

**THE EVOLUTION OF A SECURITY COMMUNITY
THROUGH A PROCESS OF INTEGRATION:
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
FOR the SADC REGION**

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Abstract

This thesis examines the security problematic of African states and focuses more particularly on the SADC region. It links the security problematic with the transactionalist approach to (supra)national integration and the concept of a security community, introduced into international relations theory by Karl Deutsch and his colleagues.

In relation to the (in)security of SADC member states, the thesis attempts to demonstrate that national integration of these states (i.e. the establishment of an amalgamated security community) has at least to accompany if not precede the establishment of a security community at the regional level (i.e. a pluralistic security community).

Since threats to the security of SADC member states are mainly non-military in nature, the 'realist' concept of security is broadened to include political, economic, societal and environmental aspects of security at different levels. Furthermore, Deutsch's concept of a security community is redefined in line with the 'new security thinking' and adapted to the situation in African states.

Moreover, this thesis attempts to demonstrate that it is essential for SADC member states to become strong and socio-economically cohesive in order to improve their competitiveness in relation to developed states, especially in their ability to deal with internal and transnational/regional threats to their security, which are (in)directly caused and perpetuated by the lack of national integration, inefficient state-making and underdevelopment - the sources of their weakness.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AFORD	Alliance for Democracy
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
AMU	Arab Maghreb Union
ANC	African National Congress
ASAS	Association of Southern African States
BDP	Botswana Democratic Party
CEAO	Communauté économique de l'Afrique de l'ouest (West African Economic Community)
CEEAC	Communauté économique des états de l'Afrique centrale (Economic Community of Central African States)
CEMAC	Central African Economic and Monetary Community
CLM	Caprivi Liberation Movement
CMA	Common Monetary Area
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CONSAS	Constellation of Southern African States
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC	East African Community
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EU	European Union
EURATOM	European Atomic Energy Community
FLS	Front Line States
FLEC	Frente de Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda (Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave)

GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HDI	Human Development Index
HIV	Human Immuno-Deficiency Virus
ISDSC	Inter-State Defence and Security Committee
MCP	Malawi Congress Party
MMD	Movement for Multiparty Democracy
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OPDS	Organ for Politics, Defence and Security
RENAMO	Resistencia Nacional Moçambicana (Mozambican National Resistance)
RMA	Rand Monetary Area
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADCC	Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference
SDIs	Spatial Development Initiatives
SWAPO	South West Africa People's Organisation
UDF	United Democratic Front
UDEAC	<i>Union douanière et économique de l'Afrique centrale</i> (Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa)
UDEAO	<i>Union douanière des états de l'Afrique d'ouest</i> (Customs Union of Western African States)
UEMOA	Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine (West African Economic and Monetary Union)
UN	United Nations
UNITA	União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola)
US	United States

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1. INTRODUCTION

The history of international relations has always been fraught with tensions and wars between different (political) entities trying to survive and achieve their objectives in a precarious international environment. Therefore, it is not surprising that realist scholars, whose theoretical endeavours established international relations as a discipline in social sciences, perceived the international system as anarchical and relations between states as characterised by the struggle for power, security and survival.

The problem of the anarchical international system figured prominently in international relations in the first half of the twentieth century. The horrors of World War I and World War II (including the massive abuse of human rights, and the creation and employment of nuclear weapons with millions of victims) induced scholars to think about how to bring states and nations closer together in a way that would make war or any other form of armed conflict highly unlikely. Their idea was to integrate states into larger entities or (political) communities.

According to Haas (1973:105) the study of (regional) integration deals with how and why states cease to be wholly sovereign, and how and why they voluntarily merge with their neighbours to lose the attributes of sovereignty while acquiring new techniques for resolving conflict between themselves. This is in general applicable to all main approaches (federalism, functionalism, neo-functionalism, transactionalism) within the study of integration.¹

¹ Although theories of integration can be roughly grouped into those dealing with economic integration (e.g. formation of free trade areas, customs unions, monetary unions, and economic unions) and those dealing with political or general integration, only the latter will be the subject of this research. This is because they focus on the issue of the establishment of peace and security between various units/entities via the formation of a community or a new political unit as the

In practice, the process of integration among independent and sovereign states was first attempted in Western Europe, where initially six countries formed the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) (1951/52), European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), and European Economic Community (EEC) (1957/58). After centuries of building up an amalgamated security community² within their own borders, Western European states were able to establish a pluralistic security community among themselves through a process of integration. The European integration process seems to confirm the idea held by integration theorists that this process is a means of promoting peaceful co-operation and reducing conflict among states in various parts of the world.

Following the example of Western European states and aspiring to repeat their success, many regional organisations sprang up all over the world, including on the African continent.³ It was believed that such arrangements would contribute to the development of African states by providing bigger markets, reducing barriers to trade, pulling together scarce resources, encouraging industrialisation, and the like. However, these attempts at integration largely failed for many

ultimate objective of the integration process. The economic integration process will be discussed only in relation to the establishment of a security community.

² For definitions of a security community, amalgamated security community and pluralistic security community, see section 2.1.5.

³ Some African regional organisations established with the goal of achieving a form of regional integration in the 1960s and 1970s were: the Arab Maghreb Union – AMU (1964), Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa – UDEAC (1964), East African Community – EAC (1967), Economic Community of West African States – ECOWAS (1975), and the West African Economic Community – CEAO (1973), which replaced the Customs Union of Western African States – UDEAO (1966). At present, one can find the following regional groupings on the African continent with similar goals: the AMU (revived in 1989), EAC (revived in 1999), Economic Community of Central African States – CEEAC (established in 1983), Central African Economic and Monetary Community – CEMAC (1994), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa – COMESA (1993), ECOWAS, Southern African Development Community – SADC (1992) and the West African Economic and Monetary Union – UEMOA (1994).

reasons, one of them being the inability of African states to evolve into strong and efficient entities such as had evolved in the West.⁴

In addition to being economically viable and politically stable, Western states managed to resolve their external security problems. This was made possible by these states having a monopoly over the means of violence and the fact that their military capacity was turned outwards in defence against external enemies.

This situation differs considerably from the one in African states, which possess juridical statehood⁵ but do not always demonstrate necessary levels of empirical statehood. Their security problematic is basically a reverse image of the situation pertaining to Western states: while the external security problematic of African states was resolved, at least during the Cold War, by the sovereignty regime mostly upheld within the framework of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), internal insecurities such as regime insecurity, illegal migration, soil depletion, HIV/AIDS, to name just a few, figure prominently on their agenda.

Considering the ongoing internal security problems of African states, including the incidence of intra-state wars and the potential spill-over effects of these insecurities into neighbouring states, it is difficult to imagine that this situation is in any way conducive to the processes of regional integration in Africa.

On account of domestic and transnational insecurities, some of the African regional organisations recognised that development objectives have to be accompanied by security and peace-building objectives and that peace and security are necessary for the realisation of developmental goals. This was realised among others by COMESA, ECOWAS, and SADC (Schiavone, 1997; Schraeppler, 1996).

⁴ During the Cold War, the East-West divide referred to the conflict between capitalist, industrial democracies of the First World or West (Western Europe, North America and Japan) and the Marxist-Leninist countries of the Second World or East (former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, sometimes China). The economically less-developed states of Asia, Africa, and Latin America were referred to as the Third World (Viotti and Kauppi, 1999: 476, 497).

⁵ For definition of juridical and empirical statehood, see section 3.2.

More specifically, the recognition that a climate of peace, security and stability is a prerequisite for development has been included in the Treaty Establishing the Southern African Development Community (1992). Despite these goals, the attainment of peace, security and stability within the SADC region (i.e. the establishment of a pluralistic security community) remains problematic because the states taking part in SADC have not yet resolved their internal security problems. This means that they have not managed to form amalgamated security communities, and this problem obstructs the integration process and development efforts of the region.

Given this situation, the main problem to be addressed in this thesis is the evolution of a pluralistic security community within the SADC region. In this regard, the attempt will be made to verify the following hypothesis: *Since the main threats to peace and security within the SADC region come from intra-state conflicts and internal insecurities in general, the objective of establishing a pluralistic security community (to bring about a climate of peace, security and stability) within the region has to be accompanied, if not preceded by, the formation of an amalgamated security community within individual member states through a process of national integration.* An assumption will be made that the process of integration and establishment of an amalgamated security community within a state is linked to the two interrelated processes of state-making and nation-building, and has to be accompanied by a process of development.

Methodologically, this thesis is based on a comparative study of relevant secondary sources: books, journals, newspapers, internet sources and statistics. In order to verify its hypothesis, the thesis will review various approaches to the study of integration and its processes in the first chapter. The transactionalist approach of Karl Deutsch will be examined in detail in order to define the concepts of amalgamated and pluralistic security communities, and to identify the

background conditions essential for their establishment as well as background conditions working against their establishment. The emergence of these communities in Western Europe and the problems of the application of the European experience in African countries will be examined in the second chapter. In the third chapter the security problematic of the SADC region will be analysed, plus its impact on the integration process within this region. Furthermore, the thesis will try to assess different theoretical possibilities in the formation of amalgamated and pluralistic security communities within the SADC region. In this case, an assumption will be made that the analysis and application of background conditions conducive to disintegration in SADC member states will be sufficient to either confirm or refute the hypothesis.

2. THEORIES OF (REGIONAL) INTEGRATION

Integration theory is a relatively new way of looking at an old problem: the merger of two or more political units to form a larger political entity (Hodges, 1978: 237). Although most of the major attempts to theorise about supranational integration were made after World War II, the search for a form of organisation transcending the nation-state is almost as old as the modern state system itself. It stemmed from dissatisfaction with the working of that system and with the conflict which appeared to be an inherent part of it (Hodges, 1978: 237).

One solution to the problem of conflict and the absence of world order in international relations was deemed to be a world government. However, many scholars have instead put their hope in regional institutions as a step towards establishing world peace. Statesmen have done the same: since World War II they have sought to overcome the deficiencies of the nation-state by resorting to various regional arrangements and preliminary forms of integration in limited supranational institutions (Morgan, 1981: 192).

In general, integration theorists have seen the merger of states into a larger political community as a means of promoting peaceful co-operation and reducing conflict between them. Various approaches to integration inherited this preoccupation with peaceful relations from classical federalism and sundry schemes for promoting perpetual and universal peace. The argument that peace can only be secured by the merger of existing political units into a single one (federation) has been made after every major European conflict since the early seventeenth century (Hodges, 1978: 238).

It is therefore not surprising that after World War I, but mostly after World War II, scholars began to study the possibilities of 'eliminating' war and conflict

among states by means of integration. The general idea was that the establishment of regionally limited "islands of peace" (Nye, 1971: 11) would eventually lead to the emergence of world peace. Various approaches to integration can thus be seen as a contribution to an optimistic vision of post-World-War relations between states, and as a 'response' to a pessimistic view of international relations and world politics put forward by realist scholars at the same time.

2.1. Contending Approaches⁶

Approximately three decades ago, Haas (1973: 104) noted that the dominant desire of students of regional integration was to explain the tendency towards a voluntary or non-coercive creation of larger political units, each of which self-consciously abstained from the use of force in the relations between the participating units and groups. This is one of the characteristics that approaches to the integration process discussed below have in common.⁷ However, they differ in many other ways.

⁶ In this thesis, only the long-range approaches to integration will be reviewed. Other short or middle range approaches, such as liberal inter-governmentalism, multi-level governance and the like, will be omitted.

⁷ Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (1971: 284) point out several common features of differing approaches to the integration process:

- they share an interest in the process by which loyalty is shifted from one centre to another;
- they are concerned with communications among units to be integrated;
- they assert that the integrative behaviour of people is a consequence of the expectations of some joined rewards and penalties;
- they see the integration process as successful when people internalise the process;
- they emphasise the effect of the integration process in one sector upon the ability of participating units to further the process in other sectors; and
- some theoreticians use systems theory in developing their models (Deutsch, Etzioni and Haas).

One of the major points of disagreement concerns the definition of integration. The term 'integration' sometimes indicates the process of connecting parts into a whole, and sometimes the product of this process. However, the best understanding should include both meanings of the term (Aćimović, 1987: 262).⁸

On the basis of differences in methodology adopted by scholars, Pentland (1973: 21-22) identifies four approaches in relation to two major criteria:

- the result of the integration process,
- the variables relevant for the integration process.

According to the first criterion, he distinguishes the state model from the community model, and for the second, the approaches stressing political variables as opposed to those emphasising economic, social and technological ones. This implies that those focusing on political variables concentrate their analysis at the level of states, while the latter concentrate their analysis at the level of an integrating system as a whole.

In this section, four approaches to integration, namely federalism, functionalism, neo-functionalism and transactionalism, will be analysed, by focusing on their explanations as to how the integration process can lead to the establishment of international peace and security. Special attention will be paid to the transactionalist approach of Karl Deutsch since it can provide a relatively good basis for analysing the situation in African states.

2.1.1. The Federalist Approach

The federalist approach to international integration takes as its dominant values peace and security. War is considered to be the inevitable product of a

⁸ In this thesis, the term 'integration' will refer only to the result of the process of integration, and the process itself will be referred to as 'integration process'

multi-state system and the perennial struggle for power; therefore, federalists argue in favour of an integrated state and the fragmentation of power (Pentland, 1973: 154-155).

This approach concerns itself with institutions and institution building, including the division of powers between federal, national and local authorities, checks and balances between organs of government, and the like (Haas, 1973: 115). Federalists offer a method of uniting separate states into a new supranational entity by means of a formal constitution, adopted as a result of a common political commitment made by all parties involved. The central federal government is said to be capable of satisfying the criteria of efficiency (by creating central bodies to carry out certain functions, and to resolve disputes between constituent parts) and democracy (by decentralising activities to ensure greater control and autonomy at the local level) (Hodges, 1978: 240-241).

For the federalists, the integration process is a matter of high politics,⁹ so they rely on the ability of national elites to amass, control and employ the levers of power. The federation can be created without previous functional integration through the propaganda and education of political elites of the area to be federalised (Coddington, 1990: 217). Political elites will thus pursue the goal of a supranational federal system when they realise the need for restructuring the conflict-prone multi-state system.¹⁰

⁹ Matters of high politics include security and political issues as opposed to social, economic and cultural issues (low politics).

¹⁰ This classic federalist approach has been elaborated in the sociological approach of Etzioni (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1971: 281-282), who refers to integration as a condition or a state. Integration comes about as a result of a process of political unification, and in a form of a political community. This political community possesses an effective control over the use of the means of violence and over a centre of decision-making that is able to affect significantly the allocation of resources and rewards throughout the community. Some of this control and decision-making may be delegated to federal units. This political community is therefore a state, an administrative-

Federalists have been criticised for idealistically pinning their hopes mainly on the political will of governments as a crucial factor for bringing about a federation. In addition, they are over-concerned with the legalistic and institutional parts of the integration process and disregard other conditions and factors that are instrumental for such a process, including community-building (Hodges, 1978: 241). Consequently, they are not in touch with the reality of international politics (Coddington, 1990: 227).

2.1.2. The Functionalist Approach

As opposed to federalists, the functionalists subscribe to the community model of integration. The ultimate goal of the integration process is a world society whose units are defined by function. This society is based on a complex, interwoven network of international organisations implementing the welfare functions, which were traditionally a domain of the nation-state, while rendering war impossible at the same time (Pentland, 1973: 70, 75).

The theme which functionalism is mainly concerned with is the development of a working peace system (Taylor, 1975: XI). For Mitrany (Aćimović, 1987: 266; Taylor, 1975: XIV), who was probably the most influential functionalist scholar, nation-states were unable to preserve peace or to improve the social and economic wellbeing of their citizens. He claimed that the creation of larger (federal) political units, based on territorial regionalism, would recreate and perpetuate all the traditional problems of the international system, including the

economic unit, and a main point of political identification for the large majority of politically aware citizens (Pentland, 1973: 148).

war-prone behaviour of states. Thus, he advocated functionalism as a theory for positive peace.¹¹

Mitrany (1975: 115, 129; Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1971: 280) suggested that the growing complexity of governmental systems and the attendant increase in technical, non-political tasks facing governments require that states share their sovereignty in certain functional areas if the good performance of these tasks demands such an arrangement.¹²

Since the central characteristic of global problems (and their solutions) is that they are fundamentally technical in nature, they cannot be settled politically. Thus, they need to be dealt with by technical experts, working within the framework of international organisations, not politicians (Mitrany, 1975: 223). International organisations would therefore gradually take over the performance of welfare tasks, traditionally performed by national administrations.

This process is seen by Mitrany (Hodges, 1978: 239; Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1971: 281) as a means of eroding popular support for the nation-state and remoulding the attitudes of the masses of people, and thus diminishing the threat to world peace posed by nationalism. "The functional approach should help", according to Mitrany (1975: 120), "to make the changes of frontiers unnecessary by making frontiers meaningless, as it would gradually overlay them

¹¹ Mitrany (1975: 184) pointed out that the essence of security is not to keep the nations peacefully apart but to bring them actively together.

¹² Mitrany's functional method builds on technical self-determination, which means that a function would determine the institutions, powers and authority necessary for its performance, and these could vary from function to function. Collaboration of states in one technical or non-political field would contribute to collaboration in other technical fields. Eventually such collaboration would encroach upon, or absorb, the political field (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1971: 280).

with a continuous growth of common activities and interests, and of common administrative agencies."

For the functionalists, the growth of a community is primarily a rational, incremental process of learning by association. As their functional needs are met by international organisations, people discover the source of their welfare and direct their expectations and loyalties to international organisations rather than to their states (Pentland, 1973: 86). This gradually leads to the development of a socio-psychological community with co-operative goals, which poses no evident threat to the existing cultural identities of groups and individuals (Taylor, 1975: X).

Functionalists have been criticised for putting too much stress on the functional processes (issues of low politics) and underestimating issues of high politics. Although Mitrany (Aćimović, 1987: 266) suggested that political issues divide nations while the economic and social problems bring them together, he disregarded the fact that issues of high politics and national interests of states basically shape the international agenda, and that issues of low politics are often elevated to the level of high politics ('trade wars', for example). Furthermore, the functionalist approach is more a prescriptive plan for action than an analysis or theory and, like the previous approach, does not reflect the reality of international politics (Willetts, 1990: 262).

2.1.3. The Neo-Functionalist Approach

Neo-functionalists provide a critique and elaboration of the functionalist approach, and they aspire to reconcile the functionalist concern with economics and welfare with a theory of political conflict and choice. Furthermore, they try to show how the integration process can advance, not through an economically or

technologically determined process and fulfilment of functional needs, but through the interaction and resolution of political conflicts among various actors (interest groups, political parties, governments, international agencies, and the like) pursuing their own interests (Pentland, 1973: 100, 110). Thus, as opposed to functionalists, neo-functionalists do not perceive the nation-state as a monolithic actor; rather, the state is viewed as a complex of interests and issue areas, some of which have more integrative implications than others (Pentland, 1973: 122).

