

**THE POWER OF HEGEMONIC THEORY  
IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: WHY LESOTHO  
CANNOT DEVELOP AN INDEPENDENT  
FOREIGN POLICY**

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**Note: The thesis relies heavily on the use of endnotes to supply additional information. The reason for this decision is to avoid distorting the flow of the arguments raised in the thesis.**

## **List of Abbreviations**

ANC – African National Congress

AU – African Union

BCP – Basotholand Congress Party

BDF – Botswana Defence Force

BNP – Basotho National Party

DRC – Democratic Republic of Congo

FPTP – First Past the Post

GDP – Gross Domestic Product

GNP – Gross National Product

HIV/AIDS – Human Immune Virus /Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome

IEC – Independent Electoral Commission

IPA – Interim Political Authority

LCD – Lesotho Congress of Democracy

LDF – Lesotho Defence Force

LHWP –Lesotho Highlands Water Project

LLA – Lesotho Liberation Army

MFP – Marema Tlou Freedom Party

MMP – Mixed Proportional Representation

NSS – Lesotho National Security Service

NUL – National University of Lesotho

PR – Proportional Representation

RSA – Republic of South Africa

SACU – Southern African Custom's Union

SADC – Southern African Development Community

SANDF – South African National Defence Force

UNO – United Nations Organization

USA – United States of America

# CHAPTER ONE

## Introduction

Hegemonic theory instructs us that boundaries are normal, natural and necessary for us because we are different.<sup>1</sup> Boundaries assist in maintaining this difference. This makes hegemonic theory a powerful ideology. What hegemonic theory cannot interrogate however, is what difference it would make if people who are already different in their thinking, behaviour and many other aspects, even if they are of the same race, live together. In holding that boundaries are normal, natural and necessary, hegemonic theory seeks to include what is necessary and to exclude what is not necessary to maintain the dominant mode of production. This may be viewed as an act of concealment. Furthermore, hegemonic theory fails to explain that what is excluded is regarded as a threat to that which is included in order to perpetuate domination and subordination. In analysing the essence of hegemonic theory, critical theory exposes its (hegemonic theory) class character, the fact that it conceals domination and subordination. It is within this context that the ruling class in Lesotho insists that the Basotho nation needs to keep its sovereign state as a source of cultural identity,<sup>2</sup> despite the large percentage of Basotho living in South Africa.

This thesis critiques hegemonic theory – especially the impact of a hegemonic state on the ability of small states to develop an independent foreign policy. The research uses Lesotho as a case study of a subordinate state in relation to the Republic of South Africa (RSA) as a hegemonic state. It draws on the history of Lesotho's quest for sovereignty and argues that

this sovereignty is constantly eroded to the advantage of its hegemonic neighbour. This constrains Lesotho's ability to develop an independent foreign policy.

The thesis's analytic tool is critical theory as interpreted by Robert Cox. Critical theory questions the epistemological (source of knowledge) and ontological (nature of being) foundations of the existing social order. The central claim of critical theory is that knowledge is historically and politically based. This theory challenges the existing theoretical traditions and rejects International Relations as a discrete field of inquiry and seeks to situate it in the wider intellectual context of social, political, cultural, philosophical and literary studies. So, critical theory challenges conventional theories<sup>3</sup> which are rooted in maintaining the existing state system. It deconstructs the conventional theory by opening up possibilities for social and political transformation. Therefore, critical theory exposes the injustices and inequalities embedded in the prevailing order because it analyses the social basis of knowledge, power and values. In this manner critical theory has an emancipatory and empowerment character.<sup>4</sup>

Critical theory has its genesis in the writings of Kant and Hegel.<sup>5</sup> Engels and Marx expanded on the ideas of these philosophers and developed an influential theory, Marxism. Marxism is composed of two interrelated parts, – dialectical materialism and historical materialism. Dialectical materialism is a theory of social consciousness; historical materialism deals with social development.<sup>6</sup>

Within the broad theory of Marxism other paradigms have developed. Gramsci's critique of hegemonic theory, for instance, was developed on the foundations set by Marxism.<sup>7</sup> In the mid-1980s various types of critical theories which challenged the established schools of thought in International Relations appeared.<sup>8</sup> Robert Cox's (1996) critical theory is one of these. Critical theory is associated with the twentieth century body of thought known as the Frankfurt School – which was also influenced by Marxism, and expands upon Gramsci's critique of hegemonic theory of social development. Gramsci's critique analyses the existing world order tracing its origins. It questions the origins of the social institutions in conjunction with the social power that constructed them. It views social power, its institutions and the world order as interrelated and interdependent phenomena. The three social processes are analysed through an historic perspective because history is seen as a motor of change. The theory views the conjuncture of power and knowledge as an integral part of the process of theorising.<sup>9</sup>

This interdependence between social power, its institutions and world order are crucial to this thesis because this research highlights the social content of class formation in Lesotho. Furthermore, the thesis sheds light on how the interests of this dominant class correlate with the interests of the ruling class in South Africa and those of the dominant mode of production. The thesis shows how social institutions within Lesotho are used to support the dominance of the ruling class. It furthermore shows that the world order is hierarchical and Lesotho occupies a subordinate place within this order, making it subordinate to the Republic of South Africa (RSA) at the regional level. On the other hand the RSA uses its hegemonic power and influence

on Lesotho to create behaviour and expectations consistent with its hegemonic interests.

### **The concept of hegemony**

In International Relations the concept of hegemony has no agreed historical context. This is due to the fact that there are two mainstream schools of thought that apply this concept to two completely different circumstances. Both Neo-Realists<sup>10</sup> and Historical Materialists<sup>11</sup> agree that hegemony is not a historic accident but a social phenomenon that results from a social conditions – both trace the roots of hegemony to state domination. However, the two schools of thought differ in terms of the circumstances in which the concept applies. Realism, for instance, holds that hegemony comes as a result of anarchic international relations that requires power to bring about world order.

For its part Historical Materialism holds that hegemony is traced from a mode of production that serves a particular class and that there is an economically dominant state system that is served by modes of production. As other states emulate the behaviour and expectations consistent with the needs of the dominant state in this system, order is brought into a world system. This thesis seeks to adopt this version of Historical Materialist.

The concept, “hegemon” was first used by the Italian Communist Party leader Antonio Gramsci. There are two main sources in Gramsci’s idea of hegemony (in Cox and Sinclair, 1996). First, in the Third International, Lenin talks about Russian Revolution and the role played by the classes and groups that participated in it. He highlights the role of the working class, the

peasantry and other groups, with similar interests. He refers to the working class as the “dictatorship of the proletariat”;<sup>12</sup> referring further to the Russian proletariat as both a dominant and a directing class. Dominance here implies dictatorship while direction implies leadership with the consent of an allied class, notably the peasantry. Deriving “hegemon” from this context, Gramsci suggests that leadership with consent means hegemony of the working class over the other classes and groups supportive of revolutionary change.

Using this as analogy, Gramsci applies the term to completely different conditions of social change. He looks at the revolutionary changes in Northern Europe in countries that had entrenched the capitalist mode of production. Here, the bourgeois class, the petty bourgeois class, the working class and other social groups united against the feudal system. As the leading class, the bourgeois class played a hegemonic role in this process. The comparison of the revolutions in Northern Europe and Russia is very important to this thesis because it is used as a means to analyse the correlation of social forces in Lesotho and to reveal which class is hegemonic and how it transforms the society from a feudal system to a capitalist mode of production.

Lesotho is predominantly an agrarian country where the majority of the population are peasants. This means that its level of development is, by and large, at the feudal stage. At the same time, however, the country is dominated by a capitalist mode of production. So, elements of the petty bourgeois class are transforming Lesotho into a later stage of the capitalist mode of production. Therefore, the correlation of classes in Lesotho are the

petty bourgeois, the working class, the landlords, the peasants and other social groups. I will argue that these classes are united against the feudal system. As the leading class the petty bourgeois class plays a hegemonic role in this transformation.<sup>13</sup>

Gramsci further argues that the conditions for hegemonic classes differ. Comparing the conditions in Russia and Northern Europe, he argues that in the former, the conditions for the capitalist mode of production were relatively well developed. The result was a small working class. Because of an undeveloped social democracy to sustain a socialist system, the peasants did not accept socialism. The working class could therefore not take on the role of a hegemonic class. Faced with a developed capitalist mode of production, the bourgeois class played a hegemonic role because the conditions for capitalist development were mature, and social democracy which preserve socialism, was acceptable to the workers and the petty bourgeoisie. Within this form of hegemony, the bourgeoisie was so firmly entrenched in civil society, that it did not often need itself to run the state. Instead the landed aristocracy could do it for them. The state management was conditional on the aristocracy recognising that the hegemonic structures of the civil society would constrain their political action.

In Lesotho, with its low level of a capitalist mode of production, the hegemony of the petty bourgeois is not complete since social democracy is not accepted by the working class, the peasants and other social groups. So, the hegemony of the petty bourgeoisie is not entrenched in the civil society. Therefore, the hegemonic class has to participate directly in running the

state. This point will be examined in more detail later in the thesis in Chapter Four.

Gramsci's analysis led him to the conclusion that the state is not only composed of the three power apparatus – administrative, executive, and coercive; it also includes the underpinnings of the political structure in civil society. This was the church, the education system, the press and all institutions which helped to create in people certain modes of behaviour and expectations consistent with the hegemonic social order.<sup>14</sup> In this fashion, the bourgeois class easily played the hegemonic role because the necessary conditions for the capitalist mode of production were ripe.

This apart, the whole society had accepted the values compatible with a hegemonic class. So, the state apparatus served the hegemonic class without its direct participation in the state – this, as will be shown, is different from what will be discussed with regard to the Russian Revolution. Furthermore, in Northern Europe coercion was not used as the system was initially not opposed. This situation differs from the situation in Lesotho because administrative, executive and coercive apparatus – apart from other underpinnings of political structure in civil society – have not been entrenched in Lesotho. As a result, people in Lesotho do not behave in a manner consistent with the expectations of the hegemonic class. This is the reason why coercion is indispensable to Lesotho as we shall see in Chapter Four.

Analysing the conditions that ushered in the Bolshevik Revolution, Gramsci concludes that the hegemony of the working class was not entrenched in the

civil society. Modes of behaviour and expectations were not consistent with the working class's hegemony. As a result, the hegemonic class had to run the state in alliance with other classes. In this way, the state apparatus had to be in the hands of the hegemonic class to secure its leadership. Furthermore, since the conditions for a social democratic revolution were not fully ripe, coercive powers had to be used because there were elements within the society which were opposed to the system.

In Lesotho the state has a narrow base as an instrument of power for the ruling class or classes against the other classes. Likewise, the state is used to guide the creation of institutions that will enhance certain modes of behaviour and expectations that are consistent with the hegemonic social order. As in Russia, the hegemony of the petty bourgeois is not fully developed in Lesotho since the development of capitalism is not at the level where the petty bourgeois is in majority. So, the state has a narrow base because the hegemonic class has not entrenched values. The state is an instrument of the hegemonic class but not of the entire society.

Gramsci's use of the concept of hegemony also came from Machiavelli.<sup>15</sup> The latter looks at power as a combination of consent and coercion. In explaining these, Machiavelli observes that coercion is always latent but is only applied in marginal or deviant cases. So hegemony is sufficient to ensure conformity of behaviour in most people most of the time. Gramsci suggests that Machiavelli was giving hegemony a wider meaning by removing it from a narrow sense of specific social classes and placing it along side dominance and subordination.<sup>16</sup>

This wider meaning liberates hegemony from the narrow class context at the national level, drawing it towards the level of state domination in the international arena. This is important in the context of South Africa's relations with Lesotho and we shall see how this is contextualised under the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) in Chapter Three. What is new in this example is the idea of coercion – the intention to subordinate. This suggests that the hegemon does not rely on suppressive measures all the time but only in certain circumstances. The role of applying other methods by the hegemon apart from coercion is also considered in Chapter Four by the South African government facilitating discussion between the Lesotho's government and opposition.

Gramsci was able to use the two origins of hegemony – Leninist and Machiavellian – and merge them. Applying them to Russia, Gramsci draws the conclusion that the working class had to apply limited coercion against rebellious elements, while building consent with co-operating classes. As we have already noted, these two meanings of hegemony have relevance in the case of Lesotho's hegemonic class and of South Africa as the hegemonic state. We shall see how coercion is applied in a limited manner by the petty bourgeois in Lesotho with the assistance of the regional hegemon, South Africa. At the same time we shall also see how the petty bourgeois class build consent with co-operating classes in Lesotho.

### **Knowledge and hegemonic power subordination**

Gramsci also underlines the role of knowledge in supporting and sustaining hegemonic power. In forging a link between knowledge and power, critical theory argues that knowledge is intertwined with a mode of thinking that is

conditioned by particular interests. Not only does critical theory trace knowledge from history, but it questions how forms of knowledge come into being arguing that power has a direct influence on the type of knowledge needed. So, a particular mode of thinking needs the type of knowledge that will support it and sustain it. This suggests that the content of knowledge differs with the different perspectives that informed it.

To understand this we need to connect values and interests with the operation of power in the process of deriving knowledge. So, power is derived from certain social interests. For the establishment of power there is a need for ideas that will sustain it – and these ideas are derived from specific forms of knowledge. Furthermore, knowledge is a crucial reserve of political power. There is a general consistency between modes of interpretation and the operation of power. It is important therefore to find out what kind of knowledge is given by the present world order. Critical theory argues that knowledge is interpreted according to the way the domain<sup>17</sup> needs it. This means that it is diluted by the interests and values of the dominant mode of production.

These ideas are applied to Basotho struggling against territorial loss to the white settler farmers in the Free State in 1849 to 1858. In Chapter Two we will explore how the British colonial power used forms of knowledge to exercise social control. The introduction of institutions – like colonial education and religion in Lesotho – instilled forms of behaviour and instilled expectations which are consistent with the dominant mode of production. In consequence, the Basotho accepted this type of knowledge as progressive. This was the beginning of British hegemonic subordination of Lesotho. This

was not a subjective choice but rather reflected Lesotho's desire to act according to the wishes of the British colonial power. How this condition benefited, or eroded, early forms of Lesotho nationhood will also be dealt with in Chapter Two.

Furthermore, in order to explain the power of hegemony, critical theory analyses such concepts as violence, boundaries, identity, statecraft and sovereignty as central themes to conceal the essence of hegemony. Critical theory suggests that states rely on violence to constitute themselves while strategic violence in turn helps them to constitute themselves. Strategic violence is an ongoing process of defining state boundaries, excluding that which differs from the hegemon and punishing those who would challenge it.<sup>18</sup>

Critical theory also interrogates the origin of the concept of boundaries by questioning the partition of the global geographic space into political units, while observing that boundaries are always particular modes of subjectivity that seem to have been replicated in a similar way throughout the world.<sup>19</sup> It further analyses the consequences of this partitioning, questioning the division of the world into "us" and "them" and arguing that this division is a source of domination and subordination.

Critical theory also scrutinises the concept of identity by observing that boundaries are fundamental to a modernity predicated on discrete containers in order to exercise particular forms of control and politics. Such formulations of identity and difference are fundamental to the structuring of a state system which simultaneously domesticates and excludes. The

territorial division which produces state identity is a constructed “self” against a threatening “other”. So, boundaries and identity of the sovereign state are responsible for the creation of the international anarchy which is routinised by the notion of sovereignty which turns on “self” and “other”.

In sum, critical theory suggests that violence, boundaries and identity contribute to a particular form of the sovereign state.<sup>20</sup> It is concerned with how prevailing modes of subjectivity neutralise (or conceal) their arbitrariness by projecting an image of normalcy, naturalness or necessity in professing statecraft. This point is important for our purposes because it questions the relevance of the existence of the idea of sovereignty between Lesotho and RSA particularly when the greater portion of Basotho live in South Africa. At the same time, critical theory suggests that sovereignty serves a certain class while concealing forms of domination and subordination. We return to these ideas in Chapter Two.

### **Critical theory, hegemonic knowledge and elites**

In emphasising the importance of ideas in revolutionary change Gramsci raises issues around the formation of the hegemonic class and the role played by intellectuals in bringing together classes which share common interests. As a classless social stratum, intellectuals play an important role in building an historic bloc by developing and sustaining the mental images, technologies and organisations which bind together the members of a class into a common identity.<sup>21</sup> Intellectuals have the advantage of exposure to different fields which they use to organise the classes in pursuing revolutionary goals.

Gramsci argues that the intellectual stratum gradually develops a clear distinctive culture, organisation and technique and does so in constant interaction with the members of the emergent bloc. In most cases, intellectuals are exposed to the ideas of liberation, first, because their access to education happens earlier than it does for any other members of the society. As a result intellectuals come to dominate the ideological directions of political parties. After liberation, this stratum forms the nucleus of the bourgeois class that will ultimately collaborate at regional and international level to advocate the interests of the domain as the hegemonic class.

In African liberation movements, intellectuals have played a decisive role by uniting the masses of the people – often from different classes – against colonial powers. So, they played a decisive role in forming the main parties in Lesotho and in transforming the ruling class by linking their interests with the regional hegemony. This we shall come to see in both Chapters Three and Four.

### **State hegemony at international level**

After exploring the application of hegemony at class level, critical theory carries the concept to international level. Here critical theory confirms that the state is the basic entity in international relations and simultaneously suggests that this is where social conflicts take place and where hegemonies of social classes can be built. It argues further that the state at international level is an enlarged state because the ruling classes at national level merge their interests at the international arena. Therefore, states with similar interests serve the same mode of production at the international level and reinforce the same hegemonic discourse. The hegemonic discourse thus

appears to represent one enlarged state. Gramsci cites the example of Italy which was a smaller power dependent on larger powers. He observes that at the foreign-policy level great powers have relative freedom to determine their foreign policies in response to domestic interests while smaller powers have less autonomy. This is because the economic life of subordinate nations is penetrated by and intertwined with that of powerful nations.<sup>22</sup>

Gramsci's observation on the relationship between Italy and great powers can be applied to the relationship between Lesotho and the RSA. Because of its economic might the RSA is the hegemon in the region. So, the RSA has relative freedom to determine its foreign policy in response to its domestic interests. In their relationship, Lesotho is a small power dependent on the RSA because its economic life is subordinated to, penetrated by and intertwined with that of the regional hegemon. As we shall see in both Chapters Three and Four Lesotho has less autonomy in the determination of its foreign policy.

Critical theory argues that powerful states have invariably undergone profound social and economic revolution and have worked out the results of the revolution in the form of state and social relations. These are all nation-based developments which have spilled over national boundaries to become internationally expansive phenomena. Other countries then passively absorb the impact of these developments.<sup>23</sup> So, the social values of the hegemonic class in one state are so entrenched in that society that they become models for emulation by other states. However, emulating states do not themselves undergo the same social revolution – they copy the values of the hegemonic state while holding on to their old norms.

Lesotho's capitalist transformation strongly emulates the values of the RSA: these are seen in political practices like democratic elections, implementation of local government, and other processes. However, Lesotho continues to uphold old values such as the monarchy, the important role of the chiefs in local government, and land allocation and confiscation by the chiefs.

Critical theory claims that the hegemonic concept of world order is founded not only upon the regulation of inter-state conflict but also derives from a globally conceived civil society which brings about links among social classes of all countries. Gramsci agrees with the Neo-Realist that hegemony eliminates conflict.<sup>24</sup> While Neo-Realism argues that hegemony eliminates conflict through military law enforcement, Gramsci argues that conflict is resolved through observing the same rules as that of the hegemonic state. In other words, when there is a common understanding of and respect for rules by all nations which conform to the idea of one global nation conflict resolution occurs. This can only happen when the dominant mode of production has linked all social classes.

The 2002 elections in Lesotho took place because of preparations made by the Interim Political Authority (IPA) and the South African government, as we shall see in Chapter Four. Through the influence of the RSA, the IPA sought to pave the way both for peaceful elections and for the acceptance of the results. By promoting the acceptance of the rules for democracy, the regional hegemon was linking Lesotho to its own political policies.

Gramsci argues that while peripheral countries may adopt some economic and cultural aspects of the hegemonic core they are less able to adopt its political models. For our purposes, the crux of the issue is that the political level of development in these countries referred to by Gramsci has not yet reached the level of the hegemonic core. For instance, some countries are still at the feudal mode of production, others are in the semi-feudal and semi-capitalist mode while others are at a very low level of the capitalist development mode. Therefore, not all countries can copy and apply the same political models of the hegemonic core because they do not have the necessary structures. These can only be built when they undergo the same social revolutionary change. Besides, the political structures in these countries deal with completely different issues from that of the hegemonic core. So, political structures in these countries reflect the economic base of the peripheries.

Critical theory argues that hegemony at the international level is not merely an order among states. It is an order within a world economy with a dominant mode of production which penetrates all countries and links into other subordinate modes of production. It is also a complex of international social relationships which connect the social classes of the different countries. As Historical Materialists, critical theorists can only see order within a world economy. This happens when the subordinate modes of production follow the same patterns of economy as that of the dominant mode. Furthermore, similar economic patterns will lead to relative order in economic spheres as countries will agree on the same economic rules.

Gramsci concludes that world hegemony can be described as a social structure, an economic structure, and a political structure. Thus, it cannot be simply one of these things but must be all three. Furthermore, world hegemony is expressed in universal norms, institutions and mechanisms which lay down general rules of behaviour for states and for those forces of civil society that act across national boundaries as rules which support the dominant mode of production.

This has lessons for southern Africa, where the leadership of the RSA is trying to introduce a similar economic order in the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) as well as in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and, in all probability, the same pattern will be seen in African Union (AU).

### **Summary**

The chapter has shown how the power of hegemony manifests at the national level in the form of a hegemonic class and how the allied classes are subordinated to the interests of the dominant class. It has also shown how at regional level a regional power behaves in accordance with the global mode of production and leads other subordinate regional states. Lastly, it has indicated how the hegemonic state sets rules in accordance with its interests, and how the subordinate states emulate behaviour in the interest of the world hegemony.

