack members of the DLF and,'In spite of heavy police presence throughout the march, including mounted police, riot police, air-patrol ... snipers and requests to address this disruption, police did not take any action' to stop the disturbance (Tolsi, 2011).

Inside the ICC itself, governments and NGO's failed to find binding agreements to reduce carbon emissions before global temperatures reach a catastrophic two degrees centigrade increase, which would lead to sea level rises, crop failures, the extinction of animal species and water shortages. As one scientist at the conference put it,

> While governments avoided disaster in Durban, they by no means responded adequately to the mounting threat of climate change. The decisions adopted here fall well short of what is needed. It's high time governments stopped catering to the needs of corporate polluters, and started acting to protect people (Lenferna, 2011).

As another attendee observed, the ICC functioned as an 'air-conditioned' fortress in which some of the world's largest corporate polluters attempted to 'greenwash' their involvement in contributing towards potentially catastrophic global warming (Durbach, 2011).

The images of police in 'Robocop' armour throughout Durban and snipers above the street level are a stark reminder of what Graham (2010:382-3) suggests is the illusory nature of military urbanism (Figure Thirteen). While the police and military were put on high alert to protect the conference from the threat of disruptive protests, it is arguable that the real existential threat came from inside the building, as political and economic elites failed to take decisive action to pre-empt environmental catastrophe. While the extent of the militarisation of urban space at such events is exceptional, it is also conceivable that as economic and ecological conditions worsen throughout the world, such operations in which state security forces are linked in with other government departments to become a machine of pre-emption, targeting and social control will find an intensified application in 'ordinary' policing.



Figure Thirteen: SAPS officers with 'Robocop' armour at COP 17, Durban, 2011

Conclusion

This chapter has argued that the militarisation of urban security in South Africa goes beyond changes in ranks and the official promotion of ‘shoot to kill’ and entails a policing logic based on pre-emption and continual anticipation of risk. Following Hansen (2006:282), it can be proposed that the deaths of protesters at the hands of the police and the sophisticated, ‘world class’ assaults simulated by elite forces ahead of the 2010 World Cup are supplemental parts of a wider governmental approach towards ‘civilian’ space.

However, while it is clear that state policing in South Africa has taken an authoritarian, militaristic turn, this should not be understood in isolation from international developments. It has often been suggested that internationally-tested policing models can modernise and democratise the SAPS. For example, at the ISS conference on public order policing in October 2011, Dianne Kohler Barnard (2011), claimed that the police had fallen behind in the ‘scientific’ methods that are ‘the focus of national training in many parts of the world’. But within a month of that conference, police departments in the USA, coordinated through the Department of Homeland Security, initiated a violent series of clampdowns on ‘Occupy’ protests in 18 cities. In the same week, hundreds of protesters in Cairo, demanding an end to the military generals’ ‘hijacking’ of the Egyptian revolution, were attacked with US-manufactured weapons and chemical agents.

According to Graham (Interviewed by Democracy Now, 2011) these clampdowns represented an elite fear about the wave of protests in public space, often coordinated through the internet, which occurred throughout the world in 2011:

> .. political and military power is controlled by people who see cities purely as threats, purely as sites of unrest, sites that need strong military and security control ... in a world where we have a really radical crisis and a radical sense of illegitimacy for the social model that we’re all still having to live under.

Two month after the police actions in the United States, local government in Cape Town used comparable tactics when responding to the attempts to ‘occupy’ public space at Rondebosch Common. At the least, this suggests that international moves towards paramilitary internal policing reinforce historically embedded militarism with the SAPS (Samara, 2005)

However, as this chapter has argued, militarisation does not exclusively emerge from the state security apparatus. The underside of the elite consensus on world class cities, identified in the previous chapter is a fearful, even paranoid rendering of urban space. Most notably, FIFA applied concepts gleaned from counter-terrorism to police commercial infractions. While the government tried to argue that security concerns were overstated, if not generated by an underlying racism and ‘afro pessimism’, the security services’ constant reassurance that it was prepared to deal with all threats implied that the World Cup was in some way menaced by a demonology of armed criminals and of opportunistic terror cells eager to prey on naïve tourists. The combination of assurance with ‘the seeding of anxiety’ (Graham, 2010: 147) reinforces military urbanism by generating an implacable sense of fear: no city can ever be ‘secure’ enough and no policing measures can ever be ‘comprehensive’ enough to defeat a world of anticipated horror.