Political integration is defined not as a condition but as a process of change which leads to a political community.¹³ As opposed to functionalists, who see the establishment of larger political communities at the regional level as perpetuating the problems of the anarchical international system, the neo-functionalists assume that a supranational political community is to be regional in scope and similar to the national communities which make it up, only larger (Harrison, 1990: 141). This new political community represents a political system of a particularly primitive kind, which is defined as a pattern of conflict or decision-making in which values are allocated authoritatively for participants, operating at the international level (Pentland, 1973: 114, 116).

Neo-functionalists assume that by collaborating at the international, or better, at the regional level, the actors try to further their individual and collective interests in the performance of some relatively non-controversial (technical or economic) function. These initial attempts to integrate subsequently spill over into more controversial (political) spheres of activity, because the actors realise that they can fulfil the original goals only by delegating more authority to collective

¹³ Haas (Hodges, 1978: 245) has defined political integration as a process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states. The result of this process is a new political community, superimposed on the pre-existing states.

decision-making (increasing the level of mutual commitment) or acting together in other related functional fields (expanding the scope of mutual commitment) or both (Hodges, 1978: 246). At the beginning, the process of spill-over was seen as deterministic, but later, neo-functionalists emphasised that there was no economic determinism in the spill-over process and that economic integration did not automatically lead to political integration (Aćimović, 1987: 268).¹⁴

The integration process thus culminates in a merging of the governments involved, as more and more decision-making is transferred to supranational institutions (Morgan, 1981: 209) in the form of regional organisations. In the neo-functionalist model of the integration process a political community is said to be engineered by these regional organisations. International organisations sustain or expand the supranational political system by providing regular information, by forcing members to re-examine their interests and priorities, by supporting the formation and development of an international bureaucratic and political elite, and by providing an arena for conflict resolution (Pentland, 1973: 117-118). They also facilitate a process of elite socialisation as the participants in policy-making begin to develop new perspectives, loyalties and identifications as a result of their mutual interactions (Harrison, 1990: 144). However, by focusing on elites, neo-functionalists neglect the issue of general public attitudes and loyalties (Pentland, 1973: 129).

Neo-functionalists have mostly based their writings on the analysis of the integration process of Western European states, and the practice has discredited their conclusions in several ways (although only a few will be pointed out here). Firstly, the expected role of supranational institutions as the motor for the

¹⁴ Haas (1964: 48) recognised that spill-over was not an automatic process because it would only occur if actors, on the basis of their interests-inspired perception, desired to adapt integrative lessons learned in one context to a new situation.

integration process has been replaced by inter-governmental bargaining (Harrison, 1990: 145-146). Secondly, the concept of spill-over is problematic since the process of spill-over can be obstructed by political "acts of will" (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1971: 301) on account of the diversity of national objectives, the differences in national conditions, and the lack of unifying, distinctively European issues as opposed to local or global ones (Hodges, 1978: 250). Thirdly, neo-functionalists disregard the changes and the dynamics of the international environment and the effects that these can have on the integration process (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1971: 301). Finally, since neo-functionalism is based on the study of pluralistic and functionally highly differentiated societies, it is not applicable to developing countries (Aćimović, 1987: 271).

2.1.4. Digression: Regionalism and New-Regionalism

Neo-functionalist writings are considered as part of the literature on regionalism. Regionalism is a set of issues rather than a single problem area for the analysis of world politics, and consequently there is no one model of regionalism or one predominant theoretical framework for the analysis of regionalism (Smith, 1997: 73).¹⁵

The idea behind the practice of regionalism is that a particular geographical area, which is best fitted for the performance of different interrelated tasks judged crucial for the welfare of individuals, or for the advantage of governments, can be delimited (Taylor, 1993: 7). Stubbs and Underhill (Smith, 1997: 70, 72) identify three central dimensions of regionalism. The first is geographical and relates to a common historical experience and a sense of shared problems among a geographically distinct group of countries or societies, which constitute a region.

¹⁵ For different categories of regionalism, see Taylor (1993), Hurrell (1995) or Smith (1997).

However, regions are not fixed once and for all and they can be redefined as conditions change.¹⁶

The second dimension of regionalism is functional and refers to close linkages of a distinct kind between countries and societies; there is a 'boundary' to the region within which interactions or transactions are more intense than those with the outside world.¹⁷ The growth of the (often undirected) processes of societal and economic interaction and societal integration is described as regionalisation. The areas or tasks of interaction covered by the region or regional organisations can differ in scope (Hurrell, 1995: 334; Smith, 1997: 71-72).

The final dimension of regionalism is institutional and relates to the emergence of organisation, giving shape to the region in a legal and institutional sense (with different levels of regional organisation) and providing some 'rules of the game' within the region. This element of design and conscious policy is central to regionalism, and thus regionalism is a kind of state project (Gamble and Payne, 1996: 250; Smith, 1997: 71, 73).

One form of regionalism is the regional integration process; since World War II many attempts have been made all over the world to embark on some kind of integration. The experiences of these processes, however, have been largely negative and in the 1970s the academic interest in regional arrangements declined.

In the 1990s, several developments have taken place with new regional formations emerging and old regional organisations being reactivated.

¹⁶ Geographically, regions are difficult to establish because the regional boundaries determined for one purpose are not necessarily appropriate for others, and the chosen dividing lines can change or come to require a change, or they can overlap (Claude, 1956: 96). Furthermore, physical contiguity can be misleading because technology, history and culture can make 'effective distance' differ from linear distance; and perceptions of what constitutes a region are affected by different political interests (Nye, 1971: 7). Thus, there are no 'natural' regions.

¹⁷ The functional boundaries can shift and overlap or merge in the same way as the geographical boundaries of regions (Smith, 1997: 73).

Concomitantly, the renewed academic interest in regionalism, often summarised as the new regionalism, has emerged (Hettne, 1996: 160).

Hettne (1996: 161) and Hurrell (1995: 332) point out several differences between regionalism and the new regionalism (both concepts used as ideal types), and they include:

- Regionalism was formed in a bipolar Cold War context, while the new regionalism is taking shape in a multi polar world order in which the former superpowers are being downgraded to regional powers, competing with other emerging regional powers.
- Whereas regionalism was created from above by the superpowers, the new regionalism is a more spontaneous process emerging from below¹⁸ from within the region with other (non-state) actors, such as firms, and labour unions, playing an increasingly important role. This trend is also accompanied by a marked increase in regional awareness or consciousness.
- Regionalism was inward-oriented and protectionist as far as the economic integration process was concerned. The new regionalism is described as 'open' and thus compatible with the interdependent world economy.
- Whereas regionalism was specific in its objectives (security or economically oriented), the new regionalism is a multi-oriented process that includes trade and economic integration, environment, social policy, security and democracy. The shift is also a result of the end of the Cold War and decentralisation/regionalisation of security concerns, and of developments in the global economy.

¹⁸ Buzan *et al.* (1998: 200) claim that bottom-up regions exist independently within the international system and top-down regions exist because of the international system. They go on to say that regions are generally a mixture of bottom-up and top-down processes, with one being clearly dominant.

- Regionalism dealt with the relations between formally sovereign states, while the new regionalism forms part of a global structural transformation in which non-state actors are active at several levels of the global system.
- While regionalism was institutionalised, the new forms of regionalism are characterised by different levels of institutionalisation, many groups consciously avoiding institutional and bureaucratic structures.

The resurgence of regionalism, especially in developing areas of the Third World, raises a question as to whether these regional arrangements will be successful this time around, especially those trying to address security issues. The transactionalist approach to the integration process could provide some insight into this question.

2.1.5. The Transactionalist Approach and the Concept of a Security Community

Like other approaches to integration, the transactionalist approach, also referred to as the pluralist or communications approach, concerns itself largely with the problem of the malfunctioning of the multi-state system and with the development of peaceful relations among nations. The goal of the integration process is the attainment of peace and security in the international system and formation of a community of states (Pentland, 1973: 29-30).

In the transactionalist view, a community cannot exist unless its members are interdependent. Since interdependence can be established by a network of mutual transactions, the intensity and scope of transactions between given groups of actors/units is an indicator of a sense of community in a given territory. In addition, the flow of transactions must be accompanied by the development of mutual responsiveness (i.e. demands communicated through the system must receive an adequate response within a certain period of time) (Hodges, 1978: 244),

so that the resolution of conflicts through violence is inconceivable in the near future (Pentland, 1973: 38).

The transactionalist approach also has an important socio-psychological dimension, because its adherents suggest that an increase in transaction flows between political units in a given region is the result of a learning process in which actors become accustomed to using new common procedures, and to developing a structure of common values. Changes in the political attitudes and behaviour of individuals are central to the creation of communities of states (Hodges, 1978: 244).

One of the best-known transactionalist scholars, Karl Deutsch, emphasises the role of transactions between people as both the indicators of their attitudes towards each other and as the causes of interdependence within the community. Drawing on historical cases, Deutsch and his associates (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1971: 286) examined ten cases¹⁹ of integration and disintegration at the national level to address the problem of the elimination of war and the building of a political community among nations. Although the cases studied were examples of building political communities at the national level, the assumption was made that they were also relevant to an understanding of the integration process at international level, because of the similarities or isomorphism in the

¹⁹ Those cases were: the union of the American colonies into the United States in 1789, its break up in the civil war, and the reunion that followed; the gradual development of union between England and Scotland and its consummation in 1707; the break-up of the union between Ireland and United Kingdom in 1921; the struggle for German unity since the Middle Ages, culminating in the unification of Germany in 1871; the problem of Italian unity since the end of the eighteenth century, culminating in the unification of Italy in 1859-1860; the long preservation and final dissolution in 1918 of the Habsburg Empire; the union of Norway and Sweden in 1814 and their separation in 1905; the gradual integration of Switzerland that was completed in 1848; the union of England with Wales after 1485; and the formation of England itself in the Middle Ages (Deutsch *et al.*, 1957: 16-17).

peaceful process of community building at both the national and international levels.

In *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, Deutsch (Deutsch *et al.*, 1957: 5) puts forward several definitions to begin his analysis. He defines political community as a social group with a process of political communication among its members, some machinery for the enforcement of rules, and some popular habits of compliance.²⁰ Political communities that have managed to eliminate war and the expectation of war within their boundaries are security communities. A security community is a group of people that has become integrated. He further defines integration as the attainment, within a territory, of a sense of community²¹ and of institutions and practices strong and widespread enough to assure, for a long time, dependable expectations of peaceful change²² among the population.

According to Deutsch (1968: 193; Deutsch *et al.*, 1957: 6) there are two types of security community: amalgamated and pluralistic. Amalgamation is the formal merger of two or more previously independent units into a single larger unit, with some type of common government after amalgamation. This common government may be unitary or federal. Therefore, any well-integrated nation-state is such an amalgamated security community. A pluralistic security community retains the legal independence of separate governments.²³

²⁰ Deutsch (1968: 160-161) has later reformulated this definition and defined a political community as a relevant degree of interdependence. He also distinguished a community of conflict from community of interest.

²¹ Sense of community is a belief on the part of individuals in a group that they have come to an agreement to resolve common social problems by the processes of peaceful change (Deutsch *et al.*, 1957: 5).

²² A peaceful change is the resolution of social problems, normally by institutionalised procedures, without resort to large-scale physical force (Deutsch *et al.*, 1957: 5).

²³ Depending on whether a community has crossed the amalgamation or/and integration threshold, Deutsch (Deutsch *et al.*, 1957: 7) distinguishes a pluralistic security community, an

Deutsch (1968: 195; Deutsch *et al.*, 1957: 28, 48-58) maintains that both amalgamated and pluralistic security communities are practical ways to achieve integration. He cites twelve background conditions that appear to be essential (but probably not sufficient) for the success of an amalgamated security community:

- mutual compatibility of the main values relevant for political behaviour;
- a distinctive and attractive way of life with some measure of social innovation as against the recent past;
- the widespread expectations of stronger and rewarding economic ties or joint rewards/gains for the participating units;
- a marked increase in the political and administrative capabilities of at least some of the participating units;
- superior economic growth in at least some participating units as compared to the recent past or neighbouring territories outside the area of prospective integration;
- some substantial unbroken links of social communication across the mutual boundaries of the territories to be integrated, and across the barriers of politically relevant strata within them;
- broadening of the political, social or economic elite within at least some of political units, and within the emerging larger community as a whole;
- relatively high geographic and social mobility of people, at least among the politically relevant strata;
- multiplicity of the scope of mutual communications and transactions with corresponding institutional framework;
- some overall balance in the flows of communications and transactions among the units to be amalgamated, such as balance of rewards between the different

amalgamated security community, an amalgamated 'insecurity' community, and a non-amalgamated 'insecurity' community.

participating territories, balance of initiatives originating in these territories, and balance of respect between these parties;

- a significant frequency of some interchange in group roles (such as being in a majority or a minority) among the political units; and
- considerable mutual predictability of behaviour.

Even in the presence of these conditions favourable to integration, some background conditions conducive to disintegration could prevent, destroy, or at least endanger an amalgamated security community, though these conditions are not sufficient by themselves to produce disintegration. They include:

- any steep increase in economic, military, or political burdens on the community or on any participating unit (especially if this increase in burdens comes at an early stage of the integration process, before integration has become consolidated by the learning of deep political loyalties and habits);
- a rapid increase in social mobilisation and political participation, faster than the process of civic assimilation to the common political culture of the community;
- a rapid increase in regional, economic, cultural, social, linguistic, or ethnic differentiation, faster and stronger than any compensating integrative process;
- a serious decline in the political or administrative capabilities of the government and the political elite, relative to the current tasks and burdens with which they have to cope;
- a relative closure of the established political elite, slowing drastically the entry of new members and ideas, and consequently encouraging the emergence of the hostile counter-elites of frustrated potential elite members;
- a failure of the government and elite to carry out in time needed the reforms and adjustments wanted or expected by the population; or failure to adjust in time to the imminent decline or loss of some privileged or dominant minority position (Deutsch, 1968: 195-196; Deutsch *et al.*, 1957: 59-64).

The attainment of a pluralistic security community can be supported by any of the background conditions favourable to the success of an amalgamated security community on the one hand, and can be hindered by the conditions or processes harmful to the latter on the other (Deutsch *et al.*, 1957: 65).

Deutsch (1968: 196; Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1971: 286-287) claims that pluralistic security communities are easier to establish and to maintain than amalgamated security communities and hence a more effective way to keep the peace among their members. They seem to require only three main conditions for their existence:

- compatibility of major political values;
- capacity of the governments and politically relevant strata of the participating countries to respond to one another's messages, needs, and actions quickly, adequately, and without resorting to violence; and
- mutual predictability of the relevant aspects of one another's political, economic, and social behaviour (but these relevant aspects are far fewer in the case of a pluralistic security community than they would be in amalgamated one).

The essential background conditions do not come into existence all at once and they are not established in any particular fixed order. Rather, they can be assembled in almost any sequence (Deutsch, 1968: 196; Deutsch *et al.*, 1957: 70). Once the background conditions come to existence the process of integration can begin.

The take-off of the integration process does not imply a sudden, new beginning, but rather a marked quickening or strengthening of the political process moving toward integration. The take-off can be considered to have occurred as soon as at least one major social or political group, or political institution, has become committed to the goal of integration (Deutsch *et al.*, 1957: 85).

The process of integration often begins around a core area consisting of one or more political units that are stronger and more developed than other political units, and in some significant respects more advanced and attractive. Other circumstances favourable to the integration process are the domination of political divisions which cut across the political units and regions to be integrated, the innovation and originality of emerging institutions, and willingness of political elites to bring about major political compromises in order to hold together movements advocating integration and cross-class coalitions (Deutsch, 1968: 196-199; Deutsch *et al.*, 1957: 72, 76, 88, 90, 114).

Many movements for integration demonstrate, according to Deutsch (1968:199), a succession of three stages. The first stage is characterised by the leadership of the intellectuals. This is followed by a stage for the politicians, when broader interest groups begin to support the integration movement. Finally, this stage flows into the stage of mass movements and/or large-scale elite politics, and the issue of political integration becomes intensely practical.

A pluralistic security community seems to require simpler processes in order to come into existence. Deutsch (1968: 201) asserts that the main process required is an increasing unattractiveness and improbability of war among the political units or the emerging pluralistic security community, as perceived by their governments, elites and populations. The second process is the spread of intellectual movements and traditions advocating integration, and thus preparing the political climate for it. Another process is the development and practice of habits and skills leading to mutual attention, communication, and responsiveness among political entities to be integrated. This process allows the preservation of the autonomy and substantial sovereignty of the participating units, and stable expectations of peace and peaceful change among them.

2.2. Methodological Considerations and the Relevance of the Transactionalist Approach for African States

The methodological problem of the transactionalist approach in general is the fact that its adherents operate with a vague terminology (mutual relevance, mutual responsiveness, adequate response, and so on). Their variables are difficult to measure. Firstly, because they have quantitative as well as qualitative dimensions. Inglehart (Hodges, 1978: 248) for example contends that the crucial factor is not the act of transaction but the attitude that underlies it. Secondly, the analysis of transaction flows is limited only to available data, which inevitably excludes much of the past. Thus, the horizontal (spatial) or vertical (temporal) comparison of specific variables is difficult.

Moreover, the transactionalist approach does not consider the relevance of coercion and the role of conflict as an integrating force. For example, scholars agree that the experience of World War II was important, if not crucial, as a catalyst in the European integration process (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1971: 311).

In addition, even though the transactionalist approach may be useful in delineating potential regions as suitable cases for integration on the basis of transaction flows and consequent increase in community formation, it is doubtful whether causal relationships can be demonstrated. Hodges (1978: 249) claims that the predictive power of the transactionalist approach may be greatest in a negative sense – to point out regions in which the absence of a network of mutual transactions makes integration unlikely or unsuccessful.

Further methodological considerations relate to a study Deutsch conducted with his associates. Deutsch (Deutsch *et al.*, 1957: 17) pointed out several deficiencies of the study. Firstly, the number of cases was small and this increased

the possibility of a sampling error. Consequently, the results were stated only in terms of probabilities. Secondly, the 'samples' were taken from one specific geographic and cultural area (North Atlantic area) and therefore the issue of political communities in other regions and their comparison to the studied region was disregarded (Deutsch *et al.*, 1957: 20).

On the positive side, it can be noted that since one of the problems of other approaches to integration was the absence of the 'final products' of the regional integration processes (their main case study was the ongoing process of European integration), the fact that Deutsch's conclusions were developed on the basis of historical cases can be regarded as a positive element. However, it seems likely that the integration process of developed states is something different from the integration process that created those states in the first place (Morgan, 1981: 214), and that integration of different political units in Europe before the twentieth century is qualitatively different from the internal integration of sovereign states on the African continent of the twentieth and twenty first centuries (see chapter 3).