Given these different levels of operation of the hegemonic power, and the context of this research it is vital to look at how the Basotho nation was

formed and how state sovereignty was crafted and what impact hegemony had in this process. The following chapter will explore these issues.

## CHAPTER TWO

### **The concept of sovereignty**

Sovereignty is one of the most contested concepts in International Relations. Many authors have written about its application in practice approaching it from Neo-Realist, Neo-Liberalist and Marxist points of view<sup>1</sup>. Sovereignty<sup>2</sup> is defined as the state's claim on two aspects: internal and external. In respect of the internal aspect sovereignty means supreme decision-making and enforcement authority with regard to a particular territory and population. External sovereignty means the absence of a superior international authority and this enforces the independence of the sovereign state.<sup>3</sup> This definition plainly implies that sovereign states have no limits to their behaviour. It further suggests that states have the absolute right to go to war in order to pursue their interests,<sup>4</sup> and that they can govern people within their domestic jurisdiction without external influence. However, in practice, states are interdependent and their behaviour in international organisations suggests that the absolute sovereign right of states is limited. States are also signatories to certain conventions that tie them to international law and determine their relations with other countries as well as to good behaviour towards citizens within their own jurisdiction. So, no state is impenetrable; in other words every state has its sovereignty curtailed.

Although it seems that there are some limitations to the power of the state, there are states that are more powerful than others. It has already been observed elsewhere in this thesis that the international system is hierarchical. Some states operate on a higher echelon, and others in a lower part of the hierarchy – plainly these do not occupy the same position. As a general rule

the more developed the state the higher its hierarchical position. More developed states are hegemonic in relation to other states. In terms of rights to action, the hegemonic state has more power than other states. This inequality between states is interrogated by critical theory because it points the essence of the concept of sovereignty. Sovereignty in this context, then, represents the interests of the dominant state and therefore it has a class character.

Tracing the concept of sovereignty from an historic perspective, critical theories conclude that it is a Western concept which originates from the Treaty of Westphalia<sup>5</sup> and that it was brought to Africa by colonial powers. The latter aimed to divide Africa into sovereign territories with the intention of dominating and subordinating the continent. This would enable the colonists to support a particular mode of production within and between divisions.

This analysis is best understood within a Foucaultian framework that knowledge is dictated by the power of the day and that it is diluted or influenced by values, norms and beliefs of the same power. The concept of sovereignty should therefore be understood within the context of the logical interdependence and mutual influence between sovereignty and the power that created it – so, sovereignty gives birth to power, and power has specific interests that have to be supported by knowledge. Therefore power determines knowledge. Without supportive knowledge, sovereignty cannot sustain the power of the day and vice versa. Furthermore, the domain selects knowledge as it simultaneously hides other forms of knowledge that it

deems unnecessary for its purposes. So, critical theory suggests that hidden forms of knowledge about sovereignty are not made available to us.

Within the dialectic between the concepts of “power”, “knowledge” and “sovereignty”, Cynthia Weber (1996) observes that different modes of power and knowledge give rise to different conceptions of sovereignty.<sup>6</sup> So, sovereignty as a concept is embedded in different domains of knowledge. The present international system is formed on concrete territorial divisions called states which, by their nature, are phenomena of inclusion and exclusion. These inclusions and exclusions because they reflect different interests, often result in violence. As argued in the previous chapter, this violence defines state boundaries, excluding that which differs from its domain and punishing those who challenge it. Weber’s analysis is important for our purposes because it shows that there are different modes of knowledge that give rise to different conceptions of sovereignty: Weber’s analysis suggests that if there is sovereignty that supports the state system there can be sovereignty that supports people-oriented aims. The latter is emancipatory in nature.<sup>7</sup> In Southern Africa, this view is confirmed by the analyses of Khabele Matlosa (2001) and Peter Vale (2003).<sup>8</sup>

Matlosa argues that sovereignty should mean the well-being of the people. He suggests that in their struggle for daily survival the people of southern Africa go to the extreme of bypassing the jurisdictional and spatial confines of the nation-state, thus increasingly rendering it irrelevant to their well-being.<sup>9</sup> In other words, Matlosa, like Weber, sees people’s sovereignty as more important than the present state system that is cast by national boundaries.

Vale shares this view arguing that the well-being of the people of the southern region lies not in the notion of state sovereignty, but rather in the idea of a regional community that is based on shared concerns which are not territorially bound.<sup>10</sup> The arguments raised by Matlosa and Vale are valuable for this work because they view sovereignty from a perspective other than that of the state system.

By critically analysing Lesotho's sovereignty, and by revisiting the notion of sovereignty from a critical constructivist view the concept can be understood from a different angle than that dictated by the domain. This explanation will ultimately answer the main question as to whether, under the impact of the hegemon, power is "whittling"<sup>11</sup> or "strengthening."<sup>12</sup>

Having seen how the concept of sovereignty is traditionally applied to safeguard the interests of a particular class, critical theory with its people-centred approach will now be used to interrogate the concept using Lesotho as a case study. My focus is on the formation of the Basotho nation and I will show how the nation existed before the introduction of state sovereignty and its colonial territorial demarcations. My purpose is to show how people-oriented sovereignty differs from state-oriented sovereignty.

Based on human emancipation, critical theory argues that people-oriented sovereignty should serve the interests of the people by questioning the essence (and the impact) of the boundaries and analyse what impact these have on the lives of the people. Arguing from the premise that a pre-colonial society in southern Africa existed without territorial demarcations, critical

theorists suggest that people were free to live wherever they could find a better source of living.

The formation of sovereign states in the southern region was a carefully crafted British colonial project with the purpose of enhancing the development of capitalism in southern Africa – South Africa was to be the center of the imperial project. Therefore, the purpose of statecraft in the other countries of the region aimed to support South African industries and particularly to provide much-needed cheap labour. As South Africa's industrial development provided the idea of creating states in the region, it is crucial to start with this issue in order to see how it contributed to the development of Basotho statecraft.

### **Mineral discovery and statehood in southern Africa**

The so-called Great Trek between 1836 to 1838 resulted in Afrikaner' conquest of two territories – namely the South African Republic (later renamed Transvaal) and the Orange River Sovereignty (later called Orange Free State). In these, the Afrikaners meant formally independent of the Cape rule and were free to continue their farming activities. However, the discovery of minerals in Kimberly in 1867 and on the Witwatersrand in 1884 resulted in more commercial-type farming to feed the increasing population around the mining industries. The construction of the railways which linked the mining areas with the seaports further changed an essentially agrarian economy into a modern economy which relied on cheap migrant labour.

The freedom of movement for the region's people in search of employment was not controlled since there were no territorial restrictions. It was however based on a common interest in finding a place that could provide a means of livelihood. The cross-regional movement of workers forged a link between people from different corners of the region: this enabled the development of a single community which allowed for a cross-pollination of culture and led to the development of a new language. Industrial centers became homes for migrating workers of the region.

Economic development in the Boer states did not only attract black people. It also attracted the interest of the British-oriented Cape government which wanted to unify this region rich in minerals. Because of these imperial interests, it was crucial to conquer all of southern Africa before other colonial powers could do so.<sup>13</sup> To this end, the British colonial power felt that the economic development of those places that were considered unlikely to have mineral resources should be hindered. The motive was that these areas would assist the main center of the regional economy, South Africa, by supplying it with cheap labour.<sup>14</sup> For the colonial power, it was imperative to unite the Boer republics with the Cape and Natal to form a unitary state. This state would then serve as an economic center to which the rest of the region would contribute.

The efforts to unite the Republics initially failed and culminated in two further Anglo-Boer Wars – the battle of 1887 in which the British were defeated, and the Anglo-Boer war of 1899 to 1902 which the Boers lost. The latter culminated in the Treaty of Vereeniging in May, 1902 and led to the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910,<sup>15</sup> – an event that led to the

quest for more minerals<sup>16</sup> and territorial conquest, especially of Southern Rhodesia.<sup>17</sup>

This discovery had resulted in the formation of two blocks in the southern region. The first was coalesced around South Africa, which brought the neighbouring countries (then called Bechuanaland, Basotholand, Swaziland and later South West Africa) under South African control. The second bloc formed around Southern Rhodesia. This was also intended to benefit white minority rule and encompassed Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.<sup>18</sup> However, the development of the railways led to South Africa, with its better-developed harbour system, becoming the hub of the routes leading to the outside world. This was the beginning of South Africa's regional domination not only transport, but also of other spheres, as the region's economy became dependent on South Africa.

The economic growth of the Union meant a decline in the conditions of life in the neighbouring territories, particularly a decline in agricultural productivity. As a result there was a massive migrant labour flow into South Africa as people went in search of jobs in its industries. This labour flow deprived other countries of manpower while it boosted the South African economy by providing unskilled labour. In this fashion, unequal economic growth developed in the region with the South African economy prospering while the economy of the neighbouring territories went into decline.<sup>19</sup>

The rise of South Africa brought about the end of traditional agrarian way of life in the region. Ironically, however, this modern state (with its powerful economy) became a place of hope notwithstanding its endemic racist

practice. The Union's modern economic development became a future regional model of growth for these neighbouring territories. South Africa dominated the region in every field of modern development; hence it became the regional power and, ultimately, hegemonic.

The formation of the Union of South Africa saw the birth of the region's first modern state which possessed a sound economic base. This act set the course for future political and economic development in southern Africa. This was because the political aspect of the traditional way of ruling through chieftainship constantly replaced or mixed with the modern type of rule through elected representation. On the other hand the traditional way of live – the dependence on subsistence farming – was destroyed because people were attracted by the modern cash economy. Because of these two factors regional people admired South Africa as both a model of political and economic development (hegemonic impact). Furthermore, the British colonisation also destroyed the traditional political and economic structures so that the region could merge into the modern South African structures.

The formation of South Africa sealed the colonial interests between Brit and Boer in a state which was based on colour rather than on class – state institutions entrenched white domination by excluding the black people not only in South Africa but also in the region. This was the beginning of control over the movement of the region's people into South Africa where employment was plentiful. The mechanism for this was the introduction of passes<sup>20</sup> which regulated the movement of the region's people into South Africa and controlled the movement of black South Africans.

Earlier in this thesis the question of authority and sovereignty was raised as a problematic issue. John Boli's (2001) assertion that people's authority equals sovereignty is here refuted,<sup>21</sup> as this research will argue that the majority of the black people in the Union were excluded from its politics. The exclusionist character of the South African state is evident in its use of political power to control the movement of the black people. White people on the other hand were exempted from these restrictions. How did the formation of the Basotho nation fit into this political project?

### **The formation of the Basotho nation**

At present Lesotho is a tiny mountainous kingdom completely surrounded by the Republic of South Africa. Its present boundaries were inherited from the British colony which was called Basotholand. Some statistics are informative: Lesotho has a land area of 30,350 square kilometers and a population of 2.2 million, 13% of its land is arable, notwithstanding that 90% of its population depends on agriculture for survival.<sup>22</sup> Lesotho's economic and political situation should be viewed geo-politically – a landlocked and small state dwarfed by a regional power – economically, politically and militarily.<sup>23</sup>

Historical and social theory offer further insights into the formation of Lesotho and its place in southern Africa. As Foucault argues, violence and statehood are interrelated; there is no state without violence.<sup>24</sup> The formation of the Basotho nation was initiated by the internecine Difaqane wars in the 1820s. The founder of the Basotho nation, Moshoeshoe I, took advantage of the violence, by providing sanctuary for people who had been scattered and

who were searching for security; they joined him, and contributed to the formation of the Basotho nation.

The people who make up the Basotho nation, belong to the Bantu people who migrated to Central, Eastern and Southern Africa from Western Africa.<sup>25</sup> They later split into a number of smaller communities. There were cultural and linguistic similarities between the smaller groups that later formed the two nations – Batswana and Basotho. The Nguni speaking communities, in spite of cultural distinctiveness, also joined in the formation of the Basotho nation.<sup>26</sup> They were allowed to maintain their language and culture, however Sesotho remained the dominant language. This shows the inclusive character of the pre-colonial Basotho nation.

The regrouping of the small communities that later formed the Basotho nation is traced to the early 1820s, beginning with the Difaqane which started in 1818.<sup>27</sup> The Sotho people occupied territory on the western side of the Drakensburg in small chiefdoms under different leaders. They needed a strong and visionary leader who could unite and organise them against the Nguni threat. That leadership was provided by Moshoeshoe I. The social environment in which he was raised influenced his style of leadership and determined his style in the decision-making process.<sup>28</sup>

Moshoeshoe I united communities fleeing without animals. He lent them cattle under the *mafisa*<sup>29</sup> system – each man took cattle and became responsible for the care and well-being of the animals, receiving in exchange the right to their milk and some of their offsprings.

The *mafisa* system was very important in attracting communities who were driven off their land and who had left behind crops and animals as they escaped, defeated by the war. Once these communities had settled among his people, Moshoeshoe I encouraged intermarriage so that their assimilation could be entrenched. He set an example himself and married daughters of some of the chiefs under his rule, giving his own daughters for marriage to some of the chiefs.

By the early 1830s Moshoeshoe I had secured a vast territory from the south west of the present Lesotho, covering the following territories: Kraai River, Aliwal North, Bethuli, Thaba-nchu, Mekoatleng, Merumotso, Hlohloloane and Joalaboholo.<sup>30</sup> He left most of these territories under the leadership of his subordinate chiefs and this became problematic.

There was a problem with autonomy because some of the chiefs were outside the immediate control of Moshoeshoe and enjoyed extensive freedom. Their loyalty to him was a matter of convenience – an assurance for their security in case they were attacked. Being situated far away from Moshoeshoe I gave them ample freedom and made them less dependent on him. The extent of the Basotho territory under Moshoeshoe I could be determined by the location of chiefdoms that paid allegiance to him. How does this pre-colonial nationhood differ from the concept of modern statehood?

The allegiance to a particular nation was based on the provision of security. Security in this context meant the ability to provide appropriate conditions

for living. This security was also important because it was not based on exclusion but on voluntary association. Any individual or group of people who wanted to be part of the community was free to join it. However, in the modern context, conceptualisation of the state boundaries is constructed to exclude others. Sovereignty in the modern context means the dislodging and dislocation of other people. The concept in practice evolves securing the powerful and threatening the weak, as we shall see in the case of the Basotho and the formation of the Orange River Sovereignty for the Afrikaners on their territory. This is later discussed in this chapter.

It is also important within this context of pre-colonial statehood to note that it was a matter of choice and convenience for people to choose whether to be included or excluded in a territory. It is critical to see how this flexibility in claims to identity took a new form with the introduction of modern political concepts and the practice of state sovereignty.

### **Lesotho's statecraft**

The expansion of white Settler communities from the Cape colony into the interior of South Africa in the 1830s posed a new threat to Moshoeshoe's territory and forced him to make land concessions. But Moshoeshoe I took advantage of the conflict between the British and the Boers. His request for British protection was motivated by Britain's preponderant power in 19<sup>th</sup> century in southern Africa. As a hegemonic state, Britain's most influential value to the Basotho nation was the acknowledgement of the need for security. Security was knitted with the concept of religion and this combination was one of the modes of knowledge used by the imperial power.

As Gramsci states, institutions like the church, the educational system and the press play a key role in the propagation of the hegemonic ideology. They lead people to accept the prevailing social order. For example, the church's message of peace, harmony, truth, knowledge and respect for political authority fostered Basotho acceptance of British hegemony.

These modes of behavior and expectations (which Gramsci refers to as an enlarged definition of a state) prepared the Basotho for adapting to British hegemony, particularly in the absence of a state apparatus that would enforce relevant behavior. So, religion as a form of knowledge consistent with the dominant mode of production was accepted as a value that would enlighten the Basotho who were considered barbaric because they did not acknowledge the existence of God. Therefore, believing in God would bring light, peace and security (which the Basotho so much desired). We now analyse to what extent that peace and security was achieved from 1833 when religion was first introduced among the Basotho until 1868 when Basotholand was formally annexed as a British protectorate.

In 1843 the British Cape governor George Napier and Moshoeshe I signed an agreement called the Napier Treaty. Through this Treaty the Cape government recognised Basotho's territorial claim over the land between the Orange (Gariep) and Caledon River, plus a strip of territory from 25 to 30 miles wide along the north side of the Caledon.<sup>31</sup>

The Napier Treaty was the first modern attempt to form boundaries for Basotho. Although this treaty did not include all the territory on which Moshoeshe I had placed chiefs who were his subjects, the Treaty did not

cause much resentment since little land was lost. But the Treaty revealed two basic problems of territorial demarcation by the Europeans. First, it was an imposition on the Basotho because when the decision to draw boundaries was made the Cape did not consult the Basotho as a result some territories that Moshoeshe I claimed for the Basotho (according to the allegiance shown above) were not included in the new territory.

Secondly, the Treaty was unfair because some Basotho were excluded from the territory that they had earlier chosen to be part of. These two issues show how European imposed boundaries are decided to the advantage of the privileged, the powerful and the rich, in this case – the Settlers (by which is meant British and Afrikaners). The native Basotho were deprived of the place of their birth.<sup>32</sup> This calls into question the legitimacy of such a decision. Lastly, the Treaty laid the foundation for more land conquest by the Settlers as they did not respect the agreement and continued to occupy more land.

In theory, the Afrikaners were still considered to be subjects of the Cape government and were aware that whatever territories they gained would be considered as part of the Cape colony. In practice, this gave the Afrikaners the licence to disregard the Treaty. The Settlers disregarded the Treaty because, despite the Cape Colony recognising the Orange River territory as a sovereign state, the territory was regarded as a colony of Britain. This view of sovereignty shows how the concept has changed in its meaning from its Westphalian origin in order to meet the interests of the colonial power. Furthermore, the Cape Colony recognised this ‘false’ sovereignty because what lay beyond its borders was considered as a threat. This recognition of

sovereignty secured the territory because dispute over it meant a challenge to British imperial rule.

The failure of the Cape government to punish the Afrikaners exposed the conspiracy between the Afrikaners and the Cape against the Basotho because the Cape did not exercise its power to stop the Settlers. The next Treaty, the Treaty of Aliwal North, signed by Moshoeshe and the Cape government in 1858 proved this. In this respect the Napier Treaty was a failure in terms of bringing peace to the Basotho nation.

As the territorial clashes continued between the Basotho and the Afrikaners in 1849, the Cape representative at Bloemfontain, Major Warden, decided to draw a new boundary called the Warden line. This boundary gave most of the arable land across the Orange River to the Afrikaners. The Basotho protested against this decision by ignoring the new boundary. The Basotho were not happy with the land concession made to the Settlers. So, the Treaty of Aliwal North was imposed on them in 1858. In 1869 the Treaty was renegotiated and was sealed with an agreement which gives the present boundary of Lesotho.<sup>33</sup>

In 1868 Moshoeshe I requested a direct rule from Britain hoping that this would stop the conspiracy between the Cape government and the Afrikaners. Moshoeshe I was not able to understand the colonial link between the Cape government and the Afrikaners because of the church's message of Britain's desire for peace and security. The 1869 Treaty still gave the Settlers most of the arable land across the Caledon River. The new boundary excluded from Basotholand a population roughly two times more than that included in it.<sup>34</sup>

The issue of the Basotho's quest for peace was fundamental to securing favourable conditions for their survival. As we have seen the colonial power failed to provide this peace. The constant land concessions to the Orange Free State was a threat to the security sought by the Basotho. This confirms the earlier observation from Devetak<sup>35</sup> that boundaries as attributes of sovereignty are created out of violence. In the case of Lesotho, the two parties (the Afrikaners and the British) who imposed the boundaries broke every concession made. These events show the class character of the European boundaries and show the fact that boundaries serve the interests of the ruling powers not the people included in them.

Furthermore, it is apparent that peace and security were not meant for the Basotho but for the Afrikaners and their colonial masters since the Basotho never attained peace and security. The production of knowledge and modes of behavior serve the colonial interests. In this manner the notions of peace and security embodied in Christianity, the religion that underlined this hegemonic order, were contradictory. Christianity was used to construct a sovereign state for the Afrikaners with the assistance of the colonial power. In the same way it was through Christianity linked to the British colonial power that Lesotho later became a sovereign state in the interests of the ruling class and the colonial power.

The missionaries introduced Christianity to the Basotho in 1833. This was the beginning of the Afrikaner threat to the Basotho's territory. The missionaries promised Moshoeshoe I that conversion of his people into Christians and acknowledgement of God would bring peace and security to his nation and Christianity was linked to British power. In this regard T.

Rolland (in Eldredge, 1993) observes that civilization makes progress in the same proportion as Christianity. In connecting Christianity to colonial powers he further observes that all those who seek God and convert also wish to dress like the European and adopt as many of the customs of civilized people as possible.<sup>36</sup> Britain in this context was considered as a power that would bring God's peace to the Basotho. But, in contradiction, civilization and Christianity brought the Basotho a worsened insecurity because it was during this period that they fought the Afrikaners and later the British from 1880 to 1881.<sup>37</sup> It is within this context that the concepts of peace and security need to be reconstructed in order to find their real meaning outside the interpretation given by the dominant social order.

Also, the issue of identity is important in this case of Lesotho's statecraft. European territorial demarcation is meant to give people some sort of identity through making them different from others. In this case how do the Basotho who are included in the Province of Free State differ from those who live in the present Lesotho? In this context identity seems to be a contradictory concept because the South African Basotho were forced to identify themselves with other people included in that territory while they were differentiated from the Basotho in the present Lesotho.

The sovereign right to decide who should be included or excluded from a bounded territory was the prerogative of the colonial power. That power neither considers the importance of the arable land available to the people left in the present Lesotho nor the traditional interdependence of the peoples on both sides of the boundary. Therefore, the issue of boundaries as seen here was constituted not in the interests of or for the protection of the Basotho,

but for the long-term interests of both the British colonial power and the Afrikaners. In fact the boundaries were meant to serve as a mechanism to control the mobility of Basotho people into and out of South Africa.