In this sense, security becomes self-radicalising as ‘criminality, protest marches, strikes or riots’ are conceived a symptoms of a wider, permanent disorder which demands combat’ (Souza, 2011:4). This is reinforced by a wider political and social consensus which has normalised the concept of internal wars against crime. As evidenced in the case of the World Cup, while opposition political parties and academic specialists may be critical of the remilitarisation of police, they enthusiastically embraced the militarisation of the tournament as a model worthy of future emulation in the on-going war on crime (Politicsweb, 2011).

The logic of war which is translated through international exchanges and consolidated across governments and the private sector is mobilised around protecting sites and events of value from anticipated threat, particularly pertinent in an era of growing inequality and social turmoil within cities. It can therefore be offered that the 2010 World Cup showed how South African cities are at the forefront of these developments. On one hand, national and urban authorities were financially wealthy enough to sponsor and manage large-scale infrastructural developments and comprehensive governance measures. But this occurred in tandem with the expansion of a state security apparatus increasingly preoccupied with pre-empting and containing social disruptions in a society characterised by structural unemployment and inequality.

While coercive measures were constrained by the considerations of international image, the World Cup was used both to restock arsenals and to experiment with the containment and sanitisation of urban space as part of a wider reconfiguration of state security. Arguably, the heightened climate of repression in South Africa reflects government’s unspoken fear of losing control over a potentially volatile powder keg of structural inequality. The advantage of the military urbanism thesis is that it highlights the global dimension of developments in South Africa, which have for the most part been understood in isolation as a response to the national crime situation. Graham’s work allows for a contextualisation of post-apartheid urban security as more than just the continuation of historical practice in the present. Rather the entrenchment of the politics of fear has kept apace with international developments.

Indeed, when applied in the South African context, the military urbanism thesis may entail more of a shock of recognition, than of novelty. Centuries of segregated urban development and a long history of internal militarisation and pacification were central facets in the creation of an advanced capitalist country with networks of wealth overlapping on poverty and repression. The preoccupation of colonial and apartheid authorities with movement, control and containment are revisited within the security logic of world class planning and events, creating a generalised extension of parallel global ‘green’ and ‘red’ zones within cities and states (Graham, 2010: 261).

However, it seems unlikely that a resurgence of socially directed ‘state provision and control’ (Graham, 2010:381) can arrest these processes. If anything, the militarisation of urban space is mediated and financed through state intervention. Furthermore, as the case of South Africa demonstrates, security forces often couch increased militarisation within Keynesian rhetoric. As shown in this chapter, SANDF officials have called for a greater role in creating the conditions for socio-economic development while SAPS strategic documents discuss an extended war on crime as part of the objectives of a ‘developmental state, where crime has severe consequences particularly on our ability to deliver programmes to our people’ (SAPS Strategic Management,2010b:2)

For Neocleous, this combination of militarisation and developmental programmes is expressive of the underlying structure of capitalist order, in which social safety nets and zero tolerance coexist. As the preparations for the World Cup demonstrated, ‘security’ encompasses everything from the quotidian to the unthinkable. While the concept of pacification provides a philosophical pivot with which to demystify the political and economic drives behind security (and insecurity), Neocleous may overestimate the extent to which elites control the ‘meaning’ of security, and downplays how securitisation capitalises on legitimate concerns for public safety. Souza’s work provides a key element in that he highlights how fear is used to entrench militarisation. In particular, ‘phobopolisation’ is seductive, in that appears to offer aggressive, result-orientated solutions to feelings of widespread social anxiety. However, this entrenches a Hobbesian view of cities in which even sporting festivals are accompanied by anxious preparation for catastrophe. This ‘socio-psychological’ (Souza, 2011:5) atmosphere of fear lingered over the tournament. For instance, it is noticeable that in a different context the stadiums, with their access control, fencing and large deployment of police could function as internment camps. Security reveals that, to paraphrase the novelist JG Ballard, under the overlit dream of mega-events lies an ambiguous realm of nightmare presided over by twin leitmotifs of spectacle and paranoia (Ballard, 1995:4).

Conclusion

> Mr President, on Thursday you outlined an infrastructure plan that represents a bold, strategic and integrated platform to mobilise the state, private investors and the South African public behind a clearly articulated storyline of South Africa's opportunities..... We identified what worked well – such as a 2010 World Cup special law to fast-track regulatory issues – and what did not work well – such as cost-over-runs. Above all, the lessons are to have a clear project scope, with binding time-frames and clearly identified responsibilities – who does what, by when, with what resources – and to solve problems expeditiously when they occur.
> – Minister of Economic Development Ebrahim Patel, 14 February 2012.