With these pros and cons in mind, it can be concluded that the study and subsequent theoretical conclusions of Deutsch and his associates is nevertheless relevant and suggestive for the study of the integration processes on the African continent. Firstly, following the example of developed states, African states are aspiring to evolve into strong, cohesive and integrated entities. Deutsch's study is therefore significant in cases where states are still struggling to build a security community within their borders, because it was based on selected historical case-studies of national (dis)integration. In these cases, however, the assumption is made that the internal situation in many African states resembles in several ways the situation before the emergence of coherent and integrated European states.

Secondly, today, African states find it more difficult to resort to violence and coercion as a means of state-making and nation-building than Western states a

few centuries ago, since this is regarded as unacceptable by the international community. In addition, gross violations of human rights, genocidal campaigns, political repression and violence can result in the withholding of aid, loans and other resources by the international community, and this can further obstruct the state-making process in countries with scarce resources. The conclusions based on case studies of peaceful integration processes in the past can suggest ways for African states to achieve the goal of becoming amalgamated security communities by peaceful means.

Thirdly, based on Deutsch's findings regarding conditions conducive to disintegration, some conclusions can be made about the factors preventing African states from ensuring peace and security within their borders.

Fourthly, although it could be argued that the increasing interdependence and multiple transactions connecting countries and peoples all over the world through the process of globalisation render the transactionalist approach redundant, in the case of African states this is not so. The level of transactions between African states in a region, especially on trade, is in most cases relatively low compared to the level of their transactions with developed countries. Also, African states have troubles engaging in the globalisation processes and increasing the level and diversity of transactions with other countries due to their economic and political position in the world system. This position is also a consequence of the unfinished processes of state-making and nation-building.

Finally, the transactionalist approach can be helpful in explaining why the absence of an amalgamated security community within the borders of many African states can obstruct the building of a pluralistic security community among these states. Here, the assumption is made that the absence of major conflicts among African states (i.e. negative peace) does not indicate that these states have managed to establish a pluralistic security community and through that, ensure

positive peace,²⁴ especially because the internal and transnational insecurities are obstructing such establishment. These issues are the subject of the next three chapters.

²⁴ Positive peace involves more than a mere absence of war and conflict between states. It is based on mutual interdependence and requires co-operation between states or formally warring parties, which is mutually beneficial.

3. STATE AND INTEGRATION

Deutsch and his colleagues studied the peaceful processes of integration. However, as Puchala (Hodges, 1978: 238) has noted, most cases of national integration in Europe are more appropriately regarded and studied as ones of amalgamation by imperialism (i.e. amalgamation by force and violence) rather than as examples of the peaceful integration process. It seems that force and violence figure prominently in the agenda of state-makers on the African continent, and therefore it is feasible that the study and better understanding of the history of state-making in Europe could help to shed light on security and other pressing issues facing non-European states, as contended by Tilly and Ayoob (Van de Goor *et al.*, 1996: 6).

3.1. The Emergence of Modern States in Europe and their Integration after World War II

The process of state-making has been defined by Cohen, Brown and Organski (Ayoob, 1996: 69) as primitive central state power accumulation. State-making must include the following: the expansion and consolidation of the territorial and demographic domain under a political authority, including the imposition of order on contested territorial and demographic space (war); the maintenance of order in the territory where, and over the population on whom, such order has already been imposed (policing); and the extraction of resources from the territory and the population under the control of the state essential to support not only war-making and policing activities but also to maintain the state

apparatus needed to carry on routine administration, deepen the state's penetration of society and serve its symbolic purposes (taxation).²⁵

The process of state-making thus results in empirical statehood. The criteria for this statehood recognised by positive international law include the following elements: a delimited territory, a stable population, and reliable and efficient government with the will and capacity to carry out international obligations. The normative aspect of statehood – juridical statehood – is the formal declaration of supremacy over all domestic authorities and, at the international level, moral and legal equality to all other states (Jackson, 1990: 53, 61).

The earliest modern European states exhibited a degree of empirical statehood: their reality consisted of a populated territory under a ruler who claimed a territory as his realm and a population as his subjects and was able to enforce this claim. Kings possessed a government apparatus that could project royal power and prerogatives both internally and externally. This apparatus might still have been rudimentary, but it was enough to sustain the ruler both domestically and internationally, and if not, the ruler and his realm were replaced by another (Jackson, 1990: 51-52).

Before a king could ensure his realm and population, he had to pacify his subjects. The European process of state-making can thus be described as a struggle between local leaders and a centralising power. Any attempt by a centralising power to impose central authority throughout the territory of the state could be met with resistance. Ultimately, Europe's numerous little kingdoms and counties produced a far smaller number of states. However, none of these rulers were

²⁵ Tilly (1985: 186) similarly argues that the state and its agents engage in four different activities that fall under organised violence: elimination or neutralisation of rivals outside the territories where they have clear and continuous priority as wielders of force (war-making), elimination or neutralisation of their rivals inside those territories (state-making), elimination or neutralisation of the enemies of their clients (protection of the citizens), and acquisition of the means of carrying out the first three activities (extraction of resources).

prepared to surrender power without a fight (Van de Goor *et al.*, 1996: 7), and the violence generated during the process of state-making was the result of actions undertaken both by a centralising power and by recalcitrant elements within the population who resisted attempts to impose order (Ayoob, 1996: 70; Cohen *et al.*, 1981: 902). Strayer (Ayoob, 1991: 266) sums up the situation by saying that the European sovereign states of 1300 were stronger than any competing political entities, but they were still not very strong. In fact it took four or five centuries for these states to 'fix' their administrative deficiencies and transform the lukewarm loyalty of the populace into a sense of nationalism.

Along with this internal pacification and domination aspect of state-making, there was an external stimulus to create compact, stable and largely homogenous (i.e. strong) states. Since there were neither internationally accepted norms of sovereignty nor internationally recognised borders, the emerging European states posed a serious threat to one another (Van de Goor *et al.*, 1996: 7). Proximity and power meant there was always a strong possibility of war, the classical problem of the state system. Deterrence, alliances and the balance of power were responses to it (Jackson, 1990: 52). This geopolitical pressure on the leaders of emerging states compelled them to mobilise their societies against external threats. The raising of armies for the survival of the state as well as acquisition of resources to maintain them (taxation) was therefore essential. The need for revenue in the form of taxes led to the realisation that economic growth and development were vital for the survival of the state (Van de Goor *et al.*, 1996: 7; Tilly, 1975: 23).

Since the development process in Europe depended on external threats, it is also described as a pessimistic model of development. Van de Goor *et al.* (1996: 7) claim that, on the one hand, a military force was indispensable to deter and fight against external threats, and development was thus essential for a state to obtain

more revenue in the form of taxes for the acquisition of its military force. On the other hand, the acquisition of military force was necessary to maintain peace and thus enable development and economic growth of a state. As a result, competition among states as regards development and the acquisition of military force also encouraged state-making and was one of the main reasons for the eventual global hegemony of Europe (Jackson, 1990: 52).

The European model also shows that, with some exceptions, state-making usually preceded the emergence of nations and nation-states by several centuries. The formation of national states was therefore not simultaneous with the emergence of nation-states²⁶ in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The latter have additionally contributed to the effective resolution of the internal dimension of security in (mostly Western) European states. Hence, its external orientation became politically and conceptually unquestioned (Ayoob, 1996: 70; Krause, 1998: 128).

The successful internal pacification eventually enabled the states of Western Europe and North America to emerge as responsive and representative national states at the beginning of the twentieth century. These were the products of the state-making process that had unfolded for at least three or four hundred years (Ayoob, 1996: 72, 76). Today, Western states set the standards for effective statehood as well as for the humane and civilised treatment of their citizens, and successfully claim the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within their territories (Weber, 1986: 38). They are successful in simultaneously meeting the basic needs of the large majority of their populations, protecting their human rights, and promoting and guaranteeing political participation. However, this level

²⁶ Tilly (Ayoob, 1996: 70) has defined national states as relatively centralised, differentiated, and autonomous organisations successfully claiming priority in the use of force within the large, contiguous and clearly bounded territories. Nation-states are those states whose peoples share a strong linguistic, religious, and symbolic identity.

of democracy and respect for human rights emerged as the final stage of the state-making process and not at the latter's expense (Ayoob, 1996: 84).

In addition, Western states are national economies in a sense that economic development takes place in a national space, regulated and nurtured by the state. The national economy normally comprises the main sectors needed for its reproduction, although there is a high level of exchange with other economies. The economy is also homogenous, so that different sectors are at similar levels of development and there is a very high degree of cross- and inter-sectoral exchange (Sorensen, 1997: 258).

Moreover, Western European states exhibit what Sorensen (1997: 261-262) terms post modernity. The post modern forms of political organisation comprise political space organised on a non-state territorial basis as in the European Union (EU). In the history of the European integration process, security considerations were an essential part of the early advances made in the co-operation between Germany and France. However, increased co-operation and supranational decision-making between EU member states can now be seen as the acquisition of competitive advantages in the light of increasing economic globalisation.

What is important to note here is that European states, despite having opposing views and conflicting interests on many issues, have managed to establish a pluralistic security community through the process of integration. The conflict-ridden Western European international system was thus transformed into the system embodied in the EU with the establishment of a single market and adoption of common policies in a number of major fields, including agriculture, regional aid, energy, transport and competition, among others. Decisions are made by the majority voting on some matters which are considered less controversial, and by inter-governmental bargaining on more controversial matters such as foreign and defence policies. The result of this decision-making is the so-called

European legislation, which is binding on all member states. Furthermore, the supranational institutions – the Commission, the Court of Justice and the Parliament – symbolically as well as in practice mark the erosion of the sovereignty of Western European states (Anderson, 1996: 153, 157).

3.2. State-Making and the Security Predicament of African States

Western European states have thus managed to achieve domestic as well as regional peace. Moreover, their juridical statehood developed concomitantly with empirical statehood and it is supported by it.

The history and formation of African states contrasts with the erstwhile emergent European states. The internal aspect of state-making is different. Most African countries have not evolved gradually over time but were geographically designed and created by outsiders. In comparison with European states, there has been no opportunity for binding factors to take root. As a result, some of the traditional structures have remained intact, which means that African states lack a unifying force of nationalism at the state level (Van de Goor *et al.*, 1996: 7).

The formal colonisation of Africa and demarcation of the continent into states between 1885 and 1902 replaced the diversity of forms of political entities, characteristic for pre-colonial Africa, with the European model of the nation-state (Herbst, 1996/97: 120). However, there was nothing 'national' about post-colonial African states. Borders, arbitrarily drawn by colonial powers, were a result of colonial powers' own appetites and bargains. They cut across ethnic, religious and linguistic ties, dismembering established political units and joining multiple pre-colonial political entities into uneasy administrative units (Thomas and Mazrui, 1992: 160).

African states were thus not a product of a peaceful or coercive integration process, and one of the important tasks of African statesmen was therefore to transform the state into a cohesive and integrated political, social and economic unit and to create a nation²⁷ within the inherited borders in accordance with the European model. Simply stated, the task consisted of shifting the loyalties from different ethnicities, tribes, religious groups or former political entities to a new state. It can be argued that this resembled the challenge of forming an amalgamated security community but within already fixed borders.

Jackson (1992: 1) claims that citizenship in African states means less than membership in a family, clan, religious sect or ethnic community. Thomas and Mazrui (1992: 160) make a similar observation by pointing out that different groups in African states maintain their separate ethnic identities by being ruled in part through their own native institutions. At the same time, different sections of the population perceive each other as strangers, sometimes as aliens, increasingly as rivals and potential enemies.

The state, or better the regime in power, which is perceived as representing the interests of a particular ethnic/social stratum or an economic/military elite, must compete for loyalty and resources with different social groups (Thomas and Mazrui, 1992: 160). It is not surprising, therefore, that many African regimes were or are being challenged by insurgent or rebel movements.²⁸

²⁷ In this thesis, the concept of a nation is understood in the sense of 'national unity', which is established, according to Rustow (1970: 350), when the majority of citizens of a country do not doubt about belonging to a certain political community or do not have any mental reservations about belonging to it. This means that a nation is not necessarily ethnically homogenous but can consist of ethnically diverse groups, and that its formation is not based on ethnicity-destruction but ethnicity-inclusion.

²⁸ These have frequently undermined the notion of a sovereign-state by conducting (in)formal political, economic and diplomatic relations with other states and by having their own 'foreign policies' (Clapham, 1998: 152).

When the competition for resources and loyalty becomes so intense that it results in conflict, the regime can privatise national security by deploying force and violence for personal and private ends, and thus national security becomes regime security. This results in a tension between regime security and human/individual or communal/group security.²⁹ The regime often disregards and even threatens the security of individuals or groups within its jurisdiction and violates their human rights in order to ensure its own security.

Jackson (Ayoob, 1991: 129; Krause, 1998: 129) talks about the "paradox of the state", where the most important threats to security in the Third World, and particularly in Africa, arise from states and regimes and are directed against individuals and local communities. African statesmen may thus abstain from violence in their international relations but be abusive and coercive in their domestic conduct, which frequently provokes internal disorder and violence (Jackson, 1990: 154). Cohen *et al.* (1981: 902, 904) assert that this political violence in former colonies is a function of the conflicts inherent in the process of primitive central state power accumulation that was characteristic for the European state-making in the past, and that it is brought about by the aggressive expansionism of the state.

The international context of African states also differs from the European model of state-making. In the contemporary world, states are in principle protected by the internationally accepted principle of sovereignty and internationally recognised national borders. Statesmen no longer need to mobilise their societies against external threats, and the absence of a hostile international environment removed the incentive for internal integration. Van de Goor *et al.* (1996: 8) note that the result has been a reversed process of state-making, since the creation of

²⁹ For discussion of the different levels of security, see section 4.1.

the state preceded that of a national army. It could be argued that unlike the process of European state-making, the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-intervention are detrimental to state-making in African states.

Although the reality did not match the idea of an amalgamated security community, African states did not disintegrate and were preserved by juridical statehood. This means that after decolonisation, African states have been recognised as sovereign entities by the international community. Consequently, they possess the same rights and responsibilities as all other sovereign states, despite the fact that many formally recognised states disclose limited empirical statehood³⁰ and their populations do not enjoy many of the advantages traditionally associated with independent statehood (Jackson, 1990: 21). Jackson (1990; 1992) refers to such states as quasi-states.

In spite of their 'quasi-statehood', African states committed themselves to the existing borders in the framework of the OAU by accepting the principles of sovereign equality of states, non-interference in the internal affairs of states, and respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and for its inalienable right to independent existence.³¹

This was also possible because of the Cold War situation. With the exception of the Congo crisis (1960-1965),³² the global strategic competition

³⁰ Jackson (1992: 8) contends that if a leader was backed by the army, commanded the government bureaucracy, was in possession of the treasury and the central bank, controlled the conduits of foreign loans and grants and was supported by key ethnic leaders, this usually sufficed for control of the 'empirical state'. Such control was tenuous: if different strategic locations, such as the presidential palace, army barracks, radio station, airport, railway terminals, major roads, were controlled, then so, probably was the state. Diplomatic recognition was automatically extended to the leaders in command of these locations, even if they were not in control of the rest of the country.

³¹ These principles were included in the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity.

³² After the surprising and premature independence of Belgian Congo, the new state collapsed into virtual disorder with a military mutiny and secessions occurring shortly after the independence. The secessions in Katanga and in Southern Kasai were overtly supported by

between the United States (US) and the Soviet Union discouraged external threats to African borders since one of the implicit rules of the Cold War was that supporting efforts to change boundaries was not part of the game (Herbst, 1996/97: 121). The superpowers feared the chaos that might have resulted from such changes, and therefore they were willing to help African states crush ethnic rebellions or threats from neighbouring countries (Herbst, 1992: 19), and to preserve their quasi-statehood at the same time.

Thus, quasi-states cannot logically collapse into a state of nature because their sovereignty is derived not internally from empirical statehood but externally from the state-system whose members have decided that these jurisdictions would not disappear. In this way, quasi-states turn Hobbes inside out (Jackson, 1990: 168-169): they are far more likely to experience the domestic state of nature³³ than engage in international conflicts.

As previously noted, on account of the Cold War rivalries, quasi-statehood was enough for African states to be accepted into the international community. In addition, all kinds of rulers were tolerated and supported. People in power often privatised the state and used it for personal enrichment and repression. Thus, the initial expectations about the role the post-colonial state would play as the prime mover of development³⁴ were not met, since development of the country was not a

Belgian military intervention and covertly by the US, since both provinces were resource-laden territories. The Soviet Union supported the union of the country, advocated by prime-minister Lumumba, which was finally preserved once Congo was secured as a US sphere of influence (see for example Gibbs, 2000 or Kabongo, 1988).

³³ Little (Buzan, 1988: 22) defines 'anarchic states' as states in which power is openly contested by the use of force. The state may still exist in some formal and legal sense, but the power within it is so fragmented, and legitimacy so weak, that it is impossible for any group to obtain the degree of dominance necessary for central governing control. Such states exist in a condition of civil war, and this reflects the anarchic structure of the international system.

³⁴ The post-colonial state was planned to play a major role in development and transformation of society by implementing policies in agriculture, industrialisation, education and other sectors. For example, the state was to direct the economy and seek to extract a surplus, which it would

priority and the state became "a cash cow to be milked" (Adebayo and Landsberg, 2000: 14).

The role initially attributed to independent African states changed from the prime mover of development to that of its main obstacle (Doornbos, 1990: 183). Privatisation of the state by different African leaders resulted in inefficiency, corruption and mismanagement in numerous African states. This, combined with the oil crises, declining commodity prices, and falling foreign investment and assistance, resulted in declines in per-capita income, mass poverty, an inability to service contractual obligations and foreign debts, and the erosion of previous achievements in the areas of health, education, foreign trade, agricultural investment, rural development, infrastructural development, and the provision of basic human needs (Ihonvbere, 1994: 117-118). This economic and social crisis on the continent has reduced the relevance of the state to the lives of its citizens, heightened conflicts, antagonisms and tensions, eroded the social fabric of African societies (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997: 99-100), and contributed to the increased human and communal insecurity on the continent.

In addition, the economic crisis that became evident in the early 1980s undercut the material foundations of African rulers. With increasingly fewer resources to distribute, rulers faced a growing problem of how to retain control of clientelist networks.³⁵ At the same time, their political legitimacy was eroded since they were incapable of solving the basic problems of socio-economic and political development. As internal discontent grew, African regimes become more

then redirect partly for the maintenance and expansion of its own apparatus, and also for redistribution to other sectors (Doornbos, 1990: 182-183).

