

Constitutional Frameworks and Democratization in Africa
since independence.

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Karim Neiryck

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Abstract.

The subject of this thesis is international studies, specifically a study of constitutional frameworks in Africa in the second half of the 20th century, focussing on a statistical correlation between constitutional frameworks, party systems, electoral systems and the Index of Democracy.

The struggle to consolidate new democracies - especially those in Eastern Europe, Latin America and Asia - has given rise to a wide-ranging debate about the hard choices concerning democratic political institutions and political markets. According to Stepan and Skach " this literature has produced provocative hypotheses about the effects of institutions on democracy " (Stepan and Skach, 1993 : 1). It forms part of the ' new institutionalism ' literature in comparative politics that holds as a premise that political democracy depends not only on economic and social conditions but also on the design of political institutions (Koelble, 1995 : 231-243). " One fundamental political-institutional question that has only received serious scholarly attention concerns the impact of different constitutional frameworks on democratic consolidation. Although the topic has been increasingly debated and discussed, little systematic cross-regional evidence [especially for our field of research : Africa] has been brought to bear on it " (Stepan and Skach, 1993 : 1-2). So far, only the book on regime transitions in Africa written by Bratton and Van De Walle seeks to fill this empirical gap (Bratton and Van De Walle, 1997, preface xiii).

In this thesis, we paid particular attention to the dichotomy between (pure) parliamentarism and (pure) presidentialism. Each type has fundamental characteristics, and for the purposes of classification these characteristics are necessary and sufficient. It was not our purpose to weigh the benefits and drawbacks of parliamentarism and presidentialism. Our intention was to report and analyse different sources of data, and we based our case exclusively on statistic correlations between regime type and the record of democratic success and failure.

We collected a data set about constitutional frameworks (matrix1), democracy indices (matrix2), party systems (matrix3) and election systems (matrix4). The basis for matrix 1 was the constitutions of the African countries (over time) and relevant literature. The basis for matrix 2 was the annual Freedom House ratings made by Raymond D. Gastil and others. The basis for matrix 3 and 4 was relevant literature. Once these matrices had been composed, we compared them and calculated statistic correlations. This long-duration model allowed us to estimate whether African constitutional frameworks, party systems and electoral systems exhibit positive or negative correlation with the index of democracy.

Chapter I

Definitions and methodology.

I.1. How to define democracy ?

Democracy is a contested term. Contemporary interpretations range from a tight focus on the electoral procedures for choosing elites to expansive visions of citizen participation in political parties, ruling groups and workplace organisations. The etymology of the term democracy refers to its roots. It refers to rule by the people. Democracy is a form of regime whose legitimacy derives from the principle of popular sovereignty : namely, that citizens are equally endowed with the right and ability to govern themselves. Modern democracy has inexorably come to mean representative democracy. For this reason, Lipset defines democracy as " a political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials, and a social mechanism which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence major decisions by choosing among contenders for political office " (Lipset, 1976 : Chap. 2). Although there exist many more definitions of democracy, according to Bratton and Van De Walle, debates over the meaning of democracy boil down to two core definitional issues :

First : is the nature of democracy best distinguished according to the form of its procedures or the substance of its results ? They prefer a procedural definition precisely because political regimes are best understood as a set of [governing] rules (Bratton and Van De Walle, 1997 : 12). As Ake notes " it is the involvement in the process rather than the acceptability of the end decision, which satisfies the right to participate " (Ake, 1993 : 35). Even if one can not deny that citizens often judge the performance of regimes in terms of the substantive benefits they receive from the government in power, to judge democracy by the substance of policy outcomes runs the risk of confusing political regimes with the extent of state intervention in the economy or with the capacity of economic institutions. The distinctive feature of democracy is not that it is necessarily better than authoritarian rule at raising or equalising living standards but that it provides political access to decision making for citizens. Thus, our understanding of democracy refers to a set of political procedures or rule by the people. We disassociate it from rule " for " the people, which implies substantively, a distributive socio-economic order. This argument can be taken further. There are some paradoxes surrounding democracy, such as the majority's right to abolish democracy itself. According to Harrison, if the "goodness" of democracy just means that the majority is always right, then if the majority decides to have a dictatorship, it would seem that there should be a dictatorship. But the goodness of democracy does not in fact mean that the majority is always right. It is important to keep the levels separate.


If we ask why democracy is good, then one powerful argument says that equality of respect means that in cases of difference in opinion, the majority view should be followed. However, if the majority wishes to abolish democracy, the goodness would also be abolished. The majority would not longer have a say, and there would be no longer equality of respect. The majority rule should indeed be followed, except where it does things which undermine equality of respect. Given the argument from equality of respect to democracy, this means: except when it undermines democracy (Harrison, 1993 : 230-231).

Second: does the definition of democracy embody a minimal set of essential requirements or does it provide a comprehensive characterisation that exhausts the phenomenon's full complexity? According to David Beetham, it is conventional for specialists in comparative politics to follow Schumpeter in defining the concept of democracy in "procedural" rather than "normative" or "ideal" terms, i.e., in terms of a set of institutional practices, rather than a set of basic principles (Beetham, 1994 : 158). According to Larry Diamond, minimalist definitions (what he terms electoral democracy as opposed to liberal democracy) do indeed descend from Schumpeter, who defined democracy as a system "for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote". Huntington, among others, explicitly embraces Schumpeter's emphasis on electoral competition as the essence of democracy. (Diamond, 1996 : 21). Huntington defines a political system as democratic "to the extent that its most powerful collective decision-makers are selected through fair, honest and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes, and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote" (Huntington, 1991 : 7- 8). Bratton and Van De Walle (in contrast to scholars as Linz and Stepan, as we will see later) also prefer a procedural approach that captures basic elements as most useful in distinguishing political regimes, especially in situations where democratisation has only begun. The flowering of any type of regime undoubtedly requires the natural development of a system of interlocking political institutions and sets of widely shared political values. But to define democracy in terms of the full realisation of ideal forms is to risk finding few actual democracies or none at all (Bratton and Van De Walle, 1997 : 12).

For this reason, Robert A. Dahl reserved the term democracy (he calls it Polyarchy) for a "hypothetical system that is completely responsive to all its citizens" (Dahl, 1971 : 15). Schedler, again for the same reason, mentions that using the term of "advanced democracy" risks idealising and stereotyping (Schedler, 1998 : 93).

Over time, Schumpeter's appealingly concise definition has required periodic elaboration to avoid inclusion of cases that do not fit the implicit meaning. The most influential elaboration has been Dahl's concept of Polyarchy (Diamond, 1996 : 21). On balance, and following Dahl's classical formulation, we find it useful to distinguish two distinct dimensions of democracy : the extent of competition (or contestation) and the degree of political participation (or exclusion). Competition and participation may vary independently of each other and actual real-world regimes occupy locations within the space bound by the idealised extremes. The specific co-ordinates of actual regimes derive from the extent to which they are more or less competitive and participatory (Dahl, 1971 : 34). It should also be noted that democracy is not a static concept. The Freedom House's annual " Comparative Survey of Freedom " is probably the best example of an attempt to judge all countries (over time) by these standards (cfr. checklist of political and civil rights) and to point out the importance of democracy and freedom (Mc Colm et al., 1992 : 1). As a result of this formulation, the most basic requirement for democracy is that citizens be empowered to choose and remove leaders. Thus democracy is defined as a form of political regime in which citizens choose, in competitive elections, the occupants of the top political offices of the state. This approach to democracy does not depend on proving that contestants for power are " true " democrats. It does not presuppose the existence of a political culture of democracy among elites or masses. It only requires that incumbents and opponents acknowledge, however reluctantly, the acceptability of electoral contest for leadership (Bratton and Van De Walle, 1997 : 12-13). The main goal of political parties and candidates in a democratic society is to win those elections. By limiting the sites of electoral competition and campaign strategies, electoral systems characterize the formation of party politics and influence the choice of many contending parties and candidates in three dimensions : specific voters, specific behaviors of voters and effective forms of influence (Katz, 1980 : 17-18). There are many types of electoral systems in democratic countries but the debate really falls into an analysis of the two predominant types of systems : 1) plurality [to which we can add majoritarian systems as they have similar properties], and 2) proportional representation (PR) systems, which are predominantly of the list or single transferable vote (STV) variety. Under plurality, MP's theoretically represent constituencies rather than political ideologies.

typology
A classification of electoral systems



There is no question that electoral systems significantly influence the number of parties in a society. Duverger, in his investigation of the relationship between electoral systems and the number of parties, found that the simple majority single ballot system favors the two-party system (Duverger, 1964 : 217). The reason is that, under this kind of electoral system, only one candidate can be elected in a given district. The best strategy of contending parties and candidates is to group into two blocs. This contributes to the development of a two-party system. The electoral system also influences the behaviour of the voters. Since only one candidate can be selected in a district, voters will favor the candidates of the two largest parties. In the long run, this too will lead to the development of a two-party system. Because so many studies have confirmed this argument, it has become to be known as " Duverger's Law ". Duverger also proposed that " the simple-majority rule with two ballots and proportional representation favor multipartyism " (Ibid., 239) However, in this case, scholars do not agree that proportional-representation (PR) systems and two-ballot majority systems contribute to multipartism, because the empirical evidence in favor is problematic. Although the effect of these formula on multipartism is not negligible, it is quite modest. They are neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition (Teh-fu Huang, 1997 : 139-140). So, although there is a strong association between the two ballot majority and PR systems on the one hand and multipartism on the other, the former does not invariably lead to the latter. This is why some scholars call this " Duverger's hypothesis" rather than " Duverger's Law ". While applying Duverger's argument, one should not neglect the impact of the process of executive formation on the number of parties in a given country. To do so would distort our understanding of the number of parties not only in presidential systems, but in parliamentary systems as well. When presidential and legislative elections are held at the same time, the presidential election imposes a single-member nationwide district over the legislative districts. If the president is elected by simple majority, the presidential election falls under Duverger's Law, which suggests two parties. The legislative election, if it is held in multimember districts using a PR system, suggests the possibility of multipartism in accordance with Duverger's Hypothesis. Therefore, the outcome may go either way and depends to a large degree on the timing of the two kinds of elections (Shugart and Carey, 1992 : 207).

Soon after independence, however, it became clear that the " Western " democratic model, based on multi-party competitive elections, would not be followed in Africa. Leaders of the newly independent nations moved rapidly and deliberately to eliminate competitive party politics. This process occurred in two interrelated phases. The first phase involved the attempt to form one-party regimes (Collier, 1982 : 95). The problem of defining a one-party regime is complex. For instance, is there an important difference between a one-party regime and a dominant-party regime? Collier decided to use the control of 100% of the seats in the legislature as defining the existence of a one-party regime (Ibid., 176).

The effective monopoly of power by a single party was achieved in some countries even before independence, during the period of decolonization. In most of these cases, the overwhelming electoral victory of a single party or the merger of two parties into one made it possible for that party effectively to eliminate all competition. By 1960 nine countries had one-party regimes. Amid statements by both political leaders and social scientists justifying or rationalizing the one-party development as a potentially "democratic" form of government suitable to multi-ethnic societies of Africa, there followed in the next half-decade the formation of seven additional one-party regimes. In most of these later cases, however, the one-party status did not result from electoral victory or merger but from the banning of all opposition parties or from the outright rigging of elections. Even in those one-party regimes which achieved such status by more legitimate means, the supremacy of the single-party was maintained by repressing the opposition and was sometimes ratified in law or in new constitutions proclaiming that only one party could legally exist. The second phase of the attempt to eliminate competitive party politics took the form of the military coup. This phase became dominant in 1966. So far, the military coup was definitely a fact in political life on the African continent, but it did not yet appear to be a pervasive phenomenon. The events of 1966 changed this assessment. A coup no longer signified a short-term intervention for the purpose of installing a new civilian government. The military expanded their role, not only seizing power to oust the civilian regime but retaining it and setting up a military regime. Throughout Africa, there is hardly a country which did not establish either a one-party or a military regime (Collier, 1982 : 95-117)

A central element in the establishment of authoritarian rule in Africa was the elimination of multi-party, competitive elections. Yet electoral policy was not uniform in the two aforementioned types of authoritarian regimes. The policy of military governments has generally been to eliminate elections. In the one-party regimes, however, elections per se were not eliminated, they were, rather, transformed into some form of controlled election (Ibid., 120). But why have one-party regimes bothered to hold controlled elections? Hermet has observed that "holding an election is never a gratuitous act ; rather, it involves both costs and benefits" (Hermet, 1978 : 13). What benefits can those who organize elections anticipate from them? As Schmitter has suggested, even a controlled election must have some motives or at least potential functions, it must be intended to contribute to sustaining political domination in some way. One must look at the form and structure of an election to see what it is designed to do (Schmitter, 1978 : 149). In addressing these issues, it is necessary to distinguish two types of one-party regimes according to the type of election held in each. The two types coincide with differences in colonial ruler : in ex-French colonies with one-party regimes, elections have taken the form of plebiscites, in ex-British colonies with one-party regimes, they have taken the form of one-party-competitive elections. Though similar in many respects, the two types of election function in somewhat different ways.

The one-party competitive election in Africa differs from the plebiscitary election, then, in two features : it tends to be accompanied by less manipulation of the symbols of popular support (in that official figures seem generally to be an accurate reflection of rate of support and legitimacy) and, of course, voters are given a choice, albeit a severely constrained one, among candidates, the two types of election seem to be designed with many of the same purposes and are intended to serve much the same functions, but with some variations. Because some choice-making is allowed, the competitive one-party election is a more effective vehicle than is the plebiscitary election for upward communication from the grass roots to the political center. Since all candidates must stand on the platform of the party and cannot distinguish themselves on broad issues, competition on the basis of serving the local community, both in terms of patronage politics of competing clientele networks and in the provision of material benefits and services to the local community, is heightened. Thus, while plebiscitary elections almost completely eliminate demand-making, restricting it to the very diffuse act of withholding support either through apathy or by a somewhat more decisive abstention, one party-competitive elections are a fairly effective channel for the expression of local, grass-roots demands. The removal of issues of national policy and overall political orientation from the competitive arena has usually meant that one-party elections have not functioned as channels for downward communication from the political center to the masses. The contribution of one-party competitive elections to promoting national integration and identity is hard to assess. Like the plebiscitary election, however, the one-party competitive election has often been seen as a kind of dedication ceremony binding the voters to the political center and heightening national consciousness by emphasizing participation in a single, national act (Collier, 1982 : 118-128).

While civilians have almost universally set up regimes with some form of electoral mechanism as one of the major points of state-society contact and as a potential legitimating device, military governments have set up regimes with few, if any, legitimating institutions. Whereas the pattern of the one-party regime, both plebiscitary and competitive, has been to transform elections and electoral participation, the typical pattern of the military regime has been to suspend elections and thus to control electoral participation as a political resource simply by eliminating it. They have immediate rationales for rule, which tend to consist of an evocation of the shortcomings of the overthrown regime and the specific reasons for military intervention, but few attempts are made to forge institutional bases for legitimacy (Horowitz, 1979 : 27). Nevertheless, the military regimes have not been uniform in this respect, and like the one-party regimes, the cases tend to fall into two groups, which again correspond to the grouping by the former colonial ruler. Among the former British colonies, the lack of an attempt to legitimate military regimes and to establish a basis for long-term rule has been the most extreme. Whereas civilian regime makes a claim to legitimate constitutional rule, however ineffective that claim may be and however dictatorial or fictional the constitution, one of the first act of a military regime is,

typically, to suspend the constitution, thereby making its transitional nature true almost by definition. In addition to suspending the constitution and dissolving the National Assembly, political parties and political activities have been banned until the return to legitimate, constitutional, civilian rule which is held out for the future. The former colonies of France and Belgium have tended to follow a pattern that contrasts somewhat with this pattern of a fairly long (with the exception of Sierra Leone) period of outright military rule without the establishment of any minimal legitimating apparatus, followed by a discontinuous return to multi-party constitutional rule. In Francophone Africa, the typical pattern of military regimes has been either to retain the single party that existed before the coup (as in the CAR, Burundi and Congo-Brazzaville) or to move quite rapidly to establish a new party. The retention or creation of a party in these military regimes reflects a process of gradual transformation of the military regime into a more civilian one based on civilian constitutions and a concern with the problems of legitimacy and constitutional rule. These regimes have tended to promulgate a new constitution, sometimes ratified by popular referendum, and in some cases this has been accompanied by the transformation of the military regime into a plebiscitary regimes similar to those discussed above. Mobutu's Zaire was the first country in which such a transformation was undertaken : in 1970 a national assembly was set up and plebiscitary elections were instituted (Collier, 1982 : 139-143).