The boundaries were intended to regulate the movement of the Basotho so that they could be readily available as labourers when it suited the colonial power. They could also be excluded and sent back to Lesotho when they were not needed. As these demarcations were implemented to serve the political interests of the colonial power and because they resulted in poverty and dependency, they ultimately highlight the immoral aspect of European imposed boundaries. The alienation of Basotho land remains a significant issue in Lesotho politics. For example, political parties in every elections in Lesotho advocate the reincorporation of the territories lost to South Africa.<sup>38</sup>

In 1868 Moshoeshe I requested direct rule from Britain. It helped him to maintain the territory that he had fought for so long. The direct rule had a serious impact on the economic development of the territory. For instance, because of British skewed economic interests in the Union of South Africa the colonial government did not develop any kind of industry in Basotholand. The purpose was to keep the territory undeveloped so that the main source of employment for the Basotho people should remain South Africa. This was done in order to make Lesotho dependent on South African in all spheres of life. This situation remained unaltered throughout the colonial period until Lesotho became an independent state on the 4<sup>th</sup> October 1966.

## **Summary**

It could therefore be stated that the concept of sovereignty is inherent in statehood. Statehood is a hierarchical system, implying that states occupy unequal status in the system. This unequal status impacts on sovereignty as the state at the top of the hierarchy dominates the others at the bottom. The domination impacts on sovereignty too as the subordinate states have to implement policies that serve the interests of the dominant state because their economies are penetrated and intertwined with those of the hegemonic state. Therefore, subordinate states have limited policy choices.

Furthermore, sovereignty serves a particular mode of production led by the hegemonic state. This means that sovereignty is premised on class interests. On the other hand it implies that in as much as the concept serves the ruling class it can serve the subordinate class or classes too. This brings us to two types of sovereignty: state-centred and people-centred. State-centred sovereignty is based on territorial boundaries and people-centred sovereignty is premised on common interests.<sup>39</sup> These two types of sovereignty are antagonistic in character because state-centred sovereignty depends on the erosion of the people-centred approach as territories limits the living conditions of the majority of the people, as we have seen in the case of the Basotho and the people of the southern region. People-centred sovereignty does not have territorial demarcations, as people are free to live where they can find the means to survive, as has been shown in the case of the Basotho and other people of the region before colonialism.

When Lesotho became a sovereign state it was already dependent on South Africa in all spheres of life. This dilutes its sovereign status. While the weakening of sovereignty could initially be blamed on the colonial power, the present post-colonial ruling class in Lesotho continues to subordinate its interests to the regional hegemon. This is seen through the continuation of the colonial agreements that were meant to subordinate Lesotho to South Africa economically. The next chapter will discuss the Southern African Customs' Union (SACU), the oldest institution established during the colonial era with the intention to economically knit Lesotho to South Africa. The SACU has rendered the hegemon the main beneficiary of the organisation. Chapter Four will discuss how South Africa in 1998 used its hegemonic power in Lesotho to protect its economic interest and, in so doing, weakened Lesotho's sovereignty.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **The Southern African Customs' Union (SACU)**

#### **Introduction**

The purpose of this chapter is to use the Southern African Customs' Union (SACU) as a case study to show how this liberal economic institution benefits the state system and yet ignores the similar pattern of social relations that connects the people of the Southern African region. It will further show how the SACU as an institution assisted in giving birth to states which played a role of minor partners to South Africa. In this asymmetric relationship Basotho's economic interests are subordinated to the regional hegemony (South Africa) and it constantly loses sovereignty to South Africa. The case study will discuss the organisation at three historic levels all of which impacted on Lesotho: under the colonial period; after independence and in the post-apartheid period. Each of these periods is important to this research because different governments ruled South Africa during the three periods. Moreover, the periods indicate a tendency towards improving interstate relations between Lesotho and South Africa. This will be observed in the increasing concessions made by the hegemon in these three stages of the SACU negotiations.

It is crucial to observe that during the process of improving interstate relations there was no practical improvement in the project of nation building in Lesotho – a self-sustained national economy – instead the conditions worsened. This is evident in the continuous deterioration of the Basotho's living conditions despite each concession.

It will further be argued that although both ruling classes are benefiting, the South African ruling class benefits more in this process, indicating superiority of the hegemonic state. The imperatives contained in this class relationship are dependency and subordination. The ruling class in Lesotho perennially depends on the South African hegemonic class to sustain itself. This dependence constantly surrenders state management to South Africa and by so doing weakens Lesotho's sovereignty.

### **Formation of the SACU and the colonial era**

It was pointed in the preceding chapter that South Africa was the first Westphalian-type state to be constructed by the British colonial power in the southern African region. This state acted not only as the centre of colonial economic power in the region, but also as the future model of state formation in the region. This had significant impact in the region for two reasons. Firstly, in terms of a state centric approach, other regional states were constructed on the South African model. This was crucial in the later development of all aspects of life in the newly formed states because South Africa was considered as a success story of capitalist economic development that was admired and could be replicated.

Secondly, the formation of the Union of South Africa also determined the future relationships of the regional states with South Africa, which was considered vital for their economic development, particularly in using the already established economic links with it. As a result, strengthening ties with South Africa made more “common sense”<sup>1</sup> than cutting ties with it.

However, a shortcoming of using this state centric approach was that other states which were formed later would not develop to the level of South

Africa because the basis of their formation was different: South Africa was formed as an economic centre of Britain in the region. Other states were formed to support the South African economy for the benefit of the British colonial interests in the region. To support this, an economic institution was set up in the colonial era to merge the economies of these future states with that of South Africa.

It was argued earlier that the protectorates<sup>2</sup> were intentionally underdeveloped by Britain, so that this would increase their dependency on South Africa. Based on similar premises of economic dependency, an institution was created that could continue the same purpose and make South Africa the rich state among the poor. The SACU was created in 1910, in order to attain this mandate. The organisation is the oldest economically integrated institution in southern Africa. It was renegotiated in 1969. It provides for free movement of goods and services among members through a common tariff. Customs and excise duties collected are paid into a common pool administered by the South African Reserve Bank. Revenue accruing to the member states is paid annually in proportion to the amount of goods and services that entered their borders.<sup>3</sup> The 2002 negotiations changed some of these conditions, as we shall see later in this chapter.

Initially the organisation included the Union of South Africa and the three British protectorates (Basotholand, Bechuanaland and Swaziland). Political attempts to integrate the three protectorates were made but, when the Union of South Africa was formed, these territories resented the process because of its discriminatory nature. They refused to be included in the Union because the indigenous people in South Africa were excluded from participating in the political affairs of the state. The people from these protectorates believed

that they would be sidelined and treated as foreigners like black South Africans because of their race. As this political integration was resisted, the colonial power imposed formal economic integration in 1910. Despite the resentment, the agreement was signed on behalf of the three protectorates by the colonial power. How did this organisation serve the hegemon?

The intention of the SACU was to share customs and excise tax between the three territories and the Union. The Union, being the administrator and the largest contributor, had a bigger share and the three other contributors shared a small portion: 0.88575% for Basotholand; 0.27622% for Bechuanaland; 0.14900% for Swaziland and 98.68903% for the Union of South Africa.<sup>4</sup> The peoples of the protectorates did not know the formula for working out these figures. This is evidenced in the demand by these territories for a reform of the institution. As a result of this demand a new formula for calculating the revenue was devised in 1969.<sup>5</sup> Besides this, the volume of trade between these countries and the Union was perceived to be bigger than the percentages they received and for this they felt cheated.

In the light of this feeling, the three started renegotiating the SACU Agreement even before independence and the agreement for amendment was concluded in 1969.<sup>6</sup> Prior to 1969 it was impossible for any substantial negotiations to be reached since Britain, as the representative of these territories, had different interests from those of the territories. Moreover, it was a part of the agreement that served South African interests too.

The three territories attained independence between 1966 and 1968. This gave them the opportunity to negotiate for themselves. However, the newly independent states were left with political and economic structures that were

firmly intertwined with that of their former colonial power. Furthermore, these political and economic structures were entangled with the Republic of South Africa (RSA).<sup>7</sup>

The new elite, who had close connections with the British colonial power, led these three territories after independence.<sup>8</sup> Even before the conversion of the elite to the capitalist system, Britain had constructed something that connected them to both itself and South Africa: the state system. Because of their class interests, the elite could not lead an economic programme which was contradictory to the interests of their former colonial master. This was possibly done unconsciously because they did not know of any alternative route of development or done consciously because in the ultimate analysis they were the ones who could benefit from the entrenched economic system rather than their nations as a whole. It was on the basis of the entrenched economic dependency on South Africa that the ruling elite renegotiated the SACU with the understanding that there was no alternative economic development outside the organisation. This led to the understanding that reforming the organisation rather than interrogating its structural foundations would be the solution. By so doing, they were granting the organisation an important degree of legitimacy.<sup>9</sup>

Another important factor for consideration in this regard is that South Africa as a hegemonic state had established the SACU as an institution that the three other states found universal in conception and compatible with their interests by virtue of sharing revenue.<sup>10</sup> In other words, these countries did not see the organisation as a tool of exploitation but as serving their interests and that reforming it would be an advantage, bringing them more revenue. Besides, they saw no alternative outside of the SACU which they viewed as

the sole vehicle for their economic development. What, however, were those issues that they found incompatible with their interests?

The three minor members wanted: a fair formula of sharing the tax; to be able to protect their infant industries against South Africa's compensation; unrestricted entry of goods into the South African market; an increase in revenue and compensation for the loss of fiscal autonomy; and a provision for regular joint discussions regarding customs, excise and sales duties and other matters of fiscal policy.

### **The 1969 SACU Agreement**

The 1969 SACU agreement brought the following changes:

- The new formula that calculated the revenue on the basis of all imports and excisable products.
- The three states shared 42% of SACU's collections to compensate their loss of fiscal autonomy, while South Africa got the rest of the percentage.
- It was agreed that the goods from the three countries should have free access to South African markets.
- It was agreed that the infant manufacturing factories in the three countries would be protected from competing with South African goods for a period of eight years.
- The three would continue to share a common monetary policy with South Africa.
- The South African Rand had status as a full legal tender in all these countries until a new agreement was reached in 1974.<sup>11</sup>

The Agreement was an achievement for the three minor members of the SACU in the following manner: The first point on the calculation of revenue on the basis of all imports and excisable products was substantive,

considering the fact that the 1910 Agreement did not show how the calculations were done. Now that the formula was based on the imports and excisable products, each member state was in a position to calculate that its increase in imported goods could mean a rise in revenue and viceversa. In this manner the three member states' revenues could obviously be higher than before the negotiations, because of escalating circumstances of dependency as more goods were imported from South Africa.

However, the terms of the formula were still dictated by South Africa as a hegemonic power, therefore SACU was still of more benefit to South Africa than to the other states. For the sake of meeting their demands, the hegemonic power needed to be seen to be articulating rules consistent with the interests of subordinate states.<sup>12</sup> For instance, the more that these states felt that the SACU was instrumental in achieving their economic interest, the more they felt that participation in the organisation was to their advantage. So, the issue for these states was not who gained more, but rather how much they gained.

This point was a disadvantage for the people of Lesotho because, as argued, the imports to Lesotho were increasing with the escalation of the dependency on South Africa. It meant that more South African goods dominated Lesotho's market and as a result reduced the chances of Lesotho's goods selling in its own market.<sup>13</sup> This blocked the chances for small businesses to develop, leaving the majority of the people with no other choice than to seek employment – ironically in South Africa. Furthermore, imported goods have to include transport costs in their prices, making the goods more expensive for people to buy. Because of this, this issue

decreased the chances for the Basotho to find a means of livelihood in Lesotho.

The second point was that 42% of the overall SACU revenue was allocated to the three countries while the rest was for South Africa. This was an achievement for the member states, given that previously they shared less than 2% of the overall revenue. With the new formula South Africa got 58%, that is it lost 40% of the previous allocation.<sup>14</sup> Again this was a substantive compromise by the hegemon, considering the economic power that gave it leverage over the other member states. This was a gesture of “good intentions” by South Africa.

On the other hand, the gesture covered the fact that the new Agreement was meant to keep the member states in the SACU. However, South Africa as the major contributor of the common pool got the biggest share. As a result it continued to dominate the organisation. This shows that the SACU was formed to mainly serve the hegemon and less so the other members. But since South Africa was the hegemony, it dictated the outcomes to its own advantage.

This point was a disadvantage to the Basotho because instead of trying to find alternative ways of stimulating Lesotho’s economic growth in order to increase revenue, the Lesotho government relied on its share in the SACU as one of the major sources of revenue. If the SACU had not offered this option, the government may have been forced to rely on internal means to increase its revenue: this could have included financial support from and taxation of the local small businesses. This could have assisted the local

economy because more people would have been engaged in these businesses and have would provided more jobs for the Basotho.

The third point was access to the South African market by the minor members. These dependent states' markets were extremely limited given their small populations. Therefore access to a larger South African market was crucial for their goods. Moreover, given that South Africa neighbours these states, its geographic position would reduce transport costs compared to doing trade with other countries farther afield. Another advantage for these countries was that they had established trade links with the RSA as far back as the colonial period. So the South African market was known to them. This was an advantage because they knew its intricacies.

Although this point sounds reasonable, it was practically difficult to implement, considering the fact that South Africa and its Union members were at two different levels of development. South Africa was using a relatively high technology in production compared with the goods of its SACU partners. Therefore, South African goods were cheaper, of higher quality and mass-produced, whereas in the states of the other Union members – goods were of low quality, produced in low quantities and thus it was more expensive to cover the production costs. The goods from these dependent states had to compete freely on the South African market and considering the levels of development mentioned above goods from such states would obviously not be marketable in South Africa as people could opt for South African goods. Regarding this asymmetric relations in trade, G. Maasdrop (1982) argues that polarization in customs unions is most likely to occur when one member is already more industrially developed than the others; its industrial centres reaps the advantages of integration.<sup>15</sup>

It has been argued here that the only type of economy that could be made to flourish in these minor member states could be through assisting of small businesses. The argument is based on the premise that these states lack capital to start huge investments. Furthermore, the above point highlighted that South African technology was more advance than that of the three other member states. Therefore, the three states could not compete with South Africa for markets.

Given these constraints, small businesses could not sell their products on the South African market because their goods could not be of as high a quality and they would need to include transport costs when selling their goods in South Africa. This would make their goods more expensive and as a result they would lose against the competition. As observed earlier, the main means of creating employment could have been assisting local businesses. The failure to offer this assistance eroded the way of living for the peoples of the three states.

The fourth point was that South African industries should not open branches in the other three member states and so compete with their infant industries. However, South African goods were sold in these states. This meant that South Africa had an opportunity to produce the same goods as those produced in the neighbouring countries and to sell them in the same market, thus competing for the market share. Once again, given the advantage of South African technology (as discussed in point three) even if its goods were taxed in these states, thereby raising their market prices, it would still dominate the market considering that consumers buy quality, not the name of where the product originates.

The problem of unequal conditions for competition was again evident in that South African companies were already experienced in trade and had the advantage of financial strength. They were therefore more competitive than the infant industries from South Africa's smaller neighbours. Given these conditions, consumers would choose South African goods, and as a result the infant industries would collapse. South African companies could easily conquer the market because their inexperienced and financially weak opponents did not give them any tough competition.<sup>16</sup> In the end, as these infant industries collapsed, South Africa could rebuild the same industries in these countries to reduce transport costs.

Furthermore, according to the Agreement the infant factories in the small member states should be protected from competing with South African factories for a period of eight years. In theoretical terms this was a sound point because these countries had just become independent and, as argued earlier, the fact that Britain left these countries without developing any economic base meant that they had the task of building factories for the purpose of both mobilising revenue and creating employment. Protecting infant industries against foreign competition was logical for economic development. But in practice this was not possible because these states lacked capital for investment in such factories.

Foreign capital was necessary for such investment, but because of the poor infrastructure in these countries it was difficult to attract such investment. However, most of the investment in the small firms was South African. Therefore protection of infant factories from competition with South Africa was basically nonsensical because given South Africa's investment, South African factories would in fact be competing among themselves. Moreover,

South Africa could not build large industries in these countries because that would industrialise these states and create employment, which would result in less movement of labour to the South African economy, which relied on cheap labour from these member states.

It has been argued that South Africa did not have any intention of industrialising the other minor member states because this would be in contradiction to its hegemonic interests. However, South Africa's investment in small businesses in these states was aimed at allowing those businesses which could not withstand the competition in South Africa to flourish. This small investment was carefully planned so that it should not contradict the hegemon's plans and provide these states with substantial employment. So, the infant factories that are referred to in this point were only intended to maximise profit. The problem with this type of investment was that it eroded Lesotho's economy to the advantage of the hegemon, while also blocking chances for the Basotho to invest in their own economy.

The last point was the use of the South African Rand as a legal tender in the three minor member states. For these newly independent states with a weak economic base, using South African currency as legal tender was important until such time that their economies would be strong enough to establish their own currencies. In this manner it was for their convenience. But, as argued above, the SACU was not intending to assist these states towards such economic independence.

Certainly these countries are still dependent on South Africa today and the dependency is becoming stronger than ever. (The level of dependence differs in each country depending on its post-colonial economic programmes.) For

other countries the temporary arrangement has eventually resulted in a permanent arrangement. It cannot be denied that in the latter years Lesotho for instance established its own currency – the Loti. But this currency is still dependent on the Rand and as a result both currencies are used concurrently as legal tenders in Lesotho. Printing of the Loti is used by the ruling class as one of the indicators of movement towards economic independence.

As argued, in the case of Lesotho, the ruling class benefited from sharing the common monetary policy because the government could argue that this was a temporary arrangement which could be stopped when the economy strengthened. Later on when the Loti was introduced, it was argued that the economy was improving. These arguments were used to gain the support of the masses for elections. However, South Africa gained more, since using the Rand in all these countries was expanding the market for its currency.

Furthermore, since the Basotho buy most goods from South Africa the equivalent exchange rate gives people easy access to South African goods. In this manner it mainly benefited South Africa, because most shopping is done there due to lack of certain goods in Lesotho and relatively lower prices. In practical terms this causes economic erosion to the advantage of South Africa.

The 1969 the SACU Agreement increased the revenue allocation to the organisation's minor member states. This Agreement as argued above did not mention how the people of these states would benefit from it. It ignored the fact that the economic integration between these states strengthened social integration between the people of these states: more

people were forced to search for employment in South Africa as their states continued to fail in providing them with jobs.<sup>17</sup> The organisation further ignored the fact that before the states were integrated economically their people had a long history of integration based on their similar patterns of life before pre-colonial contact and the beginning of the mining revolution in South Africa. Efforts to strengthen border controls between states to register goods bought from one member state and to regulate people's movement across these barriers resulted in decreasing attempts to find a means of livelihood for those in the member states the dominant state – South Africa. This issue that was central to the interests of the people of these states and yet was sidelined by the 1969 SACU Agreement. From this context the neo-liberal economic institution exposes one contradictory characteristic of the state system: while the system integrate economically it attempts to disintegrate the masses of the same states by the continuation of its Westphalian borders.

The apartheid system was considered as an obstacle to any serious economic development that would benefit the people of the three states. The apartheid's racial discrimination was considered as a negative factor that hindered the benefit of South Africa's massive economy to other regional states. Many people in the region supported the liberation struggle with the hope that the end of racial discrimination in South Africa would benefit regional economic development. However, this has not been the case. The case study on the SACU serves as an example of how the state system operates and this will explain why there has been more continuity in the SACU than change.

## **Post-Apartheid SACU Agreement of 2002**

The end of apartheid in 1994 and the advent of a democratic dispensation in South Africa motivated the leaders of the four states<sup>18</sup> to renegotiate the SACU Agreement. In 2002 the following issues were agreed upon:

Institutions would be formed for the running of the SACU even at the level of day-to-day administration.

Although South Africa was still managing the common revenue pool, for a transitional period of two years, after this outcome, the management would henceforth rotate among the membership. The formula for sharing the revenue was given a new format, divided into three components:

- i. The level of development, which was meant to give a less developed state more shares;
- ii. The excise component, which would be calculated on the value of the GDP of member state as the percentage of the overall GNP of SACU.
- iii. The customs revenue calculated on the value of all goods imported from all the members.

The members also agreed on co-operation in case of restrictions applied to goods in transit. To protect the infant industries in the smaller member states, levies were to be paid on goods coming from South Africa. Lastly, the members agreed on common policies of industrial development; cooperation in agricultural policies and strategies; and recognition of balanced industrial development.<sup>19</sup>

The 2002 SACU agreement seemed to be more progressive in comparison with the previous one. The margin of the shift from the antecedents reflected the concerns of the other Union members about the role that the new South

Africa would play as a hegemonic leader. The fact that South Africa accepted the formation of daily management structures to run the organisation and by so doing allow other members to participate in its daily activities was important because all members could now see how the organisation performed.

Furthermore, the management of the organisation was going to rotate among member states. This too was important in giving all members the chance to gain inner knowledge of how the organisation performs and so eliminate the suspicion that the other members were cheated. However, the four other states were still minor members because they were not at the same level of development as South Africa, as we shall see in the argument raised by Blumenfeld later in this chapter.

Therefore, managing the organisation did not mean equal status in trade or competition. These changes were still to the advantage of the hegemon, particularly because it motivated the other members to stay in the organisation, while its members continued to provide South Africa with markets. The rotation of management among the Union members of common revenue pool seemed to illustrate that the new South Africa would be democratic and transparent. This transparency was shown by giving all members a chance to participate in formulating the revenue sharing formula, and also in the recognition of the different levels of development among the member states. This was a crucial element because all along it had made these countries feel that the formula was iniquitous, because it was always in favour of South Africa.