³⁵ Clientelism is a term referring to a practice of rulers in many Third World states, aimed at maintaining the support and loyalty of their followers. The loyalty is sustained by the distribution of and access to the state's resources in the form of jobs (for example, important political, bureaucratic or military/police positions in the state with the attendant benefits are allocated to 'clients'), contracts, loans, licensees, import permits, and the like (Sorensen, 1997: 260).

repressive. Repression, however, was politically costly; not just because it produced a cycle of political violence, but also because it diverted state resources from more productive activities (Chabal, 1998: 292).

Therefore, the political-economic crisis resulted, first, in spontaneous popular protests against the crisis; second, struggles over the rules and resources for political liberalisation; and third, installation of some kind of new regime (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997: 98-100; Clapham, 1998: 147-148). Domestic pressures were combined with the economic conditionality of the international financial institutions and Western governments, which started in the 1980s, and political conditionality, which followed in the 1990s. As a result of these changes most African leaders embarked on economic and political reforms to 'appease' domestic and foreign pressures. However, it is questionable how these reforms can be conducive to state-making and nation-building in African states.

As previously pointed out, the problems of insecurity and instability in African states are related to the process of state-making and nation-building. However, while in the European history the security problems of emerging states were mainly resolved by force and violence, such means of state-making and nation-building are seen as unacceptable today. The study of the peaceful integration processes and the attainment of security communities at the state as well as regional level is thus relevant for African countries since they cannot resort to violence to internally pacify their populations, because war³⁶ and massive

³⁶ In its Article 1/1, the Charter of the United Nations (UN) states that one of the main purposes of the UN is to maintain international peace and security. To that end, the UN can take collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace; and bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.

abuses of human rights³⁷ have been 'outlawed' by the international community as legitimate means in politics.

Even though political violence and oppression, massive abuses of human rights, intra-state conflicts, and the like demonstrate that norms or standards of the international community are not being observed in many African countries, the political conditionality of international organisations and donor community is compelling them to respect these standards, since a failure to do so can result in the withholding of aid and other assistance, which is vital for many of them.

Consequently, African state-makers have to design their (security) policies in line with these circumstances at both the state and regional levels. Moreover, they need to consider the economic, social and environmental issues that contribute to insecurity in their states besides military and political ones. These issues have been labelled 'new security threats' and they provide the central focus of the so-called 'new security thinking', which will be the subject of the next chapter.

³⁷ The international community considers the so-called International Bill of Human Rights, composed of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as the minimum standard of human rights and freedoms that (civilised) states have to respect.

4. The Debate Surrounding the Concept of security

In the realist perspective of international relations, the concept of security was conceived of in military terms and it was state-centric. States were the referent objects of security and security was seen mostly as the absence of military threats. This traditional and Western-centric conception of security has been broadened and deepened, especially in recent years, to include threats arising from political, economic, social and environmental security sectors and operating at different levels of security. However, redefining the concept of security by including non-military threats has implications for the concept of a security community as defined by Deutsch and his colleagues, as will be established bellow.

Furthermore, since this new concept of security includes threats, which emerge as a consequence of poor economic and social situations in different developing countries, it needs to be linked to the process of development. The link between development and security was already recognised by Southern African Development Community (SADC) member states in the Treaty of Windhoek (1992) by stating that the climate of peace, security and stability was a prerequisite for development. The former Secretary General of the SADC, Makoni (1994: 17), similarly acknowledged this link by stating that without peace, security and stability either within or between the countries, the benefits of comprehensive integration would always be undermined. However, the notion that security as a condition and development as a process are mutually reinforcing seems to be more accepted by the academic and international communities³⁸ than the idea that

³⁸ Annan (1998; 2000) and Boutros-Ghali (1992/93: 95) claim that sustainable development is essential for African states because poor economic performance and/or underdevelopment can result in economic crisis and consequently exacerbate internal tensions, which can eventually lead to conflict. Solomon (1998) argues that there is a close relationship between security and

security is a prerequisite for development. Therefore, a security community among as well as within African states can only be assured if accompanied by development. In this chapter, the expanded concept of security and the relation between security and development will be explored. Moreover, an attempt will be made to redefine the concept of a security community in line with the new security thinking.

4.1. New Approaches to Security

The debate related to the concept of security originates in the realist school of international politics. According to realists, states as unitary actors operate in an anarchical international system and they face insecurities stemming from the nature of that system, including threats to their existence. To survive in such an environment and to ensure their security, states have to acquire more power than their adversaries, military power in particular.³⁹ Therefore, the concept of security was originally state-centric, and threats to states were external and military in nature. In addition, the security of citizens was identified with, and guaranteed by, the security of the state (Krause and Williams, 1996: 232).

According to Ayoob (1991: 263), this realist concept of security is Western-biased and needs to be redefined in order to analyse the security problematic of Third World states. It is being increasingly recognised that the nature of threats in these states is qualitatively different from threats traditionally

development since it is difficult to attract investment in countries engaged in a civil war. This, in turn, has negative implications for development. Shoeman (1998: 13) similarly asserts that building and maintaining security can (and should) be reinforced by development, and vice versa.

³⁹ Lippmann's argument that a nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice its core values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war (Solomon, 1998), mainly summarises traditional (realist) views of security.

included in the realist concept of security. For example, the insecurity in African countries is caused by the illegitimacy of governments, ethnic rivalry, economic underdevelopment, and excessive external dependence (Zacarias, 1999: 142), among others. The insecurities arising from these circumstances are directly or indirectly linked to the problems of state-making and nation-building, and are therefore mostly internal in nature.

For instance, one of the major sources of insecurity was and remains the problems of regime (in)security. These problems have encouraged unconstitutional interventions by armed forces and political opponents, as well as ethnic claims (Kacowicz, 1997: 373). Such internal threats to the security of African states have been acknowledged by Ayoob (1991: 259) who claims that security should be defined in relation to the vulnerabilities that threaten, or have a potential, to bring down or considerably weaken state structures and the regimes presiding over these structures. This definition assumes the primacy of political variables in determining the degree of security. Ayoob goes on to say that other types of vulnerabilities, such as economic or environmental, become components of his definition only if they become acute enough to take on overtly political dimensions.

Although adopted for the special conditions of Third World states, this concept of security is still state- and regime-centric and does not take into consideration that the security of a state or regime is not necessarily synonymous with the security of the citizens living within that state (Booth, 1991: 5), as is generally the case in developed states. On the contrary, a regime or government can threaten the security of its people/citizens, either through action by employing oppressive policies or through inaction by its incapacity to sustain a good life for all (Venter, 1996: 162). Thus, it is necessary to separate analytically the insecurities threatening the existence of states and regimes representing them from

those threatening the existence of people(s), or combine state-centric approach with people-centric approach to address the problems of human and communal security.

As a result of criticism, the narrow realist concept of security was expanded by different scholars; horizontally, to include other sectors alongside the military one, such as the political, economic, societal and environmental; and vertically, beyond its state-centric focus, by including different levels of security either down to the level of individual/human security and group/communal security, or up to the level of regional and international security as opposed to only state security⁴⁰ (Booth and Vale, 1995: 313; Krause, 1998: 126).⁴¹ New approaches, which are trying to deepen and broaden the concept of security, include critical⁴² and constructivist approaches, focusing on the processes through which individuals, groups, and threats become constructed as 'social facts', and the influence of such constructions on the security problematic. The basic claims of the critical and constructivist approaches are that security is not an objective condition, that threats to security are not only a matter of correctly perceiving a constellation of material forces, and that an object of security is not stable or unchanging, as postulated by realist scholars (Krause and Williams, 1996: 246).

⁴⁰ In this thesis, the term 'national security' is synonymous with the integrated or holistic concept of security. The assumption is made that national security can only be achieved when the security of a state, regime, and the communities and individuals living within that state is ensured. Furthermore, the attainment of regional and international security is the necessary condition for maintaining national security.

⁴¹ Krause (1998: 127) expressed a concern that the attempts to expand the agenda or the levels at which security is discussed would contribute to the loss of an analytic core for the concept of security. However, as argued by Buzan (1991: 368), these levels and sectors are more like analytical devices for breaking up an integrated/holistic concept of security and different viewing platforms from which the problem can be observed than self-contained areas for policy or analysis.

⁴² Critical approaches conceive of security holistically and view (regional) security in terms of the notion of community. Furthermore, these approaches are aimed not only at analysing reality, but changing it (Booth and Vale, 1995: 310, 324).

When trying to analyse the security problematic in the SADC region, Zacarias (1999: 139, 144) uses a people-centric approach with a focus on human security. He defines security as "... a condition of continuous fulfilment of human aspirations as guaranteed by a certain enabling environment, in which the human beings who inhabit it are assured that it will not be disrupted, especially by human action." He further maintains that the building blocks of the environment for security rest on three pillars: order, justice and peace. These pillars need to coexist in a society in a condition of dynamic equilibrium for security to be realised.

Similarly, Booth and Vale (1995: 324) claim that in order to be lasting, security in the form of order, justice and peace must be owned by the people(s). Booth (1991: 319) builds on the people-centric approach and maintains that security (as the absence of threats) and emancipation (as the freeing of people from physical and human constraints, which stop them from carrying out what they would freely choose to do) are "two sides of the same coin". He uses the Kantian idea that people should be treated as ends and not means, and states as means and not ends, to support his argument that individuals are the ultimate referent of security.

Here, the question arises as to which definition of security is the most useful for the analysis of the security problematic of African states, and SADC member states in particular. As argued, definitions focusing on only one aspect of the security problematic have to be put aside or incorporated into a more general definition of security.

Buzan and his associates (Buzan *et al.*, 1998: 21, 23-24) attempt to form such a general definition, which includes different levels as well as different sectors of security, by using the constructivist approach. Accordingly, they claim that security is about survival. Threats are not always physical, so they should

preferably be linked to the notion of survival especially when the referent object⁴³ is not the state but the nation, ethnicity or some other identity group (Krause, 1998: 135).

Thus, securitisation of an issue occurs when this issue is presented as posing an existential threat (i.e. a threat to survival) to a designated referent object. The handling of this existential threat requires emergency measures and extraordinary means, and justifies actions outside the normal political procedure (Buzan *et al.*, 1998: 23-24).⁴⁴ Similarly, Cawthra (1997) asserts that issues should not be labelled as security threats unless there is no other way of dealing with them. A threat poses a high possibility of severe disruption to the normal processes of government and society within a relatively short time.

Furthermore, Buzan *et al.* (1998: 24-25, 31) stress another feature of the concept of security and that is its inter-subjective character, meaning that securitising actors (i.e. actors who securitise issues by declaring something existentially threatened)⁴⁵ do not decide whether an issue is securitised, but this is decided when the 'audience' accepts it as such. In other words, security is ultimately constructed inter-subjectively between securitising agents and the audience. Consequently, to securitise or to accept a securitisation is always a

⁴³ Referent objects are 'things' that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival (Buzan *et al.*, 1998: 36).

⁴⁴ Extraordinary measures and actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure separate a securitised issue from a politicised one. When an issue is politicised it is part of a public policy, requiring a government's decision and resource allocation (Buzan *et al.*, 1998: 23) and as such falls within the framework of normal politics. Thus, an issue is politicised when it is perceived as a mere problem and securitised when it is perceived as a threat.

⁴⁵ Securitising actors can thus be states' leaders, different groups within civil society, international governmental and non-governmental organisations, ethnic and religious leaders, and the like.

political choice; this choice, however, has to be made within socially defined limits as to what can and cannot be securitised (Buzan *et al.*, 1998: 29, 39).⁴⁶

4.2. New Security Thinking and the Concept of a Security Community

In the past, the political choices regarding the securitisation of issues in African states were made by elites in power at the expense of the security of the citizens. These choices were backed by their Cold War allies, and although the backing was considerably reduced after the Cold War, many regimes or their successors continued endangering the security of the populace. Here, two questions arise: how the tension between state/regime security on the one hand, and human and communal security on the other can be resolved; and how the concept of a security community understood in terms of the absence of military threats can be reconciled with the new security threats and the reality of African states, SADC member states in particular.

On the first question: if human beings are put at the centre of everything we do, as suggested by the Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan, in his *Millennium Report* (Annan, 2000), this would clearly require that the concept of security becomes people-centric. This is relevant especially in cases where states, or better yet regimes in power, which are meant to play the role of a neutral agency and are considered to be the only legitimate entity for ensuring the security of the citizens, pursue their own security at the expense of the security of the majority of citizens,

⁴⁶ The perception of the apartheid regime in South Africa of what represented threats to its security can illustrate Buzan's point. The regime listed leftist activities, exaggerated humanism, permissiveness, materialism and related ideologies, black racism, exaggerated individual freedom, one-man-one-vote, boycotts, demonstrations, undermining activities, and so on as posing threats to its security (Zacarias, 1999: 99). It can be argued that the audience, South Africans, rejected such a definition, except for most of the ruling (white) minority. It is also clear that this perception of threats was politically conditioned and ideologically motivated.

and hence represent a source of threats to human security. In this case, the problem arises as to who is ultimately going to ensure the security of people.

The implementation of this task cannot be left to more or less organised groups of people because this could result in a situation where different groups of combatants take the provision of 'security' into their own hands, as already demonstrated by the events in some African countries, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia, or Liberia. The other possible solution is a more prominent role of international institutions, dealing with security as well as development issues. At present, this solution does not seem plausible since many developed countries (especially the US) as the most capable financial and material supporters of the UN peace and security related activities have adopted a 'hands off' approach when it comes to addressing the most acute African security problems.

If we take the position that the ongoing processes of state-making and nation-building in many African countries are the main causes of different insecurities, it seems that the final solution to the paradox of the state lies in the process of national integration with the consequent establishment of an amalgamated security community which would eliminate or 'reconcile' the tension between regime and human security.

On the second question: since there is a consensus emerging within the academic community that threats to the security of African states are mostly non-military in nature, Deutsch's definition of a security community needs to be adapted to the conditions in African states. Thus, a security community is here defined as a community which has managed to eliminate the existential threats related to large-scale violence and political instability (e.g. war, political violence, a regime's oppression of a population) and at least minimise existential threats related to the general wellbeing of the population (HIV/AIDS, poverty, crime,

drug trafficking, soil-erosion, and the like). The latter are included in this broader definition of a security community because they frequently contribute to the causes of internal conflicts or pose existential threats to a large part of the population. If they are not at least minimised, they will continue preventing the establishment of a security community within as well as between the states. Since these threats are related to the economic and social conditions of African states, the process of development becomes instrumental in the establishment of security communities on the African continent.

In terms of the above definition of a security community, development is understood firstly, as a process aimed at significantly reducing or eliminating the existential threats to referent objects; and secondly, in terms of human development, which is the development of people, for the people and by the people (UNDP, 2000). Therefore, development is aimed at increasing the availability and widening of the distribution of basic life-sustaining goods, raising the standards of living, and expanding the range of economic and social choices available to individuals and states (Van Wyk, 2000). Development as an end is aimed at achieving "freedom from fear" and "freedom from want" (Annan, 2000) as two basic conditions for a decent standard of living. At the same time, freedom from fear and freedom from want represent the main pillars of a security community as defined above.

4.3. (Regional) Security Complex

Another important characteristic of the security problematic of African states is that threats resulting from an extensive variety of deprivations (such as famine, disease, and deadly epidemics) are also transnational in nature (Kacowicz, 1997: 373). They are sometimes aggravated by internal conflicts with a tendency

to spill over into neighbouring states. Hence, certain security issues are shared by several states in a region and cannot be resolved by individual states alone. In such cases, the interrelated concepts of regional/transnational security complex and regionalism/regionalisation become relevant.

In relation to the mutual concerns linked to the security problematic, Buzan *et al.* (1998: 12) introduce the concept of a security complex,⁴⁷ defined as "...a set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another." They further argue that the dynamics and structure of a security complex are usually generated by the units within it, by their security perceptions of, and interactions with, each other. Thus, security complexes are products of the increasing regionalisation in different security sectors at various levels. They may also occur as a result of the collective securitisation of pressures arising from the operation of larger systems, such as the global environment or the global economy. Security complexes are theoretical constructs, but they also reflect observable patterns of global politics and cannot be constructed haphazardly (Buzan *et al.*, 1998: 14, 201).

Buzan *et al.* (1998: 12) also assert that the internal dynamics of a regional security complex can be located along a spectrum according to whether the security interdependence is motivated by amity or enmity. At the negative end of the spectrum lies conflict formation, in which interdependence arises from fear, rivalry, and the mutual perception of threat. In the middle of this spectrum lies a security regime,⁴⁸ in which the interests of states are neither wholly compatible nor

⁴⁷ Buzan *et al.* (1998: 201) also introduce the concept of a security constellation, which is a much wider concept than security complex, and it encompasses the totality of possible security interrelationships at all levels.

⁴⁸ Acharya (1994: 86) defines a security regime as a formal or informal arrangement whose main objective is to significantly reduce, if not eliminate, the likelihood of war by securing

wholly competitive, and where it is possible to assure compliance with a set of principles, rules and norms (Acharya, 1994: 89) to deal with the security dilemma⁴⁹ among states. At the positive end of the spectrum lies a pluralistic security community in Deutsch's sense. The regional integration of states in a sense of the establishment of a pluralistic security community will eliminate the regional security complex (Buzan *et al.*, 1998: 12). Based on this explanation, we can conclude that Buzan's understanding of a security complex relates mainly to military threats. However, states can also be interdependent as regards the security problematic in the economic, political, social and environmental sectors.

This interdependence of the security problematic, which is also characteristic for the SADC region, compels SADC member states to co-ordinate their efforts when dealing with transnational and other threats to their security, also in the context of their integration process. In the next chapter, some of the issues found in military, political, economic, societal and environmental security sectors, which can be perceived as threats to the security of SADC member states, will be analysed.

adherence to a set of norms and rules that restrain the conflictual behaviour of regional actors in relation to one another. In the case of African states, this security regime would have to deal with other threats to security at the state, regional, communal or individual level, arising from the political, social, economic and environmental sectors.

⁴⁹ In the early 1950s, Herzl (Solomon, 1998) introduced the term 'security dilemma', defined as a structural notion in which the self-help attempts of states to look after their security needs tend, regardless of their intentions, to lead to rising insecurity for others as each interprets its own measures as defensive, and the measures of others as potentially threatening.

5. THE SECTORAL BREAKDOWN OF THE SECURITY PROBLEMATIC IN THE SADC REGION

The SADC region has a security problematic relatively similar to other parts of the African continent. Venter (1996: 164) summarises these similarities by pointing out that, firstly, all major threats to the security of the region derive from internal rather than external factors, with some countries having domestic crises with a potential to spill over into neighbouring states. Secondly, the most serious security threats are political, economic, social and environmental in nature rather than military. Finally, certain issues are transnational in nature: refugees, illegal immigrants, environmental degradation, the depletion of and competition for scarce natural resources, the proliferation of small arms, and drug smuggling, among others.

