

**The Impact of Policies on Development-Induced Resettlement Processes and Outcomes:
A Lesotho-India Comparative Study**

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Abstract

The practice of Development-Induced Displacement and Resettlement (DIDR), historically, has often led to negative consequences for those affected by development projects, including but not limited to, the construction of large dams. Although DIDR arises from the need to provide goods and services that characterise development, it often leaves those who are forced to give up their assets, resources, and long standing social networks in dire socio-economic conditions as a result of resettlement. In many such cases, the provision for losses suffered by those primarily affected is often insufficient, leading to further losses experienced as a result of the complete life change experienced by those affected by resettlement. Research has shown that the insufficiency of such provisions for losses is attributable to not only the value of the provision itself, but also the manner in which resettlement processes are implemented. While early on, researchers believed that the development of policies would have a significant, positive impact on the practice of resettlement and its outcomes, evidence would later show that the development of policies alone is not a panacea for all challenges associated with forced resettlement. Further research revealed that resettlement is characterised by inherent and active complexities which are often at play, and may impede effective implementation. Hence, while the development of policies is essential, both the development and implementation of policies must be undertaken in a manner that seeks to actively address the inherent complexities of resettlement.

This thesis aims to explore the implementation of resettlement policies in two case studies, where in one case, resettlement was informed by national policy, and in the other, by policies developed by a parastatal tasked with the responsibility of executing resettlement. The study makes a comparative analysis between the two cases, and explores the factors at play in the implementation of resettlement policies – whether such factors serve to facilitate or impede effective implementation – as well as the nature of the outcomes on the ground. As an overarching goal, the research aims to provide a basis upon which a framework for the development of a national level policy of resettlement may be developed. In this regard, the thesis undertakes a comparison of the Indian resettlement case with the Lesotho case. The former, in addition to having developed a resettlement policy at the national level, has a long history of experience in forced resettlement and displacement, from which invaluable lessons have been learned. The latter, on the other hand, has no resettlement policy at the national level, although the country has also experienced forced resettlement dating back to nearly three decades ago. Although India and Lesotho have distinct social, cultural, economic and

demographic characteristics, research has shown that the complexities of forced resettlement, and their outcomes on affected people, are largely applicable across the different contexts. Hence, certain dimensions and lessons can be transferable from the Indian case to the Lesotho case, and vice versa. However, for the purpose of this thesis, the focus is on providing a basis for national policy development in Lesotho, in light of Indian policies and practice.

The empirical basis of the thesis is an ethnographic study undertaken in relation to the Chandil Dam resettlement case in Jharkhand, India and the Mohale Dam resettlement case in Maseru, Lesotho. The thesis engaged both qualitative and quantitative research methods, as well as four, complementary theoretical tools that analyse the effects of forced resettlement on affected people. The thesis reveals that the negative consequences of forced resettlement resulting from its inherent complexities continue to manifest with concerning effects on the lives of those affected. It shows that the implementation of policies is a complex process that requires collaborative effort from a wide range of stakeholders in a given context. National policies of resettlement are, thus, instrumental in this regard, as they can create an enabling environment for the facilitation of collaborative efforts towards sustainable livelihood re-establishment for those who involuntarily suffer losses to resettlement.

Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to my daughter, Naleli Khwezi, it is a symbol of endurance and determination. It is also a symbol of companionship, a reminder that everything that we achieve in life is a result of a contribution from someone. You contributed to this thesis before you knew life. I was carrying you when I went to India to undertake fieldwork for this thesis, and for three months you were there with me, you kept me company without even knowing. You were a constant reminder that there is more to life than the challenges of today. I wish upon you every good thing that your heart will desire in your future, and know that with endurance and determination you can achieve far greater things than you can imagine.

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1 Chapter One: Introduction to the Research

1.1 Introduction

Development projects, which are meant to provide for the needs of the public, such as water, energy, road networks, food, housing, etc., may result in the forced removal of some segments of the population, who are seen to be in the way of such projects (Blaser, et al., 2004). In many cases, those who are forced out from their original settlements to make way for development projects, are subsequently left in dire socio-economic conditions (Evrard and Goudineau, 2004; Fernandes, 2008; Khan, 2015; Mathur and Marsden, 1998; Mathur, 2013; Scudder, 2005; Yntiso, 2008). These unintended consequences have necessitated serious interrogation of the way in which resettlement processes are planned, funded and implemented. Since the 1950s, researchers have been studying the phenomenon of Development-Induced Displacement and Resettlement (DIDR), in an attempt to understand its nature and consequences, and why it is that it often leads to predominantly negative effects on those affected (Cernea, 2000; 2008; Colson, 1971; De Wet, 2006; Downing, 1996; Rew, 2006; Scudder, 1973; 2005; 2009).

Although DIDR is a composite acronym, there is a conceptual and policy-based need to distinguish between ‘displacement’ and ‘resettlement’. Displacement is the social disruption and/or economic deprivation that result when people are physically relocated or denied access to productive resources on which they were reliant, usually involuntarily (Mathur, 2006:38; Parasuraman, 1999:3). Resettlement on the other hand, incorporates both the social and economic displacement that results when people are moved from their original settlements to new ones, and the processes undertaken towards recovering the losses and re-establishing their lives after their physical removal (Mathur, 2006:39; Parasuraman, 1999:3). Thus, resettlement is the planned relocation of people affected by development projects, together with provisions made towards their relocation and the recovery of perceived losses of assets, resources and livelihoods. In some cases, there is a distinction between the process of moving affected people, referred to as resettlement, and the long-term process of rebuilding lost livelihoods beyond resettlement, referred to as rehabilitation (Fernandes, 2008:183). The Indian policy and Act for resettlement, for example, which will be discussed later in Chapter Eleven, distinguishes between resettlement and rehabilitation (Government of India, 2007; 2013).

This research will focus on resettlement as a process that involves not only the physical removal of the development projects' affected people, but also the provision made towards the recovery of their losses. 'Forced' or 'involuntary' resettlement will also be used to denote the nature of resettlement by development, which usually does not require consent from those primarily affected (Diaz, 2012:6). However, as indicated above, although resettlement entails provision for the disruption it causes, it is often accompanied by negative consequences, in part, due to insufficient provision made towards the re-establishment of lost assets, resources and livelihoods (Cernea, 2008; Fernandes, 2008; Maldonado, 2009; Witter and Satterfield, 2014). Some authors argue that such negative consequences often arise because the resettlement of the people primarily affected on account of development projects was historically, and to some extent still is, not central in the planning, implementation and evaluation of development projects associated with resettlement (Penz, et al., 2011:65). However, the negative consequences of resettlement have also been attributed to its inherently complex nature (De Wet, 2006; 2009).

Largely owing to its negative effects on those directly affected, resettlement policies were developed – first by the World Bank in 1980 – to inform the undertaking of resettlement in development projects, in a way that seeks to mitigate some of its negative consequences (Fox, 1998:308). Nevertheless, as the discussion throughout this thesis will show, even in the context of policies, which have since been improved and developed more widely in various cases of resettlement by development, the consequences of resettlement remain predominantly negative. Notwithstanding, with the enhancement of the understanding and policies on the practice of resettlement, there has been noteworthy progress in the various cases of forced resettlement, with regard to the effects on the ground. Hence, while there is ongoing critique on the sufficiency – or lack thereof – of policies and/or their implementation, the role of policies in ensuring a more constructive practice of resettlement is widely acknowledged (Cernea, 2008; Mathur, 2008; Price, 2008). This thesis explores the impact of policies on resettlement processes and outcomes in two resettlement cases, with the aim of providing a basis for the development of a national resettlement policy in one of the two case studies. This comparative exploration investigated the implementation of a parastatal resettlement policy on the one hand, and a state's resettlement policy informed by a national resettlement policy on the other.

1.2 Research Objectives

This thesis is empirically predicated on two case studies, one in India and another in Lesotho, and investigates the implementation of specific resettlement policy documents in each of the two cases. To explore the impact of policies on resettlement processes, the thesis focusses on providing an analysis of the social and economic consequences to resettled communities, of policies on resettlement. A selective comparison of the implementation of resettlement policies in the specific case studies was undertaken, with the goal of understanding the challenges of policy execution, how such challenges were negotiated against the dynamics on the ground, and what the outcomes were on the affected people.

As its overarching goal, the research provides a basis upon which Lesotho, and potentially other countries in the Southern African region, could develop their respective resettlement policies at the national level. While some African countries – Mozambique, Namibia and Zambia being exemplars – have formulated policies at the national level that are aimed at informing resettlement processes in their respective contexts (Republic of Mozambique, 2012; Republic of Namibia, 2017; Republic of Zambia, 2015), other countries in the Southern African region, including Lesotho and South Africa, have not yet formulated national policy frameworks for resettlement. However, the Namibian National Resettlement Policy framework is targeted at the redistribution of land to correct persistent inequalities “stemming from Namibia’s colonial history” (Republic of Namibia, 2017:10), and not necessarily to deal with current cases of forced resettlement by development.

Although there are resettlement related policies in some Southern African countries, such as Lesotho and Swaziland, such policies are only project-specific, and are not national level policies. As later discussions will reveal, the policies of resettlement which have been developed in Lesotho are those related specifically to the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP). Similarly, in Swaziland a resettlement policy was developed in relation to a specific project, the Maguga Dam (Galvin, 2013:3). The discussion of the findings will reveal some of the limitations of project-specific policies, and why national level policies are necessary.

In achieving its goals, the research was guided by the following research objectives:

- To analyse the social and economic consequences of policies on resettlement processes and outcomes in selected geographical areas

- To identify local participatory strategies employed in the planning and implementation of resettlement processes, and factors facilitating or impeding such participation
- To analyse the factors and processes influencing the formulation and outcomes of resettlement policy in selected geographical areas
- To examine the extent to which policy dimensions and contexts are transferrable from the Indian case to the Lesotho case – and potentially to other Southern African contexts.

1.3 The Context of the Study

As shown above, the empirical aspect of this thesis is based on two case studies, the Mohale Dam project of the LHWP in the Maseru District, in Lesotho, and the Chandil Dam project of the Subarnarekha Multipurpose Project (SMP) in the Jharkhand State, in India. The Indian study presents a particularly interesting case, not only based on its complexity and long-standing history of forced resettlement, but also its resettlement policy component at the national level. The overarching goal of the thesis is to provide the basis for the development of a national resettlement policy in Lesotho, and potentially in other countries in Southern Africa. Hence, it was essential to select a case study with a national resettlement policy, to learn from its policy development experience. In addition, the complexity of the Indian context of resettlement provides invaluable insights into the intricacies of policy implementation in forced resettlement, and how such complexities may be navigated in practice.

On the other hand, Lesotho currently does not have a resettlement policy at the national level, although forced resettlement by development has been experienced in the country for nearly three decades (Devitt and Hitchcock, 2010; LHDA, 1989; Makoro, 2014; Matli, 2004). This not only motivates for a comparison with the Indian case, but also presents an opportunity to learn from the experience of a country with national resettlement policies, and to potentially transfer some aspects into the Lesotho context, for the purposes of resettlement policy development at the national level. Additionally, resettlement in the LHWP presents a curious case, as one of the biggest dam projects in Africa. Hence, this study undertook a comparative exploration of the implementation of the Jharkhand State's resettlement policy, informed by the Indian national policy of resettlement, with the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority (LHDA) resettlement policy. Although with significantly different cultural,

historical and policy contexts, both Lesotho and India have experienced forced resettlement and its associated impacts.

Established in 1986, the LHDA has been responsible for the implementation of the LHWP, of which the Mohale Dam project in the Maseru District in Lesotho is a part. The implementation of resettlement induced by the dam constructions under the LHWP has been informed by resettlement policies developed by the LHDA, as the implementing authority. In the case of India, the SMP, based in the State of Jharkhand in India, has been responsible for the implementation of multipurpose projects, which includes the Chandil Dam. The resettlement component of this project has been undertaken on the basis of various policy frameworks over the years, but for the purpose of this thesis, the resettlement policy of the Jharkhand State, informed by the Indian national policy of resettlement, was investigated (Government of India, 2007; State of Jharkhand, 2008). Later discussions in Chapters Seven and Thirteen will speak further to the selection of the policy document for investigation in this thesis. Hence, the two resettlement cases, the Mohale Dam resettlement and the Chandil Dam resettlement, form the basis upon which this thesis was undertaken.

1.4 Theoretical Perspective

To explore the impact of resettlement policies in the selected case studies, the investigation was undertaken through the lens of the well-known ‘risks of impoverishment and reconstruction’ by Cernea (2000), which outlines the inherent, negative social and economic consequences of resettlement, and how they can be mitigated. Research has, however, shown that some of the reasons for the persistence of the negative effects of resettlement is that involuntary resettlement is a complex process, which often goes in ways that are not expected, and sometimes not understood (Rew, et al., 1996; 2006). Hence, this thesis is also informed by the ‘inherent complexities’ approach by De Wet (2006), which explores some of the issues related to the complex nature of forced resettlement. It explores the problems of policy implementation, and how the tensions between policy formulation and practice were – or failed to be – negotiated, taking into cognisance the complexities of resettlement.

For some authors, resettlement is a process that develops in stages, through which affected people experience resettlement and its consequences. In this regard, the ‘stage framework’ by Scudder (1973; 1993; 2005; 2009) also forms part of the theoretical perspective on which the undertaking of this research is based. These theories were employed in this thesis in a

complementary manner, based on the strengths of each of them, to cultivate an understanding of particular aspects of forced resettlement.

1.5 Introduction to the Research Methodology

The undertaking of this research involved fieldwork in Lesotho over a period of three months, accompanied by another three months in India. During the execution of the fieldwork, a combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches were employed to gather data, from a variety of respondents in different categories. For the qualitative aspect, the research involved the use of in-depth interviews, informal interviews, participant observation, focus group discussions, and oral histories. In addition, quantitative data was gathered through household surveys in both contexts, and content analysis, which included the review of relevant documents related to the planning and implementation of policies in the resettlement projects in question. A detailed presentation of the research methodology is outlined in Chapter Seven.

1.6 Chapter Outline

This thesis is divided into seventeen chapters. Chapter Two seeks to link the two concepts of development and forced resettlement, and explores ideological contestations on the concept and practice of resettlement by development. Chapter Three relates a detailed discussion on resettlement theories which informed the undertaking of this research. Chapter Four sets out to present a discussion on the phenomenon of DIDR, and how it has evolved over the years. It also explores examples of four cases of resettlement by large dam projects, which, for different reasons, have attracted international curiosity and analysis, leading to greater understanding in the field, of certain aspects of forced resettlement. Lastly, Chapter Four explores ethical issues in forced resettlement.

Chapter Five presents an exploration of policies of resettlement, both at the international and local levels. Chapter Six presents a discussion which seeks to link the theories and policies of resettlement, and explore how they tend to work out in practice. Chapter Seven comprises the presentation of the research methodology employed in the undertaking of this study. Chapter Eight explores the context of one of the two case studies of this research – the Mohale Dam case in Lesotho. Chapters Nine and Ten present a discussion of the findings from the Mohale Dam resettlement case study.

Chapter Eleven explores the complex context of forced resettlement and displacement in India. Chapter Twelve presents an overview of the Chandil Dam case – the other case study

under consideration in this research. Chapters Thirteen and Fourteen present a discussion of findings from the Chandil Dam resettlement case study. Chapter Fifteen discusses the comparison of the findings from the two case studies, and explores policy features which are transferable from the Indian to the Lesotho case. Chapter Sixteen then makes a case for the development of a national resettlement policy in the Lesotho context. Chapter Seventeen presents the concluding remarks on the findings of the research.

2 Chapter Two: Development, Forced Resettlement and Contested Perspectives

2.1 Introduction

The concept of development is a highly contested one, and has evolved significantly over time. While it can be argued that development – as a practice or a collection of planned, connected activities aimed at improving life (Gasper, 2012:2) – is as old as human beings themselves, it has transformed significantly after World War II (WWII) (Pieterse, 2010:5). Up until WWII, development was mainly conceptualised within the framework of monetary value and production, particularly in Western countries, who transferred their practice and approaches of development to other parts of the world, through the process of colonialism, mainly to benefit the West (Asante, 2007; Falola, 2002; Gemery and Hogendorn, 1978:250; Williams, 2016:895; Worger, et al, 2001; Zeleza, 1993:156-157). Defining development is as difficult as bringing together different ideologies, coined at different epochs, and understood within a variety of contexts all around the globe. However, at the core of it, “development is concerned with the betterment of life” (Sen, 1988:15).

DIDR, the movement of people from their places of origin to new ones on account of development projects, notably increased after WWII; with the coming into light of the project of development tied to modernisation, which entailed infrastructure development, advanced technology, and the expansion of industrialisation (McCully, 1996:2; Termiski, 2015:104). Although the movement of people from one place to another in search of better living conditions did not only begin with modern day development, for the purpose of this thesis, the discussion will focus on development as it has been shaped since WWII. In this chapter, the different perspectives on development will be discussed, and linked to the core subject of DIDR, reflecting how the complexity of development as a concept, renders it to varying understandings by different stakeholders around the world, and, in turn, relates to the way in which these different stakeholders view resettlement by development.

2.2 Development and Forced Resettlement by Development Post-WWII

After WWII, the concept of development took on a different perspective, with the aim being to rebuild countries which had been devastated by warfare (Chamedes, 2015:55; Van Ufford, et al., 2003:3). The main emphasis was “modernisation, industrialisation and economic growth” (Bull and Boas, 2012:319). Central to this concept and practice of development was the building and resuscitation of the infrastructural, technological and economic aspects of

society (Clemens and Kremer, 2016). Instead of a singular focus on the economy in GDP terms as the main, or arguably, the only indicator of development, the economy became part of other aspects which together form what could be viewed as development (Heyneman, 2003:316). However, in practice, development continues to lean more towards economic approaches than multidimensional, and this is one of the issues of contestation in DIDR as the discussion in this section will show.

Development post-WWII, in the form in which it can be observed today, was first conceived and designed in the West, the features of which were subsequently transferred to the global South and East. Advances in technology, infrastructure, and structures that facilitate progress of the economic, health, political and administrative aspects of society, were regarded as the measure of development, the lack or absence of which would be considered “underdevelopment” (Escobar, 1988:429). By virtue of having accumulated greater economic, political and military power, partly during the colonial era, Western countries had more features of what could be regarded as development than those in the Southern hemisphere and those in the global East (Asante, 2007; Falola, 2002; Gemery and Hogendorn, 1978:250; Oliver and Atmore, 2005; Williams, 2016:895; Worger, et al, 2001; Zeleza, 1993:156-157). More nuanced, complex historical accounts than can be discussed in this section can explain this inequality (Asante, 2007; Falola, 2002; Munro, 1976; Zeleza, 1993).

The terms “developed” and “underdeveloped” were coined to describe different regions and countries of the world. The former colonies – later transitioning into independent states – of European countries such as Britain, France, Germany, Portugal, were seen as underdeveloped and, therefore, in need of reforms to aid them to transition towards development (Leys, 2005:109). Thus, the entire process of development was based, and to a greater extent, still is, on transferring approaches, conceptualisations, frameworks, and techniques of the course of betterment of life from the West to the rest of the world (Oliver-Smith, 2010:132; Rist, 1997). A large part of this transformation of the underdeveloped regions to development was modernisation. Modernisation entailed a process of abandoning the traditional to advanced modes of production, as well as changes in the “organisational, political and social characteristics” of these underdeveloped, previously colonised regions (Bossen, 1975:587; Coetzee, 2001:30).

Through the process of colonialism, the West had already introduced certain aspects of development, conceptualised within the framework of industrialisation, commercialised agriculture, etc., which had previously begun in the West (Mendes, et al., 2014:121). Hence, when the former colonies finally regained their independence, they carried over the western form of development into their new, independent states. This entailed prioritisation of national planning to strategically advance aspects such as infrastructure development, the development of strategic and democratic institutions, industrialisation, etc. all with the underlying objective of attaining economic growth (Penz, et al., 2011:63). In Sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, industrialisation had begun during the colonial era in the 1920s, albeit at a smaller scale until the 1940s; and then reinvigorated, more widely, in the 1960s – the era of African states' independence (Lewis, 1984:4; Mendes, et al., 2014:121).

From the late 1950s onwards, infrastructure development, industrialisation, and the establishment of strategic and democratic institutions took centre stage in the practice of development (Coetzee, 2001; Fields, 1975; Lall, et al., 2006; Termiski, 2015:104). The construction of roads and bridges, dams, housing, power plants, as well as the establishment of big industries, was all seen as an expression of development (Coetzee, 2001; Penz, et al., 2011:64). In this process, however, many who were considered by development planners and practitioners, to be physically or geographically in the way of development, were forcefully resettled and displaced to new areas (Blaser, et al, 2004; Termiski, 2015). In that era, displacement, coupled with forced but planned resettlement, particularly in the African continent, was expressed in two forms; growing rates of voluntary rural-urban migration driven by the industrialising urban centres, and development-induced resettlement owing to infrastructure construction (Fields, 1975:165; Lall, et al., 2006:8; McCully, 1996:2; Termiski, 2015:104). For the purpose of this thesis, however, only the latter forms the subject matter in focus. As shown in Chapter One above, the entire thesis is predicated upon the concept of DIDR, a composite term entailing forced displacement and resettlement.

Beginning with one of Africa's first planned development projects that induced forced displacement of many from their original areas to new ones in the late 1950s – the Kariba Dam – development forced resettlement and displacement has since uprooted hundreds of thousands across the African continent (Colson, 1971; Gillet and Tobias, 2002:50; Lassailly-Jacob and McDowell, 1996:187; Magadza, 2006:271; Scudder, 2005:188; Scudder and Colson, 1982). The Kariba Dam alone induced the forced displacement and resettlement of about 57,000 Gwembe Tonga in Zambia and Zimbabwe (Colson, 1971:4; Gillet and Tobias,

2002:50; Lassailly-Jacob and McDowell, 1996:187; Scudder, 2005:189). Ghana's Akosombo Dam, built in the 1960s, saw the displacement of some 80,000 people in 740 villages (Tamakloe, 1994:101). Egypt's Aswan High Dam, also built in the 1960s, induced the forced resettlement of some 120,000 Nubians (Terminski, 2015:68). More recently, the Merowe and Kajbar Dams saw the forceful resettlement of approximately 60,000 Sudanese between 2003 and 2008 (ibid.:105). The Kariba and Aswan High dams have been selected as exemplary cases that will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Four. As will be shown, the two, representing some of the largest dam projects in Africa, present contrasting cases of the general outcomes of forced resettlement on those directly affected.

Forced displacement and resettlement in the context of planned development was also – and continues to – taking place in other parts of the world other than Africa, more extensively in Asia, but also in Europe, North and South America. Examples include the Irkutsk Hydro-electric Power Station in Russia, constructed between 1950 and 1956 (Terminski, 2015:186). It is estimated that the project resulted in the resettlement of about 17,000 people from 200 communities (ibid.:186). Also, the Cerro de Oro Dam in Mexico, completed in 1989, was accompanied by the resettlement of some 26,000 people (Scudder, 2005:60). However, resettlement projects undertaken in more developed contexts such as Europe and North America, have generally been less frequently associated with significant negative consequences on those affected, in terms of the inability of affected peoples to recover from resultant losses (Terminski, 2015:220). According to Terminski (2015:220), this is partly owing to the availability of resources and opportunities. This corroborates Scudder's assertion, that the availability of opportunities post-resettlement plays a significant role in facilitating economic development and improved standards of living in the long-term (2005:41).

According to McCully (1996:3), by 1990, there were roughly 40,000 large dams in the world, of which only 5,000 were built before 1950. A large dam is defined as one that is "15 metres or greater from lowest foundation to crest or a dam between 5 metres and 15 metres impounding more than 3 million cubic metres" (International Commission on Large Dams, 2011:3). By the turn of the millennium, large dams were estimated at 45,000 globally (Terminski, 2015:86; Wu, et al., 2003:1239; Yan, et al., 2005:474). Today there are over 50,000 large dams in the world (International Commission on Large Dams, 2014). China alone had, by 1990, about 19,000 large dams, only eight of which were built before its communist revolution in 1949 (McCully, 1996:4), and today it has over 23,000 large dams

(Terminski, 2015:66). India alone has some 4,000 large dams (ibid.:66). The consequence of this massive construction of large dams was the uprooting of communities and groups of people from their original settlements to new areas around the globe, with predominantly negative and in some cases catastrophic socio-cultural, economic and environmental consequences (Cernea, 1997:1569; Colson, 1971:1; Debasree, 2015:449; Evrard and Goudineau, 2004:951; Muggah, 2003:5).

In China alone, about 45 million people have been forcibly moved on account of development projects between 1950 and 2000, an estimated 24 million of which were due to the construction of dams (Yan, et al., 2005:474; Terminski, 2013:14-15). In India, an estimated 60 million people were involuntarily displaced by development projects between 1948 and 2008 (Fernandes, 2006:111; Hind, 2016:111; Mathur, 2011:1; Neef and Singer, 2015:603; Terminski, 2013:15). In the Soviet Union, the dam constructions program of the 1950s saw the displacement of approximately 1.5 million people (Terminski, 2015:68). In Egypt, between 1960 and 1971, the construction of the Aswan High Dam resulted in the displacement of approximately 120,000 people (ibid.:68). All these and other instances of forced resettlement were followed by serious atrocities experienced by those affected, directly or indirectly, by involuntary displacement and resettlement across the world.

2.3 Contesting Perspectives on Development and Forced Resettlement by Development

Forced displacement and resettlement have been an integral part in facilitating the process of development in many cases, such as in the provision of water, electricity, food, housing, roads networks, etc. Development projects that induce involuntary resettlement are seen by some writers as “indisputably necessary”, as they improve many people’s lives by providing employment and supplying better, needed services and resources (Cernea, 2000:11-12). According to Baijal and Singh (2000:1659), the need for drinking water, energy, increased agricultural output, and flood control, has made large dam constructions indispensable in contexts such as India, where a significant number of large dams have been built. However, the movement of people on account of development projects and the associated socio-cultural, economic and environmental costs borne by those who are forced out from their areas, have not been central to the practice of development itself (Penz, et al., 2011:65). Oftentimes, development projects and forced resettlement borne out of them, are seen as two separate components, and not as interrelated aspects of a composite process of development, which are supposed to speak to each other (ibid.:66).

As a result, those who are forced out of the way end up in worse economic situations – not to mention social impacts – because even on economic terms, resettlement is not considered central to economic planning (Penz, et al, 2011:65). More nuanced, detailed deliberations will explain these consequences of resettlement throughout the thesis. In this regard, there have been contestations on not only the sufficiency, but also the ethicality of development approaches that are deeply rooted in economic frameworks, with little to no regard for how economic development speaks to the well-being of the majority or the most vulnerable in a given context (Gasper, 2012:14; Penz, 2003:144; Penz, et al, 2011). In this sense, when development projects that are aimed at augmenting service delivery, or the improvement of infrastructure, forcefully displace people and induce the loss of assets and livelihoods without adequately making up for them afterwards, the benefits of development are inequitably distributed. Hence, this can raise ethical questions relating to the conceptualisation and approaches of the concept and practice of development. Ethical issues in forced resettlement will be discussed later in Chapter Four.

In response to this imbalanced approach to development, critics have called for development practitioners to move away from approaches that are heavily reliant on economic frameworks to the detriment of other aspects of human well-being (Fukuda-Parr, 2003; Sen, 1990; Ul Haq, 1995)). Although the UNDP's Human Development Reports, first released in 1990, are not necessarily about displacement or related consequences of development, the underlying message cuts across the practice of development predicated upon economic growth, irrespective of the context. The central message of the report is that, although economic growth is intrinsic to the process and practice of development, it is also significant to actively consider how economic growth translates into human well-being (UNDP, 1990). Thus, development is more than just about infrastructure development, industrialisation, or economic growth, it is about the expanded choices through the creation of more opportunities, that can allow people to access healthcare, education, material resources, etc. (Gaude and Peek, 1976; UNDP, 1990; Sen, 1990; Terminski, 2015:49).

In this context, resettlement by development should not be seen as merely the removal of the people who are in the way of development, but as a development project in its own right (Tashi and Foggin, 2012). Its fundamental aim should be to allow affected people to transition out of poverty and other forms of underdevelopment into growth, enabling them to also partake in the benefits of the process of development. As in a small-scale resettlement in Tibet, China, where about 148 families were resettled on account of an ecological project, the

affected people were allocated arable land and housing in the new areas; with many claiming, according to Tashi and Foggin's report, "that housing, transportation, and access to education and healthcare services have generally improved" from their previous ones (2012:148). Thus, in accordance with a more balanced, responsible approach, development – and its associated resettlement – must be people-centred, participatory, multidimensional and sustainable (Chapman, et al., 2003:2; Carney, 2003:13; Downing and Garcia-Downing, 2007:3).

However, the problem is that in many cases, resettlement projects do not lead to improved, but rather worse-off living conditions (Downing, 1996:34; Maldonado, 2012:195; Parasuraman, 1999:4), and are often non-participatory and not people-centred. Later discussions will explore some of the factors that contribute to predominantly negative consequences of resettlement. Hence, further criticisms have been targeted at the recommended multidimensional approaches to development. Critics argue that current development approaches, even when they are said to be multifaceted, still remain largely based on a top-down approach (Kurian, 2000). Development-forced resettlement projects in particular, are inherently premised on a top-down approach to planning and implementation. In most cases, if not all, development projects which result in resettlement are conceived and planned at the institutional level, usually outside the involvement, nor approval of the affected people (Hwang, et al., 2011:73; Jackson and Sleight, 2000:224; Kwai-cheong, 1995:98; Scudder, 1993:130).

For this reason, writers such as Kurian (2000:842) and Routledge (2003:249), based on their research in resettlement and displacement situations in India, contend that many development processes do not reflect a deep understanding of such issues as ethnicity, culture, and how they are intertwined with the environment in shaping identity and cultural values. Hence, oftentimes there is a disconnect between development projects, and social and environmental sustainability (Kurian, 2000:842; Routledge, 2003:249), which can reflect in forced resettlement and displacement situations. Although in the above stated study by Tashi and Foggin (2012:148) in Tibet, China, the majority of resettled people expressed satisfaction with their proximity to basic services, a point of dissatisfaction was that the surrounding environmental conditions, such as rangeland, had deteriorated significantly. Kurian (2000:484), thus, argues that such shortfalls are inherent in imposed forms of development, as they may be incompatible with environmental and socio-cultural dynamics on the ground.

Researchers such as Cernea (2000:11-13), argue that while they acknowledge the negative impacts inherent in forced displacement and resettlement, development projects that induce resettlement remain essential in society, because of the perceived needs that people have. In this regard, the question of whether or not development projects must continue to be constructed does not arise. For development project sympathisers, a matter which does arise, is how efforts must be channelled to ensure that those who are affected by forced displacement do not end up worse-off, but also benefit by having their livelihoods improved from their previous standards to better ones post-resettlement (Cernea, 2000:13; Maldonado, 2012:204; Vanclay, 2017:3). Furthermore, some authors not only see DIDR as a necessity, but also as an opportunity for development (Arthur, 2017; McDonald, et al., 2008:84).

This means that, beyond the benefits of development projects that result in resettlement, the resettlement component itself can be undertaken strategically to improve the lives and livelihoods of those affected. According to Cernea, this can be achieved by purposefully preventing the inherent risks of resettlement, which will be discussed in the next chapter, by providing safeguards in displacement situations, to turn the risks into opportunities for development (2000:13). For Cernea (2000:13), if essential strategies are put in place, policies effectively implemented, and sufficient resources secured and used efficiently to eliminate negative consequences, it is possible to arrive at equitable distribution of the benefits of development projects.