Introduction

In the speech cited above, which responded to President Zuma's 2012 State of the Nation Address, Minister Patel described the 'project management' experience of the World Cup as an example of the government's future approach to infrastructural and development programmes. This chapter will argue that Patel's description of 'strategic' projects which mobilise the state, the private sector and the public behind a 'clearly articulated storyline' is equally applicable to a critical understanding of the 2010 World Cup security measures and operations.

This conclusion has three primary aims. It intends to return to the original research question and offer a final perspective on the securitisation and militarisation of the tournament in South Africa, framed against the international context outlined in the theoretical framework. Secondly, it is intended to highlight the implications of this research for the study of policing and security, both in South Africa and internationally. Finally, it will offer suggestions for further research.

From policing to security

Chapter One began by contrasting theories which deal with the construction of security with the narrow focus of the available literature on the 2010 FIFA World Cup. It was maintained that academic work on the topic had concentrated almost entirely on two areas. Firstly, it discussed the practical issues of deployments such as budgets, personal numbers and the potential long-term applicability of equipment purchases to the war on crime. However, despite being presented as a dispassionate examination of the special challenges of hosting such a wide-scale event, this was underlain by a series of unchallenged assumptions about security. Notably, researchers cohered around a series of linked ideas: that it was imperative for the South African government to assure the highest level of security and that the World Cup was an exception for which the 'normal rules' of policing were inadequate. This approach focused on security as a *sui generis* area of importance.

Secondly, despite differences in emphasis, with some writers being more sceptical of the government's security capacity than others, this body of work was overwhelmingly skewed towards the role and actions of the South African state. The extent to which security operations were determined by FIFA's commercial projects was underplayed in favour of accounts of how the SAPS, with the assistance of other government departments, planned to secure the event. This reflected the belief that security is an apolitical social good and that the role of academic research is to identify how best the state can 'deliver' this 'service', and ignored the repressive and exclusionary facets of both security discourse and practice. Indeed, in conflating disparate phenomenon such as street crime, political violence and popular 'unrest' as 'threats', this research neatly dovetailed with and reiterated the total security planning espoused by the government.

Such a narrow focus left two major research lacunas. Firstly, it served to present 'national security' as an area of risk management distinct from commercial concerns and assumed that the militarisation of the tournament was an inescapable result of living in an increasingly dangerous, unpredictable world. A key component was the presentation of 'world class' practices as a cynosure for the 'war on crime' in South Africa. This missed an opportunity to explore the political ramifications of the state security forces working as a delivery system to manage FIFA's commercial product.

Notably there was an almost complete silence on parallel security trends within the country such as the overt remilitarisation of the SAPS and the more subtle moves towards increasingly fortified urban space. As described in Chapter Six, van der Spuy (2010) and Cornelissen (2011) presented more sophisticated surveys of the securitisation of the tournament, which at least gestured toward facets of space and exclusion. However, in choosing to focus on the applicability of legacies as a barometer of success, both these accounts assumed that the expansion of state power is an a priori good. This reflected a latent conservatism in which crime and security threats are conceived as forms of 'disorder' which require a reassertion of the authority of the state. For Cornelissen (3226), much of crime in post-apartheid South Africa 'stems from the context of civil disobedience formented by the anti-apartheid liberation ideology of the 1970s and 1980s, which in the contemporary era has evolved into a widespread questioning of authority and more sinisterly, an endemic culture of social violence'.

In contrast, Chapter One offered a series of philosophical perspectives which view security as a political technology of reproducing and fortifying order, which is structured by underlying material concerns and political power. This goes beyond the intricacies of state policing and into wider projects of social and spatial control. In particular, Neocleous (2007) argues that the critical potential of mainstream security studies is constrained by a 'myth of balance' which attempts to negotiate between democratic freedoms and the apparently urgent requirements of national security which necessitate restrictions on liberty. However, this doctrine of national security is itself a form political power, used to legitimate all forms of state control through an ideological conflation between the people and the state (137). Security is the first principle of the modern liberal democratic state, leaving little ‘defence against authoritarian or absolutist encroachments on liberty, as long as they are constructed in the name of security’ (143).