Despite the complexity of the security problematic, many Southern African countries are still preoccupied with mostly military and political security issues. For example, the defence and security white paper, adopted by the Mozambican government in 1997, sets goals for the defence and security agencies, which cover the military and political sectors.⁵⁰

As opposed to this understanding, South Africa's security concept, which was included in its White Paper on National Defence (Defence in a Democracy, May 1996), is in line with the new approaches to security, and the people-centric approach in particular. National security is not viewed as a predominantly military

⁵⁰ The goals are the following: to guarantee the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country; to defend and consolidate national unity; to defend and ensure the normal functioning of democratic institutions; to safeguard the internal and external security of the state; to ensure the fundamental rights and liberties of citizens; and to maintain law and public order (Chachia, 2000).

and/or police problem; it is broadened to incorporate political, economic, social and environmental issues. The South African government has recognised that the biggest threats to its people are socio-economic: poverty, unemployment, poor education, the lack of housing and the absence of adequate social services, as well as high levels of crime and violence.

Therefore, the issue of what represents the security problematic in the SADC region can be a subject of contention, since different securitising agents stress different aspects of security. In the following section, selected issues from different security sectors, which were or can potentially be securitised, are examined in more details to demonstrate the complexity of the security problematic of SADC member states.

5.1. The Military Sector

The military sector covers relationships of forceful coercion, and military security concerns the traditional or realist preoccupations with armed offensive and defensive capabilities of states and states' perception of these capabilities and of each other's intentions (Buzan *et al.*, 1998: 7-8). Therefore, the threats in the military sector arise mainly at the state level, but can be found also at the communal level in 'anarchical states'.

As already noted, one of the features of many African states is the fact that they turn the Hobbesian anarchy, characteristic for the international system, inside out. Consequently, African states have been able to maintain negative peace (understood as the absence of war or conflict) among themselves, and external

military threats have not represented a security issue.⁵¹ Still, even in the absence of external military threats, the military has played an important role in African societies.

The military has been crucial in maintaining the security of a regime in the face of numerous armed and civilian opposition groups. The history of South Africa during apartheid and Mozambique during the civil war illustrate this, as do the current situations in Angola and the DRC.

In some cases, the military has staged *coups d'état* to take over the government. In the SADC region, Lesotho experienced such military rule when the authoritarian government of Chief Jonathan was overthrown by the military in 1986 (Booth and Vale, 1995: 319).

Related to the issue of military threats is the problem of arms proliferation. One of the major factors that has contributed to the high levels of violence and conflict in African countries is the transfer of weapons and weapons technology from the industrialised countries. Sophisticated weapons acquired at great cost to provide security can often increase the prospects of conflict and add to the insecurity of African states (Ayoob, 1991: 274).

However, arms do not come only from developed countries. The SADC region has its own supplier – South Africa. Increasingly, the region is said to be an important market for the South Africa's armament industry, but the export of arms

⁵¹ Although inter-state conflicts were not on the agenda, the (c)overt support of African states for rebel, liberation or other movements in neighbouring states can be considered as hostile and representing a (military/political) threat. The examples are numerous; during the Cold War, the Zairian president Mobutu and South Africa supported the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) fighting the Angolan government, the Front Line States (FLS) supported the African National Congress (ANC) against the apartheid regime, Malawi assisted the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) until 1986, Zambia and Angola backed the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO), and so on. This practice continued after the Cold War with Angola supporting Kabila's rebellion against Mobutu in the DRC, and Rwanda and Uganda as preponderant regional powers supporting rebel groups in the DRC.

to the region provides further means for increased insecurity in the region and the means for its inhabitants to kill one another. In this case, the desire for disarmament is overshadowed by South Africa's goal of generating jobs in the country with high levels of unemployment, and developing other sectors of the economy (Booth and Vale, 1995: 309).

5.2. The Political Sector

The political sector is about relationships of authority, governing status and recognition; and political security concerns the organisational stability of states, systems of government and the ideologies giving them legitimacy (Buzan *et al.*, 1998: 7-8). Here, the tension between regime and human/communal security is most evident.

Threats to political security in African states come mainly from within their borders. Political systems in many African states generate and perpetuate autocratic practices embodied in a minority regime, which manipulates the apparatus of the state in a discriminatory and arbitrary manner that furthers the interests of the minority. This situation does not improve considerably during democratic transitions (see section 5.4.), which are currently taking place all over the African continent.

As a result, regimes in power face challenges from domestic opposition in the form of demonstrations, riots, strikes and even armed resistance. Consequently, such regimes generate oppressive and repressive violence, which endangers the security of excluded populations or those advocating alternative policies (Fall, 1993: 76). This situation is not only perpetuated by the regimes in power; the whole administration is geared towards strengthening the security of a

regime. Citizens consider such regimes as illegitimate and the same is true for the ideology sustaining them (Fall, 1993: 76).

South Africa during apartheid provided a good example of an illegitimate regime since the ruling regime was racially exclusive and thus based on minority rule. The regime security was maintained at the expense of the security of the majority of South Africans. Consequently, for South Africa's majority, the insecurity of the Pretoria government and its apartheid regime represented the hope of improved security, a security to be achieved by a non-racial and democratic political system (Booth and Vale, 1995: 307).

In addition, the political instability caused by domestic strife in South Africa and the impact of destabilisation on South Africa's neighbours was a threat to the regimes in the region (Zacarias, 1999: 112). With the exception of Angola, where South Africa became involved in the civil war backing UNITA, South African armed forces adopted a practice of supporting insurgent groups in Mozambique and Angola and striking at suspected ANC and SWAPO camps and facilities throughout Southern Africa. This had destabilising effects in targeted countries (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe) and the entire Southern African region (Sullivan, 1989: 203).

Additional examples of regime insecurity are regimes currently in place in Lesotho and Swaziland, which are increasingly challenged by the opposition pressures to (further) democratise their political systems. The presence of the democratic South Africa in the neighbourhood can additionally contribute to this insecurity (Booth and Vale, 1995: 319).

The challenges to regional interstate borders represent another threat to political security and could destabilise the SADC region. In early 1994, Namibia was finally consolidated into a single unit when Walvis Bay, formerly a part of South Africa, became part of the country. This has set a precedent on the basis of

which other states around South Africa have laid claims to South Africa's territory: Lesotho claims the territories in the eastern Free State province, Swaziland areas of Mpumalanga. Other border disputes in the region include the dispute between Tanzania and Malawi over the boundary in Lake Malawi, and Namibia's claim to Sidudu/Kasakili Island in the Okavango/Chobe river on the Botswana border (Booth and Vale, 1995: 318; Venter, 1996: 163). The latter dispute was resolved by the International Court of Justice in 1999 (CIA, 2000). However, since 1997, two other islands have been in dispute between these two countries, Setungo and Luyondo, also in the Okavango/Chobe river (Africa South of the Sahara, 1999: 777).

Moreover, the borders of SADC members are not challenged only from outside, but also from within by various secessionist movements. For instance, the Front for Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave (FLEC) is fighting for the independence of Cabinda from Angola; and the Caprivi Liberation Movement (CLM) wants to ensure the secession of the Caprivi strip from Namibia (Africa South of the Sahara, 1999: 159, 778).

5.3. The Economic Sector

The relationships of trade, production, and finance are the essence of the economic sector; and economic security is about access to the resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power (Buzan *et al.*, 1998: 7-8). The threats to security in this sector arise at the state as well as the individual level.

Underdevelopment,⁵² which is a prevalent condition in African countries, has considerably contributed to the instability in these countries, and has been aggravated by a hostile international economic environment (for selected developmental indicators see Table 1). The first factor that leads to instability is the disparity among regions. Disparities in regional development result from differences in economic resource endowment, and varied levels of development and modernisation as well as imbalances in such sectors as employment, education, health and infrastructure. These economic imbalances amongst regions have been, if not created, at least sustained and strengthened by clientelism, and have been the cause of frustration in the poor regions. On the other hand, regions well endowed with natural resources oppose the exploitation of these resources for the benefit of the whole population, or rather consider that a region's economic superiority must be reflected in the position of the inhabitants of this region in the domestic political arena (Fall, 1993: 82).

One can find an example of such regional disparities in Mozambique. Its economy was not geographically integrated and there were no major roads or corridors linking the hinterland with the coastline from east to west, or functional roads between its southern and northern borders. Southern Mozambique, had strong connections with the development of South Africa's economy and, as a

⁵² According to Human Development Report for 2000 (UNDP, 2000), SADC member states have not ranked high in the Human Development Index (HDI). HDI measures the average achievements in a country in three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life (life expectancy at birth), knowledge (adult literacy and combined gross primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment ratio), and a decent standard of living (Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita – purchasing power parity in US dollars). Out of 174 countries surveyed in 2000, Seychelles ranked 53, Mauritius 71, South Africa 103, Swaziland 112, Namibia 115, Botswana 122, Lesotho 127, Zimbabwe 130 as the countries with medium human development, and the DRC 152, Zambia 153, Tanzania 156, Angola 160, Malawi 163 and Mozambique 168 as the countries with low human development.

TABLE 1: DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

Country	GDP per capita in 1998 (US\$)	Life Expectancy at Birth in 1997 (Years)	Adult Illiteracy in 1995 (%)	Population with Access to Social Infrastructure in 1994-1995 (%)		
				Sanitation	Safe Water	Health Services
Angola	427	48	47	16	32	n.a.
Botswana	3 175	51	30	55	70	n.a.
DRC	119	54	23	18	25	26
Lesotho	396	59	29	38	57	80
Malawi	156	41	44	63	54	35
Mauritius	3 664	72	17	100	100	100
Mozambique	134	48	60	54	28	39
Namibia	1 865	56	56	34	57	59
Seychelles	7 087*	n.a.	72	92	97	n.a.
South Africa	2 819	66	18	53	70	n.a.
Swaziland	1 203	61	23	70	60	n.a.
Tanzania	256	52	32	86	49	42
Zambia	409	44	22	64	59	n.a.
Zimbabwe	565	49	15	58	74	85

* data is for 1997

n.a. – data is not available

Sources: African Development Bank (1999) *African Human Development Report 1999*. Oxford: Oxford University Press for African Development Bank.

SADC (2000) *The Official SADC Trade, Industry and Investment Review 2000*. Southern African Marketing Co. (Pty) Ltd. and SADC.

result, is the most developed area in Mozambique (Lundin, 2000).⁵³ Similarly, Zambia's economy is dominated by a core area along the rail line from Livingstone to the Copperbelt, where most of the economic activity is focused (Rule, 1996: 364).

The inequitable distribution of resources within as well as between the countries in the SADC region is producing and strengthening asymmetries within the region. While South Africa's economy is two and a half times larger than the rest of SADC economies taken together, the gap between South Africa and the weakest economies of Malawi, Mozambique and Tanzania is even larger. These economic asymmetries have a twofold impact. They can increase fears of domination by strong economies on weaker economies,⁵⁴ and they can encourage the emergence of economic refugees (Zacarias, 1999: 114-115).

States of immigration feel threatened by this phenomenon, since refugees add to the already existing socio-political strain. South Africa has attracted immigrants from countries such as Mozambique, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Angola, and the DRC, to name just the countries from the SADC region, especially after the transition to majority rule. Economic refugees are believed to engage in criminal activities (arms smuggling, for example), to aggravate the high rates of unemployment, and to represent a drain on already stretched social services.⁵⁵

⁵³ About 47 percent of Mozambican manufacturers are located in and around Maputo, although the government is encouraging decentralisation towards Beira and northern Mozambique (Africa South of the Sahara, 1999: 759).

⁵⁴ For instance, South Africa is being accused of flooding neighbouring markets with its products and destroying local manufacturers while closing its market to their exports by way of high tariffs and other barriers. However, South Africa's neighbours generally cannot provide the products that constitute the bulk of its imports on the one hand, and on the other, South Africa produces itself many of the agricultural and mining commodities that other SADC member states can supply (Leistner, 1997: 119).

⁵⁵ In 1994, it was estimated that 5 million illegal immigrants cost South Africa 1.985 million rands (Solomon and Cilliers, 1996).

These beliefs may encourage xenophobia and lead to domestic unrest (Cawthra, 1997; Ryan-Sinclair, 1998: 339, 345).

In addition, international experience shows that when cross-border migration develops, new transnational issues surface. These include drug smuggling and the proliferation of small arms, which are also major elements in a new subculture of "border-economies" in Southern Africa (Booth and Vale, 1995: 307).

The economic problems in many African countries thus lead to a situation in which large numbers of people are deprived of their resource base and capacity for self-reliance. As a result of poor economic performance, some of the economies are unable to provide for the basic needs (food and health) of their people.⁵⁶ With high levels of unemployment⁵⁷ the chances of criminal activity increase (Zacarias, 1999: 113).

The end of the civil war in Mozambique put the issue of the integration of former soldiers into the society on the agenda. The lack of employment opportunities coupled with the inability of small-scale agriculture to guarantee the subsistence of rural families forced former combatants to use anything at their disposal for survival, including weapons. Together with unsettled refugees, displaced people and unemployed youth, they represent recruits for criminal groups and thus crime has become a way of life for many people. However, the

⁵⁶ The available data on the population living below poverty line for selected SADC member states are as follows: 47 percent in Botswana (1997), 49.2 in Lesotho (1993), 54 in Malawi (1991), 10.6 in Mauritius (1992), 57 in South Africa (1996), 51.1 in Tanzania (1991), 86 in Zambia (1993) and 60 in Zimbabwe (1999) (figures are estimates only) (CIA, 2000; The Economist, February 24 – March 2, 2001).

⁵⁷ The estimated unemployment rates for different SADC states are as follows: more than 50 percent in Angola (1999), 20-40 in Botswana (1999), more than 50 in Lesotho (1999) (unemployed and underemployed), 2 in Mauritius (1996), 30-40 in Namibia (1997) (unemployed and underemployed), 30 in South Africa (1999), 22 in Swaziland (1995), 25 in Zambia (1998) and 50 in Zimbabwe (1999) (CIA, 2000).

inability of the police to fight crime represents a risk that law-breaking will become a rule, resulting in a culture of lawlessness in Mozambique (Chachiua, 2000), thus producing a permanent threat to the security of ordinary citizens.

In cases where the state has failed to ensure the economic security of its citizens, they must depend on international humanitarian assistance for their survival. This assistance, while crucial in saving lives, may also have the effect of encouraging dependency and undermining development. This, in turn, reinforces poverty, underdevelopment, the competition for scarce resources, the conflict over state power and the control over resources and distributive system (Deng, 1996: 219), and perpetuates threats to economic security.

Another issue that can be singled out in relation to economic security is the problem of the economic viability of the so-called 'pocket states'. Lesotho and Swaziland are small landlocked countries with few natural resources. Both countries are poverty-stricken and provide a labour reserve for a dominant regional economy – South Africa. Lesotho depends on four major sources of capital formation: migrant remittances, dividends from the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), foreign aid, and the export of water through the Lesotho Highlands Water Project. Swaziland depends on the sugar and timber industries as the main foreign exchange earners. Both economies rely on South Africa for employment, trade, supplies of subsistence goods and various other commodities (Matlosa, 1998: 324-325). Thus, any major disruption in the economic ties with South Africa would have implications for the economic security of both states.

5.4. The Societal Sector

The societal sector concerns itself with the relationships of collective identity. Consequently, societal security relates to the sustainability and evolution

of traditional patterns of language, culture, religious and national identity and custom (Buzan *et al.*, 1998: 7-8). Therefore, communal security is mostly associated with this sector.

As noted, one of the major projects of African statesmen after independence was nation-building, i.e. the fusing into one nation of a multitude of ethnic communities often separated by arbitrary colonial borders. However, ethnic and other group identities proved too strong to be abolished or replaced by one 'national' identity. As a result, the state apparatus and political power was hijacked by minority groups motivated by strong ethnic and at times religious sentiments, which has led to the identification of power with the dominant ethnic group, with marginalised ethnic groups developing an anti-establishment attitude (Fall, 1993: 79). Even in countries where political systems were initially based on the support of several ethnic groups, the ethnic basis of regimes have eventually shrunk.

In Zambia, for example, Kaunda gained power after independence with broad multi-ethnic support. Of around six major ethnic groups, only the Ila and Tonga supported the opposition. However, this broad support of the ruling party soon contracted and Kaunda declared a single-party state to disguise the narrow (ethnic) base of his party, confined by then largely to the Nyanja of the east. Their support of Kaunda was clearly demonstrated in the 1991 election when Kaunda's party won all the seats in the Eastern Province, where the Nyanja represent the majority of population (Horowitz, 1993: 26; Rule, 1996: 372-373).

The grievances of other (excluded) ethnic groups brought about a major victory of Chiluba's Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), an interethnic opposition group. The Chiluba regime, however, was repeating the process of exclusion that narrowed the base of his predecessor. In March 1995, increasing divisions became evident within the MMD between the Bemba to which Chiluba

belongs and the Nsenga (Africa South of the Sahara, 1999: 1163; Horowitz, 1993: 26).

The prevalence of ethnic affiliations in politics is characteristic of many African countries. This calls the transitions to democratic political systems as promoted by Western states into question.⁵⁸ These democratic transitions are seen as a panacea for resolving many problems preoccupying African states, including the problem of ethnic divisions and tensions. Although multiparty elections have been taking place in SADC member states, ethnic divisions and ethnic alliances remain an important ingredient of multiparty politics.⁵⁹

Malawi's multiparty elections of 1994 have shown that the three political parties that emerged as serious contenders in the run-up to the elections (the Malawi Congress Party (MCP), the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the Alliance for Democracy (AFORD)) drew their support from a regional platform, but this 'regionalism' was a product of the ethnic composition of the country. The MCP drew its support from the Central Region, populated mostly by the Chewa.

⁵⁸ As asserted by Rustow (1970: 354): "a country is likely to attain democracy not by copying the constitutional laws or parliamentary practices of some previous democracy, but rather by honestly facing up to its particular conflicts and by devising or adapting effective procedures for their accommodation." His argument is supported by Berger and Lukman's (1967: 51-55, 59-61) theory of institutionalisation, according to which social order is a product of human activity in the past. Institutions imply historicity, i.e. they always have a history of which they are a product and cannot be created instantaneously. To persist in time, these institutions have to be transmitted to a new generation as 'objective reality'. In the case of political institutions and activities, this would imply that 'objective reality' is transmitted by way of political socialisation. Therefore, the transmission of political reality from generation to generation is characteristic of all societies, but such transmission from society to society can prove problematic, extremely difficult or, in some cases, even impossible, because 'objective (political) realities' of two different societies might not be reconcilable.