However, evidence shows that in reality, essential procedures, policies, and allocation of sufficient resources are rarely implemented in the majority of cases (Parasuraman, 1999:4; Rew, et al., 2006:45; Scudder, 2005:18). Although, theoretically, policies are designed to bridge the gap between theory and existing realities (Parasuraman, 1999:4), reflected outcomes do not always follow the same order. Largely owing to a lack of adherence to policies and recommended procedures, there often is a disparity between what resettlement policies promise and what the affected people on the ground end up with (De Wet, 2001:4638; Rew, et al., 2006:45). Complexities around issues of policy and implementation will be discussed later in the thesis. Added to the quandary is the fact that in the majority of resettlement cases, over 90% are not funded by the World Bank, which is one of the major funders of externally funded resettlement-inducing development projects (Cernea, 1999:15). Hence, if such projects do not have resettlement policies of their own, they are also not obligated to adhere to those of the World Bank. As discussions in Chapter Five will show, the World Bank was the first institution to develop resettlement policies, and has since had a

significant role in resettlement policy development in many of its borrower countries, including Lesotho.

Furthermore, the reality of forced resettlement is that, in a given context, some stakeholders are those who are forcefully moved, while others benefit directly from development projects, whether as salaried officials or those for whom a development project is constructed. Therefore, equitable distribution of benefits, as Cernea (2000:13) argues, is significantly difficult to achieve, if not entirely impossible (De Wet, 2015:92). Even where resettlement projects are undertaken in a relatively responsible manner, as in the case of the Aswan High Dam project in Egypt, which will be discussed later in Chapter Four, resettled people still pay the price of having to move involuntarily (De Wet, 2001). Thus, in practice, there is no feasible way of ensuring that forced resettlement does not harm affected people. The idea that the benefits of a resettlement-inducing development project can be distributed equitably is an ambitious one. It also assumes, as Rew, et al. (2006) argue, that the implementation of resettlement policies is an uncomplicated process, provided procedures are followed step by step. Whereas, in practice, empirical evidence has shown, and some authors have also argued, that beyond the surface, what underlies a lack of adherence to policies and procedures, and by extension, the failure of resettlement practice, is a complex nature of forced resettlement (De Wet, 2006; Rew, et al., 2006).

Consequently, some critics, and policies in different contexts, state that forced resettlement, which tends to impoverish affected people (Downing, 2002:8) – and later discussions will explore the complexities that lead to this outcome – should be avoided or minimised (Government of India, 2007; 2013; Kothari, 1996:1484; The World Bank, 2013; 2016). Citing overwhelming evidence on the negative consequences of forced displacement and resettlement, critics argue that development projects that necessitate forced displacement should be avoided, if not entirely abandoned (Scudder, 2005:18). Instead, implementing institutions should channel their efforts towards finding alternative means to provide needed services and resources. Writers such as Ansar, et al. (2014), although arguing from an economic perspective, contend that smaller interventions might present a more favourable option than big projects, which tend to take longer than planned, resulting in significant cost overruns in the long-term.

From a resettlement perspective, numerous, smaller interventions may result in either significantly less disruption or none at all (Qing, 1997). A policy provision for the argument

on resettlement avoidance or minimisation – options assessment – will be discussed later in Chapter Five on the policies of resettlement. Notwithstanding, there are complications related to the implementation of policy provisions such as options assessment. This thesis is aimed at assessing the implementation of policies and their impact on resettlement processes and outcomes. Therefore, a significant part of the discussions throughout the thesis will centre on the complexities of policy implementation in resettlement processes, and outcomes.

2.4 Conclusion

The concept of development is highly contested, and because of this contestation, the manner in which it is undertaken and viewed by various stakeholders in different contexts is inconsistent. Consequently, accompanying components such as resettlement are also viewed differently by different actors in the development fraternity. While some stakeholders see resettlement as a necessity in facilitating processes towards development, others, mainly those who are negatively affected, see development as a system that only facilitates inequality. As later discussions will show – particularly in exploring different cases of development-induced resettlement in various parts of the world – the undertaking of development projects, and their associated resettlement and displacement, is often riddled with power dynamics between different stakeholders, who are affected in different ways by development projects. The discussion of grassroots resistance in the Indian context in Chapter Eleven, as well as the ethnographic chapters, will also reflect these power dynamics in forced resettlement situations. In the next chapter, theories of resettlement are discussed.

3 Chapter Three: Theories of Involuntary Resettlement

3.1 Introduction

Following a wide range of predominantly negative consequences suffered by many in involuntary resettlement, various theoretical frameworks have been developed in an attempt to make sense of resettlement processes, its consequences and how its negative effects can best be alleviated. The first conceptual frameworks of resettlement can be traced back to the work of earlier scholars such as Chambers (1969) and Nelson (1973) (Cernea, 2000:14; Chambers, 1970; Koenig, 2001:8; Muggah, 2002:7). Following this early conceptualisation, Scudder's Four Stage Framework (FSF) was developed in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and has remained one of the major theoretical tools in the field of resettlement, together with Cernea's Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction (IRR) model, developed in the 1990s (Cernea, 2000; Scudder, 2005). This chapter discusses theoretical tools that informed the undertaking of this research.

3.2 A Background to the Theorisation of Involuntary Resettlement

Resettlement as a formal field of study began in the 1960s (Scudder, 1973:48; 2005:31). The establishment of resettlement as a field of study followed Brokensha's recommendation, having conducted some research with the Volta Dam project in Ghana as a case study, and realising a need for a sociological understanding of forced resettlement (Scudder, 2005:31; 2009:25). However, at the time, scholars such as Scudder and Colson had already begun, since 1956, a long-term study among the displaced Gwembe Tonga in Zambia (Scudder, 1993:123). The field has since become an ever-growing body of knowledge with theories, models and policies that seek to promote a responsible practice of resettlement (Satiroglu and Choi, 2015:3). Although there were no theories or policies specific to involuntary resettlement before the 1950s, multitudes were already being resettled and displaced on account of development projects.

Since the 1950s, scholars and practitioners have engaged in scholarly studies on those affected by development-induced involuntary resettlement, in an attempt to understand the nature and consequences of forced displacement (Terminski, 2015:22). Scudder and Colson's study among the Gwembe Tonga in Zambia and Zimbabwe (although more intensely in Zambia), became a reference point for many other subsequent studies of forced displacement. In particular, it became the basis upon which Scudder's FSF was tested and further developed (Scudder, 1993:124; 2005:32). This framework, which identifies resettlement processes and experienced effects in stages, extrapolates a pattern of resettlement consequences, on the

basis of similarities in the experiences of different groups of people affected by involuntary resettlement (Scudder, 1993:124; 2005:32).

The framework was designed in the 1970s, informed by long-term research that was undertaken in displacement situations, both spontaneous and planned (Scudder, 1981:12; Scudder, 2005:32). Although the framework was, and continues to be, very instrumental in informing, systematically, resettlement processes and in advancing the understanding of resettlement and its consequences, it was found by some researchers to provide an inadequate understanding of a very complex phenomenon of involuntary resettlement (Cernea, 2000). Furthermore, it was critiqued for being overly general to explain the contextual and behavioural variations that affect the outcomes of resettlement, as later discussions on the theory will show. The framework and its criticisms will be discussed later in this chapter.

The limitations of Scudder's framework necessitated the development of a complementary theory, which would be able to capture the complex nature of involuntary resettlement. Consequently, in the early 1990s Cernea, the first Sociologist to be employed by the World Bank, developed the IRR model (Cernea, 1990; 1997; 2000). This model has since informed a wide range of research related to forced resettlement (Mahapatra, 1999; Mathur, 1998; Sapkota, 2000; Vanclay, 2017). Cernea's IRR model was also informed by extensive research in forced resettlement, and, similar to Scudder's FSF, it identifies a pattern in the outcomes of involuntary resettlement. The model's strength lies in its ability to identify the risks inherent in resettlement situations, and prescribing measures to counter or prevent such risks from materialising.

However, the model was criticised for being too mechanical and for mainly focusing on the socio-economic risks, discarding cultural and psychological risks (Downing, 1996). Limitations notwithstanding – and more will be discussed below – Scudder's FSF and Cernea's IRR model remain two of the main theoretical tools that have contributed significantly towards the understanding of the phenomenon of DIDR. They have also inspired and informed the development of other theoretical tools. De Wet's 'Socio-spatial' analysis and the 'inherent complexities' approach to forced resettlement, were later developed to make sense of certain aspects of resettlement, which the IRR and the FSF could not capture. These theories explore rather subtle characteristics of forced resettlement, and explain its multi-layered, intricate nature, and how that can be expressed by the persistent, negative consequences on those directly affected. These theoretical tools are discussed in detail below.

3.3 Scudder's Four Stage Framework (FSF)

Scudder's FSF was first developed in the 1970s, inspired by the work of earlier scholars such as Nelson (1973) and Chambers (1969). As with Nelson and Chambers, Scudder believed that stages are a useful way of breaking down and understanding long-term development projects as they change through the different phases over time (Scudder, 1981:12; Scudder, 2005:33). Both Nelson and Chambers had earlier used stages in their research on new settlements, one focusing on the experiences of settlers in new areas, and the other on institutional processes respectively (Scudder, 1973:130). Nelson's three-stage framework consisted of the pioneer, consolidation and growth stages, and Chambers' framework consisted of pre-resettlement, project organisation, and devolution of authority stages (Scudder, 2005:33). In addition to the three-stage frameworks used by these scholars, Butcher (1971) categorised resettlement into two broad stages, the initial resettlement and the development stages (Scudder, 2005:33). Today the literature, and policies such as the Indian national resettlement policy, refers to these two broad stages as 'resettlement and rehabilitation' (Burra, 1999; Fernandes, 2008:183; Gill, 1995; Government of India, 2007; 2013; Modi, 2009). It was upon the foundation laid by these conceptual frameworks that Scudder developed his FSF.

At the time when Scudder developed his FSF, there was little to no clear conceptual distinction in the studies of people displaced by wars, natural disasters, spontaneous or planned development projects (Scudder, 1993:126). Hence, the framework was used in different types of resettlement situations (Scudder, 1981:12). In cases of spontaneous settlements, the framework was used as a four stage framework, and in planned resettlement cases, Scudder applied it as a five stage framework, with the planning and initial infrastructure development as two separate stages (Scudder, 1993:130-131). The framework has, however, evolved over time as more research was undertaken through different phases in real life contexts that informed it. As it stands today, since the most recent amendments in 2005 and 2009, it is directed specifically at "involuntary community resettlement" associated with large dams' construction (Scudder, 2005:32). Table 3.1 below outlines Scudder's Stage Framework as it evolved over the years.

Table 3.1 The Evolution of Scudder's Stage Framework

Year	Stage one	Stage two	Stage three	Stage four	Stage five
1981	Planning, infrastructure, and settler recruitment	Transition	Economic and social development	Handing over and incorporation	
1993	Planning	Initial infrastructure development	Initial adaptation	Economic development and community formation	Handing over and incorporation
2005	Planning and recruitment	Adjusting and coping	Community formation and economic Development	Handing over and incorporation	
2009	Planning for resettlement before physical removal	Coping with the initial drop in living standards that tends to follow removal	Initiating economic development and community formation activities necessary for improving the living standards of first-generation resettlers	Handing over a sustainable resettlement process to the second generation of resettlers and to non-project authority institutions	

Compiled from Scudder (1981:13; 1993:130-135; 2005:33-41; 2009:30)

The FSF is a behavioural framework that deals with resettlers and how they can be expected to behave in forced resettlement situations, as they go through the different phases (Scudder, 2005:32). Similar to Cernea's IRR model, which will be discussed in detail below, it is predictive and seeks to prescribe how a successful resettlement programme can be planned

and implemented, and how resettlers behave through the stages (ibid.:32). According to Scudder, a successful resettlement project is one that is “economically, environmentally, institutionally and culturally sustainable” reflected well into the second generation of resettlers (2005:32).

One of the fundamental effects of forced resettlement, as Scudder has observed over his long-term empirical research in forced resettlement, is that of stress among resettled people, particularly in the first two stages of resettlement (Scudder, 2009:29). As Scudder asserts, “physiological, psychological, and social-cultural stresses” are an integral part of forced relocation (ibid.:29). However, more than the stressful effects of resettlement, the FSF, similar to Chamber’s framework, describes resettlement in terms of its contiguous processes. It focusses on institutional processes in planning for, executing and handing over resettlement projects (Scudder, 1993:130; 2005:32). Also, in the same sense as Nelson’s framework, the FSF is behavioural, it focuses on resettlers’ responses to forced relocation. The four stages are discussed below, and incorporate both aspects of institutional processes and the behaviour or responses of affected people, to resettlement through the stages.

Stage one: Planning and recruitment

This is the initial stage of resettlement where planning for the conceived idea of resettlement begins. Most activities in this stage take place at the institutional level, where, in most cases, the people to be resettled are not yet aware that they will be moved (Scudder, 1993:130). In large-scale development projects such as China’s Three Gorges Dam which resettled over one million people, this stage can begin well over ten years before physical relocation takes place, or over several generations (Heggelund, 2008:99; Hwang, et al., 2011:74; Yan, et al., 2005:474; Scudder, 1993:130). Although at this stage the affected people may not be aware that their lives are about to change drastically and permanently, Scudder argues that the change process effectively begins at this stage, where government’s investment in the affected areas is halted, and the standards of living begin to drop (Scudder, 1993:130-131). As in the case of China’s Three Gorges Dam, where government investment was stalled in anticipation of the planned dam reconstruction and resettlement, by the time resettlement finally commenced, the standards of living had already deteriorated in the reservoir region (Jackson and Sleigh, 2000:231).

The second level of the first stage is when the people to be resettled are informed of the plan to relocate them. At this stage, stress-related behaviours begin to emerge in a number of

ways, including shock, denial, agitation, etc. In the case of the Kariba Dam resettlement, for example, six thousand people who resided downstream from the dam initially refused to move, leading to conflict that broke out following police intervention to force them from their habitations (Colson, 1971:21). Also, a few respondents in the Mohale Dam resettlement case in Lesotho had indicated that they initially wanted to refuse to move, but were informed that it was not their decision to make. The government had already decided and *gazetted* the plan, and it cannot be reversed. The absolute power of the state embedded in the principle of *eminent domain*, which will be discussed in the next chapter on ethical issues, affords the state authority to acquire land for public purpose, outside the approval of private owners. It is this position of the state that allows governments to impose resettlement on citizens. In order to minimise stress-related effects, Scudder asserts that active participation of affected people in the planning and implementation of resettlement must be incorporated (2005:33), even if certain decisions are inaccessible to them, as is the nature of forced resettlement.

The significance of resettler participation is not only necessary to minimise stress-related effects but it also has practical implications, and relates to the choices people have and their ability to influence decision-making. Whether or not resettlers have access to choices and the kinds of choices afforded to them, may affect their ability to recover post-resettlement. The findings on the Chandil Dam resettlement case in Chapter Thirteen will show that the limited choices that resettled people had with regard to housing compensation, led to many people choosing cash compensation instead of constructed houses, and this affected their ability to recover from lost houses. This indicates that resettler participation, when incorporated, it should be in a manner that is meaningful to the affected people, and has a tangible influence in implementation processes. Hence, the kind and level of resettler participation is vital to the way stage one of resettlement works out, and the consequences thereof.

According to Scudder, in order to secure a successful resettlement programme, resources for resettlement processes, and opportunities for resettled people post-resettlement, must be mobilised effectively during the conception phase of a resettlement-inducing development project (2005:32). The failure to commit sufficient resources and to secure sufficient opportunities subsequently impedes the possibility of a successful resettlement project. However, research has shown that in most cases, resources allocation is almost always limited, and economic opportunities in the settlement areas are often limited, the result of which is the inability of the affected people to re-establish and improve their livelihoods after

forced relocation (Evrard and Goudineau, 2004:959; Scudder, 2005:61). As later discussions will show, such outcomes may be the result of a combination of factors including budget limitations, limited timeframes, a lack of political will, other contextual social dynamics, etc. (De Wet, 2006; Downing 1996; Scudder, 2005).

In the Zambian Kariba Dam resettlement, for example, officials showed commitment to carrying out a successful resettlement process, but were hindered by limited time for planning, insufficient resources allocated, a lack of administrative capacity, and a lack of opportunities in the new areas, all factors which are common in many forced resettlement cases (Colson, 1971; Scudder, 2009:37).

In its form as a five stage framework published in 1993, the second stage of the FSF included initial infrastructure development, which preceded physical relocation (Scudder, 1993:130-135). However, as outlined in the previous publication in 1981, and subsequent publications in 2005 and 2009, the initial infrastructure development component of the FSF is incorporated in this first stage. This is a critical stage where houses and other amenities must be constructed in preparation for people to be moved. The extent to which resettled people are able to recover their losses – particularly of assets and access to services and other resources – is determined by the ability of the project authorities to provide the necessary infrastructure at this stage.

Oftentimes when people are forcefully moved, they are promised a better life and better services after relocation; yet, in many cases, people are moved before essential infrastructure is put up (Clark, 2009:185). Even in the Egypt's Aswan High Dam resettlement case – one of the few cases of resettlement which became successful in re-establishing and improving the living standards of the majority of resettlers – not all facilities that had been promised had been put up when people were moved into new areas (Scudder, 2005:66). Although the government had promised to reclaim lost land through the implementation of an irrigation scheme in the new areas, irrigation facilities had not been installed and the land was not yet ready for ploughing when the people moved in (Abu-Zeid and El-Shibini, 1997:213; Scudder, 2005:73-74).

Stage two: Adjusting and coping

This is the stage when the physical relocation process commences, and according to Scudder, it can take years, even with relatively small groups of resettlers (2005:34). Physical relocation

in the Mohale Dam resettlement case, where only 321 families were relocated, took roughly six years to complete, and was undertaken in two phases (Devitt and Hitchcock, 2010:70). In a study exploring 32 cases of both voluntary and involuntary resettlement in the 1970s, Scudder found that it was only in one case, where stage two was completed in less than three years (Scudder, 2005:34). In the rest of the cases, physical relocation lasted for a minimum of five years, and in extreme cases could take more than ten years (ibid.:34). In most cases, physical relocation takes longer because it happens in stages. As in the cases of the Mohale and Chandil dams, people residing in low-lying areas were usually the first to be moved to make way for the construction and filling of the dam. As the engineering project develops, other groups are moved. Hence, Scudder asserts that stage two is more likely to overlap with stage one, particularly the initial infrastructure development aspect (Scudder, 2009:39).

When the framework was first developed as published in 1981, the second stage was referred to as “The Transition Stage” (Scudder, 1981:14), which represented the transitional period that resettled people go through, as they encounter the physical, psychological, social and environmental changes. In subsequent years, the stage was renamed “The Adjusting and Coping Stage” which emphasised the process of not only transitioning but also settling in and attempting to cope with the adjustment (Scudder, 2005:34). Even in its most recent naming as the “coping with the initial drop in living standards that tends to follow removal” stage, the implications of transitioning, adjusting and coping are still pertinent as parts of the processes that resettled people go through in this stage (Scudder, 2009:30). A combination of these characteristics – transitioning, adjusting, and coping – makes this phase “the most stressful of the four stages” (Scudder, 2009:39). Hence, Scudder believes that although the framework is more than just about stress, there is no denying that physiological, psychological, and social-cultural stresses are central to resettlement experiences and the subsequent behavioural patterns of resettlers (ibid.:29).

The two major effects of this stage are the declining standards of living and conservativeness on the part of the affected people (Scudder, 2005:34). The failure to timeously develop all the necessary infrastructure, services, and opportunities to facilitate the re-establishment of livelihoods in the areas of relocation, lead to a decline in the standards of living soon after physical relocation. Even in well-planned cases such as the case of the Aswan High Dam, as will be discussed in the next chapter, the standards of living declined in the initial years following relocation, and only began to improve beyond five years into their stay (Fahim,

1983:33; Scudder, 2005:74). One of the fundamental and common elements in resettlement that affect the implementing authorities' ability to meet their infrastructural and services provision targets – which subsequently leads to the decline of the living standards after removal – is limited time for planning and implementation, and unexpected events (Scudder, 2005:66). As in the case of the Kariba dam, where the dam filled much earlier than expected due to persistent rains, people living in low-lying areas had to be relocated in haste (Colson, 1971). As a result, significant decline in the standards of living immediately followed physical relocation in the Kariba case. Later discussions on the 'inherent complexities' approach will reflect in more detail why development projects, particularly in developing countries, often fall behind scheduled timeframes.

However, the Mohale Dam resettlement case provides a contrasting exemplar in this regard, and the ethnographic analysis will later show this. In the initial ten years following physical relocation, the LHDA implemented a relief cash grant for landless resettlers. This was meant to cater for the immediate losses following resettlement, while the affected people adjusted to their new environment. Landless resettlers would have typically had access to agricultural land through certain social arrangements, also to be discussed later, and their forced resettlement led to the loss of access to such social arrangements. Although this relief grant was not implemented without challenges (detailed accounts will be discussed later in the thesis), the fund provided needed relief, albeit temporarily, and cushioned some resettlers against the immediate decline in the standard of living. However, when the grant depleted after ten years, and with the scarcity of natural resources and economic opportunities in the new areas, the standards of living began to deteriorate. Later discussions will speak further to the issues which were at play in this case.

In order to cope with the stressful effects of not only the imposed drastic changes but also the declining standards of living, Scudder asserts that as a norm – exceptions notwithstanding – the resettled people tend to portray “risk aversion” as opposed to risk taking, and appear to be “clinging to the familiar” (Scudder, 1981:14; 2005:34; 2009:40). This is expressed in their reluctance to explore new ways of living, insisting on their familiar modes of subsistence where possible, and attempting to replicate their previous structures and symbols (Scudder, 1981:14; 2005:34). For Scudder, this is their way of coping with the imposed changes and the uncertainty that comes with the changes (Scudder, 1981:14).

Downing (1996:42) gives an example of resettlers clinging to the familiar and attempting to replicate previous structures and symbols, in relating the accounts of resettlement of three communities in central Mexico who were resettled due to the Zimapan Dam. When permitted to rename the main street in their new area, they named it after the river along which they had previously resided. Furthermore, clashes were reported to have ensued among the communities regarding who would reside along the “River” banks, even though the actual river was not there.

Stage three: Community formation and economic Development

In this stage, the characteristics of risk-aversion and clinging to the familiar begin to fade. It is in this phase when resettled people begin to experiment with other modes of living and establishing new social networks to initiate the re-establishment of their livelihoods. This stage can commence from two years into the new areas onwards, depending on the activities and availability of opportunities (Scudder, 2009:41). According to Scudder, there are two major factors necessary for the drastic change associated with this third stage to occur; availability of sustainable opportunities, and radical change in the attitudes and behaviour patterns on the part of the resettled people (Scudder, 2005:37). Behaviour change among the resettled people may follow as they settle into the new areas and become familiar with their new environment.

The availability of opportunities is as much dependent on the exposure to resources and services in the new areas, as it is about the manner in which the planning stage was undertaken and the kinds of provisions made in the processes. A lack of opportunities in the new areas creates a dependency syndrome, which is a conducive condition for prolonging risk aversion and clinging to the familiar (Scudder, 2005:38). Scudder contends that project authorities who claim that dependency syndrome is an inherent characteristic of resettlers are, in fact, blame-shifting, because contrary to the sentiment, it is a lack of economic opportunities that results in what can be seen as a dependency syndrome (ibid.:38). In actuality, Scudder, from his extensive research, has found that all over the world, where opportunities are available, resettlers tend to be willing to diversify their economic activities, which is indicative of risk-taking on the part of the affected people, and can only be cultivated in the presence of opportunities (Scudder, 1981:14; Scudder, 2005:38).

In some cases, risk taking can extend to the exploration of opportunities beyond initial settlement areas, in search of opportunities elsewhere, once available economic opportunities in the new settlements have been exhausted – or even when they have not been (Scudder,

1981:14). During the fieldwork in the Mohale case, for example, many resettlers, particularly the heads of households, whether men or women, had migrated into the urban areas of the capital city in search for jobs, some even outside the country. Although labour migration is a historical phenomenon in Lesotho, one that is still prevalent country wide, it is argued here that for people who resettled from Mohale, which is rural and further from the capital city, and moved into the peri-urban or urban areas, it may have increased their prospects of finding job opportunities or to pursue other economic activities in the city. The Indian case study, in relation to the Chandil Dam, will reflect how proximity to the urban areas, and perceived economic opportunities, affect resettler preferences of resettlement areas.

Notwithstanding, project authorities can also initiate economic activities to support the re-establishment of livelihoods in the new settlements, and this is something that needs to be planned for, adequately funded and implemented intentionally and systematically. Service provision is another area in which project authorities have a responsibility to deliver, through infrastructure development and management, in order to enable economic development in the new areas. Egypt's Aswan High Dam and China's Three Gorges Dam provide classical examples of how a collaborative approach – involving governments, non-governmental organisations, the private sector, etc. – can be employed to augment service provision and economic development in situations of forced resettlement (Fahim, 1983:33; McDonald, et al., 2008:88; McDonald and Webber, 2008; Scudder, 2005:60). However, it remains the responsibility of project implementing authorities to initiate this process and to plan and implement it with a long-term view.

However, as indicated earlier, the availability of opportunities is not the only success factor necessary for the transition to occur in stage three; radical change in the behaviour patterns on the part of affected people is another. Change in behaviour requires resettlers to begin changing their attitudes towards their new areas to see them as their new homes, and begin to capitalise on available opportunities (Scudder, 2005:37). The alternative could be for resettlers to continue to cling to the symbolism and sentimentality of their old homes, which in itself is not inherently negative, but if they fail to simultaneously open up to the new communities as their own, it will only deter the process of community formation.

Institutional processes can also aid behaviour change and community formation, through active participation of affected people – both resettlers and host community members – and

initiating activities that promote cohesion among different affected groups. Hence, how resettlement is prepared for in stage one is critical in determining how the following stages unfold. The LHDA has a good programme when it comes to community formation, that encourages sharing of the benefits of resettlement among host and resettler groups. This is in light of the fact that once groups of people move into an area, they share local resources and services with their hosts, hence a cooperative approach to implementing community development activities is necessary. Later discussions will show how this process unfolded in practice, and the issues that arose.

Stage four: Handing over and incorporation

This is the last stage of resettlement, where the project is handed over to more enduring structures such as government institutions, non-governmental organisations, the private sector, etc., or to the second generation of resettlers (Scudder, 2005:40). For Scudder, a resettlement project would have been successful if the living standards of the second generation – the first group to be born in the new areas or those who were born in the original areas but grew up in the new settlements – would continue to improve (ibid.:40). Two of the conditions necessary for resettlement to reach this stage and for the living standards to continue to improve are that economic opportunities must be sustainable; and that the second and subsequent generations have the capacity and commitment to continue to leverage those opportunities (Scudder, 2005:38) and possibly create more.

In order for opportunities to be sustainable, into the second and subsequent generations, resettlement projects have to be planned for with a long-term view. This means that mechanisms such as cash compensation, though necessary in resettlement situations, must be understood for what they can and cannot achieve. Cash compensation may provide immediate relief from losses associated with resettlement, but cannot be the basis upon which living standards are sought to be improved in the long-term. Hence, Cernea argues that compensation alone leads to impoverishment; instead, mechanisms of benefit-sharing must be put in place to drive more sustainable programmes of livelihoods re-establishment (2008; 2009). The issues related to compensation and the recommended mechanisms of benefit-sharing will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Six. This makes resettler participation a crucial factor in resettlement planning and implementation (Bartolome, et al., 2000:22-26).

However, for a number of factors, Scudder argues that at this stage, some of the common features of resettlement include the inability of implementing agencies to hand over responsibilities to more enduring institutions such as government ministries (Scudder,

1993:126). With factors such as what he terms “organisational jealousy” coming into play, Scudder found that in some cases, as in the case of the LHDA, government ministries were reluctant to take over responsibility for projects that were not started by them (Scudder, 2005:40). In addition, when handing over is meant to occur, there is a tendency for local institutions to fail to maintain infrastructure and services (Scudder, 1993:126). Again, the LHDA provides an example in this regard. Some of the houses in the project site in Mohale, which had been built during the construction phase, were handed over to Lesotho’s Ministry of Tourism to accommodate tourists who visit the project site. With poor maintenance over the years, many of them are gradually losing structural integrity.

3.4 The Contribution of Scudder’s Four Stage Framework (FSF)

The FSF has been instrumental in enabling an understanding of resettlement as a processual, systematic undertaking. In this regard, the different stages and the activities entailed in each stage, are not discrete or independent, but are interrelated elements that speak to each other. That is, the manner in which the first stage is planned for and implemented, determines the outcomes in subsequent stages, and the results reflected in these subsequent stages are, in turn, indicative of the implementation of the first stage.

Hence, where planning is undertaken more inclusively, effectively and sufficiently, involving participatory strategies, adequate resources, and adequate time allocation, the living standards among resettled people will more likely only decline temporarily, but improve in the long-term. As stated above, living standards tend to decline during the initial transition into stage two, and the discussion in some of the examples of resettlement cases that are explored in this thesis will show why this tends to be the case. In addition, as Scudder (2005:37) asserts, the context in which resettlement takes place, and the opportunities availed therein, plays a significant role in the outcomes of forced resettlement on affected people. In this context, the framework informs the broader planning of resettlement processes, and what can be expected at the different phases, depending on the initial planning, allocation of resources and adopted approaches – whether participatory or non-participatory.

Furthermore, the framework is favourable in its strength as also enabling behavioural analysis of resettled people. In this sense, the framework is instrumental in informing planners on the need to employ activities that can encourage or facilitate behavioural transition among resettlers, from withdrawal to opening up, leading to community formation. Such activities may include collaborative projects between the resettled and host community members, as in

the case of the Mohale Dam resettlement, to encourage cooperation and potentially expedite community formation. However, issues related to collaborative projects between the new and old community members in resettlement will be discussed, as reflected in the studied Mohale case.

3.5 Criticisms of Scudder's Four Stage Framework (FSF)

While Scudder's FSF remains one of the main theoretical tools in the study of development-induced resettlement, like many theoretical frameworks it has not gone uncriticised. The FSF have been largely criticised for operating at the "high level of generalisation", thus being unable to adequately deal with variations (Scudder, 2005:41). Linked to this is the criticism that the framework was overly influenced by a single case study – Gwembe Tonga (Partridge, et al., 1982). Gwembe Tonga was a homogenous population, naturally bearing significantly similar socio-economic characteristics (Colson, 1971), which makes it less difficult to characterise their behavioural responses in a specific way. However, this may not be the case in projects that involve the resettlement of socially and economically heterogeneous groups of people. Nevertheless, although the refinement of the framework has, over the years been informed to a greater extent by the Kariba Dam resettlement case than by any other, its early development was influenced by research from a number of resettlement cases, including those not dam-related (McDonald-Wilmsen and Webber, 2010:147; Scudder, 1981:9; Scudder, 2005:32).

Another criticism of the framework is that, while Scudder believes that stages are an effective way of breaking down complex processes that occur over a long period of time, Weist argues that, on the contrary, stages have a "static quality", which makes it challenging to deal with the dynamism of the behaviour and coping mechanisms in forced relocation (Weist, in Scudder, 2005:43). Even in well-planned resettlement projects, the transition from one phase to another does not always follow a linear fashion that can be neatly described in stages. Scudder, in fact, concurs that in reality, resettlement processes do not always occur one after the other. In some cases, handing over in stage four can happen before economic development and community formation in stage three (Scudder, 2005:43). Still in some cases, two stages can happen concurrently (ibid.:43). Hence, analysing resettlement projects in terms of stages may be complicated, if it is for the purposes of informing planning and implementation, when resettlement processes do not always follow a particular stages or linear fashion.