As a consequence of this historical argument, Neocleous argues that the contemporary philosophical interest in ‘exception’ (Agamben, 2005) overstates the novelty of the present era. While the loss of liberty for ‘security’ is not as extreme as under fascist or Stalinist regimes in the last century (144), historical evidence

> ... suggests that far from being aberrational or exceptional to liberal democracies, emergency powers have been exercised over and again in the last hundred years and more, becoming so fundamental to the political administration of capitalist modernity that they have, to all intents and purposes, become a permanent feature of liberal democratic polities (143).

Exceptional events

However, mega-events provide an example of political projects that can indeed be considered exceptional. For example, it is striking that the question of ‘balance’ was hardly noted within academic studies of the 2010 World Cup: the absolute level of security was generally considered self-evidently desirable. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter Two, the security operations at mega-events adopt the logic of emergency litigating suspensions of the law, the militarisation of civil spaces and draconian sentencing. Moreover, the state and corporate actors involved in planning appear to understand these events as exceptions which demand exorbitant budgets and full societal mobilisation around a transcendent national project.

But this is a particular kind of ‘emergency’, pivoting around the governance of festival, consumerism and image rather than crisis. What is striking about mega-events is that authoritarian aspects of state power, from pre-emptive bans and moral panics to the occupation of urban space, are enrolled in the service of entertainment. As discussed in Chapter Three, this resonates with a broader shift within cities, marked by close connections between aesthetics and multi-scalar levels of securitisation. Weizman suggests (2007: 145) that these layers of urban security, from surveillance systems to zero tolerance policing, result in coexistent forms of domination combining ‘direct discipline and indirect control’.

Mega-events introduce the additional element of spectacle, as urban space, movement and legal systems are temporarily subsumed under the rule of the image desired by host states and corporate power. However, as Hagemann (2010) suggests, this spectacle also exposes the layers of domination which circulate through cities and the shared security templates, practices and ideas translated between the state and private sector, which blur distinctions between ‘public’ and ‘private’ policing.

In turn, mega-event governance provides a concrete reminder of how ‘security’ is organised across local, national and transnational scales. This goes beyond the importation of external practices into the domestic scale, as mega-events also provide glimpses into global circuits of conflict and power. For example, while South Africa’s security forces were policing the commercial rights of BP Africa at the World Cup, its parent company was attempting to place some of the blame for the Gulf of Mexico oil spill on the malfunction of cement oil-well casing built by the Halliburton. In turn, Halliburton has become infamous for allegations of war profiteering from the occupation of Iraq (Hughes, 2007), a conflict in which hundreds of ‘retired’ South African policemen and soldiers, including former members of apartheid death squads (Perelman, 2004) worked as mercenaries. And finally, to revert back the 2010 World Cup, the SAPS was simultaneously promoting its purchase of bomb disposal automatons ‘battle tested’ in that war. This is not to suggest that all these events and incidents are explicitly connected but rather to highlight the global dimensions of contemporary securitisation. Indeed, South Africa’s security establishment explicitly viewed their operations at the 2010 World Cup as part of a global mobilisation. In turn, this was believed to require policing measures which went beyond the territorial bounds of host cities and into preparations designed for a boundless, borderless battlespace.

In order to calibrate this international background of urban securitisation with the specific elements of the South African context, Chapter Four explored Stephen Graham’s analysis of the intensification of militarisation within cities. However, while it was argued that the 2010 World Cup can be understood as a concretisation of military urbanism, the focus on Northern cities was qualified with specific examples of how urban crime has entrenched these developments within South African cities. This created a platform from which to view the exchange between local practices and transnational security tactics and procedures. Conversely, it allowed for an exploration of how South African cities can be understood as ‘laboratories’ (Abourhame, 2009) for globally circulated security practices.

As a result, the four studies presented in Chapters Six to Nine aimed to respond to the research question by arguing that:

By working through a politically created and managed state of exception, security measures and operations were used as part of a shared state and corporate project of securing the 2010 FIFA World Cup, which contributed to an on-going militarisation of public policy and civil space in South Africa.

Security projects and exception

As argued in Chapter Six, the World Cup resulted in an unprecedented security operation in which the state, aided by private security firms and foreign governments, enforced a security network throughout the nine host cities, across transportation routes and land, maritime and aerial borders. But while this was intended to market South Africa's opportunities, it was simultaneously a mobilisation directed at ensuring the profits and prestige of FIFA. These security measures have been conventionally understood (van der Spuy, 2010, Cornelissen, 2011) as both a response to the exceptional security demands of the event and as a developmental opportunity which offered security 'legacies'. Such perspectives echoed the public legitimations used by the government and attempted to suggest how this legacy could be actualised and ensured.