⁵⁹ It seems that Rustow (1970) is correct in arguing that 'national unity' as a single background condition must precede all other phases of the democratisation process, which are: the preparatory or conflict phase, the decision or institutionalisation phase, and the habituation phase. National unity must also persist throughout all these phases as regional or ethnic divisions can result in the situation of latent or manifest secession if they are not crosscut by class or other cleavages.

The UDF gained its votes from the south dominated by the Yao, and AFORD from the Northern Region mainly populated by the Tumbuka. Similar patterns were observed in the 1999 elections, although religious factor also played a part (Thorold, 2000: 136-138). With such ethnic divisions, recent pre-election violence between supporters of the ruling UDF and the main opposition party – the MCP – is not surprising (Allafrica.com, 9.4.2001).

Violence frequently accompanies the election process in Africa. For instance, during the 1999 election campaign in Namibia, there were numerous cases reported of SWAPO supporters⁶⁰ using violence to intimidate opposition candidates and supporters (Glover, 2000: 146-147).

In general, voting along ethnic lines and politics based on ethnic allegiances do not represent problems in themselves, but they become problematic if ethnic identities are securitised when they are perceived as threatened. Although ethnic conflicts and tensions are frequent in African politics, the experience of ethnically homogenous countries, such as Lesotho, suggests that the fundamental causes of internal conflicts in Africa transcend ethnicity and ethnic competition (Kokole, 1996: 128). Ethnic or religious overtones that many political and social conflicts in Africa take are only a façade for the much more complex social and political situations of injustice, inequality and domination. The ethnic factor appears to be a framework for social recourse and mobilisation aimed at finding a solution to a problem (Fall, 1993: 80-81).

In relation to this, Bayart (1993: 55) asserts that in the context of contemporary African states ethnicity exists mainly as an agent of accumulation, both of wealth and of political power. Manifestations of ethnicity can be perceived less as a political force in itself than as a channel through which competition for

⁶⁰ SWAPO mainly draws its support from the former Ovamboland (Ohangwena, Omusati, Oshana and Oshikoto regions) (Glover, 2000: 143).

the acquisition of wealth, power or status is expressed. Ethnicity is asserted when it is useful to a group in securing an advantage or resisting deprivation (Turner, 1997: 9).

Since in many African countries, including SADC member states, resources are scarce, but more available in the sector of public administration, the struggle for power becomes a struggle for wealth (Bayart, 1993: 87, 89). In times of economic hardship, when the struggle for scarce resources intensifies, people tend to organise themselves into ever-smaller groups to compete more successfully for access to resources (Solomon and Cilliers, 1996).

Thus, the securitisation of ethnicity does not necessarily mean that a particular ethnic group itself is threatened, rather that the security of people is threatened by factors arising from other (non-societal) security sectors, economic or environmental, for example. Ethnic or religious leaders as securitising agents can interpret or 'rationalise' these threats in ethnic or religious terms and use ethnicity or a religious group as the main object of security.

For instance, on account of economic grievances, RENAMO managed to secure its support largely from the Ndau ethnic group from central Mozambique and has stood against the government dominated by Southerners, who are better off in terms of wealth and education compared to their Ndau counterparts (Solomon and Cilliers, 1996).

The ethnic element is basically exploited in most SADC member states for various reasons: in Angola's civil war where Savimbi portrays himself as the leader of the Umbundu, who are allegedly marginalised by the government, supported by the Kimbundu and *mesticoes*; in South Africa, where Zulu nationalism has resulted in thousands of lives being lost; in Malawi, where, as noted, parties organise themselves along regional and ethnic lines, and so on (Solomon and Cilliers, 1996).

5.5. The Environmental Sector

The environmental sector is about relationships between human activity and the planetary biosphere. Environmental security concerns the maintenance of the local and planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which other human enterprises depend (Buzan *et al.*, 1998: 7-8).⁶¹

The environment represents a source of threats to SADC members since it can generate conflict, especially in states where natural resources provide the main source of wealth and subsistence for citizens. All natural resources are potential sources of conflict, especially when they entail access to oil and mineral wealth. It is often stated that minerals are a root cause of conflict, and that they finance the conflicts in the DRC and Angola. The income derived from the minerals is used to extend the fighting capacity of the combatants, thus prolonging instability, conflict and human suffering (Selebi, 1999: 10).

TABLE 2: ENVIRONMENT

Country	Percentage of Arable Land in 1991	Environmental issues
Angola	3	Soil erosion on account of population pressures, desertification, deforestation of the tropical rain forest, inadequate supplies of potable water
Botswana	2	Periodic droughts, overgrazing, desertification, limited fresh water resources
The DRC	3	Droughts in the south, water pollution, deforestation
Lesotho	11	Overgrazing resulting from population pressures, severe soil erosion and exhaustion, desertification
Malawi	18	Deforestation, soil degradation, water pollution
Mauritius	52	Water pollution
Mozambique	4	Recurrent droughts, migration of the population to urban and coastal areas has environmental consequences, desertification, pollution of surface and coastal waters

⁶¹ For the environmental issues facing individual SADC member states, see Table 2.

Country	Percentage of Arable Land in 1991	Environmental issues
Namibia	1	Droughts, limited fresh water resources, desertification
Seychelles	2	Water supply depends on catchments for rain water
South Africa	11	Lack of water resources, pollution of rivers, air pollution (acid rain), soil erosion, desertification
Swaziland	12	Limited supplies of potable water, overgrazing, soil degradation and erosion
Tanzania	4	Soil degradation, deforestation, droughts
Zambia	7	Air pollution (acid rain), deforestation, soil erosion, desertification, lack of adequate water treatment
Zimbabwe	7	Deforestation, soil erosion and degradation, air and water pollution

Sources: Solomon, Hussein and Cilliers, Jakkie (1996) "Sources of Southern African Insecurity and the Quest for Regional Integration". *People, Poverty and Peace* (Monograph No. 4). [on line] <http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/MONOGRAPHS/NO%204/Sol%20+-%20Cill.html>
CIA (2000) *The World Factbook 2000*. [on line] <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook>

Another environmental condition causing problems in the SADC region is environmental scarcity.⁶² Scarcity of arable land is one such problem in the SADC region (see Table 2). African soil is often poor and not fertile enough to sustain the population. Botswana and Lesotho, for example, are not very suitable for agricultural production. In other parts of the SADC region, droughts and floods often affect food production. A problem related to the scarcity of arable land is the unequal distribution of this land (Van Wyk, 2000), which can result in political instability, as the situation related to the redistribution of the land owned by white farmers in Zimbabwe demonstrates.

⁶² There are three types of environmental scarcity: supply-induced scarcity, caused by degradation and depletion of environmental resources; demand-induced scarcity, which results from population growth or increased per capita consumption of a resource; and structural scarcity, which arises from an unequal social distribution of a resource (Percival and Homer-Dixon, 1998: 280).

Scarcity of arable land is aggravated by soil degradation. According to research conducted by the Institute for Natural Resources in Africa (UNU/INRA, 1999), the top causes of African soil degradation are overgrazing, inefficient agricultural activities, overexploitation, deforestation and vegetation removal. The research also finds that direct links existed between agricultural dependence and the fourteen African wars between 1989 and 1997. Agricultural decline results in migration as a survival strategy for Africa's rural poor, putting great pressures on the environment and natural resources of the new settlement areas and contributing to the growing urbanisation problems at the same time. Among sixteen African countries where soil degradation is the most acute, one can find Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, all SADC members.

In addition, following a major world wide study on water resources, the UN published a report in 1996 which predicts that water is likely to be the source of major conflict in a number of water-scarce regions of the world, including Southern Africa around the Zambezi basin (Selebi, 1999: 10).

The overall picture that defines the SADC region is that of water scarcity. At least three SADC member states – Botswana, Namibia and South Africa – are acutely short of water. Water is therefore now recognised as a fundamental political weapon in the region and it will increasingly shape the international relations and security arrangements of Southern Africa. Namibia's intention to drain water from the Okavango/Chobe river caused a diplomatic dispute between Namibia and Botswana. The disputes around the Okavango/Chobe water reserves are illustrative of the water problem in the SADC region (Van Wyk, 1998).⁶³

South Africa is trying to solve the problem of its water (in)security by 'importing' water from Lesotho through the Lesotho Highlands Water Project.

⁶³ For more on water scarcity as a security issue, see Solomon (1996).

However, South Africa's plans to solve its water demands by obtaining supplies from the Zambezi river, which flows through eight other SADC member states, might cause a political confrontation. Malawi has a problem with its biggest river, the Shire, which supplies the state's hydro-electric power. The river is shrinking and may dry up as a result of falling water levels in Lake Malawi (Van Wyk, 1998).

Furthermore, the inability of the SADC region to deal with natural disasters such as droughts, floods and cyclones, which periodically affect agricultural production, contributes to the insecurity of people. In the process, natural disasters have damaged infrastructure and caused severe losses of food, cash crops and livestock (Zacarias, 1999: 113).

* * *

In this chapter, some of the issues that are or can be securitised in various security sectors of SADC member states have been analysed. Certain issues that might be considered relevant for the discussion in this chapter have been omitted because they can be linked to these sectors only indirectly, such as high levels of illiteracy, poor education, and HIV/AIDS. Since the HIV/AIDS pandemic is particularly acute on the African continent and especially in the Southern African countries, this issue has been securitised by African statesmen and by different regional and international governmental and non-governmental organisations. HIV/AIDS combined with other epidemics is endangering the lives of millions of Southern Africans, and therefore, it would be relevant to include the health sector in Buzan's sectoral classification of the security problematic, at least when describing the security problematic of African countries. In the next chapter, an attempt is made to analyse the factors preventing the establishment of security communities in Southern Africa at the state as well as the regional level.

6. SADC AS A SECURITY COMMUNITY

Various insecurities originating in military, political, economic, societal and environmental security sectors can forestall the national but also the supranational integration process of SADC members. For example, it is unlikely that a country dealing with domestic problems and insecurities arising on account of the absence of national integration and underdevelopment, and with limited resources for addressing them, would be committed to allocating resources, fully participating in, and taking advantage of the integration process at the regional level.

This chapter attempts to analyse the situation in SADC member states against the background conditions conducive to disintegration as stipulated by Deutsch, and evaluate if and to what extent they are preventing the establishment of amalgamated security communities within SADC member states. Then, on the basis of the past and current attempts at integration, it tries to assess the prospects of SADC member states becoming a pluralistic security community.

6.1. National (Dis)integration of SADC Member States

Even though the previously discussed military, political, social, economic and environmental issues might not be considered as threats individually but rather as problems, combined together they undoubtedly pose a great burden for SADC member states, especially since they are interrelated and mutually reinforcing. Consequently, there is no simple solution for addressing them.

Any solution can prove difficult to find and implement, especially because African states are still struggling to develop into viable entities that would be able to compete with developed states on a more or less equal basis. Most states in the

SADC region can be characterised as weak,⁶⁴ and some of them as quasi-states. They possess juridical statehood recognised by the international community, but their empirical statehood is weak, ill-functioning or even non-existent. Their physical bases, socio-political cohesion and institutions are affected either by colonial policies, internal disputes or other insecurities, or by regional instability. Furthermore, the SADC region shows vulnerabilities to both military and non-military threats (Zacarias, 1999: 99). It seems that these problems have to be solved through the processes of nation-building, state-making and development.

If the situation in SADC member states is assessed against the background conditions conducive to disintegration as posited by Deutsch and his colleagues (see section 2.1.5), the following conclusions as to why these states have largely failed in their tasks of state-making, and (to a certain extent) development, can be made.

Firstly, after independence, SADC member states did not succeed in producing political loyalties directed towards the state; instead, the loyalties were directed towards different social groups within a particular state. In most Southern African states, state institutions have a limited geographical scope with state institutions being stronger in the capital and urban centres and weaker in the rural periphery or countryside. This situation is linked with the problem of insufficient infrastructure. The lack of infrastructure (roads and railways, for example) obstructs communication between the urban centres and the countryside.

In most SADC member states, the transport infrastructure was built by former colonial powers to facilitate the transportation of extracted resources for export rather than to connect the various parts of these countries. This was the case in Zambia, Namibia, Mozambique, Angola, the DRC, and Tanzania, to name some

⁶⁴ Buzan (1988: 28; Ayoob, 1991: 267) distinguishes between strong and weak states based on their socio-political cohesiveness.

of them. Furthermore, after independence, the existing and new transport infrastructure was poorly maintained due to lack of investment in this sector (Africa South of the Sahara, 1999).⁶⁵ Consequently, it is not infrequent that sub-state loyalties overcome state objectives, since the absence of the state allows for the development of local politics with objectives, values and priorities that can differ or even conflict with those of the state (Zacarias, 1999: 103).

In countries characterised by civil war, the state is physically forced to withdraw from the countryside, since the infrastructure is destroyed and its officials are forced to abandon state functions. Subsequently, large areas are left behind without any state institutions to undertake basic political, economic and social functions (Zacarias, 1999: 105). Furthermore, the destruction of the transport infrastructure in a country can have regional consequences as the case of the Mozambican civil war demonstrates. This war affected regional trade, since the country provided an outlet for the Southern African landlocked countries (Africa South of the Sahara, 1999: 759).

Secondly, except in a few countries such as Lesotho, national cohesion is inherently weak. The economic, cultural, social, and ethnic heterogeneity and differentiation of populations living in a particular state has not been matched by the compensating integrative process of nation-building; the political elites in power rather used force for nation-building and/or for eliminating their opponents.

Furthermore, the economic problems in such states can generate conflicts of solidarity and allegiance among the social groups, resulting from imbalances and

⁶⁵ Although South Africa has a relatively good transport infrastructure – the best in Africa (it has around one-third of all the railway track length in Sub-Saharan Africa, for example) – its transport network was almost exclusively designed to connect white cities and areas. The network of rural feeder roads is very poor, as are road and rail links with African townships and former 'homelands'. The government is trying to improve this situation with new infrastructure projects, known as the Spatial Development Initiatives (SDIs), which are planned to have national as well as regional impact (Africa South of the Sahara, 1999: 1010; EIU, 2000a: 21).

disparities between regions and communities (Fall, 1993: 82). The cases of regional imbalances in Mozambique and Zambia are already mentioned (see sections 5.3. and 5.4.), but the problem of regional imbalances is not limited only to these two countries.⁶⁶

Thirdly, after decolonisation, most of the 'democratic systems' in the SADC region, left behind by the departing colonial powers, gave way to either *de jure* or *de facto* one-party or one-man authoritarian regimes with the exception of Botswana and Mauritius.⁶⁷ After independence, the new regimes exploited control over the state for accumulation of personal wealth. Since the elites in SADC member states were relatively closed, and since there was a lack of opportunities to accumulate wealth by other means, their power was constantly challenged by counter-elites who wanted to use the state for their own enrichment (Diamond, 1988: 1, 21). Sometimes counter-elites managed to get control of part of the state's territory, often with important sources of wealth such as oil and different minerals, especially diamonds, as the civil wars in the DRC and Angola show.

Although former authoritarian regimes gave way to multiparty politics and popular elections in the 1990s, which can be seen as a positive development, many current ruling parties control the majority of the seats in parliament. In such a situation, parliament as a fundamental institution of governance is generally weak, without a strong opposition (Africa News Online, 16.2.2000). This is the case in Angola, Lesotho, Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, although in some

⁶⁶ In Malawi, the Southern Region is the most developed of the three regions and contains more than half the population. New investment in the Northern and Central Regions and the movement of the state's capital from Zomba to Lilongwe in the early 1970s have made some progress towards addressing these regional imbalances (Africa South of the Sahara, 1999: 670). In South Africa, the most important region in the country's economy is Gauteng as the commercial, industrial and mining core of the economy, contributing around 37 percent of the country's GDP (EIU, 1999: 22).

⁶⁷ Another exception to this rule was South Africa with its racially based regime, where the practice of 'democracy' was limited to the white minority.

SADC member states the majority of the ruling party and the weakness of the parliamentary opposition are more overwhelming than in others. Even the longest existing democracy in Southern Africa – Botswana – has this 'problem', because the ruling party (the Botswana Democratic Party – BDP) has managed to win the vast majority of parliamentary seats in every election since independence.

In addition, elections are used more to justify the ruling party's predominance than to ensure the participation of the population in a particular country. In countries where the ruling party majority in parliament is sufficient to change the constitution, good reasons can easily be found to justify such changes, as the events in Namibia and Zambia⁶⁸ have shown (Africa News Online, 16.2.2000).

Since many political parties tend to be ethnically based or supported by a particular ethnic group, the exclusion of ethnic groups from the government has further implications for the 'fragile' democracies in the SADC region. In ethnically divided societies, the election process is frequently accompanied by violence between supporters of different parties (see section 5.4.).

Finally, severe economic situation in the 1980s in several SADC member states resulted in mass protests, which were subsequently politicised. Protesters began linking their economic grievances to official corruption and mismanagement. Facing mass opposition, the SADC rulers introduced reforms leading to political liberalisation and democratisation. However, as asserted by Bratton and Van de Walle (1997: 107), increased political participation did not

⁶⁸ The new Zambian constitution, adopted in May 1996, prevented the former Zambian president Kaunda from contesting the presidential election. The new constitutional provisions banned any president from a third term in office, and any candidate whose parents were not both of Zambian origin (Kaunda's parents were from Malawi) from participating in the presidential election. Similarly, with support from SWAPO members, the national assembly of Namibia amended the constitution in order to allow Nujoma to seek a third presidential term (Africa South of the Sahara, 1999: 778, 1163).

result in a change of political culture or in the rules of the political game, as can be seen in the political situations in Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Lesotho and Angola.⁶⁹

We can conclude that in at least the majority of SADC members the background conditions favourable to disintegration are forestalling the integration process of those states. Some member states such as South Africa, Botswana, Mauritius, and Seychelles are closer to becoming integrated, i.e. amalgamated security communities, than others, but even in these countries statesmen have to deal with economic, social and environmental problems, which are putting considerable burdens on their governments. These include poverty, debt burdens, aid dependency, unemployment, dependency on one or two commodity exports, the HIV/AIDS pandemic, resource scarcity and depletion, and underdevelopment in general.

In some states, underdevelopment has become more a preoccupation of numerous governmental and non-governmental international organisations than a responsibility of their governments. The SADC governments have to give in to such management if they do not want to be cut off from loans and grants.

Economic, social and other burdens are not only weakening state structures and the ability to engage in efficient state-making and nation-building, they are also endangering the security of ordinary citizens. SADC member states are therefore failing to achieve the goal of integration at state level and this is obstructing the integration process at regional level.

⁶⁹ These countries are characterised by political instability or civil war. Their leaders are being accused of autocratic practices, corruption and serving their self-interests. Similar practices have been observed in the past, although the situation has somewhat improved.