The FSF was formulated to deal with how the processes of resettlement affect resettled people, and how people respond in this regard. And because it focusses on processes and behaviour, it is unable to adequately deal with causal factors, for example. Therefore, apart from foretelling what happens in resettlement, it cannot sufficiently explain why the consequences of resettlement tend to take the direction they do. Owing to these and other limitations in dealing with a wide range of resettlement cases – and while acknowledging its significance – there was a need for a theory that could capture some dynamics underpinning the predominantly negative consequences of forced resettlement.

Cernea's Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction (IRR) model was later formulated in the mid-1980s, systematically outlining vulnerabilities that people get exposed to when they are forcibly moved from their original to new places (Cernea, 1990; 1997; 2000). The model has subsequently provided a premise upon which many scholars and practitioners have tried to understand the consequences of resettlement; arguably one of the most used conceptual tools in the study of forced resettlement. It provides a more critical analysis of the consequences of resettlement, which can be – and has been – used to inform policy making, planning and implementation of many resettlement programmes. The next section forms a discussion of the IRR model.

3.6 The Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction (IRR) Model

Cernea's IRR model is an attempt to explain why forced resettlement almost always leads to negative consequences. While the FSF explains 'what' happens to the people being affected in resettlement situations, and 'how' they respond to what happens, the IRR model explains 'why' resettlement leads to certain kinds of negative consequences. Additionally, similar to the FSF, which identifies a pattern of occurrences in forced resettlement and the responses it triggers in stages, the IRR model also identifies a pattern. However, the IRR model identifies a pattern related to the causes of negative consequences in resettlement cases. In this sense, Cernea attempts to answer the question, why is it that resettlement leads to certain kinds of consequences that people get exposed to in forced resettlement situations? In responding to this question, Cernea identified what he calls 'the inherent risks' in resettlement situations, particularly involuntary resettlement (Cernea, 2000:19). The second question that the IRR model seeks to respond to is, how can the inherent risks of resettlement be prevented from turning into reality?

The strength of the model to explain the consequences of resettlement lies in its multi-layered functions of prediction, diagnosis, and problem-resolution (Cernea, 2000:21-22). These, the model achieves through deconstructing the complex, multifaceted process of resettlement into different kinds of elements, elements that lead to the consequences of resettlement, reflected in the experiences of affected people (ibid.:19). When these elements have been identified, the model then prescribes measures to prevent them from materialising.

The fundamental issue with involuntary resettlement is that due to the fact that people are moved from their often longstanding resources and livelihoods, it imposes a loss of various forms of capital – socio-cultural, physical, and financial – which, in turn, inflicts disempowerment, helplessness and impoverishment on those directly affected (Dwivedi, 1997a:3). The relationship between displacement and the loss of capital will be explained further in the discussion of De Wet's Socio-spatial analysis to resettlement. This analysis recognises that there is a direct link between people's environment and their livelihoods; and that in many rural communities, which in many cases is where the effects of forced displacement and resettlement are felt, established livelihoods are linked to the natural environment (De Wet, 1995). However, the relationship between people's livelihoods and their environment is not exclusive to the physical environment, it also includes the social and economic landscape.

Hence, forced and abrupt separation from their social and physical environment exposes resettlers to the eight risks identified by Cernea as: "landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalisation, food insecurity, increased morbidity, loss of access to common property resources, and community disarticulation" (Cernea, 2000:20). According to Downing (2002:8), the failure to prevent these intrinsic risks may lead to new forms of poverty amongst affected people. For Downing, these effects of resettlement are so consistent that, although they differ in severity across various cases, they are often reflected in cases of forced resettlement regardless of the sector or industry in which they takes place (2002:8). Thus, having identified the risks, specific, targeted strategies must be employed in order to reverse the risks and build towards reconstruction in forced resettlement. The reconstruction measures prescribed by the model are: "land-based resettlement, reemployment, house reconstruction, social inclusion, improved healthcare, adequate nutrition, restoration of community assets and services, as well as networks and community rebuilding" (Cernea, 2000:20). The risks, together with the recommended measures to reverse them are discussed below.

1. (a) Landlessness

Productive land is a fundamental asset upon which people's livelihoods, productive systems, and commercial activities are predicated, and according to Cernea (1997:1572; 2000:23), people's forced removal from this asset forms a "principal form of decapitalisation". This kind of loss due to forced resettlement is even more articulated in areas where, beyond residential land, people's livelihoods are mainly reliant on agricultural produce as in agrarian societies. According to Downing (2002:9), impoverishment from the loss of land may take four forms: (1) the initial loss of land to a development project, (2) damages to the land's productive potential in the surrounding areas, where resettled people may no longer have access, (3) consequential losses in the productive value of land on account of environmental impacts, and (4) loss of land due to the inability of the affected people to acquire alternative land. As a contribution of this thesis, a fifth form can be added; where landless people lose access to social arrangements through which they access land use.

The fourth point is, in fact, the reason for the surfacing of new poverty, alongside old poverty, as the inability to gain alternative land inhibits the ability to recover from losses and re-establish lost livelihoods. In the state of Orissa in eastern India, for example, mining resettlement led to the loss of land reaching up to five times the pre-displacement rates (Downing, 2002a:9). Kenya's Kiambere Hydropower resettlement reduced land holding from an average of 13 to 6 hectares (Cernea, 2000:23). As a result, people who had access to a sustainable form of livelihood and a productive system were left susceptible to a new form of poverty – landlessness. A study by Eguavoen and Tesfai (2012:54), among the people resettled on account of the Koga Irrigation Scheme, in Ethiopia, reveals how some resettlers who were once self-sufficient farmers have been reduced to a hand-to-mouth way of life, after their forced resettlement in which they lost their land.

"When we used to live in rural Enamirt, the whole city benefited from us...we had vast land where we were able to collect many crops and grazing fodder and the surplus we sold in the market here in town...now they see me buying fodder from the market and they say I am a poor immigrant" (Eguavoen and Tesfai, 2012:54).

As indicated by Ibanez and Moya (2010:168), mainly due to marginalisation and shortage of productive land, displaced households are often unable to catch up on their lost livelihoods after their forced resettlement. They are more likely to get trapped in a cycle of poverty with

new forms of poverty being generated. In effect, the loss of land in land-based economies may snow-ball into other kinds of disorientations such as ill-health due to high stress levels imposed on affected people (Mahapatra, 1999:203).

Landlessness can, in some cases, translate into a loss of income, and therefore, increased poverty. The Saguling Reservoir in Indonesia provides a good example in this regard, where landownership decreased by 47% after resettlement, resulting in loss of income to nearly 50% of resettled people compared to pre-resettlement (Cernea, 2000:24). The Mohale Dam resettlement project also exemplifies this effect of income losses, where some people were reliant on growing cannabis as a cash crop before resettlement, and subsequently lost income due to resettlement.

Where alternative land may not be provided for affected people, as in many cases due to the growing global land pressure, alternative means of livelihoods must be explored (Cernea, 2000:35). However, evidence suggests that opportunities for new forms of livelihoods in the new areas are often limited with the increased demand resulting from resettlement-caused influx (Lassailly-Jacob, 1996:197). Over 80% of displaced Batwa population in Uganda, forest dwellers who were displaced on account of conservation, were not compensated for lost land, including communal land, and remained landless for over six years from the time of their displacement (Cernea and Schmidt-Soltau, 2003:1823). Of the majority who remained landless after their forced displacement, 66% found alternative residence squatting with private owners with no form of legal security (ibid.:1823).

(b) From landlessness to land-based re-establishment

Land-based resettlement involves a land-for-land arrangement, where resettled people who lost land to resettlement are provided with alternative land in the new areas to which they are relocated. According to Lassailly-Jacob (1996:196-197), land-for-land does not only mean that adequate surface area must be provided, but also that provided land must be adequately productive. It also means that the affected people are given full title of ownership, and are allowed to farm the way they know how, without “sophisticated” agricultural methods imposed on them, particularly in the initial stages when stress levels are still high (ibid.:198). In addition, it means that where applicable, provision of common land must follow where access to common property has been lost (Lassailly-Jacob, 1996:196).

However, Cernea (2000:36) asserts that the provision of alternative land is one of the most difficult aspects of resettlement to implement, due to growing land scarcity; and, therefore, it requires innovative approaches. In China's Shuikou Dam resettlement, for example, previously unproductive land on the hills around the reservoirs were converted into flat terraces for horticulture and into forested areas (ibid.:36). This effort not only transformed the physical environment but also the socio-economic landscape. The forested areas provided work and livelihoods for approximately 20,000 resettlers (Cernea, 2000:36).

Nonetheless, transforming unproductive land into useable land does not only require creativity but also financial and human resources. In the case of Shuikou Dam, the project paid significant amounts for mechanical equipment and human capital to recover large portions of land (Cernea, 2000:36). In contexts where financial resources are lacking, such as in developing nations, land recovery measures may take a long time or even be considered infeasible owing to financial costs. In this regard, the absence of alternative land in the new areas makes land-based resettlement one of the hardest measures to achieve in rehabilitating affected people after their forced resettlement. This may consequently render all the knowledge of land and its associated coping mechanisms non-transferrable and useless in the new settlements (Cernea, 1997:1574; Downing, et al., in Downing, 2002a:9).

As a result, the alternative practice is to compensate lost land with cash grants, which, however, has been proven to be ineffective in re-establishing livelihoods. There is enough evidence to suggest that the money received for compensation of land is rarely used to replace the lost land or to purchase other fixed assets; the general practice is to use it for immediate needs such as food, school expenses, clothing, etc. (Mburugu, 1994:53; Slater and Mphale, 2009:15). Although other reasons for not being able to replace land have to do with growing land scarcity, as in the cases of Lesotho and India, resettlement comes with extra expenses that people incur, and oftentimes insufficient provision is made to cover immediate expenses. This leaves affected people under immense pressure to use compensation money, regardless of its purpose, to cover immediate losses. Hence, Scudder (2005:32) asserts that in stage two, living standards can be expected to drop significantly.

In addition, land-based rehabilitation is further complicated by other socio-legal dynamics. Land tenure systems can be very complex in some societies, where traditional systems established at the local level come into contact with legal systems at the national level. Rao

(2005:39) cites the example of Santhal Pargana, India, where some tribal groups are considered illegal occupants of the land they have been cultivating for years and depend on, on account of the state level Santhal Pargana Tenancy Act of 1949. In this context, the people in question are not regarded as owners of the land they occupy. In many cases, compensation for land is based on “ownership” as recognised by national laws, and not necessarily the “right” to use land. Moreover, access to land for landless people may come in the form of social arrangements that afford them land use, yet this may not be recognised for compensation purposes (Bartolome, et al., 2000:9; Jackson and Sleight, 2000:233). Although resettlement policies now typically provide for compensation for people who may not have conventional entitlements to land but whose livelihoods are dependent on it, the implementation of this policy prescription remains rather obscure (The World Bank, 2013: Section 15(b)). The findings from the studied Chandil case in India will attest to this assertion.

2. (a) Joblessness

The risk of job losses in resettlement situations is especially high in urban areas, but it also applies to rural areas where people are employed in agriculture or manual labour (Cernea, 1997:1573). Yet, recovering from lost jobs in the new areas can be extremely difficult and costly. According to Cernea (2000:24), job losses can occur in three ways: (i) in urban areas, in the industry and services sector, (ii) in rural areas, where landless labourers lose access to employment by landowners or to land use through such arrangements as sharecropping, and (iii) small enterprise owners such as craftsmen and shopkeepers may also lose access to markets due to involuntary resettlement and displacement.

In a study which was undertaken in Jebba, Nigeria, Olawepo (2008:119) shows how families who were resettled due to the construction of the Jebba Lake Basin were economically displaced, and how that affected and limited their informal economic activities. In this regard, the hardest hit were those who were resettled to areas further away from their original places, who subsequently lost their occupations as fishermen, hunters and farmers (ibid:119).

The challenge with certain kinds of job losses such as self-employment in small enterprises is that, in many cases compensation is not channelled towards recovering lost livelihoods. Instead, compensation may be granted for lost assets alone. This is exemplified in the Madagascar Tana Plain project as cited by Cernea (2000:24), where small enterprise owners such as those who ran workshops, food stalls, and artisan units, were not compensated for

their lost livelihoods, resulting in significant impoverishment among the displaced. When people are forcibly displaced, not only do they lose assets that facilitate their businesses, but also “established markets and clientele” (Mathur, 2013:18).

Although in some cases the development project that induces resettlement may provide employment to some resettled people, this is usually on a temporary basis, and not adequate in re-establishing livelihoods in the long-term. China’s Three Gorges Dam provides an example in this regard, where many people were employed in the project during the construction phase, which increased income levels significantly during that period, but the living standards drastically declined when many lost their jobs when construction came to an end (Wilmsen and van Hulten, 2017:100).

Additionally, the loss of occupations that derive value directly from the land may be difficult to counteract, even in cases where alternative employment is secured (Mahapatra, 1999:203). Where livelihoods are based on deriving value from what the land yields, most capable family members are more likely to be involved in the work, but where an alternative form of employment is implemented, only one or two members of the family may find employment, with other members remaining without employment (ibid.:203). This may not necessarily translate into improved living standards for the whole family because, unlike land, which tends to provide for the family as a whole, salaried employment only rewards one person.

The effects of unemployment may be so severe as to go beyond poverty and reduced standards of living, extending to other forms of social-ills. In a study conducted by Mankodi (in Mahapatra, 1999:204) with regard to resettlement in the Ukai Project in Gujarat, India, incidences of social ills such as alcohol abuse and gambling were reported to have increased after resettlement owing to “the imposed idleness”. Criminal activities are also more likely to increase in cases where unemployment rates are high, and this includes situations where unemployment has been imposed by forced resettlement and displacement.

(b) From joblessness to reemployment

Reemployment requires investment in the areas where people are resettled to, particularly those in which a significant number of people are moved into one area, increasing the demand for job opportunities. This may be achieved through the establishment of enterprises or community development projects. However, Cernea (2000:24) asserts that this requires serious commitment on the part of not only the implementing authorities but also other key stakeholders such as government and the private sector.

Although a multi-stakeholder approach may be effective in creating employment opportunities in cases where people lose their jobs to forced displacement, the success of such efforts is subject to an enabling socio-economic and political environment. This means that their success is dependent on the context in which the enterprises, services, or community development projects are implemented. Such initiatives cannot escape the contextual dynamics on the ground, and are more likely to mirror such dynamics. In the Mohale case, where community development projects were initiated in rural and peri-urban areas, mainly in the form of small enterprises, a lack of management skills, limited markets, and limited resources – all characteristics of the economic landscape in rural settings – contributed to the failure of such initiatives to provide employment and re-establish livelihoods.

Reemployment may also be forged through skills training, such as in the case of the Chandil Dam resettlement. However, skills training alone is not sufficient to counter the risks of impoverishment in a form of joblessness. If skills training is to be effective in improving livelihoods, it has to be accompanied by employment (Cernea, 2000:37). The Dudichua Coal Project in India enabled the employment of nearly 60% of displaced farmers through skills training (ibid.:37). Conversely, the Vindhyachal Super Thermal Power Project in India provides a less convincing case, where, of the 56% of the affected families studied, only 21% were gainfully employed (Mahapatra, 1999:204).

3. (a) *Homelessness*

Like the loss of land, the loss of a home is a fundamental form of impoverishment, which can have severe repercussions for those affected if not immediately reversed. When people are forced to move out from their homes, they lose their “natural and man-made assets” (Cernea, 2000:25). In all cases where people are physically resettled, they lose their homes. If this form of loss is not recovered through the provision of a new home in the new area, it marks the beginning of impoverishment, and can spill over into other kinds of impoverishment. For some resettlers, the loss of a home may also symbolise cultural and identity displacement (Cernea, 1997:1573; Cernea, 1998:50; Sapkota, 2001:150). A home is a place where rituals and cultural activities are performed, and one that provides a sense of belonging for those who reside in it. When forcefully relocated, the sense of loss is usually more than just the loss of a physical structure, but also has psychological and cultural effects (Cernea, 1997:1573).

The feeling of the loss for some people may be so severe that the provision of a new home may not be sufficient to make up for the loss. Some respondents in the Mohale Dam resettlement case stated that if it was not for inundation, they would go back to their old homes, even years after physical relocation took place, despite new houses having been provided for them. In the Kariba case, one of the terms proposed by the resettled people to the government at the time of their resettlement was that the people should be allowed to reoccupy the land which was not inundated after the dam had filled (Colson, 1971:23). This is indicative of the kind of attachment that people tend to have with their ancestral homes, which may make the effects of their loss more significant.

Although the effects of homelessness may be long-term for some resettlers, Cernea contends that this kind of loss tends to be only temporary for others (2000:25). In fact, where there is political will, this is one of the least complicated risks to prevent (ibid.:38). While in some cases resettled people may complain about the quality and/or utility of the houses they are provided with, as in the case of Aswan High Dam resettlement (Fahmi, 1993:84; Scudder, 2016:25), providing the housing structure itself is practically less complicated than restoring losses such as land, which are dependent on land availability. However, where for a variety of reasons, compensation for house reconstruction is either not provided or is insufficiently provided for, it is mainly the most vulnerable who may be subjected to chronic homelessness (Sapkota, 2001:151).

The ethnographic chapter on the case of Chandil will later show that, even in cases where resettled people are unable to rebuild houses immediately after physical resettlement because of limitations such as the insufficient cash compensation, resettled people often prioritise house reconstruction (Cernea, 2000:39). In some cases, as Cernea argues, people use their compensation for other losses to rebuild houses (ibid.:39). Hence, although this may ensure that people have shelter, it can also lead to other kinds of impoverishment, where people are unable to recover other losses because they used their cash compensation to build houses.

In some cases, as in many cases of resettlement in India, resettlers are given cash compensation for lost houses, valued in market related terms (Fernandes, 1998; Ghatak and Ghosh, 2011; Ghatak, et al., 2013; Parasuraman, 1999; Mahapatra, 1999). Because of the limitations associated with market value approaches, such as under-accounting for or undervaluation of lost assets, the cash compensation given to the affected people tends to be insufficient to afford them the reconstruction of new houses in the new areas (Cernea, 2003;

Parasuraman, 1999; Mahapatra, 1999). As a result, where people are given cash compensation instead of reconstructed houses, the risk of homelessness may be turned into reality, either on a short-term, long-term or permanent basis.

(b) From homelessness to house reconstruction

In order to prevent homelessness and build towards the reconstruction of houses, Cernea (2000:40) argues that resettlement policies must explicitly provide for the improvement of living conditions, and not restoration. As indicated earlier in Scudder's FSF, the standards of living in the areas of resettlement begin to deteriorate prior to relocation during the planning stage, and as such property values begin to decrease due to decreased investment in the areas. Scudder (1993:130-131) argues that people's assets, and by extension their living standards, do not only begin to deteriorate when they are physically moved from their original homes, but from the very first time they learn that they will be resettled. From that time, they cease investing in fixed assets such as houses, livestock, and some even stop cultivating the land as they are already battling, psychologically and otherwise, with the idea of leaving a long-standing way of life to start a new one, often unwillingly (ibid.:130-131).

In this regard, if compensation for houses is not appreciated at the full market value, but rather at a lower replacement value, the result will be homelessness or declined housing conditions (Cernea, 1997:1573; Cernea, 1998:50; Cernea, 2000:39). In the Chandil Dam resettlement, some respondents are reported to have had to save money over the years following their physical relocation, in order to build new houses, as they could not afford housing in the new areas with the money that had been allocated for compensation of their lost homes. Many in such cases were forced to find alternative places to live, such as moving in with family members or living in rented houses, which raises many other issues related to incomes, impacts on social relations, etc.

Although over the years, with the development and improvement of policy in the Chandil case, a provision for house reconstruction was implemented, this was accompanied by other complexities, which led to some people still choosing cash compensation, instead. Later discussions in Chapter Thirteen will reflect on this in greater detail. As a result, some of those who chose cash compensation delayed the reconstruction of homes, with some houses still incomplete during the current study's field work in 2016, over two decades later.

According to Cernea (2000:39), improved housing entails:

“More square footage per house, better quality housing material, better roofing material, connection to basic services such as water, electricity, etc., safe sanitation facilities, space for house gardens”.

To ensure that improved housing is provided for affected people, the best approach is to provide housing in the new areas, instead of giving cash compensation for house reconstruction (Cernea, 2000:39). Not only will this guarantee affected people a home after relocation, but it also removes the burden of responsibility for house construction from the affected people, who have already suffered multiple disruptions. While the affected people must be consulted to incorporate their preferences in houses construction, logistical responsibilities must not be imposed on them.

In cases where resettled people are not provided with houses at the time of their relocation, it may take years for them to rebuild homes, naturally leading to homelessness. In a study conducted in two of the villages where people were resettled in relation to the Akosombo Dam in Ghana, only 34% of houses had been completed 15 years after relocation, leaving the rest exposed and vulnerable to homelessness; and in some villages as low as only 2% of houses had been built (Tamakloe, 1994:102). In some resettlement projects in India, where new housing had not been constructed for resettled people at the time of their relocation, they had to be moved to temporary structures – “emergency housing centres” Mahapatra (1999:204). In such cases, affected people ended up “homeless” in the long-term due to endless delays by authorities in providing permanent housing (ibid.:204-205).

In sharp contrast, the LHWP offers a good example in this respect, where all resettled households were built houses in the new areas. Furthermore, people were consulted with regard to certain options that were available. Although the kinds of choices allowed were limited, as certain decisions were made by officials, the housing conditions were generally improved. Notwithstanding, some respondents were not entirely happy with the types of houses and their functionality, hence some even made adjustments to accommodate their preferences. Later discussions in the ethnographic chapter will further explore these issues.

4. (a) Marginalisation

Cernea (2000:26) conceptualises marginalisation as the loss of economic power that resettled families are exposed to in forced resettlement situations, which leads to the deterioration in their living conditions and perceived inferiority of status. Marginalisation is one of the effects of resettlement that tends to linger long after physical relocation. Unlike tangible forms of

impoverishment, such as landlessness and homelessness, which can be quantified and replaced, marginalisation often leaves resettled people to their own devices. Because the process of resettlement is one that unfolds over time, the effects of intangible forms of impoverishment such as marginalisation may continue to spiral long after physical relocation (Colson, 1971; De Wet, 1995; Pankhurst, 1992).

This form of impoverishment presents itself in various ways, including cultural, social, psychological, political and economic. The tangible forms of impoverishment tend to be more economic in nature, and are often the ones most researched and engaged with than intangible forms (Fernandes, 2000:212). Intangible losses require significantly more collaborative effort and time, and are mainly dependent on the cooperation of host community members and other stakeholders in the contexts to which people are resettled – such as communities and political leaders.

Cultural marginalisation may present itself in the inability of resettled people to carry out their cultural practices in their new environment, due to a lack of facilities, or because of different kinds of alienation that deter them. Pankhurst (1992:201-210) gives detailed accounts of cultural disruptions and marginalisation in Ethiopia, where, due to changes in administrative regulations and new settlement arrangements, resettled people were prevented from practicing or observing some of their religious and cultural beliefs. This includes burial traditions tied to religious or cultural beliefs.

Cultural marginalisation may also be expressed through the disregarding or undermining of cultural statuses of resettled people in their host communities (Cernea, 2000:26). The effects of being culturally excluded may affect resettlers' access to opportunities and entitlements to resources necessary for their livelihoods (Koenig and Diarra, 2000:341); such as grazing land, forested areas for collection of firewood, water sources, etc. In a study that explored the social impacts and impoverishment risks from resettlement related to the Koga Irrigation Scheme in Ethiopia, Eguavoen and Tesfai (2012:54) show how resettled families were subjected to blatant marginalisation, supposedly identified by their clothing that was different from the host community members'. Having relocated from rural to urban areas, some resettlers found it rather challenging to integrate into urban milieu, and the reported hostility of some host community members added to the difficulty (ibid.:54). An account from one of the respondents in that research reveals the alleged hostility:

“To your surprise, we used to live not far from this town, but in the beginning they considered us as a strange ethnic group, especially the insults that were hurled at our females was shameful for us and created bad feelings for us, but we just tolerated all these things, thinking that tomorrow we’re going to live peacefully” (Eguavoen and Tesfai, 2012:54).

Social marginalisation is related to cultural marginalisation, in that resettled people being subjected to a change in environment, may find themselves in settings they are not accustomed to and do not feel part of. De Wet (1995) in his exploration of villagisation schemes in South Africa, shows how the imposed changes in settlement arrangements saw some people moving into larger communities, different from their previous, smaller communities in which they had felt at home. In this context, a new sense of place was created after resettlement, one which resettled people were not familiar with (ibid.).

The Gumz of Ethiopia, an ethnic group resettled into the Metekel region in the 1980s – as part of a famine controlling strategy by the Ethiopian government – were, for a long time after their resettlement, marginalised and alienated in the region to which they were resettled, for inhabiting the lowlands, which were considered by the highlanders to be disease-ridden and remote (Gebre, 2003:57). In addition to being socially marginalised, the Gumz were politically marginalised; for a long time they were under-represented at the local and regional government levels (ibid.:57). This explains why, in counteracting marginalisation, the cooperation of other stakeholders including political and community leaders is essential.

Another form of marginalisation in forced resettlement is psychological, which is possibly one of the least researched forms when it comes to exploring the effects of resettlement and displacement (Fernandes, 2000:212). Scudder, in his FSF, explores the stress effects of resettlement on affected people, but in his own assertion, the framework is not fundamentally about stress (2009:29). Marginalisation does not only begin once resettled people are living in the new areas; Fernandes (2000:214) argues that resettled people are excluded right from the beginning of the project, where decision-making is done at a higher administrative level, without their involvement. This echoes Scudder’s sentiments that resettlers’ lives begin to be affected even before they are moved (1993:130). By the time they settle into new communities where they are subjected to social and cultural forms of marginalisation, their self-image has already been denigrated from the alienation they experience regarding their own displacement (Fernandes, 2000:214).

(b) From marginalisation to social inclusion

Marginalisation in resettlement situations is partly sustained by unequal power relations and a lack of information on the part of affected people. In order to correct this likely effect and efficiently integrate resettled people into resettlement processes as well as into their new communities, intentional, active strategies must be put in place across the different stages of resettlement.

Power inequality is embedded in all processes that involve multiple stakeholders, more so when such stakeholders occupy different administrative levels in a particular process, and/or are affected in unequitable ways by the process in question. These dynamics must be acknowledged in order to be actively engaged with. In resettlement cases, information and knowledge play a key role in enabling multi-stakeholder collaboration in the planning, implementation and monitoring of resettlement processes. Because affected people often have less access to information in comparison with implementing authorities, who may also be sources of information through their decision-making power and positions, defined lines of communication and information sharing must be put in place in order to include affected people in certain decision making processes.

Furthermore, clear strategies must be designed and implemented, in an effort to enable participation of all stakeholders in the resettlement process. Stakeholders include not only resettled and displaced people, but also the host communities, their leaders, civil society organisations, etc. When these are all actively involved, through information sharing and shared responsibilities, the effects of social, cultural and psychological marginalisation may be minimised. This is provided that information sharing involves giving less knowledgeable people information that is relevant and understandable to them. Implementing authorities, who, because of their skills and access to major decision-making processes, are naturally more knowledgeable about the technical aspects of the project, must endeavour to explain, translate, and communicate information in a manner and language that is easy to understand by stakeholders across the board (Fernandes, 2000:221).

On the other hand, affected people are the ones who hold information regarding the losses to be suffered on the ground, based on their position as the ones who are primarily affected. Hence, their knowledge in this regard must be recognised and actively incorporated in resettlement processes, particularly by the implementing authorities. Also, host communities are more knowledgeable regarding details such as available resources in the new areas and

their management, as well as what it would mean to have a significant number of people moved into their territories. Therefore, their input must also be appreciated throughout the process, in order to permit resettled people access to community resources (Cernea, 2000:41). Such collaborative measures are more likely to ease the integration of resettled people into their new communities. The LHWP, with their defined community participation strategies, provides a good example of resettlement processes that incorporate a multi-stakeholder participation approach. The analysis of data in Chapter Ten will unpack how this unfolded in practice in the Mohale Dam case, and how the dynamics on the ground intersected with these strategies.

5. (a) Food insecurity

Following the loss of productive land, jobs and other means of livelihood to forced resettlement, food insecurity is a predictable consequence experienced by affected people (Cernea, 2000:27). In fact, with the decline in standards of living, more articulated in stage two, as outlined by Scudder (2005:34), food insecurity can be expected to rise after physical relocation, and may linger longer if not adequately addressed. This may be especially more pronounced in cases where people are relocated from rural areas, as their livelihoods would have been typically reliant on farming land. As in the above cited rural Enamirt case in Ethiopia, after relocation, people who previously produced food for their own subsistence subsequently had to buy food as well as other basic needs, increasing the likelihood of food insecurity (Eguavoen and Tesfai, 2012:54).

(b) From food insecurity to adequate nutrition

Measures for preventing the risks of food insecurity from continuing for a long time relate to land-based rehabilitation in rural milieu, and re-employment for livelihood re-establishment in urban settings (Cernea, 2000). Food, as a basic need of human beings, is the fundamental indicator of declined living standards. This may be expressed through the shortage of food or shortage of certain kinds of food items such as protein-rich foods (ibid.:27).

Food insecurity after relocation in agrarian contexts may be linked to lack of access to land, and the time lapse between actual physical relocation and the time when land is ready for cultivation or crops are ready to be harvested. In this regard, food insufficiency may result from a combination of factors including land unavailability, decreased land fertility (which translates into less production), as well as changes in methods of cultivation and choice of

crops (Hakim, 2000:233). The loss of jobs, business opportunities or other means of livelihoods may also precede food insecurity among resettlers in other contexts.

In response to this likely and basic form of impoverishment, it is necessary for resettlement implementing authorities to make provision for some form of relief during the period of preparation for land cultivation, or while resettled people are still settling in and attempting to re-establish their livelihoods. For this kind of relief to be effective, it should be implemented outside actual compensation for lost assets and resources. In the case of Mohale, where a relief grant was implemented at the beginning of resettlement, only the landless resettlers were illegible for this grant, and this meant that affected people who owned land were deprived of this provision, and thus had to use their compensation money for immediate losses related to resettlement.

However, research over the years suggests that, despite efforts to provide relief in the initial stages of resettlement, food insecurity tends to persist, leading to a long-term dependency on external assistance to curb the lack of access to food among resettled people (Cernea, 1997:1575). As in the case of Sri Lanka, in relation to the Victoria Dam resettlement, 55% of resettled families were still reliant on food grants long after their physical relocation (Rew and Driver, in Cernea, 2000:27). This complication is linked to the above discussed limitations of land-based rehabilitation and livelihoods re-establishment through re-employment. This resonates with Scudder's assertion, that for living conditions to improve in stage three of resettlement, there is a need for availability of sustainable opportunities from which resettled people could re-establish their livelihoods (2005:37). The re-establishment of sustainable livelihoods for resettled people, followed by reliable incomes or food productions, has the potential to address food insecurity.

6. (a) Increased morbidity

Food insecurity, psychological distress, joblessness, landlessness, etc. are all the effects that, in turn, reinforce the risk of increased morbidity and mortality (Cernea, 1997:1574; 2000:27). According to Scudder, increased morbidity is more likely to escalate during stage two, when stressful conditions among resettled people are higher (2005:34). In addition, an upsurge in population density in areas of relocation may increase the spread of communicable diseases (Cernea and Kennedy, in Scudder, 1973:52).