The problem this point raises is that it gives an impression that, by recognising that the other member states were less developed than the hegemon, it automatically meant that the economic disparities between these states and South Africa would be eliminated. Concrete measures were necessary to address the disparities. For instance, industrialisation of these minor states was necessary so that they could stop supplying the hegemon with cheap labour. Technological transfer to these states was also important so that they would be able to compete with the hegemon. These and many others steps could address the disparities. But this clause did not raise this important issue.

This new Agreement recognises the fact that the development component would be weighted in favour of the less developed member states. This component therefore seemed to demonstrate that South Africa as the hegemon was ready to part with some financial privileges to give other members a chance to develop. This point is more of a “good gesture” than of solving the problem raised above because it does not mention how much of a share would be given to the less developed states in order to mitigate the problem of unequal development. At a practical level, from 2002 to date, there is no sign of any rapid industrialisation in any of these states to prove that they are closing the gap with South Africa.

The formula of sharing the excise component also seems to exhibit transparency. This component would be calculated from the value of the member’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in a specific calendar year as a percentage of the total GDP of SACU in that year. By implication, the more the GDP of the given member the more would be its excise share. Therefore

no country would blame another for its small GDP; instead this component would seem to encourage the members to work hard to increase their GDP. In this manner this component would also act as a stimulus for economic growth as it would encourage the members to generate more GDP.

This component is problematic because economic competition is not encouraged by how much share a state gets in the general pool but is premised on the ability of the state to produce quality goods and compete. As pointed out earlier, these states lacked the ability to produce such goods and to compete with South Africa because they are not at the same level of development. Furthermore, we have argued that the level of dependency was increasing, making these states import more goods from the hegemon. For example, thousands of Basotho mineworkers are retrenched every year.<sup>20</sup> This decreases the revenue that Lesotho gets from the miners' remittances, while the families that depend on the salaries of these workers are left in worse conditions.

Another aspect of the formula is the customs component. Customs are calculated on the basis of the intra-SACU imports, which would depend on the amount of imports each member had incurred in a specific year. A member's share would be a percentage of its imports calculated against the intra-SACU imports. This means that the more the member imports from the Union and the less it exports to it, the less would be its share of the customs component and viceversa.

This component seemed fair because it depended on the individual states' exports and imports. It also seemed to encourage the member states to produce more so as to reduce their imports and strive for more exports,

which would be healthy for the balance of trade and a strong currency. The idea of increasing revenue through export is also problematic because it depends on exported goods and yet exports depend on the production power of the given nation. But as highlighted above these states lack that capacity.

Furthermore, it has been observed that the Basotho buy most of their goods from South Africa and the use of the Rand and Loti as legal tenders in Lesotho provides the opportunity to use both tenders to purchase goods at the nearby South African towns. This factor increases South African imports to Lesotho and affects the balance of trade.

The Agreement stipulates that all members provide freedom of transit of goods to and from the Union members. The members retained the right to prohibit and restrict goods from their territories if such goods violate public morals, public health or security, or as a precaution against animals or plant diseases, parasites and insects and other problems that would violate the integrity of the state and /or its environment. But where such prohibition and restrictions are implemented, this should be done with the cooperation of other Union members. Therefore cooperation could be accepted where there would be consultation. This aspect seems to eliminate the chances of the stronger member acting as it pleased in disregard of the smaller members.

One of the major problems was freedom of transit, as these neighbouring countries depended, to varying degrees, on South Africa for this. But on the other hand South Africa did not need or use any of these countries for any transit purposes. As a result it was not South Africa that needed transit, but the other member states. Therefore, H. Blumenfeld's argument (1993) that interdependence is based on the same level of development obviously did

not exist as far as this issue of transit was concerned.<sup>21</sup> South Africa still had the leverage to prohibit goods from these countries from passing through its territory. As indicated earlier, the idea of free trade between South Africa and its Union members would not be reciprocal. No matter how many changes are made to the agreements, as long as the levels of development are not addressed, there cannot be fair trade.

The Agreement also reflects the role of South Africa as the hegemon when it accepted that for the economic growth of the other members their infant industries should be protected against the competition of South Africa's relatively highly developed industries for a period of eight years. This was a substantial time frame to allow for such industries to grow and to gather financial strength in order to be competitive later. The 2002 SACU Agreement pointed to increasing revenue for the minor member states and protecting their infant industries. It was observed earlier that the issue of protecting infant industries was illusory. The 2002 agreement has added nothing new to change this situation.

Lastly, the members agreed on common policies of industrial development; cooperation in agricultural policies and strategies; and recognition of balanced industrial development. These policies were raised in recognition of the imbalances in economic growth in these states and it was important that these imbalances were addressed. But, as we have mentioned, being aware of these problems was not enough, what was crucial was how they were tackled, and more importantly lack of capital was the main problem for the minor states. Unfortunately, this aspect of the issue was never raised. Furthermore, there were no stipulated measures which could be taken if the

dominant member broke these policies. So, South Africa has the leverage to break them without any fear.

While the 2002 Agreement marks a milestone in the SACU in terms of increasing the revenue of the four minor states, it should also be viewed in the light of the premises of its main objective – to integrate the four states economically so that the minor states can depend on the South African economy as a market for their goods and South Africa can depend on the minor states as a source of cheap labour. Was this Agreement shifting away from this objective? It has been argued elsewhere in this chapter that thousands of mineworkers are retrenched every year. These workers participated in the organised labour movement and got relatively better salaries. The retrenchment of these workers has worsened the living conditions of their families. Whatever packages were paid to them are spent in medication to mitigate the HIV/AIDS pandemic which is rampant in the Sub-Saharan states.<sup>22</sup> The 2002 SACU Agreement is silent on such issues as this, yet these are problems that the majority of the people are facing. The organisation only discusses issues that affect and benefit the states.

Despite the retrenchment of thousands of mine workers, a new tendency to recruit foreign labour in South Africa is gaining momentum. South Africa's labour legislature based on higher salaries forces employers to seek temporary foreign labour which is more prone to accept low salary. For production purposes, cheap labour from the neighbouring states is now more preferred than ever before.

In order to circumvent and indeed vitiate the state system, the Basotho have used their linguistic and cultural links with South African to find jobs legally in South Africa and to access pensions. Others are crossing the borders illegally in order to search for jobs because, among others factors, the SACU has failed to bring about the dream of a better southern Africa.<sup>23</sup> This shows how underdevelopment and escalating poverty have caused people to take extra-state initiatives to find a means of livelihood and as a result have rendered the state system irrelevant.

### **Summary**

In a nutshell, the revenue for the minor SACU members is increasing at the expense of the masses, who are forced to buy goods in South Africa because their source of income in their own countries has been eroded by the state system. The result of this process is an escalating unemployment crisis in these countries<sup>24</sup> as the gap between the poor and the rich widens. The SACU, as an economic vehicle for supporting and legitimising the ruling class, erodes the opportunity for the masses to survive through constantly impoverishing their living conditions. The argument that the SACU is readily aiming to keep the member states as sources of cheap labour for South African industries and as a market for its goods remains valid.

Lastly, the case study has shown that the SACU is a tool to secure the member states by supplying a constant source of income. In this process of state security the organisation serves the powerful and rich ruling class. Ironically, the ordinary people – the majority – are sidelined from this income. Furthermore, the case study proves that where states dominate the entire life of the society and become secured, the ordinary people become

insecure and lose sovereignty. In this context sovereignty is for the ruling class which is its sole beneficiary. This returns to the argument that the neo-liberal system is exclusive in character and in this process benefits the minority, while the majority are excluded.

The most striking manifestation of the conflicting policy of South Africa is its foreign policy. While the regional hegemony is preaching peace and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, the 1998 political problems exposed South Africa's inconsistency in policy application. The 1998 military intervention in Lesotho is a clear example of a policy with double standards. It exposes the fact that where state interests are presumed to be at stake moral principles do not have a place. The next chapter will critically analyse the hegemon's intervention in Lesotho.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **The Southern African Development Community's (SADC) Military Intervention in Lesotho in 1998**

#### **Introduction**

South Africa's military intervention in Lesotho in 1998 was portrayed as the defence of stability and democracy in Lesotho.<sup>1</sup> From a critical point of view the following questions can be asked: Who gave South Africa the right to maintain order among regional states? Whose stability and democracy was South Africa reinforcing in Lesotho? The answers to these questions lie in the logic and essence of the hierarchical nature of the Westphalian state sovereignty. States occupy different positions in the Westphalian system. At the regional or global level a state that occupies the highest position dominates and dictates upon the weak. It sets rules and norms to be followed and plays a hegemonic role. States that do not abide by these rules are liable to be punished by the hegemon.

Furthermore, the state system represents the interests of the ruling class in the society and this class has a connection with its alliances at regional and global levels. The ruling class in the hegemonic state safeguards these internationalised class interests. These interests that cut across the barriers of the boundary contradict the essence of the Westphalian state sovereignty which is premised on concrete borders, characterised by inclusion and exclusion. These cross border interests prove that the interests of the ruling class are not state bound, and therefore implies that boundaries are constructed only to limit the interests of the subordinate class or classes. In

this regard, state sovereignty limits the subordinate class' terrain for survival while on the other hand it enlarges that of the dominant class. It is against this background that the 1998 military intervention in Lesotho should be seen as a cross border act to protect the interests of the ruling class in both Lesotho and South Africa. Moreover, the intervention limited the rights of the Basotho to decide what was best for their interests as the decision was reached without taking their concerns into account. This eroded the rights of the Basotho's sovereignty over their territory. This decision in essence is an indication that Westphalian state sovereignty is for the benefit of the ruling clique and its allied class in other states, while it is disadvantageous to the majority of the people included in it.

How did South Africa attain the dominance that gave it the right to police the region's stability and democracy? South Africa as the first sovereign state in the region was able to develop faster than the rest of the region. Moreover, other regional states were formed with the aim of contributing to South Africa's economic development. As mentioned in Chapter Two, these countries were divided into two groups: suppliers of cheap labour and suppliers of raw materials. The architect of this Westphalian sovereignty in the region – the British colonial power – destroyed the main base of the regional economy (agriculture) while failing to support any modern economic base that could cater for the interests of the majority of the people. As a result other regional states were made weak and dependent on South Africa.

These conditions led to the development of South Africa as the first state among unequals.<sup>2</sup> South Africa's domination of the technological highways

and byways; its developed economy; skilled people; market-friendly economy; and strategic location – from the global security point of view all contributed to what Vale refers to as the reductionist logic that considered South Africa as a beacon of hope in a doomed continent.<sup>3</sup> While these factors laid the foundations for South Africa to develop much better than other regional states, the contribution of the regional states in its development (as suppliers of cheap labour) is hardly mentioned and is at times ignored.<sup>4</sup> Furthermore, development (in this western context) is considered and measured by Western standards that benefit the state system such as the gross national product, balance of payments, rate of returns and others. Other indexes (ironically from the West too) that have a direct impact on the Westphalian state sovereignty and also affect the people – for example: infant mortality rate, low life expectancy, unequal distribution of resources, unequal development of the different regions of the states, GNP per capita, an increase in the rate of unemployment, increase in poverty, high crime rate, HIV/AIDS pandemic and others<sup>5</sup> – hardly appear in government statistics.<sup>6</sup>

Although South Africa is regarded as the model of economic development for Africa, it is not immune to these indexes. The irony is that the same people who voted for the ruling class in the democratic RSA are the ones who demonstrate against the government in Port Elizabeth, Cape Town and other places to demand proper housing.<sup>7</sup> This is one sign of how this ‘model of hope’ has sidelined its own citizens in development, and yet it carries the responsibility of providing stability and democracy in other regional states. Why was democratic South Africa so eager to secure democracy in Lesotho in 1998; to solve political conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo

(DRC); in Burundi and as far beyond the region as Ivory Coast and yet it has failed to secure for its people the most basic need: shelter. This analysis exposes another important premise of Westphalian sovereignty: the interdependence of knowledge, power and sovereignty according to Foucault.<sup>8</sup>

We have observed the importance of what we know and how we came to know it elsewhere in this thesis. Viewed in the same light of knowledge production, it is critically important to look at why South Africa is expected to play such a crucial role in regional security and development and yet its charity fails to begin at home. Let us consider the following point: In 1990 M. Sejanamane analysed the scenarios of post-apartheid South Africa and argues that democratic South Africa will play “Father Christmas” to its neighbours. That is, South Africa is seen as a powerhouse of the continent where its size and level of development will spur on developments in the neighbouring countries.<sup>9</sup> Has this been the case or is there any likelihood that the present dispensation based on a state hierarchical system will be able to play this role? The ordinary people in the region too supported the fight against apartheid with the same hope that the democratic dispensation coupled with economic magnitude and a peaceful South Africa would benefit their countries.<sup>10</sup> But all this hope has been in vain.

There is one common thing that international relations analysts and the ordinary masses learn from the system: that the state system coupled with Western democracy is a source of a better life for the people. Taking this neo-liberal statist approach even further, it is argued that a peaceful region will bring a single community based on common interests. This was the

message that the former South African President, Nelson Mandela, promised the region.<sup>11</sup> Ironically, mainstream international relations equates community with the state or nation. It considers the sovereign state as an ideal form of community yet does not critically look at the moral limitations of this political organisation, particularly within the context of changing global conditions.<sup>12</sup> In 1998 the new democratic South Africa brought peace to Lesotho through violence. The question to ask is: What stability did Lesotho achieve when 6021 people lost jobs<sup>13</sup> and an estimated two billion Rands<sup>14</sup> was needed for the reconstruction of the economy as a result of the invasion? This example of statist behaviour raised this challenging question for analysts in mainstream international relations: Is what we learn about state behaviour correct? This is clearly manifested in what Vale considers as a need for a change in reading habits.<sup>15</sup> In other words we need to scrutinise what we learn about the state system.

Knowledge represents a powerful tool in the shaping of society and the building of an alternative community and, because of this, to change the world requires that we should think differently about it.<sup>16</sup> To carry the point further: how we have learnt what we know determines how we will see the future and the future becomes the hostage of our knowledge. Marxism too holds that human beings are the products of society in as much as they contribute to the behaviour of that same society.<sup>17</sup> In this respect people are convinced that states as the sole vehicles of development will improve people's well-being for the better. As a result of this statist logic, people did not see a problem in the South African state but in its apartheid system.

But if the people's thinking or analysis had gone deeper than the evils of apartheid and if they had asked themselves where else in the world does it occur that the state represents or benefits all the people and where else do the achievements of the most developed state benefit its neighbours, they might have deduced that the problem is partly rooted in the apartheid system but mainly in the state system as a whole. It has been observed elsewhere in this thesis that knowledge that is dictated upon the people by the dominant mode of production (the liberal mode) is chosen to suit the state's class interests. Any analysis within the premises of the state system is consistent with this mode and is used to support the status quo. Cox calls this approach problem solving, as opposed to the critical approach.<sup>18</sup> This problem solving approach causes the "new South Africa", although nominally at peace with its neighbours,<sup>19</sup> to behave in the same manner as the apartheid South Africa.

The hierarchical nature of the system makes South Africa the first among unequal states. As a result, other regional states contribute to its development. The system in Africa, although copied from the Westphalian model, is not reciprocal in the sense of European boundaries. Apparently we easily forget that in the case of Europe too, states follow the hierarchical order of the system, otherwise any changes in world hegemonies could not have occurred. Many proponents of international relations tend to make the same mistake when analysing the state system and become captivated by the knowledge dictated upon by the system. Consequently, they fail to realise that South Africa's economic enhancement from the regional states does not necessarily have a reciprocal developmental impact on its neighbouring states. If such reciprocity existed South Africa would lose its status as the

first among the unequals. It would lose its domination and ability to maintain regional order for its own interests. In essence this would be the death of the state system in southern Africa, as all the states would develop equally. Similarly boundaries would lose their primary function of exclusion and inclusion. Furthermore, mainstream international relations analysts fail to differentiate between state development and people's development. They consider the two to be interrelated and yet they are contradictory as the former is exclusive and the latter is inclusive.

How does South Africa's regional power fit into sovereignty or viceversa? We have observed that sovereignty is constructed on the basis of exclusion and inclusion. The included is premised on the fear of the excluded, that is the excluded threaten the included. This threat is the basis for states to be constructed on violence, as Foucault too observes.<sup>20</sup> This view is inherent in sovereignty and as a result insecurity is an integral part of state sovereignty. For this reason, apartheid and a democratic South Africa, constructed on Westphalian state sovereignty, are bound to be insecure and violent as well as exclusionist in order to maintain the class interests of the state.

South Africa's regional domination and ordering is not a peculiar phenomenon. It is copied from what is happening globally. At global level the United State of America (USA) as the leading military power and a global hegemon is using its capability to force other states to obey its orders through the pretence of supporting Western values such as democracy and liberalisation of the economy while denying other nations the right to cherish their own values. Although the USA is an icon of western democracy, few have asked the following questions: How many Americans participated in

the 2000 presidential elections?<sup>21</sup> Why did the election of George W. Bush in 2000 become so controversial if American democracy is something to aspire to? The irony of international relations is that such controversies surrounding elections can be applied to other leaders who do not seem ready to dance to the tune of the liberal ideology. Therefore, this implies that the point is not how to copy but who copied. States on the higher level of the system inherit the right to behave as they please as long as they serve the system. If there is anything that bears testimony to this it is the 2003 Gulf War against Iraq led by the USA and its allies.

The USA accused Iraq of possessing weapons of mass destruction, contrary to the conditions put out by the United Nations Organisation (UNO). The UNO sent inspectors to Iraq to search for the weapons but to no avail. The USA claimed that the weapons could not be found because they were moved to other places. For this reason it insisted that Iraq was guilty and should be punished. The warning went further: the USA would attack Iraq with or without the UN's support, as if the presence of the weapons was more of a threat to the USA than it was to the whole world. The attack was launched and Saddam Hussein toppled and yet to date no weapons have been discovered.

One of the USA allies, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, was the first to declare that the information on weapons of mass destruction was wrong but that the toppling of Saddam Hussein was necessary to stop the genocide that the dictator had committed upon the Iraqi people. The USA leadership also confirmed that the weapons were not found. This shift in position by the USA and the British leaders on what the Iraqi War was about, typifies what

Foucault said about regimes of truth: every mode of production produces the type of knowledge that supports it.<sup>22</sup> At one point it was not clear whether the Iraqi War was about the settling of old scores with Saddam Hussein as George W. Bush junior complained that Saddam Hussein hated his father.

Even supposing that the war in Iraq was to prevent genocide, as the neo-liberal perspective convinced the world, how many Iraqi people have died since that war ended?<sup>23</sup> After Saddam Hussein was toppled, Iraq turned into a land of lawlessness.<sup>24</sup> Whose security are the USA and its alliance protecting in Iraq? The disintegration of the Soviet Union rendered the US as the sole global hegemon. This opened opportunities for the expansion of the free market economy. The USA's New World Order was set. This order is the USA's economic order. The global hegemon sets rules as well as values to be followed by the world; states that do not follow the rules are considered a threat to world peace. Therefore, peace has to be secured through violence. This has been the case with Afghanistan<sup>25</sup> and elsewhere American interests are perceived to be at stake. Those countries that fail to dance according to the US tune are declared terrorist states whose leaders have to be punished.

South Africa's regional interests fit well into the US global interests. At regional level the USA has assigned certain hegemonic states to police the globe. In the Middle East Israel was ironically formed with the support of the British hegemon on Palestinian territory. The Israeli state treats Palestinians as foreigners in the land of their birth. The Palestinians are maimed, killed, displaced and imprisoned. In justifying the Israeli atrocities on the Palestinians the dominant mode of production has produced religion

as a type of knowledge to support Israel. Religion plays a crucial role in convincing Christians that the present territory of the state of Israel was given by God to His chosen people. What crime did the Palestinians commit that they deserved to be God's outcasts and suffer such atrocities in the land of their birth?<sup>26</sup> Ironically, it is not Israelites but Palestinians who are called terrorists by the neo-liberal leaders (co-incidentally the same term that was used for black South Africans when they were fighting the apartheid system).

The old and new South Africa with its strategic security position for the interests of the dominant mode of production was, and still serves US' interests in the Southern African region. As a result, South Africa defines the regional order. Without its consent regional initiatives will fail. This was the case in the joint intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) by Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia only a month before South Africa did the same in Lesotho.<sup>27</sup> The lesson learnt from the DRC episode is that states collaborate when they have common interests but that there is no collaboration when hegemonic interests are at stake.

Given this broad analysis of the behaviour of the hierarchical state system, let us see how South Africa entrenches its dominance and that of the ruling class at the expenses of the masses of the Basotho by using the political crisis in Lesotho. It is important to realise that squabbles over the limited resources have always been at the heart of the political crisis in Lesotho, where the ruling class have fought among themselves over these resources, and have sidelined the ordinary people. And yet in this crisis it is the ordinary masses who become the victims.

Political conflicts in Lesotho are an historic phenomenon which seems to rely more on coercion than on the ballot box to settle disputes. It is vital to trace these events from an historical perspective to ascertain their impact on the post independent state. This will show how violence has been a persistent phenomenon. It will also show how Westphalian state sovereignty has been problematic to the Basotho people, but because it is copied from the dominant mode of production, the ruling class continues with its implementation. As observed in Chapter Three the ordinary masses have taken other measures to render the state sovereignty irrelevant by crossing the boundaries to find places which offer them better living conditions. This action disproves the statist approach that there is no alternative to the system.<sup>28</sup>

### **The supremacy of instruments of coercion over the ballot box**

In the 1970 general elections, the ruling party, the Basotho National Party (BNP) lost to its main opponent the Basotholand Congress Party (BCP). The BNP refused to relinquish power and deployed security forces (the police force) to suppress its opponents. It nullified the election results and suspended the constitution. In response the BCP organised its supporters and armed them to fight the BNP regime. But the BNP easily suppressed the resistance because the BCP was poorly organised and its supporters were inadequately trained for military intervention.