Although they hold on to their defintial consensus, Bratton and Van De Walle recognise that elections alone are not a sufficient condition for democracy. They do not wish to commit " the fallacy of electoralism " by ignoring that the consolidation of democracy on the long run involves the permanent establishment of many other valued institutions, such as civilian control over the military, independent legislatures and courts, viable opposition parties and voluntary associations, plus a free press. But no other democratic institution precedes elections, either in time or importance. In their view elections are the principal and necessary condition of democracy (loc.cit). Mehran Kamrava agrees with this view : " the political processes that occur in the Third World can in large measure be summed up as efforts to obtain legitimacy and institutionalism " (Kamrava, 1993 : 1). So, although few scholars would wish to deny that " free and fair^h" elections constitute an essential part of democracy, there are several problems with the procedural or institutional method of defining it. Some of these problems have been summed up by Beetham. First, because it is unable to tell us what exactly makes these institutions "democratic", it encourages a purely formalistic approach to democracy, in which procedural means such as " freely competitive elections " or " multipartyism " become treated as ends in themselves. Secondly, the concentration on the electoral process leaves out much else that is important to democracy, such as : the control ordinary people exercise over their own items to add to this list. In the light of these inadequacies, we cannot dismiss so readily the need to begin with a definition of democratic principles. A system of collectively binding decision-making can be judged democratic to the extent that it embodies the principles of popular control and political equality, and specific institutions or practices to the extent that they help realise them (Beetham, 1994 : 159).

How does liberal democracy extend beyond the minimalist (procedural or formal) and intermediate conceptions of democracy described above? According to Diamond, in addition to regular, free and fair electoral competition and universal suffrage, it requires the absence of "reserved domains" of power for the military or other social and political forces that are neither directly or indirectly accountable to the electorate. Second, in addition to the "vertical" accountability of rulers to the ruled (which is secured most reliably through regular, free and fair elections), it requires "horizontal" accountability of officeholders to one another. This constrains executive power and so helps protect constitutionalism, the rule of law and the deliberative process. Third, it encompasses extensive provisions for political and civic pluralism, as well as for individual and group freedoms. Specifically, liberal democracy has the following features (Diamond, 1996 : 23-24) :

- 1) Real power lies - in fact as well as in constitutional theory - with elected officials and their appointees, rather than with unaccountable internal actors (e.g., the military) or foreign powers.
- 2) Executive power is constrained constitutionally and held accountable by other government institutions (such as an independent judiciary, parliament, ombudsman, and auditor general).
- 3) Not only are electoral outcomes uncertain, with a significant opposition vote and the presumption of party alternation in government over time, but no group that adheres to constitutional principles is denied the right to form a party and contest elections (even if the electoral thresholds and other rules prevent smaller parties from winning representation in parliament).
- 4) Cultural, ethnic, religious, and other minority groups, as well as traditionally disadvantaged or unempowered majorities, are not prohibited (legally or in practice) from expressing their interests in the political process, and from using their language and culture.
- 5) Beyond parties and intermittent elections, citizens have multiple, ongoing channels and means for the expression and representation of their interests and values, including a diverse array of autonomous associations, movements, and groups that they are free to form and to join.
- 6) In addition to associational freedom and pluralism, there exist alternative sources of information, including independent media, to which citizens have (politically) unfettered access.
- 7) Individuals have substantial freedom of belief, opinion, discussion, speech, publication, assembly, demonstration and petition.

- 8) Citizens are politically equal under the law (even though they are invariably unequal in their political resources), and the above-mentioned individual and group liberties are effectively protected by an independent, impartial judiciary whose decisions are enforced and respected by other centres of power.
- 9) The rule of law protects citizens from unjustified detention, exile, terror, torture, and undue interference in their personal lives not only by the state but also by organized anti-state forces.

These elements of liberal democracy constitute most of the criteria used by the aforementioned Freedom House's annual Survey of Freedom around the world. Two dimensions of freedom - political rights and civil liberties - are measured on a seven-point scale, with a rating of 1 indicating the most free and 7 the least free. Countries whose scores average 2.5 or below are considered "free", those scoring 3 to 5.5 "partly free", and those scoring 5.5 and above "not free" (Mc Colm et al., 1992 : 51). The "free" rating in the Freedom House survey is the best available empirical indicator of "liberal democracy". Of course, as with any multipoint scale, there is inevitably an element of arbitrariness in the thresholds used for each category. Yet there is a significant difference even between average scores of 2.5 and 3. The intermediate conceptions of democracy, which fall somewhere in between "electoral" and "liberal" democracy, explicitly incorporate basic civil freedoms of expression and association, yet still allow for considerable restriction of citizen rights. The crucial distinction turns on whether political and civil freedoms are seen as relevant mainly to the extent that they ensure meaningful electoral competition and participation, or instead are viewed as necessary to ensure a wider range of democratic functions (Diamond, 1996 : 24-25).

I.2. (Pre)Conditions for democracy.

Talk of "conditions" can all too easily be read deterministically, especially when economic conditions are discussed. A good example is Tatu Vanhanen's "Prospects of Democracy". Vanhanen writes: "I agree with those that many different factors - economic development, various social structures, external factors, and the diffusion of democratic ideas - may affect the chances to establish and maintain democratic institutions in a particular country, whereas I disagree with the additional assumption according to which there is not and cannot be any single dominant explanatory factor of democratization. My argument is that there is and that there must be a common underlying factor in the process of democratization. I have derived this assumption on the existence of a common explanatory factor from the principles of the neo-Darwinian theory of evolution, which claims that all important characteristics of life have evolved in the continual struggle for existence and that they are more or less shared by all the members of the species concerned [...] From this theory I got the idea that the

Darwinian theory of evolution by natural selection provides a theoretical explanation for human politics and for the struggle for power. Politics can be interpreted as an expression of the universal [inevitable and incessant] struggle for existence in living nature. Politics is for us a species-specific way to compete for scarce resources and to distribute them among the members of society. The permanent scarcity of some important resources and the need to distribute them by some means explain the necessity of politics [...] The variation of political systems from the rule of the few to the rule of the many follows from the regularity discussed above " (Vanhanen, 1997 : 22-25).

The evolutionary theory of democratization formulated above differs from several other theories of democracy at least in one important respect. It seeks an ultimate explanation for democratization from evolutionary principles that are assumed to remain the same from country to country, whereas the other theories seek explanations from various proximate factors whose significance varies geographically, culturally or from one period to another. However, a simple voluntarism is no more adequate than its deterministic counterpart. The project of " democratic consolidation " (a term we will discuss later) is clearly more difficult in some circumstances than others. It is a task of social science to identify these circumstances and subject them to comparative analysis. Yet these " conditions " can at most be described as " facilitating " or "hindering ", rather than as " determining " a given outcome. But do simple voluntarism and its deterministic counterpart exclude each other ? Not necessarily because they focus on explanatory factors at different levels of explanation. Vanhanen's theory focusses on the ultimate underlying factor of democratization, whereas those other theories are concerned with different proximate or local factors of democratization, and many of those proximate or local factors can be regarded as special cases of the underlying common factor (Vanhanen, 1993 : 25).

So, which are the preconditions for democracy ? According to Przeworski, there are five major preconditions for democracy : (Przeworski, 1996)

- 1) Affluence (a state of wealthiness [deterministic in Van Hanen's theory] and not poverty will reduce class conflict.)
- 2) Socio-cultural factors (industrialisation, inflation and economic growth, urbanisation, education,...).
- 3) Favourable international climate (the more democracies there are in the world or a region, the more likely it is that democracy will survive.
- 4) Institutions (choice and effect of constitutional frameworks, debate presidential and parliamentary regimes).
- 5) Political learning (relying on past tradition can also be applied to anti-democratic forces).

I.3. Democratic transition and liberalisation.

What about the language of " democratisation " ? Is it an improvement? According to Kamrava, it would be inaccurate to assume that the failure of non-western " ism's " in the Third World is tantamount to a victory for western ways and means for the region. To the contrary, imported western models are likely to crumble under the weight of indigenous conditions (Kamrava, 1993 : 224). Even if this was true, is it not weird that the same author states that " regardless of social, cultural and political characteristics that are unique to individual countries, throughout the Third World there is an uniformly weak nexus between state and society " (Ibid., 268) ?

A possible answer to Kamrava's critic is embodied in the working definition of democratisation itself. One should make a difference between democratic transition and liberalisation. A democratic transition is complete when a sufficient agreement has been reached about political procedures to produce an elected government, when a government comes to power that is the direct result of a free and popular vote, when this government de facto has the authority to generate new policies, and when the executive, legislative and judicial powers generated by the new democracies do not have to share power with other powers de jure (Linz and Stepan, 1996 : 1).

With this working definition, it should be clear why scholars insist on distinguishing between liberalisation and democratisation. In a non-democratic setting, liberalisation may entail a mix of policy and social changes, such as less censorship of the media. There is also somewhat greater space for the organisation of autonomous working-class activities, the releasing of most political prisoners, the return of exiles, perhaps measures for improving the distribution of income and most important, the toleration of opposition. Democratisation entails liberalisation but is a wider and, more specifically political concept. Democratisation requires open contestation over the right to win control over the government, and this in turn requires free and competitive elections, the results of which determine who governs. Using these definitions it is obvious that there can be liberalisation without democratisation.

The discussion of what constitutes a completed democratic transition helps highlight two further issues. First, transitions may begin that are never completed, even though a new authoritarian regime does not assume power. The definition helps guard against the "electoral fallacy" that is, that a necessary condition of democracy, free and fair elections, is seen as a sufficient condition of democracy. Second, by including in the definition the need to reach an agreement on the specific institutional arrangement for producing democratic government, we limit ourselves to decision-making within the democratic political arena. Disagreements among democrats over such issues as unitary versus a federal state, a monarchical or republican form of government, or the type of

electoral system may create questions about the legitimacy of the emerging democratic government, the decision-making process and indeed the future of the political system. Such institutional indeterminacy about core procedures necessary for producing democracy may not only leave the transition incomplete, but could also postpone any consolidation of democracy. Although disagreement is normal, a deep and continuous confrontation among the political elites and the majority of the population, with no sign of accommodation to the enacted institutions, is certainly not conducive to consolidation. In most cases after a democratic transition has been completed there are still many tasks that need to be accomplished, conditions that must be established and attitudes changed (Linz and Stepan, 1996 : 1-5).

I.4. In search of explanations for regime changes.

The theoretical literature on democratisation offers a wide array of competing explanations about regime changes. The debates generated by the enquiries raise paradigmatic issues that lie at the heart of social and political theory. The first set of issues concerns the relative impact on political change of structural factors versus individual actions and events. Are regime transitions a function of underlying preconditions at the level of the deep formations of economy and society? Or does political change depend on the preferences and choices of leaders and their skills at mobilising resources, counteracting opponents and taking advantage of opportunities? The second debate concerns the degree to which political change is determined by national rather than international forces. The last controversy involves the relative explanatory importance of political versus socio-economic factors.

We follow Bratton and Van De Walle's "politico-institutional approach". They favour an explanation of regime transitions based on domestic political considerations. They argue that, as analytical instruments, macro-economic and international forces (although they remain very important) are too blunt to discriminate among the particular political histories of countries undergoing regime transition. A country's political prospects derive directly from its own inherited practices (Ibid. , 41). Or in other words, we have to understand political transitions in terms of the structures of the preceding regime. Both scholars propose that political transitions in (African "neopatrimonial") regimes depart from this modal path in the following major respects :

- Political transitions originate in social protest
- Elites fracture over access to patronage
- Elite political pacts are unlikely (what typically emerges is a second-best solution)
- Political transitions are struggles to establish legal rules
- During transitions, middle class elements align with the opposition

Bratton's and Van De Walle's research on democratic transition in Africa resulted into four categories of transition outcomes, ordered to represent an ascending scale towards democracy. The first possible answer was that a regime transition never began. Either the authoritarian ruler was so obdurate that he refused to countenance reform, or the internal security situation was so uncertain due to civil war that reform efforts could not get underway. In either case, a transition was precluded. A common regime outcome, especially in the presence of civil war, was a form of anarchy. Second, there were countries in which a transition began but soon was blocked. Here the incumbent was never sincere about adopting a reform agenda, or the military as a corporate group intervened to foreshorten the reform process. These traditions led essentially to the reimposition of strict authoritarian rule. Third, there were flawed transitions to liberalized forms of authoritarianism in which the incumbent strongmen conceded multiparty elections but managed to retain political power, usually by manipulating the electoral process. The fourth and last possible outcome was a democratic transition that culminated in the installation of a new government as a result of free and fair election in which the loser accepted the election results. The resultant democracies were invariably fragile (Ibid. , 284).

I.5. Democratic consolidation.

When are democratic transitions consolidated? Schedler mentions a four-fold classification: authoritarianism, electoral democracy, liberal democracy and advanced democracy. He presents this classification of regime families graphically along a one-dimensional continuum of democraticness, with authoritarian regimes placed at one end and advanced democracies at the other.

These four regime types define the empirical contexts as well as the normative horizons and practical tasks that characterise distinct conceptualisations of democratic consolidation. The two middle categories, electoral and liberal democracy, represent the empirical referents of all debate on democratic consolidation. By doing so, Schedler differentiates between negative formulations of democratic consolidation (preventing democratic breakdown and preventing democratic erosion), positive formulations (completing democracy and deepening democracy) and a neutral formulation (organising democracy) (Schedler, 1998 : 92-93).

Schedler suggests a return to the concept's original concern with democratic survival (a negative formulation of democratic consolidation), which is "securing achieved levels of democratic rule against authoritarian regression" (Ibid. , 103).

Scholars like Schedler argue that the emergence of a democratic political culture is an essential component of democratic consolidation. Democracy, in other words, is not possible without democrats: it is "democratic survival". We draw the distinction between the consolidation of democratic rule and the mere survival of new democratic regimes. In our view, consolidation is the more or less total institutionalisation of democratic practices, complete only when citizens and the political class alike come to accept democratic practices as the only way to resolve conflict. It requires that political actors so fully internalise the rules of the game, that they can no longer imagine resorting to non-electoral practices to obtain office. One could speak of two separate transitions: a first, shorter passage from authoritarian rule to the installation of a democratic government and a second, longer, shift toward a (consolidated) democratic regime.

Essentially, we mean by a consolidated democracy a political situation in which, in a phrase, democracy has become "the only game in town". Even in the face of severe political and economic crisis, the overwhelming majority of the people believe that any further political change must emerge from within the parameters of democratic formula. Constitutionally, "a democratic regime is consolidated when governmental and non-governmental forces alike, throughout the territory of the state, become subjected to, and habituated to, the resolution of conflict within the specific laws, procedures and institutions sanctioned by the new democratic process [...] There are two important caveats. First, when we say a regime is a consolidated democracy, we do not exclude the possibility that at some future time it could break down [...] Our second caveat is that we obviously do not want to imply that there is only one type of consolidated democracy" (Linz and Stepan, 1996 : 6).

What are the features of a consolidated democracy, or in other words, what are the conditions of democracy? Democracy is a form of governance of the state. Thus, no modern polity can become democratically consolidated unless it is, first a sovereign state. If a functioning state exists, five other interconnected and mutually reinforcing conditions must also exist or be crafted for a democracy to be consolidated. These five conditions are the following :

First, the conditions must exist for the development of a free and lively civil society. Second, there must be a relatively autonomous and valued political society. Third, there must be a rule of law to ensure legal guarantees for citizens freedoms and independent associational life. By rule of law, we mean that the government and the state apparatus would be subject to the law, that areas of discretionary power would be defined and increasingly limited, and that the citizens could turn to courts to defend themselves against the state and its officials. Fourth, there must be a state bureaucracy that is usable by the democratic government. Fifth, there must be an institutionalised economic society.

By "civil society", Linz and Stepan refer to that area of the polity where self-organising groups, movements and individuals, relatively autonomous from the state, attempt to articulate values, create associations and solidarities, and advance their interests. By "political society" in a democratic setting they mean that arena in which the polity specifically arranges itself to contest the legitimate right to exercise control over public power and the state apparatus. Political parties, electoral rules, interparty alliances and legislatures (by which society constitutes itself politically to select and monitor democratic government) constitute the core institutions of this democratic political society.

To achieve a consolidated democracy, the necessary degree of autonomy and independence of civil and political society must be further embedded in and supported by the rule of law, the third area. To protect the rights of its citizens and to deliver the other basic services that citizens demand, a democratic government needs to be able to exercise effectively its claims to the monopoly of the legitimate use of force in the territory (Stepan and Linz, 1996 : 7-14). A state of law is particularly crucial for the consolidation of democracy. It is the most important continuous and routine way in which the elected government and the state administration are subjected to a network of laws, courts, semi-autonomous review and control agencies, and civil-society norms that not only check the state's illegal tendencies but also embed it in an interconnecting web of mechanisms requiring transparency and accountability. Freely elected governments can, but do not necessarily create such a state of law. The consolidation of democracy, however, requires such a law-bound state. Constitutionalism and the rule of law must determine the offices to be filled by election, the procedures to elect those officeholders, and the definition of limits to their power in order for the people to be willing to participate in it, and to accept the outcomes of the democratic game (Diamond, Plattner, Yu and Tien, 1997 : 19).

The fifth and final supportive condition concerns the economic society, which calls attention to two claims. First, there has never been and there cannot be a non-wartime consolidated democracy in a command-economy. Secondly, there has never been and almost certainly will never be a modern consolidated democracy in a pure market economy. Therefore, consolidated democracies require a set of socio-politically crafted and accepted norms, institutions and regulations, which we call economic society that mediates between the state and the market (Linz and Stepan, 1996 : 14 -15).

I.6. Constitutional frameworks.