Changes in environmental conditions may also play a role in the deterioration of health among resettlers. Artificial lakes and blocked irrigation systems can be fertile ground for the

proliferation of insects, flies, mosquitoes, etc. (Kedia, 2009:99). Hence, diseases such as malaria, yellow fever and schistosomiasis have been widely associated with communities surrounding reservoir areas (Kedia, 2009:99; McCully, 1996:87-95). In their study of the conservation-displaced Batwa people of Uganda, Cernea and Schmidt-Soltau (2003:1823) found that the rate of child mortality had increased to 47.7% in the post-relocation period. Nearly half of the children born in the resettled areas died before their fifth birthday. This figure was three times the national average of 14.1% (Cernea and Schmidt-Soltau, 2003:1823). In the Kariba resettlement case in Zambia, 41 children died in a space of three months shortly after relocation among the 1600 people resettled to the Central African Plateau (Scudder, 1973:52-53).

Studies have shown that the levels of vulnerability to ill-health among displaced populations are higher than pre-resettlement levels. Still, in relation to the Kariba resettlement, over 50 people died in one case, allegedly due to the consumption of poisonous wild plants during a period of food insecurity (Scudder, 1973:53). A combination of the lack of food and the lack of knowledge of wild vegetables in the areas of relocation may have contributed to this tragic event.

(b) From increased morbidity to improved healthcare

Although services such as healthcare are sometimes promised to resettled people in the new settlements, preventive healthcare measures are often ignored (Cernea, 2000:42). This means that, even apart from the failure of many resettlement projects to deliver the promises of services such as those related to healthcare provision, planning for any eventualities such as the outbreak of diseases is seldom done (ibid.:42). Health impact assessments prior to resettlement are often not done, hence potential health hazards are rarely incorporated as part of resettlement plans (Kedia, 2009:101). This is despite the effects of stress-related illnesses and environmental changes on physical health have been well documented (Cernea, 2000:42; Kedia, 2009:103; Scudder, 1973:52-53).

The effects of stress-related illnesses and environmental changes on the affected people's health are more likely to be severe among vulnerable groups, such as children and the poor (Mahapatra, 1999:207). This may be, in part, due to their deprived access to healthy, balanced diets (ibid.:207), or fragile immune systems, particularly among small children. Hence, the provision of healthcare services must be delivered in a manner that is accessible,

even to the most vulnerable groups in a given context. Collaborative efforts with other stakeholders such as government departments may be essential in this regard.

For instance, because incidences of increased morbidity are more likely to heighten in contexts where the general standards of living are low, which, as indicated earlier, may be expected from stage two and beyond, healthcare services must be subsidised if they are to be beneficial to displaced populations. The affordability of healthcare services is as important as their provision. In an example from Cernea and Schmidt-Soltau's study in Uganda, healthcare amenities were much closer in the areas of relocation than they were in the original places; however, the associated costs made it nearly impossible for low to no income communities among the displaced to access healthcare services (2003:1822).

Hence, a study by the World Health Organisation (WHO) of the four countries in the lower Mekong Basin – Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia – concluded that health and sanitation services in resettlement cases must, in fact, be institutionalised, as part of the integrated developmental approach to resettlement (Cernea, 2000:42-43). The Nangbeto Dam resettlement project in Togo exemplifies this recommendation, where an ongoing health monitoring programme was implemented throughout the construction phase, as part of the preventive measures (ibid.:43).

7. (a) Loss of access to common property resources

In economically poor communities, among both the landed and landless, common property resources which may include forested areas, rivers, useful wild grasses, indigenous medicine, grazing land, etc. play a fundamental role in sustaining livelihoods (Beck and Nesmith, 2001:119; Cernea, 1997:1575; 2000:29; Jodha, 1985:247). Because these are often demarcated within indigenous areas, and although rights to access may be recognised traditionally, where conventional means of ownership – such as a title deed – are used in compensation mechanisms, the losses associated with common property resources may not be recognised, and therefore, not compensated for (Cernea, 1997:1575; 2000:29). In such cases, the implementing authorities may use the lack of legal grounds for not compensating affected people, even where it is known that the people in question depend on such provisions (Koenig and Diarra, 2000:337-338). Thus, although under certain customary laws, indigenous rights may be recognised in this regard, land-acquiring bodies may choose alternative laws that do not recognise indigenous rights, particularly in contexts where different legal systems apply concurrently.

On the other hand, in cases where land-acquiring bodies are willing to compensate affected people for the loss of common property rights, the next hurdle to overcome is determining the appropriate valuation for compensation. One of the arguments in relation to common property resources is that, because they are open to use by multiple people – and this applies to both open access resources and common property resources – they are more likely to be depleted sooner than private property resources, because of “over-consumption and under-investment” (Kibreab, 2000:300). This is also termed the “tragedy of the commons” (ibid.:300). Koenig and Diarra (2000:333) distinguish between open access resources and common property resources. For them, the former refers to resources that allow use by anyone who can physically access them, whereas the latter refers to resources which are granted exclusively to certain groups of people, such as certain ethnic groups or communities (ibid.:333-334). Although common property resources are more likely to be comparatively better managed, both sets of resources are susceptible to rapid depletion due to utilisation by multiple consumers.

In this sense, organisations who are willing to pay for common property resources may encounter a difficulty in determining the value of resources that would have soon been depleted even without displacement (Kibreab, 2000:300). However, this conundrum makes applicable Scudder’s argument that resettlement programmes must, in fact, aim to improve living standards rather than simply restoring them (1993:130-131). Hence, instead of determining the value of common property resources in the areas where people are being resettled from, on the basis of the estimated depletion rate, a projected amount equivalent to what it would cost to re-establish livelihoods in the new areas should be applied instead. As the discussion of the Mohale Dam resettlement case will show, compensation for common property resources in this case was measured on the basis of the cost of equivalent, alternative resources in the new areas, such as the price of alternative fuel, instead of attempting to value lost resources.

(b) From loss of access to restoration of community assets and services

In order to deal with some of the issues related to the loss of common property resources, some projects have attempted to establish new, collective forms of livelihoods such as development projects to make up for the losses. The LHWP is a classic example in this regard. However, in some cases – and indeed in case of the LHWP – the success of such initiatives is deterred by poor management and a lack of effective monitoring. Hence, where

alternative initiatives are introduced as a mechanism for making up for lost common property resources, they must be cushioned with comprehensive management and monitoring strategies.

Moreover, such initiatives and resettlement processes in general, are often bound by unrealistic timeframes, whereas empirical research has proved that resettlement and its associated processes are, in reality, long-term processes (Cernea, 2000:41; Colson, 1971; Scudder and Colson, 1982). Re-establishing community assets and resources is a multi-layered, complex process that must be allowed to take its course over a long period of time (Cernea, 2000:41). Efforts to restore lost community assets and resources must, therefore, be planned as long-term processes to ensure that they are not aborted by short, unrealistic timeframes. Allowance for the re-establishment of community resources to take their necessary course, regardless of how long that takes, is particularly crucial because in many cases, there are no pre-existing supporting structures to aid or facilitate such initiatives (Werner, 2001:6-7). Infrastructure, skills, organisational development, and monitoring mechanisms are a few examples of what could be necessary devices to be established before alternative community resources are initiated, and later discussions of the case of Mohale Dam resettlement will attest to this.

8. (a) Social disarticulation

Among other effects, two things tend to happen when established communities are destabilised by involuntary resettlement; established networks are dismantled, leading the affected people to lose access to accumulated social capital embedded in their established networks and social ties (Cernea, 1997:1575; Tabucanon, 2012:9; Witter and Satterfield, 2014:1395). Resettled people also experience different kinds of marginalisation, as discussed above, making it difficult for them to rebuild new networks in the new areas. According to Cernea (2000:30), this may be more pronounced in situations where people are resettled “in a dispersed manner” as opposed to being resettled as communities or groups.

Similar to other forms of capital, social capital is accumulated over a given period of time, and is embedded in the relationships and networks that people build through trust and reciprocity, over a significant period of time (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000:226). Although social capital is not necessarily economic in nature, it can facilitate access to other resources that people in, especially, less economically vibrant communities need to make a living (Bayat, 2005:6; Portes, 2000:48). People in less economically developed areas may use forms

of social capital in their day-to-day lives to complement their lack of financial resources. However, social networks can also facilitate access to financial means across different groups with various income levels. Community-based insurances and credit schemes are only a few examples of devices through which people exchange financial resources using social networks (Eguavoen and Tesfai, 2012:55). Therefore, when the existing social fabric that cushions these networks and sustains social capital is dismantled through forced resettlement and displacement, the results can be devastating and long-term.

Although in some cases people may continue to invest and yield benefits from their old networks even after relocation, this scenario is more likely in situations where people are not widely dispersed (Cernea, 2000:30). As in the case of some resettled people in Merawi in Ethiopia, resettled on account of the Koga irrigation scheme, religious and funeral rites were maintained even after relocation (Eguavoen and Tesfai, 2012:55). However, even in such cases where people maintain contact after relocation, the sense of belonging to those networks may no longer be the same, because of the absence of spatial and cultural phenomena that had originally glued them together (Downing, in Cernea, 2000:30). Notwithstanding, community disarticulation is manifested to a greater extent in cases where people from the same networks are relocated to areas far apart from each other, as opposed to being relocated in cohesive groups and social units (Cernea, 2000:30).

(b) From community disarticulation to networks and community rebuilding

As with the risk of marginalisation, community reconstruction is often overlooked in resettlement processes, and is typically left as the responsibility of resettled people to facilitate their own integration into host communities (Cernea, 2000:40). For effective reconstruction and integration of resettled people into host communities, “deliberate preservation of community structures” or facilitation of the establishment of new networks and structures, should be pursued by implementing authorities as part of the rehabilitation process (ibid.:41). The preservation of community ties and networks may be ensured through resettling affected people in groups, and establishing new villages for them in the new settlements. This approach is prescribed by the applied policies in both the Mohale and Chandil dam cases, as later discussions will show (LHDA, 1997; State of Jharkhand, 2008). Old community structures may also be transferred through designing new villages in a manner that resembles old ones – in cases where large numbers requiring the design of new villages are relocated.

The formation of new networks may be facilitated through joint community activities, including those meant to re-establish lost common property resources. The LHDA, through community development projects aimed at compensating lost common property resources and livelihoods re-establishment, adopted a joint beneficiary approach, where both the resettled and host community members shared in the planning, implementation and benefits of the programmes. This was meant to facilitate the integration of resettled people into the new areas, by creating activities and a platform for collaboration between the two groups – new and old community members – while also facilitating the re-establishment of livelihoods. However, an unexpected counter-outcome was that in some cases, this shared-benefits approach became the source of conflict between incoming and host communities, as this will be articulated in greater detail in the discussion of the findings in Chapter Ten.

3.7 The Contribution of the Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction (IRR) Model

The IRR model has been useful in many contexts in helping researchers and practitioners to better understand the consequences of resettlement and how to prevent its negative impacts. Mahapatra (1999) tested the IRR model in the Indian context, to understand the consequences of resettlement on affected people, as well as how such consequences could be countered. As the two focal areas of the model, Mahapatra explored the economic and social consequences of resettlement, including the loss of “material assets, employment, common property resources, health levels and nutrition” (1999:189). The model has also been used in other research contexts (see for example: Horgan (1999); Koenig (2001); Mathur (1998); McDonald-Wilmsen and Webber (2010); Muggah (2000)).

The model has also been instrumental in informing the development of resettlement policies. Cernea, who developed the model, was a social policy Advisor to the World Bank for over two decades, and has, in his position, influenced World Bank policies related to resettlement. In turn, World Bank policies of resettlement have influenced those of borrower countries including those of the LHDA in Lesotho (Devitt and Hitchcock, 2010:70; Scudder, 2006:46; The World Bank, 2010:vii) as well as in India (Morse and Berger, 1992). As the two case studies will show, while their policies are not framed within the premise of the IRR model, there are elements that are targeted at addressing some of the consequences outlined in it.

The strength of the model is in analysing the multi-dimensional risks inherent in resettlement, and in informing strategic measures that can be employed to prevent the risks and mitigate its negative effects. It helps practitioners anticipate the outcomes of resettlement, and respond

accordingly to prevent them. Hence, in this study, which aims to understand the impact of policies in the undertaking of resettlement processes, and its outcomes in this regard, the analysis is framed within the IRR model, to provide a structured view of the outcomes. While the policies applied in the studied cases are not necessarily structured on the basis of the risks outlined by Cernea, the research uses the risks and reconstruction model to evaluate how the outcomes of resettlement on affected people were anticipated and incorporated into the policies. The research also aims to assess the outcomes on the ground, thus, the analysis also focusses on the outcomes in relation to the risks.

3.8 Criticisms of the Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction (IRR) Model

The strengths and subsequent contributions of the IRR model notwithstanding, have not gone uncriticised. One of the gaps in the model has been highlighted in Mahapatra's research (1999). In his analysis of resettlement projects in India framed within the IRR model, Mahapatra included the loss of education as one of the consequences of resettlement, an area not considered in the IRR model (1999:195). The significance of education as one of the areas that needs to be considered in resettlement processes came out in the findings of this research. As later discussions will show, some of the constraints in the implementation of policies in the studied cases are low educational levels. The level of education among resettled people can either facilitate or impede measures to prevent the risk of joblessness, which, in turn, has a significant impact on re-establishing livelihoods after resettlement. Mahapatra's research explores the loss of access to education, which results from the disruption of schooling imposed by forced resettlement (1999:195), and the current study reflects educational constraints to preventing the risk of joblessness in resettlement. While these are two different angles, the point of argument here is that education is one of the variables necessary in analysing the consequences of resettlement and other constraints that may arise in mitigating the risks, which also need to be factored in policy.

Additionally, the IRR model has been criticised for being overly general and failing to capture complex issues such as the micro-political aspects of forced resettlement and displacement (Muggah, 2000:158). Linked to the criticism of being too general is that some authors see it as too technical, focusing mainly on the economic impacts, and paying little attention on the social and environmental impacts of resettlement (De Wet, 2006:182). However, as Mahapatra highlights, the IRR model "is seminal" in nature, and in that sense it offers a framework that is useful for the further examination of the consequences of resettlement, providing a scope for the analysis of other areas (1999:195). Moreover, Cernea

argues that, unlike conventional risk analysis, which is part of a projects' economic and financial preparation methodology, and is often carried out within a strict confine, the risks of displacement are not routine-based; therefore, the model accommodates the changing dynamics in the way people are affected (2000:45).

However, another limitation of the model as Scudder argues is that, despite it being instrumental in dealing with unsuccessful cases, explaining why the majority of resettlement cases end up leading resettled people into worse-off socio-economic conditions, it does not deal with the behaviour of resettlers as key players in resettlement processes (Scudder, 2005:47). For Scudder, even in prescribing reconstruction measures to counter the risks that lead to the failure of resettlement, the model does not appropriate the behaviour of resettlers as one of the key determinants for the success of the process (ibid.:47).

Also, the model seems to suggest that the problems of resettlement are only a question of adherence to procedures and recommended measures to curb negative consequences. This suggests that if these measures were incorporated properly, the problems associated with resettlement would be eliminated. However, in practice, research has shown that the process of resettlement is far more complex in nature (De Wet, 2006; 2015). Rew, et al. (2006) have also raised the same concern regarding policies, that the implementation of resettlement policies is often assumed to be merely a question of following procedures and policy provisions. Yet research shows time and again that a variety of issues emerge in implementation processes, indicating the inherent complexity of resettlement, which the next section will explore in greater detail (De Wet, 2006; 2015; Rew, 1996; Rew, et al., 2006). Nevertheless, the IRR model remains, arguably, the most useful tool in explaining the consequences of resettlement and how to mitigate them.

3.9 The Inherent Complexities Approach to Resettlement

The underlying assumption of the complexity approach to resettlement is that resettlement is a very intricate, multi-dimensional process that is often accompanied by various dynamics at different levels (De Wet, 2006). The FSF has sought to identify similar characteristics of resettlement, and how affected people typically respond to these situations (Scudder, 1973; 1993; 2005; 2009). On that basis, it seeks to inform strategic planning and implementation of resettlement processes. On the other hand, the IRR model attempts to create an understanding of various negative consequences of resettlement, highlighting the predictability of these

unintended consequences, and how to not only mitigate them, but also invert them into development opportunities (Cernea, 1997; 2000).

The complexity approach views resettlement from a different angle. It posits that, while it is necessary to inform resettlement design and implementation by means of frameworks that identify its characteristics and how they relate to the experiences of the people, it is also necessary to appreciate the underlying intricacies that inform the inconsistencies between theory and practice (De Wet, 2006:180). De Wet uses the Inherent Complexities Approach to highlight the features that make resettlement an extremely difficult process, even when theory and policies are applied as prescribed. He argues that resettlement is fundamentally problematic, has aspects that are potentially unamenable to routine planning and procedure, and to add to the complication, is a multi-layered process (De Wet, 2006).

3.9.1 Resettlement as a problematic institutional process

There are a number of factors that make resettlement an inherently problematic process, but one of the fundamental ones is that it is resource-intensive. In order for resettlement to be undertaken efficiently and successfully, it has to be planned and implemented over a long period of time, with access to significant financial resources and skills (Scudder, 2005:34). However, resettlement is often a result of a development project that is intended to generate revenue, in contexts where not only are infrastructures and resources needed, but also income. As a result, developing countries are typically stricken by a lack of the very resources needed to make resettlement a successful process (De Wet, 2006:186).

Furthermore, because of a shortage of other essential resources, such as financial and human capital, planned activities in a resettlement process are often delayed, subsequently falling behind other scheduled activities such as the construction of the actual development project (De Wet, 2006:186). By which time, the resettlement component is rushed through to make way for construction to commence. Hence, a very critical time factor in resettlement processes is often significantly compromised, and more likely extends to other kinds of challenges, such as delayed compensation, delayed house reconstruction for resettled people, etc. (Mahapatra, 1999:204-205; Scudder, 2005:74).

Resettlement in the Akosombo Dam in Ghana, for instance, had serious time limitations to a point where a substantial number of people were relocated before houses were completed, resulting in not only homelessness but also other kinds of social ills such as food insecurity, landlessness, etc. (Tamakloe, 1994:102). Mahapatra (1999:204) gives an example of the

Indian context – as cited earlier – where people were moved to so-called “emergency housing centres” meant to temporarily accommodate resettled people while their houses are being constructed. This occurs where, for various reasons, the resettlement component is delayed, consequently leading to an expedited relocation process to allow for the construction component.

Human capital is also one of the resources often lacking in resettlement processes, where implementing officials are, in themselves, out of their depth, struggling to undertake the mammoth task that is resettlement. The lack of skills may affect the implementation of crucial activities such as pre-resettlement surveys, technical planning, ensuring the active involvement of multiple stakeholders, the implementation of the relocation component within the context of policy provisions, reconstruction, monitoring, etc. (De Wet, 2006:181).

Notwithstanding, Rew, et al. (2006:45) argue that, even in cases where implementing officials are amassed with suitable skills and aided by comprehensive resettlement policies, research continues to show notable shortfalls in successful resettlement outcomes. In their study focussing on resettlement policy implementation in Orissa, India, Rew, et al. found that even though the project was undertaken within a comprehensive policy context by accomplished senior officials, there was still not much success evident in the outcomes of resettlement (2006:45).

On this basis – also considering other resettlement cases – Rew, et al. (2006:45) concluded that resettlement is, in fact, an inherently complex process, and if the implementation of the policy is to be successful, multi-dimensional, context-sensitive approaches must be applied. For them, no elimination of a single factor can yield noticeable, successful results (ibid.:45). Hence, to claim that more resources, or greater participation or training, etc. can singlehandedly address the shortcomings of resettlement, is to miss the influence of the undercurrents of an inherently problematic process (Rew, et al., 2006:45). These underlying factors may include pre-existing social, cultural, economic and political issues in a given context, and later discussions, particularly the chapters on the findings, will bring this out in more detail.

3.9.2 Resettlement as potentially incompatible with routine planning and procedure

It follows, therefore, that the success of a resettlement process is not only a question of the process itself, but also of the context in which it is implemented. For this reason, De Wet

(2006:187; 2015:88) argues that some aspects of resettlement appear to be potentially unamenable to the technical nature of resettlement planning. While theoretical tools such as the FSF and the IRR model encourage that lessons learned from previous projects should be incorporated into current ones in order to prevent potentially negative consequences of resettlement, some aspects of resettlement may not be transferrable to certain projects. Resettlement happens within established social, political, and economic settings. As such, the manner in which it takes place – and indeed its outcomes – is subject to being influenced by these pre-existing dynamics.

For example, in a study conducted by Rew, et al. (2006), in Orrisa, among other cases, it was revealed that a comprehensive policy and adequate skills dimensions could not escape the influence of the existing social and economic inequalities on the ground. These socio-cultural determinants, and the effects they have on the resettlement process and outcomes, speak to the contextualised nature of the process, which may be incompatible with technical procedures.

In some cases, as in tribal contexts in India – as later discussions will show – issues of landownership are quite complex, and often integrated into customary practices (Bhatia, 2012:161). However, implementing authorities in projects within such contexts may employ legal approaches to determine the entitlement of affected people for compensation purposes (Fisher, 1995:31; Morse and Berger, 1992:19; Routledge, 2003:247). This means that people with no legal claim to property may not receive compensation, even though they are not only customarily entitled to such compensation but also depend on it. This, and similar issues, have raised serious contentions and conflicts between affected people and implementing authorities. The exploration of the Indian context of displacement and resettlement in Chapter Eleven will later unpack these issues.

Additionally, development projects that induce forced resettlement occur as part of national projects, heavily subjected to national political agendas and stipulated timeframes, regardless of the availability of resources or other limitations (De Wet, 2006:187). The LHWP is one of the classic examples that are considered to have been influenced by the politics of the day. The signing of the treaty between the governments of Lesotho and South Africa in relation to the project happened at the height of political unrest in Lesotho in the mid-1980s, shortly after the military coup saw a shift in the political landscape (Ferguson, 1990:108; Mwangi, 2007:8; Thabane, 2000:634). Amidst these tensions, the then apartheid South African

government seized the moment to sign a deal for a dam project with Lesotho – the LHWP (Mwangi, 2007:8; Thabane, 2000:634). In the 1980s, the Ethiopian government implemented a large-scale resettlement project as part of its food production management strategy, amid widespread criticisms and resistance from the global community (Pankhurst, 1992). Similarly, in the 1960s the Egyptian government constructed the Aswan High Dam to facilitate part of its socialist development agenda (Fahim, 1983:25; Scudder, 2016).

In this regard, resettlement tends to be a deeply politicised process, not only at the national level but also down to the local level. The World Bank, in its review of Bank-funded projects across the world, found that one of the fundamental problems in resettlement implementation is a lack of political will (Scudder, 2005:66). This means that, even in situations where sufficient resources could be committed to the resettlement component, the actual implementation is determined by the priorities of the government or the responsible authority. At the local level, the politicisation of resettlement processes can be expressed in who the opportunities for development projects are afforded to, who is involved in joint livelihoods re-establishment activities, how much power they hold, etc. Power dynamics across the different levels of resettlement in the studied cases will be discussed further in the discussion of findings. In this context, even where resettlement projects are (or could be) well-planned, their implementation may be influenced by political dynamics, from national down to local levels.

3.9.3 Resettlement as a multi-layered process

To add to this complexity is the notion that resettlement is both a vertical and a horizontal process. Forced resettlement, and the consequences induced by it, occur at different levels of society; the individual, community, institutional, national, and international (De Wet, 2006:190-193). The forces at play in the process of resettlement, such as policies or lack thereof (whether at the sectorial or national level), the risks of impoverishment, political will, resources, etc., are all premised at different levels, from individual all the way to international institutions. Yet, when resettlement takes place, everything happens all at the same time, and the effects are felt across the board (Cernea, 2000:31). Although different categories of stakeholders and different demographic groups are affected differently, and with different levels of severity, the effects are experienced within a given period of time (De Wet, 2006:191). Albeit for some the effects may last longer than others.

Nevertheless, while certain factors of resettlement operate at certain levels and not others, the individual and community levels are affected by all the factors at play in enabling the success or failure of the process. The risks of impoverishment, resettlement policies, political will, resources, etc., all affect the resettled individuals and communities. Moreover, these are the two levels where the effects of resettlement linger for a long time after relocation (Scudder, 2005:34). At the institutional level, implementing officials have to simultaneously deal with a host of “legal, administrative, institutional, financial and personal demands, as well as the affected people” (De Wet, 2006:187). While this is undeniably an enormous task, and certainly problematic, rarely are the personal effects of resettlement considered at the institutional level. Hence, displaced people remain the greatest victims of an involuntary, permanent, and predominantly negative change imposed by resettlement.

At the national and international levels, the effects of resettlement are virtually absent, the factors that are mostly at play are those that bring out power dynamics. The role of international organisations in resettlement mainly has to do with financing the projects, which comes with conditionalities whose impact trickles all the way down to affected people. However, financing institutions are mainly concerned with attaching conditionalities that speak to mitigating the risks associated with the invested capital, and not fundamentally the protection of the affected people (Baird and Shoemaker, 2007:879). De Wet (2006:193) argues that financing institutions seem to be “happy to lend money without worrying too much about the niceties of resettlement”. Hence, where the conditionalities attached to funding from financing institutions are incompatible with the dynamics on the ground, this may increase the negative effects felt downwards at the individual, community and institutional levels.

Scudder (2006:51) gives an example of the LHDA’s Mohale Dam case, where after the physical removal of the people, the resettlement implementing staff was hastily downsized, largely owing to a lack of understanding of the long-term effects of resettlement processes, as well as financial factors. This, Scudder argues, significantly affected the capacity of the implementing institution, the LHDA, to implement the remaining component of rehabilitation for the resettled people (2006:51). However, it is incomprehensible that the LHDA could have misunderstood the long-term impact of resettlement on the affected people, given that they had already had a previous experience with resettlement in the implementation of the earlier Katse Dam project.

3.9.4 Factoring complexity into the policy process

In order to mitigate the negative effects of an inherently problematic resettlement phenomenon, De Wet (2006:199) recommends that resettlement policies be designed and implemented in a manner that factors in the complex nature of resettlement. This policy approach is one that captures the multi-dimensionality of resettlement through participatory, open-ended approaches (De Wet, 2005:277; 2006:199; Rew, et al., 2006:45). Some funders, planners and implementers may contend that open-ended approaches have severe financial implications, and may potentially delay implementation, as opposed to clearer criteria with hard procedures, budgets and timeframes (Koenig, 2006:125). However, De Wet argues that, evidently, the opposite is the case; for him, “an unrealistically constrained process generates problems, resistance and unanticipated outcomes of its own, usually in a very costly manner” (De Wet, 2006:199). Koenig (2006:126) also corroborates this assertion, stating that active participation of affected people often ensures their cooperation, and a better understanding of social and other impacts of resettlement; and in that sense, reduces grassroots resistance and related costs.

While stakeholder participation cannot eliminate all the problems associated with forced resettlement, it certainly has a great potential to ease the transition of resettled people, and their integration into the new environment. Furthermore, an open-ended approach to resettlement allows different stakeholders to deal with contextual dynamics, such as socio-cultural and political determinants more openly, and possibly, more genuinely.

3.10 The Contribution of the Inherent Complexities Approach to Resettlement

The complexity approach to resettlement has been useful in facilitating an understanding of the subtle, yet fundamental issues that underpin the success (or lack thereof) of resettlement processes and policy implementation. While Scudder’s FSF and Cernea’s theoretical tools provide an overview of processes and behavioural responses to, and the consequences of forced resettlement respectively, the complexity approach complements them by enabling an understanding of why resettlement does not always work as expected, even when theories are taken into cognisance and policies followed as closely as possible.

Over the years, the developers and implementers of policies have demonstrated a willingness to acknowledge relevant contextual, social, cultural and economic complexities. A discussion of policies of resettlement in Chapter Five will reflect on some of the pertinent issues that have been incorporated into policies at different levels, such as gender inequality, land or

property ownership, methods of livelihoods re-establishment, etc. The discussion of the case studies will also reflect some of these policy features.

3.11 Criticisms of the Inherent Complexity Approach

The utility of the complexity approach notwithstanding, there are some limitations that can be highlighted. Participation of affected people in resettlement processes, and development projects in general, is often recommended in order to improve the effectiveness of projects (Chifamba, 2013; Dungumaro and Madulu, 2003; Greyling, 2006; Isham, et al., 1995; Narayan, 1995; Scudder, 2005:260; Stein, 2001; Thamae, 2006:89). In particular, in resettlement projects, participation of affected people is indispensable if a better understanding of pre-existing contextual dynamics is to be arrived at, by implementing agencies and other stakeholders. The inherent complexity approach recommends a more open-ended approach to resettlement, which takes into account underlying factors that influence resettlement implementation (De Wet, 2006), and this requires an understanding of subtle contextual undercurrents.

However, although participation is often mentioned as one of the key aspects in resettlement, and is also mentioned in the complexity approach (De Wet, 2006; Koenig, 2006:126), the capacity of resettled people to effectively participate in resettlement activities is not sufficiently engaged with. De Wet explores, in his analysis, the initiatives of affected people in resettlement cases, mainly through leveraging spontaneous opportunities for their benefit (2006). However, the analysis does not bring out the need for implementing agencies to incorporate capacity building, as a strategy to facilitate active participation, in ensuring a more open-ended approach to resettlement, recommended by the approach.

The limitations associated with a lack of capacity among affected people who participate in development projects that are meant to re-establish their livelihoods beyond resettlement, will come out in the discussion of findings, particularly in the Mohale case. The discussion will show that, although the implementing authority – the LHDA – incorporated active participation of affected people in the development projects that were aimed at improving their livelihoods, the projects failed partly because of a lack of capacity and management skills among affected people who participated.

3.12 Socio-Spatial Change Analysis to Resettlement

Forced resettlement gives rise to an imposed change of space and the natural environment to those forcibly moved. De Wet (1995; 2015) uses the Socio-Spatial Change analysis to

understand the relationship between people and their physical environment, and what happens when this relationship is disrupted. Two things tend to happen when people are forcibly moved from well-established physical settings to new ones; they lose their sense of social and cultural identity associated with the old place, and they lose access to a resource base provided by their physical environment which supported their livelihoods.

De Wet sees people as not only occupying spaces where they live, but in fact as being “socially and culturally emplaced” in those spaces (2015:86). Downing (1996:37) also asserts that space may be socio-culturally defined or may have social and cultural elements attached to it. This means that social and cultural meanings and values may be attributed to certain aspects of the physical environment that people inhabit, whether natural or man-made. These may include rivers, mountains, religious structures, forests, etc. For Downing, although “imagined social order” or cultural spaces are intangible in nature, they are real and meaningful for people who hold them, and the consequence of forced separation from such spaces can be devastating (1996:38).

The socially-constructed meanings and relationships that people have with spaces are cultural expressions intrinsic to their identity (Downing, 1996:36; Greider and Garkovich, 1994:2). This could explain why some people identify themselves by where they originate, as is also common in the Basotho culture. Hence, the Sesotho expression that can be loosely translated:

“I am (name) of (name of place)” (note the use of “of” in place of “from”),

is not only meant to state where one is “from” but mainly about where one belongs, and by extension who one really is. Greider and Garkovich (1994:2) echo this in a quote below:

“...human relationships with their environment are really cultural expressions used to define who we were, who we are and who we hope to be at this place and in this space.”