By contrast, Chapter Seven discussed the 2010 World Cup as an elite political and economic project. Rather than focusing on how opportunities to upgrade security apparatus and training were 'missed' or undermined through political and financial maladministration, the chapter discussed the concept of legacies as a political tool. While underpinned by the extractive political economy of the FIFA tournament, the government used the declaration of a 'national security event' to facilitate a shared project of state marketing and commercialism. The political creation and management of a state of exception was also highly responsive to a host of additional actors from the private security sector and foreign governments. Security was versatile enough to link the aspirations of host cities, major corporations and transnational institutions such as INTERPOL, an organisation which is increasingly serving as a facilitator between FIFA and national policing bodies.

This is not to suggest that governance was a seamless, unitary process but rather that the security model provided enough coherence for groups, which in other respects may have different political, financial and institutional goals, to work together for mutual benefit. The occasional disagreements and disputes between FIFA and local and national government which were made public, such as Bheki's Cele's argument with Jerome Valcke (Chapter Six), were outweighed by the more consistent reality of state-corporate symbiosis (O'Reilly, 2010) with the qualifier that FIFA's relationship towards hosting authorities was a particularly 'parasitic' variant of this symbiosis.

As a result, the chapter was marked by a profound scepticism about the academic focus on legacies. Firstly, the governance of the World Cup was driven by political and corporate interests rather than any serious effort to create substantive forms of public safety governance. And not only were security measures shaped by commercial concerns but they were intended to be concentrated, visible and temporary, with an overt focus on protecting exclusive 'islands' and 'zones'. Secondly, the meanings of security held by involved institutions ranged substantially beyond urban policing and included ‘social cohesion’, the penalising of commercial rivals and the opening of new security markets. Once again, this suggests that previous research into the World Cup mostly conflated security with state-driven policing and the prevention of ‘objective’ risk. However, this overlooked how elite constructions of World Cup security, both for participating governments and the private sector, indicated a much more open-ended focus on social and spatial control, which facilitated the projects of these dominant interests.

However, such security projects have the tendency to sacrifice public accountability, legal procedure and financial restraint. The self-legitimating flavour of this is provided in Patel’s (2012) quote at the beginning of the chapter, which claimed that ‘binding time-frames’ and ‘fast-track’ regulations, such as the 2006 Special Measures Act, create a focused ‘problem-solving’ model which can prevent ‘cost over-runs’ and inefficiency. However, it is exactly this concept of temporally bound, exceptional projects which creates opportunities for the misappropriation of funds and restrictions on civil liberties. At witnessed in the context of the 2010 World Cup, security, along with other areas of preparations, became ‘non-negotiable’, where the public was only provided with glimpses into the planning and expenditures of possibly the largest security operation in South African history.

The state, space and occupation

As a result, Chapter Eight aimed to dispute the belief that FIFA had ‘hijacked’ national security for financial gain. Firstly, rather than being a neutral enforcer of public safety, it was argued that the government prioritised a specific image of South Africa which was reliant on sanitising space and defining political protest as a disruptive threat. But secondly, rather than being ‘privatised’ as the armed wing of capital, the World Cup revealed how the government remains the central structuring force in South African society. Notably, FIFA’s perceived status as an ‘occupying’ power was in fact a product of state intervention. In turn, the government was prepared to subsidise an event with uncertain financial returns because it provided an impetus to pursue a variety of national and local projects.

Under the simulated emergency conditions of the 2010 World Cup, the security forces were integrated with other government departments into a ‘war machine’, which aimed to combine restriction and mobility. This responded to a shared state/corporate logic of vaguely defined ‘world class cities’, in which the entertainment and movement of tourists of spectators was prioritised, while an open-ended set of risks were ‘pacified’ and contained. As a result, security operations were intensely theatrical. Deployments of police and weapons systems were as much about adopting the signature and semiotics (Boyle and Haggerty, 2009) of previous events as responding to localised challenges. Indeed, this suggests that mega-event security is self-reinforcing, as different hosts are compelled to replicate the procedures and mobilisations of their predecessors, leading to ever larger operations. But while security was used as a theatre of power to signal the strength of the South African state, the World Cup was successful precisely because this remained a supporting 'side show' to the main event.