The struggle to consolidate new democracies, especially after the "Third Wave of Democratization" [Huntington, 1991], has given rise to a wide-ranging debate about the hard choices concerning democratic political institutions and political markets (Linz and Stepan, 1996 : 15). According to Stepan and Skach "this literature has produced provocative hypotheses about the effects of institutions on democracy. It forms part of the new institutionalism literature in comparative politics that holds as a premise that political democracy depends not only on economic and social conditions but also on the design of political institutions" (Stepan and Skach, 1993 : 1-2). Indeed some scholars, for example Bratton and Van De Walle as aforementioned, favour a "new institutionalist approach" or "politico-institutional" explanation of regime transitions based on domestic political considerations. They argue that, as analytical instruments, macro-economic and international factors are too blunt to discriminate among the particular political histories of countries undergoing regime transition. Instead, they constitute contexts that shape political structures and precipitate political action. But because of their essentially secondary or supporting role in relation to the explanation of regime transitions, both scholars choose to downplay economic and international factors in their explanatory model, which concentrates on the processes and institutions internal to existing political regimes. Except that it is often overlooked, the point is so obvious that it hardly seems necessary to make : a country's political prospects derive directly from its own inherited practices (Bratton and Van De Walle, 1997 : 41). Przeworski and Wiseman agree with this : "What determines the initial choice of democratic institutions ? Much of the answer can be gleaned from a casual glance at history" (Przeworski, 1998 : 303). According to Wiseman, change in the nature of African political systems has been forced upon authoritarian leaders by their being subjected to a wide range of pressures. Among observers of African politics there would be universal agreement that these pressures have been a combination of those originating from internal domestic sources and those originating from external foreign sources. Whilst it is true that the balance between those two will vary from case to case, an examination of the literature produced so far on African democratisation suggests that a clear majority of specialist Africanist scholars (for example Bayart, Chazan, Welch and Clapham) supports the view that the paramount source of pressure has arisen from essentially domestic forces (Wiseman, 1996 : 35-36).

One fundamental political-institutional question that has only recently received serious scholarly attention concerns the impact of different constitutional frameworks on democratization and democratic consolidation (Bratton and Van De Walle, 1997 : preface xiii). Constitutional frameworks are institutional structures that provide basic rules and incentives for government formation - the conditions under which

governments continue to rule or are peacefully terminated in functioning democracies - and organisations within which a variety of political actors interact (Diamond et al.,

1997 : 138). Democracies are of course not all the same. Systems of representation, arrangements for the division and supervision of powers, and methods of organizing interests, as well as legal doctrines and the rights and duties associated with citizenship, can and do vary widely among regimes that are generally recognised as democratic. These differences, expressed in the details of institutions, generate effects that two millennia of reflection and investigation have still not enabled us to grasp fully (Ibid., 300).

However, according to Stepan and Skach, " study shows that the range of existing constitutional frameworks in the world's longstanding democracies is narrower than one would think. With one exception (Switzerland), every existing democracy is either presidential (as in the United States of America), parliamentary (as in most Western Europe), or a semi-presidential hybrid of the two (as in France and Portugal, where there is a directly elected president and a prime-minister who must have a majority in the legislature)" (Stepan and Skach, 1993 : 4-5).

So, generally speaking, there are two possible constitutional structure in democratic countries : parliamentarism and presidentialism. Therefore, particular attention should be paid to contrasting what Stepan and Skach call " pure parliamentarianism " with "pure presidentialism ". Each type has only two fundamental characteristics, and for the purposes of classification these characteristics are necessary and sufficient. A pure parliamentary regime in a democracy is a system of mutual dependence : 1. The chief executive power must be supported by a minority in the legislature and can fall if it receives a vote of no confidence. 2. The executive power (normally in conjunction with the head of the state) has the capacity to dissolve the legislature and call for elections. A pure presidential regime in a democracy is a system of mutual independence : The legislative power has a fixed electoral mandate that is its own source of legitimacy. 2. The chief executive power has a fixed electoral mandate that is its own source of legitimacy (Skach and Stepan, 1993 : 3-4).

Other scholars agree with this classification, but tend to give more characteristics. According to Juan J. Linz, all presidential and all parliamentary systems have a common core that allows their differentiation and some systematic comparisons. In addition, most presidential democracies are probably more similar to each other than the larger number of parliamentary democracies are alike [the opposite is claimed by other scholars as we will see later].

In parliamentary systems the only democratically legitimated institution is the parliament and the government deriving its authority from the confidence of the parliament, either from parliamentary majorities or parliamentary tolerance of minority governments, and only for the time that the legislature is willing to support it between elections and, exceptionally, as long as the parliament is not able to produce an alternative government. Presidential regimes are based on the opposite principle. An executive with considerable powers in the constitution and generally with full control of the composition of his cabinet and the administration is elected by the people (directly or by an electoral college elected for that purpose) for a fixed period of time and is not dependent on a formal vote of confidence by the democratically elected representatives in a parliament ; the president is not only the holder of executive pwer but the symbolic head of state and cannot be dismissed, except in rare cases of impeachment, between elections. Two features stand out in presidential systems : 1. Both the president, who controls the executive and is elected by the people (or an electoral college elected by he people for that sole purpose) and an elected legislature (uni-or bicameral) enjoy democratic legitimacy. It is a system of " dual democratic legitimacy ". 2. Both the president and the Congress are elected for a fixed term : the president's tenure in office is independent of the Congress. This leads to the " rigidity " of the presidential system. Most of the characteristics and problems of presidential regimes flow from these two essential features (Linz and Valenzuela, 1994 : 3-47). In his analysis of presidential democracy, Arend Lijphart came to the conclusion that a third essential difference must be stated and that this difference accounts for much of the majoritarian proclivity of presidential democracy : the president is a one-person executive, whereas the prime minister and the cabinet form a collective executive body. Within parliamentary systems, the prime minister's position in the cabinet can vary from preeminence to virtual equality with the other ministers, but there is always a relatively high degree of collegiality in decision making. In contrast, the members of presidential cabinets are mere advisers and subordinates of the president. The three dichotomous criteria Lijphart uses, yield not only the pure presidential and parliamentary types, but six additional types of democracy, as shown in table 1. As his typology shows, there are few democracies that combine presidential and parliamentary characteristics, and three of the potentially " mixed " types have no empirical examples at all. The vast majority of democracies fit the " pure " parliamentary or presidential types (Lijphart, 1998 : 93-94).

Table : Typology.

	Collegial executive		One-person executive	
	Dependent on legislative confidence	Not dependent on legislative confidence	Dependent on legislative confidence	Not dependent on legislative confidence
Executive selected by legislature	Pure Parliamentarism: Most West European democracies Australia Canada France (1958-88) India Israel Jamaica Japan Malaysia New Zealand Turkey Nigeria (1990-96)	Switzerland	No empirical examples	Lebanon
Executive selected by voters	No empirical examples	Cyprus (1960-63) Uruguay (1952-67)	No empirical examples	Pure Presidentialism: Most Latin American democracies Cyprus France 5th Republic (1958-62) France 6th Republic (1962-69)

The success of semi-presidential regimes (for example the Fifth Republic in France) has attracted the attention of scholars and politicians and has led to consideration of similar systems as an alternative to both presidentialism and parliamentarism. Such a system has been described in the literature as a bipolar executive, a divided executive, a parliamentary presidential republic, a quasi-parliamentary, a semi-presidential government and as a premier-presidential system, indicating how different those systems can be both in theory and in practice. Arend Lijphart has argued that these systems are not syntheses of parliamentary and presidential systems but rather systems that alternate between presidential and parliamentary phases (see table 1). Basically, dual executive systems have a president who is elected by the people either directly or indirectly, rather than nominated by the parliament, and a prime minister who needs the confidence of the parliament. Other characteristics not always found but often associated with dual executive systems are : the president appoints the prime minister, although he needs the support of the parliament, and the president can dissolve the parliament. This is a significant break with the separation of powers (Ibid., 48).

What about the choice of these institutions ? Should we expect democracy to last longer under one institutional system than under another ? Our analysis is limited to only one set of institutional features, summarized as parliamentarism versus presidentialism. We leave mixed systems aside as presenting too small a sample to yield any robust estimate. We thus test the hypotheses of Linz, Valenzuela, Stepan and Skach, who offer several reasons why parliamentary democracies should prove more durable than presidential ones. The choice of a system of government is very crucial for the survival or breakdown of democracy. Hence, Linz has argued that parliamentary systems sustain, advance and consolidate democratic institutions better than presidential regimes (Linz, 1994 : 4). His argument is based on three main criticisms of presidential system in relation to democratic consolidation and stability (Mainwaring, 1997 : 30-32).

A first criticism of a presidential regime is that the fixed term of the president's office introduces a rigidity that is less favourable to democratic consolidation than the flexibility offered by parliamentary mechanisms of no confidence and dissolution. Presidents are elected for a fixed period of time that, under normal circumstances, can not be modified, shortened or prolonged. From this, it is noted that the duration of the mandate of a president becomes an essential political factor to which all actors in the political process have to adjust. In addition, in a presidential system it is difficult to remove a democratically elected head of government who has no longer popular or parliamentary support and to extend the term of a popular president beyond constitutional limits. Consequently, good presidents are turned out of office, even if the population, political elite and parties continue to support them. Presidents have therefore little time to pursue their projects and to carry out all their policies. As a result they try to accomplish a great deal in a short term. However, some scholars

argue that the fixed term of the president's office is seen as an advantage in a sense that it rules out some uncertainty and unpredictability inherent to a parliamentary system (Linz, 1994 : 8-9). According to Przeworski, one of Linz's arguments is also that the stakes are higher under presidentialism, since a race for the presidency can have but a single winner. Linz observes that a defeated presidential candidate has no official role in politics, and most likely will not even be a member of the legislature, while in a parliamentary system the defeated candidate for the premiership will be the leader of the opposition. Moreover, it is likely that the fixed term of office under a presidential system is longer than the expected term of office under a parliamentary system. Finally, under presidentialism the chief executive is at the same time the head of the state, thus being able to portray the president's partisan interest as the national interest and thereby undermine the legitimacy afforded to the opposition.

A second criticism of presidential regimes is that these regimes are more prone to immobilism than parliamentary systems. In other words, they are more likely to generate legislative paralysis. Such paralysis can occur under either system : under parliamentarism when no majority coalition can be formed, and under presidentialism when the legislature is controlled by a majority that is hostile to the president but not large enough to override presidential vetoes routinely. Under presidential systems the executive, by virtue of the fixed term of the office, can survive alongside hostile legislatures, leading to stalemates between the executive and the legislative branch. In several contemporary presidential regimes the main line of conflict is between the president and the congress, rather than among political parties. Under such conditions, no one can govern (Przeworski, 1998 : 300-301).

A third criticism of presidential regimes is that a presidential regime rests upon a winner-takes-it-all logic, which is unfavourable to democratic stability. Whereas a parliamentary system might produce an absolute majority for a particular party, it gives representation to a number of parties. In a presidential election, the victorious candidate takes over the whole executive branch, while a first minister candidate whose party gains less than 51% of the seats might be forced to share power with another party or constitute a minority government. The control of the executive in a presidential system is in the hands of the winner of the election while in parliamentary systems there might be a coalition government. Moreover, presidential regimes generate a zero-sum game because winners and losers are sharply defined for the entire period of the presidential mandate (Linz, 1994 : 14 -15). In parliamentary systems, small parties can still influence the course of political activity, especially if a vote of no confidence is passed against the prime minister and new election is called. In a presidential regime, on the contrary, the defeated candidate loses all and is not likely to be considered as a desirable candidate for the next presidential election (Horowitz, 1991 : 206).

Legislative majorities are more frequent under presidentialism than under parliamentarism. In Przeworski's survey, 57.9% of the time under the former and 49.0% under the latter. But in 24.4% of the presidential years, the share of the largest in the legislature was smaller than one-half and larger than one-third. Since the proportion needed to override a presidential veto is typically two-thirds, these figures indicate that the conditions for executive-legislative deadlock are common under presidentialism. The average number of effective parties is about the same under the two systems : 3.10 under parliamentarism and 3.05 under presidentialism. Yet extreme fractionalization (in which no party controls more than one third of the seats) is more frequent under presidentialism (occurring 18% of the time) than under parliamentarism (where it occurs only 8.9% of the time) (Przeworski, 1998 : 301).

According to Mainwaring, Linz is right about the durability of alternative institutional arrangements. During the period under investigation, 14 democracies (or 28% of the 50 cases) died under a parliamentary system. Only one (12.5% of 8 cases) died under a mixed system, and 24 (52% of 46 cases) died under presidentialism. Among those democracies that died during the period under scrutiny, the parliamentary systems lasted an average of eight years, while their presidential counterparts lasted nine. But the parliamentary systems that were still around as of 1990 were much older : on the average of 43 years, as compared with 22 for presidential regimes. The probability that a democracy would die under presidentialism during any particular year of the study was 0.049, the comparable probability under parliamentarism was 0.014. If this difference appears small, think in terms of expected lives : democracy's life expectancy under presidentialism is less than 20 years, while under parliamentarism it is 71 years (Mainwaring, 1993 : 198-228). This difference in durability is not an effect of the levels of economic development (cfr. Vanhanen) at which parliamentary and presidential regimes operated. While parliamentary systems are on the average found in wealthier countries, presidential democracies are less durable at almost every level.

What about the party system ? According to Przeworski, democracies seem less likely to survive when they combine presidentialism with a fragmented party system. Combining presidentialism with a legislature where no single party has majority status is fatal : such systems can expect to live only 15 years. Presidential democracies in which a single party does have a legislative majority can expect to live 26 years. Deadlock, a situation in which the share of seats of the largest party is between one-third and one-half, is even more deadly to presidential regimes. They die at the rate of 0.038 (with an expected life of 26 years) when there is no deadlock and at the rate of 0.091 (with an expected life of 11 years) when there is. Furthermore, descriptive information on parliamentarism supports Mainwaring's argument that parliamentary systems with disciplined parties and a majority party offer the fewest checks on executive power, and hence promote a winner-takes-it-all approach more than presidential systems. Single party majorities are not conducive to the survival of parliamentary democracies.

Those in which one party had a majority of seats in the Lower House of the legislature have an expected life of 55 years, while parliamentary systems without a one-party majority have an expected life of 111 years (Przeworski, 1998 : 302).

Although all these facts sound very convincing, some scholars still disagree with Linz and his fellow colleagues. According to Horowitz, Linz' "leitmotiv" (the claim that parliamentary systems are more conducive to stable democracy than are presidential systems) applies especially to nations with deep political cleavages and numerous political parties, and it runs the risk of becoming conventional wisdom before it receives searching scrutiny. Horowitz argues that Linz' quarrel is not with the presidency, but with two features that epitomize the Westminster version of democracy: first, plurality elections that produce a majority of seats by shutting out third-party competitors, and second, adversary democracy with its sharp divide between winners and losers, government and opposition. Because these are Linz's underlying objections, it is not difficult to turn these arguments around against parliamentary systems, at least where they produce coherent majorities and minorities. Where no majority emerges and coalitions are necessary, sometimes (but only sometimes) more conciliatory processes and outcomes emerge. Horowitz concludes that as a result Linz's thesis boils down to an argument not against the presidency but against plurality elections, not in favour of parliamentary systems but in favour of parliamentary coalitions (Horowitz, 1990 : 73-79).

In his article "the virtues of parliamentarism", Linz provides an answer to the aforementioned critique. Linz agrees with Horowitz that the study of democratic regimes cannot be separated from the study of electoral systems and even he agrees that his analysis does not cover all possible methods of presidential election. His analysis concentrates on the two most common methods of election: the simple majority or plurality system, and the two-candidate runoff. Majoritarian implications of presidentialism, the winner-takes-it-all features, may indeed also be presented in parliamentary systems with the plurality elections in single-member districts, especially under the two-party systems that so often go together with the Westminster-style parliamentary government. In societies that are polarized, or fragmented by multiple cleavages, a multiparty system with proportional representation may allow the formation of alternative coalitions (as in Belgium for example), and thus forestall dangerous zero-sum outcomes. Certainly, parliamentary democracies in which a single disciplined party obtains the absolute majority of all seats find themselves in what is close to a winner-take-all situation. But this is not the most frequent pattern in parliamentary systems, particularly when there is proportional representation. Linz concludes that Horowitz fails to address the basic problem of competing claims to legitimacy of presidents and congresses, and the resulting potential for conflict between the two branches. Presidents occasionally win such conflicts, no doubt, but the argument is about institutions, not about how particular persons will fare in this or that set of circumstances (Linz, 1990 : 85-86).

Mainwaring's and Shugart's book on presidentialism is an example of scholars who try to move beyond the dichotomous debate of presidential versus parliamentary government

by highlighting the great variation among presidential regimes. Although we support the dichotomy, their view is most interesting and should be accounted for. Mainwaring and Shugart emphasize two general conclusions in their book. First they argue that presidentialism has important variations. Much of the literature has treated presidentialism as a relatively homogeneous regime type. Yet a very strong claim can be made that differences within the presidential regime type are quite important. Presidential regimes vary so greatly in the powers accorded to the president, the types of the party and electoral systems with which they are associated, and the socio-economic and historical context in which they were created, that these differences are likely to be as important as the oft-assumed dichotomy between presidential and parliamentary systems. The way both presidential and parliamentary governments function, and ultimately the advantages and shortcomings of both, depend on the entire institutional context.