Forested areas are considered in some cultures, for example, as sacred places dedicated for ancestral spirits and deities; such as the observing of sacred groves in some Indian cultures (Arora, 2006:60; Malhotra, et al., 2001:1). A sacred grove is defined as a clump of trees or a patch of forest protected and dedicated to deities or ancestral spirits (Arora, 2006:60; Malhotra, et al., 2001:1). These preserved areas are often protected through customary taboos and sanctions (Arora, 2006:60; Malhotra, et al., 2001:1). The practice of preserving the sanctity of forested landscapes is as much about present religious observations as it is about generational transferral of indigenous religions attached to the natural environment (Arora,

2006:61; Ormsby and Bhagwat, 2010:320). Hence, it serves both a religious purpose and cultural preservation that informs generations about who they are. As a result, the disruption of such a fundamental socio-cultural order can lead to a psychologically disempowering feeling of loss and a sense of being lost. This can also be regarded as cultural displacement.

Socially, the change of environment can initially bring a sense of social disorientation, where people feel out of place and feel inhibited from forming new social relationships. In a study of two villages in the then Ciskei district in South Africa, which were affected by forced resettlement resulting from imposed villagisation, De Wet shows how some people, who had previously lived in smaller communities and had now been moved to larger ones, initially felt socially dis-emplaced (1995:37). However, he argues that the extent of social displacement in cases where people were moved to nearby places from their original ones, and in some cases moved together with their kinsmen, was not to the same extent as when groups were moved further away and scattered across a larger geographical area (De Wet, 1995:211; 2006:183).

Additionally, the human-space relationship can be instrumental in establishing or facilitating the means of livelihoods. The impoverishment risks discussed above all outline the disruption of an established physical environment, strongly linked to social and economic realities (De Wet, 2015:86). People in mostly less economically vibrant contexts often leverage their physical environments to support their livelihoods (Cernea, 1997:1575; 2000:29). Forced resettlement, thus, removes people from this resource base, usually with limited alternatives to rebuilding the same kinds of resource structures or even new ones (De Wet, 2015:86). Examples include situations where people are moved from places closer to rivers as water sources, to new settlements without provision of alternative water sources. This was, in fact, the case with the people resettled from Mohale to Ha-Ratau in Lesotho, who had been resettled from areas with plenty of water sources such as rivers and natural springs, but were experiencing significant water shortage in the new areas, because the installed community water taps were dysfunctional.

The discussion of the findings will show how, in the studied cases, resettled people lost access to natural resources such as indigenous medicinal plants, wild vegetables, special grasses for house roofing, and forests useful for collection of firewood and non-timber resources. In both these cases, alternative natural resources were scarce in the new areas, making it difficult for the affected people who could not secure alternative means of supporting their livelihoods, to recover from their losses of access to natural resources.

3.13 Conclusion

The four theoretical tools discussed above are complementary in that they view resettlement from different angles, but are all interdependent in terms of enabling an understanding of resettlement, its processes and consequences. As will be shown in Chapter Seven which presents the research methodology, the use of multiple theoretical frameworks enables the understanding of a problem studied from a variety of angles, and thus, gives a clearer picture of the problem. The FSF provides an overview of processes of resettlement, yet at the same time provides a grassroots level analysis in exploring the behaviour of resettled people in response to resettlement processes, albeit the behavioural analysis is highly generalised. The analysis of the outcomes of resettlement policies in this study will take into consideration the stages at which the studied resettled people are in terms of the FSF, and how that relates to the processes of resettlement, and the kinds of responses generated by affected people.

To complement this generalised view of resettlement, the IRR model provides an understanding of the components of resettlement, to appreciate the construction of its consequences. The model achieves this by deconstructing the individual components into pieces that can be rebuilt, to overturn the potential negative consequences of resettlement into development. In this regard, the analysis of the impact of policies in this research is framed within the IRR model, exploring how the policies have attempted to mitigate the inherent risks associated with resettlement.

On the other hand, the complexity approach provides an analysis of underlying determinants, and this complements the functionality of the FSF and IRR model, by accounting for subtle influences that are not present at a technical, generalised level at which the two theoretical tools operate. In this regard, the complexity approach explains the factors that counter the effectiveness of the IRR and FSF, as well as how the intricacies of resettlement processes and the context in which they are implemented can be navigated. The approach is engaged in this research, therefore, to understand the challenges of policy implementation, and how they were navigated by implementing authorities and the affected people, the outcomes of which are described in terms of the IRR model, within the applicable stages of the FSF.

Lastly, the socio-spatial analysis is also employed to understand the relationship between resettled people and their environment, and how this relates to the experienced consequences. The socio-spatial analysis in that sense cuts across the other three theoretical tools. The behaviour or responses of the affected people to resettlement processes described by the FSF,

such as clinging to the familiar, stress-related effects, etc., are a result of the separation of resettled people from their established natural environments (Scudder, 1981:14; 2005:34; 2009:40).

Also, the inherent risks of resettlement described by the IRR model are related to the loss of capital, imposed by the separation of affected people from their natural environments, which have social, economic, and cultural relevance (Cernea, 1997; 2000). Finally, the complexities of resettlement described by the inherent complexities approach are related to pre-existing socio-cultural, economic, and environmental landscapes, which contribute to making resettlement a problematic process that often diverges from routine or technical plans (De Wet, 2006:187; 2015:88). The next chapter will explore other complexities related to forced resettlement, the unfolding of the phenomenon of DIDR over time, as well as examples of four dam projects that have international relevance.

4 Chapter Four: Development-Induced Displacement and Resettlement

4.1 Introduction

The practice of DIDR has evolved significantly since 1956, when some of the first scholars in the field – Scudder and Colson – started their long-term research among the Kariba Dam resettled and displaced Gwembe Tonga in Zambia (Scudder, 1993:123). As indicated earlier, DIDR is a composite term incorporating the forced physical removal of people from their original homes to new ones, the destabilisation and losses associated with it, as well as the planned process of re-establishing their losses (Mathur, 2006:38-39; Parasuraman, 1999:3). The two concepts of displacement and resettlement are integrated in that displacement in all its forms – socio-cultural, physical, and economic – is an inevitable result of the forced removal of people, and resettlement incorporates both displacement and provision towards the recovery of the losses imposed by displacement.

However, resettlement is also an all-encompassing term that refers to both the process of physical removal of affected people, and re-establishing livelihoods and recovering some losses suffered by the affected people (Bartolome, et al., 2000:8; Parasuraman, 1999:3). The use of “some” is intentional in this case, in line with the argument, with which this thesis concurs, that some losses, particularly those of an intangible nature, are so complex that they cannot be recovered by any measures employed in resettlement processes, and later discussions in this chapter will unpack those complexities. Nonetheless, there is also a conceptual distinction between resettlement as the physical removal of people and the provision made for losses experienced during the removal, and rehabilitation, as the long-term process aimed at re-establishing lost livelihoods and other long-term losses, after the removal of the affected people (Bartolome, et al., 2000:8).

In this chapter, the evolution of the practice of DIDR is outlined, showing how far the practice of forcefully resettling people has come, and what areas remain unaccounted for, in attempting to improve the process and its consequences on affected people. In addition, further complexities of resettlement will be explored, showing what some of the complications are, and how they relate to mishaps in the practice of forced resettlement by development. The chapter will also explore examples of four large dam projects that have drawn significant international attention and critique. Lastly, the chapter will explore ethical considerations, highlighting some of the issues that are born out of competing priorities and effects of resettling people involuntarily for the purposes of development.

4.2 The Evolution of DIDR

DIDR arises from development projects meant to provide resources and services such as road networks, water, housing, electricity, etc. to the public. Ironically, the undertaking of such development projects often involves the removal of other groups of people, who are said to be “in the way of development”, whose welfare is often left compromised after their resettlement (Blaser, et al., 2004; De Wet, 2001:4637; Downing, 1996:34; Maldonado, 2012:195; Parasuraman, 1999:4). While a common practice is to properly plan for and budget for development projects, this does not always happen in resettlement. Until 1980 when the first resettlement guidelines were adopted by the World Bank, resettlement was typically viewed by development practitioners as merely the removal of people who are obstructing development, with little attention, if any at all, paid to the real effects that resettlement has on those who are forced to make way for development. The Kariba Dam case, one of the first large dam projects in Africa, follows this characterisation (Colson, 1971).

Based on the experienced, predominantly negative consequences of forced displacement and resettlement on affected people, the effects on human rights, people’s standards of living, and the social, psychological and environmental impacts, have been recurring themes in the literature on DIDR since its establishment as a field of study (Clark, 2009; Dickinson and Webber, 2007; Downing, 1996; 2002; McCully, 1996). These themes often underpin research, policies and theories of resettlement. As research has shown time and again, in many cases of forced resettlement, these themes have emerged as those in which people are negatively affected, with devastating consequences (Cernea, 1997; 1999; 2000; Clark, 2009; Downing, 1996; 2002; McCully, 1996; Scudder, 2005). According to the World Commission on Dams (in Ozesmi, 2006:1), “half of the 192 dam projects which were financed by the World Bank before 1994, had no resettlement plans” (Ozesmi, 2006:1). Of those that had resettlement plans, 70% had plans that only provided for financial compensation, discarding socio-cultural and environmental costs; and even of that 70%, only 25% complied with the minimum requirements of the World Bank guidelines (ibid.:1).

In the case of the Kariba Dam, which will be discussed in detail later in this chapter, as one of the longstanding cases of large dam-related resettlement in Africa, the impact on the socio-economic, psychological, and fundamental human rights was not significantly, if at all, considered when people were forcibly moved (Colson, 1971). This has, in fact, proven to be a common thread in many cases across the globe. As indicated in Scudder (2005), with regard to his study of fifty dams around the world, in over 80% of the cases, the living standards of

people had deteriorated. According to McCully (1996), the Hoover Dam, along the Colorado River in the United States, has had significant environmental and economic costs to affected areas and people. Attipoe and Amoah (1989) also highlight, in the case of the Volta Dam in Ghana, the environmental and economic consequences of resettlement due to large dam construction.

Prior to the 1980s, the failure of resettlement was largely attributed to a lack of resettlement specific policies, which would, theoretically, inform resettlement processes for better results (Satiroglu and Choi, 2015:5). Many scholars and practitioners around the world called on international institutions such as the World Bank and governments to advance the course of resettlement policy development (Muggah, in Satiroglu and Choi, 2015:5). However, as De Wet (2006; 2015), Rew, et al. (2006), Scudder (2005), and others would later argue, based on evidence from their long-term research on resettlement, the failure or negative consequences of resettlement can be attributed to more than just policies themselves, or to adequate policies, but also to the complexity of DIDR, which will be explored further below. The complexity of policy implementation, a lack of political will, and other practical minutiae such as a lack of resources, administrative ineptitude, etc., have all been attributed to the shortcomings of policy implementation, and therefore, to the persistent negative consequences of resettlement (De Wet, 2006; 2015; Koenig, 2001; Scudder, 2005; Rew, et al., 2006). Hence, Rew, et al. (2006:45) argue that policy is not the end in itself, it is practice, which means its impact can only show when it is incorporated as an ongoing process across the different stages of resettlement. The concept of policy practice adopted by Rew (1996; 2006) will be discussed later in Chapter Six.

In 1980, the first ever resettlement guidelines were developed by the World Bank, following widespread advocacy, for a more responsible approach to resettlement induced by development projects (Fujikura and Nakayama, 2015:xviii; De Wet, 2001:4638). By then, much of research conducted since the mid-1950s had provided compelling evidence for the atrocities caused by forced resettlement on those who are involuntarily moved on account of development (Colson, 1971; Scudder and Colson, 1982). World Bank-financed projects were not an exception in leading the majority of affected people into worse-off conditions after forced resettlement. One of the most extensive, catastrophic bank-financed projects which resulted in significant impoverishment of the many affected was the Sobradinho Dam in Brazil in the 1970s, which induced the resettlement and displacement of approximately 65,000 people (Maldonado, 2012:195). Even after the development and implementation of

the guidelines, bank-financed projects continued to reflect significant deficits with regard to the outcomes of forced resettlement on the affected. India's Sardar Sarovar Project, which will be discussed below, presents an example in this regard, as shown in the independent assessment of the project and its effects on affected people, published in 1992 (Morse and Berger, 1992).

In general terms, the 1980 World Bank guidelines provided for a more considerate approach to resettlement, one which takes into account, at the first instance, that resettlement should be avoided by all means possible, and that if avoidance cannot be sustained, dam construction, and therefore resettlement, should be carried out with the most possible restraint (Fox, 1998). Additionally, the guidelines provided for ways to compensate those who are subjected to destabilisation and losses against their own will (*ibid.*).

Although the guidelines made way for a more informed, and systematic compensation for those affected by imposed resettlement (Maldonado, 2012:195), many critics came out speaking against the technical nature of the guidelines, and how, contrary to the complex losses suffered by the affected people, the guidelines – and later versions – mainly focus on the socio-economic losses, and largely undermining the cultural and psychological costs (Downing, 1996:34-35). Similar critiques, as has been discussed in Chapter Three above, were also charged against theories such as Cernea's IRR model. Furthermore, some critics highlighted the inadequacy of compensation as the main – in some cases the only – remedy for losses associated with forced resettlement (Cernea, 2003; 2009; Duan and McDonald, 2004; Kanbur, 2008; McDonald, et al., 2008). In this regard, some debates have focused on the manner in which the losses are measured, and the terms of who is or is not entitled to compensation, which often leads to the under-estimation of losses, and by extension, under-compensation of affected (Cernea, 1999; Downing, 1996:34-35; Scudder, 2005:129). Issues of compensation and entitlements will be discussed further in the last section on ethical issues.

Over the years, the impact of policies on resettlement outcomes as well as the ability of mechanisms such as compensation to make up for the losses of resettlement, have been under intense scrutiny by many scholars and practitioners in the resettlement field (Fernandes, 2008; Ghatak, et al., 2013; Scudder, 2012; Cernea, 1999; 2003; 2005; 2008). Compensation and its limitations will be discussed in more detail later in Chapter Six. The discontent followed evidence of little to no improvement in resettlement consequences on affected

people, despite the presence and implementation of policies (De Wet, 2001:4638; Rew, 1996; 2006; Vanclay, 2017:10). Later discussions of resettlement cases will speak to this issue. The growing discontent related to persistent atrocities which many affected people continued to be subjected to resulted in many calling for reforms of policies, policy implementation processes, as well as the practice of resettlement itself (Cernea, 2008; Clark, 2009; Reddy, et al., 2015; Rew, 2006; van der Ploeg and Vanclay, 2017). Further research and ongoing engagements on the nature of resettlement and its consequences have led to a shift towards a more comprehensive paradigm in resettlement practice – resettlement with development (Cernea, 2008; Duan and McDonald, 2004; McDonald, et al., 2008:84).

In this regard, many scholars and practitioners have argued that the only way resettlement could be prevented from leading to poverty and disasters, is if it is strategically designed with a development component for the affected people at the centre of it all (Cernea, 2008; Duan and McDonald, 2004; McDonald, et al., 2008). This means that, beyond the provision of compensation for losses, affected people must be intentionally assisted to rebuild their lives beyond the physical resettlement component. The concept of resettlement with development is synonymous with what is referred to as rehabilitation in other contexts (Bartolome, et al., 2000:12). In the Indian context, for example, rehabilitation is distinctly incorporated into policy to provide for the development of affected people after physical removal (Government of India, 2007; 2013). Cernea, in his earlier discussed IRR model from the early 1990s, provides the basis upon which affected people can be assisted to recover from the losses beyond physical resettlement.

However, some critics contend that the rehabilitation component beyond resettlement is mostly not sufficiently pronounced; not only in the policies but more so in policy implementation processes (Bartolome, et al., 2000:9; Fernandes, 2007:203-204; Iyer, 2007: 3105- 3106). Bartolome, et al. (2000) attribute the shortfall in effectively incorporating rehabilitation in resettlement processes to such issues as institutional, political and economic contexts in which resettlement projects are implemented. For example, Fernandes (2007:204) ascribes the shortcomings of policy implementation in rehabilitating affected people in the Indian context to – in part – flawed land laws. These issues will be explored in Chapter Six on policy practice. Hence, while resettlement policies are available to inform the practice of resettlement, the outcomes on the ground continue to reflect a different image from the one painted by policies.

One of the elements that has constantly riddled resettlement practice is that of power dynamics, which may either lead to the oppression of less powerful groups, or lead to conflicts between different stakeholders, both effects which may impede proper policy implementation. Asymmetrical power dynamics in cases of planned, funded, and systematic resettlement, often find expression in how resettlement processes are designed, as well as how policies are implemented, usually showing in the outcomes reflected on the ground (Clark, 2009:182). The ethnographic chapters in this study will show how this aspect has come out in the two cases studied in Lesotho and India, where power inequality among different stakeholders or groups found its way and inhibited policy implementation.

Due to their geographical settings, rural, and often poor communities have typically been the hardest hit in many cases, owing in part to their proximity to natural resources such as rivers, forests, minerals, etc. (Baijal and Singh, 2000:1662; Debasree, 2015:449), concerning which development projects are established. Hence, the question of power inequalities becomes more perceptible, as these are populations with, predominantly, less economic power and educational training, and often lack the resources necessary to fight legally for their entitlements against powerful implementing institutions (Baijal and Singh, 2000:1662; Debasree, 2015:449; Scudder, 2005:260). This is exemplified by widespread displacement of forest-dwelling tribal groups in the Indian context, both historically and in the post-independence era, as discussed in Chapter Eleven, as well as the resettlement of rural communities along the Senqunyane River in Lesotho, as discussed in Chapter Nine. One of the fundamental issues relating to power inequality in forced resettlement is that those who have the most to lose, that is, those directly affected by development projects, have the least decision-making power in resettlement processes.

Consequently, many writers have, over the years, highlighted the need for a participatory approach to resettlement, one that incorporates the active involvement of the primarily affected people, allowing them to influence certain decisions and processes (Koenig, 2006:125; Yan, et al., 2005:721; Thamae, 2006:90). The LHWP's Mohale Dam resettlement provides a good example of a case where participatory strategies were designed to engage the affected people more actively in resettlement processes. The ethnographic chapters will later reflect how, and to what extent, participation of affected people was incorporated in this regard. The discussion of the studied Chandil Dam resettlement case will also explore participation of affected people in the context of Jharkhand.

The incorporation of participation of affected people in resettlement situations is one of the areas which has not always been actively considered in forced resettlement processes, but is gradually improving as the practice of development-induced resettlement evolves. The inclusion of aspects such as rehabilitation in resettlement policies is another area of improvement, as stated earlier, and the chapter on the policies of resettlement will demonstrate this. There is no doubt that policy reforms over time, both at the international and local levels, have been instrumental in developing the practice of DIDR across the globe (Fujikura and Nakayama, 2015:xix).

However, the consequences of resettlement continue to be largely negative and a source of ideological conflict across the world (Duan and Wilmsen, 2012; Scudder, 2005:1). What is even more unsettling is that, while there are new dynamics regarding the consequences of resettlement, what remains a challenge is dealing with persistent problems that have been under scrutiny for decades (Choi, 2015; Duan and Wilmsen, 2012; Sigamany, 2015; Xi, et al., 2015). Resettled and displaced persons continue to be subjected to impoverishment, loss of capital in all its forms – cultural, social and monetary in other cases – without much success in recovering these losses in a sustainable manner (Koenig, 2006:105; Mathur, 2011). This is despite the fact that theoretical models such as Cernea's IRR, which not only highlights the risks associated with forced resettlement but also suggests preventive measures, has constantly appeared in the literature and has also influenced policy development (Dwivedi, 2002:717; Horgan, 1999; Koenig, 2001; Mahapatra, 1999; Mathur, 1998; McDonald-Wilmsen and Webber, 2010). In the next section, the factors that make for the complex nature of resettlement will be discussed, and later in Chapter Six, the discussion will focus on why there is often a disparity between resettlement theories, policies, and outcomes on the ground.

Beyond all the challenges and criticisms of large dam constructions and their associated involuntary resettlement with predominantly negative consequences, they have often been justified on economic grounds (Fahim, 1983:25-26; Heggelund, 2008:99; Hwang, et al., 2011:74; Manwa, 2014:640; Yan, et al., 2005:474; White, 1988:5-6). This has seemingly taken precedence over the enormous social, environmental and psychological costs that those affected usually have to incur. However, in recent years, new evidence has emerged, providing some counter arguments for why, even on economic grounds, the benefits of large dams frequently fall below expectations. A study conducted by Ansar, et al. (2014), exploring the economic impact of large dams across the globe has revealed that, even outside the associated resettlement costs of large dams, their economic benefits are often overestimated

and the costs underestimated. This has led to the conclusion that, although economic benefits have more often been used as the fundamental justification for large dams, the economic benefits may fall short of materialising to the estimated extent.

Furthermore, even with regard to resettlement, the impacts are often underestimated, which is linked to the underestimation of the costs of resettlement-induced development projects, both economic and social. In the case of Bargi Dam in India for example, the submergence of the dam was, in the end, three times the initially projected figure, which meant that more than the initially estimated number of people were affected, thus increasing the cost of the resettlement (Dwivedi, 1997a:11). In this regard, the economic argument for the construction of large dams is becoming harder to defend.

4.3 The Complexity of Development-Induced Resettlement Practice

As indicated previously, resettlement is a complex process, and this partly accounts for the persistent negative consequences on those directly affected, despite the improvement in policies and theories. The discussion of De Wet's Inherent Complexities Approach earlier outlined some of the factors that make resettlement a complex process that it is (2006). However, the factors outlined in De Wet's approach are not all the factors that relate to the complexity of resettlement. Thus, the discussion in this section further explores this aspect of forced resettlement.

Amongst an array of factors that lead to the complexity of resettlement as a practice, is the fact that it is a long-term process, whose effects unfold over time (Scudder and Colson, 1982; Slater and Mphale, 2009; Takesada, 2009; Tamakloe, 1994). Oftentimes, implementing agencies undertake resettlement only making provision for immediate losses, and rarely is provision made for losses incurred by the first generation to be compensated in subsequent years. Yet, as Scudder (1993:130; 2009:29) asserts, based on his empirical research from the mid-1950s, if a resettlement programme is to be successful, it has to be planned and implemented for at least two generations. This is because the consequences of resettlement usually trickle down from generation to generation. Hence, some of the effects experienced long after physical relocation may not be apparent in the initial stages of resettlement, and therefore not accounted for. In the case of the Mohale Dam in Lesotho, a relief fund was allocated to landless resettlers who would have had no compensation for the loss of access to land through other social arrangements. This came in a form of an annual cash grant for up to ten years. When the fieldwork for this research was undertaken in 2015, the fund had already

depleted and additional effects of the losses had begun to reflect in both the first and the second generations.

Furthermore, the experienced losses in forced resettlement are typically valued by implementing agencies from the time when pre-resettlement surveys are undertaken (the LHDA progress reports on pre-resettlement surveys are testimony to this assertion) (LHDA, 1995a; 1995b; 1995c). However, as shown in Chapter Three, the losses associated with resettlement begin to materialise long before resettlement implementation plans are drawn (Scudder, 1993:130-131). This is because, as stated earlier, once a plan is conceived to construct a development project in a particular area, government investment is halted in anticipation of the associated resettlement (Jackson and Sleigh, 2000:231; Scudder, 1993:130-131). Additionally, even apart from reduced government investment in resettlement areas, the affected people themselves cease investing in their development once they learn of the planned resettlement (Scudder, 1993:130-131).

Under normal circumstances, human beings are constantly attempting to improve their lives, investing in one way or the other towards their betterment, even in small ways. However, once people learn that there is an intention to have them forcibly moved, the natural response is to stop investing, and from that point, losses begin (Scudder, 1993:130-131). In consequence, valuating the losses that people experience only from the time when pre-resettlement surveys are undertaken, thus, leads to the under-accounting of those losses and, subsequently, under-compensation. Moreover, in many cases, even the pre-relocation surveys are insufficiently done, with the losses not adequately captured, and the impact not fully understood – nor incorporated – resulting in further under-compensation (Fernandes, 2008; Khan, 2015; Maitra, 2009:203; Mathur, 2013; Mohanty, 2005:1319; Scudder, 2005:195). As a result, compensation measures designed in the context of these limitations will, in all likelihood, leave people in worse-off socio-economic conditions, in addition to the psychological and cultural effects associated with forced resettlement and displacement.

Coupled with these limitations is the fact that resettlement fundamentally imposes the disruption of or loss of capital in all its forms – social, cultural, physical and economic – subjecting those affected to not only changes in livelihoods, but also a lack of capital (Mahapatra, 1999:195). In some cases – and this also came out during fieldwork in the studied cases – implementing agencies cite dependency syndrome as one of the major causes of the failure of resettlement projects, often implying that affected people are unwilling to

initiate their own livelihood re-establishment. Yet, where the means of livelihoods are taken away from affected people without sufficiently replacing them in the new areas, dependency is inevitable (Scudder, 2005:73). This partly explains why the effects of involuntary resettlement tend to linger long after people are moved. Even in rare cases where losses may be sufficiently recovered after resettlement, the initial losses of capital are inevitable, by virtue of people being moved from their resource base.

As a result, these and other complexities of resettlement as a process tend to affect the manner in which resettlement policies are implemented, and the adequacy of implementation processes. Therefore, as indicated earlier, in the majority of cases, resettlement projects lead to insufficient recovery of the losses, and subsequently, to reduced living conditions. It is indisputable that many situations of forced resettlement have been detrimental across the world, leading affected people to worse-off socio-economic, cultural and psychological conditions (De Wet, 2001:4637; Downing, 1996:34; Maldonado, 2012:195; Parasuraman, 1999:4).

The above arguments notwithstanding, the implementation of policies themselves, independent of the complex nature of resettlement, is in itself a problematic process. This is in part because policy implementation is not an isolated process, it is an integral part of a multifaceted political, social and economic environment in given contexts, and these aspects often have their own inherent challenges. The challenges of pre-existing contextual dynamics extend, therefore, to resettlement policy implementation. The challenges of policy implementation will be discussed later in Chapter Six on policy practice. In the next section, the discussion will provide an overview of selected examples of large dam resettlement cases, which have drawn significant international critique.

4.4 Dam-Induced Involuntary Resettlement Cases

The four cases of resettlement induced by the construction of large dams discussed below were selected not only for their international prominence but also for specific features that they each highlight. The Three Gorges Dam in China is the world's largest hydro-electric project in terms of power generation capacity (Hwang, et al., 2011:73; Yan, et al., 2005:474; Wilmsen and van Hulten, 2017:94). This project presents a curious case because of its magnitude. The discussion will explore how the implementation of the project was undertaken, in the context where a significantly large number of people were resettled, resulting in a need to provide resources and rehabilitation measures for multitudes. The

interest in the case also relates to understanding how participation was facilitated or impeded, in a case involving a significantly large number of people.

The Sardar Sarovar Dam Project in India is one of the projects that have attracted a wide range of international debates. In 1991, the World Bank commissioned an independent review of the project after intense resistance and protest by local organisations, calling for the project to be subjected to accountability measures, through a review that would inform, empirically, whether or not the applicable policies were adhered to (Morse and Berger, 1992). As Morse and Berger (1992) state, this was the first ever review of its kind, where the World Bank accepted that its project be subjected to public scrutiny, through a highly publicised, independent review process. The discussion in this case will explore the interplay of these local dynamics, and how that influenced the implementation of resettlement processes. In turn, the discussion will explore how all these processes translated into livelihoods re-establishment (or lack thereof) among affected people.

The Kariba Dam Project in Zambia and Zimbabwe is Africa's first large dam project. This project was implemented during the colonial era, in a context that was, therefore, minimally participatory (Colson, 1971; Scudder and Colson, 1982). The discussion will examine how this context influenced the implementation of the resettlement component, and what that meant in terms of livelihoods re-establishment after resettlement. The project also presents an interesting case in that it was partly the basis upon which the development of the above discussed Scudder's FSF was developed and also tested (Scudder, 1993:124; 2005:32).

Lastly, the Aswan High Dam Project in Egypt represents a rare outcome in resettlement projects. It is one of the few projects that are regarded as a successful resettlement case, in that it led to the improvement of living standards among resettled people going into the second generation (Scudder, 2005:59). The discussion will, therefore, explore the factors at play in enabling this rare outcome. However, recent research by Scudder (2016:35-36) reveals that living standards among some resettled people have recently declined, partly for reasons that do not necessarily have to do with the resettlement process itself, such as the economic context of the wider Egyptian society. The effects of resettlement, and the way it was implemented, on living conditions among resettled people, will be discussed in relation to the historical and present day contexts.

As indicated earlier, one of the aspects of resettlement that makes its consequences to be so complex is that it is a long-term process, whose effects unfold over time. Some of the issues

which apply today in these cases may have not been apparent at the beginning, and only began to emerge over time. However, it is for this reason that theoretical tools such as the FSF, the IRR, as well as the inherent complexity and spatial approaches, are instrumental in informing the processes of resettlement and possible consequences. Furthermore, long-term studies, such as those undertaken in the selected cases discussed in this section, are instrumental in enabling the understanding of how resettlement and its consequences unfold over time.

4.4.1 China's Three Gorges Dam Project

A Background to the Project

The idea of building a dam along the Yangtze River in China was first conceived in 1919, but it was not until 1992 that the Government of China endorsed the project (Gleick, 2009:147; Jackson and Sleigh, 2000:224; Kwai-cheong, 1995:98; Zhang, 2014:1048). Largely owing to wars, political unrest and revolution, the plan was suspended, and only revived much later in the 1960s (Gleick, 2009:147-148; Jackson and Sleigh, 2000:224; Kwai-cheong, 1995:98). At the time, however, the construction of the dam was perceived by some members of the public, scholars and officials as infeasible, unaffordable, and socially and environmentally costly (Jackson and Sleigh, 2000:224-225; Qing, 1997: unpagged). At the height of the dam construction, resistance began to foment with many opposing it on socio-economic, environmental and technical grounds. Its opponents believed that the construction of smaller dams upstream would cost much less, resettle fewer people, and would not be as much of an environmental hazard as the planned biggest dam in the world, along the Yangtze River (Jackson and Sleigh, 2000:224; Qing, 1997:unpagged).

However, in 1992, the construction of the dam was given the go-ahead by the Chinese government, amidst increasing public tension (Hwang, et al., 2011:73; Jackson and Sleigh, 2000:224; Kwai-cheong, 1995:98; Qing, 1997: unpagged; Zhang, 2014:1048). The Three Gorges Dam, which had resettled approximately 1.3 million people by 2007, was constructed for three major purposes: flood control, hydropower generation, and navigation improvement (Heggelund, 2008:99; Hwang, et al., 2011:74; Yan, et al., 2005:474; Zhang, 2014:1050-1051). In 2007, an official announcement was made indicating an increased number of people to be resettled on account of the Three Gorges Dam, bringing the number up to “at least 4 million people” (Brown, et al., 2008:622; Xinhua, in Gleick, 2009:145). Although there were compelling arguments against the dam, including its negative environmental impacts,

massive involuntary resettlement with likely negative consequences, and the destruction of cultural landmarks and archaeological sites, the construction of the dam went ahead (Robinson, 2003:16).

As is the nature of forced resettlement, the mandate of the state to claim land for public purpose does not depend on public approval according to the principle of *eminent domain*. This is partly indicative of unequal power dynamics, where the state wields absolute power over the land within its territories, and can possess it for the purpose of public service provision or improvement, even when other members of the public, including private owners of the land to be acquired, are not in agreement with the decision. The next section on ethical issues will unpack the concept of *eminent domain* and its associated precepts – public purpose and just compensation.