Five years later, assisted by the South African government the BCP formed its military wing the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA). The LLA carried out sabotage activities on economic installations throughout the 1970s and the

1980s. This type of power struggle demonstrates that access to state political power does not depend on the ballot box but rather on the barrel of the gun. This has been the main feature of Lesotho political development especially from 1970 to 1998. The security forces, as we shall see in this chapter, have played a significant role in Lesotho power politics.

These power politics also underline the military intervention of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in the country's civil conflict. Furthermore, it is important to note that Lesotho's geo-political situation has also played a role in its political crisis. The geo-political situation can be analysed from two main aspects: First, from the perspective of the country's underdevelopment caused by its dependence on South Africa. Second, the direct interest of the hegemon in Lesotho's political and economic development was premised on keeping the country as a source of cheap labour for its economic development. In the recent years the hegemon became interested in Lesotho's Highland Water.<sup>29</sup>

### **South Africa's hegemonic interests in Lesotho**

As the regional hegemon South Africa has vested interests in the political developments in Lesotho. Lesotho's geo-political position is critical to South Africa, as a result any government that does not cooperate with the hegemon is considered "rebellious."<sup>30</sup> Furthermore any political instability in Lesotho has both economic and political repercussions. This is seen in Lesotho's 1970 elections, Lesotho's support for South Africa's liberation movements during the apartheid era, and the 1994 to 1998 political conflicts. The 1998 political crisis has its basis in the long history of antagonism between BCP

and BNP, especially because of the BNP's characteristic reliance on the armed forces in the 1970s.

In the 1993 elections the BCP won a landslide victory in all 65 constituencies.<sup>31</sup> Some of the opposition parties led by the BNP declared the results null and void. They protested that the elections had been rigged, for example, by inclusion of what they claimed were names of non-existent people on the voter's roll.<sup>32</sup> Further they contested that the ballot papers were designed in a manner that votes cast for other parties appeared on the BCP ballots. The opposition initially wanted the regional hegemon to intervene, in fact to assist in the formation of a government of national unity. They also contested the election in court, where they lost the case.<sup>33</sup>

The protest itself should be seen as a strategy to facilitate the intervention of the security forces who had always been politically closer to the BNP. Thus in March 1994 some low ranking officers in the army requested a 100% salary increase. They knew it would be impossible to meet this demand because it was too high. It was suspected that the request was not really about salaries because if it were so, it could have been made during the tenure of the military regime which had only been handed power a year earlier.

This issue divided the army into two factions. As a result, a violent clash broke out between the two factions. Unable to control the situation, the government requested that the SADC intervene. On the basis of the request, Botswana, the RSA and Zimbabwe pledged a mediatory role to resolve the conflict.<sup>34</sup> The conflict was resolved with recommendations that the army be restructured and retrained. Aware of the threat to the fragile democracy in

Lesotho, the three SADC states (Botswana, the RSA and Zimbabwe) formed a body called the Troika with the mandate to be guarantors of democracy in Lesotho. This was embedded in the Memorandum of Understanding signed by the three countries and the government of Lesotho.<sup>35</sup>

The Memorandum of Understanding was a crucial agreement between the Lesotho government and the Troika. Although it was a government elected by the Basotho masses, it failed to consult the people. Instead the ruling class interest (in the four states) prevailed over Lesotho's electorate. This diminished the right of the Basotho to participate in their affairs as the Memorandum of Understanding constituted the first formal step in the handing over of their country's sovereignty to foreign powers. The Memorandum meant that the Basotho were sidelined from the solving of their own political problems, and that such a right was vested in the "Troika".

In essence the Memorandum signified the fact that all the concerned parties agreed that the Lesotho government did not have effective control over its state institutions, especially the security apparatus. Thus the Memorandum handed effective governance to the Troika. It meant that Lesotho's political decisions would always be taken by these foreign powers as indeed subsequent developments would prove. In essence one of the most important attributes of a sovereign state was lost.<sup>36</sup> In whose benefit was the Memorandum?

The ruling class in Lesotho and the Troika had the right to determine when to intervene in Lesotho's political conflicts. This Memorandum secured the

power of the ruling class in Lesotho. This confirms the suggestion that hegemony supports any government in Lesotho that does not contradict or oppose its interests. On the other hand the Memorandum gave the hegemon the intervening power on issues which were deemed to cause instability. The Memorandum eroded Lesotho's sovereignty on two levels: at statist level, the Memorandum meant that Lesotho's state interests could be subordinated to the hegemon's.

However, the Memorandum secured the ruling class's power to govern. The Memorandum meant that the Basotho people would no longer be able to decide on what was beneficial to them.<sup>37</sup> The Memorandum exposed an important element about sovereignty: that the concept is fluid. It changes to fit a particular class. For instance, considering the definition that 'sovereignty is an exclusive right for the state to exercise authority over its own affairs'<sup>38</sup> and this case of the Memorandum, the ruling class does not have the exclusive right to exercise authority over its own affairs. The illusiveness of sovereignty here is that the Troika was given the right to intervene in Lesotho's political affairs. By implication the Basotho cease to have this exclusive right and as such lose sovereignty.

However, it is important to observe that the Troika was meant to protect the same sovereignty. Whose sovereignty was protected? The Memorandum secured the right of the ruling class to govern and therefore the ruling class's sovereignty was protected. With regard to this, the contradiction inherent in this concept, is that where people's sovereignty is eroded, the ruling class's sovereignty is secured. However, it is important to observe how other forces

in Lesotho challenged the effectiveness of the Memorandum because they felt excluded.

In addition to its appeal for intervention against the election results from South Africa, the opposition also asked King Letsie III to form the government of national unity. The King took advantage of the situation and demanded the reinstatement of his father as the monarch, notwithstanding that when his father had been dethroned by the military government the issue was never raised then.<sup>39</sup> In August 1994 the King announced that he had suspended the constitution and dissolved the government.<sup>40</sup> While there may be several reasons for the King's intervention, the main one appeared to be the refusal of the BCP government to re-instate his father, Moshoeshe II, to the throne.

In response to the overthrow of the government, the BCP leadership requested the South African Development Community (SADC) to intervene. Botswana, the RSA and Zimbabwe were given the responsibility to again intervene. Through the pressure from these three countries, the masses of Basotho people and the international community the democratically elected government and the constitution were reinstated within a month.

From the foregoing a pattern emerged that both the government and the opposition in Lesotho recognised the central role of South Africa in resolving what seemed like the country's political crisis and yet it was the ruling class's crisis. Thus South Africa's hegemonic power was acknowledged. By requesting South Africa's intervention in the crisis, the ruling party in Lesotho and the opposition effectively ceded the Basotho's

sovereignty to South Africa. What is common in both cases is that the erosion of state sovereignty was not material to them as both the government and the opposition were only interested in state power from whence they would advance their class interests. It is also important to observe that in these episodes the SADC provided a critical cover for South Africa's interest which played a leading role in all political crises in Lesotho.

Despite efforts to restructure the army in Lesotho, as long as the army and the other security forces remain pro-BNP, the young democracy (the right for the Basotho to decide their fate) would always be at risk as the two incidences of violent clash between the two factions of the army and the dissolution of the government by the King, discussed above indicate.<sup>41</sup> Furthermore, the BNP knew that it would always rely on that base (the army and the police) to destabilise the government and force it to succumb to its demands for power sharing. The security forces were the BNP's bargaining chip as it did not have the mass support to defeat the BCP through elections. Subsequent developments further showed that the security forces were a menace to the BCP government and laid bare the ineffectiveness of the Memorandum. This signifies the fact that the ruling class's sovereignty is in essence the erosion of the Basotho's rights. The BNP's leading clique felt that it had the right to be included in governing too without considering the will of the people. The following incidents (detailed below) further show that the security forces's support of the BNP was a menace to the people's rights and these incidents also challenged the effectiveness of the Memorandum.

In early 1995 junior members of the Lesotho National Security Service (NSS) rebelled against their senior officers whom they accused of collaborating with the ruling party.<sup>42</sup> By the middle of 1995, prison officers also went on a go-slow in protest against the appointment of a senior officer charged with the integration of former members of the LLA with the prison service. The integration was viewed as infiltration of the former BCP army personnel into the prison force and was unacceptable.<sup>43</sup> In October 1995 dissident police officers killed three senior police officers they accused of siding with the government in police matters and this was followed by a full-blown police strike.<sup>44</sup> The army was called in to quell the strike<sup>45</sup> after failed attempts to arrest the suspects in the police murder case.

In all these episodes one tendency is discernible – junior officers rebelled against their seniors. This is also seen in the activities of the army. Central to the rebellion is the accusation levelled against senior officers by junior officers that the former supported the government. This makes apparent the allegiance of junior officers to the BNP. Furthermore, the security forces had learnt from previous experience that in all successful and failed *coups d'état* junior officers were always the planners and executors. Therefore a pattern had emerged in which senior officers were always at the mercy of their juniors. A similar dependence on junior officers was evident in the military government.<sup>46</sup> These junior officers expected the same dependent relationship from the BCP government. Whenever the BNP complained about the outcome of the elections, the security forces would complain about their senior officers in order to bring instability in the forces. This instability always impacted on the executive since the officers would not render efficient service to the government.

It is important to observe that the junior security officers were guaranteed regular salary increases at the time of the military rule. A failure to fulfil this promise resulted in a military coup. This guaranteed salary increment was not assured by the civilian government. This led to conflict of interests between the two.

### **The BCP split and the formation of the Lesotho Congress of Democracy (LCD)**

In 1997 the BCP leadership headed by Ntsu Mokhehle<sup>47</sup> was no longer in control of the party and internal disputes arose as potential successors struggled for power. The party split and the veteran founder of the party, Ntsu Mokhehle, with a big majority support in parliament formed a new party called the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) and established a new government. The Lesotho constitution does not condone nor support the issue of floor crossing, but it accepts that the majority of parliamentarians can form the government.<sup>48</sup> Therefore, aware of the silence of the constitution on this matter, the LCD took advantage of the constitution and formed the new government. Members of the BCP protested against the action and declared the LCD's government unconstitutional. In this protest BCP was supported by the BNP and other opposition parties as they demanded the formation of a government of national unity. The opposition took the case of the formation of the new government to the high court and lost<sup>49</sup> and so the protests failed.

In the subsequent 1998 elections, the LCD won 79 seats, while the BNP won one seat.<sup>50</sup> The opposition formed by the BCP, BNP and Marema-Tlou

Freedom Party (MFP) complained about electoral irregularities and declared the whole process fraudulent.<sup>51</sup> In order to allay the complaints of the opposition, South Africa sent the then Deputy President, Thabo Mbeki, to mediate between the Lesotho opposition and the government. Mbeki and the two sides (government and opposition) agreed to institute a commission of enquiry headed by a South African judge, Pius Langa, in early August 1998.<sup>52</sup> Impatient for the results of the Langa Commission the opposition started mobilising supporters as they assembled at the Royal Palace grounds to protest against the election outcome. The opposition also appealed to King Letsie III to dissolve the LCD government and form a government of national unity in preparation for new elections.<sup>53</sup>

Aware that it would not be easy for the King to take such unconstitutional steps the BNP used its traditional connections to acquire armaments for its youth. The youth went “amok” terrorising opponents.<sup>54</sup> Roads leading to Maseru city centre were blocked, businesses closed and workers forced out of offices.

In one incident, demonstrators forced their way into the parliament building, leading to its closure after parliamentarians were temporarily held hostage. The opposition had requested permission to march to the Palace grounds to hand over a petition to the King. Although their permit was for a few hours the demonstrators refused to leave the Palace grounds as more people joined in.<sup>55</sup>

Sent to forcefully remove the demonstrators from the Palace, the police had their vehicle fired at from the demonstrators as it approached the Palace.<sup>56</sup> It

was uncertain who was responsible for the shots, however it occurred in the presence of members of the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) guarding the Palace. This indicated that the army, or at least some elements within it, supported and armed the opposition. Because of this the police failed to quell the demonstrations at the Palace. Over days demonstrators increased at the Palace grounds and attacks on ministerial and other vehicles also increased.

The situation deteriorated as the security forces turned a blind eye to illegal actions by the opposition, the former claimed that they were political events and therefore the army had no right to intervene. On the other hand the government supporters regrouped on the roads outside the city and were not allowed to enter the city by the army, arguing that this was to avert a potential clash between them and the opposition. In actual fact, however, this gave the opposition more space and time to disrupt business activities closing shops and other businesses.

When the government realised that it had completely lost control of Maseru, the administrative capital, the Prime Minister wrote a letter to the Troika requesting assistance in a form of military intervention.<sup>57</sup> Rumours spread that the commander of the army had bought himself a farm in South Africa at the cost of one million Rands and that he was seen regularly in the company of some government ministers.<sup>58</sup> All this misinformation was intended to discredit the army commander and to agitate the army to rebel against him. Soon these allegations bore results as on the 11<sup>th</sup> September 1998 twenty-nine high ranking officers of the army were arrested and

imprisoned by junior army officers. Later released and forced to resign from the army, they fled to South Africa.<sup>59</sup>

Given this chaotic situation in Lesotho, the South African government sent the then Minister of Defence, Joe Modise, and some high ranking South African National Defence Force (SANDF) officers to mediate between the rebelling group of soldiers and the army hierarchy in Lesotho. The focus of the mediation was reinstatement of the expelled senior army officers and amnesty for the dissident group within the army.<sup>60</sup>

But the rebels frustrated the efforts to peacefully resolve the conflict: each time the South African mediators left after an agreement had been reached, the rebels would secretly consult with the opposition parties who would advise against the implementation of the agreement.<sup>61</sup> This marked the end of the prospects for a peaceful solution to the conflict or schism within the army.<sup>62</sup>

Meanwhile, the Langa Commission was expected to give its findings on 9<sup>th</sup> September 1998. But it was delayed as the Report had to first be submitted to the SADC leaders at their Summit in Mauritius.<sup>63</sup> When the Report was made public on 17<sup>th</sup> September it was ambiguous on crucial issues. For instance, it elaborated on numerous administrative irregularities in the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) conduct during the elections. And yet, it concluded that these irregularities were not so serious as to render the election results invalid.<sup>64</sup>

The fact that the Report was not forthright on whether there was or was not rigging or whether or not the opposition had lost the elections, coupled with the delay in releasing the Report, was used by opposition to allege that between the 9<sup>th</sup> and the 17<sup>th</sup> September the Report was “doctored”<sup>65</sup> to protect the LCD. This was also reinforced by the Report’s conclusion that LCD should be respected as the de facto government. Thus the Report angered the opposition and left them feeling that the SADC and particularly South Africa was impartial in the dispute. This led to further deterioration of the situation in Lesotho.<sup>66</sup>

On the morning of the 22<sup>nd</sup> September 1998 an announcement was made through Radio Lesotho that there was no government in Lesotho. The announcement was accompanied by a request to King Letsie III to form a government of national unity.<sup>67</sup> This precipitated the SADC’s military intervention in the political crisis.

### **The Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) military solution to Lesotho’s political crisis**

On the morning of 22<sup>nd</sup> September 1998 South African National Defence Force (SANDF) troops reinforced by helicopters entered Maseru.<sup>68</sup> South African mass media announced that the intervention force was a joint South African and Botswana operation sent under the terms of the 1994 Memorandum of Understanding. The intervening army had a clear mandate:

- Disarm and contain all armed groups that threatened the de facto government, security and stability of Lesotho;
- Take control of military and other strategic installations; and

- Protect the territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Lesotho.<sup>69</sup>

In order to achieve these objectives the army had to recapture the Royal Palace, suppress the mutineers and secure the Katse Dam.<sup>70</sup>

The SANDF was divided into four groups and deployed to the following places: the Palace; Makoanyane Barracks; Ratjomose Barracks and Katse Dam. At the Ratjomose Barracks, the base of the rebels, the rebels did not put up any resistance but instead fled in panic. At the Makoanyane Barracks a battalion of 30 soldiers was caught by surprise as they prepared to change duty. Apparently the SANDF had been misinformed that the rebels were at this barracks and as the troops landed they went on a spree, shooting in all directions. The LDF members who were about to be relieved ran in panic as they fought for survival.<sup>71</sup> This group, which was held hostage, resisted for almost three days as more reinforcement came to rescue SANDF members who had not expected any resistance. Two LDF members were killed in that fierce fight.

Also caught by surprise was the LDF garrison at Katse Dam situated hundreds of kilometres from Maseru, and the centre of the events. Four SANDF helicopters were dispatched to the dam where eighteen LDF members were killed with little resistance.<sup>72</sup>

The arrival of the SANDF troops at the Palace led the protestors to disperse in all directions as shots were fired in the air. The fleeing crowd initially provoked by what they considered to be a South African invasion ran amok

and looted South African owned shops and set fire to South African registered vehicles. A good part of the Maseru businesses district was destroyed by arson and looting.

The intervening army concentrated on military targets and ignored the looting. Initially the police watched not knowing which side to join, but later were seen using their service vehicles also in looting. The houses of the Deputy Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister among others, were also set on fire. Later in the day as chaos continued some members of the LDF reached Roma where the houses of the Prime Minister, the Minister of Finance and local Members of Parliament were also looted and set ablaze.<sup>73</sup> The mayhem extended to the towns of Mafeteng, Mohale's hoek, Maputsoe and Butha-Buthe. The youth went on a spree of hijacking vehicles which were driven recklessly and over turned, often resulting in the killing of the occupants as the frenzy of looting and destruction, fuelled by intoxication from alcohol looted from bottles stores, got out of control.

The National University of Lesotho had to close while foreign students fled to Ladybrand. Owners of foreign businesses and other foreigners in fear of being targets also escaped to Ladybrand. The chaos resulted in an influx of around 4,000 refugees to Ladybrand.<sup>74</sup> Hospitals, in particular the Queen Elizabeth II in Maseru, filled with casualties sustained in the frenzy.

By the time the SADC Force<sup>75</sup> took control and restored law and order a lot of damage had been done. Since businesses including factories were burnt down most commodities could not be bought in Lesotho. So for many weeks people crossed the border to Ladybrand to buy goods. Thousands of people

were left without jobs. South Africa claimed that nine of its soldiers had died, while Lesotho lost 18 soldiers. The Lesotho Chamber of Commerce and Industry estimated the loss in stock to be R158 million while damage to property was estimated at R87 million and these were 6021 job losses.<sup>76</sup>

Given the above facts South Africa gained commercially from the destruction of businesses in Lesotho because shortage of commodities left the people with no option but to buy them at nearby South African towns. The de facto government was restored and the opposition was represented in parliament, as we shall see. Accessing commodities in South African towns meant extra travelling expenses for the ordinary people. Furthermore, they lost jobs due to looting and burnt businesses and factories. Therefore the intervention eroded their means of living and increased poverty. In this manner the SADC intervention brought a political ‘solution’ to Lesotho which only benefited the ruling class but worsened the living conditions the ordinary masses.

Once law and order had been restored through the intervention of South Africa’s Minister of Safety and Security, Sydney Mufamadi, the opposition and the re-instated government returned to the negotiation table. South Africa was considered to be partial to the whole conflict and the opposition resented this. On the 1<sup>st</sup> October 1998 the South African mass media repeatedly announced that the Deputy President Mbeki was going to make an important speech concerning political development in Lesotho.<sup>77</sup> On the same Thursday and Friday the opposition and the government were involved in serious talks about the way forward. The talks were supposed to continue until the Monday of the following week. The discussion continued on Friday

and adjourned at 7.30 p.m. for Mbeki's speech. To the consternation of everybody Mbeki announced that the parties in Lesotho had agreed that while the LCD would continue to govern, an Interim Political Authority (IPA) composed of two members of each party would be formed to prepare for the next elections to be held within 15 to 18 months.

The announcement was completely out of line with what the parties had been discussing. However, to the shock of the participants the chairperson of the meeting, Minister Mufamadi, apparently aware of what the speech would be about, told the participants after the announcement that there was no other alternative to what the Deputy President had announced.<sup>78</sup> For the LCD to be recognised as the government was a great achievement and the opportunity to prepare for the elections after a year was no big trade off.<sup>79</sup> That the opposition was forced to accept the LCD as the government was a blow, and an acknowledgement of defeat. At the same time the consolation was that the opposition would be represented in the IPA, which offered some form of power sharing with the government. There was also the gain of monthly salaries for those who would be members of the IPA.

The IPA was given the task of restructuring the First-Pass-The Post election model (FPTP) to blend it with the Proportional Representation model (PR).<sup>80</sup> This was a long-term achievement for the opposition because a number of members of the opposition parties would become parliamentarians and therefore draw salaries and other benefits from state coffers. This opportunity was to a large extent not possible under the FPTP. More importantly the PR model would ensure representation for thousands of people who vote for the opposition but would not have been represented in the old system.

It is critically important to state that although the intervention was claimed to be SADC sponsored, most of the initiatives and proceedings were single handedly undertaken by South Africa. This brings us to the question: why did South Africa use the cover of the SADC when, in practice, it was solely in charge of the situation in Lesotho?

### **New South Africa: more continuity than change**

South African's regional interests date back to the colonial era. States in the region were formed to advance South Africa's economic interests. In pursuit of these interests, apartheid South Africa was known for its aggressive foreign policy against its neighbours. The people of this region had hoped that a democratic South Africa would meaningfully contribute to the development of their countries. Hence they felt obligated to support the South African liberation movements that wished to overthrow apartheid. But the new South Africa has brought continuity rather than change. Why South Africa's aggressive foreign policy has been retrieved and given a new name in a democratic dispensation – intervention.