There are four major institutional dimensions along which presidential systems vary, focussing on four factors : 1) the degree to which they conform to or vary from " pure " presidentialism ", 2) the legislative powers of the president, 3) the degree of party system fragmentation, which affects the prospects for general compatibility or conflict between the president and the assembly, 4) the discipline or lack thereof of political parties. Although both scholars have focussed on these institutional differences, they are aware that there are other very important factors in determining how presidentialism functions : the quality of leadership, the nature of social cleavages and political conflicts, the level of economic development, and the political culture. Nevertheless [cfr. politico-institutional approach], institutional arrangements help or hinder democratic governments in their efforts to govern effectively (Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997 : 435-436). Their second major theme has been that these variations among presidential systems have consequences for how well they are apt to function. They believe that presidential systems tend to function better with limited executive powers over legislation, mainly because a weaker executive means that the congress has more opportunity for debating and logrolling on controversial matters. Having weaker executive powers also means that cases in which presidents lack reliable majorities are less likely to be crisis-ridden, since the president has fewer tools with which to try to do an end run around the congress. Finally, they argue that presidentialism usually functions better when presidents have at least a reasonably large bloc of reliable legislative seats (Ibid., 436-437).

What can we conclude from the aforementioned literature? In our point of view, the survival of democracies does depend on their institutional systems. Parliamentary systems seem to last longer, much longer, than presidential ones. Majority-producing electoral institutions are conducive to the survival of presidential regimes : presidential systems facing the deadlock are particularly brittle. The evidence that parliamentary democracy survives longer and under a broader spectrum of conditions than presidential democracy thus seems incontrovertible (Przeworski, 1998 : 303).

Chapter II

Country studies : Overview of Constitutional Frameworks, party and electoral systems in Africa since independence.

In this chapter we give an overview of the different constitutional frameworks (mainly presidential or parliamentary regimes, presidents, HS and PM's), party systems (no-party system, one-party system and multiparty system) and electoral systems (majoritarian, proportional representation or PR, semi-PR, and others such as no elections at all).

We only mentioned information that could be used in the four matrices that can be found in chapter III. Data was considered to be relevant from independence until 1999.

The main sources for this chapter were " The Europa World Year Book ", " The Africa Contemporary Record...Annual Survey and Documents ", " Africa South of the Sahara and Africa at a glance. Facts and figures 1997/8 ". Further information was found in relevant literature and on the internet.

Chapter II

Country Studies : Overview of Constitutional Frameworks, party and electoral systems in Africa since independence.

II.1. Algeria.

Independence 5 July 1962, Constituent Assembly elected 20 Sept 1962.

Interim Pres Ferhat Abbas, 1962-1963 elected by Constituent Assembly, 25 Sept 1962

PM Ahmed Ben Bella, 1962-1963 elected by Constituent Assembly, 26 Sept 1962

Pres Ahmed Ben Bella, 1963-1965 single-party system (FLN) and Pres regime introduced, Aug 1963

Ben Bella popularly elected Pres, Sept 1963

Pres (Col) Houari Boumedienne, 1965-1978 military takeover, 19 June 1965

new constitution, charter and Boumedienne

Pres (unopposed) after 3 referenda, 1976

legislative election on basis candidate list FLN, 25 Feb 1977

Pres (Col) Bendjihid Chadli, 1979-1992 Boumedienne died (Dec 1978)

PM Muhammad Abd al-Ghani, 1979- ? party elected Chadli, Jan/Feb 1979

one-party legislative election, March 1982

Pres election, reelected unopposed, Jan 1984

PM Abd al-Hamid Brahimi, 1985- ? one-party legislative election, Feb 1987

PM (Col) Kasdi Merbah, Nov 1988-Sept 1989 Chadli reelected Pres, Dec 1988

multiparty system restored after

referendum and new constitution, Feb 1989

PM Mouloud Hamrouche, Sept 1989-July 1990

PM Sid-Ahmad Ghozali, July 1990-July 1992 FIS recognised (Sjeik Madani, Belhadj)

Chadli resigned in electoral crisis, 11 Jan 1992

FIS 188/231 seats 1st round legislative election

emergency declared, mil/civ rule from Jan 1992

FIS forbidden, Feb 1992

Pres Mohammed Boudiaf, Jan-Jun 1992 Chair High Council (collegiate presidency)

Pres Ali Kaffi, 1992-1994 succeeded Boudiaf (assassinated, 29 June)

PM Belaid Abd es-Salam, July 1992-Aug 1993

PM Redha Malek, Aug 1993-April 1994

Pres Lamine Zérroual, 1994 -

minister of defense, appointed by High Council, Jan 1994,

Zérroual popularly elected Pres, Nov 1995 (4 candidates)

PM Ahmed Guyahia, Dec 1995-Dec 1998 Proportional electoral system (no longer majoritarian electoral system)

multiparty legislative election, June/Oct 1997

(2 Chambers), not free and fair, FIS boycott

PM Smail Hamdani, Dec 1998- ?

II.2. Angola.

Independence 11 November 1975

Pres Agostinho Neto, 1975-1979

elected by MPLA Congress, single party system
Position of PM abolished, Dec 1978

Pres Jose Eduardo dos Santos, 1979-

Neto died (Sept), dos Santos elected by party
one-party legislative election, 1980

NA agrees with multiparty system, March 1991

PM Fernando José França van-Dúnem, July 1991-Nov 1992

post PM reintroduced
multiparty and proportional electoral system
introduced 1992,

Pres election : dos Santos (49,57%), Sept 1992
Savimbi (Unita) got 40%

legislative election (MPLA 54%, Unita 34%),

Sept 1992, free and fair declared by UN

PM Marcolino José Carlos Moco, Nov 1992-June 1996

PM Fernando José França van-Dúnem, June 1996-Jan 1999

Dos Santos reelected unopposed party Pres, Dec 1998

II.3. Benin.

Self-government Dec 1958, Independence 1 August 1960

Pres Hubert Maga, 1960-1963

multi-party legislative election, 1960

HS (Col) Christophe Soglo, 1963-1964

civ/mil intervention, Maga deposed

Pres Sourou Apithy, 1964-1965

multi-party election, Jan 1964 won by Apithy

PM Justin Ahomadéybé, Jan 1964 -Nov 1965

Pres Tahirou Congacou, 29 Nov /22 Dec 1965

military takeover, Nov 1965

Pres (Gen) Christophe Soglo, 1965-1967

military takeover, Dec 1965

Pres (Col) Alphonse Alley, 1967-1968

military power struggle, Dec 1967

Pres election May 1968 declared void,

new constitution after popular referendum

Pres Emile Zinzou, 1968-1969

civilian appointed by military, June 1968

HS (Col) Paul de Souza, 1969-1970

military takeover, Dec 1969

Pres Hubert Maga, 1970-1972

civilian rule restored, rotational presidency

Pres Justin Ahomadegbe, 1972

rotation, May 1972 - Oct 1972

HS (Gen) Mathieu Kérékou, 1972-1980

military takeover, 26 Oct 1972

Pres Mathieu Kérékou, 1980-1991

single-party system introduced, 1975

PRPB (People's Party of the Revolution)

Loi Fondamentale, National Revolutionary Assembly, 1977

one-party legislative election,

Nov 1979 and Jun 1984

reelected unopposed Pres 5-year term by

ANR, Feb 1980 and July 1984

one-party legislative election, June 1989

National Conference, 19-28 Feb 1990

Pres Nicéphore Soglo, 1991-1996

multi-party system restored, new constitution

Pres Mathieu Kérékou, 1996-
PM Houngbédji, April 1996-May 1998

multiparty legislative election, Feb 1991
Soglo popularly elected, March 1991
multi-party legislative election, 1995
Kérékou popularly elected, March 1996

II.4. Botswana.

Self-government 1965, Independence 30 Sept 1966, parliamentary regime, Pres elected by legislature

PM Seretse Khama, 1965-1966

multiparty legislative election, March 1965
de facto 2 party system, Botswana Democratic Party (BDP, Khama and Masire) and Botswana National Front (BNF, Kenneth Koma)

Pres Seretse Khama, 1966-1980

elected by NA, 1966, new constitution provides for a Pres who serves as HS and government, Republic, 30 Sept 1966
multi-party legislative elections, 1966, 1974 and Oct 1979

Pres Ketumile Masire, 1980-1998

Khama redesignated
Khama died (Jul 1980), NA elected vice-Pres Masire
Masire re-elected by NA after multiparty legislative elections, Sept 1984, Oct 1989 and Oct 1994

Pres Mogae, April 1998

multiparty legislative election, Oct 1999

II.5. Burkina Faso. (Upper Volta, since 1983 Burkina Fasso)

Selfgovernment 1958, Independence 5 August 1960

Pres Maurice Yaméogo, 1960-1966

multiparty election 1958
single-party elections 1964, 1965

HS (Gen) Sangoulé Lamizana, 1966-1978

military takeover, 3 Jan 1966, political activities suspended Sept 1966-Nov 1969
new constitution and multiparty legislative election, 1970

PM Gérard Ouédraogo 1971-feb 1994

coalition government UDV and PRA
military coup, Lamizana dissolved NA, Feb 1974
civil regime restored, referendum Nov 1977

Pres Sangoule Lamizana, 1978-1980

PM Joseph Conombo, 1978-1980

HS (Col) Saye Zerbo, 1980-1982

multiparty legislative and Pres elections, 1978
single-party system introduced, 1978
military takeover, 25 Nov 1980
political parties banned

HS (Maj) Jean-Baptiste Ouedraogo, 1982-1983

PM (Capt) Thomas Sankara, Feb-Aug 1983

HS (Capt) Thomas Sankara, 1983-1987

military power struggle, 7 nov 1982

military power struggle, 4 Aug 1983
Lybian state-model (Jamahiriya-state)
Conseil National de la Révolution

HS (Capt) Blaise Compaoré, 1987-1991	military power struggle, 15 Oct 1987 Sankara killed
Pres Blaise Compaoré, 1991 -	new constitution and multiparty system restored, 1991 Compaoré popularly elected Pres unopposed, Dec 1991 (election not free and fair) multi-party legislative elections 1992, 1997
PM Kaboré ?- March 1998	
PM Kadré Désiré Ouédraogo, March 1998- ?	Campaoré popularly reelected Pres, Nov 1998 (election free and fair)

II.6. Burundi.

Self-government Jan 1962, Independence 1 July 1962	
King Mwambutsa IV, 1915-1966	several PM's succeeded each other, 1962-1966
PM André Muhirwa 1962-1963	
PM Pierre Ngendandumwe, 1963-1965	
PM Albin Nyamoya, 1964 -1965	(Ngendandumwe assassinated Jan 1965)
PM Joseph Bamina, 1965	multiparty election, 1965
PM Leopold Biha, 1965	
King Ntare V, 1966	palace revolution/deposed father, July 1966
PM (Capt) Michel Micombero, 1966	PM 8 July 1966 - 29 Nov 1966
HS (Gen) Michel Micombero, 1966-1976	military takeover, Nov 1966, Burundi republic new constitution after referendum, 1974 one-party system (Uprona) introduced and Micombero elected Pres by party, 1974
HS (Col) Jean-Baptiste Bagaza, 1976-1984	military power struggle, 1 Nov 1976 post PM abolished, Oct 1978 plebescitary legislative election, Oct 1982
Pres Jean-Baptiste Bagaza, 1984-1987	popularly elected Pres unopposed, Aug 1984
Pres (Maj) Pierre Buyoya, 1987-1993	military takeover, military committee for national salvation, 3 Sept 1987 new constitution and multiparty system restored after referendum, 9 March 1992 opposition parties officially recognised
Pres Melchior Ndadaye, July-Oct 1993	Ndadaye (Frodebu) popularly elected Pres, 1 Jun 1993
PM Sylvie Kiningi, July 1993- ?	legislative election, 29 June 1993 Pres Ndadaye killed in failed military coup, 21 Oct 1993
Pres Cyprian Ntaryamira, Jan-April 1994	elected by NA, 1993 killed in aircraft disaster, April 1994
Pres Sylvestre Ntibantuganyā, 1994 -1996	appointed April, elected by NA, Sept 1994
PM Anatole Kamyenkiko, Jan 1994 -Feb 1995	
PM Antoine Nduwayo, Feb 1995-July 1996	

PM Pascal Firmin Ndimira, July 1996
HS (Maj) Pierre Buyoya, 1996-

military takeover, 25 July 1996, became Pres
27 Sept 1996, post PM abolished, June 1998
Buyoya reinaugurated Pres by NA, 11 June 1998

II.7 Cameroon.

Self-government 1959, Independence 1 Jan 1960, Republic of East Cameroon (1960-1961), Federal Republic of Cameroon (1961-1972), United Cameroon Republic (1972-)

PM André-Marie Mbida, 1957-1958

multiparty election, 1956

PM Ahmadou Ahidjo, 1958 -1959

Mbida dismissed, deputy PM succeeds

Pres Ahmadou Ahidjo, 1960-1982

former PM elected Pres, 5 May 1960

multiparty legislative election, April 1960

single-party system introduced, Sept 1966

National Cameroonian Union, renamed in
March 1985, Rassemblement Democratique
du Peuple Camerounais (RDPC)

new constitution = Pres regime, June 1972

plebiscitary one-party legislative election

1965, 1970, May 1973, 1978

Ahidjo reelected 1965, March 1970, April

1975, April 1980 (5th successive term)

Ahidjo retired, succeeded by PM Biya

Biya reelected, post PM abolished, 1984

one-party legislative and Pres elections,

Biya elected unopposed, April 1988

Pres Paul Biya, 1982-

appointed by Pres

multiparty system restored, 1992

PM Sadou Hayatou, April 1991-April 1992

PM Simon Achidi Achu, April 1992- ?

multiparty legislative elections Oct 1992

Biya popularly elected Pres, Oct 1992

(both elections not free and fair)

PM Peter Mafany Musonge, Aug 1996- ?

multiparty legislative elections, May 1997

Biya popularly elected Pres, Oct 1997

(both elections not free and fair)

II.8. Cape Verde.

Independence 5 July 1975, in federation with Guinea-Bissau (1975-Jan 1981)

Pres Aristides Pereira, 1975-1991

one-party legislative election June 1975,

single-party system (PAICV), 1975

PM Pedro Pires, 1975- ?

first constitution, Sept 1980

one-party legislative election, Dec 1985

Pereira reelected Pres by party, Jan 1986

multiparty system introduced, 1990

Pres Antonio Mascarenhas Monteiro, 1991-

Mascarenhas popularly elected Pres,

Feb 1991, 1996

Multiparty legislative election,

17 Feb 1991, Dec 1995

II.9. Central African Republic.

Selfgovernment Dec 1958, Independence 13 Aug 1960 Presidential regime
PM Barthélémy Boganda, 1958-1959 multiparty election, Dec 1957 and 1959
leading party won all seats in NA, party
split in 2 after death Boganda, March 1959
PM David Dacko, 1959-1960 Dacko faction predominated, opposition faction
suppressed, remaining small parties dissolved in 1962
Pres David Dacko, 1960-1966 elected Pres by NA, Nov 1960, former PM
single-party system introduced, 1962
Centrafrican Democratic Assembly (RDC)
single-party elections 1964, 1965
HS (Col) Jean-Bédél Bokassa, 1966-1979 military takeover, 31 Dec 1965
period of military rule, 1966-1979
proclaimed " Pres for live ", 2 March 1972
PM Elisabeth Domitien, Jan 1975-April 1976
PM Ange-Félix Patassé, April 1976-July 1978 new constitution, 1976
Bokassa crowned " emperor " , 4 Dec 1977
PM Henri Maidou, July 1978-Sept 1979
Pres David Dacko, 1979-1981 military takeover, 10 Sept 1979
PM Bernard Christian Ayandho, 1979-1980 French military intervention in favor Dacko
new constitution and multiparty system
after referendum, Feb 1981
HS (Gen) André Kolingba, 1981-1993 Pres election frauded by Dacko, Ma 1981
military takeover Sept 1981, period of
military rule, Kolingba chairman MCNR
Kolingba Pres and PM, 21 Sept 1985
one-party system reintroduced and Kolingba
elected Pres after referendum, Nov 1986
one-party plebescitary legislative election,
July 1987
PM Edouard Frank, March-Dec 1991
PM (Gen) Timothée Malendoma, Dec 1991-Feb 1993
PM Enoch Derant Lakoné, Feb -Aug 1993
multiparty system restored, 1993
legislative elections, Aug 1993
Pres Ange-Félix Patassé, 1993- Patassé popularly elected Pres, 22 Aug 1993
PM Jean-Luc Mandaba, Oct 1993-April 1995 PM appointed by Pres
PM Gabriel Kayambounou, April 1995-June 1999 French military intervention, 1996
PM Jean-Paul Ngongandé, June 1996-Jan 1997
PM Michel Gbezera-Bria, Jan 1997- multiparty legislative election, Nov-Dec 1998
Patassé popularly re-elected Pres, Oct 1999

II.10. Chad.