Through the construction of the dam, one of the government of China's main objectives was to mitigate catastrophic floods in the country, following a number of occasions where floods – such as those of the 1930s, 1950s and later on in the 1990s – claimed numerous lives, and would most likely continue to cause damage far exceeding what it would cost to construct the dam (Fearnside, 1988:1; Jackson and Sleight, 2000:227; Robinson, 2003:16). Although the option to construct smaller dams upstream was on the table, they would have not been able to address potential floods that could affect some 200 million people downstream (Jackson and Sleight, 2000:227).

However, opponents were of the opinion that the project was mainly driven by a “state capitalist” agenda, where the main driving forces were the maximisation of power production and the improvement of river transport, “increasing ship size from 2,000 ton to 10,000 ton” for the facilitation of industrial expansion (Beattie, 2002:139; Jackson and Sleight, 2000:227). Even though China has a socialist politico-economic system, its development agenda is heavily economic, and is influenced by open market principles of free trade, increased production, and prioritisation of profits, which are also features of the capitalist economic system (Wilmsen, et al., 2011:361). Hence, for some critics, the dam was mainly an economically driven project, with little attention paid to its immense social and environmental consequences (Qing, 1997: unpagged).

In response to concerns about the social and environmental impacts of the dam, the Chinese government established programmes to facilitate resettlement and rehabilitation for those who would be affected by its construction. These programmes were aimed at facilitating the

physical resettlement component as well as re-establishing livelihoods beyond resettlement – the rehabilitation component (Wilmsen and van Hulten, 2017:94). The programmes had two main goals to which a few objectives were channelled. The first – the Partnership Support Programme – was aimed at infrastructure development in the resettlement areas as well as the creation of employment (Jackson and Sleigh, 2000:231; Wilmsen and van Hulten, 2017:94). The second was the Development Assistance Fund, which was geared towards the re-establishment of livelihoods, educational support, health services, and subsidies for resettled people, with special focus on vulnerable groups such as the elderly, the poor and people with disabilities (Wilmsen and van Hulten, 2017:94). The implementation and outcomes of these programmes are discussed below.

Lost livelihood re-establishment

The losses of livelihoods suffered by those who were forcibly moved on account of the Three Gorges Dam will be discussed against the measures applied to rehabilitate them. The discussion in this regard is informed by research based on different case studies; hence, there are variations in the outcomes of resettlement. Nonetheless, the cases will broadly show how, in the main, the consequences of resettlement reflect on the ground.

Prior to resettlement, an estimated 330,000 of the total number of people resettled due to the Three Gorges Dam were rural populations mainly reliant on subsistence farming, which involuntary resettlement would take away from affected people (Fearnside, 1988:5). Statistics that are more recent show, however, that the number increased to over 800,000 (Heggelund, 2006a:190). The initial plan regarding the resettlement of affected rural populations in the reservoir area was that they would be resettled within the reservoir region (Heggelund, 2006a:189; 2006b:79; Heming, et al., 2001:202). This policy provision resonates with those of the Katse Dam in Lesotho, and the Chandil Dam in India, as later discussions will reveal. The rationale in both the Katse and Chandil cases was that resettling the affected within their regions would enable them to retain some of their social and cultural capital, as well as access to some of the natural resources not inundated (LHDA, 1989; State of Jharkhand, 2008). This was most likely the rationale in the Three Gorges resettlement case.

However, in 1999, that policy element was changed and resulted in the resettlement of about one-third of the rural population to areas outside their original places in the reservoir region (Heggelund, 2006b:79). The argument for this policy change was that most of the land in the

reservoir area had already deteriorated, and would only get worse with increased dependence through resettlement influx (Heggelund, 2006b:79). Nevertheless, owing to population growth and resultant arable land pressure, not much alternative land was available in the areas to which people would be resettled outside the reservoir region (Fearnside, 1988:5; Wilmsen, et al., 2011:363). This resulted in the decline of both land holding and agricultural production in the new areas. In response to the need for farming land, part of the plan was to move some portion of the population uphill, where dairy farms would be established to support the needs of resettled farmers (Fearnside, 1988:6). However, whether that plan became a reality is unclear, much of the recent studies do not seem to reflect this issue.

After resettlement, some people who lost farming land were compensated with land in the new settlements; however, as indicated earlier, available alternative land was inadequate and the affected people reported less yields than before from their new allocated land (Heming, et al., 2001:203; Jackson and Sleight, 2000:234; Yan, et al., 2005:483). The reasons for the decline of agricultural production in the new areas were three-fold. First, because of the magnitude of the impact of the project, and the vastness of the land needed to resettle the affected people, assessments of available land were conducted through aerial photography (Yuefang and Steil, 2003:427). However, upon closer examination during implementation, implementing officials found that parts of the identified land that was considered available consisted of steep slopes and infertile soils (ibid.:427). Such an outcome is reflective of the complexities of resettlement indicated earlier, that some aspects of resettlement appear to be unamenable to routine planning, such that even where planning is undertaken, possibly efficiently, the outcomes may take up a life of their own (De Wet, 2006:187; 2015:88).

The second reason is related to the first; because of the inadequacy of the land available to resettled people, smaller plots were allocated for resettled people in the host communities. The principle was that no more than an average square meterage of land held by host community members would be allocated to the incoming, resettled members (Yan, et al., 2005:483). Hence, because more people had to now share the land, many of those who were resettled from the rural areas where they had large patches of land had less in the new areas (Heming, et al., 2001:203; Jackson and Sleight, 2000:234; Yan, et al., 2005:484). Lastly, land usage patterns had changed in the new settlements, which meant that landholders could no longer grow crops as per their own discretion, but had to abide by prescribed patterns, that were meant to regulate land fertility retention (Yan, et al., 2005:484). All these changes in

plot sizes and land use patterns, which resulted in the decline of agricultural production, meant that many could no longer subsist on farming, and had to go in search for jobs (Yan, et al., 2005:487).

Consequently, many of the rural resettlers faced different forms of marginalisation in the new areas, including their inability to use their previously acquired land cultivation skills, because of changing lifestyles for some, and changing land use patterns imposed on resettlers in the new areas (Heggelund, 2006a:187). According to Cernea (1997:1574), some forms of marginalisation may occur when resettled people are unable to engage skills acquired prior to resettlement in order to sustain their livelihoods in the new areas, such that their human capital is rendered inactive. Moreover, other forms of marginalisation resulted from conflicts with hosts, due to what the hosts saw as “preferential treatment” for the resettled people, because of government tax and other living subsidies for resettled people (Qiu, et al., in Heggelund, 2006a:187).

The other segment of the affected people were urban dwellers, who constituted over 50% of the total population affected, many of whom would lose their jobs due to involuntary resettlement (Fearnside, 1988:5; Kwai-cheong, 1995:100). The plan in response to this loss was to resettle some people in the industrial areas, where they could potentially find employment in the factories (ibid.:6). Also, as part of the economic benefits of dam construction, some of the people would be employed in the project in construction jobs, as well as in the transport industry (Wilmsen and van Hulten, 2017:100). However, although the employment rate increased significantly from 2003 when construction had just begun, most jobs were subsequently lost after 2011 with the completion of the dam (ibid.:100).

As a result, income levels rose significantly between 2003 and 2011, which improved the living standards of the people for a short while, with some households reporting household income increase of up to 440% in that period, which then dropped afterwards (Wilmsen and van Hulten, 2017:99). While Scudder argues, in his FSF, that living standards tend to decline in stage two, shortly after relocation, this case provides a contrasting example, where living standards only began to decline nearly ten years after relocation, which is the phase in which, according to Scudder’s framework, economic development must take off, in stage three. This contrast affirms Weist’s criticism of the stage framework by Scudder, that the phases of

resettlement do not always follow a linear fashion; some stages may overlap, and still others may occur in an order different from the one outlined in the FSF (Scudder, 2005:43).

Furthermore, an increase in income levels could be read as an improvement in living standards, but according to Wilmsen and van Hulten (2017:99), a closer look may reveal other dynamics, which may counter the improvement of livelihoods among the affected people. One finding in this case reveals that in some cases, an increase in income levels led to increased and unsustainable spending patterns. With some resettled people coming from rural and/or low-income regions and moving into high spending regions in the resettlement areas, Wilmsen and van Hulten's study revealed that more households in the studied areas reported to be in greater debt than in any other time preceding their resettlement (2017:99). This was particularly the case with those who resettled from rural areas to urban areas, than those who moved from rural to rural or urban to urban (Hwang, et al., 2011:84; Wilmsen and van Hulten, 2017:99). This might indicate difficulties in adjusting to new livelihood patterns among former rural dwellers, leading to further impoverishment, despite a possible increase in income levels.

The discussion of Lesotho's Mohale Dam resettlement, which is one of the case studies in this research, will reveal a similar pattern, where the studied former rural dwellers resettled from the Mohale region to peri-urban areas, demonstrated difficulties adjusting to high-spending lifestyles after resettlement. The difficulty in adjusting to new living patterns is particularly exacerbated by the fact that many lost their productive assets and access to natural resources, which in many cases could not be recovered.

With an increased urban population resulting from resettlement in the Three Gorges Dam, the demand for jobs increased significantly, leading to increased rates of unemployment in the resettlement regions (Kwai-cheong, 1995). This resulted in voluntary migration from initial resettlement areas to those closer to industries where people went looking for jobs, causing further strain on the resources and services in industrialised regions (Yan, et al., 2005:491-492). This pattern of voluntary migration after involuntary resettlement correlates with Scudder's stage three, characterised by resettlers' risk-taking behaviour, which, as indicated earlier, may include the exploration of new opportunities outside their initial resettlement areas. The studied case in Lesotho revealed similar trends of labour migration after resettlement.

Comparable trends between the small-scale resettlement in Lesotho's Mohale Dam case, and a large-scale resettlement in China's Three Gorges Dam case, confirm Scudder's argument based on the study of 50 dam cases, that the number of people resettled does not make a significant difference in terms of their ability to recover from losses (2005:58). What makes a difference is whether or not there are opportunities for development in the new settlements or surrounding areas. However, it can also be argued that where greater numbers of people are resettled, as in the Three Gorges Dam, it puts an immense pressure on available resources in the new areas. An example can be drawn from the situation in the Three Gorges Dam, where resettled people were allocated smaller plots in the new areas, because there were many people among whom the limited available land had to be shared. As a result, agricultural production was reported to have declined (Heming, et al., 2001:203; Jackson and Sleight, 2000:234; Yan, et al., 2005:483), negatively affecting the ability of resettled people to recover from the losses.

Compensation

Compensation for affected people addressed losses of production or livelihoods, land and moving expenses (Jackson and Sleight, 2000:231; Wilmsen et al., 363). On the table was the offer of an average 20,000 yuan per resettled household, based on the losses suffered (Jackson and Sleight, 2000:231; Wilmsen et al., 2011:364), but it is not clear what the amount specifically entailed. Also, a pertinent question is what the amount meant in terms of losses experienced by people, and the consequences those losses imposed on affected people. That is, whether that amount was able to afford them the replacement of assets lost to forced resettlement in the new areas, and whether or not they were able to rebuild and improve their livelihoods after resettlement. Furthermore, the sufficiency of compensation packages to make up for losses is not only determined by the value offered for the loss, but also the manner and time in which compensation is delivered. Issues of compensation delays will be unpacked in Chapter Six on policy practice.

In the case of the Three Gorges Dam, apart from the adequacy or inadequacy of compensation, which has often been an issue with compensation mechanisms in resettlement situations, issues of bureaucratic mismanagement of resettlement funds came out in some research findings (Heggelund, 2006a:13; Wu, in Jackson and Sleight, 2000:235). While the government had promised to offer an average of 20,000 yuan to each resettled household based on losses suffered, in some cases there were reports of local officials offering on

average 10,800 yuan (Jackson and Sleigh, 2000:231). As is often the challenge in many instances of forced resettlement, resettlement in the Three Gorges Dam was limited by financial shortages, which is arguably part of the reason why in some counties, officials have attempted to negotiate for reduced compensation packages (Jackson and Sleigh, 2000:231). However, some authors argue that inconsistent compensation amounts were the result of an endemic corruption in the country, which has also come out in other large dam projects (Heggelund, 2008; Ting, in Jackson and Sleigh, 2000:236).

Also, apart from a shortage of funds for resettlement, the region surrounding the reservoir had already been set back even before resettlement began. Due to the construction of the dam and the resettlement that came with it, government investment in the region was stalled while the dam and resettlement were being planned (Heming, et al., 2001:199; Jackson and Sleigh, 2000:231). As a result, by the time dam construction and resettlement began, the region had become one of the poorest, with a lack of services and proper infrastructure, and by extension, the standards of living had begun to deteriorate even before physical relocation took place (Jackson and Sleigh, 2000:231). This resonates with Scudder's argument that the losses experienced by affected people in resettlement situations begin long before the physical resettlement component commences (1993:130-131). This means that, by the time compensation planning is undertaken and implemented, people affected have already suffered prior losses, which are often not incorporated, partly because they are not understood.

Compensation for lost houses came either as new houses built in the new settlements, or as a lump sum, reportedly enough to build new houses as well as to cover moving expenses (Yan, et al., 2005:482). Generally, houses in the new settlements were reported to be "bigger and of a better quality" than the previous houses (Yan, et al., 2005:482). The quality of the houses was measured on the basis of the materials used to build them, and the sizes of the houses were measured by the floors' square metres (ibid.:482). In the cases studied by Yan, et al. (2005), the majority of the affected people were reported to have been satisfied with their new houses. This outcome corroborates Cernea's assertion that, where there is political will, the risk of homelessness is one of the least complicated to prevent in resettlement situations (2000:38).

However, other resources that were lost such as common property were generally not compensated (Wilmsen, et al., 2011:365). These include forests, as well as the river itself,

which provided some means of livelihood for households that operated small ferries and boats across the river (ibid.:365). These losses were reportedly not compensated, even though, unlike other non-tangible losses, they are more easily quantifiable to attach a value for the loss. Cernea (2000:29) has also argued that the losses associated with lost access to common property resources are typically not compensated in many resettlement projects. Nonetheless, as an exceptional cases in this regard, later discussions will show how the loss of common property resources were compensated in the Mohale Dam resettlement case in Lesotho. The impact of the losses of livelihoods attached to common property resources are often exacerbated by the fact that they are more long-term, and the failure to recompense them result in chronic decline in living standards.

Access to services

Resettlement in relation to the Three Gorges Dam has been characterised by some writers as implemented with a development component, or as a development project in itself (Duan and McDonald, 2004; McDonald, et al., 2008; Zhang, 2014:1053). This view was based on the investment of the government towards the improvement of services provided in the new areas and the surrounding regions in the name of resettlement. Since 1992 when the project was established, through the Partnership Support Programme and Development Assistance Fund, which are the two major programmes aimed at facilitating resettlement and rehabilitation in the Three Gorges Dam region, the government in collaboration with the private sector have invested about 1.2 billion yuan (Zhang, 2014:1053). These funds were geared towards infrastructure development and employment creation, as well as the provision of services in the new areas and surrounding regions (McDonald, et al., 2008:88). The establishment of enterprises and other development projects, provision of training for affected people, as well as provision of social and health services, were some of the purposes to which the funds were geared (ibid.:88).

However, the implementation of these development initiatives has not been without challenges and controversies. While increased funding for, especially, the rehabilitation component has ensured that affected people and those who now live in the region have access to resources and services to improve their lives, access to those services has led to increased inequalities and tensions rooted in what others believe is partisan programme implementation (Heggelund, 2006a:13; McDonald, et al., 2008:96). Those who live in the areas where development projects and enterprises are concentrated have had a better chance of rebuilding their livelihoods than their counterparts in less developed regions (McDonald, et al.,

2008:97). Not only did they have a better chance of employment, but also better access to schools, healthcare facilities, and other basic infrastructure; whereas their counterparts were less privileged in this regard (ibid.:97). Furthermore, in some cases, research indicates that involvement in enterprises or development projects was influenced by connections with certain officials, such that in some households, there were a few members in a family who were employed while in others there were none, with no clear criterion (Heggelund, 2006a:13).

Moreover, studies such as the one conducted by Hwang, et al. (2011), reveal that despite improved access to services in some regions to which people were resettled, the overall wellbeing of studied resettled people had deteriorated over time. This is especially true in relation to healthcare, access to schooling and social support (ibid.:87). Other challenges related to access to services in the new settlements were water shortages, ironically, particularly in the reservoir region (Kwai-cheong, 1995:100). This is a trend that is indicative of the inequitable distribution of benefits in development projects that induce resettlement, where negatively affected people do not share in the direct benefits of such a project. As will be seen in the other cases studied, and in the ethnographic chapters studied in this research, inequitable distribution of project benefits is a common pattern.

Participation of affected people

In order to attract support from a wide range of stakeholders, the government of China established a programme to facilitate participation of affected people (Kwai-cheong, 1995:100). However, although some consultation programmes or public gatherings that were held may be documented as participation, some authors argue that consultative activities are only a doorway to participation, and not participation in its entirety (Cornwall, 2008:272). For participation to be meaningful, it has to be facilitated in a manner that allows affected people to influence decision-making (Cornwall, 2008:272; Paktar, 1995:158).

Conversely, in the case of the Three Gorges Dam, resettlement working meetings were held during the resettlement planning stages, in which the state council and other official representatives informed affected people of the decisions already made at the higher executive level (Heggelund, 2006a:188). Decisions such as the staged manner in which people would be moved and how many people would be moved at a time, are ordinarily made by the implementing authorities. However, certain kinds of decisions, such as those related to rehabilitation and development, could possibly be open to the influence of directly affected

people, as was the case in the Mohale Dam resettlement studied in this research. Nevertheless, research shows that in the case of Three Gorges Dam, participation of affected people was nearly non-existent (Heggelund, 2006a:188). In addition, where the affected people protested resettlement conditions, the use of state force through arrests were often imposed (ibid.:188). Consequently, the implemented compensation, rehabilitation and development plans were those planned at the implementing authority level, with little to no influence of directly affected people.

4.4.2 India's Sardar Sarovar Dam Project

A Background to the Project

The Sardar Sarovar Project (SSP) is part of the Narmada River Programme in India, which involves the construction of 30 large dams, 125 medium and 3000 small ones (Routledge, 2003:244; Scudder, 2005:193; Wood, 1993:973-974). The dam was planned mainly for the purpose of irrigation – for an estimated 1.8 million hectares of farming land – and for the generation of hydropower to the capacity of 1450 MW (Baviskar and Singh, 1994:349; Dwivedi, 1998:141; Gandhi, 2003:484; Scudder, 2005:193-194; Wood, 1993:974). The Narmada River, on which the SSP was constructed, runs through three states in central and western India – Gujarat, Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh (Gandhi, 2003:484). However, while the social and environmental impacts of the dam were mainly felt in Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra, the primary beneficiaries are inhabitants of Gujarat State (ibid.:484). This is not an isolated case, as in many cases of development projects involving forced resettlement, those who are forced out from the acquired land and those who benefit from the project are seldom the same group.

As with the Three Gorges Dam, the Sardar Sarovar Dam has been a source of intense conflict amongst different stakeholders across the region and the country since its inception in the 1960s (Cullet, 2007:1; Dwivedi, 1998; Scudder, 2005:194; Wood, 1993:968). Initially, the conflict sparked among the three states involved, due to disagreements on the proportions of costs and benefits to be shared, but the tensions that would follow, initiated by the affected people's resistance to the project, would be more long-term and widespread (Cullet, 2007:1; Scudder, 2005:194; Wood, 1993:969). In 1969, a tribunal for the Narmada Water Dispute was established (hereafter called the Tribunal), with the aim of finding common ground, an objective that was only achieved a decade later (Baviskar and Singh, 1994:350; Fisher, 1995:12; Narula, 2008:354). The Tribunal's final report in 1979 paved the way for the

beginning of the project, with a clear outline of benefits and cost-sharing, as well as guidelines for the resettlement of those who would be affected (Baviskar and Singh, 1994:350; Narula, 2008:355; Dwivedi, 1999:50; Scudder, 2005:194).

Beyond the inter-state disputes and their solution, public resistance became one more hurdle for the construction of the dam, which would last for decades. Like many other cases, the construction of the dam was opposed on socio-cultural and environmental grounds (Berger, 1993:36; Dwivedi, 1998:143; Mehta, 2005:615; Scudder, 2005:194). Just less than a decade into the construction and resettlement, the project was criticised for insufficient compensation, and for failing to rehabilitate the majority of the affected people; largely owing to a lack of proper planning, a lack of public participation, inadequate resources allocation and implementation (Mehta, 2005:616-617; Scudder, 2005:195). Coupled with pressure from local activists and the international community, the socio-economic and environmental effects of the dam evoked the World Bank's withdrawal from funding the project in 1993 (Fisher, 1995:5; Mehta, 2005:618). Discussions on participation of affected people below will further explore issues of local resistance in the SSP. The SSP is one of the largest dam projects in India, which has attracted a lot of analysis and critique. Hence, different kinds of issues that came out of the SSP resettlement and displacement will be discussed in some of the later chapters of this thesis.

Despite pressure from a wide range of stakeholders for the Indian government to call off the project, the government was resolute that the benefits of the dam construction far outweighed its costs; maintaining that it would significantly alleviate drought and poverty in drought-stricken areas (Fisher, 1995:3; Gandhi, 2003:484; Terminski, 2015:89). In fact, some proponents believed that the project was a matter of life and death, referring to it as a "lifeline of Gujarat" (Berger, 1993:36). In addition to irrigation and power generation, the dam, when completed, would provide water to an estimated 40 million people in Gujarat (Berger, 1993:36; Dwivedi, 1998:141). Based on the number of people who would benefit from the project, and the tangible benefits that would supposedly provide substantial economic advantages and drought relief, the decision to continue with the construction of the dam prevailed.

Lost livelihood re-establishment

According to official reports, the construction of the SSP would result in forcible resettlement of an estimated 43,000 households in 245 villages (Parasuraman, et al., 2010:41; Sangvai, in

Routledge, 2003:246). However, critics have argued that the number is a gross underestimation of the impact of the dam. Writers such as McCully (1996), Ram, Sangvai (in Routledge, 2003:247) argue that the dam would, in fact, resettle 85,000 households, and further displace some 600,000 people, who would likely lose their livelihoods. Other writers have even estimated that the construction of the dam would inundate an area in which at least 100,000 people lived, which approximates the physical resettlement of over 100,000 people (Berger, 1993:35).

Prior to involuntary resettlement, most people in the Narmada Valley region sustained a life less reliant on the formal economy, yet were self-sufficient in their livelihoods. In the case of Manibeli, for example, one of the villages affected by the dam construction in the Maharashtra State, many people lived off agriculture, forest resources such as wood, river resources such as water and fish, as well as livestock (Parasuraman, 1999:186). Furthermore, alongside paid labour, landless people in this area relied on established social networks which facilitated agricultural production (ibid.:185-186). In this sense, people who did not own land, were able to live off agricultural production through their social networks that facilitated access to land and land produce, as well as through paid labour.

Also in other states, both landed and landless people relied on agriculture for subsistence. According to Morse and Berger (1992:89), among the resettled and displaced people in the six villages in Kevadia in the Gujarat State, both landless labourers and landholders lost access to land, which played a fundamental role in the economy in the region. It is estimated that the six villages lost about 70% of agricultural land to construction associated with the SSP (ibid.:89). In addition to the construction of the dam itself, there was additional infrastructure such as road networks, administrative blocks, etc. to which people in Kevadia lost arable land (Morse and Berger, 1992:89).

However, it is worth noting that the issue of landownership is, in some cases, structured along social lines, and has an impact on how different categories of people experience or are affected by forced resettlement. In the state of Madhya Pradesh, for example, among the 140 affected villages consisting of a combination of castes and tribes, the owners of larger pieces of land were predominantly non-scheduled castes, while the scheduled groups (both castes and tribes) comprised mainly landless and small plot owners (Morse and Berger, 1992:181). Later discussions in Chapter Eleven will describe the social groupings in the Indian context, and how they relate to the socio-economic realities of the different groups. The discussions in

Chapter Eleven will also show how people within different social categories are affected by resettlement, some of whom are excluded in compensation and rehabilitation processes, whether by the applied procedures or social structures. However, in the case of SPP, landless affected people who were initially excluded from benefiting from compensation and rehabilitation, were later included as beneficiaries, as discussed below.

As part of compensation for lost livelihoods among affected people, the Narmada Water Dispute Tribunal ruled, in 1979, that the resettled people were entitled to land-for-land compensation, which should be awarded to the heads of households (defined as male) as well as all major sons (defined as those over the age of 18) (Dwivedi, 1999:50; Fisher, 1995:31; Whitehead, 1999:1942). Discussions on compensation below will stipulate the measures of land compensation implemented. In addition, the affected states' governments were to provide land compensation for landless people who were affected, who would lose their livelihoods to resettlement, with no claim to land (Dwivedi, 1999:50). However, this was a result of resistance and pressure from affected people on the authorities, calling for compensation for lost livelihoods among the landless, who were initially not included as part of compensation beneficiaries (ibid.:50).

Nevertheless, because of land shortages the land-for-land requirement was implemented with significant shortfalls. The ethnographic study by Whitehead (1999) undertaken in south and central Gujarat State for example, reveals that about 40% of the landed resettlers indicated that they received less than five acres of land. Moreover, there were a few other cases in which the main households claimed that they never received land, even though they had had land before being displaced (Whitehead, 1999:1942). Additionally, there were ongoing disputes between the governments of the three involved states –Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Gujarat – and the affected people, due to the failure of the governments to implement land compensation for major sons and landless displaced people (Morse and Berger, 1992).

Moreover, for many of those who were allocated land, the productivity of their land, in comparison to previously owned land, was reportedly lower. According to Whitehead (1999:1942), nearly all respondents pointed to the fact that their arable land in the new areas was significantly less productive, even during the monsoon. This could mean that even though land was provided for some of the affected families, the effects on food security may

have been inconsistent, with some being less nutritionally secure as compared with their previous lives due to reduced yields from the less fertile land.

In addition, some of those who were given land had to first clear it, hence it took them longer to get to a point where they could cultivate it (Parasuraman, 1999:193). The government of Maharashtra, for instance, in an attempt to address land scarcity, converted over 4,000 hectares of forestland into agricultural land, to facilitate land compensation for affected people (Parasuraman, et al., 2010:43). This was the result of a call from local groups consisting of activists and the SSP-affected people in Maharashtra, to the government to release some degraded forestland to supplement scarce agricultural land for rehabilitation purposes (Dwivedi, 1997b:8). However, after clearing the land it was discovered that at least 1,500 hectares of the land “was rocky and uncultivable” (Parasuraman, et al., 2010:43). Hence, the affected people had to first prepare the land to try to salvage some for potential cultivation.

During the initial transition stage, the government introduced a relief subsistence allowance, which was meant to assist resettled people in the interim, while they prepared for their first yield (Parasuraman, 1999:193). Scudder notes in the previously discussed stage framework, that the initial period of transition in resettlement is often followed by reduced standards of living, partly because the affected people are still trying to find their feet, and in some cases preparing for land cultivation (2005:34). Hence, such an initiative for providing a relief subsistence was a commendable way of mitigating the drop of the living standards among the resettled people.

However, three to four years later, some people were only receiving their subsistence allowance, by which time, many had experienced significant difficulties (Parasuraman, 1999:193). As later discussions will show in discussing the limitations of compensation, the adequacy of compensation is not only a matter of the value attached to the loss but also the manner in which it is implemented. The untimely manner in which the subsistence allowance was delivered to the affected people in Maharashtra, completely defeated its purpose of providing relief, during the time when the affected people were preparing the land for cultivation.

As a result of these and other limitations – unfulfilled land compensation in some cases, poor quality of provided land, and delayed subsistence relief to cushion the affected people at the initial stage – many people who lost their livelihoods were, for a long time, not able to

improve nor restore them. Although some young people managed to secure employment in the construction project, only a few of them benefited, among the masses whose livelihoods had been lost to resettlement (Parasuraman, 1999:195). Over two decades after the first people were resettled by the SSP, the majority of them had still not recovered from their losses, and their livelihoods had worsened (Scudder, 2005:295). In 1994, the government made an admission that they had failed to rehabilitate the hundreds of thousands of the people who were resettled and displaced by the Narmada Valley projects (Mehta, 2005:638).

According to Scudder (2005:195), the failure of the SSP to, at the least, restore the livelihoods of the affected people is indicative of the five major reasons for the failure of resettlement projects across the world. In his analysis of the SSP resettlement and rehabilitation programmes, Scudder concluded that a lack of political will, a lack of proper planning and implementation, a lack of resources – both financial and human capital – hindered resettler participation, as well as a lack of opportunities to allow resettlers to share in the benefits of the project, are the main factors that impeded positive outcomes in many resettlement cases including in the SSP (2005:195).

Compensation

Compensation in the SSP was offered for losses of land, houses, and trees, as per the resettlement guidelines outlined in the final report of the Tribunal, as well as the first World Bank resettlement guidelines of 1980, as the World Bank was, at the time, still a co-funder of the project (Parasuraman, 1999:188). As stated in the Tribunal report, the state of Gujarat was given a major responsibility for resettlement costs, obligated to offer irrigated land to resettlers from Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh, who were willing to move to Gujarat (Dwivedi, 1999:50). This was because the benefits of the dam, on whose account the people were being resettled, included irrigation schemes in the state of Gujarat, hence, the state was obligated to provide irrigated land for the resettled people from Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh (Morse and Berger, 1992:115). Also, the same obligation to provide land compensation for the affected people was assigned to the Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh states, for people who wanted to resettle into their respective states (Dwivedi, 1999:50).

However, one of the issues that became a source of contention was that, although the Tribunal report stipulated resettlement and rehabilitation guidelines, the three states each had their own policies, which defined the levels and quantities of the stipulated compensation items to be provided. People in Maharashtra reported to have received an average Rs.5,220

per household as a combined lump sum for houses, land and trees, which was only 50% of what was due to them (Parasuraman, 1999:189). The other 50% was kept by the government, to cover land-for-land compensation, which the government would provide to the affected people, reportedly without the approval or knowledge of the affected people (ibid.:189). Many of them were still awaiting their other 50% when they learned that the money had already been deposited into the government's account for land compensation (Parasuraman, 1999:189). This is indicative of a lack of communication, information distribution, and participation, which research has highlighted as some of the shortcomings that have affected implementation processes in the SSP (Scudder, 2005:195). Needless to say, this sparked further tensions between the affected people and the authorities, instigating legal battles against the government and intensifying protests across the region, which had already begun prior to resettlement (Dwivedi, 1998:136; Gandhi, 2003:484; Wood, 1993:977).

In Gujarat, where the benefits of the project were geared to (Gandhi, 2003:484), a better compensation was offered, partly the reason for dissatisfaction and subsequent resistance in Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh (Narula, 2008:358; Parasuraman, 1999:189). The affected people in the state of Gujarat were offered an average Rs.8,780 per hectare for land compensation, excluding other compensation benefits (Hasan, 2016:91). Moreover, both landed resettlers and landless labourers in Gujarat were eligible for two hectares of irrigated land, whereas in Maharashtra, only five years later was the state resettlement policy amended to provide for one hectare of irrigated land to the previously landed, landless labourers, major sons and adult unmarried daughters (Dwivedi, 1999:51).

This is remarkable as it speaks to inequitable distribution of costs and benefits in forced resettlement situations. While the people from Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh were bearing most of the costs with no direct benefits from the dam, they were also compensated less for their losses, and their counterparts in Gujarat, who would enjoy direct benefits of the project, were compensated to a greater extent for their losses. Better land compensation that was offered in Gujarat was enabled by the irrigation schemes that resulted from the SSP, which gave access to irrigated land to the people in Gujarat, a benefit the resettled people in the other two states did not have (Morse and Berger, 1992:115).