South African's intervention policy in Lesotho and elsewhere should be viewed within the context of the pursuing and enhancing of its interests in the region through domination. To analyse this, it is necessary to revisit the process that led to the military intervention. The regional hegemon, South Africa did not seek the authority of the UN's Security Council before taking the decision to intervene militarily.<sup>81</sup> Besides, the issue was never decided in any of the SADC meetings prior to the intervention.<sup>82</sup> Furthermore, the decision to intervene sharply contrasted with South Africa's stance on a

similar situation in the civil conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in August of the same year. In the DRC's case Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola had decided to intervene without the authorisation of the SADC. South Africa vehemently denounced military intervention and advocated a negotiated solution to the problem.<sup>83</sup>

Why this sudden change in South Africa policy orientation in the case of Lesotho? In 1998 South Africa had no economic interests in the DRC and therefore its policy was based on "principles"<sup>84</sup>. In Lesotho, principles could not be applied because the hegemon had immediate economic interests. Apart from this, around the period of the DRC intervention South Africa and Zimbabwe were engaged in a power struggle over the control of the SADC and its structures. Zimbabwe was in charge of the SADC Organ on Politics Defence and Security while the RSA was in charge of the organisation. This tussle between Zimbabwe and South Africa fits with what Gramsci would refer to as the exhaustion of the full potential of an old power and the emergence of a new power.<sup>85</sup> Prior to South Africa's membership in the regional body, Zimbabwe was regarded as the leading power or state in the SADC. In the post-apartheid era South Africa was without doubt the emerging power.

Therefore South Africa, on account of its economic and military power, assumed the leadership role in the SADC to the dismay of Zimbabwe. Thus, South Africa's stance on the DRC situation had little to do with a principle but more to do with the hegemonic competition between itself and Zimbabwe. It can therefore be argued that in this case political interests were the motivating factor for this stance.

What interests did the hegemon have in Lesotho? One of the mandates of the intervention force was to keep security and stability in Lesotho. It is important to note the gap between the arrival of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) and The Botswana Defence Force (BDF) in Maseru. The SANDF entered Lesotho earlier on the morning of 22<sup>nd</sup> September 1998 while the BDF arrived in the afternoon of the same day. While chaos already existed in Maseru before the BDF's intervention, burning and looting started when opposition supporters were dispersed from the Palace by the SANDF. However, the destruction continued unabated without any intervention on the part of the SANDF on that first day.

It is also important to note that there were a number of other army barracks in Lesotho other than Ratjomose and Makoanyane, yet some SANDF personnel armed with phosphorous bombs were sent to Katse Dam. Records indicate that the highest number of members of the LDF were killed at this garrison.<sup>86</sup> It is also crucial to note that the mutineers were stationed at Ratjomose and that there were about 40 mutineers. It is therefore wrong to conclude that the whole LDF personnel apart from the officers who escaped to Ladybrand had mutinied. The other evidence is that there were other LDF personnel assisting Minister Modise in negotiating with the mutineers. But these facts were not considered in the intervention operation. The group stationed at Katse had nothing to do with the events in Maseru and yet while this garrison did not put up a resistance against the SANDF, its soldier was slaughtered in cold blood.

One of the most important conditions of military intervention is to minimise the loss of lives. As pointed out, unlike the resistance at Makoanyane barracks the Katse garrison did not put up any resistance. On these grounds it becomes apparent that the SANDF failed to execute its mandate. It failed to secure property that was looted and burnt. It failed to secure lives of the supporters of the government against the rampaging members of the opposition. Riots expanded to other towns before unaffected thus highlighting the fact that the intervention failed to protect the stability of Lesotho. It is clear that the SANDF's main focus was the Katse Dam, taking into consideration the type of weapons used there and the number of LDF personnel killed.<sup>87</sup>

South Africa has spent billions of Rands on the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP)<sup>88</sup> and yet a large percentage of the rural Basotho has no access to clean water. The project was crucial for South African industrial centres in Gauteng. So, insecurity of this project was considered a threat to South Africa's industry. But what threat did the 40 mutineers at Ratjomose pose to the dam several kilometres away? Speculations that the mutineers could have sabotaged the dam seem to be the only answer. Therefore the Katse Dam was what South Africa wanted to secure, not property or human lives in Lesotho. Thus the intervention was not humanitarian by any standard.

Lastly, the 1998 military aggression was not condemned, while those which took place in Lesotho during the Apartheid era in 1982 and 1985 were. The reason for this was that the new democratic South Africa was pursuing regional order. The regional hegemon was enhancing the interests of the

world hegemon, as other dominant states have the same interests in the global free market economy. The failure to condemn the military action, further indicates that the democratic South Africa has over shadowed the Basotho's sovereignty to the extent that the international community did not recognise the country as a sovereign state but rather as the backyard of South Africa.<sup>89</sup> Thus by implication South Africa has the right to put things in order in its territory. All these events have shown how the Basotho have been marginalised by the state system and have had their sovereignty eroded.

### **Summary**

South Africa's economic and massive military power has given it leverage over other states in the region. Given this position, the regional hegemon dictates what kind of order must prevail in the region. While the regional hegemon claims its policy principles are guided by support for the regional democracy, one of the worrying aspects is its use of military force in solving regional conflicts. The result of this force is the undermining of the people's rights, the destroying of their living conditions and the dictating of their fate. Recalling South Africa's past use of force in the region in protection of "Christian values" against the "communist onslaught"<sup>90</sup> one sees the same order being pursued in the guise of the defence of democracy. However, under this guise of democracy the hegemon fails to account for its "silent diplomacy"<sup>91</sup> concerning the Zimbabwean political crisis or the suppression of democratic organisations in Swaziland. Therefore, regional democracy in the context of the hegemon is not based on principles but on its economic and political interests. This has serious implications on the Basotho's sovereignty.

The 1998 military aggression in Lesotho should be viewed against the background of South Africa's economic interests in the region as a whole. This event eroded the Basotho's sovereignty and imposed a type of order (or democracy) in Lesotho that benefited the ruling class (in this case both the elites of the opposition and the ruling party represented in the PR electoral model). On the other hand ordinary people in Lesotho did not benefit at all from this development while their taxes subsidised enlarged state institutions. In comparison with other countries in Lesotho is the most over-represented in the region. This has nothing to do with improving the Basotho's living conditions other than satisfying the needs of those who have been demanding a government of national unity and of securing the power of the ruling party.

What does this national unity have to do with the welfare of the Basotho? In reality the majority of the people have been excluded from sharing in the resources. This is the essence of state sovereignty that the regional hegemon is also supporting in Lesotho, under the guise of upholding "democracy" in the region. Whose democracy is this? Firstly, it serves the ruling class. Secondly, it serves the hegemon because it secures its interests in Lesotho. That is as long as the ruling class does not engage in a power struggle there will not be any presumed threat to the Lesotho's Highlands Water Project. Thirdly, the 1998 military intervention meant the surrender of the Basotho's decision-making processes to its hegemonic neighbour to the extent that even the ruling class does not have a final say in major political decision without South African authorisation. By implication Lesotho's political

decision is dependent on the hegemonic interests, not on the interests of the Basotho.

Fourthly, the kind of order that the intervention brought in Lesotho serves the dominant mode of production too. The LHWP has been constructed with billion of Rands from international organisations. The interest of these organisations in the project is that the water will be used in South African industries where the dominant states have huge investments. This fact explains why the intervention was not condemned by the system, since it also secured its interests.

Lastly, this case study proves as noted earlier in this chapter that under the Westphalin state sovereignty there is a hegemonic class in society. The interests of this class are linked to those of its alliance at regional and global levels. Its interests are therefore secured by this alliance. In this context ruling class's sovereignty is not state bound, but internationalised. On the other hand this system erodes the welfare of the subordinate class – ironically the majority of the people – by limiting their interests to state borders. The SADC intervention undermined the fact that true security can only be achieved by people and groups if they do not deprive others of it.<sup>92</sup> The state's security as the modern form of social organisation is not capable of bringing any social equity as one social class is secured at the expense of another. This form of social organisation deepens the social polarisation.

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **CONCLUSION**

Chapter One of this thesis analysed the orthodox perspective on state sovereignty. It argued that the realist paradigm based on hegemonic discourse produces both a socially dominant class and state. The domination is based on hegemony in world politics. The hegemony produces knowledge that sustains itself and subordinates the rest of the society. From this perspective sovereignty serves the function of guarding the interests of the privileged few who are coincidentally the most powerful.<sup>1</sup> In this regard state sovereignty and its underpinning institutions are meant to maintain this status quo. While realism accept hegemonic discourse as the given framework premised on ruling historic bloc,<sup>2</sup> it is challenged by Critical Theory which throws into sharp relief a change in development based on a counterhegemonic paradigm.

The latter paradigm exposes the nature of the hegemonic discourse based on the fact that a small part of society dominates a large part and it is characterised by exclusion in social development. This polarizes the society as some members are given access to resources and better opportunities to develop is denied to others. It argues that state sovereignty with its social segregation hinders other members of society to explore their skills and

abilities to develop and to benefit the rest of the society. In this manner social inequality engenders injustice. With regard to these facts critical theory concludes that the hegemonic discourse is immoral as it practises exclusion and particularity. As a result a counterhegemonic paradigm's main task is to seek intervention in this polarised world politics<sup>2</sup> by advocating a more just and emancipatory society that caters for the freedom and development of individuals and groups. This challenge is based on the fact that institutions of state sovereignty are historical and social constructs.<sup>3</sup> Thus they can be reconstructed to meet the demands of a more just society based on freedom for all. It is within this context of a just society that Chapter Two discussed the formation of Basotho traditional society and analysed how it was characterised.

Chapter Two elaborates on the formation of the Basotho society and draws the conclusion that it differs from Westphalian society in many aspects. It reveals that the traditional Basotho society was inclusive in character and its territorial boundaries were open, allowing people the freedom of choice to become its members. This is in contrast with what happened during the colonial period when boundaries were designed in order to force or assimilate people into areas where they did not want to be, while excluding some. Therefore in contrast with Westphalian state sovereignty, the borders of this society served a contrary purpose.

Furthermore, the chapter observed that groups of people formed one community because they were united by common interest founded on common security. The weak and poor social members were provided with the means to survive. This highlights a moral aspect of the community in

which even those who joined it voluntarily were provided with the means of survival. This further reveals another positive aspect of the traditional society: that social responsibility was to eradicate poverty not to enrich other members through the subordination of others. Indeed the *raison d'être* of society was to eliminate poverty as a source of insecurity. Security in this sense meant the creation of opportunities of survival for all. The operational principle therefore was not exclusion in the sense of protecting the interests of a particular class in society, but was inclusive of all. This fundamental characteristic of Basotho traditional society distinguishes it sharply from Westphalian sovereignty whereby the dominant group survives at the expense of subordinate groups.

Moreover, the fate of the community was decided at common gatherings where opinions were canvassed and decisions taken democratically. This aspect is devoid of the class domination intrinsic to Westphalian society whereby decisions are taken by the dominant class. Traditional democracy also differed from Liberal democracy which represents the interest of the chosen few.<sup>4</sup> Furthermore, this community was managed through the interests of the whole society and not through the influence or consent of a hegemonic mode of production.

The thesis in Chapter Three further discussed the activities of the state sovereignty institutions in an attempt to show that the system's underpinning organisations conceal its unjust character. This chapter discussed the SACU as a case study and argued that the Westphalian state institution divides society by serving the interests of a particular class while sidelining the majority of society. It argued that decisions taken at this institution give an

impression that every concession made by the hegemonic state (RSA) benefits the other member states and presumably their people too. However, the chapter argued that these benefits do not trickle down to the masses, instead their living conditions are eroded while simultaneously opportunities for state institutions to survive at the expenses of the people increase. This renders the ruling class as the sole beneficiary of participation in the SACU. Moreover, the chapter showed how the institution (SACU) perpetuates the subordination of the Basotho to the domination of the hegemonic class and state by failing to articulate their interests.

In this context the SACU demonstrates a contradiction in that while member states in this organisation are continuously gaining with every new agreement reached, the living conditions of the ordinary people on the other hand continue to deteriorate. Furthermore, the increasing shares for the SACU member states are the reason for the strengthening of the border controls so that the state's security is assured for attaining more shares.

In a nutshell these extra measures to tighten border controls limit opportunities for the people of these states to seek a means of livelihood elsewhere. The contradiction of state sovereignty here is that while there is increasing cooperation and integration between the member states leading to the improvement in the sharing of their wealth, their people are forced by the artificial border into further isolation and denied the right to share their common resources and wealth. This contradiction exposes the fallacy that state sovereignty is premised on people's welfare. From a critical international relations perspective, this chapter, therefore, showed that the

SACU is founded on the basis of promoting social injustices and therefore like other immoral social constructs has to be deconstructed.

In Chapter Four it is argued that the state system displays its injustices by projecting knowledge selectively to conceal its character. The SADC military invasion in the political crisis in Lesotho is presented as an intervention. But the results of this intervention point to the contrary as a lot of property was destroyed causing an enormous loss of jobs and people were killed, although the professed intention was the protection of lives and property. Despite these negative results the chapter argued that the event was used by both the hegemonic class in Lesotho and South Africa as a campaign for restoring democracy and order in Lesotho.

Critical theory therefore challenges the conventional definition that democracy is the rule of the people by the people and for the people. It contends that such a democracy where people lose their lives and their living conditions deteriorate cannot be equated to people's rule. In this context the theory challenges the liberal discourse which conceals who gained from "the reinstated democracy". The critical international relations perspective shows that it was not the ordinary people who benefited but the ruling class in both Lesotho and the RSA along with the other elites in the opposition parties in Lesotho.

The crux of this chapter therefore showed the hegemonic discourse uses knowledge to support its domination. This knowledge conceals the essence of the state system as its portrayal that the threat to the ruling class interests is a threat to the whole society is contrary to the truth.

### **The role of critical theory**

Critical international relations was used as an analytical tool and informs the methodology of this thesis which aims to find a new approach. The intention is not merely to fill the gap created by the mainstream international relations or realist theory, but to introduce a critical element to this discipline. This can only be achieved through a theory that introduces a methodology that does not exclude other people from social development but empowers them to fulfil such roles. This is a theory that strives for a just society based on creating conditions for universal freedom.<sup>5</sup>

Critical theory, therefore, challenges the orthodox thinking that the sovereign state is the sole nucleus of identity and vehicle of security. It views this thinking as exclusionist because it particularises security to certain states and class. Critical theory denounces this thinking which pursues security for these states at the expense of others. This inevitably creates insecurity for the excluded<sup>6</sup> as well as the included<sup>7</sup>. It denotes that states are boundary-confined, but humanity is broader and not territorially confined. Thus critical theory focuses on humanity as a concept that cuts across all social relations. It strives to bring peace to all in the world, despite different cultures, languages and factors.

In a nutshell, the view of critical thinking is that the security of the southern African community is not rooted in the liberation of South Africa from the atrocities of apartheid and the ushering in of a democratic society, as the liberal perspective would like people to believe.<sup>8</sup> The type of democracy experienced in post-apartheid South Africa and the regional order it strives

for continues to sustain state sovereignty at the expense of regional people. This manifests clearly in demands by ANC supporters for better services and it was acknowledged by the organisation at its National General Council (NGC) in July 2005 that the unrest protests the masses signify the failure by the government to respond to the demands of the electorate.<sup>9</sup> This implies that realist discourse is deceiving when it advocates that South Africa can afford the luxury of better lives for regional people while it fails to offer better conditions to its own people. It is also imperative to observe that a few weeks before the July 2005 NGC the party (ANC) regarded the protests as the work of a 'Third Force'. Thus the example shows how the champions of the regional democracy and order were forced to swallow a bitter pill and accept the reality. In the same context of accepting the reality, one wonders how long it will take for South Africa to accept that it is its weapons (among others) that fuel war in the DRC in contrast with its regional conflict mediation role.<sup>10</sup>

The theory therefore argues that the continuing dominance of the RSA is a source of regional insecurity.<sup>11</sup> This is premised on the fact that critical theory views security as a quest for autonomy and emancipation. Security is regarded as the absence of violence, war, poverty, political oppression, poor education and other factors.<sup>12</sup> The absence of these problems that hinder free human development will bring a just and secured society. In this manner counterhegemonic discourse is a departure from the traditional strategic security which is static, exclusive and particularistic in contrast with critical security discourse which is general as it cuts across all human social relations and all communities.<sup>13</sup> This therefore means that a community is not differentiated by race, geo-political location, culture or any characteristic

that would bring any form of discrimination and subordination. In this regard the theory further reacts against the conventional tendency to associate community with the state or nation<sup>14</sup> which is premised on either race, culture, territorial location and others. Ironically it is the same Westphalian community that discriminates against people despite categorising them in the same race, culture and territorial location.

The continuous defying of borders by the regional people in their search for a living will force the statist discourse to accept that the Southern African Development Community based on state sovereignty can never resolve the problems faced by the regional community nor will it be able to destroy what unites this community. The inevitable is that state driven interests will always contradict people's interests. This is demonstrated practically by the people in the region who cross the artificial borders in search of better living conditions. This is an indication that the state discourse is not sustainable, as it is not derived from practice.

Critical thinking further challenges the orthodox paradigm and its view that the traditional African community was backward and barbaric. Chapter Two of this thesis has exposed this fallacy. It argued that given the many positive aspects of this community it would be for the good if they were incorporated into modernity to make it more democratic and emancipatory. Modernity derived from the West has contextualised this community as barbaric and this view must be rejected in all its forms for the simple reason that it was not premised on the Western thinking of perpetuating the interest of a particular mode. Critical theory denounces this mode of thinking as

exclusive and unjust because it considers other people's way of life as bad while it promotes a particular life style.

Moreover the theory scrutinises the role of orthodox security studies particularly in the context of the destruction incurred by the South Africa hegemon in the southern African region. The region continues to be held hostage to the traditional school of thinking that states and their institutions offer the only alternative to a better secured community. This analysis undermines the tragedy that the region went through and continues to face as old habits repeat themselves in the democratic South Africa.<sup>15</sup> It is on this basis that Vale argues that people are trapped in promises of false community that replicate the unhappy memories of the past premised on coercion as the natural way of state survival. This has set the precedent that it is the normal way for the world to function and exist.<sup>16</sup>

On the other hand the thesis argues that it is difficult to pinpoint where a particular community starts and ends. However it proposes that the southern African people have three concrete historic interactions that set bases for one community. First its pre-colonial interactions; second the interaction resulting from mineral discovery in South Africa; and third its common threat by the apartheid system. These and other factors are foundations for a single community.

In conclusion this thesis intends to demonstrate that the hegemonic discourse is an obstacle to independent foreign policy in Lesotho, not in the context of the domination of the ruling class asserting its rule but in the context of the freedom of the majority of the people in Lesotho to decide on the policies

that will cater for their well-being. An independent foreign policy would give the people of Lesotho the right to choose what will benefit themselves as well as the regional people they have so much in common with and to forge a real regional community without any exclusion, as was the case with the traditional Basotho community. Therefore, this thesis makes a departure from the orthodox school that views the future of the Basotho as part of the RSA, as a tenth province or as benefiting from a democratic South Africa. This view is premised on the state system and various authors and analysts tend to see this as an alternative for the Basotho. This thesis argues that as long as these two elements of state sovereignty or any other state based system exist there will never be any freedom of decision-making and benefits for the Basotho or the regional people.

This also links to the argument that the Basotho's political, economic or social problems cannot be resolved in isolation from other regional problems because there are no people who will benefit or be secure in this region while their neighbours are suffering. This is the lesson that the apartheid system has shown the region, that we all have a common fate and coincidentally the post-apartheid South Africa is sending the same message too.

## NOTES

### CHAPTER 1

<sup>1</sup> Territorial demarcations in Africa took place as a result of the European colonial rule that divided people among small states with the intention of showing that those people who are excluded from a particular territory are foreign to those who are included. As a result those who are excluded are bound to have special permission (passports) to enter the territory of those who are included. This exclusion basically indicates that the excluded are different from the included. However, these demarcations did not consider (many of) similarities in African societies such as linguistic, cultural and other factors. As a result some members of the same society have been separated and instead have been included with others who have a completely different language and culture. While this segregation may be considered to be based on race, as in the case of the former apartheid South Africa whereby segregation was argued to perpetuate purity of race and cultural differences, in African societies some states are formed with the exclusion of societies which have the same race and culture. Thus segregation loses even that essence on the issue of apartheid see Hund and Van Der Merwe, "Ideology and Politics in South Africa: A Social Science Approach," pp. 82-88.

<sup>2</sup> The South African province of Free State has a large population of Sesotho speaking people as a result of the historical exclusion of these people from Lesotho. In order to strengthen the link and their cultural identity with their fellow Basotho in Lesotho, they have formed a cultural organisation called "*Mokhahla oa Thesele*" translated as Thesele's blanket. (Thesele is another name for Moshoeshe I). This organisation celebrates Moshoeshe Day under the chairmanship of the MEC for Culture and Technology in Free State every year. King Letsie III is usually represented by one Principal Chief from Lesotho at the Free State celebrations. This organisation participates in the mourning day of the former monarch Moshoeshe II, which is held at Thaba-Bosiu in Lesotho the 15 January yearly. See the constitution of *Mokhahla oa Thesele*, 11 November, 1998.

<sup>3</sup> Reference is made to neo-realism and neo-liberalism which are rooted in the traditional theory of problem-solving as these paradigms take the world order as it is, with the prevailing social and power relationships and institutions into which they are organised, as a given framework for action. Neo-liberalism and neo-realism work within this order and serve to preserve it thereby perpetuating existing inequalities of power and wealth. These theories are conservative as they maintain the status quo. See Evans and Newnham, 'Critical Theory and Postmodernism' in *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations*, pp. 106-108

<sup>4</sup> *ibid.*, pp.106-107.

<sup>5</sup> Critical theory is used as the philosophy that questions the prevailing social and political order which uses a method of immanent critique. See Richard Devetak, "Critical Theory" in *Theories of International Relations*, pp.145-146.

<sup>6</sup> The two aspects of Marxist theory are interrelated in the sense that dialectical materialism talks about social consciousness, while historical materialism deals with social development. Social consciousness develops as a result of the given material conditions and history plays a vital role in this regard because knowledge is gathered from a long process of historical experience. See Apostolova, Latev and Slavov in *Marxist-Leninist Philosophy*, pp. 35-144.