Self-government 1958, Independence 11 August 1960
PM N'Garta Tombalbaye, 1959-1960 succeeded PM Gabriel Lisette, multiparty system
Pres N'Garta Tombalbaye, 1960-1976 elected by NA,
single-party system introduced, 1962
Union Nationale pour l'Indépendance et la
Révolution (UNIR)
plebiscitary elections NA 1962, 1963, 1969
French military intervention, 1968, 1969
HS (Gen) Felix Malloum, 1975-1979 military takeover, April 1975 (Tombalbaye killed)
French military intervention, 1978
PM Hissine Habré, Aug 1979 appointed PM, Malloum and Habré resigned
23 March 1979, Transnational Government of
National Unity
HS (Gen) Goukoni Oueddei, 1979-1982 civil war/Malloum's forces defeated,
March 1979
HS (Gen) Hissene Habré, 1982-1990 civil war/Goukoni's forces defeated, June 1982
Habré Pres, 21 Oct 1982
French military intervention, 1983, 1986
new constitution after referendum,
Habré reelected Pres, Dec 1989
HS (Gen) Idriss Deby, 1990-1996 civil war/ Habre's forces defeated, Nov 1990
French military intervention, 1992
National Conference, 1993
multiparty interim government installed, 1993
Moungar (interim PM) deposed by interim gov
new constitution multiparty system, March 1996
Pres Idriss Deby, 1996- Deby popularly elected Pres, July 1996
PM Koiba, Aug 1996-April 1997 appointed by Pres
multiparty legislative election, Jan-Feb 1997
PM Nassour Ouaidou, April 1997-

II.11. Comoros.

Unilateral independence, 6 July 1975, recognized by France 31 December 1975
Pres Abdallah Abderrahman, 1975 Pre-independence government leader in
multiparty system, Pres and PM Aug 1975
Pres Mohammed Jaffar, 1975-1976 Abdallah deposed in coup, Aug 1975
Jaffar Pres and PM
Pres Ali Soilih, 1976-1978 Jaffar resigned, Jan 1976,
single-party system evolved
PM Abdellahi Mohamed, ? military takeover, May 1978 (mercenaries)
Pres Abdallah Abderrahman, 1978-1989 new constitution = Pres system, Oct 1978
PM Salim Ben Ali, 1978-1982 Abdallah elected unopposed Pres, Oct 1978
legislative election, Dec 1978

single-party system introduced, Jan 1979
 one-party legislative election, March 1982
 Abdellah reelected unopposed second 6-year term, 30 Sept 1984
 post PM abolished, Dec 1984
 multiparty system reintroduced, 1987
 legislative elections March 1987 frauded, Abdellah's candidates declared elected
 Abdellah reelected Pres unopposed, Nov 1989
 Abdellah assassinated, Nov 1989
 French military intervention, 1989
 multicandidate Pres election, 3 March 1990
 multiparty legislative elections, Nov 1992, Dec 1993

Pres Said Mohammed Djohar, 1989-1996

PM Haladi, Jan-May 1993
 PM Said Ali Mohamed, May 1993-Jan 1994
 PM Mohamed Abdou Madi, Jan-Oct 1994
 PM Halifa Haumadi, Oct 1994-April 1995
 PM Mohamed Caabi El Yachrouto, April-Sept 1995 Pres Djohar retired after military takeover mercenaries, Sept 1995
 French military intervention, Oct 1995

Pres Mohammed Taki Abdoukarim, 1996-1998 Popularly elected Pres, March 1996
 new constitution after referendum, Oct 1996
 multiparty legislative election, Dec 1996

PM Ahmed Abdou, Dec 1996-Dec 1997
 PM Nouridine Bourhane, Dec 1997-March 1998
 PM Ben Saïd Massoundi, March-Nov 1998
 Pres Ben Saïd Massoundi, 1998 - Pres Taki died 6 Nov 1998
 PM Abbas Djoussouf, Nov 1998- opposition leader, appointed PM by Pres

II.12. Congo Brazzaville.

Self-government 1958, Independence 15 August 1960

Pres Abbe Fulbert Youlou, 1960-1963 pre-independence PM, elected Pres, 1961

PM Massemba-Debat, Aug-Dec 1963

Pres Massemba-Debat, 1963-1968 civil strife/military intervention 19 Dec 1963
 Massemba-Debat elected Pres by NA

PM Pascal Lissouba, 1963-1966 one-party system introduced, July 1964

HS (Maj) Marien Ngouabi, 1968-1977 military takeover, 5 Aug 1968, national revolutionary council, chaired by Ngouabi

PM and temp HS Alfred Raoul, 1968 5 Sept - 31 Dec 1968, Ngouabi Pres Dec 1968
 new constitution = single-party system, 1970
 period of military rule, 1968-1973
 constitutional referendum and plebiscitary assembly election, 1973, post PM abolished

HS (Col) Yhombi-Opango, 1977-1979 Ngouabi assassinated, successor elected by party
 Pres March 1977- 5 Feb 1979

HS (Gen) Denis Sassou-Nguesso, 1979-1992 military power struggle/purge, 5 Feb 1979

	one-party legislative election, July 1979 Pres reelected 2nd term, 30 July 1984
PM Sylvain Goma, Dec 1975-Aug 1984	
PM Ange Eduard Ooungui, Aug 1984 - ?	succeeded Goma as PM, 11 Aug 1984 one-party legislative election, some non-party members on list, Sept 1989
PM Alphonse Poaty Souchapaty, Sept 1989-Jun 1991	National Conference Feb-Jun 1991, multiparty system restored, March 1991
PM Andre Milongo, Jun 1991-Aug 1992	
Pres Pascal Lissouba, 1992-1997	Lissouba popularly elected Pres, Aug 1992 (multicandidate)
PM Bougho-Nouarra, Aug-Nov 199	multiparty legislative election, June-July 1992,
PM Claude Antoine Dacosta, Nov 1992-June 1993	
PM Yhambi-Opango, June 1993-Aug 1996	multiparty legislative election, May 1993
PM David Charles Ganao, Aug 1996-Sept 1997	
PM Kolelas, Sept 1997-	
HS (Gen) Denis Sassou-Nguesso, 1997-	military takeover, October 1997

II.13. Congo Kinshasa. (Zaire)

Independence 30 June 1960, parliamentary system	
Pres Joseph Kasavubu, 1960-1965	elected by NA, June 1960
PM Patrice Lumumba, 1960	multiparty legislative election, May 1960 Lumumba PM, Jun-Sept 1960
PM Joseph Ileo, 1960-1961	Lumumba dismissed by Kasavubu, Sept 1960 military intervention Mobutu, Sept 1960 college of commissioners rules until Feb 1961 civilian rule restored, Feb 1961, Lumumba assassinated, Feb 1961
PM Cyrille Adoula, 1961-1964	Ileo resigned Aug 1961, Adoula new PM
PM Moïse Tshombe, 1964-1965	invited by Kasavubu and Adoula to form government, July 1964 multiparty election, 1965
PM Evariste Kimba, 1965	Tshombe dismissed, Oct 1965
HS (Gen) Joseph Mobutu, 1965-1970	military takeover, 24 Nov 1965 Period of military rule, 1965-1970
Pres Mobutu Sese Seko, 1970-1997	one-party system from 1967 new constitution, 1967 and 1970 = Pres system popularly elected Pres unopposed, 1970, Dec 1977, July 1984 one-party legislative election 1970, Oct 1977, 1984, Sept 1987 (all plebescitary)
PM Mpinga Kasenda, 1977-1979	military intervention France/Morocco, 1977 military intervention France/Belgium, 1978 new constitution, 1978

PM Bo-Boloko-Lokonga, March 1979-Aug 1980

PM Nguza Karl-I-Bond, Aug 1980-April 1981

PM Nsinga, 1981-1982

PM Kengo Wa Dondo, Nov 1982-Oct 1986/Nov 1986-April 1991

Mobutu himself launches idea National Conference, Jan 1990

conditional multiparty system reintroduced, 1990

PM Mulamba Lukoji, April 1991-Sept 1991

PM Etienne Tshisekedi, Sept 1991-Oct 1991

PM Mungul Diaka, Oct-Nov 1991

PM Nguza Karl I Bond, Nov 1991-Aug 1992

PM Faustin Birindwa March 1993-Jun 1994

PM Kengo Wa Dondo, Jun 1994-May 1997

PM Lukoji announces opening NC, 7 Aug 1991-Sept 1996

Transition NA agrees on draft new constitution, Sept 1996

Rebellion East Congo, October 1996-

Pres Laurent-Désiré Kabila, 1997-

Mobutu's government overthrown, May 1997

II.14. Côte D'Ivoire.

Self-government Dec 1958, unilateral independence 7 Aug 1960, subsequently recognized by France

PM Felix Houphouët-Boigny, 1959-1960

multiparty election/referendum, 1958,

PM 1 May 1959

Pres Felix Houphouët-Boigny, 1960-1993

elected by NA, Pres 27 Nov 1960

new constitution, post PM abolished, 1960

de facto single-party (PDIC), despite

constitutional provisions for the existence

of other political organizations, no

opposition party was granted official

recognition until 1990

one-party plebiscitary legislative elections

and Pres election, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980,

1985

multiparty system since 1990

H-Boigny reelected 7th term, 28 Oct 1990

multiparty legislative election 25 Nov 1990

H-Boigny died, 7 Dec 1993, Bédié (Pres NA)

succeeded in terms of constitution for rest

of term, popularly elected Pres, Oct 1995

multiparty legislative election, Dec 1995

PM Onatara, Nov 1990- ?

Pres Henri Konan Bédié, 1993-

II.15. Djibouti.

Self-government 1967, Independence 27 June 1977, country single electoral district

Pres Hassan Gouled Aptidon, 1977-

multiparty election /referendum, May 1977

Pres elected by NA, 24 June 1977

PM Ahmed Dini, 1977- Feb 1978

PM Mohamed Abdellah Kamil, Feb-Sept 1978

PM Bourkat Gourad, Sept 1978-(still leader of gov 1999)

single-party system introduced, 1981 (RPP)

Gouled reelected Pres unopposed,

7 July 1981, April 1987

one-party plebescitary legislative elections

May 1982, April 1987

new constitution after referendum, Sept 1992

multiparty system (maximum 4 parties)

multiparty legislative election, 18 Dec 1992

(not free and fair)

Gouled popularly reelected Pres, May 1992

multiparty legislative election, 19 Dec 1997

II.16. Egypt.

Independence 28 February 1922, Arabic Republic of Egypt, Oct 1951

King Fuad, 1922-1936

Sultan since 1917, multiparty system

King Farouk, 1936-1952

succession

PM (Gen) Mohammed Neguib, 1952-1953

military takeover, 23 July 1952

Pres (Gen) Mohammed Neguib, 1953-1954

military decree, 18 June 1953

PM (Col) Gamal Abdel Nasser, April-Nov 1954

monarchy abolished, non-party system

Pres (Gen) Gamal Abdel Nasser, 1954-1970

military power struggle, Nov 1954

New constitution after referendum,

Nasser elected Pres unopposed and PM,

23 Jun 1956

one-party system (ASU), Dec 1962

Pres Anwar Sadat, 1970-1981

Nasser died (Sept), Vice-Pres Sadat

elected by NA, 1970

new constitution = Pres nominated by NA

and chosen by popular referendum, 1971

3 political platform's allowed beside ASU, 1976

Sadat accepted designation 2nd 6-year term, Sept 1976

first relatively free legislative elections since 50's, Oct 1976

multiparty system restored, 1977

approved by referendum, 1978

PM Mustafa Khalil, Oct 1978-May 1980

designated PM by Pres Sadat

new political parties, (for ex. NDP Sadat)

multiparty legislative election, 1979

Pres Hosni Mubarak, 1981-

Sadat assassinated, Oct 1981,

vice-Pres Mubarak elected 6-year term,

reelected Oct 1987, July 1993 and 1999

PM Ahmad Fuad Muhi al-Din, Jan 1982-June 1984

multiparty legislative elections 1984

PM Kamal Hasan Ali Lufti, Jun 1984-Nov 1986

multiparty legislative election May 1984

PM Atif Muhamed Sidai, Nov 1986-Jan 1996

multiparty legislative election, April 1987,

Nov-Dec 1990 (opposition boycott), Nov-Dec 1995

PM Kamal Ahmed al-Gauzouri, Jan 1996-

II.17. Equatorial Guinea.

Independence 12 October 1968

Pres Macias Nguema, 1968-1979

multiparty election, Sept 1968

Pres election 29 Sept 1968

one-party system introduced, Feb 1970

" Pres for live ", July 1972

new constitution = Pres regime, 1973

HS (Col) Obiang Mbasogo, 1979-1989

military takeover, 3 Aug 1979

new constitution after referendum, Aug 1982

plebescitary one-party legislative elections,
Aug 1983, July 1988

Pres Obiang Mbasogo, 1989-

elected Pres (first time popularly), Jun 1989

transition to multiparty system since nov 1993

multiparty legislative elections, 21 Nov 1993,
(opposition boycott)

PM Sylvestre Siale Bileka, Dec 1993-March 1996

Obiang popularly elected Pres, Feb 1996

PM Angel Sarafin Seriche Dougan, March 1996-

II.18. Eritrea.

Independence 24 May 1993

Pres Issaias Afewerki, 1993-

elected by NA consisting of members of the

EPLF for the period 1993-1997, 8 June 1993

one-party system, other political parties banned

new constitution = Pres system, "conditional "

political pluralism, 23 May 1997

II.19. Ethiopia.

Independent since early times

Emperor Menelik II, 1889-1913

founder of the last dynasty

Emperor Lij Iyasu, 1913-1916

succession

Empress (Regent) Zawditu, 1916-1930

succession

Emperor Haile Selassie I, 1930-1974

succession

HS (Gen) Aman Andom, 1974

military takeover, 12 Sept 1974, Andom

chairman PMAC (provisional military
administrative council)

HS (Gen) Teferi Benti, 1974-1977

Andom executed in purge, Nov 1974,

succeeded by Benti as chairman PMAC, power
actually held by vice chairman Mengistu

HS (Col) Mengistu Haile Mariam, 1977-1987

Benti executed in purge, Feb 1977,

succeeded by Mengistu

one-party system, 1978

Pres Mengistu Haile Mariam, 1987-1991

one-party plebescitary legislative election,

June 1987, Mengistu elected Pres by NA,

Interim Pres Meles Zenawi, 1991-1995

Sept 1987

civil war, Mengistu deposed, 21 May 1991
Zenawi elected by Council of
representatives, July 1991

New constitution (Federal Democratic
Republic) and multiparty system introduced,
1994, constituent assembly 90% dominated
by Zenawi's party (RDF), opposition boycott
multiparty legislative election, June 1994

Pres Negaso Gidada, 1995

elected non-executive Pres by NA, Aug 1995

PM Meles Zenawi, 1995

multiparty legislative election (won by
Zenawi's alliance), May 1995 (opposition
boycot)

II.20. Gabon.

Self-government Nov 1958, Independence 17 Aug 1960

PM Leon Mba, 1959-1960

multiparty election, July 1958

Pres Leon Mba, 1961-1964

elected by NA, 1961

Pres Jean Aubame, Feb 1964

military takeover, Feb 1964

Pres Leon Mba, 1964-1967

re-instated (French military intervention),
Feb 1964

legislative elections, April 1964, de facto
one-party system, opposition outlawed

reelected Pres 2nd 7-year term, March 1967

one-party plebiscitary legislative election,
March 1967

Pres Omar Bongo, 1967-

vice-Pres when Mba died, 29 Nov 1967

one-party (PDG) system introduced, 1968

one-party plebiscitary legislative election,

1969, 1973, 1980, 1985

Bongo elected Pres unopposed, Nov 1986,

Feb 1973, Dec 1979, Nov 1986

National Conference, 27 March-21 April 1990

multiparty system restored, 1990

PM Osimir Oye Mba, Nov 1990-Sept 1994

multiparty legislative election, Nov 1990, won
by PDG (Bongo)

French military intervention, 1990

multiparty legislative election 1991, 1996

Bongo popularly elected, 5 Dec 1993

(election 1993 not free and fair)

PM Paulin Gbame-Nguema, Sept 1994 - ?

PM Jean-François Ntoutoume-Emane ?

multiparty legislative election, Dec 1996

Bongo popularly reelected Pres, Dec 1998

II.21. Gambia.

Independence 18 February 1965, constitutional monarchy (British Crown) until 1970
PM Dawda Jawara, 1965-1970
Pres Dawda Jawara, 1970-1994

(Capt) Yaya Jammeh, 1994-1996
Pres Yaya Jammeh, 1996-

multiparty legislative election, 1962
change to republic, 24 April 1970
multiparty legislative election, 1972, 1977
reelected Pres by NA
multiparty legislative election, May 1982
reelected Pres (first time popularly), May 1982
multiparty legislative election and Pres election, March 1987, Jun 1992
military takeover, July 1994, military rule
multiparty system restored,
Jammeh popularly elected, 26 Sept 1996 (election not free and fair)
new constitution, Jan 1997
multiparty legislative election, Jan 1997

II.22. Ghana.