6.2. The Challenge of the Formation of a Pluralistic Security Community in the SADC Region

Since the beginning of the twentieth century there have been 'integrating efforts' underway in Southern Africa. They were a consequence of the economic dependence of South Africa's neighbouring states on South Africa, which resulted in the establishment of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and the Rand Monetary Area (RMA), now the Common Monetary Area (CMA).

They were also a result of the anti-apartheid stance of South Africa's neighbours, since South Africa was posing a threat and causing instability in the Southern African region. This common anti-South African position resulted in informal arrangements among the Front Line States (FLS)⁷⁰ and in the institutionalisation within the framework of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC), and later the Southern African Development Community (SADC). However, because of domestic changes the latter organisation welcomed the post-apartheid and democratic South Africa as a new member state and this act indicated a change in inter-state relations in the Southern African region.

Although the SACU and CMA arrangements can be described as 'working', the development, political and security objectives stated in the SADC founding treaty, whose fulfilment could eventually lead to the establishment of a security community between SADC member states, are far from being realised. There are several economic, political and other obstacles at the regional level preventing the establishment of a pluralistic security community in the SADC region, and some of them are examined in this section.

⁷⁰ The FLS did not have any basic legal instruments and thus no formal status in international law (Cilliers, 1999: 84).

6.2.1. A Historical Overview of the Attempts at Regional Integration

In 1910, the agreement establishing the South African-dominated SACU between South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland⁷¹ started the integration process in Southern Africa. Its purpose was to expand trade in the area of the union.⁷² In 1969, SACU was renegotiated and South Africa conceded more advantageous conditions to its partners, but this was not sufficient to attract new members (Zacarias, 1999: 162-163).⁷³

As was the case with the formation of SACU, the signing of the 1974 agreement establishing the RMA⁷⁴ between South Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland rested only on common economic interests. Furthermore, both arrangements were based on South Africa's domination over the weaker neighbouring economies⁷⁵ and not on common values, common rules, or predictability of behaviour. On the contrary, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland supported the opposition to apartheid and subsequently South Africa raided their territories in search of its opponents.

⁷¹ Namibia was formally a member of SACU by virtue of being 'administered' by South Africa since 1915, and joined the union after its independence in 1990 because of its dependence on South African economy.

⁷² SACU provides for free movement of goods and services among member states and the application of a common external tariff to non-members (Leistner, 1997: 115).

⁷³ The renegotiations of the scheme whereby South Africa gets access to the markets of other SACU member states for its internationally uncompetitive goods in return for a disproportionate share of the revenue pool going to Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland started in 1994, because all SACU members had been dissatisfied with the functioning and performance of the scheme since 1980s (Gibb, 1998: 299). The renegotiations of the SACU agreement are currently at an advanced stage and are expected to be concluded in 2001 (Allafrica.com, 15.3.2001).

⁷⁴ The RMA provided for free capital flow and implementation of common exchange controls in the area (Leistner, 1997: 117). In 1986, the RMA was superseded by a new agreement, establishing the Tripartite Monetary Area, now the CMA (Africa South of the Sahara, 1999: 616), which Namibia formally joined in 1992.

⁷⁵ This domination is rooted in the history of the Southern African region. During the colonial era, the development of capitalism produced a high level of structural integration between South Africa and the region. However, the core areas of capital accumulation were focused on South Africa while other colonies functioned as peripheries and service economies. Consequently, there were inequalities in development within the region (Gibb, 1998: 290), which have been perpetuated up to the present.

Still, both arrangements worked because South Africa was seeking a legitimisation of its internal policies, and the rest of the member states saw a possibility of extracting benefits from co-operation with the dynamic regional economy (Zacarias, 1999: 163-164). However, the RMA and SACU stayed limited to South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland and were not broadened to include other Southern African states.

During the 1980s, the apartheid regime in Pretoria tried to mobilise a support for the Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS), an organisation that was to be anti-Marxist and devoted to the principles of free enterprise and regulation of economy by market mechanisms. The aim of this endeavour was to increase regional economic interdependence and lessen the threat of international sanctions, while at the same time secure the markets for South Africa's manufactured products (Gibb, 1998: 292).

However, in 1980, the incompatibility of political, social and ideological values between South Africa and other Southern African states resulted in the signing of the Lusaka Declaration by nine states (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe),⁷⁶ which formally established the SADCC as a counter-constellation to CONSAS. Its objectives were:

- the reduction of economic dependence, particularly on the Republic of South Africa;
- the forging of links to create a genuine and equitable integration;
- the mobilisation of resources to promote national, interstate and regional policies; and
- a concerted action to secure international co-operation within the framework of the strategy for economic liberation (Leistner, 1997: 118).

⁷⁶ Namibia joined in 1990.

The SADCC gained a reputation as a 'success' (Gibb, 1998: 302) perhaps because its objectives were not as ambitious as the objectives of other African regional organisations, which aimed at different forms of regional economic integration. However, the member states failed to reduce economic dependence on South Africa, and their dependence even increased over the years (Cilliers, 1996: 18).

This circumstance and the end of apartheid, which removed the principal motive for and source of unity among SADCC member states, resulted in the formation of the SADC in 1992 (Gibb, 1998: 302). The former SADCC member states became members of the new organisation, South Africa joined in 1994, Mauritius the next year, and the DRC and Seychelles in 1997.

The SADC wants, according to the founding treaty, to achieve a general objective of development and economic growth through regional integration. More specifically, Article 5 of the Treaty of Windhoek (1992) sets out the following principles and objectives:

- to achieve development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance the standard and quality of life of the peoples of Southern Africa and support the socially disadvantaged through regional integration;
- to evolve common political values, systems and institutions;
- to promote and defend peace and security;
- to promote self-sustaining development on the basis of collective self-reliance, and the interdependence of member states;
- to achieve complementarity between national and regional strategies and programmes;
- to promote and maximise productive employment and utilisation of resources of the region;
- to achieve sustainable utilisation of natural resources and effective protection of the environment; and

- to strengthen and consolidate the long-standing historical, social and cultural affinities and links among the peoples of the region.

Although the SADC strives to achieve a few non-economic objectives, these have to be viewed mainly as supporting the main objectives of development and economic integration. The extent to which such integration is conducive to the building of a security community is questionable but, as argued by liberal scholars, the countries engaging in high levels of trade are less likely to fight one another. Therefore, the increased levels of regional trade and other attendant transactions can have a positive impact on eventual political integration. However, there is general consensus that the processes of regional economic integration on the African continent have been unsuccessful so far, and are likely to be so in the future because of several economic and political conditions, which also obstruct the economic integration process of SADC member states.

Economic obstacles to the integration process of African states, as seen by different scholars, can be summarised as follows:

- models of the integration process are based on the European example, but the assumptions underlying that model are not relevant in the African context (Leistner, 1997: 120; Van Rooyen, 1998: 128);
- the trade between African countries is far too limited⁷⁷ because the economies are not complementary, but rather competitive (Cilliers, 1996: 13; Gibb, 1998: 303; Leistner, 1997: 120);
- the manufacturing sector is very small in most African countries (South Africa, Zimbabwe and Mauritius are said to be the exceptions in the SADC region) and dominated by multinational corporations, and countries are dependent on the export of one or two primary commodities (i.e. there is a

⁷⁷ For data on the intra-SADC trade, see Conclusion.

lack of diversification of produced and exported goods) (Leistner, 1997: 120; Van Rooyen, 1998: 126);

- import duties represent a significant contribution to government revenues and the removal of barriers to trade would mean a decrease in budget resources;
- the universal shortage of foreign exchange is an obstacle to increased intra-African trade because countries generally demand payment in an internationally accepted currency (Leistner, 1997: 120-121);
- there are major divergences among countries in respect of per capita income, industrialisation, and resource endowment, and the liberalisation of trade can contribute to even greater differences in regional development and to de-industrialisation in some countries (Gibb, 1998: 304, 306; Leistner, 1997: 121; Van Rooyen, 1998: 126); and
- heavy external indebtedness of most African countries, an infrastructure oriented towards serving the trade with Europe, falling per capita income, dependence on external aid,⁷⁸ and the absence of societal groups with vested interests in promoting the regional integration process further contribute to the failure of the process of economic integration (Leistner, 1997: 121, Van Rooyen, 1998: 129).

Moreover, Schweickert (1996: 52) claims that the integration process among African states is hardly a viable option, because its net gains are too low for it to pass the hurdles erected by political, social and cultural factors. These political, social and cultural obstacles include:

- artificial political boundaries;

⁷⁸ According to the Africa Institute (Cilliers, 1996: 18), SADC projects depend on donor finance for 90 percent of total costs. Moreover, donors complain that completed projects are not properly maintained, especially since SADC member states have troubles meeting the running costs of the projects (Leistner, 1997: 119).

- different languages, legal and administrative systems, and cultural patterns, which are part of the colonial heritage, and help perpetuate close ties with former colonial powers (Leistner, 1997: 121);
- ideological differences and cleavages between leaders which cannot be overcome by shared economic aims, especially because the benefits of regional integration are too long-term to make them politically popular (Haas, 1973: 111; Van Rooyen, 1998: 130);
- premature politicisation of actor expectations, thus preventing incremental bargaining on relatively non-controversial shared objectives (Haas, 1973: 111);
- the lack of internal integration of African countries, which makes them poor partners in a regional integration process because leaders are preoccupied with nation-building and maintaining and strengthening the control at home (Haas, 1973: 111; Van Rooyen, 1998: 129);
- narrow national/personal interests of governments and leaders, which are put above the regional ones (Leistner, 1997: 121);
- bargaining with reciprocal benefits, especially where payoffs have to be deferred, is difficult because of the limits on resources;
- the lack of a deep and wide popular base for co-operation (Makoni, 1994: 14, 17); and
- the difficulty of forming voluntary groups on a regional basis in the absence of pluralism (Haas, 1973: 111; Van Rooyen, 1998: 129).

Despite these political and economic obstacles, there is one positive outcome noted by several scholars, which resulted from the SADC integration process: the forging of a regional identity and a sense of common destiny among the countries and peoples of Southern Africa (Cilliers, 1996: 18; Makoni, 1994: 14). Van Nieuwkerk (1998: 29) opposes this view by claiming that the main actors in the SADC "drama" are states and the political elites in control of these states.

Leistner (1997: 119) agrees with this position by arguing that up to now, the SADC has been essentially a club of governments, of which the vast majority of their peoples are barely aware. He goes on stating that cultural and social barriers which exist between most of the member states are consolidated by suspicion, fear and hatred of neighbours. These and other 'barriers' that are preventing the establishment of a pluralistic community in the SADC region are discussed in the next section.

6.2.2. The Negative Impact of Regional Dynamics on the Formation of a Pluralistic Security Community

In addition to disintegrative forces within SADC member states there are other factors operating at the regional level, which prevent the development of a pluralistic security community in the SADC region. Firstly, it is difficult to establish what Southern Africa encompasses as a region geographically and politically. This difficulty arises partly because of the allegiances of some countries to several regional groupings with similar objectives, and partly because Southern Africa lacks social, political and economic homogeneity. SADC members have not only failed to produce a sense of nationalism, as argued above, but also a sense of regionalism. As stated by Solomon and Cilliers (1996), Southern Africa is characterised by a multitude of narrow ethnic sub-nationalisms.

Secondly, economic asymmetries can further obstruct the development of a pluralistic security community in the SADC region. The Community's stated objective is the so-called development integration,⁷⁹ but in practice its member

⁷⁹ The basic assumption of development integration is that industrialisation and diversification of export commodities must be advanced before market integration can be considered. Development integration involves a multi-sector programme in production,

states are primarily engaged in market integration (negative integration)⁸⁰ (Malan, 1998: 4). The latter is known to strengthen or even increase the differences between member states of a regional organisation, which can lead to political tensions if not addressed properly. It is believed that the liberalisation of trade within the SADC region⁸¹ will have little impact on SACU member states, where trade has been carried on in similar terms for decades. Mauritius is also expected to have few problems in implementing the free trade agreement, but other states will find it much harder to implement the agreement, particularly Zimbabwe, which is the second largest regional trader after South Africa (EIU, 2000c: 25).

Thirdly, political tensions can also arise on account of the differences in political values, because the SADC region comprises diverse political regimes. These vary from relatively democratic systems (such as Botswana, Mauritius, and South Africa) and semi-democratic regimes with authoritarian tendencies (Lesotho, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Zambia) to monarchical political systems (Swaziland) and countries entrenched in civil wars (Angola and the DRC). Such differences in political values make the mutual predictability of behaviour more difficult, especially since the behaviour of states is often based less on consistent foreign policy, and more on the arbitrary and erratic personal policy of some regional leaders.

Fourthly, this situation makes questionable the willingness of governments to respond to one another's messages, needs and actions adequately and in time.

infrastructure and trade. Conscious state intervention is necessary to promote co-operation and interdependence, while equal distribution of the benefits of such integration is needed. This integration is more political in nature than market integration, for example (Van Rooyen, 1998: 129).

⁸⁰ The market integration-approach is based on the regional economic integration experience of industrialised states. It includes the lowering and the removal of tariffs and other trade barriers between states in a region in order to increase trade between them (Van Rooyen, 1998: 128).

⁸¹ The SADC officially launched the free trade agreement, which does not cover Angola, the DRC and Seychelles, on September 1, 2000 (EIU, 2000c: 24).

Furthermore, the vulnerability of SADC member states to transnational threats due to their weakness can result in tensions between them. For instance, Angola has accused Zambia of covert support given to the UNITA by prominent members of the MMD. This support seems to have weakened as a result of the organised bombing campaign by Angola in Lusaka in the early 1999. During 2000, however, repeated cross-border raids by UNITA and Angolan government troops have created more tensions, with Zambia protesting the incursions and Angola denying them (EIU, 2000b: 11).

Finally, since the national interests of SADC member states dominate over collective or regional ones, the regional institutions are weak and display characteristics of an inter-governmental body as opposed to a supranational one (Solomon and Cilliers, 1996). The weakness of these institutions, which is further increased by the lack of common political values, has contributed to the fact that major security crises in the region were not dealt with within the framework of the SADC. Instead, the actions addressing these crises were undertaken outside the SADC structures (interventions in Lesotho by Botswana and South Africa and in the DRC by Namibia, Angola and Zimbabwe). In the next section, the institutions within the framework of SADC designed to manage and prevent regional and transnational threats are examined.

6.2.3. The Management of Regional and Transnational Threats to Security

Some threats to security mentioned in the previous sections, such as arms smuggling, trans-border crime, illegal immigration, the spill-over of domestic conflicts into neighbouring states, refugees, and economic asymmetries between states, are regional or better yet transnational in nature. These issues combined with domestic concerns of SADC members (poverty, water supply, environmental

degradation and HIV/AIDS, for example) can lead, according to Ohlson (Adekanye *et al.*, 1999: 52), to severe conflicts between Southern African states if not handled appropriately and in time. Hence, the management of different transnational and regional security threats at the regional level is necessary for the eventual elimination of a regional security complex. Yet that can prove to be a problem for the SADC region.

According to Buzan's definition of a security complex, the integration process within and between SADC member states could eventually lead to a security community provided that these states constitute a (sub)regional security complex. However, it is probably safe to argue that the SADC region cannot constitute a security complex by itself. Security issues from neighbouring states spill over into the SADC region and vice versa. For example, the security problematic of virtually all DRC's neighbouring states, including SADC non-member states, is essentially linked to the security problematic of the DRC.

The events in the DRC indicate that regional security must increasingly encompass the SADC's immediate neighbourhood if the spill-over of instability and conflict into the region is to be avoided. Furthermore, regional security can only be assured by continental security throughout Africa (Selebi, 1999: 6). Thus, it would be difficult to establish first, a workable security regime and later, a security community in the SADC region without linking such a regime to a wider security arrangement. This does not mean that the management or removal of threats in the SADC region is to be avoided at the expense of a broader arrangement, rather that the porous borders of the SADC cannot guarantee the development of a security community among its members without the establishment of security communities in countries bordering the SADC region, since the spill-over of insecurities from the neighbouring states can threaten the security of SADC member states.

Although the SADC focuses on development integration, its member states have designed, as a result of threats to security in the region, a mechanism for the management of mostly political and military threats to security. In 1996, the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) was founded with plans to institutionalise the new security thinking in its organisational structure. However, by the second half of 1997, the OPDS was suspended because of "structural problems" (Breytenbach, 2000: 85).⁸² These structural problems have been resolved only recently at the extraordinary summit of SADC leaders in March 2001, where it was decided that the Head of the OPDS would report to the SADC Chairman. The OPDS will be part of the SADC structures and co-ordinated on a *troika* basis. Leadership will be rotational for a period of one year (Allafrica.com, 12.3.2001).

It can be argued that political and security co-operation in Southern Africa dates back to the early 1970s when Tanzania and Zambia formed a grouping known as the Front Line States (FLS) (Malan, 1998: 12).⁸³ The FLS was an informal forum for the discussion of mainly political and, to a lesser extent, military problems common among liberation movements, and the problems faced by newly independent governments (Cilliers, 1999: 4). The most important task, however, was to lobby for the liberation of Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe from white minority rule. Other states in the region joined later (Mozambique in 1975, Angola in 1976, Zimbabwe in 1980, Namibia in 1990 and South Africa in

⁸² These included the uncertainty about the position of the chair of the OPDS relative to the chair of the SADC, the functional autonomy or dependence of the OPDS, and the operational procedures when conflict resolution would be on the agenda (Breytenbach, 2000: 85-86).

⁸³ On account of the informal character of the FLS, it is difficult to establish when the FLS was formed. Cilliers (1999: 5) puts the beginning of the FLS in 1975 with Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia as founders. Venter (1996: 173) claims that the FLS grouping was formed in 1974, and Cilliers (1996: 25) that it was established in 1970 by Tanzania and Zambia.

1994), and on July 30, 1994 the organisation was dissolved to become the political and security wing of the SADC, since the elimination of white minority rule in the region removed the *raison d'être* of the FLS.

Security issues of the FLS were discussed in the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), also an informal substructure of the FLS (Cilliers, 1999: 4). The ISDSC was established in 1983 with initially seven member states (Malan, 1998: 40)⁸⁴ and since it was not disbanded as the FLS was, its membership reflects the membership of the SADC. The ISDSC has three subcommittees dealing with defence, public security and state security with no permanent secretariat (Cilliers, 1999: 37-38),⁸⁵ but it is planned that the ISDSC will be an institution of the OPDS (Breytenbach, 2000: 86).

The history of the OPDS dates back to 1995 when SADC foreign ministers decided to create the Association of Southern African States (ASAS), which would provide a mechanism to deal with conflict prevention, management and resolution in Southern Africa. However, in June 1996, the SADC Heads of State accepted the formation of the OPDS instead with 16 political, defence and security objectives to be pursued by the new institution (Malan, 1998: 13-14).⁸⁶ The

⁸⁴ Another source (Cilliers, 1999: 88) notes that the first meeting of the ISDSC occurred in 1975 and was attended by Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia.