<sup>7</sup> Hegemonic theory is based on the premises of Marxist philosophy because hegemony analyses societal developments from a historic perspective. Marxism views history as a long process which is interrelated. And this process is made by society. Marxism argues that classes appeared at one given level of social development and that the driving forces in the history of social development are classes. These classes are reflected by different relations to the means of production. Classes that own the means of production are dominant in society and play the role of social hegemon in the society. Other classes are subordinated to the interests of the ruling class, the hegemonic class. Analysing from the same perspective Gramsci argues that at the international level there is a state that dominates others because of its economic power. As a result of this power, that state plays a hegemonic role as other states at the lower hierarchy of the international system are subordinated to the interests of the hegemonic state. See Apostolova, Latev and Slavov, "Origins and Essence of Classes" in *Marxist-Leninist Philosophy*, pp. 207-210. Cox and Sinclair, "Gramsci, hegemony, and international relations: an essay in method in *Approaches to world Order*, pp. 135-137.

<sup>8</sup> One of the established schools of thought is Neo-Liberalism, which argues that the state should not interfere in the running of the economy and that the market forces should regulate prices. This school is dominant in the present globalisation era because it

supports the US hegemony in dominating the world market since the policy favours the US's penetration of the other states' market. This theory supports the present mode of production. See Adar and Ajulu, "*Globalization and Emerging Trends in African States' Foreign Policy-making Process*", pp. 4-5.

The other school of thought is Neo-Realism which argues that the international system is dominated by states and that states are egoistic in character. Each state wants to maximise its interests at the international level and as a result the system is anarchic in character. Therefore, there is a need to bring order to the system. The state that is capable of bringing order to the system is the one with the military power to suppress others as it sets rules and regulations to be followed by others and punishes those who fail to follow the rules. Such military power plays a hegemonic role according to Neo-Realism. This theory also supports the present mode of production as it argues for subordination of other states to the present dominant state, *ibid.*, 4-5.

<sup>9</sup> Foucault explains the interdependence of the two phenomena in that every power chooses the type of knowledge that it needs for its support and existence. Therefore, knowledge is carefully selected from a wide spectrum of knowledge so that such knowledge that is not needed by the existing power is left out. In this regard knowledge enshrines power interests. See Devetak in "Postmodernism" in *Theories of International Relations*, pp.180-184.

<sup>10</sup> Neo-Realists derive the concept of hegemon from the balance of power. They argue that hegemons arise and use their military strength to create sets of political and economic structures and norms of behaviour that enhance the stability of the world system which also advances their own security. Realism believes that the system is anarchic in character hence a need for the hegemonic state to restore order. See Krieger in *Handbook of International Relations*, pp. 354-355.

<sup>11</sup> Historical Materialists derive the concept from economic power. From this perspective a state that has the economic power dominates others and as a result it leads the world system as other states accept its leadership and emulate its behaviour. They accept rules set in its interests. What is important here is that the hegemon leads by consent while coercion is limited. See Cox and Sinclair in "Gramsci, hegemony, and IR: an essay in method" in *Approaches to World Order*, pp. 125-126.

<sup>12</sup> The concept of dictatorship is not used in the sense of coercion, but in the context of domination of other classes and giving them direction. It is used here to mean leadership with the consent of other classes, *ibid.*, pp. 125-126.

<sup>13</sup> The petty bourgeoisie is interested in transition to the capitalist mode of production so that it can benefit from this mode as it will serve its business interests. The landlords are

members of a class which has acquired a large portion of the land in the feudal system. Transformation to the capitalist mode will benefit this class, since the chiefs have the right to allocate and to confiscate land when they deem it necessary. The peasantry is interested in the capitalist mode because of small perches of land allocated to them by the chiefs, yet the chiefs have large areas of land. Lastly the small working class has an interest in the capitalist mode because it provides them with jobs and conditions to sell their labour. Against all these classes there is the chieftain class which possesses land by birth-right and the law gives chieftainship the right to increase its land by confiscating more from other people if land is uncultivated for a period of over three years. In this manner the chieftain class benefits from the feudal system. See Lesotho Land Act 1979.

<sup>14</sup> Gramsci gave the state a wider meaning than the traditional composition of the administrative, executive and coercive apparatuses by bringing in other institutions through which the state influences its citizens. See Cox and Sinclair, "Gramsci, hegemony, and IR: an essay in method" in *Approach to World Order*, p. 126.

<sup>15</sup> *ibid.*, p.127.

<sup>16</sup> Lenin applied the concept of dictatorship at class level in the society and used it to mean leadership with the consent of the allied classes. Gramsci used the concept of hegemon in the same sense but gave it a wider meaning when he applied it at the international level to refer to the leadership of a given state through its domination and subordination of other states, *ibid.*, p.127.

<sup>17</sup> The term "domain" is used by Devetak to imply the dominant mode of production or the dominant social system. The term refers particularly to the present capitalist mode of production. See Devetak, "Postmodernism" and "Violence" in *Theories of International Relations*, pp. 182 and 194-196.

<sup>18</sup> Critical theory exposes another aspect of violence from the orthodox meaning that simplifies violence as a bad phenomenon, yet the hidden meaning is that it is through violence that states exist. This implies that the moment violence ceases to exist states will also die, but because of the interests of the domain violence is perpetuated purposely so that states continue to exist to benefit the hegemonic mode, *ibid.*, pp. 194-195.

<sup>19</sup> Boundaries are meant to create fear in excluding and including people so that those who are excluded fear those who are included. This fear is created for the benefit of the domain. *ibid.*, pp.196 –197.

<sup>20</sup> By implication critical theory suggests that if people were free to move and stay where they can make a better living without being hindered by boundaries there would not be

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any violence nor segregation caused by identity and as a result there would not be any sovereign states. This further implies that sovereign states are sources of violence among mankind and therefore are negative phenomena, *ibid.*, pp.194-196.

<sup>21</sup> Lesotho's elite is fractured. The first part of the stratum uses the government as a means to accumulate wealth. This is the ruling class. This stratum is engaged by government departments as ministers, ambassadors and other high-ranking posts where the opportunities for accumulation are higher. The reason for this is that unlike in countries with relatively developed economic sectors, government is the leading vehicle for accumulation in Lesotho given its poor economic base. The second part of the elite is employed in the parastatals as the managers of the institutions. This is particularly discernable after the privatisation of government service institutions as more qualified personnel are required at highly attractive remunerations. The third part of the elite participates in the institutions of higher learning as the managers and lecturers. Due to the semi autonomous status of these institutions the posts offered have a relatively higher remuneration compared with government posts. The last part of the elite forms part of the brain drain. This part is employed in foreign countries, particularly South Africa, whereby it enforces the erosion of Lesotho's sovereignty and re-enforces South African hegemony on Lesotho. This stratum also takes advantage of the affirmative action policy as it is employed in high posts in South Africa. In all these cases this stratum is using these advantages to transform from an elite to a class with similar interests as the ruling class in Lesotho.

<sup>22</sup> Hegemonic theory refers to an enlarged state at international level. This is different from what Gramsci refers to as wider meaning of the state at nation level whereby he is referring to institutions which help in building behavior and expectations in accordance with the interests of the ruling class. Here the theory refers to all the states that have committed themselves to serve a particular mode of production and in this case they look like one big state, but divided into different territories. See Cox and Sinclair, "Gramsci, hegemony, and IR: an essay in method" in *Approach to World Order*, p. 132.

<sup>23</sup> Gramsci observes the magnitude of the influence by the hegemonic order as so powerful that in the subordinate states it is emulated and entrenched unconsciously, *ibid.*, p. 134.

<sup>24</sup> In as much as Neo-Realism and Historical Materialism do not view the role of the hegemon in the same manner, both theories agree that the phenomenon eliminates conflicts. Neo-Realism sees the hegemon using military power to eliminate conflicts. Critical theory argues that it uses hegemonic influence by setting rules and regulations consistent with its interests and those of the subordinate states. Furthermore, the subordinate states emulate the leader, so there will be no conflict of interests. See Krieger in *The Oxford Companion Politics of the World*, p. 354.

## CHAPTER 2

<sup>1</sup> Both Neo-Realism and Neo-Liberalism explain sovereignty from the statist perspective through which the concept is interrogated in a manner that serves the status quo. Whereas critical theory with its emancipatory approach interrogates the concept outside of the state system and tries to apply it in International Relations in a normative way. See Evans and Newnham, “Normative theory” in *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations*, pp. 382-383.

<sup>2</sup> The concept of sovereignty reflects differences in ideology and political priorities and as such there is little neutral ground when it comes to this concept. These differences in ideology and political priorities are the main areas of contest in different paradigms as some theories try to defend the state system and others denounce it as discriminatory and subordinatory in character. See Krieger, “Sovereignty” in *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, pp.789-791.

<sup>3</sup> This definition of sovereignty entails claims that the state is autonomous in foreign policy and is an exclusive competent in internal affairs. In practice there is no such state. See Evans and Newnham, “Sovereignty” in *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations*, pp.504-505.

<sup>4</sup> It is important to recall that Realist theory also argues that states are egoistic in character and they pursue their domestic interests at the international level hence the international system is anarchic. This is due to the same argument that states do not have limits to their behaviour as part of sovereign manifestation. But in practice states are limited in their behaviour of pursuing their domestic interests at the international level and in the manner that they treat people within their domestic jurisdictions, *ibid*, pp.504-505.

<sup>5</sup> The concept of sovereignty was derived from the Peace of Westphalia Treaty in 1648. This Treaty ended hostilities in the Thirty Year War in Europe. The Treaty recognised a society of states based on the principle of territorial sovereignty. It established the independence of states and emphasised that each state had jurisdiction rights, which all other states had to respect. See Evans and Newnham, “Westphalia Peace of 1648” in *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations*, pp. 572-573.

<sup>6</sup> The argument raised by Weber on different perceptions of sovereignty is important particularly when considering Matlosa’s observation of people’s sovereignty. Weber argues that sovereignty has many perceptions depending on the interests that the concept is serving. See Weber in “Postmodernism” in *Theories of IR*, pp. 183-184.

<sup>7</sup> Weber argues that sovereignty is not a fixed concept and that like any political concept or institution its functions, competences, and legitimate privileges change over time. This argument in essence suggests that the concept is flexible and it change functions and,

competences to serve particular interests. In this regard the argument implies that in as much as it serves the interests of the ruling class it can change functions and serve the interests of the subordinate class – i.e. people-centred, *ibid.*, pp. 183-184.

<sup>8</sup> Matlosa uses the concept of sovereignty as people-oriented in the manner that the concept serves the majority of the people or the subordinate class. Vale on the other hand instead of using sovereignty talks of regional community in the same context used by Matlosa. In this context Vale too refers to the majority of the people or the subordinate class. See Matlosa, “The Dilemma of Security in southern Africa: The case of Lesotho” in *Security and Development in Southern Africa*, p. 87 and Vale, *Security and Politics in Southern Africa: The Regional Dimensions*, pp. 135-143.

<sup>9</sup> Matlosa draws a difference between state sovereignty and people’s sovereignty by comparing state sovereignty to state security. At the same time he observes that people’s security depends on people’s sovereignty. In other words absence of well-being signifies the absence of security. See Matlosa in “The Dilemma of security in Southern Africa: The case of Lesotho” in *Security and Development in Southern Africa*, p. 87.

<sup>10</sup> Vale argues that southern Africans are united by shared history but the state system has separated them into different states making them different people. He further argues that this community (southern African) is united by shared concerns and this is above the state system’s concern. See Vale in *Security and Politics in Southern Africa: The Regional Dimension*, pp. 135-143.

<sup>11</sup> Matlosa’s observation is that Lesotho’s sovereignty is whittling away due to its penetration by foreign powers. These foreign powers have rendered the well-being of the Basotho more difficult because they do not have the rights to decide what suits them. He is mainly referring to the reliance of the Lesotho government on the “Troika” for stability. See Matlosa, “The Dilemma of security in Southern Africa: The case of Lesotho” in *Security and Development in Southern Africa*, p. 88.

<sup>12</sup> Heller and Sofaer believe that the participation of the state in international organisations as well as the signing of international conventions is not eroding sovereignty instead it strengthens sovereignty as this participation secures the existence of such a state. But the strengthening of the state sovereignty does not answer who gains under that state security. The argument is raised from the statist perspective. See Heller and Sofaer in “Sovereignty: The Practitioners’ Perspective” in *Problematic Sovereignty*, p. 45.

<sup>13</sup> British colonial power’s rush to conquer more territories was also motivated by the fact that the Portuguese had established themselves in the present Mozambique and Angola; and the Germans in Namibia. These colonial powers were threatening British interests in the region for more land conquest. See Blumenfeld, *Economic interdependence in Southern Africa: From conflict to co-operation*, pp. 19-20.

<sup>14</sup> The discovery of mineral resources in South Africa led to the destruction of the traditional way of life (subsistence farming) in the southern region. The colonial power hindered the economic development of this so that the indigenous people could contribute their cheap labour for the development of the regional powerhouse – South Africa. See Phillip in “The Future of the Migrant Labour System: A NUM Perspective” in *The New Post-Apartheid South Africa and its Neighbours*, pp. 83-87.

<sup>15</sup> The formation of the Union in 1910 marked the beginning of the formation of a Western type state in Africa. This also marked the first territorial demarcation of Africa into states in the form of the European style. See Vale in “Dissenting Tale” in *Theory, Change and Southern Africa’s Future*, p. 21.

<sup>16</sup> The British efforts to unite the Boer Republics with the rest of the country was motivated by the discoveries of minerals in Kimberly and Witwatersrand between 1867 and 1884. The idea was that after the formation of the Union the British colonial power could strive for more territorial conquest in other parts of the region hoping to explore more mineral resources there, while such discoveries would contribute to the Union as the centre of the colonial economic base in the region. However, negotiations to unite the Boer Republics with the rest of the country failed resulting in two Anglo-Boer Wars. But before the Union was formed, the British colonial power was already exploring opportunities to discover minerals in other parts of the region ahead of other colonial powers. See Blumenfeld in “Economic causes of the Boer War” in *Economic Interdependence in Southern Africa: From Conflict to Cooperation?* pp. 20-22.

<sup>17</sup> It is important to note that territorial conquest is not independent from mineral discovery. These two phenomena are interrelated in the sense that conquest was driven by the desire to discover minerals resources or labour that would assist in tapping such minerals. In order to have claims on such mineral resources it was imperative for the colonial power to lay claim to the territory first. For that reason the British striving for regional colonisation was first initiated by the discovery of minerals in the Boer Republics, followed by the efforts to bring these republics under their colonial rule while at the same time striving to conquer other territories. See Blumenfeld in “The extension of the British colonial rule” in *Economic Interdependence in Southern Africa: From Conflict to Cooperation?* pp, 19-20.

<sup>18</sup> Blumenfeld is referring to the rush for colonial divisions of Africa and observes that although there were two centres of British colonial power in Southern Africa the centre built around Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland was also meant to support the main centre, which was South Africa. See Blumenfeld in *Economic Interdependence in Southern Africa from Conflict to Co-operation*, p. 42.

<sup>19</sup> The decline in regional economy is a result of the industrialisation of South Africa and its prosperity is premised on the fact that the region’s traditional way of life was destroyed by the impact of the modern cash economy in South Africa. The indigenous people deserted their subsistence style economy as they were forced by the colonial rule to pay taxes and the only way to do that was to work in the industries in South Africa.

See Phillip in “The Future of the Migrant Labour System: A NUM Perspective” in *The New Post-Apartheid South Africa and Its Neighbours*, p. 83.

<sup>20</sup> Passes were among several mechanisms of control introduced in South Africa which made the indigenous people foreigners in the land of their birth. See Vale in *Security and Politics in South Africa: The Regional Dimension*, p. 46.

<sup>21</sup> Boli argues that the state derives its sovereignty from the ultimate source of authority, which is the people, and it exercises that sovereignty on the people’s behalf. See Boli in “Sovereignty from a World Polity Perspective” in *Problematic Sovereignty*, p.70.

<sup>22</sup> See Ajulu in Lesotho’s Changing Electoral Geography 1965-1993 in *Democratisation and Demilitarisation in Lesotho. The General Elections of 1993 and its aftermath*, p. 4.

<sup>23</sup> See Selinyane in “Defending Fragile Democracy in Post-Cold War: Lessons from Lesotho” in *Review of Southern African Studies*, p. 76.

<sup>24</sup> See Foucault, “Postmodernism”, in *Theories of International Relations*, pp.194-195.

<sup>25</sup> See Davis in *A History of Southern Africa*, pp. 12-13.

<sup>26</sup> In the southern part of Lesotho there is a large community of Xhosa speakers who use Sesotho as their second language. In the northern part there is a community of Ndebele speakers too. These two communities joined the Basotho at the time of Difaqane, but they have kept their languages and culture although they have integrated into the Basotho nation. See Lye and Murray in *Transformations on the Highveld: The Tswana and Southern Sotho*, p. 14.

<sup>27</sup> The Difaqane wars were started in the present Kwazulu/Natal by the Nguni tribes between Ndwandwe and Shaka and the wars spread to the rest of the southern part of Africa. Many communities were destroyed as some formed new communities. See Sanders in *Moshoeshoe: Chief of Sotho*, pp. 24-25.

<sup>28</sup> Moshoeshoe I grew up in a relatively normal situation whereby his leaders discussed issues and took decisions democratically. This style of decision-making had a great influence on his future leadership. See Thompson in *Survival in Two worlds: Moshoeshoe of Lesotho 1786-1870*, p. 2.

<sup>29</sup> The *mafisa* system was very influential in attracting followers to Moshoeshoe I particularly those who fled the war leaving live-stock behind, because live-stock played an important role in traditional life. See Eldredge in *A South African Kingdom: The Pursuit for Security in 19<sup>th</sup> Century in Lesotho*, p.34.

<sup>30</sup> All these territories today form part of the Free State province, *ibid.*, pp. 42-46.

<sup>31</sup> The Sesotho name for the Caledon River - Mohokare (means deep inside our territory) shows that the Basotho were never happy with their territory given to the Settlers by the

British colonial power. See Eldredge in *A South African Kingdom: The Pursuit for Security in 19<sup>th</sup> Century Lesotho*, p. 50.

<sup>32</sup> See Vale on security in *Security and Politics in South Africa: The Regional Dimension*, p. 36.

<sup>33</sup> See Khabele Matlosa, “The Dilemma of Security in Southern Africa: The Case of Lesotho” in *Security and Development in Southern Africa*, p. 84.

<sup>34</sup> *ibid.* p.86.

<sup>35</sup> See Devetak in “Postmodernism” in *Theories of International Relations*, pp. 194-197.

<sup>36</sup> See Eldredge in *A South African Kingdom: The Pursuit of Security in Nineteenth-century Lesotho*, p. 94.

<sup>37</sup> In 1880-81 the Basotho fought the Cape government because they refused to hand over their guns to the Cape government as these guns were considered to make the Settlers insecure. This resulted in the Gun War. See Eldredge in *A South African Kingdom: The Pursuit of Security in nineteenth-century Lesotho*, p. 154.

<sup>38</sup> See Matlosa, “The Dilemma of Security in Southern Africa: The Case of Lesotho” in *Security and Development in Southern Africa*, p. 87.

<sup>39</sup> See Vale in *Security and Politics in South Africa: The Regional Dimension*, pp.136-143.

## CHAPTER 3

<sup>1</sup> See Taylor, *Stuck in the Middle GEAR: South Africa's Post-Apartheid Foreign Relations*, pp. 29-31.

<sup>2</sup> The protectorates were the three British colonies of Bechuanaland, Basotholand and Swaziland that were economically integrated into the Union of South Africa in 1910. See Aye in *Journal of African Studies*. Vol. 15 No. 3&4 1988, p. 63.

<sup>3</sup> See Vale in *Security and Politics in South Africa: The Regional Dimension*, pp. 194-195.

<sup>4</sup> The percentages allocated to the three minor member of the SACU show how unfair the sharing formula was. In fact they serve as a sign that the organisation was intended to benefit the hegemon, not the other members. Another problem was that it was never mentioned why the minor members' shares were not equal. See Swatuk in “Lesotho: Walking the Highwire between Rhetoric and Reality in Foreign Policy” in *Small States: Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Southern Africa*, p. 44.

<sup>5</sup> See Bardill and Cobble in *Lesotho: Dilemmas of Dependence in Southern Africa*, pp.73-74.

<sup>6</sup> See Ayee in *Journal of African Studies* Vol. 15 No. 3&4 1988, pp. 63-65.

<sup>7</sup> See Urnov in *South Africa against Africa*, pp. 12-13.

<sup>8</sup> Before the independence of the protectorates, Britain had left its influence well secured in the leading elite or traditional institutions like the monarchy to perpetuate its legacy. Lesotho was a constitutional monarchy with the prime minister as the head of government. The Westminster type of government in Lesotho was a duplication of the British model. See <http://print.infoplease.com/ceb/people/A0845740.html>. Botswana was a democratic republic with the president as head of the government. The President, Sir Seretse Khama, was a British scholar, and had married a British national while studying there. In opposition to his marriage to a British woman, he had to forfeit his throne. See <http://ubh.tripod.com/bw/sKhama.htm>. Swaziland was a constitutional monarchy and in 1973 the King assumed all powers. It relies on its traditional type of government as an absolute monarchy. However, King Sobhuza II was educated at a British school in the Eastern Cape Lovedale. See <http://print.infoplease.com/ceb/people/A0845740.html>. This school was one of the earliest colonial schools for higher education in Southern Africa. It produced most of the first black regional intellectuals.

<sup>9</sup> Ian Taylor in analysing the participation of the RSA in a number of international organisations observed a tendency of South Africa of accepting reforms in these organisations. He argues that instead of interrogating the essence of such organisations the South African government accepted reforms in them and by so doing the government was accepting their legitimacy to exist although in essence these organisations were cheating the developing world. See Taylor in *Stuck in the Middle GEAR: South Africa's Post-Apartheid Foreign Relations*, p. 166.