Self-government 1952, Independence 6 March 1957, constitutional monarchy until 1960
PM Kwame Nkrumah, 1952-1960
Pres Kwame Nkrumah, 1960-1966
HS (Gen) Joseph Ankrah, 1966-1969
HS (Brig) Akwasi Afrifa, 1969-1970
PM Kofi Busia, 1969-1972
Pres Akufo-Addo, 1970-1972
HS (Gen) Ignatius Acheampong, 1972-1978
HS (Gen) William Akuffo, 1978-1979
HS (Flt-Lt) Jerry Rawlings, 1979
Pres Hilla Limann, 1979-1981
HS (Flt-Lt) Jerry Rawlings, 1981-1992

multiparty elections, 1951, 1954, 1956
new constitution before 1954 elections
change to republic, 1 July 1960
single-party introduced, 1964
military takeover, 24 Feb 1966
chairman of national liberation council
no-party rule, 1966-1969
predecessor resigned, civilian rule restored
Afrifa heads collegiate presidency
multiparty legislative election, Aug 1969
elected by NA as non-executive Pres, Aug 1970
military takeover, January 1972
chairman of national redemption council,
replaced by supreme military council (SMC),
13 Jan 1972 - 5 July 1978
no-party rule, 1972-1979 (parties banned)
military power struggle, chairman of SMC,
5 July 1978 - 4 June 1979
military revolt, 4 June 1979
Acheampong, Afrifa and Akuffo executed
civilian rule restored by Rawlings
multiparty legislative, June 1979
Limann popularly elected Pres, Sept 1979
military takeover, 31 Dec 1981
political parties banned, no-party system
Lybian state model (Jamahiriya-state)

Pres Jerry Rawlings, 1992-

Provisional National Defense Council
(highest authority) and local committees
for the defense of the Revolution
multiparty system restored, 1992
multiparty legislative election, Nov 1992,
Dec 1996
Rawlings popularly elected Nov 1992,
Dec 1996 (both fairly free and fair,
multiple candidates)

II.23. Guinea.

Independence 2 October 1958

Pres Ahmed Sekou Touré, 1958-1984

multiparty election, 1957
single-party system introduced, 1958
Touré chosen Pres by NA, 2 Oct 1958
plebiscitary one-party legislative election,
1963, 1968, 1974, Jan 1980
reelected 5th time unopposed, 14 May 1982

Pres Lansana Beavogui, 1984

HS (Gen) Lansana Conté, 1984-1993

PM Diara Traoré, 1984-1985

Pres Lansana Conté, 1993-

Touré died in March, succeeded by PM Beauvogui
military takeover, nov 1984, single-party retained
jailed and died in 1986
multiparty system introduced, 1993
Conté popularly elected, 19 Dec 1993,
(not free and fair), 14 Dec 1998
multiparty legislative election, June 1995

II.24. Guinea-Bissau.

Independence 10 September 1974

Pres Luiz de Almeida Cabral, 1974-1980

PM Mendes, 1974-1978

PM (Gen) Joao Vieira, 1978-1980

HS (Gen) Joao Vieira, 1980-1994

elected by PIAGC Congress,
one-party system
one-party legislative election, Dec 1976
one-party legislative election, 1978,
Cabral reelected Pres, 1978
military takeover, Nov 1980, Pres of the
council of the state, head of government
one-party system retained
new constitution post PM abolished and
one-party legislative election, May 1984,
June 1989
Vieira elected Pres by party, May 1984,
June 1989

PM Carlos Correia, Dec 1991-Dec 1998

Pres Joao Vieira, 1994 -

PIAGC agrees with multiparty system
multiparty system since 1994,
multiparty legislative election, July 1994,

Dec 1998 (free and fair, intern. observers)
Vieira popularly elected Pres,
July- Aug 1994, Dec 1998

PM Francisco José Fadul, Dec 1998-

II.25. Kenya.

Self-government June 1963, Independence 12 December 1963, Constitutional monarchy
1963-1964 British Crown

PM Jomo Kenyatta, 1963-1964

new constitution, April 1963
multiparty legislative election, May 1963,
victory KANU (Kenya African National Union)
change to republic, 12 Dec 1964, Pres system
single-party (KANU) system evolved,
KADU merged in KANU, 10 Nov 1964
one-party competitive legislative election,
1969 and 1974

Pres Jomo Kenyatta, 1964 -1978

Kenyatta died 11 August 1978
NA elected vice-Pres Moi, Oct 1978
legislative election, Nov 1979
Moi elected Pres 5-year term, 8 Nov 1979
one-party system formalized, 1982
one-party legislative election, Sept 1983
Moi reelected unopposed, 26 Sept 1983
one-party legislative and Pres election,
Feb-March 1988
multiparty system restored, Dec 1991
Moi popularly elected, 29 Dec 1992
multiparty legislative election, 95 KANU
/183 seats (not free and fair)
multiparty legislative and Pres elections,
Dec 1997 (not free and fair)

Pres Daniel Arap Moi, 1978-

II.26. Lesotho.

Self-government May 1965, Independence 4 October 1966, constitutional monarchy, PM
responsible to NA

King Moshoesoe II, 1966-1990

succession, inaugurated 12 March 1960
Moshoesoe II dethroned by military rulers,
13 Nov 1990

King Letsie III, 1990-1995

King Moshoesoe II, 1995-1996

reinstated by civilian rulers, 25 Jan 1995,
died in motoraccident, 15 Jan 1996

King Letsie III, 1996-

second succession, inaugurated, Feb 1996
multiparty legislative election, April 1965
de facto single-party system evolved
abortive legislative elections and civilian
coup, 1970 (state of emergency)

PM Leabua (Chief) Jonathan, 1965-1986

HS (Gen) Metsing Lekhanya, 1986-1991	abortive legislative elections, 1985 nominees elected unopposed military takeover, 20 Jan 1986, chairman military council, all executive and legislative powers vested to the King
HS (Col) Elias Ramaema, 1991-1993	military takeover, Lekhanya deposed, 30 April 1991
PM Ntsu Mokhehle, April 1993-May 1998	multiparty civilian rule restored, Mokhehle's Congress Party won legislative election, March 1993, (free and fair)
PM Mosisili, May 1998-	multiparty legislative elections, 23 May 1998

II.27. Liberia.

Independence 26 July 1847. Its constitution based on that of the US, the country had been ruled by 17 executive presidents prior to Pres Tubman's term. The first was Pres Joseph J. Roberts, 1848 -1856.

Pres William V S Tubman, 1944 -1971	presidential elections (every 4 years) from 1943
Pres William R Tolbert, 1971-1980	vice-Pres when Tubman died, elected 1971, 1975
HS (Sgt) Samuel Doe, 1980-1985	military takeover, April 1980 (Tolbert killed), People's Redemption Council
Pres Samuel Doe, 1985-1990	regulated multiparty system introduced, 1985 multiparty legislative and Pres elections, Oct 1985
Interim Pres Amos Saywer, 1990-1994	elected at peace conference, Sept 1990 Doe killed in civil war (10 Sept 1990)
Council of state, 1994-1997	collegiate presidency composed of leaders various armed groups
Pres Charles Taylor, 1997-	multiparty system restored, 1997 multiparty legislative election, 19 July 1997 Taylor popularly elected Pres, 19 July 1997

II.28. Lybia.

Independence 24 Dec 1951

King Idris I, 1951-1969

King Idris I, 1951-1969	traditional ruler (Amir) since 1921 several PM's, 1951-1969 " multiparty " elections, 1952, 1960, 1965 de facto politicians elected on personal basis
HS (Col) Muammar al-Qaddafi, 1969-	military takeover, Sept 1969 Revolutionary Commando Council highest authority, no division of power, Dec 1969, ASU sole authorized political party, Jun 1971, GNC first session in Jan 1976, later became the GPC ASU mass-organisation and cultural revolution, 1973 Non-party system since 1977, Lybia's name changed in " Socialist People's Libyan Arab

"Jamahirya", March 1977 Qaddafi elected by GPC
as revolutionary leader of the new state

II.29. Madagascar.

Self-government Oct 1958, Independence 26 June 1960

PM Philibert Tsirinana, 1957-1959 multiparty election, 1957 Tsirinana vice-Pres
executive council

Pres Philibert Tsirinana, 1959-1972 elected by NA, May 1959
popularly re-elected 1965, 1972
de facto one-party system, PSD (Tsirinana)
104 of 107 seats in the First Chamber and 52
of 54 seats in Second Chamber

HS (Gen) Gabriel Ramanantsoa, 1972-1975 Civil strife/military takeover, May 1972
confirmed 5-year term referendum Oct 1972
legislative election (?), Oct 1973

HS (Col) Richard Ratsimandrava, 1975 predecessor resigned, Feb 1975

HS (Gen) Gilles Andria Mahazo, 1975 predecessor assassinated, Feb 1975,
National Military Directorate

Pres (Lt-Cdr) Didier Ratsiraka, 1975-1993 appointed by army, 15 June 1975 elected
under one-party system,
Libyan state-model, 1976

PM Rakotonaina, ?-July 1977

PM Kakotoarijaona, July 1977-Feb 1988 one-party legislative election, Jun 1977
reelected Pres 7-year term, 7 Nov 1982
one-party legislative election, Aug 1983

PM Ramahatra, Feb 1988-Aug 1991

PM Razanamasy, Aug 1991-Jun 1993

National Conference, new constitution after
referendum and multiparty system restored,
Aug 1992

multiparty legislative election, Jun 1993

Pres Albert Zafy, 1993-1996

Zafy popularly elected Pres, 28 Feb 1993

PM Francisque Ravony, Aug 1993-Sept 1995 elected by NA

PM Rakotovahiny, Sept 1995-May 1996 appointed by Pres after constitutional
amendment, referendum

Interim Pres and PM Ratsirahonana, 1996 Zafy impeached by Constitutional Court,
5 Sept 1996

Pres Didier Ratsiraka, 1997

popularly elected Pres, Dec 1996

PM Pascal Rakotomavo, Feb 1997-July 1998

PM Tantely Andrianarivo, July 1998-

multiparty legislative election, 17 May 1998
proposal for mixed system single-seat
constituencies and a form of PR (2-member)

II.30. Malawi.

Self-government Jan 1963, Independence 6 July 1964, constitutional monarchy (British Crown) until 1966
 PM Kamazu Banda, 1964-1966 Feb 1963 multiparty legislative election, 1961, became PM
 Pres Kamazu Banda, 1966-1994 new constitution = change to republic and Pres system, 6 July 1966
 one-party system (MCP) introduced, 1966
 Banda " Pres for life ", July 1971
 one-party competitive legislative election, May 1978, June 1992
 Pres Bakili Muluzi, 1994 - multiparty system restored after referendum and new constitution, 14 Jun 1993
 Muluzi (UDP) popularly elected, May 1994
 multiparty legislative election, May 1994
 single ballot iso multiple ballot electoral system, June 1998

II.31. Mali.

Self-government 1958, Mali Federation with Senegal (4 April 1959 - 20 August 1960), Independent 20 June 1960 as member of Mali federation, separate independence 22 September 1960
 Pres Modiba Keita, 1960-1968 Pres Mali Federation, April 1959-Sept 1960
 one-party system introduced, Sept 1960
 plebiscitary legislative election, 1964, 1965
 HS (Gen) Moussa Traoré, 1968-1979 military takeover, Nov 1968, chairman of Comité Militaire de Libération Nationale
 period of military rule, political parties banned, 1968-1979
 new constitution after referendum, 1974
 one-party system restored, March 1979
 plebiscitary one-party legislative election, June 1979, June 1982
 Pres Moussa Traoré, 1979-1991 Traoré elected Pres/PM unopposed, Jun 1979
 Traoré reelected Pres unopposed, June 1985
 one-party legislative election, June 1988
 HS (Col) Amadou Toumani Touré, 1991-1992 military takeover, 25 March 1991
 National Conference and
 multiparty system introduced, 1991
 new constitution after referendum, Jan 1992
 multiparty legislative election, Feb-March 1992, July-Aug 1997
 Pres (Col) Alpha Oumar Konaré, 1992- popularly elected 26 April 1992,
 re-elected Pres 11 May 1997

II.32. Mauritania.

Self-gouvernement 1958, Independence 28 November 1960
 PM Moktar Ould Daddah, June 1959-Aug 1960 parliamentary system
 Pres Moktar Ould Daddah, 1960-1978 multiparty election, Jun 1959
 new constitution = Pres system, May 1961
 one-party system evolved from 1961
 one-party system, 1964
 one-party plebiscitary legislative elections,
 1966, 1971, 1975

HS (Col) Ould Mohammed Salek, 1978-1979 military takeover, 10 July 1978, Pres of
 Comité Militaire de Redressement National (CMRN)

PM (Lt-Col) Ahmed Ould Bouceif, 1979 PM, 6 April-27 May 1979 (died, aeroplane crash)

PM (Lt-Col) Mohammed Khouna Haidalla, 1979 PM appointed by Salek, 31 May 1979

HS (Lt-Col) Mahmoud Ould Louly, 1979-1980 military power struggle, Jun 1979
 Salek forced to resigne by CMSN (formerly CMRN)

HS (Lt-Col) Khouna Ould Haidalla, 1980-1984 military power struggle,
 Louly deposed 4 Jan 1980, Haidalla
 chairman CMSN, HS and Pres

HS (Lt-Col) Sid'Ahmed Ould Taya, 1984 - 1992 military power struggle , Haidallah
 deposed, Taya chairman CMSN

Pres (Lt-Col) Sid'Ahmed Ould Taya, 1992-
 multiparty system restored, 1992
 Taya popularly elected Pres, Jan 1992
 multiparty legislative elections, March
 1992

PM Boubacar, ?-Jan 1996 multiparty legislative elections, Oct 1996

PM Cheikh el Avia Ould Mohamed Khama, Jan 1996-
 Taya popularly reelected Pres, Dec 1997

II.33. Mauritius.

Self-government 1967, Independence 12 March 1968, constitutional monarchy (...-1992)
 Queen Elisabeth II, 1968-1992 represented by governor's-general

PM Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, 1967-1982 multiparty legislative elections 1967,
 Dec 1976

PM Anerood Jugnauth, 1982-1995 leader election-winning coalitions,
 multiparty legislative elections Jun 1982,
 Aug 1983, Aug 1987, Sept 1991

Pres Cassam Uteem, 1992-
 Change to republic, 12 March 1992
 non-executive president, elected by NA

PM Navin Ramgoolam, 1995-
 Ramgoolam's alliance won multiparty
 legislative election, Dec 1995
 Uteem reelected Pres by NA (5-year term)
 majoritarian electoral system, proposal
 considering the adoption of PR-system,
 Oct 1998

Assembly, Feb 1990
popularly elected Pres, Dec 1994
multiparty legislative election, Dec 1994

II.37. Niger.

Self-government Dec 1958, Independence 3 August 1960
PM Hamani Diori, Dec 1958-Aug 1960 multiparty legislative election, 1958
one-party system introduced, 1959
Pres Hamani Diori, 1960-1974 elected Pres by NA, 1960
one-party system introduced, 1960
one-party plebiscitary legislative election, 1965, 1970
Diori reelected Pres by party, 1965, 1970
newly created post of PM
PM Oumarou Mamane, Jan-Nov 1974 military takeover, 15 April 1974, Kountché
HS (Gen) Senyi Kountché, 1974 -1987 Hs and Pres of Supreme Military Council
newly created post PM
PM Oumarou Mamane, Jan-Nov 1983
PM Hamid Algabid, Nov 1983-1987
HS (Col) Ali Saibou, 1987-1993
Koutché died (19 Nov 1987),
army appointed Saibou HS and Pres of SMC
PM Oumarou Mamane, July 1988-Dec 1989
one-party legislative election, Dec 1989
Saibou popularly elected Pres, Dec 1989
PM Mahamidou, March 1990- ?
Pres Mahamane Ousmane, 1993-1996
National Conference, July 1992
multiparty system introduced
multiparty legislative election, Feb 1993
Ousmane popularly elected Pres,
March 1993
PM Mahamadou Issoufou, April 1993-Sept 1994
multiparty legislative election, 1995
PM Hama Amadou, Feb 1995- ?
HS (Col) Ibrahim Barre Mainassara, 1996 military takeover, 27 Jan 1996
Pres Ibrahim Barre Mainassara, 1996-1999 multiparty system restored,
multiparty legislative election, Nov 1996
(relatively free and fair)
Mainassara popularly elected Pres , July 1996
Mainassara died in April, 1999
Wanké chairman military council (CRN),
CRN was established to exercise executive
and legislative authority during a 9-month
transitional period prior to the restoration
restoration of elected organs of government.

II. 38. Nigeria.

Self-government 1954, Independence 1 October 1960, constitutional monarchy (British crown) until 1963, Republic since 1963

- PM Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, 1957-1966 appointed PM, Aug 1957, multiparty legislative election, 1957
first federal legislative election, Dec 1959
coalition government Azikiwe's NCNC and Balewa's NPC
constitutional monarchy, represented by Governor-General Azikiwi
- Pres Nnamde Azikiwe, 1963-1966 change to federal republic, 1 Oct 1963,
Azikiwe elected by NA (non-executive Pres)
multiparty legislative election, 1964
- HS (Gen) Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi, 1966 military takeover, 15 Jan 1966 (Balewa killed)
no-party rule 1966-1979
- HS (Gen) Yakubu Gowon, 1966-1975 military power struggle, July 1966 (Ironsi killed)
- HS (Gen) Murtala Mohammed, 1975-1976 military power struggle 29 July 1975,
Gowon disposed, Murtala Chief of supreme military council
- HS (Gen) Olusegun Obasanjo, 1976-1979 Murtala assassinated, 13 Feb 1976,
army appointed Obasanjo (Chief of Staff)
political parties allowed after 12-year old state of emergency, Sept 1978
new constitution, Sept 1978
- Pres Shehu Shagari, 1979-1983 multiparty civilian rule restored,
Multiparty legislative elections, July 1979
Shagari popularly elected Pres, Aug 1979
multiparty legislative and Pres elections, Aug 1983
- HS (Gen) Muhammed Buhari, 1983-1985 military takeover, Dec 1983
all parties banned
- HS (Gen) Ibrahim Babangida, 1985-1993 military power struggle, Aug 1985
(Buhari disposed), transition to multiparty (13 parties) civilian rule, 1986-1993
de facto 2 party system (SPD, NRC) imposed since 1989, multiparty legislative elections, June 1992 and Pres elections, 12 June 1993 (declared void)
- Interim Pres Ernest Shonekan, 1993 Babangida handed power to civilian cabinet, 27 August 1993
- HS (Gen) Sani Abacha, 1993-1998 Shonekan forced to resign, Abacha (defense minister) assumed power, 17 Nov 1993
Abacha popularly elected Pres, 27 Feb 1999
multiparty legislative election, Dec 1997
- HS (Gen) Abubakar, June 1998-Feb 1999 Abacha died on 8 June 1998

Pres Olusegun Obasanjo, May 1999

Abubakar handed power to Obasanjo

II.39. Rwanda.