Notwithstanding, the general tone in a lot of research, with regard to the implementation of compensation and rehabilitation in the SSP, indicates inadequate compensation and rehabilitation, which did not meet the World Bank standards as stipulated in the guidelines,

nor adhered to some of the Tribunal prescriptions (Berger, 1993; Morse and Berger, 1992; Scudder, 2005; Wood, 1993:980). Later discussions on participation of affected people will show how the general dissatisfaction of the public regarding the manner in which rehabilitation and compensation were implemented, led to widespread resistance that drew not only national but also international attention.

Access to services

In their original areas, many of the resettled people in the three affected states had access to river water, forest resources for fuel and other uses, land, etc. (Morse and Berger, 1992; Parasuraman, 1999:201). However, with resettlement, people lost access to such resources, and many were unable to regain alternative resources after being resettled (Morse and Berger, 1992). Many resettled people across the region had no access to healthcare facilities, road infrastructure and electricity in their new settlements, forcing them to travel long distances to access such services in neighbouring areas (Morse and Berger, 1992; Parasuraman, 1999:201-203). This is despite the clear stipulation in the Tribunal's report that facilities such as healthcare centres, schools, religious structures, and services such as piped water and electricity, as well as road infrastructure, must be provided in areas to which people would be moved, particularly those to which larger numbers of people were moved (Dwivedi, 1999:50). Although other places had schools within a reasonable distance from their villages, most schools were ill-equipped and under-staffed, and still some were dominated by boys, due to socio-cultural practices that exclude girls, a trend representative of many other areas in India, even those outside resettlement situations (Parasuraman, 1999:201). Discussions in Chapter Eleven, on the Indian context, will speak to this culturally-influenced boy-girl disparity in access to education.

Participation of affected people

One of the limitations of resettlement processes in relation to the SSP identified by researchers and independent reviewers is the lack of participation of affected people. Scudder (2005:195) highlights this in his book, "The Future of Large Dams", and this has appeared repeatedly in other research reports. The absence of a clear participation strategy and political will to involve affected people was one of the key grievances in many civic actions against the construction of the dam (Dwivedi, 1998:147-148; Gandhi, 2003:487; Scudder, 2005:195). A study conducted in 26 villages in Madhya Pradesh revealed that in all the studied cases, no notice was given to the affected people – as prescribed in the applied Land Acquisition Act of

1894 – regarding the impact of the dam construction and the entitlements of affected people (Dwivedi, 1999:49). Furthermore, even in cases where notices were given, no form of engagement with the affected people was incorporated, in order to forge a clear understanding of the extent of the impact of the dam construction (ibid.:49).

Largely due to the manner in which resettlement processes were undertaken in the Narmada project – of which the SSP is one of the biggest projects – and the resultant shortcomings as noted above, the construction of the SSP has been accompanied by multiple incidences of protest and social upheaval. This originated from people across the social spectrum including activists and resettled people (Aravinda, 2000:4002; Narula, 2008:358). In 1984, the first public demonstration in relation to the SSP was organised by different groups in the two states of Maharashtra and Gujarat, demanding better rehabilitation and compensation, as well as more effective implementation (Dwivedi, 1997b:7). The demonstration comprised a total of 23 tribal villages in Gujarat and Maharashtra, all of whom were affected by the construction of the SSP (ibid.:7). This was the beginning of many protests that would follow.

Local NGOs in the affected states, such as SETU, an organisation based in Ahmedabad, in Gujarat, were involved in mobilising affected local communities consisting of mainly tribal groups, to organise in demand for better rehabilitation implementation from the Narmada projects authorities (Dwivedi, 1997b:8). The Chhatra Yuva Sangharsh Vahini, a youth group established to engage the government through protests in Gujarat, is one example of the groups that joined forces to drive resettlement reform in relation to the SSP (Narula, 2008:358). Together with activists from SETU, groups of the affected people formed the Narmada Dharangrasta Samiti (NDS), which continued to mount pressure on the authorities to review and improve rehabilitation measures (Dwivedi, 1997b:8).

However, while in some cases protest action was successful in securing resettlement policy reforms that saw rehabilitation measures improved, as in the case of the Chhatra Yuva Sangharsh Vahini, the implementation of rehabilitation measures remained inadequate (Narula, 2008:358). This would later be proved by an independent review of the SSP engaged by the World Bank, whose report was released in 1992 (Morse and Berger, 1992). Consequently, the position of different organisations began to shift towards the opposition of the dams' construction (Narula, 2008:358).

In 1989, a number of local organisations including the Narmada Ghati Navnirman Samithi of Madhya Pradesh, the Narmada Ghati Dharangrasta Samithi of Maharashtra, the Narmada

Asargrastha Samithi of Gujarat, and other local groups united to form the Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA) also known as the Save the Narmada Movement. The objective of the collective was to oppose the continuation of the Narmada dams' construction (Bhalla and Mookerjee, 2001:90; Jacob, 2017:492; Narula, 2008:358; Nilsen, 2007:273-274; Rajagopal, 2005:195). The NBA remains one of the most noteworthy movements in the history of democratic India, one that has had a significant impact on the practice of development-induced resettlement across the country (Bhalla and Mookerjee, 2001:90; Nilsen, 2007:273).

The success of the NBA was a result of its multi-stakeholder, multi-level and multi-dimensional approach (Narula, 2008:359). In their quest for the termination of the Narmada dam projects, the NBA involved different stakeholders from the affected people on the ground, the governments at the state and national levels, all the way to international organisations such as the World Bank, which was one of the funders of the SSP at the time (Jacob, 2017:492; Narula, 2008:359). Initially, the movement had engaged different methods at grassroots level, such as marches and protests, hunger strikes, *dharna*, which all did not yield the desired results, compelling the movement to escalate their methods to engaging stakeholders at a higher level (Narula, 2008:359). *Dharna* is a form of peaceful demonstration which involves camping at the premises of a person or entity from whom restitution is sought (Chaudhuri, 2008:137).

In engaging international stakeholders, the NBA gained significant prominence, acquiring the involvement of human rights and environmental organisations abroad, and forming what came to be known as the Narmada International Action Committee, comprising organisations from India and other countries, such as the USA, Canada, Japan, Australia, etc. (Narula, 2008:364). In 1991, the World Bank, responding to mounting pressure propelled by the NBA, employed a team of independent reviewers to assess the implementation of resettlement processes in the SSP, and their outcomes on affected people (Morse and Berger, 1992). In their 1992 report, one of the independent reviewers' notable findings stated that:

“...the Sardar Sarovar Projects as they stand are flawed, that resettlement and rehabilitation of all those displaced by the Projects is not possible under prevailing circumstances, and that environmental impacts of the Projects have not been properly considered or adequately addressed” (Morse and Berger, 1992: XII).

In addition, the report placed part of the blame for the manner in which resettlement was undertaken and the resultant situation on the ground, on the World Bank as the project's

funder (Morse and Berger, 1992: XII). While the World Bank decided – against the pressure and evidence that the project significantly compromised affected people – to continue supporting the project, it was under the condition that the involved Indian states’ governments comply with specific requirement within a given period of time (six months) (Narula, 2008:367). However, five months later, the Indian government made a decision to cancel the remaining part of the loan from the World Bank, a decision which some commentators regarded as an admission of failure to comply with World Bank requirements (ibid.:367).

To date, the NBA remains one of the most notable movements that has had a significant impact across India. Later discussions in Chapter Eleven will further discuss grassroots resistance against and in relation to forced resettlement and displacement in the Indian context, and how that has impacted on policy development at the national level. National policy on resettlement and rehabilitation serves as a framework that speaks to policies at the states level, and this will come out in detail in Chapter Eleven.

4.4.3 Zambia’s Kariba Dam Project

A Background to the Project

The construction of the Kariba Dam on the Zambezi River began in the mid-1950s, following which an estimated 57,000 people – the Gwembe Tonga – were forcefully relocated between 1957 and 1958 (Colson, 1971:4; Jarosz, 1992:109; Gillet and Tobias, 2002:50; Scudder, 1973:49). At the time, the federation of the then Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland – today’s Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi respectively – had just been established. At the core of it, the Kariba dam was aimed at providing hydropower to the growing industrial sites in Zambia and Zimbabwe (Colson, 1971:4). Being Africa’s largest man-made lake, the dam was seen as a symbol of modernisation and economic progress. It would supply Zambia’s Copperbelt and Zimbabwe’s industrial sites with power to the capacity of 1,626 MW (Scudder, 1965:6).

However, beyond the material benefits of the dam lied the Gwembe Tonga, whose lives would be affected significantly, forced to change forever, and mostly for the worst (Colson, 1971:54). As indicated earlier, the Kariba Dam was constructed during Rhodesia’s colonial era – a time of invasion and disregard of local contexts – and paid little to no attention to the effects the dam would have on the people affected (ibid.:15). If anything, some international bodies were concerned with the effects of the dam on the environment and wild life, with

some even going to as far as raising awareness and campaigning to rescue them (Colson, 1971:4). Although some Gwembe Tonga attempted to resist relocation, their resistance was futile as, ultimately, they were effectively forced from their homes. In one particular case, excessive force was used by the police, sending shockwaves across the region and compelling all those who still entertained intentions of resistance to abandon such action and capitulate (ibid.:41).

A possible reason why little to no regard of the fundamental rights of the people affected by the Kariba dam was taken into consideration is that, in the colonial context, the region was regarded as one of the poorest, measured by the absence of proper infrastructure, recurring hunger, low literacy rates, and high rates of unemployment (Colson, 1971:16). As a consequence, the authorities may have felt that the Gwembe Tonga, being forcefully moved, in fact had little to nothing to lose. Moreover, even among the resettled people, there were some who believed the dam was a success story, because of its tangible economic benefits (Scudder, 2005:188). Also, at the time, because of the government's vision to expand economic growth through industrialisation and modernisation, the growing demand for labour force had already begun to pull men from rural areas into developing cities (Colson, 1971:18). Hence, forceful relocation may have been regarded by some, even among the Gwembe Tonga, as only part of the inevitable, as people were already migrating, voluntarily, from rural areas such as Gwembe into the industrial urban areas.

On the other hand, many other Gwembe Tonga were happily settled in their areas with no ambition to migrate, surviving on natural resources, and the established social safety nets, which they could leverage in place of material or financial resources (Colson, 1971:5-6). These are the kinds of costs – social and cultural – that are not often captured, and, therefore, not compensated in forced resettlement contexts, as Downing (1996) argues. While it may be difficult to quantify intangible losses for the purpose of compensation, Scudder (2005:191) argues that the loss of livelihoods attached to land and other natural resources can be compensated through the provision of alternative resources and opportunities in the new areas. Measures to re-establish the lost livelihoods for the Gwembe Tonga are discussed below.

Although the people affected by the construction of the Kariba Dam were resettled within the territories of both Zambia and Zimbabwe, much of the longitudinal studies on resettlement in the Kariba case were undertaken on the Zambian side. Both Scudder and Colson, prominent

researchers on resettlement in the Kariba Dam case, began their studies in the region in 1956 – although Colson had earlier begun research in the area in 1949 – and have since continuously done research among the resettled Gwembe Tonga in Zambia over the years (Colson, 1971; Scudder, 1962; 1965; 1973; 1993; 2005; 2009; Scudder and Colson, 1982; 2002). The discussions in this section will draw from this longitudinal study, and focus mainly on the Zambian case, although reference will still be made to the Zimbabwean case where comparison can be drawn.

Lost livelihood re-establishment

Prior to forced resettlement, the Gwembe Tonga were predominantly an agrarian society (Scudder, 2005:191). Forced resettlement imposed by the construction of the Kariba Dam resulted in the loss of some of the most arable land in the region, along the Zambezi River on which the dam was built (Jarosz, 1992:109; Scudder, 1962:14; 2005:191). In responding to forced resettlement and the consequences it would have on affected people, different approaches were adopted by the governments in the two territories – Zambia and Zimbabwe. On the Zimbabwean side, the government adopted a direct rule tactic, where the affected people were not involved in any of the decisions. Community leaders were informed of the decisions made by the government, with no input invited from the affected people (Colson, 1971:20).

Whereas on the Zambian side, a relatively participatory approach was adopted, where the affected people were allowed to influence certain decisions related to compensation and rehabilitation for their losses. These included that the resettled people were to receive cash compensation for their losses, the direct benefits of the dam, such as commercial fishing, would be reserved for the resettled people, infrastructure and other basic services would be provided in the new areas, and the resettled people would be allowed to maintain their old patterns of cultivation (Colson, 1971:23-24). All these provisions had an impact on how the resettled people were able to fare after being resettled.

Commercial fishing provided the needed development for many of the Gwembe Tonga on the Zambian side during the initial transition stage (Scudder, 2005:190). This also extended to other areas of investment, such as livestock, where the people who benefited from fishing were enabled to accumulate livestock from their fishing earnings (Cliggett, et al., 2007:26; Scudder, 2005:191). Livestock keeping was, particularly, supported by the development of

fertile grazing land resulting from the reservoir drawdown, which encouraged more people to invest in livestock (Scudder, 2005:191).

Although the initial agreement was that commercial fishing benefits would be extended to resettlers for a limited period of time, many continued to benefit from this arrangement even long beyond the lapse of that agreement. As research would later show, long after resettlement, particularly with regard to the Zambian side of the lake, the Kariba case continues to provide one of the examples of how the benefits of a development project can be extended to resettled people on a more long-term basis (Scudder, 2005:189). The inshore fishery on the Zambian side of the lake has continued to provide development opportunities “to thousands of resettlers and [host]” populations (Scudder, 2005:189), partly exemplifying the implementation of the concept of “resettlement with development” (Duan and McDonald, 2004; McDonald, et al., 2008).

However, not many opportunities were available in either of the two sites of the Kariba resettlement to provide for the majority of the affected people (Scudder, 2005:66). Largely due to the growing demand for economic and employment opportunities, coupled with changing lifestyles resulting from exposure to a new economy, many of the resettled Gwembe Tonga experienced difficulties maintaining living standards in the long-term (Cliggett, et al., 2007:24; Colson, 1971). Hence, the living standards of the majority of resettlers in the Kariba case worsened after resettlement (Scudder, 2005:59).

In addition, the difficulties inherent in re-establishing livelihoods after resettlement arose from other complexities such as the scarcity of agricultural land in the new settlements. Due to land scarcity, most affected people were moved inland, where land was less fertile and could only be cultivated once a year, unlike their previous lands which were more arable, and enabled the production of multiple crops in a year (Scudder, 2005:191). This was especially the case on the Zambian side, where more people were resettled, whereas in the case of Zimbabwe, there were fewer resettlers and more unoccupied land, suitable for cultivation (Colson, 1971:20). According to the initial plan for physical resettlement, about 29,000 people from Zambia would be resettled. This figure would later increase to 34,000, while about 11,000 people would be resettled from the Zimbabwe side, which later increased to 23,000, putting immense pressure on both governments, but more so on the Zambian (Colson, 1967:7; 1971:26).

While there were some people who were allocated arable land in the new settlements on the Zambian side, the majority had to first clear their land before they could start ploughing, and it took them a considerable amount of time to get their first harvest (Colson, 1971:52). As in the case of India's Sardar Sarovar Dam resettlement, the affected people in the Zambian territory were given some relief subsistence while they were preparing for their first plough (ibid.:52). However, unlike in the Indian case, the Kariba resettlers were given subsistence in a form of grain as opposed to cash (Colson, 1971:52). Although many welcomed the grain as a free gift, it soon became evident that it was, in fact, deducted from what was supposed to be their cash compensation (ibid.:52). Similar to resettlement in the SSP, resettlement in the Kariba case was riddled with poor communication between affected people and the implementing authorities. This has been cited in research, as one of the limitations in most resettlement cases (Scudder, 2005:68).

Although effective communication between affected people and implementing authorities in itself is not a sufficient measure of the success or failure of a resettlement project, coupled with political will it can be a gateway to effective participation of affected people. Participation of affected people has been cited as one of the factors that facilitate success in resettlement projects (Scudder, 2005:68). This is because it provides an opportunity for a better understanding of the losses suffered, and how they can be better restored. It can also aid in creating ways to forge a sense of ownership and belonging among resettled people, which in turn, can help to facilitate adaptation processes after resettlement.

Delayed cultivation in the areas of relocation, and in some cases the unavailability of suitable arable land, resulted in serious famine among some Gwembe Tonga in the initial years after resettlement. These conditions forced them to have to clear and plough on rocky, infertile land on the slopes (Colson, 1971:59-60). Needless to say, this did little to alleviate hunger, as yields were dismal, owing to the infertility of the land on which they sowed (ibid.:60). For many, the loss of fertile land meant that they had to find alternative means of living, including fishing, wage labour and informal trading (Colson, 1971).

From the mid-1960s – the time Zambia gained its independence – until the mid-1970s, the country experienced an economic boom resulting from a wide range of economic opportunities including its major exports of copper, also benefiting the resettled Gwembe Tonga, (Clark, et al., 1995:96; Cliggett, et al., 2007:21; Colson, 1971). This economic growth saw the country noticeably developing infrastructure and public services such as road

networks, healthcare centres, schools, agricultural extensions, etc. (Clark, et al., 1995:96; Colson, 1971). The improvement of infrastructure such as roads gave easier access to the urban centres for services such as healthcare, schools, shops, etc. to the resettled Gwembe Tonga, which impacted on their lifestyles, although for a long time, many continued to also maintain certain aspects of their old ways of living (Colson, 1971).

However, this period was followed by declining living standards among the resettled Gwembe Tonga, following the country's economic downturn in the mid to late 1970s (Clark, et al., 1995:96; Cliggett, et al., 2007:26). The national economic downturn that was experienced in Zambia from the 1970s was the result of economic events that had nothing to do with resettlement nor were within the sphere of control of the country itself. In 1975, the price of copper – which accounted for the majority of exports in Zambia – decreased significantly, snowballing into other development areas such as employment opportunities, when people lost their jobs in the copper mining industry, and by extension in other related industries (Cliggett, et al., 2007:26; DiJohn, 2010, 1).

Over the years, some among the Gwembe Tonga have had to move towards the lowlands closer to the reservoir, to explore living opportunities such as fishing, cultivation of more fertile land due to reservoir drawdown, and to find fertile grazing land and water for their livestock (Cliggett, et al., 2007:21; Scudder, 2005:192). However, with the growing population, pressure on land resources continues to mount, and many among the Gwembe Tonga are now facing the scarcity of arable land (Cliggett, et al., 2007:24).

Participation of affected people

As stated earlier, resettlement in the case of Kariba took place within a colonial context, with minimal to no participation of affected people. However, there are striking differences between the manner in which the Zambian part of resettlement was undertaken in comparison with the Zimbabwean side. The government on the Zimbabwean side was not open to any form of participation from affected people. The people would be offered what the government had conceived as appropriate compensation, and they would receive and request nothing more (Colson, 1971:20). Unlike in the Zambian case, no economic opportunities for livelihood restoration were offered to the local people who were forcibly moved, all the direct benefits associated with the lake would be channelled towards European interests (ibid.:20).

On the other hand, in the case of Zambia, the government opened a negotiation space for affected people to negotiate their resettlements (Colson, 1971:23-24). These negotiated settlements included compensation and rehabilitation measures as indicated above, which had an impact in enabling resettled people to find alternative means of securing their livelihoods such as fishing, through which they were able to sustain other endeavours, including livestock keeping (Cliggett, et al., 2007:26; Colson, 1971; Scudder, 2005:191).

Resettlement in the Kariba Dam resulted in the loss of land among the previously agrarian Gwembe Tonga, many of whom were not able to recover their lost land, or secure land of equally high quality. Although alternative means of livelihood were afforded to resettled people, through the direct benefits of the dam on the Zambian side, there were not enough opportunities to cater for the growing needs of the majority of the affected people, and the generations that followed. While the economic benefits at the national level also benefited many of the people affected by the Kariba Dam, the economic downturn that followed also affected resettled people and impacted on how they adapted to the loss of fundamental productive assets to resettlement. The ethnographic findings in Chapters Nine and Thirteen will also show that wider economic realities at the national or regional levels have a significant impact on how resettlement processes are implemented, even within the context of the policies designed to inform and improve resettlement practice.

4.4.4 Egypt's Aswan High Dam Project

Background to the Project

In the wake of the Egyptian revolution in the early 1950s, the new socialist government committed itself to “the elimination of the social ills” some of which were believed to be the result of, among other things, long-standing land feudalism (Fahim, 1983:25). In 1952, about 6% of the Egyptian population owned 65% of arable land, whereas the 94% majority shared the remaining 35%, a fact that for many was a structural cause of widespread poverty and inequality in the country (Fahim, 1981:12). In response to this, part of the new government's plan was to reform agricultural production patterns and revitalise industrial expansion (ibid.:12). Linked to this goal was the construction of a dam along the Nile River, the Aswan High Dam – the second dam in Aswan, after the Aswan Dam built during British colonial rule between 1899 and 1933 – to respond to the need for broader economic transformation (Fahim, 1981:8; 1983:25-26; Hassan, 2007:75; White, 1988:5-6).

Following agrarian reforms in the late 1950s, the construction of the Aswan High Dam, which began in 1960, was perceived as an opportunity to improve agricultural production through irrigation schemes (Beddis, 1963:77; Fahim, 1983:27; Hassan, 2007:75). The dam would also be instrumental in providing hydro-electric power for the facilitation of industrial expansion, to support the goal of the government to augment economic growth (Beddis, 1963:77; Fahim, 1981:12; 1983:27; White, 1988:6). In addition, the dam was meant to control the floods, such as those of 1964, 1975 and 1977 that the dam would later prevent, which would have been catastrophic to the Egyptian people (Hassan, 2007:74; White, 1988:6).

However, like many large dam projects, the construction of the Aswan High Dam along the Nile River was met with criticisms from various stakeholders, including some international organisations, particularly those concerned with environmental conservation (Fahim, 1983:28; White, 1988:8). Among other things, the dam was criticised for its potential to cause soil salinity through expanded irrigation, its negative impact on local fish species, and by extension the fish industry, as well as for causing diseases, such as schistosomiasis due to the extension of irrigation (Fahim, 1981; 1983:28; White, 1988:34). Nonetheless, the Egyptian government was adamant that despite the potential negative consequences, the dam would yield greater benefit for the majority of its citizenry than the costs it would impose (Fahim, 1983:28). At the heart of it, the Egyptian government perceived the construction of the dam as a symbol of their economic and political independence; imbued with endless opportunities for economic growth, food security for their growing population, and raising the general standards of living (Fahim, 1981:13).

The perceived positive contributions of the dam notwithstanding, its construction would induce the involuntary resettlement of over 100,000 Nubians, about 50,000 of whom were Egyptian Nubians (Beddis, 1963:77; Hassan, 2007:85; Scudder, 2005:73; Terminski, 2015:105; White, 1988:7) of whom the discussion in this section is focussed. The effects that the dam imposed on these affected groups of people, the losses they suffered, and the measures taken to restore those losses are discussed next. However, as the discussion will reflect, the Aswan High Dam is one of the few success stories of forced resettlement, where the livelihoods of the majority of resettled people were said to have improved after resettlement (Scudder, 2005:59). The factors that contributed to this improvement form part of the discussion.

Lost livelihood re-establishment

Like many other societies on the African continent, the resettled Nubians of the Aswan High Dam had long established livelihoods which were tied to land and the natural environment (Hassan, 2007:85). In addition to land cultivation, some Nubians were reliant on animal husbandry, which contributed to their household income (Fahmi, 1993:101). Also significant to their lives and livelihoods was their strong social fabric, linked to the culture of joint ownership of natural resources such as water sources and date palms (Fahmi, 1993:101; Hassan, 2007:85). Forced resettlement imposed on the tens of thousands of Nubians led to the disruption of these established livelihoods and highly-organised social order. Although the resettled people would later benefit from the irrigation scheme in the new areas (Scudder, 2016:15), land was not ready for cultivation at the time of physical resettlement, hence many who had lost land to resettlement faced a decline in food supply in the first few years of their arrival in the new areas (Scudder, 2005:74; 2016:20). In addition, about 40% of the resettled people did not recover their lost land after resettlement, due to the scarcity of land in the areas to which they were moved (Scudder, 2016:15).

In response to concerns about involuntary changes that the Nubians would experience because of the construction of the dam, the Egyptian government made what others have termed “extensive” plans for the resettlement component of the project (Beddis, 1963:77). These plans included development measures for the resettled people, such as land reclamation through irrigation, and employment creation for urban resettlers who would not benefit from farming-based rehabilitation measures (Scudder, 2016:15). Development opportunities not associated with farming included the construction of five factories in Kom Ombo, which would provide employment opportunities for some of the people who lost their livelihoods to resettlement (ibid.:15). Discussions on compensation below will reflect how compensation for arable land was implemented. It is quite remarkable that the people who were directly affected also became, in this sense, beneficiaries of the development project that necessitated their forced resettlement. In many cases of involuntary resettlement, those who are forcefully moved never get to experience the direct benefits of the development project that resettled them.

In addition to the loss of livelihood, some resettlers believed that the dam construction had a negative impact on the social fabric of their society. For some resettlers, the construction of the dam and the resettlement it induced was the reason for the subsequent upending of social

and family structures, due to the increase in labour migration that rose after construction (Fahim, 1983:31). However, contending arguments indicate that the construction of the dam was merely an easy target for criticism, as historical evidence points to the fact that migration had been a long-standing coping mechanism against the scarcity of resources, not only among the Nubian society but also in other parts of the country (Fahim, 1983:31). Although the construction of the first dam in Aswan resulted in an increase in migration to the cities due to the loss of land to inundation, the construction of dams was not the only reason people migrated into this part of the world (Fahim, 1983:31; Hassan, 2007:85). However, there is no doubt that forced resettlement, and the loss of livelihoods that resulted from it, may have contributed to migration incidences.

Also, for some Nubians, the involuntary relocation not only imposed the loss of their livelihoods but also their sense of identity, inflicting immense psycho-social pain, particularly among the elderly (Fahim, 1983:31). According to Downing (1996:41), attachment to space can be a powerful force in which people's identity is embedded. As indicated above in the discussion of De Wet's Socio-spatial analysis – and Downing also argues – people attach social and cultural significance to the physical environment which they inhabit (De Wet, 2015:86; Downing, 1996:37). Hence, for some Nubians, their identity was attached to Old Nubia. In a study conducted by Scudder (2016:19), some respondents indicated that the first ten to fifteen years of their resettlement were hard, due to the difficulty with adjusting to their new areas. This is reflective of a deep attachment that some resettlers had to their old areas, and therefore, the inflicted tension that was imposed by forced resettlement in this regard.

In an attempt to retain the culturally-linked identity of these resettled Nubians, the new villages were given the same names as the old, inundated ones (Abu-Zeid and El-Shibini, 1997:213). Furthermore, for many who felt that they were being resettled to unfamiliar places where they would never feel at home, the tide quickly turned when they started decorating their new houses with traditional Nubian themes, making them feel that their houses represented some aspects of their original culture (Fahim, in Scudder, 2016:27; Hassan, 2007:85). An indication of what Scudder in his FSF refers to as “clinging to the familiar” (Scudder, 1981:14; 2005:34; 2009:40).

Additionally, in an effort to preserve the Nubian culture before the old settlements were inundated, the Egyptian Ministry of Culture initiated, in 1960, shortly before the dam filled, a photographic survey meant to document Nubian houses and other antiquities for recording

(Fahim, 1983:34). Through this initiative, twenty artists and writers were engaged to sail along the Nile in a large boat, capturing pictures of houses and villages that would soon be submerged (ibid.:34). The preservation of cultural symbols through recording is quite a rare undertaking in resettlement situations. However, in this particular case, it may have been informed by a culture of symbols and artefacts preservation, which is important in the Egyptian culture. Cultural preservation, although with no material significance in terms of livelihood re-establishment, can serve as a form of adaptation mechanism for those to whom culture is highly prized.

According to Scudder (2005:59), resettlement in relation to the Aswan High Dam Project exemplifies one of the exceptional cases of resettlement projects, different from the majority, which often lead to predominantly negative consequences on affected people. In a study conducted by Scudder (2005) on 50 cases of resettlement, the Aswan High Dam project was one of the three cases that resulted in “improved living standards of the majority” of affected people. One of the noteworthy aspects of the Aswan High Dam resettlement is the manner in which the pre-resettlement survey was undertaken. Pre-relocation surveys, if improperly and inadequately done, are often cited as one of the major reasons for the under-accounting and under-compensation for the losses, as they serve as the basis for determining the losses and to inform appropriate reparation measures (Scudder, 2005:68).

In the Aswan High Dam case, the Egyptian government, through the Ministry of Social Affairs, engaged over 200 personnel to carry out the pre-relocation survey, covering 6,066 Egyptian Nubian families (Fahim, 1983:33; Scudder, 2016:16). The engagement of extra personnel ensured that despite the large number of affected people, the losses they would suffer were sufficiently captured. This is partly the reason why, as Scudder (2005:58) argues, the number of people resettled has no significant impact on whether or not their losses can be sufficiently factored-in and recovered. Instead, three other factors which come out of the Aswan resettlement case, which are often cited in the success or failure of resettlement projects, are political will, proper planning and adequate of funding (ibid.:64-66). In the early stages of the construction of the dam, the United State of America, which had initially pledged financial support for the dam, withdrew their support (Fahim, 1983:29). The Egyptian government took it upon itself to mobilise resources for the dam, and to ensure that the process was carried out in a manner that would improve the living standards of affected people (ibid.:29). Thus, as Scudder asserts, this resettlement case is an exemplary case where

adequate funding was committed, coupled with political will and opportunities created to support livelihoods re-establishment beyond physical relocation (2005:74).

However, this does not mean that resettlement in the Aswan High Dam case was without any challenges or inadequacies. In fact, the living standards of resettled people only began to improve five to ten years after their relocation into the new areas (Scudder, 2005:74). This resonates with what can be expected in stage two of the FSF, where the standards of living initially decline, before economic development can take off in the subsequent stage three. Compensation for the affected people, and some challenges associated with its implementation, are discussed below.

Compensation

The resettled Nubians were compensated for the loss of their houses, land and date palms (Scudder, 2016:15). For all the resettled Nubians, about 25,000 houses were built, in 33 villages that formed the new settlements (Abu-Zeid and El-Shibini, 1997:213; Hassan, 2007:85). However, other research shows that there are other areas in which there was a deficit in the provision of housing for affected people, such as among urban resettlers, where the government failed to complete the over 9100 houses that were promised to affected people (Scudder, 2016:37). This shortcoming was in relation to the second phase of resettlement, where the government had promised to provide housing for urban resettlers, a promise which was yet to be fulfilled at the time of Scudder's research (ibid.:15).

One of the notable shortcomings when it came to housing compensation in the Aswan resettlement was a lack of participation of affected people. This was evident in how the houses were designed in a manner that discarded the social and cultural functioning of houses among the Nubians (Fahmi, 1993:84; Scudder, 2016:25). The resettled people were not involved in the planning and designing of housing provisions, which, therefore, meant that all their views regarding what the quality of the house was to be, as informed by their culture and social organisation, were not incorporated in the design (Mahgoub, 1990:3; Scudder, 2016:25).