<sup>10</sup> Gramsci observes that when the hegemonic power has entrenched itself the subordinate states must find the hegemony's interest universal and compatible with their interest. See Cox and Sinclair in "Gramsci, hegemony, and International Relations: an essay in Method" in *Approach to World Order*, p. 136.

<sup>11</sup> See Bardill and Cobble in *Lesotho: Dilemmas of Dependence in Southern Africa*, pp. 72-74.

<sup>12</sup> The compromise by South Africa in working out the formula for calculating the revenue was considered an achievement by the minor partners because they could calculate their revenue using the formula. Therefore these states felt that the hegemon was serving their economic interests too. See Cox and Sinclair on the role of hegemony in "Gramsci, hegemony, and International Relations: an essay in method" in *Approach to World Order*, p. 136.

<sup>13</sup> See Bardill and Cobbe in *Lesotho: Dilemmas of Dependence in Southern Africa*, p. 73.

<sup>14</sup> *ibid.*, pp.72-73.

<sup>15</sup> See Maasdrop in *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*. Vol.2 No. 1, 1982, p. 85.

<sup>16</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 90-91.

<sup>17</sup> See Matlosa, “Overview of Labour Markets and Migration Patterns in Southern Africa” in *Migration and Development in Southern Africa*, pp. 35-36.

<sup>18</sup> In 1990 Namibia became independent and became the fifth member of the SACU. Namibia was formerly a German colony. But after the defeat of Germany in the First World War, in 1920 the territory was handed over to the Union of South Africa as a caretaker on behalf of the League of Nations. South Africa ignored the Agreement giving it the mandate of administering the territory and reporting to the League and instead governed South West Africa (SWA) as a colony until 1990 when it became a sovereign state.

<sup>19</sup> See Lesotho’s Ministry of Trade and Commerce: *SACU Agreement 2002*.

<sup>20</sup> See Matlosa, “Overview of Labour Markets and Migration Patterns in Southern Africa” in *Migration and Development in Southern Africa*, p. 38.

<sup>21</sup> Blumenfeld argues that substantive trade is that which are transacted between countries with at relatively the same level of development, which will allow them to compete on equal basis. He further argues that in the situation where the economic levels are not the same the more developed state will inevitably benefit more. See Blumenfeld in *Economic Interdependence in Southern Africa: From Conflict to Co-operation*, p. 42.

<sup>22</sup> See, FAO Report, “Training HIV/AIDS Orphans Sub-Saharan Africa,” *Public Eye* (Maseru), Friday May 13<sup>th</sup> – 19<sup>th</sup> 2005, p. 13.

<sup>23</sup> See Matlosa in “The Dilemma of Security in Southern Africa: The Case of Lesotho” in *Security and Development in Southern Africa*, p. 87.

<sup>24</sup> See The Year Output on Number of Mineworkers by Office in TEBA, 2005.

## CHAPTER 4

<sup>1</sup> See Lesotho Clippings Post-Electoral Crisis Vol. 2 November 1998, “Lesotho Death Toll Rises to 66,” *Mail and Guardian* (Johannesburg), September 23,1998. p. 16.

<sup>2</sup> Peter Vale, *Security and Politics in South Africa: The Regional Dimension*, pp. 49-55.

<sup>3</sup> *ibid.*, p. 108.

<sup>4</sup> Some authors in writing on International Relations do not consider the contribution of cheap labour provided by South Africa's neighbouring states to its economy. Instead export of labour is considered to reduce their rate of unemployment. See, Blumenfeld, *Economic Interdependence in Southern Africa: From Conflict to Co-operation*, p. 33.

<sup>5</sup> In 2001 Lesotho's economic growth rate was estimated at 3.5% and yet there was a remarkable decrease in other indexes that directly affect ordinary people such: as life expectancy as a result of HIV/AIDS, an increase in unemployment, an increase in street children, high crime rate and others. See Sootho, "Wrinkles of Development in Lesotho to be Ironed," in *The Lesotho Monitor* Vol: 2 No. 1 January-February 2003, pp. 19-27.

<sup>6</sup> See "Anti-ANC Rage Rising," *Mail and Guardian* (Johannesburg), May 20-26, 2005. p. 22.

<sup>7</sup> See "Five years on, the People are Speaking their Minds," *The Star* (Johannesburg), Wednesday June 1, 2005, p. 6.

<sup>8</sup> See Foucault, "Power, Knowledge", in Postmodernism in Burchill et al., eds., *Theories of International Relations*, pp. 181-184.

<sup>9</sup> Sejanamane, "Dependency and the Foreign Policy Options of Small Southern African States," in Santho et al., eds., *Southern Africa After Apartheid: Prospects for the Inner Periphery in the 1990s*, p. 15.

<sup>10</sup> See "The Frontline States, SADC and Constructive Engagement," in Chakaodza et al., in *International Diplomacy in Southern Africa: From Reagan to Mandela*, pp. 65-102.

<sup>11</sup> See Vale, *Security and Politics in South Africa: The Regional Dimension*, p. 60.

<sup>12</sup> See Booth and Kant "Autonomy, Security, Community in Critical Theory" in Burchill et al., eds., *Theories of International Relations*, p. 168.

<sup>13</sup> See "Over Two Thousands Lose Jobs After Destruction", *Mopheme-The Survivor* (Maseru), October 13, 1998, p. 5.

<sup>14</sup> See "Many Lost the Hope of Finding New Jobs," *Mopheme-The Survivor* (Maseru), October 06-12, 1998, p. 3.

<sup>15</sup> See Vale in *Security and Politics in South Africa: The Regional Dimension*, p. 1.

<sup>16</sup> *ibid.*, p.24.

<sup>17</sup> See Lektorsky, "Objectiveness of Knowledge and the Possibility of a Gap between Perspective and Conceptual System," in *Subject, Object and Cognition*. pp. 174-180.

<sup>18</sup> See Devetak “Traditional and Critical Conceptions of International Relations Theory,” in Burchill et al., eds., *Theories of International Relations*, pp. 150-151.

<sup>19</sup> See Vale, *Security and Politics in South Africa: The Regional Dimension*, p. 167.

<sup>20</sup> See Foucault “Violence,” in Postmodernism in Burchill et al., eds., *Theories of International Relations*, p. 195.

<sup>21</sup> See “So Bush Did Steal the WhiteHouse,” <http://www.cosortiumnews.com/Print/112101a.html>

<sup>22</sup> Foucault “Genealogy in Postmodernism” in Burchill et al., eds., *Theories of International Relations*, pp. 185-186.

<sup>23</sup> See “Worry over Rocketing Death Toll in Iraq Attacks: Suicide Bomber wounds 15 Amid Plea for US Forces to Remain for Longer,” *The Star* (Johannesburg), Thursday June 2, 2005, p. 4.

<sup>24</sup> See “Iraqi Forces are nowhere near Close to Matching the Insurgency: ‘Blooding’ Jihadists in Iraq,” *Mail and Guardian* (Johannesburg), May 27 to June 2, 2005, p. 20.

<sup>25</sup> On this issue, for instance, the Taliban government was accused by the US as a terrorist rule in Afghanistan and was deposed, but Afghanistan remains one of the worst countries for the violation of women’s rights. See, “Taliban Gone, But Afghan Women are still Brutalised,” *The Star* (Johannesburg), May 31, 2005, p. 4.

<sup>26</sup> See “Israel Rocket Strike seen as Threat to Truce,” *The Star* (Johannesburg), Tuesday May 31, 2005, p. 4.

<sup>27</sup> See, “Crisis in Lesotho: The Challenge of Managing Conflict in Southern Africa,” ed., Lambrechts in *Foundation for Global Dialogue* Series No. 2 March 1999 N0: 2, pp. 27-28.

<sup>28</sup> See Matlosa, “The Dilemma of Security in Southern Africa: The Case Study of Lesotho,” in Nana Poku et al., ed., *Security and Development in Southern Africa*, p. 87.

<sup>29</sup> Roger Southall, “Is Lesotho South Africa’s Tenth Province?,” ed., Lambrechts in *Foundation for Global Dialogue* Series N0: 2 March 1999, pp. 23-24.

<sup>30</sup> Co-operation in this case means to pursue such policies that would not conflict with the interests of the hegemon. An example of policies that conflict with the hegemon’s interests was the support of the South African Liberation Movements in the 1990s and 1980s. See, Andrei Urnov “The ‘Total Strategy’ of Aggression and Neo-colonial Deception (March 1976-1980),” in *South Africa Against Africa*, pp. 129-157.

<sup>31</sup> See Roger Southall “Lesotho: Democracy at Gunpoint? South Africa Intervenes”, in *Southern Africa Report*, p. 12.

<sup>32</sup> Among the allegations was that some “ghost voters” had voted. *ibid.*, p. 16.

<sup>33</sup> Whether the elections were rigged or not, the BNP knew that it would be difficult for the BCP to govern without securing the support of the police and the army which were the BNP’s strong support base. So, relying on these forces the BNP knew that it would force the BCP’s government to accept its demands or face instability. See, Machobane *The King’s Knights: Military Governance in the Kingdom of Lesotho 1986-1993*, pp. 124-125.

<sup>34</sup> See “US Support Troika Investigations,” *Mopheme-The Survivor* (Maseru), September 01, 1998, p. 3.

<sup>35</sup> The Troika has the right to intervene in political problems in Lesotho any time it deems that democracy is at stake. The problem with this Agreement is that it does not really depend on the three states’ common understanding of the situation in Lesotho, but rather on RSA’s view. The events that followed later showed that the hegemon had more decisive power than the rest of the Troika members to act on what is perceived as political instability in Lesotho. See Southall “Lesotho: Democracy at Gunpoint?,” *Southern Africa Report*, p. 17.

<sup>36</sup> The attribute referred to here is the ability for the state to have control over its territory and citizens. See Krasner in *Problematic Sovereignty*, pp. 7-9.

<sup>37</sup> This will be seen by the South Africa’s then Deputy President’s speech on the 1<sup>st</sup> October 1998 when all the parties in Lesotho were negotiating the way forward after the SADC intervention in Lesotho. The speech was made without the consultation of the Basotho nation and it eventually served the interests of the ruling class through its resolutions. See Southall “Lesotho: Democracy at Gunpoint? South Africa Intervenes”, in *Southern Africa Report*, p. 15.

<sup>38</sup> See Vale *Security and Politics in Southern Africa: The Regional Dimension*, p. 38.

<sup>39</sup> King Moshoeshoe II was dethroned by the military regime in March, 1990 and his son was installed as the King in November 1990. See Machobane, *The King’s Knights: Military Governance in the Kingdom of Lesotho 1986-1993*, pp. 114-129.

<sup>40</sup> See “Smearing Palace with Blood,” *Mopheme-The Survivor* (Maseru), August 25-31, 1998, p. 2.

<sup>41</sup> The two episodes were the two-army factions fighting and the King’s coup d’état supported by the army in August 1994. See, Mothibe, “The Military and the 1994 Constitutional Crisis: A Question of Trust?,” in *Review of Southern African Studies*. Vol: 2 No. 1 February 1998, pp. 1-3.

<sup>42</sup> See Selinyane, "Security Forces and Democracy, in Defending Fragile Democracy in the Post-Cold War: Lessons from Lesotho", in *Review of Southern African Studies* Vol: 2 No. 1 February 1998, pp. 94-97.

<sup>43</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>44</sup> See "Nkeane Sterns Court in Testimony against Molise," *Mopheme-The Survivor* (Maseru), March 10-16, 1998, p. 3.

<sup>45</sup> There were allegations that South Africa would intervene militarily if the army failed to quell the police mutiny and the army acted to avoid the embarrassment. *ibid.*, p. 3.

<sup>46</sup> See Machobane in "The King's Knights: Military Governance in the Kingdom of Lesotho 1986-1993," pp. 124-125.

<sup>47</sup> The veteran BCP leader, Mokhehle was old and ailing. It was clear that he was going to relinquish party leadership and hand over power to a younger leader, but it was not obvious who that could be. As a result there was power struggle in the party. This led to the two factions supporting two potential leaders. See, "Mokhehle Reported OK!," *Mopheme-The Survivor* (Maseru), March 17-23, 1998, p. 1.

<sup>48</sup> See Sekatle, "The Establishment of LCD Implications for the 1998 General Elections" in *Lesotho Social Science Review* Vol: 3 N0: 2, pp. 75-76.

<sup>49</sup> See "Surprise Landslide for LCD: Will it be Mosisili or Maope?," *Mopheme-The Survivor* (Maseru), May 26-June 01, 1998, p. 1.

<sup>50</sup> See "Opposition Protest Election Results," *Mopheme-The Survivor* (Maseru), May 26-June, 1998, p. 1.

<sup>51</sup> See "Langa Group Fails to Round-up as it Hits a Constitutional Rock," *Mopheme-The Survivor* (Maseru), August 25-31, 1998, p. 1.

<sup>52</sup> See "Plan to Kill Supporters Foiled," *Mopheme-The Survivor* (Maseru), August 18-24, 1998, p. 3.

<sup>53</sup> See "Police Officer Killed at the Palace Shooting," *Mopheme-The Survivor* (Maseru), August 18-24, 1998, p. 1.

<sup>54</sup> See "Plan to Kill Supporters Foiled," *Mopheme-The Survivor* (Maseru), August 18-24 1998, p. 3.

<sup>55</sup> See "Police Officer Killed at the Palace Shooting," *Mopheme-The Survivor* (Maseru), September 08-14, 1998, p. 1.

<sup>56</sup> *ibid.*,

<sup>57</sup> See “Lesotho: Country Report,” *The Courier* (Belgium) Issue No. 194 September-October 2002, p. 71.

<sup>58</sup> See “Opposition Protest Election Results,” *Mopheme-The Survivor* (Maseru), May 26-June, 1998, p.1.

<sup>59</sup> In these discussions some LDF members who were aware of the rebels’ unconstitutional acts mediated together with their South African counterparts. At times this group continued the talks without South Africans. See, “S.A Defence Minister in Lesotho to intervene in the Army Fracas,” *Mopheme-The Survivor* (Maseru), September 15-21, 1998, p. 1.

<sup>60</sup> *ibid.*, p. 1.

<sup>61</sup> *ibid.*, p. 1.

<sup>62</sup> See “Langa Report in Maseru,” *Mopheme-The Survivor* (Maseru), September 15-21, 1998, p. 1.

<sup>63</sup> *ibid.*, p. 1.

<sup>64</sup> See Pule “Politics Since Independence,” Pule and Thabane eds., *Essays on Aspects of the Political Economy of Lesotho 1500-2000*, pp. 209-210.

<sup>65</sup> The opposition believed that the Langa Report was conducted in a manner that would suit the LCD. See Southall, “Is Lesotho South Africa’s Tenth Province?,” in *Comparative Monitor*, in *Indicator SA*, Vol: 13 No. 4 p. 87.

<sup>66</sup> See Matlosa, “The Dilemma of Security in Southern Africa: The Case of Lesotho,” in Poku, ed., *Security and Development in Southern Africa*, p. 97.

<sup>67</sup> It was not clear who read or compiled the broadcast at the national radio station but it was obvious that it was in support of the opposition. See, Pule “Politics Since Independence”, in Pule and Thabane, eds., *Essay on Aspects of the Political Economy of Lesotho 1500-2000*, p. 189.

<sup>68</sup> See “SADC Troops in Brick of War,” *Mopheme-The Survivor* (Maseru), October 06-12, 1998, p. 1.

<sup>69</sup> See Matlosa, “Conflicts and Conflict Management: Lesotho’s Political Crisis After the 1998 Election”, *SAPES Regional Conference Maseru*, 5-6 February 1999, pp. 22-23.

<sup>70</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 22-23.

<sup>71</sup> See “LDF Lost 18 Soldiers not 58,” *Mopheme-The Survivor* (Maseru), October 06-12, 1998, pp. 3-8.

<sup>72</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 3-8.

<sup>73</sup> See Lesotho Clippings Post-Electoral Crisis Vol. 2 November 19989, “Mayhem Spreads throughout Lesotho,” *Mail and Guardian* (Johannesburg), September 24, 1998, pp. 28-29.

<sup>74</sup> See “SADC Military Intervention in Lesotho has a Bad Aftertaste,” *Mopheme-The Survivor* (Maseru), October 05-12, 1998, p. 5.

<sup>75</sup> The Botswana Defence Force (BDF) arrived in Maseru on the evening of the 22<sup>nd</sup> September 1998. It was then that the intervention could correctly be called a SADC Force initiative, composed of the two states though it was still not representative of the organization – SADC.

<sup>76</sup> See “Many Lost Hope of Finding New Jobs,” *Mopheme-The Survivor* (Maseru), October 06-12, 1998, p. 3.

<sup>77</sup> See “Mbeki’s Statement Angers Opposition, But Fresh Elections Underway,” *Mopheme-The Survivor* (Maseru), October 06-12, 1998, p. 1.

<sup>78</sup> *ibid.*, p. 1.

<sup>79</sup> *ibid.*, p. 1.

<sup>80</sup> See “Lesotho: The Country Report,” *The Courier* (Belgium) Issue No. 194 September-October 2002, pp. 74-75.

<sup>81</sup> See “Lesotho in Crisis: Managing Conflict in Southern Africa,” ed., Lambrechts in *Foundation for Global Dialogue* Series No. 2 March 1999, p. 26.

<sup>82</sup> *ibid.*, p. 26.

<sup>83</sup> *ibid.*, p. 27.

<sup>84</sup> The issue of principles is questionable too because the RSA had political interests to oppose Zimbabwe at that time. *ibid.*, pp. 27-28.

<sup>85</sup> Cox, “Gramsci, hegemony, and international relations: an essay in method” in Cox and Sinclair, eds., *Approach to World Order*, p. 131.

<sup>86</sup> See “Crisis in Lesotho: The Challenge of Managing Conflict in Southern Africa”, ed., Lambrechts in *Foundation for Global Dialogue* Series No. 2 March 1999, p. 29.

<sup>87</sup> The Katse garrison was attacked with phosphorus bombs. *ibid.*, p. 29.

<sup>88</sup> See “Lesotho: The Country Report,” *The Courier* (Belgium) Issue No. 194 September-October 2002, p. 73.

<sup>89</sup> See Southall, “Is Lesotho South Africa’s Tenth Province?,” in *Comparative Monitor SA*, Vol. 15 No. 4, p. 88.

<sup>90</sup> The term ‘communist onslaught’ was used by the apartheid system to declare war on the Southern African Liberation Movements. It was argued that these organisations were involved in the furthering of communist aims in the region and therefore were to be destroyed to protect the Western values. The fight against the communist onslaught was concretised in the policy of aggression on regional states under ‘the Total Strategy’. Total Strategy was coordinated action in all fields: military, psychological, economic, political, sociological, technological, diplomatic, ideological, cultural, etc. See Urnov, *South Africa Against Africa*, pp. 129-156.

<sup>91</sup> See “South Africa’s ‘silent’ diplomacy,” <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/wprld/africa/2818297.stm>

<sup>92</sup> See Devetak, “Autonomy, Security, Community,” ed., Burchill in *Theories of International Relations*, pp. 167-168.

## CHAPTER 5

<sup>1</sup> See Vale in *Security and Politics in South Africa: The Regional Dimension*, p. 144.

<sup>2</sup> See Devetak, “Critical Theory”, eds., Burchill and Linklater in *Theories of International Relations*, p. 165.

<sup>3</sup> *ibid.*, p. 164.

<sup>4</sup> Liberal democracy represent the interests of the few members of the society who participate in parliament and make laws to their advantage and claim that such laws are made for the whole society. See, Parenti in *Democracy for the Few*, p. 14.

<sup>5</sup> See Devetak, “Critical Theory”, eds., Burchill and Linklater in *Theories of International Relations*, p. 167.

<sup>6</sup> Under the dominance of the Liberal democracy those states that are perceived as not sharing the same views as the Western values are considered threats to the liberal system. Such a case is the Iraqi War in 2004.

<sup>7</sup> The 11<sup>th</sup> September 2000 attack in the US and 7<sup>th</sup> August, 2005 in Britain show that the Liberal system is not immune to insecurity.

<sup>8</sup> The liberation of South Africa from the apartheid system is a reform within the state system and does not offer deep rooted social change to the lives of the South African people. Therefore it continued the status quo by introducing liberal democracy which is democracy for the ruling class. This is confirmed by the mass protests to demand for better services in different parts of South Africa cited in this work.

<sup>9</sup> See, “Courageous Bid to Reform ANC,” *The Star* (Johannesburg), Tuesday, July 5, 2005, p. 10.

<sup>10</sup> See “Illegal Supply of Arms to Militias Fuels DRC Strife, Says Amnesty,” *The Star* (Johannesburg), Tuesday, July 5, 2005, p. 6.

<sup>11</sup> See Vale, “Dissenting Tale”, in *Theory, Change and Southern Africa’s Future*, p. 19.

<sup>12</sup> See Devetak, “Critical Theory,” eds., Burchill and Linlater in *Theories of International Relations*, pp. 166-167.

<sup>13</sup> *ibid.*, p.167.

<sup>14</sup> *ibid.*, p. 168.

<sup>15</sup> South Africa’s invasion of Lesotho in 1998 is similar to its attacks on the same country in 1982 and 1985. All cases are characterised by an exercise of state domination on its weaker neighbour. It has been argued in this thesis that all these attacks reflect the Westphalian method where violence is used to sustain state sovereignty. See Urnov in *South Africa Against Africa*, pp. 129-149; and Vale on how the “The New South Africa” too continues on the path set by the apartheid system in keeping order in the region. Vale in *Security and Politics in South Africa: The Regional Dimension*, pp. 118-134.

<sup>16</sup> See Vale in *Security and Politics in South Africa: The Regional Dimension*, p. 23.

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