Self-government 1961, Independence 1 July 1962

PM Gregoire Kayibanda, 1960-1962

multiparty election, June 1960

self-proclaimed republic 28 Jan 1961

Pres Gregoire Kayibanda, 1962-1973

multiparty election, Sept 1961 under

UN auspices, Republic after referendum

multiparty legislative elections 1965, 1969

de facto one-party regime, MDR all 47 seats NA

Kayibanda reelected Pres, 1969

HS (Gen) Juvenal Habyarimana, 1973-1978

military takeover, 5 July 1973

one-party system (MRND), 1978

new constitution after referendum, 1978

reelected Pres unopposed, 1978, Dec 1983

one-party legislative election, Dec 1981,

Dec 1983

Pres Juvenal Habyarimana, 1978-1994

reelected unopposed (3rd time), Dec 1988

one-party legislative election, 19 Dec 1988

won by MNRP (Habyarimana)

Tutsi rebel (FP) attack 30 Sept-1 Oct 1990

multipartysystem reintroduced, 1991

PM Sylvestre Nsanzimana, Oct 1991-April 1992 newly created post PM

PM Dismas Nsengiyaremye, April 1992-April 1994

Arusha agreement ignored by extremist's
on both sides, 1993

Habyarimana killed (6 April 1994), civil war

Pres Pasteur Bizimungu, July 1994 -

Bizimungu elected by coalition government,

July 1994 (Kagama vice-Pres and defense)

PM Faustin Twagiramungu, July 1994 -1995

installed by FP, leader gov, "national unity",
deposed on 28 Aug, fled country 13 Sept 1995

PM Pierre Célestin Rigyema, Aug 1995-

II.40. São Tomé and Príncipe.

Independence 12 July 1975

Pres Manuel Pinto da Costa, 1975-1991

elected by liberation movement, Dec 1975

PM da Cunha Lisboa Trovoada, 1975-1979

jailed by Pres, post PM abolished, 1979

new constitution = one-party and

Pres system, 1982

PM Celestino Rochas da Costa, Jan 1988-Jan 1991

PM appointed by Pres

multiparty system, new constitution after
referendum, May 1990

PM Daio, 1991

multiparty legislative elections Jan 1991,

transitional government, Jan-April 1991

Pres Miguel Trovoada, 1991-

Trovoada popularly elected Pres unopposed,

March 1991, da Costa retired
 PM Norberto Costa Alegre, May 1991-July 1994
 multiparty legislative election, Oct 1994,
 PM Armando Vaz d'Almeida, Dec 1995-Dec 1998
 Re-elected Pres July 1996 (multicandidate)
 PM Guilherme Posser da Costa, Dec 1998

II.41. Senegal.

Self-government 1958, Member Mali Federation 14 April 1959-20 August 1960,
 Independent as member of Mali-Federation, June 1960, seceded 20 August 1960,
 separate independence 5 September 1960

Léopold Sédar Senghor, 1959-1960

Pres Federal Assembly, Mali Federation
 elected by NA as president of Senegal,
 5 Sept 1960

Pres Léopold Sédar Senghor, 1960-1980

PM Mamadou Dia, 1960-1962

Sept 1960, multiparty system,
 French military intervention, 1962
 single-party system evolved from 1963
 Pres election, Dec 1963
 multiparty legislative election, 1963
 new constitution 1963, post PM abolished
 one-party system, 1966

PM Abdou Diouf, 1970- ?

post PM reinstated, 1970
 Dia reelected Pres unopposed
 one-party plebiscitary elections 1968, 1973
 multiparty system restored, 1976 -1978
 Senghor reelected Pres 4th 5-year term,
 Feb 1978 (2 candidates)
 multiparty (3 parties) legislative election,
 Feb 1978

Pres Abdou Diouf, 1981-

Senghor retired, 31 Dec 1980, succeeded by
 PM Diouf, popularly elected 1983, 1988, 1993

PM Habib Thiam, ?-1983

multiparty legislative election, Feb 1983,
 Feb 1988, May 1993, May 1998

PM Habib Thiam, April 1991-July 1998

post PM abolished, 1983

PM Mamadou Lamine Loum, July 1998-

post PM reinstated

II.42. Seychelles.

Self-government 1974, Independence 29 June 1976

Pres James Mancham, 1976-1977

multiparty legislative election, 1974
 Mancham Pres Jun 1976-Jun 1977

PM Albert René, 1976-1977

opposition leader

Pres Albert René, 1977-

seized power, 5 June 1977,

one-party system and Pres system after
 new constitution, 26 March 1979

one-party legislative election, June 1979
 René reelected Pres unopposed, June 1979,
 17 June 1984, June 1989
 multiparty system restored, 1992
 multiparty legislative election, July 1993,
 March 1998
 René popularly elected Pres, July 1993,
 March 1998

II.43. Sierra Leone.

Self-government 1958, Independence 27 April 1961, constitutional monarchy (British Crown) until 1971

PM Milto Margai, 1958-1964 multiparty legislative election 1956, May 1962
 de facto 2 party system : People's Party (SLPP, Margai)

PM Albert Margai, 1964 -1967

PM Siaka Stevens, 1967

and All People's Congress (APC, Stevens)
 predecessor (half-brother) died in April
 multiparty legislative election, March 1967
 SLPP and APC both 32 seats

HS (Col) Andrew Juxon-Smith, 1967-1968

military takeover, 21 March 1967
 chairman of National Reformation Council
 no-party system 1967-1968

PM Siaka Stevens, 1968-1971

Pres Siaka Stevens, 1971-1985

army restored civilian rule, April 1968
 change to republic, 19 April 1971
 multiparty legislative election, May 1973,
 May 1977 (opposition boycott)
 new constitution = one-party system
 (APC) and Pres regime, May 1978
 Stevens reelected unopposed, 1976
 reinvested new 7-year term, 1978

Pres (Gen) Joseph Momoh, 1985-1992

Stevens retired, party elected Momoh, Aug 1985
 one-party legislative election, May 1986

HS (Capt) Valentine Strasser, 1992-1996

military takeover, April 1992

HS (Gen) Julius Maada Bio, 1996

military takeover, Jan 1996
 multiparty system restored, 1996

Pres Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, 1996-1997

Kabbah popularly elected, March 1996
 (multicandidate)
 multiparty legislative election, Feb 1996

HS (Maj) John Paul Koromah, May 1997-March 1998

military takeover, 24 May 1997

Pres Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, March 1998-

ECOMOG-intervention, Kabbah reinstated

II.44. Somalia.

Unification of Italian and British Somaliland on independence, 1 July 1960

Pres Abdullah Osman, 1961-1967

elected by NA

PM Ali Shirmarke, 1960-1964

multiparty legislative elections, 1959/60,
 May 1964

PM Abdar-Razak Hussein, 1964 -1967	Shirmarke replaced after party split
Pres Ali Shirmarke, 1967-1969	elected Pres by NA, June 1967
PM Ibrahim Egal, 1967-1969	PM appointed by Pres
HS (Gen) Siyad Barre, 1969-1980	Shirmarke assassinated, military takeover, Oct 1969
	military rule, no-party system
	one-party system, July 1976
	one-party legislative election, 30 Dec 1979
Pres Siyad Barre, 1980-1991	People's Assembly elected Barre as Pres, Jan 1980, single-party system from 1980
	one-party legislative election, 31 Dec 1984
	first direct Pres election, Barre reelected unopposed, 23 Dec 1986
Interim Pres Ali Madhi Mohammed, 1991-	civil war, Barre defeated, 27 Jan 1991
Somalia has practically been without a central government since 1991.	
Pres Madhi has not been generally recognized as a head of state.	

II. 45. South Africa.

British Dominion status, 31 May 1910, followed by sovereign independence in 1931
 From 1910 until the adoption of a republican constitution, 31 May 1961, SA was first subject to the British government and later, as an independent state, shared the British Crown, while successive governors-general represented the monarch. From 1961, 5 non-executive presidents succeeded each other as heads of state until a new constitution introducing an executive presidency, took effect on 3 September 1984. Prior to the era of legislated apartheid, Gen Louis Botha (1910-1919), Gen J.C. Smuts (1919-1924, 1939-1948) and Gen J.B.M. Herzog (1924 -1939) served as executive heads of government (PM). The executive PM's of the apartheid era were the leaders of the National Party: Dr D.F. Malan (1948-1954), J.G. Strijdom (1954 -1958), Dr H.F. Verwoerd (1958-1966), B.J. Vorster (1966-1978) and P.W. Botha (1978-1984). During the period 1910-1984, the franchise in the traditional multiparty system was, most of the time, limited to the white minority. As from 1984, the Asian and coloured minorities were granted representation, on a group basis, in a tricameral parliament.

P.W. Botha, 1984 -1989	elected Pres by parliament, 5 Sept 1984
F.W. de Klerk, 1989-1994	Botha resigned, 15 Aug 1989, parliament elected de Klerk after general election, Sept 1989

The interim constitution of 1994 introduced a fundamental system change by extending the franchise to all citizens. It also provided for the reincorporation and reintegration of the so-called independent republics of Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, Transkei and Venda, which had formerly been part of SA, and for the re-integration of the six-selfgoverning black states into the SA government structures. The 1994 constitution took effect on 27 April 1994, the first day of the freedom election, following intense multiparty negotiations after Pres de Klerk, on 2 Feb 1990, had envisaged the eventual transfer of power to a democratically elected, power-sharing government.

Pres Nelson R Mandela, 1994 -1999 elected by NA following ANC election victory,
26 April 1994, inaugurated 10 May 1994 to head a GNU
Pres Thabo Mbeki, 1999- elected by NA following ANC election victory

II.46. Sudan.

Self-government Jan 1954, Independence 1 Jan 1956, parliamentary republic
A collegiate presidency (committee) performed the functions of head of state from
1956 to 1969 and again from 1986 to 1989

PM Ismail al-Azhari, 1954-1956 multiparty legislative election, Jan 1954
PM Abdallah Khalil, 1956-1958 Azhari defeated in NA
HS (Gen) Ibrahim Abboud, 1958-1964 military takeover, Nov 1958
Interim PM al-Khatim al-Khalifa, 1964 -1965 general strike/civ. rule restored, Oct 1964
PM Mohammed Mahgoub, 1965-1966 multiparty legislative election, June 1965
Pres Ismail al-Azhari, 1965-1969
PM Sadiq al-Madhi, 1966-1967 Maghoub defeated in NA
PM Mohammed Maghoub, 1967-1969 Madhi defeated in NA
PM Abubakr Awadallah, 1969
HS (Col) Gaafar al-Nimeiri, 1969-1971 military takeover, May 1969
Pres (Gen) Gaafar al-Nimeiri, 1971-1985 Numeiri elected Pres by party, Sep 1971
one-party system, Oct 1971
new constitution = Pres regime, 1973
one-party legislative election, May 1974,
Feb 1978, May 1980, Oct 1981
plebescitary Pres election, April 1983
reelected unopposed 3rd term
HS (Gen) Sowar al-Dahab, 1985-1986 military takeover, 6 April 1985
chairman Transitional Military Council
PM Sadiq al-Madhi, 1986-1989 civilian rule restored, collegiate presidency
multiparty legislative election, April 1986
victory Umma-party Madhi
HS (Gen) Omar Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir, 1989-1996 military takeover, June 1989,
transition to civilian rule from 1993
Pres Omar Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir, 1996 Bashir popularly elected Pres, March 1996
multiparty legislative election, March 1996

II.47. Swaziland.

Self-government April 1967, Independence 6 Sept 1968
Traditionally, Swaziland has a dual monarchy, comprising the Queen Mother and her
son, the King. The modern constitution, adopted in 1978, vests the King with real
executive authority in a non-party system.

King Sobhuza II, 1968-1982 succession, inaugurated, Dec 1921
PM Prince Makhosini Dlamini, 1967-March 1976 multiparty legislative election,
April 1967, PM appointed by the King
multiparty legislative election, May 1972

PM (Gen) Maphevu Dlamini, March 1976-Oct 1979
 PM Prince Mabandla Dlamini, Oct 1979-March 1983
 Queen regent Dzeliwe, 1982-1983 succeeded on Sobhuza's death, 21 Aug 1982
 Queen Mother Lathwala, 1983- predecessor dismissed (palace coup), Aug 1983
 PM Prince Bhemini Dlamini, March 1983-Oct 1986 legislative election, Nov 1983
 King Mswati III, 1986- succession, inaugurated, 25 April 1986
 PM Sotsha Dlamini, Oct 1986-Oct 1993 legislative election, Nov 1987, Sept 1993
 PM Janeson Mbilini Dlamini, Oct 1993-July 1996
 PM Sibusiso Dlamini, July 1996-Oct 1996 legislative election, Oct 1996

II.48. Tanzania.

Independent 9 Dec 1961 of Tanganyika, Dec 1963 of Zanzibar, Tanganyika joined with Zanzibar to form United Republic of Tanzania in April 1964

PM Julius K Nyerere, 1961-1962 multiparty legislative election, 1960
 PM, May 1961-Jan 1962
 PM Rashidi M. Kawa, 1962 PM, Jan - Dec 1962
 multiparty legislative election, Nov 1962
 Pres Julius K Nyerere, 1962-1985 change to republic, 9 Dec 1962
 one-party (CCM) system from 1965
 Pres election, Sept 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980
 one-party competitive legislative election, Sept 1965, 1970 and 1975
 new constitution = one-party system, Pres nominated by party, popularly elected, 1977

PM Edward Sokoine, ? - Nov 1980

PM Cleopa David Msuya, Nov 1980-Feb 1983

PM Edward Sokoine, Feb 1983-April 1984

PM Salim Ahmed Salim, April 1984 - Oct 1985

Pres Ali Hassan Mwinyi, 1985-1995 Nyerere retired, Nov 1985
 Mwinyi elected Pres by party unopposed,
 reelected unopposed Oct 1990
 one-party legislative election, Oct 1985, Oct 1990

PM Joseph Warioba, Oct 1985-Nov 1990

PM John Malecela, Nov 1990-Nov 1994

multiparty system restored, Jan 1992

PM Cleopa Msuya, Nov 1994 -Oct 1995

Pres Benjamin Mkapa, 1995-

Mwinyi retired (Oct 1995),
 Mkapa (CCM) popularly elected (62%), 1995
 multiparty legislative election, 1995
 (CCM 214/269 seats)

PM Frederick Sumaye, Oct 1995-

II. 49. Togo.

Self-government Oct 1956, Independence 27 April 1960

PM Nicolas Grunitzky, 1958-April 1961 multiparty legislative election, 1958

Pres Sylvanus Olympio, 1960-1963

legislative election, April 1958, Olympio's UT won all seats, opposition candidates disallowed
Olympio elected Pres unopposed, 1960

Pres Nicolas Grunitzky, 1963-1967

military takeover, May 1963, Olympio killed, tried to govern on multiparty base
new legislation elected single list equal representation 4 main parties

HS (Gen) Gnassingbe Eyadema, 1967-1980

military takeover, Jan 1967, Kleber Dadjo chairman of CRN, Eyadema Pres April 1967
period of military rule, 1967-1980, political parties banned

Pres Gnassingbe Eyadema, 1980-

new constitution, constitutional referendum and elected Pres unopposed 1972, Dec 1979 plebiscitary legislative election,
Dec 1979, first elections for 16 years
single-party system from 1979
one-party legislative election, March 1985
French military intervention, 1986
Eyadema elected Pres unopposed, 21 Dec 1986
one-party legislative election, March 1990
National Conference and new constitution after referendum, multiparty system restored,
July-Sept 1991

PM Joseph Kokou Koffigeh, July 1991-Feb 1994

elected by National Conference
Eyadema popularly reelected, 25 Aug 1993 (election 1993 not free and fair, "farce")
multiparty legislative election, Feb 1994 won by opposition

PM Kodjo, April 1994 -March 1999

Eyadema popularly reelected Pres, June 1998 (not free and fair)

PM Eugene Koffi Adegboli, March 1999-

multiparty legislative election, March 1999

II. 50. Tunisia.

Self-government 1954, Independence 20 March 1956, Constituent Assembly elected 25 March 1956

King Mohammed al-Min, 1943-1957

traditional ruler (Bey)

PM Habib Bourguiba, 1956-1957

multiparty legislative election, 25 March, PM installed 11 April, change to republic, 25 April 1957

de facto single-party system evolved since 1956
one-party legislative election, 25 July 1957