⁸⁵ The ISDSC's role is to provide a forum for:

- reviewing and sharing the experiences, exploring areas of co-operation and exchanging views in the field of defence;
- co-ordinating activities, exchanging experiences and information, and exploring the areas and means of enhancing co-operation in the field of public security;
- reviewing the security situations and issues related to security, recommending appropriate measures to deal with potential threats to the stability in the SADC region and member states, and considering ways of consolidating and expanding co-operation in the field of state security (Cilliers, 1999: 38).

⁸⁶ The OPDS role is to:

- protect the people and safeguard the development of the region, against instability arising from the breakdown of law and order, interstate conflict and external aggression;

objectives can be roughly grouped into those dealing with: military issues, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace enforcement, conflict prevention, management and resolution, crime prevention, intelligence, foreign policy, and human rights (Cilliers, 1999: 26).

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- promote political co-operation among member states and the evolution of common political value systems and institutions;
 - develop a common foreign policy in areas of mutual concern and interest, and to lobby as a region on issues of common interest at international forums;
 - co-operate in regional security and defence through conflict prevention, management and resolution;
 - mediate in interstate and intrastate disputes and conflicts;
 - use preventive diplomacy to pre-empt conflict in the region through an early warning system;
 - where conflict occurs, to seek to end it as quickly as possible through diplomatic means. Where such means fail, the OPDS would recommend that the Summit should consider punitive measures. These responses would be agreed upon in a Protocol on Peace, Security and Conflict Resolution;
 - promote and enhance the development of democratic institutions and practices within member states, and encourage the observance of universal human rights as provided for in the charters and conventions of the OAU and the UN;
 - promote peacemaking and peacekeeping in order to achieve sustainable peace and security;
 - give political support to the organs and institutions of the SADC;
 - promote political, economic, social and environmental dimensions of security;
 - develop a collective security capacity and conclude a Mutual Defence Pact for responding to external threats, and a regional peacekeeping capacity within national armies that could be called upon within the region or the continent;
 - develop close co-operation between the police and security services of the region, with a view to addressing cross-border crime, as well as promoting a community-based approach on matters of security;
 - encourage and monitor the ratification of the UN, the OAU and other international conventions and treaties on arms control and disarmament, human rights and peaceful relations between states;
 - co-ordinate the participation of member states in international and regional peacekeeping operations; and
 - address extra-regional conflicts which impact on peace and security in Southern Africa (Malan, 1998: 40-41).

However, the co-ordination of policies and the management of security issues in the SADC region is problematic because of several circumstances noted by various scholars:

- as a weak institution, the SADC often responds to rather than initiates actions on security-related developments;
- the SADC secretariat seems reluctant to engage in issues that could divert its focus from economic and development matters (Cilliers, 1999:12, 81);⁸⁷
- the OPDS is meant to promote economic, political, environmental and social dimensions of security, but there is no connection or formal interaction between the socio-economic sectors of the SADC and OPDS at present (Breytenbach, 2000: 88);
- an attempt to institutionalise civil society participation in the SADC or the OPDS processes has not been made yet, and there is the absence of integrated systems, processes and methods to deal with the issues of human rights and the advancement of democracy and good governance (Breytenbach, 2000: 88; Cilliers, 1999: 45, 76). This is quite understandable since the advancement of these 'controversial' values can erode the security of some regimes in power; and
- the ISDSC, in turn, has neither the mandate nor the structure to deal appropriately with conflict prevention, management and resolution (Malan, 1998: 17).⁸⁸

⁸⁷ In spite of this, donor pressure has already resulted in protocols and initiatives regarding small arms, landmines and drugs (Cilliers, 1999: 12).

⁸⁸ The reality is that most SADC member states have small armed forces that are ill-equipped, poorly trained by international peacekeeping standards, poorly led, and with a strong emphasis on internal security concerns. Therefore, sub-regional peacekeeping and intervention would be dependent upon the dominance of a single regional power, such as South Africa, as opposed to the combined efforts of a number of states. Furthermore, capacity-building for peacekeeping is largely dependent on donor countries seeking to capacitate weak and unconsolidated states to provide security in a region (Cilliers, 1999: 52-53).

Once the OPDS starts functioning, other problems can arise due to the sensitivity of SADC leaders to the interference in the internal affairs of their states. Furthermore, one can be sceptical about the loyalty of some states to SADC arrangements, since they are also members of COMESA. Zimbabwe as the dominant member of COMESA has tended to show more devotion to this organisation than other states in the region. Such conflicting membership can lead to stalemates, unnecessary competition (institutional rivalry)⁸⁹ and the misapplication of the scarce regional resources (Zacarias, 1999: 116).⁹⁰

It can be concluded that the presence of conditions conducive to disintegration within the SADC member states, the absence of conditions favourable to integration at the regional level, and the inability of SADC institutions to deal with regional and other threats to security, strongly work against the establishment of a pluralistic security community within the SADC region.

⁸⁹ For instance, COMESA member states are also committed to the promotion of peace, security and stability as prerequisites for achieving sustainable development. The member states have realised that the conflicts within the region have a negative impact on COMESA's integration agenda, since some of the member states have not been able to join the Free Trade Area, which started functioning on November 1, 2000, due to the prevalence of conflicts (COMESA Web Page; Allafria.com, 10.4.2001).

⁹⁰ The lack of resources makes it more difficult for states to support regional organisations financially. For instance, by July 2000, SADC member states owed the organisation more than 6.8 million US dollars, while the DRC has never paid its dues to the Community ever since it joined in 1997 (Allafria.com, 14.2.2001).

7. CONCLUSION

The Cold War has in many ways inserted rigidity into the thinking of political leaders as well as theoreticians. The predominance of ideological, economic and military rivalry between the two superpowers induced scholars to view international relations largely in the context of this rivalry. Consequently, security studies as part of international relations theory concerned themselves with the security of states in the Cold War environment and were mainly a domain of Western scholars.

After the Cold War, the releasing of tensions in international politics brought new economic and political issues to the surface, such as trade liberalisation, economic development, democratisation and human rights, to name just a few. Moreover, the security preoccupations of the US and the Soviet Union prevented the international community from putting issues such as poverty, famine, illiteracy, political oppression, resource scarcity and environmental degradation at the top of its agenda, even though they were a dominant concern of the majority of the world's population.

As a result, the international and academic community increasingly started taking into consideration non-military threats to the survival of people, and the new security thinking developed. It is being recognised that in many parts of the world, particularly in Africa, states cannot be seen as the main or only referent objects of security. Furthermore, the state was, and still is, a source of threats to the citizens. This occurs when a regime in power uses oppression or engages in civil war to stay in power; and also when a regime manages the state for the enrichment of its members on the one hand and mismanages the economy, health

and social services on the other, which results in increased levels of poverty, famine, disease, unemployment, and so on.

The tension between state/regime and human security has induced some scholars to consider people as the main referent object of security, and to put human security at the centre of security preoccupations. This people-centric approach seems to be increasingly recognised by the international community and the UN with its agencies in particular, by placing people at the centre of its development and security endeavours.

With the end of the Cold War, hopes were placed on the international community to play a greater role in addressing the security concerns of African people in the absence of legitimate, responsible and efficient states. This raises the question as to how relevant the African state is for the security and wellbeing of the African people.

Since the approach of the international community to Africa's most acute security problems, related to the political instability and civil wars, is 'African solutions to African problems', and since the state is still considered the only legitimate institution to ensure security of the people, and "the guardian of the common good" (Zacarias, 1999: 153) at the same time, the African state has to persist. However, where the legitimacy of the state as a provider of security is disputable, as is the case in many African states, this is largely due to the unfinished processes of state-making and nation-building, and is further undermined by underdevelopment of these countries.

The fact that SADC members are still struggling to become integrated/cohesive and strong states, and that conditions conducive to disintegration as put forward by Deutsch and his colleagues are preventing them from becoming integrated communities, makes the building of a pluralistic security community within SADC region rather difficult. Differing political

values, mistrust, personal rivalry and fear between SADC member states as well as regionalisation of new security threats indicate that the SADC is a "community of fate" (Booth, 1994: 16) rather than a security community.

However, some developments can be observed at both the state and regional levels that could provide a basis for regional integration efforts. The end of apartheid removed a source of tensions and insecurities in the region and an obstacle to building a security community in South Africa and Southern Africa, at the same time. Moreover, the gradual liberalisation of the political systems in the SADC region provides an opportunity for the development of common values of the SADC member states.

But if the process of political liberalisation is not accompanied by state-making and nation-building it can result in the escalation of political tensions and insecurity. Although democratic regimes tend to keep their international peace, only strong states can keep their domestic peace (Kacowicz, 1997: 385). The adoption of Western models of democracy by a weak state can lead to political instability when excluded groups challenge the winning group and consequently increase the threats to the security of a regime as well as the population at large. In addition, political pluralism can exacerbate possible ethnic and separatist rivalries, with irredentist claims that spill over state borders (Kacowicz, 1997: 376).

Therefore, contrary to the policies of the international community, democracy is far more likely to succeed as a mechanism for introducing accountability into a strong state than as a means of preserving a weak one (Clapham, 1993: 434). Furthermore, national unity has to precede any process of democratisation (Rustow, 1970). Thus, the path to increased levels of human security necessarily leads through the establishment of a strong state with loyal citizens.

Bearing in mind the functioning of African societies and the previously mentioned disintegrative tendencies stemming from the uncritical adoption of Western models of democracy, we can agree with Bayart (Riley, 1992: 549) who sees Africa's potential for democracy more in the creation of small collectives established and controlled by rural or urban groups, such as local associations, than in parliaments and parties, and instruments of the state, of accumulation, and of alienation. Such decentralisation can also enhance the loyalty of citizens, since they are given a better opportunity to participate in the decision-making process.

Still, the loyalty of various (regional, religious and ethnic) groups will not be assured as long as they do not take part in the division of the state's resources. Since these resources are scarce and, in most cases, insufficient or hardly sufficient to satisfy the needs of one group, the 'pie' from which pieces for different groups are cut needs to be enlarged through the process of development, conceived not only in economic but also in social and political terms.

A second positive development is that SADC members seem to be committed to increasing the flow of transactions between them, particularly trade. In mid-1994, shortly before South Africa joined the SADC, about 4 percent of the ten SADC members' trade was within the Community, while 25 percent was with South Africa. When South Africa became a SADC member, the intra-Community trade increased and is now estimated at around 25 percent. This increase is largely due to South Africa's membership in the organisation, because the level of trade between other member states remains low (see Table 3 and Table 4). With the liberalisation of the intra-SADC trade the percentage of intra-Community trade is expected to rise to about 35 percent (EIU, 1999: 43; EIU, 2000a: 24).

The extent to which the development of SADC member states could be strengthened by the trade liberalisation and economic integration process at the regional level is debatable, but according to the 1995 World Bank analysis

(Solomon and Cilliers, 1996), which basically summarises conclusions made in the past by various scholars, the structure of African countries' exports and imports differs so widely that regional trade integration efforts hold little promise for accelerating industrialisation and growth. Thus, it is not surprising that South Africa's liberalisation of trade with the EU preceded the one with the SADC. It can be hoped, however, that in time the expected development and economic growth of South Africa will have spill-over effects in the Southern African region, thus increasing the prospects of the SADC for becoming a pluralistic security community through the regional integration process.

TABLE 3: EXPORTS OF SADC AND SACU MEMBER STATES

Organisation	Intra-Organisation Exports*	Intra-Organisation Exports Excluding South Africa*	Exports of Members States to South Africa*	Exports of South Africa to Member States*
SADC	21.19	4.59	10.93	24.43
SACU	25.47	0.28	26.93	17.14

* all figures represent the percentage of world trade in 1996

TABLE 4: IMPORTS OF SADC AND SACU MEMBER STATES

Organisation	Intra-Organisation Imports*	Intra-Organisation Imports excluding South Africa*	Imports of Members States from South Africa*	Imports of South Africa from Member States*
SADC	22.4	3.86	44.39	6.76
SACU	21.81	0.16	89.36	5.45

* all figures represent the percentage of world trade in 1996

Data for Tables 3 and 4 was calculated on the basis of figures from SADC (2000) The Official SADC Trade, Industry and Investment Review 2000. Southern African Marketing Co. (Pty) Ltd. and SADC.

Although the percentage of intra-SADC trade is relatively low, some countries are more 'integrated' than others. As noted, during apartheid SACU provided easily accessible markets for South Africa's exports, and thus Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland still import most of their goods from South Africa (see Table 4). Since this level of trade is not matched by a similar level of trade on South Africa's side, trade relations of SACU member states are characterised by their dependence on South Africa's exports, rather than interdependence. In the case of Swaziland and Lesotho, this dependence is even greater because they represent labour reserves for their economically dominant neighbour.

This circumstance can have potentially disruptive effects on intra-SACU relations, but if the problem of dependency is addressed properly, this small area within the SADC, possibly with some other neighbouring states (Mozambique, for instance), can provide the core area of the economic as well as political integration process, provided that problems of their national integration are addressed efficiently and in time.

A third factor worth noting is that this approach of "variable geometry" or "variable speed" (Van Rooyen, 1998: 130) can be strengthened by improving and building the transport infrastructure to facilitate transactions within and between SADC member states. Many projects to build the so-called transport corridors are currently being planned or implemented, such as the Maputo corridor, the Lubombo corridor (both involving South Africa and Mozambique), the West Coast corridor, and the Wild Coast corridor (both in South Africa), to name some of them (EIU, 2000a: 21-22).

The construction and renovation of transport infrastructure is in process in all Community states, largely with the support of donor countries and the World Bank. It is especially needed in countries where transport networks were destroyed

or made inoperative by civil war as in Angola and Mozambique (Africa South of the Sahara, 1999).

A fourth important factor is that transnational insecurities are forcing SADC member states to co-operate on a bilateral or multilateral basis. The illegal immigration of economic and other refugees to South Africa is a good example of such a transnational issue where co-operation is necessary. As proven in the past, the South African government is unable to deal with the numbers of illegal immigrants entering the country every day (Solomon and Cilliers, 1996). It is clear that border controls or forceful repatriations will not solve the problem; this can be achieved mostly through long-term 'projects' of economic development, state-making and nation-building, the implementation of which will remove the causes of emigration. Thus, South Africa should be interested in co-operating with the countries of emigration to implement these projects as soon as possible.

The presence of transnational and regional threats to security requires that the efforts aimed at the establishment of amalgamated security communities are strengthened at least by the management of threats at the regional level, albeit not necessarily in the framework of the SADC. It seems that because of the deficiencies of OPDS and SADC more 'modest' bilateral or multilateral arrangements might provide a better way for the formation of a regional security regime and produce more tangible results than comprehensive regional ones. Working and successful bilateral or multilateral agreements addressing a particular security issue or a cluster of issues can enhance the trust between countries or their leaders and encourage them to co-operate on the resolution or management of other security issues. The end-result of this step-by-step approach would be a security regime.

Many successful operations have been undertaken with the co-operation of clusters of SADC member states to enhance the security in the region (for some

examples see Cilliers, 1999). In addition, several bilateral and multilateral agreements relating to co-operation on various security issues⁹¹ have been concluded by SADC member states, and the signing of more agreements is in preparation.⁹² Co-operation regarding security can also be attempted at sub-national levels.⁹³

In addition to all these positive changes, we cannot disregard the integrative potential of (latent or manifest) conflicts and tensions within as well as between states. Although conflicts tend to be detrimental to the development of a security community, any successful and peaceful resolution of conflicts can build mutual confidence and benefit community-building.

All these developments are compelling the SADC to continue with its integration process, particularly at the regional level. However, most SADC members are poorly integrated weak states still facing the demanding tasks of state-making and nation-building, whose implementation could eventually lead to national integration (i.e. the establishment of an amalgamated security community).

Here, the question arises as to whether the simultaneous establishment of a pluralistic security community is possible between SADC members on the one hand, and an amalgamated security community within the states on the other, or whether one has to precede the other.

Deutsch's concept of a pluralistic security community implies that a pluralistic security community is composed of entities that have already become

⁹¹ These agreements include measures related to mutual defence, weapon smuggling, drug smuggling, disaster relief, security training and assistance, trade on small arms, cross-border policing, and the like (Solomon and Cilliers, 1996).

⁹² See for example Cilliers, 1999: 68-74.

⁹³ Bilateral agreements dealing with transnational 'crime' have been signed at the provincial level between the Mpumalanga province in South Africa and the neighbouring provinces of Maputo and Gaza in Mozambique (Solomon and Cilliers, 1996).

integrated. Therefore, communities that have not eliminated the preparations for, and expectations of conflict, among their members cannot achieve integration at the supranational level. This condition does not seem to be fulfilled by most SADC member states where inter-ethnic or communal violence and tensions, or even civil wars, indicate the absence of an integrated community. If we use the broader definition of a security community (see section 4.2.), the absence of such a community within the SADC member states is even more evident.

Since most SADC members are incapable of assuring the security of their citizens by forming security communities within their borders (ensuring freedom from fear and freedom from want), this is also preventing the formation of a larger security community at the regional level. The emergence of a pluralistic security community in a region before the emergence of amalgamated security communities is thus theoretically and practically inconceivable. If the SADC region is to become a pluralistic security community, national integration is necessary in order to remove or minimise internal insecurities.⁹⁴ A pluralistic security community has to evolve on the basis of integrated national communities, but the concomitant development of pluralistic and amalgamated security communities is theoretically possible.

It is difficult to imagine, though, that the process of national integration is going to end in the short term, and since its successful completion is required for SADC member states to effectively engage in the formation of a pluralistic security community, the goal of the establishment of such a community in the SADC region is necessarily placed in the distant future.

⁹⁴ Here, the argument made by Claude (Taylor, 1993: 42) that the consolidation of the state in developing countries has to precede the (functional) co-operation and integration becomes relevant. States need to be strengthened in order to be transcended. Thus, the weakness of developing states can in part explain why they have problems engaging in the integration as well as the globalisation processes.

The analysis in this thesis has addressed the complexity of the security problematic of the SADC region. In addition, this problematic is linked to the process of integration within as well as between SADC member states and the establishment of amalgamated and pluralistic security communities.

The issues of new security threats and the establishment of a security community are being increasingly researched by African scholars and institutions. However, freedom from fear and freedom from want as the two main pillars of the new security thinking still need to be adopted by the majority of SADC governments as the guiding principles of economic, social, environmental, health and other policies. This can be considered as a first step to establishing amalgamated and pluralistic security communities, where the elimination or considerable reduction of 'old' and 'new' security threats will ensure quality of life for the people in the SADC region.

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