However, this was not just simulation, as the adoption of an all-encompassing definition of World Cup security had very real consequences. At the local level, the World Cup provided an impetus to sanitise space and warehouse unwanted populations, despite official denials of any causal link. The issue of evictions and removals was mostly ignored within the mainstream of security studies, partly because it appeared not to fall under the parameters of policing. But the evidence presented in chapter eight suggests that, at the very least, FIFA restrictions and host city branding combined to create a powerful motor for on-going evictions and removal. To put it in another way, the facts preceded the legitimations. As a result, the spectacle of the 2010 World Cup puts a spotlight on the violence and dislocations which attend the creation of 'world class cities'. Because it is poor people who are the target of such pacification, such events are often glossed over in the media and academia.

This also reveals a more brutal side to contemporary social reality in that 'security' and 'development' may be used as euphemisms which underplay the extent of state violence and resegregation through the mechanism of class. While a transit camp such as Blikkiesdorp may appear to exist in a different world from the high-tech stadiums, the chapter argued that they can be considered different aspects of the same security logic of containment and control. The difference is in the focus placed on them by the state: the security operations at stadiums were what the world was supposed to see, while removals and evictions were intended to disguise and prevent unwanted intrusions into this aesthetic. This suggests a further overlap between the security apparatus at mega-events and the tactics deployed in war zones and occupied territories. The check points, searches, fences and policing procedures during the 2010 World Cup were in part tools of an on-going and effectively one-sided class war of gentrification and relocations (Neocleous, 2011) which is continually being fought within South African cities.

Militarisation

It is these intimate links between different security architectures and tactics which reveal the extent of militarisation within urban governance and public policy. While Chapter Nine maintained that the state security forces remain the central platform of militarisation in contemporary South Africa, this is reinforced by a broader political and corporate consensus which views cities as sites of vague, irregular and perpetual 'threat' (Graham, 2010). Rather than emerging from a single source, militarisation works through overlapping circuits which combine to interpenetrate the logic and tactics of war into everyday civil space. While military urbanism has mostly been studied from the perspective of the global North (Souza, 2011), the example of South Africa shows how the on-going war on crime has normalised the use of similar equipment, procedures and strategies. In turn, this has been packaged into the state's fascination with appearing 'world class'.

This is why, for instance, the Gautrain could be unveiled with proud statements about its use of military grade technology (Chapter Seven) and the militarisation of airspace during the tournament be presented as a necessary component of hosting a sporting event (Chapter Nine). An uncritical focus on importing 'modernity' and 'expertise', which is translated across the state, business and within security studies, is troubling, considered how recently democracy was achieved in South Africa. Less than two decades ago, the country was governed as a white supremacist national security state, and, as the continuation of police violence in the current era suggests, this has resulted in a profound legacy of basal authoritarianism which has not been fully expunged in the post-apartheid period. By placing domestic militarisation in its international context, it can be argued that the extent to which military urbanism is becoming an urban 'best practice' has a particular danger in the South African context. The global normalisation of conceptions of urban life as a perpetual war has 'boomeranged' into South Africa as 'world class' governance techniques, rehabilitating and reinvigorating authoritarian tendencies under a new, modern veneer.

However, following Klein (2007), Graham (2010: 260) argues that the overlapping wars on crime, terror and disorder which are pursued throughout the world are 'not being mobilised to win'. In contrast, the militarisation of urban space is designed to maintain, and profit from constant low level conflict and turbulence. More especially this is aimed at putting up walls, both visible and invisible, around flows and concentrations of wealth and power. While Klein's (441-2) presentation of a future of continuous 'green zones' moving through and across 'red zones' of exclusion may appear extreme, it is evident that the governance of the 2010 World Cup embodied this cocktail of mobility and fortification.

This reflects a profoundly ambiguous security ideology. On the one hand, mega-events are a sign of prestige and 'stability' which few states can provide, but on the other, planners envision cities where order is so tenuous that it can collapse into chaos at any time. While the scenarios detailed by South African security establishments were not as intricate as those emerging from inside the Pentagon (Carr, 2010), the militarisation of the 2010 World Cup was underpinned by a similar ambience of apocalyptic fear. Security planning is conditioned by a dramatised vision which attempts to pre-empt future threats (ibid), creating a stark contrast between the dystopian undertow of operations and the optimistic image of the 2010 World Cup. As some of the most powerful institutions in society, the doctrines and psychologies of the military and police demand greater scrutiny, especially as their focus on crisis management (Peters, 2011) may reveal how the current domestic and geopolitical order is far less stable than its presentation within other parts of the political system.