Pres Habib Bourguiba , 1957-1987	Pres and one-party legislative election, 1959 new constitution = Pres system, 1 June 1959 Pres and one-party legislative election, 1964, 1969
PM Bahi Ladgham, ?-1970	
PM Hedi Nouria, 1970-1980	Bourguiba " Pres for life ", Nov 1974
PM Mahamed Mzali, 1980-1986	multiparty legislative election, 1 Nov 1981
PM Rachid Sfar, July 1986-1987	multiparty legislative election, Nov 1986 (opposition boycott)
Pres Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, Nov 1987-	Bourguiba retired (Nov), PM Ben Ali assumed presidency, Ben Ali popularly elected unopposed, 1989
PM Hedi Baccouche, Nov 1987-Sept 1989	opposition parties elected to NA for first time in multiparty legislative election, March 1994, following changes to electoral system Ben Ali popularly reelected Pres, March 1994, Oct 1999
PM Hamed Kazoni, Sept 1989-	

II. 51. Uganda.

Self-government March 1962, Independence 9 October 1992	
King Mutesa II, 1962-1963	traditional ruler (Kabaka of Buganda)
PM Milton Obote, 1962-1966	multiparty election, April 1962
Pres Edward Mutesa, 1963-1966	former monarch, change to republic, 9 Oct 1963
Pres Milton Obote, 1966-1971	Obote seized power, Feb 1966, executive Pres Federal system replaced by unitary one Obote designated Pres by NA, April 1966 Republic, Sept 1968 one-party system introduced, Dec 1969
HS (Col) Idi Amin Dada, 1971-1979	military takeover, Jan 1971 no-party system 1971-1979
Pres Yussuf Lule, 1979	Tanzanian invasion, Amin deposed, Jan 1979, army command appointed Lule to head provisional government, April-June 1979
Pres Godfrey Binaisa, 1979-1980	Lule deposed by military, Binaisa chairman of Military Commission of Ugandan National Liberation Front (UNLF) and Pres Jun 1979-May 1980
HS Paulo Muwanga, 1980	Binaisa deposed by military, 12 May 1980 Muwanga chairman UNLF, May-Dec 1980
Pres Milton Obote, 1980-1985	multiparty legislative election, Dec 1980 (first post-Amin legislative election) (Museveni's party NRA only gets 1%)
HS (Gen) Tito Okello, 1985-1986	military takeover, July 1985

Pres Yoweri Museveni, 1986- Museveni's forces seized power, Jan 1986
 PM Samson Kisekka, 1986- Jan 1991 no-party system, 1986
 PM George Adyebo, Jan 1991-Nov 1994 legislative election, Feb 1990 (first since 1980),
 only presidential nominees
 legislative election, March 1994
 PM Kintu Musoke, Nov 1994 - April 1999 new constitution, 1995, no-party system
 Museveni popularly elected Pres, May 1996
 (multicandidate, free and fair)
 legislative election, Jun 1996
 PM Apolo Nbimbambi, April 1999-
 King Ronald Mutebi, 1993- 36th Kabaka of Buganda, no political power
 King Patrick Kaboyo, 1993- Omukama of Toro kingdom, no political power

II.52. Zambia.

Self-government Jan 1964, Independence 24 Oct 1964, republic since independence
 PM Kenneth Kaunda, 1964 multiparty legislative election, Jan 1964
 Pres Kenneth Kaunda, 1964 -1991 multiparty election, 1968, Kaunda nominated Pres
 by NA, re-elected 5-year term, Dec 1968
 one-party system (UNIP) from 1972
 one-party competitive legislative election, 1973,
 Dec 1978
 Kaunda popularly reelected unopposed, 1973,
 Dec 1978, Oct 1983 (5-year terms)
 PM Nalumino Mundia ?-April 1985 appointed by Pres
 PM Kebby Musokotwane, April 1985-March 1988 PM appointed by Pres
 one-party legislative election, Oct 1988
 Kaunda reelected Pres unopposed, Oct 1988
 new constitution = multiparty system, Aug 1991
 Pres Frederick Chiluba, 1991- Pres elections Oct 1991, Chiluba re-elected Pres
 Nov 1996 (multicandidate, free and fair)
 multiparty legislative election Oct 1991, Nov 1996

II.53. Zimbabwe.

Self-government 1923, Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1953-1963,
 Independence 18 April 1980. A multiparty system, dominated by a white minority, had
 been in force since 1924. The PM's of Southern Rhodesia were : Charles Coghlan (1924 -
 1927), H.U Moffat (1927-1933), G. Mitchell (1933), Godfrey Huggins (1933-1953), G.
 Todd (1953-1958), Edgar Whitehead (1958-1962), Winston Field (1962-1964), I.
 Douglas Smith (1964-1979) and, after the internal settlement Abel Muzorewa (1979).
 The PM's of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyassaland (1953-1963) were Godfrey
 Huggins, later Lord Malvern (1953-1956) and Sir Roy Welensky (1956-1963). Less than
 two years after the dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyassaland in 1963
 Southern Rhodesia (Rhodesia), ruled by the Rhodesian Front (RF), unilaterally declared
 itself independent 11 Nov 1965. The Heads of State, following Southern Rhodesia's
 unilateral declaration of independence in 1965, were C du Pont (1965-1976), J Wrathall

(1976-1978) and, after the internal settlement, J Gumedede (1979). The liberation war that followed UDI culminated first, in a settlement between the RF and the " internal " black political parties on 3 March 1978 and an elected government, headed by Bishop Muzorewa, in June 1979, and, secondly, in a settlement between the internal parties and the liberation movements (in exile), in London, on 21 Dec 1979. As a result, Robert Mugabe's Zanu won the non-racial elections held in March 1980, while Ian Smith's RF won all 20 seats reserved for the white minority. The reserved seats were abolished in 1987.

Pres Canaan Banana, 1980-1987

PM Robert G. Mugabe, 1980-1987

elected non-executive Pres by NA, April 1980

multiparty legislative elections, March 1980,
June 1985

De facto 1 party system ZANU-PF (Mugabe)
other parties however tolerated

Banana sworn in second term, April 1986

Banana retired, Dec 1987

Pres Robert G. Mugabe, 1987-

elected (first executive) Pres by parliament,
31 Dec 1987

popularly elected Pres March 1990, March 1996

multiparty legislative elections March 1990,

April 1995 (ZANU-PF won 118/120 seats,

free and fair)

Chapter III

Matrix 1, 2, 3 and 4.

In this chapter we collected a data set about the Index of Democracy (matrix 1), constitutional frameworks (matrix 2), party systems (matrix 3) and electoral systems (matrix 4).

The basis for matrix 1 was the annual "Survey of Freedom" around the world made by Raymond D. Gastil and others, and published by the Freedom House since 1973. We made the indices ourselves for the period prior to 1973. Two dimensions of freedom - political rights and civil liberties - are measured on a seven-point scale, with a rating of 1 indicating the most free and 7 the least free. Countries whose scores average 2.5 or below are considered "free" (f), those scoring 3 to 5.5 "partly free" (pf), and those scoring 5.5 and above "not free" (nf) (Mc Colm et al., 1992 : 51). The "free" rating in the Freedom House Survey is, in our point of view, probably the best available empirical indicator of "liberal democracy". Of course, as with any multipoint scale, there is inevitably an element of arbitrariness in the thresholds used for each category. Yet there is a significant difference even between average scores of 2.5 and 3.

The basis for matrix 2 were the constitutions of the African countries (over time) and relevant literature, such as the Africa Contemporary Record. The following constitutional frameworks can be found in the matrix: (pure) presidential regimes (e), (pure) parliamentary regimes [including non-executive president and constitutional monarchy] (a), monarchy (m) and others (o), such as Head of States in military regimes.

The basis for matrix 3 was relevant literature. The different categories of party systems we used were the no-party system (0), the one-party system (1) and the multiparty system (M).

The basis for matrix 4 was relevant literature and information we found on the internet, especially the ace-project. The different categories of electoral systems we used were the majoritarian electoral system (m), proportional representation or PR (p), semi-proportional representation (s) and others (one-party elections,...) or no elections at all (e).

Chapter IV

Tables with results and comments.

In this chapter one can find the total amount of the different combinations of codes found in the aforementioned matrices.

Table 1 contains the combinations of " Free " with constitutional frameworks, party systems and electoral systems. Table 2 contains the combinations of " Partly Free " with constitutional frameworks, party systems and electoral systems. Table 3 contains the combinations of " Not Free " with constitutional frameworks, party systems and electoral systems. In total, there were 211 years of " Free " democracy, 677 were " Partly Free " and 1825 were " Not Free ".

In table 4 one can find the statistical correlation (in percentages) of the Index of Democracy with constitutional frameworks. Parliamentary systems show greater correlation (55%) than presidential regimes (42.20%) with " Free " democracy. This becomes even more evident when one looks at the bottom of table 4. Parliamentary regimes only represent 17.21%, whereas presidential regimes represent 57.87% of all cases.

In table 5 one can find the statistical correlation (in percentages) of the Index of Democracy with electoral systems. To our great surprise, we found that majoritarian systems show greater correlation (57.82%) with " Free " democracy than PR-systems (23.70%). We do not have a plausible answer for this.

In table 6 one can find the statistical correlation (in percentages) of the Index of Democracy with party systems. Multiparty systems show far greater correlation (87.70%) with " Free " democracy than no-party systems (4.30%) and one-party systems (8%).

Tabel 1. Combinations of " Free " with frameworks, party and electoral systems:

F 211	E 89	0 3	M P S E	0 0 0 3
		1 6	M P S E	0 0 0 6
		M 80	M P S E	34 42 2 2
	A 116	0 0	M P S E	0 0 0 0
		1 11	M P S E	0 0 0 11
		M 105	M P S E	88 8 8 1
	M 0	0 0	M P S E	0 0 0 0
		1 0	M P S E	0 0 0 0
		M 0	M P S E	0 0 0 0
	0 0	0 6	M P S E	0 0 0 6
		1 0	M P S E	0 0 0 0
		M 0	M P S E	0 0 0 0

Table 2. Combinations of "Partly Free" with frameworks, party and electoral systems.

PF 677	E 353	0 38	M P S E	0 1 0 37	
		1 146	M P S E	1 1 0 144	
		M 167	M P S E	131 88 35 13	
		A 160	0 1	M P S E	0 0 0 1
			1 13	M P S E	0 0 0 13
			M 146	M P S E	103 31 8 4
		M 94	0 21	M P S E	21 0 0 0
			1 16	M P S E	0 0 0 16
			M 57	M P S E	57 0 0 0
	0 70	0 33	M P S E	1 0 0 32	
		1 24	M P S E	0 0 0 24	
		M 13	M P S E	8 5 0 0	

Tabel 3. Combinations of "Not Free" with frameworks, party and electoral systems.

NF 1825	E 1128	0 75	M P S E	0 1 74 37
		1 632	M P S E	1 7 0 624
		M 421	M P S E	198 130 62 31
	A 191	0 1	M P S E	0 0 0 1
		1 13	M P S E	0 0 0 13
		M 177	M P S E	109 55 8 5
	M 133	0 56	M P S E	21 0 0 35
		1 16	M P S E	0 0 0 16
		M 61	M P S E	57 0 0 4
	0 373	0 197	M P S E	2 0 0 195
		1 146	M P S E	0 0 0 146
		M 30	M P S E	13 12 2 3

Table 4. Statistic correlation Index of Democracy with Constitutional Frameworks.

	E		A		M		O		total	
F	89	42.20%	116	55.00%	0	0.00%	6	3%	211	100%
	5.67%		24.80%		0.00%		0.92%		7.78%	
PF	353	52.14%	160	23.63%	94	13.88%	70	10%	677	100%
	22.50%		34.26%		41.40%		10.80%		24.96%	
NF	1128	61.80%	191	10.47%	133	7.29%	573	31%	1825	100%
	71.80%		40.90%		58.64%		88.30%		67.27%	
total	1570	57.87%	467	17.21%	227	8%	649	24%	2713	100%
	100%		100%		100%		100%		100%	

Table 5. Statistic correlation Index of Democracy with Electoral systems.

	M		P		S		E		total	
F	122	57.82%	50	23.70%	10	4.74%	29	14%	211	100%
	14.44%		13.12%		11.11%		1.99%		7.60%	
PF	322	43.51%	126	17.00%	8	1.00%	284	38%	740	100%
	38.10%		33.00%		8.90%		19.45%		26.60%	
NF	401	21.98%	205	11.23%	72	3.95%	1147	63%	1825	100%
	47.46%		53.80%		80.00%		78.60%		65.70%	
total	845	30.44%	381	13.72%	90	3%	1460	53%	2776	100%
	100%		100%		100%		100%		100%	

Table 6. Statistic correlation Index of Democracy with Party Systems.

	0		1		M		total	
F	9	4.30%	17	8.00%	185	87.70%	211	100%
	2.30%		1.66%		14.72%		7.90%	
PF	93	13.80%	199	29.50%	383	56.74%	675	100%
	23.80%		19.45%		30.47%		25.27%	
NF	289	16.20%	807	45.21%	689	38.60%	1785	100%
	73.90%		78.88%		54.82%		66.83%	
total	391	14.64%	1023	38.34%	1257	47%	2671	100%
	100%		100%		100%		100%	

Conclusion.

The subject of this thesis is international studies, specifically a study of constitutional frameworks in Africa in the second half of the 20th century, focussing on a statistical correlation between constitutional frameworks, party systems, electoral systems and the Index of Freedom.

The struggle to consolidate new democracies has given rise to a wide-ranging debate about the hard choices concerning democratic political institutions and political markets. According to Stepan and Skach " this literature has produced provocative hypotheses about the effects of institutions on democracy " (Stepan and Skach, 1993: 1). It forms part of the " new institutionalism " literature in comparative politics that holds as a premise that political democracy depends not only on economic and social conditions but also on the design of political institutions (Koelble, 1995: 231-243). " One fundamental political-institutional question that has only received serious scholarly attention concerns the impact of different constitutional frameworks on democratic consolidation. Although the topic has been increasingly debated and discussed, little systematic cross-regional evidence [especially for our field of research : Africa] has been brought to bear on it " (Stepan and Skach, 1993: 1-2).

When subjecting Africa to such a comparative analysis, we have tried to avoid reducing a complex continent to a single, undifferentiated category. Instead, we draw attention to variants of political regime. Therefore, in this thesis, we collected a data set about the Index of Democracy, constitutional frameworks, party systems and electoral systems in Africa since independence. Once the matrices had been composed, we compared them and calculated statistic correlation (in percentages). This long-duration model allowed us to estimate whether African constitutional frameworks, party systems and electoral systems exhibit strong or weak correlation with the Index of Democracy.

In this thesis, we paid particular attention to the dichotomy between (pure) parliamentarism and (pure) presidentialism. Each type has fundamental characteristics, and for the purposes of classification these characteristics are necessary and sufficient. It was not our purpose to weigh the benefits and drawbacks of parliamentarism and presidentialism. Our intention was to report and analyze different sources of data, and we based our case exclusively on statistic correlations between regime type and the record of democratic success or failure.

Our main point is that parliamentary systems show greater correlation (55%) than presidential regimes (42.20%) with " Free " democracy. This becomes even more evident when one looks at the bottom of table 4. Parliamentary regimes only represent 17.21%, whereas presidential regimes represent 57.87% of all cases. Of all 467 parliamentary years, 116 or 24.80% were " Free ", whereas 89 or only 5.67% of all 1570 presidential years were " Free ". We contend that the choice of constitutional frameworks is very crucial for the survival or breakdown of democracy. We thus tested the hypothesis of Linz, Valenzuela, Stepan and Skach, who offer several reasons why parliamentary democracies should prove more durable than presidential ones.

What about the party system and the electoral system? We agree with Horowitz (Horowitz, 1990 : 73-79) and Linz (Linz, 1990 : 85-86) that the study of democratic regimes cannot be separated from the study of electoral systems and party systems. The way both presidential and parliamentary governments function, and ultimately the advantages or shortcomings of both, depend on the entire institutional context. There is no question that electoral systems significantly influence the number of parties in a society, and visa versa.

In table 6 one can find the statistical correlation (in percentages) of the Index of Democracy with party systems. Multiparty systems show far greater correlation (87.70%) with " Free " democracy than no-party systems (4.30%) and one-party systems (8%). Furthermore, 185 or 14.72% of all 1023 multi-party years were " Free ", whereas in no-party systems only 9 or 2.30% and in one-party systems only 17 or 1.66% were " Free ".

In table 5 one can find the statistical correlation (in percentages) of the Index of Democracy with electoral systems. To our great surprise, majoritarian electoral systems show greater correlation (57.82%) with " Free " democracy than PR electoral systems (23.70%). However, if one looks at the relative success of both, there is not much difference. 122 or 14.44% of all 845 majoritarian years were " Free ", whereas 50 or 13.12% of all 381 parliamentary years were " Free ". A plausible answer for all this might be found in the fact that often in contemporary countries with PR electoral systems, one can also find a dominant party system, for example the ANC in the RSA.

We conclude that political democracy depends not only on economic and social conditions but also on the design of political institutions. Different constitutional frameworks have different impact on democratic consolidation. Last, we emphasize that the relation between regime type and democratization is not mechanistic and it certainly does not fully determine particular results. The remainder of the explanation of democratization must be derived from other factors.

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