In conclusion, this thesis has attempted to look behind the justifications of ‘national security’ and ‘legacies’ to reveal the political ambitions and financial interests which drove the securitisation of the 2010 World Cup. Rather than militarisation coming from the exclusive source of the state, it has argued that under the state of exception, various aspects of urban space, technology and policy were melded into a continuous security project unfolding throughout South Africa. In particular, it has attempted to disrupt the assumed conflation between national security and the public (Neocleous, 2007). Instead, it has focused on how ‘security’ is not so much a service provided by the state but rather a mechanism through which political and economic power is reproduced and sustained.

Significance of This Approach

Such an approach offers a useful platform from which to approach the exchange between transnational security developments and domestic policy and space. From this standpoint, the thesis has developed an account of the security measures of the 2010 World Cup which focused as much on the ‘whys’ as the ‘hows’ of governing the event. This has concentrated on both the material forces underlying security and the psychologies of power revealed within the control of space and organisational deployments.

This thesis has argued that the academic studies of the 2010 World Cup were limited by a narrow understanding of security which focused almost exclusively on logistics and budgets. Too often such work served to merely reiterate the official line and justifications of ‘national security’. This is partly a product of the technocratic focus of security and strategic studies in post-apartheid South Africa. In particular, this reflects the belief that a unitary phenomenon called security is a ‘service’ provided by the state, which through the correct management techniques, training and imported ‘silver bullets’ (Graham, 2010) can aid an often hazily mapped national quest for ‘safety.’ The shared conclusion is often that South Africa needs more ‘efficient security’, ‘smarter’ policing and less ‘political interference’.

However, such research is sustained by an artificial separation which divorces the ‘transcendent’ goal of security from elements of political power, economic exploitation and social domination. Moreover, such a separation considerably obscures how security is by nature a construction of political power. While this is not to deny the legitimate urgency of attempting to improve public safety and to find ways to reduce criminal violence, an exclusive focus on the elusive entity of ‘security’ mystifies the political, social and economic causes of risk and fear. In many cases, security has become a euphemism for attempts to contain the problems caused by the uneven, unjust and even brutal trajectory of post-apartheid society.

More specifically, this suggests that mega-events' use of overbearing state power in aid of extractive political economy can cause further insecurity and social anxiety. A sobering recent example is provided in Greece (Samatas interviewed by Molnar,2011), where the security apparatus established for the 2004 Athens games has been used to monitor and disrupt the on-going civil unrest resulting from the country's economic collapse, a crisis to which profligate Olympic spending contributed. At the very least, events such as the 2010 World Cup are often shielded from public scrutiny by the claims of 'security', which circumvents much-needed discussions on consequences, expenditures and desirability. Academic research can contribute to this discussion by taking a more explicitly political approach which demystifies security and its spatial and social manifestations. This requires a more critical stance towards official statements about 'modernity' and 'efficiency' in order to discuss the realities and human consequences of what is done in the name of security. In conclusion, this thesis calls for a study of security and power which does not rely on the often stupefying and amorphous concepts of 'legacies', 'crime control' and 'national security', which are used too frequently by the state to contain and pacify critical analysis. Instead, this calls for a focus on the structures of security politics and its hold over urban space and everyday life.

Further Research

Such an approach also indicates further avenues of possible research which were not covered within the confines of this thesis. For example, there is much need for a comprehensive, city-by-city survey of how the security preparations for the 2010 World Cup impacted on on-going local projects and political struggles. For example, in the case of Cape Town, the residents of the Symphony Way informal settlement resisted attempts to move them into Blikkiesdorp by occupying a nearby road in Delft for 21 months, the longest political action of its kind in South African history (Symphony Way Pavement Dwellers, 2011). The city was warned by residents that uprooting people to an anonymous settlement with few economic opportunities would lead to an outbreak of gang-related violence, which has indeed been the case, suggesting that greater focus can be placed on how security may often be bought at the expense of creating insecurity on the 'periphery'. There is also space to explore how mega-events may embolden elite crime, particularly in corruption and abuse of public funds. The coming years will also provide further opportunities both to track long-term impacts within South African cities and to compare this experience with the procedures which will be unveiled at future FIFA World Cup tournaments in Brazil, Russia and Qatar.

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