Such omissions of social and cultural organisation included the construction of houses based on the size of nuclear families, discarding the external family system through which family members were able to assist each other, and in some cases co-existed (Scudder, 2016:25). In this sense, some family members found themselves separated from their expanded family on whom they were, in some ways, reliant prior to resettlement (ibid.:25). Moreover, some of

the provided houses were smaller than the ones people used to own prior to resettlement, which made living arrangements difficult, particularly with the expansion of families through marriage and childbirth (Scudder, 2016:25). All these and other issues compromised compensation for houses and in some cases led to the decline of the quality of housing among the resettled people.

To make up for lost land, about 28,000 acres of fertile land was reclaimed through extended irrigation schemes, and provided to resettled people in the new settlements (Abu-Zeid and El-Shibini, 1997:213; Scudder, 2005:73-74). However, although the resettled Nubians were compensated for their lost land for cultivation, which formed one of their major livelihoods, it took about five years before the land was ready for ploughing due to delays in installing irrigation facilities (Scudder, 2005:74). As a result, what followed immediately after physical relocation was a severe shortage in food supply. Unlike in the case of the Sardar Sarovar and the Kariba resettlement projects in India and Zambia respectively, where the governments provided relief during the initial stages of resettlement, the Egyptian government mobilised food supply from the United Nations' Food and Agriculture Organisation, for an initial period of 18 months (Fahim, 1983:162; Scudder, 2016:28).

Many of the resettled people faced serious disappointment in this regard, as the reality in the new areas did not match their expectations. This is a common occurrence in forced resettlement cases, where resettled people are promised resources and services in the new areas, only to move in before such services are availed (Clark, 2009). In other cases, these promises never materialised, as in the case of the LHWP, where infrastructure development promised to some affected people such as roads, electricity, etc. had still not been provided nearly two decades after resettlement. In the case of the Aswan High Dam, cash compensation was also provided for resettled people for other losses such as date palms (Scudder, 2016:16), which provided much needed relief among those who struggled to eke out a living during the first few years.

New bakeries were built in the new settlements to cater for the resettled people's need for bread – their staple food (Fahim, 1983:72). The majority of those bakeries, however, did not last long before they were closed, owing to an unexpected poor support from resettlers, who opted for a more cost effective approach of making homemade bread (ibid.:72). This speaks to the earlier mentioned limitation in many resettlement cases, where participation of affected people is not sufficiently incorporated, which often leads to a breakdown between what the

resettled people really need, and what the authorities provide. The Aswan resettlement project has been hailed for many positive attributes including a relatively sufficient allocation of resources, political will, and multi-stakeholder involvement. However, a lack of participation of the primarily affected people was one of its shortfalls (Fahim, 1983:169; Mahgoub, 1990:3; Scudder, 2016:25).

Furthermore, another hurdle to be overcome once the land was ready for cultivation was the changing of agricultural methods, which many resettled people found difficult to do. As stated by Lassailly-Jacob and Fernea and Gerster (in Fahmi, 1993:101), Nubians were traditionally dependent on subsistence agriculture and animal husbandry. However, contrary to traditional agricultural methods, which the resettled Nubians were accustomed to, irrigation methods required capital and management skills (Fahim, 1983:84). Hence, some resettled Nubians continued to practice traditional methods of subsistence farming and livestock keeping in the new settlements. In a 1989 study by Lassailly-Jacob (in Scudder, 2016:33), over two decades after the first group of Nubians were resettled, some were still incorporating their old cultivation practices into farming in the new areas.

One of the issues that affected the provision of compensation, particularly during the initial stages of resettlement, was broken communication channels. Some resettled people could only speak Nubian – their indigenous language – and not Arabic, the official language used by many officials, which was also commonly used in the new settlements (Fahim, 1983:80-81). This negatively affected the manner in which implementation processes were undertaken in some cases, as the officials and the affected people could not communicate effectively.

The issue of language was also raised by some resettlers later into their resettlement, as one of the negative consequences that have been imposed on them by forced resettlement. In this regard, some resettled people indicated that Nubian as a language was becoming less spoken, as more people were adapting to the widely spoken Arabic language in the new areas, both among urban and non-urban resettlers (Rouchdy, in Scudder, 2016:31). Rouchdy, a linguist by profession, attributed this linguistic transition to the wider context in which the resettled Nubians lived, such as the educational system that is facilitated mainly in Arabic, and also access to other forms of information such as mass media (print, television, radio, etc.), which all distribute information in the Arabic language (ibid.:32).

Access to services

A number of Egyptian government ministries – Agriculture, Education, Health, Public Transport and Housing – collaborated to provide services to the resettled people in the new areas (Hassan, 2007:85). However, many of the services were only availed long after people had already moved into the new areas. As indicated earlier, because of the short time often allocated for resettlement projects, coupled with unexpected events which may arise during the construction of development projects (Scudder, 2005:66), it has become the norm for people to be moved into new areas before services promised to them are ready. This is partly the reason why writers such as Clark (2009) argue that for resettlement projects to be undertaken properly and with adequate observance of human rights, it must be a matter of policy for the necessary services to be put in place before the people are moved into new areas. However, in most cases practical reasons are usually cited for the shortcomings of resettlement projects in this regard.

As indicated earlier in the discussion on the complexity approach by De Wet (2006), in many cases the inadequacy of resources lead to delayed implementation of different aspects of both the development project component, and its accompanying resettlement project, which often results in resettlement projects being rushed to make way for the construction of the development project in question. Discussions in Chapter Six will reflect other issues that relate to complications that may lead to difficulties in providing necessary, or promised services and infrastructure in the new areas prior to resettlement.

A few years into the new settlements, the Egyptian government through its various ministries had gradually started putting up structures to facilitate service provision in the new areas (Fahim, 1983:88). These included road networks, telecommunications, post offices, healthcare centres, and electricity (ibid.:88-89). Furthermore, each of the 33 new villages were built a mosque, and 36 schools were also built in the new areas (Hassan, 2007:85). Shopping centres were established, where the resettled people could have access to stores for basic needs (Hassan, 2007:85; Scudder, 2016:31). Ironically, for people who were forcefully resettled on account of a large dam project, access to fresh water remained a challenge for resettlers long after their physical relocation (Fahim, 1983:90). However, in general, many of the services that were not available in Old Nubia were availed in the new settlements (ibid.).

Scudder notes that in recent years, there has been an economic downturn in the wider Egyptian context, also affecting resettled Nubians, such as the growing demand for jobs, as

well as other demands associated with a financial economy, which requires increased income among households (2016:35-36). This is more pronounced among resettled people who did not benefit from the land reclamation scheme, and had to find alternative means of livelihoods, such as employment opportunities. As indicated earlier, about 40% of the resettled people in urban areas received cash compensation instead of land compensation, due to the scarcity of agricultural land in the new areas, such as the people resettled to the Kom Ombo area (Scudder, 2016:15).

However, Scudder also notes that the economic difficulties experienced by the resettled people did not necessarily translate into declining living standards, as many respondents in his research indicated that their standards of living had improved from their previous ones in Old Nubia, largely due to access to education and employment opportunities (2016:39). While a lack of job opportunities has become a reality in contemporary Egypt, many of the resettled people have benefited from employment opportunities created in the new areas on account of resettlement, such as the factories built in Kom Ombo, where many could not get land-for-land compensation due to its scarcity (ibid.:15). Hence, by and large, the living standards of the majority of affected people in the Aswan High Dam were improved after resettlement. This can be attributed to a number of factors, including the extensive manner in which resettlement was planned for, but most importantly, diversified opportunities created for the resettled people in the new areas in the long-term.

Participation of affected people

As indicated earlier, despite a few positive aspects, the lack of participation of directly affected people was one of the shortcomings of the Aswan High Dam resettlement project. Although resettled people were allowed to choose the areas to which they would be resettled, and did influence the government's decision in this regard, they were not able to influence or participate in any other decisions beyond that (Fahim, 1983, 33-36). In fact, some government officials, as cited in Fahim (1983:169), held the view that at the very best, the role of resettlers can be "advisory and not that of decision-making".

However, for Fahim (1983:169), the advisory role is merely "ceremonial" as opposed to "substantial" participation, or what is regarded by some writers as only consultation and not participation in totality (Cornwall, 2008:272). This happens when people are only informed of the decisions made or are to be made, without the ability to influence those decisions. For example, the representatives of the affected Nubians were only shown the design of the

houses that would be built for them, without being able to suggest changes, taking into consideration some social and cultural functionalities (Fahim, 1983:169). As noted earlier, this approach had some negative effects on the lives of affected people. Although the Mohale Dam resettlement presents a similar case, where the designs of the houses did not incorporate the input of the affected people, other functional aspects of the houses were opened to the influence of affected people, and the discussion of findings in Chapter Nine will unpack this in greater detail.

4.4.5 Summary of the Discussed Resettlement Cases

Livelihoods re-establishment

The re-establishment of livelihoods beyond resettlement is a long-term process that not only requires that people be compensated sufficiently for their losses at the beginning of resettlement, but also that long-term plans are made to enable them to improve their livelihoods even long after their resettlement. Scudder argues in his FSF that the initial stage of transition is often followed by reduced living standards for a number of reasons that have to do with the availability of services, facilities and resources that facilitate livelihoods in the new areas. This is often expressed through, among other areas, declined food security, as food is a basic need, and also because in the majority of resettlement cases, including the ones discussed above, the affected people are those from rural areas mainly reliant on agriculture and other natural resources. As discussed earlier in this chapter, this is often linked to geographical factors, because people who reside in remote, rural areas are also close to natural resources such as river water, forests, etc. which are usually the very resources that lead to development projects such as large dams, conservation, etc. On the other hand, these are also the very resources on which the surrounding communities are reliant. As a result, because these fundamental resources are lost by affected people to resettlement, where alternative resources and services are not yet available after resettlement, and this is often the case, living standards are bound to decline.

In all the discussed cases, the livelihoods of many – and in other cases the majority – of affected people deteriorated in the initial transition stage, largely owing to a lack of land to facilitate the recovery of lost land among the resettled, previously agrarian people. However, in the Aswan case, this shortage of land and the resultant food insecurity in the initial stage was later reversed through land reclamation schemes. Alternative employment opportunities were also created to complement land reclamation for those who were not able to benefit

from the irrigation scheme. Also in the case of Kariba, alternative means of livelihoods such as commercial fishing were established to benefit affected people. Similarly, in the case of Three Gorges Dam resettlement other alternative livelihoods included the establishment of development projects and enterprises, from which the affected people – particularly those resettled from the urban areas who lost jobs – could benefit.

However, in the two cases – Kariba and Three Gorges dams – the fundamental problem was that there were insufficient opportunities to cater for the growing needs of the majority. As a result, although there were people who benefited from the establishment of alternative economic opportunities, the majority still remained excluded and, therefore, their living standards deteriorated. In the case of Sardar Sarovar Project, the fundamental challenge was that, in addition to the inadequacies in the implementation of compensation and rehabilitation measures, there were no substantial opportunities from which resettled people could benefit after physical resettlement. Also, in a similar manner as in the Kariba and Three Gorges cases, due to the scarcity of land, the majority could not recover their lost land, and were, thus, left food insecure; though there were some affected people who benefited from land reclamation schemes in the state of Gujarat.

Hence, although research shows that the number of people resettled has no significant effect on the outcomes of resettlement on affected people (Scudder, 2005:58), it is argued here that, where a large number of people are resettled – as in the above discussed resettlement cases – the resources in the new settlements are put under immense pressure, further decreasing the prospects of affected people to access opportunities and re-establish themselves. In addition, in most rural contexts, particularly in developing regions, the majority of the people have low levels of education and skills, and thus, are unable to find sustainable employment in the new areas, which could serve as an alternative in cases where people fail to recover their previous livelihood. Later discussions in Chapters Nine, Ten, and Thirteen will show that low levels of education may be a real hindrance in implementing measures to re-establish livelihoods beyond resettlement. In particular, the Indian case will reflect this more clearly, as scholarships and employment opportunities are some of the rehabilitation measures incorporated in the applied policy, which were partly impeded by low education levels.

However, the Aswan resettlement provides a contrasting case where, although it was a large-scale resettlement project in terms of the number of people resettled, the living standards of the majority of the affected people were improved, primarily due to the opportunities

provided to them in the new areas in the long-term. These opportunities included educational development, which enabled many more resettled Nubian to partake in employment opportunities. In addition, the availability of irrigated land in the new areas ensured that the majority of the resettled people recovered their lost land. Employment opportunities ensured that those who did not benefit through irrigation acquired alternative means of livelihood.

Compensation

In all the discussed cases, compensation measures included a combination of both monetary and asset-based approaches. However, due to the above noted issue of land scarcity in many cases, land-for-land compensation – because land is one of the fundamental losses that people experience in forced resettlement – is often implemented poorly. Often this leads to an alternative form of cash compensation, which, as research has shown consistently, is predominantly unsustainable and hardly ever leads to the actual re-establishment of livelihood (Cernea, 2003; 2008; Fernandes, 2008; Maitra, 2009). This is particularly the case where rehabilitation or measures of livelihood re-establishment are inadequate, forcing resettled people to use their compensation funds to cover their immediate, daily expenses instead of recovering their lost assets. Discussions in Chapter Six will cover issues of compensation in detail.

Access to services

Although in many cases, affected people are promised better services in the new areas when they are forcibly moved on account of development projects, often the facilities are only provided after they have been moved, while in other cases the resettlers never get to see the promised services. In the above discussed resettlement cases, promised services such as electricity, road networks, healthcare services, schools, etc., were in most cases only provided long after the resettled people had been moved, or in other cases never materialised. As indicated earlier, this is partly due to the complexities of resettlement that have to do with a lack of resources, a lack of political will, delayed implementation of other project components, which in turn affect the implementation of the resettlement component, etc.

Participation of affected people

The participation of affected people remains one of the least considered aspects in many resettlement projects, as exemplified by the above discussed resettlement cases, despite research showing that active resettler participation increases the potential of positive

outcomes in resettlement. Although gradually, some projects are beginning to appreciate the necessity of affected people participating in resettlement processes – such as in the case of the LHWP – many of the decisions remain inaccessible to the people primarily affected. Decisions such as the design of houses, compensation packages, are examples of those that, in many cases, are made exclusively by implementing authorities. Many resettlement projects do not even have structured ways of ensuring the participation of affected people. The ethnographic chapters – Chapters Ten and Fourteen – will reflect how the affected people in the Mohale and Chandil resettlement cases were engaged, and discuss the nature and extent of their involvement in the process of resettlement.

4.5 Ethical Issues in DIDR

Forced displacement and resettlement have often raised ethical questions related to unequitable benefits and losses suffered by different stakeholders in forced resettlement projects (Cernea, 2000:11; De Wet, 2009:79). On the one hand, there are those for whom development projects necessitate compulsory relocation and, by extension, displacement. While on the other hand, there are those for whose benefit development projects are initiated, who often do not have to suffer the losses related to the construction of projects. Consequently, not only does this raise ethical issues but also questions on how to respond constructively to the displacement that comes with development projects.

In addition, ethical issues in forced resettlement arise partly from the earlier discussed power dynamics and their negative effects on the less powerful. The point of departure in cases of involuntary resettlement is that the state has an absolute right to acquire private land outside the approval of private owners. Many issues arise from this absolute entitlement of the state to land. Informed by the principle of *eminent domain*, which originated in 1625 from the work of Hugo Grotius – *De Jure Belli et Pacis* – land expropriation is underpinned by two conditions; that it is strictly for the purpose of public good and that just compensation is given for the losses incurred by those forcefully resettled and displaced (Berger, 1977:204; Desai, 2011:95). From these two conditions, many ethical issues arise.

4.5.1 Development as the greater good - public purpose

One of the main points of contention regarding “public purpose” is how the phrase is interpreted and applied by different stakeholders in different contexts, and how this is expressed in resettlement processes and outcomes. Axioms such as “the welfare of the people is the paramount law”, “public necessity is greater than private necessity” or “the greater

good” (Mohan and Shiju, 2011:13) are often used to justify the right of the state to forcefully acquire land through the principle of *eminent domain*. However, where the conundrum lies is on the differences in the application of such concepts as public purpose or greater good, and how they apply in real terms. Technically, “the welfare of the people is the paramount law” should also capture the wellbeing and rights of those who are forcibly moved in involuntary resettlement cases, yet their welfare is often compromised by the perceived need for resettlement-inducing development projects, by certain stakeholders in a given society (Penz, et al., 2011:95). While it can be argued that the course of development is a greater one, the challenge is that the concept of development itself has been a source of debates based on ideological differences (Gasper, 2004:1).

Macro, neoliberal development policies emphasise the need for economic progress, facilitated by such aspects as infrastructure development (Oliver-Smith, 2006:142). The end of WWII came with an emphasis on economic revitalisation, which was fundamentally premised on infrastructure development and the establishment of development institutions (ibid.:142). These economic development goals have since seen many more cases of resettlement-inducing development projects than in any other time in history, as discussed earlier. Because involuntary resettlement is often accompanied by negative consequences, contending arguments have often pointed out to the limitations of development policies that are solely driven by an economic agenda, instead of being rooted on the assurance of people’s welfare as the fundamental goal of human progress (Gaude and Peek, 1976; UNDP, 1990; Sen, 1990; Terminski, 2015:49). In this sense, the fundamental duty of development is that it does not cause harm, but instead, serve to promote wellbeing among citizens (Penz, et al., 2011:118-119). However, where resettlement-inducing projects are developed, there is always some kind of harm inflicted on those forcefully resettled because they are considered to be in the way of development.

Central to the persistent implementation of development projects that propel forced resettlement, despite their negative consequences, is not only their perceived contribution to the project of development, but also power dynamics that facilitate how development is arrived at. While there may be a consensus among different stakeholders in society on the values that guide development, such as human wellbeing, human rights, and sustainability (Penz, et al., 2011:120), how those values are ensured is often a source of conflict between the involved stakeholders. Development projects are often justified on grounds related to the improvement of human wellbeing through the augmentation of services and resources. Yet,

the wellbeing of those forcefully resettled on account of development projects is often left compromised, as in the majority of cases, resettled people are left in worse-off socio-economic conditions. Writers such as Drydyk (in De Wet, 2009:91) argue that if a development project can be shown to be incapable of affording benefits to “social groups including the worse-off”, then such a project should be abandoned. However, in practice, there are cases where development projects fail such tests related to “no harm” caused to the most vulnerable, yet because of the power vested in the state, such projects prevail based on the state’s perception of the benefits of the project, even if they do not meet the requirements of human rights, human wellbeing and sustainability.

The above discussed Sardar Sarovar Project is such an example, where despite evidence based on an independent review, that “...resettlement and rehabilitation of all those displaced by the project was not possible under ... [the] circumstances...” (Morse and Berger, 1992: XII), the state went ahead with the construction of the project nonetheless. These irreconcilable differences between the authorities acquiring land and the people directly affected often result in resistance from affected people on the ground, and some kind of coercion on the part of the more powerful implementing authorities.

Oftentimes, where there is a conflict of priorities, issues of power inequalities come into play, and determine which of the interests and priorities prevail. Because of the principle of *eminent domain*, which affords the state power to acquire land without the approval of private landowners or users, when there are disagreements regarding the necessity or ethicality of a resettlement-inducing development project, the state’s interests customarily prevail. Later discussions on grassroots resistance in the Indian context will reflect this tension between the state and the affected people, and how in many cases, the state has the upper hand. This was also reflected in the above discussed resettlement cases, where development projects were implemented amidst resistance from people on the ground.

In this regard, critics of development frameworks based on economic measures such as GDP, argue that for development to be ethically defensible, it should include values such as equity, cultural freedom, access to opportunities, and environmental sustainability (Basu, 2012; Kurian, 2000; Penz, et al., 2011:120; Sen, 1990; Terminski, 2015:53). However, these values are often perceived and prioritised differently by various stakeholders, based on how each set of stakeholders is affected by a development project. In addition, values such as equity are usually difficult to reconcile, as the nature of resettlement is such that some stakeholders bear

the cost that others do not, while others enjoy the benefits not enjoyed by those who bear the cost in many cases. Furthermore, issues of cultural freedom are complicated by the contextualised nature of culture, such that cultural meanings and values are usually observed by specific stakeholders in a resettlement project, and are not shared by all the involved stakeholders. In this regard, cultural values are often only observed as far as the development project in question can allow, or other stakeholders are willing to accommodate such values.

Although development projects that induce involuntary resettlement – such as large dams – have been proven to be predominantly destructive to certain segments in the given population, the moral urgency behind their continuous approval is usually tied to their perceived ability to reduce poverty, and to alleviate drought in drought-stricken areas (Fisher, 1995:3; Gandhi, 2003:484; Gasper, 2004:1). However, the irony is that involuntary resettlement that arises from such development projects has been shown to result in increased poverty among resettled people, in cases where losses are not efficiently recovered, which is in most cases across the globe (Scudder, 2005; Terminski, 2015), including the above discussed cases with the exception of the Aswan High Dam resettlement case.

Oftentimes, the people who tend to suffer forced resettlement on account of the greater good are those with less power – in both economic and political terms. As argued earlier, in most cases people who are primarily affected by resettlement are based in rural, less economically developed contexts, largely due to their geographical settings. And because their economy is often predominantly based on natural resources, social networks, etc., which are rarely compensated in resettlement situations (Cerne, 2000), many of their losses are underestimated in compensation procedures. As later discussions in Chapter Six will argue, compensation procedures are usually limited from fully capturing the losses which are qualitative in nature, with long-term benefits or uses (Cerne, 2009:41). This is because compensation procedures are customarily based on market-related approaches, which have limitations in incorporating qualitative losses, such as those linked to natural resources and social networks. Even in cases where natural resources are compensated, as in the studied Mohale Dam resettlement case, the losses are often under-accounted for, and therefore, under-compensated.

Because of the complexities inherent in forced resettlement, which often make it difficult to achieve positive outcomes for affected people, one of the fundamental elements of resettlement policies, present in most international, and national policies, is that of options

assessment. Options assessment is a policy provision which prescribes that, in the first instance, alternative means of providing goods and services, which do not involve involuntary resettlement and environmental degradation, must be exhaustively explored before a decision to undertake a resettlement-inducing project is made (Asian Development Bank, 1995: Section 34 (i) and (ii); Government of India, 2007: Section 1.4; International Finance Corporation, 2012: Section 3). However, the implementation of this policy provision continues to expose ethical deficits in a number of cases. The forceful nature of forced resettlement, coupled with the complexities involved in resettlement, which often make it nearly impossible for affected people not to be harmed in resettlement cases, constitutes inevitable human rights violation on those resettled and displaced (De Wet, 2009:79). This, therefore, raises a need to ensure that a resettlement-inducing project is implemented where there is no feasibility of alternative means of meeting the perceived needs. For, on the other hand, as Drydyk (in De Wet, 2009:91) argues, the failure to meet the needs of other groups of people on account of preventing forced resettlement, may also constitute a violation of the human rights of those denied development.

However, although options assessment is a necessary requirement and a policy provision, in practice, the assessment of alternative means are rarely sufficiently undertaken. The sufficiency of options assessment includes, among other requirements, a participatory approach which incorporates the involvement of affected people (The World Bank, 2003:xxii). Active stakeholder involvement, particularly that of primarily affected people, may help address tensions between the implementing authorities and affected people, and prevent resistance on the ground, if ultimately, the chosen option is one that induces resettlement (ibid.:xxii). Nonetheless, in practice, options assessment is either not undertaken or is undertaken without stakeholder involvement, partly due to concerns related to the costs of a participatory process, both financial and time-related (The World Bank, 2003:17).

In addition, because in some cases dam projects are part of national projects tied to political agendas, such as in the above discussed cases of resettlement in Kariba and Three Gorges dams, and the studied Mohale Dam case, options assessment might as well not be incorporated if the decision to build a dam has already been taken by the government. This is indicative, therefore, of the fact that to some extent, policies without ethical conviction and political will among other factors, remain theoretical provisions with no positive impact. Hence, ethical issues in resettlement processes speak to not only the complexity of the

process itself, but also to the integrity of key players to see the process of responsible resettlement realised.

4.5.2 Just compensation

The second condition of the principle of *eminent domain* is just compensation for affected people. Since the formalisation of forced resettlement as a field of study, compensation has been, arguably, the most debated and critiqued aspect of resettlement. Just compensation is a fundamental element of resettlement, which determines whether affected people are able to recover from losses suffered or are led to worse-off conditions after resettlement. By virtue, just compensation alone would be sufficient prerequisite in involuntary resettlement, because it would ideally be implemented in a manner that ensures equitable benefits for the losses suffered. However, it is often carried out in such a minimalistic and reserved manner that typically leads to under-compensation, and by extension, impoverishment (Cernea, 2008; Fernandes, 2008; Penz, et al., 2011:87). Under-compensation occurs when the losses suffered by the forcefully resettled or affected people outweigh any gains. Cernea (2003; 2008) argues that in many projects where people are involuntarily resettled, affected people are led to impoverishment partly due to the limitations of compensation, which will be discussed in detail in Chapter Six.

Although compensation has inherent limitations, procedural challenges associated with compensation also tend to get in the way of sufficiently making up for the losses suffered on account of forced resettlement. Hence, compensation tends to result in impoverishment, regardless of how generously and efficiently it is implemented. The discussions in the ethnographic chapters will also confirm this assertion. In consequence, more qualitative descriptions have had to be incorporated in addition to compensation, with a companion concept – rehabilitation – also having to be distinctively articulated, owing to the limitations of compensation in re-establishing livelihoods and other losses after forced resettlement. There are many reasons why people end up being under-compensated in resettlement cases, but in this sub-section, only those related to ethical issues will be discussed.

The point of departure in determining appropriate compensation for the forcibly displaced is entitlement and valuation. Entitlement in forced resettlement is about who has or has no right to compensation, and what kinds of losses they are entitled to be compensated for, having been affected by and/or forcibly moved on account of a development project. Further issues of entitlement will come out in detail in the contextual and ethnographic chapters of the two

cases studied in this research, particularly in the Indian context. As discussed earlier, forced resettlement is one of the areas in which power asymmetries arise and are expressed with devastating consequences on the vulnerable, affected people. Entitlement and valuation are two of the ways in which power inequalities show in forced resettlement, often with negative consequences on affected people. Thus, many ethical issues have arisen in this regard, with many authors questioning the fairness and ethicality of frameworks or approaches employed to determine who is or is not entitled to compensation (Morse and Berger, 1992:19; Routledge, 2003:247).

Two fundamental questions that bring out ethical tensions when it comes to compensation entitlements are; who determines who is or is not entitled to compensation? And who determines what the affected people are entitled to? Compensation is often subjected to specific administrative procedures to determine the validity of “ownership” of lost assets by those who claim losses. The limitation in this regard has been that in many cases, entitlement is confined to certain procedural standards that define the legality or proof of “ownership”. The use of procedures such as legal approaches to determine entitlement often override the dynamics of land and property ownership or use patterns in different contexts – particularly in indigenous societies as will also be seen in Chapter Eleven – leaving many affected people in deprived, worse-off conditions (Fisher, 1995:31; Morse and Berger, 1992:19; Routledge, 2003:247).

In the Indian context, for example, resettlement by development projects was for a long time implemented on the basis of the Land Acquisition Act (LAA) of 1894, amended in 1984. This act was heavily criticised by many authors for discarding contextual dynamics (Arora, 2017; Asif, 1999; Fernandes, 1998; Morris and Pandey, 2007), including landownership and use patterns among groups such as tribes. In this context, customary rights, on the basis of which tribal groups organised land use, were not compatible with legal measures provided for in the LAA, which was developed during the British colonial era. Later discussions in Chapter Eleven will reflect further on issues related to this tension.

In response to the incompatibility between indigenous, customary rights and legal provisions used to determine the entitlement of those affected by development projects, resettlement policies, both at international and national levels, are beginning to recognise and incorporate indigenous rights to property and landownership. Examples include those of the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation, and the Indian National Policy – which will be

discussed in the next chapter – that provide for the recognition of not only those with legal and customary rights but also those with no rights, who are dependent in some ways on the land being acquired (Government of India, 2013: Section 16; International Finance Corporation, 2012; The World Bank, 2013: Section 15).

However, as the discussion of findings will show, particularly of the studied Indian case, the implementation of policies in this regard may be dependent on conditions such as timeframes, which – although meant to control opportunistic land occupation – may also exclude some genuinely affected groups. In addition, some people with customary rights continue to be excluded despite policy provisions, due to the complexity of implementation, which, in one way or another, always have to follow certain institutional procedures, in some cases to the exclusion of those with claim to the acquired land. The discussion of the studied Chandil Dam resettlement case in India will show how, even in the context of the newly implemented resettlement policy, there were still some people with customary land rights, who were excluded due to the limitations or complexities associated with resettlement implementation.

Some shortfalls with regard to implementing compensation in an ethically sensitive manner relate to a lack of active participation of affected people in resettlement processes, from planning, implementation, through to monitoring (Penz, et al., 2011:96). The active participation of affected people is not only an ethical imperative but also a necessity if resettlement programmes are to be successful. From an ethical point of view, resettler participation is necessary because the consequences of resettlement are felt by, typically, the most vulnerable of all stakeholders – the resettled communities. Scudder (2005:260) asserts that in many cases, the groups of resettled people tend to be “the poorest, the least educated, and the least politically connected”. For this reason, power dynamics easily find their way in the manner in which resettlement projects are implemented, and the ethnographic findings from this thesis will show this in detail. Hence, it is ethically responsible to actively engage the resettled people, not only to improve the understanding of losses, but also to affirm their right to information, entitlements for their losses, and dignity as a people.

In practice, the dissemination of information, transparent assessment of alternatives in options assessment, efficient collection and recording of information from affected people, and the engagement of affected people in livelihood restoration programmes, are all part of a participatory resettlement process, which, if incorporated effectively, can aid the resettlement process for the better (Penz, et al., 2011:98; Scudder, 2005:291). Yet a number of factors,

such as a lack of political will, limited time allocated for the resettlement component, etc., often come into play and inhibit an active participatory process.

As a result, decisions on who should or should not be included for compensation are often high-level decisions that the affected people are excluded from. The effect of which is that in some cases, affected people are under-accounted for, with mainly those who are physically displaced being regarded as the only legitimately affected people, excluding those economically or otherwise displaced without physical relocation (McCully; 1996; Penz, et al., 2011:87). The exclusion of affected people in major decision-making is also linked to under-compensation of the real losses suffered, as the decisions on what affected people ought to be compensated for, is also customarily done at the executive level. The exclusionary nature of major decision-making in resettlement processes often raises questions related to the sufficiency of compensation packages designed externally, without internal influences of the people who are fully aware of the actual losses to be incurred. The irony is that, the executive position of implementing authorities affords them higher access to influence processes, and the people most affected have less, in some cases no access to the decisions that affect them directly.

This exclusive process of deciding on the entitlement of affected people by the implementing authorities is also related to the valuation of losses suffered by affected people. For what are often sighted as practical reasons, a utilitarian, cost-benefit approach is usually engaged to estimate the losses experienced by affected people, against the projected gains to be afforded to them (Cernea, 2003:41; Penz, et al., 2011:68-74). Although this has been critiqued by many authors as highly limited and inadequate, and that asset-based compensation and benefit-sharing should be incorporated instead, in practice there is a huge deficit in the implementation of this alternative (Cernea, 2009). The cost-benefit approach often incorporated in evaluating the gains versus the losses associated with development projects – resettlement and displacement being two of the losses incurred by affected people – is usually limited by the economic and technical nature of the process, and its limitations in sufficiently evaluating qualitative losses (Oliver-Smith, 2010:140; Penz, et al., 2011:74). The discussion on the economics of resettlement implementation in Chapter Six will explore some of the limitations associated with economic approaches engaged to evaluate the losses suffered by affected people in forced resettlement.

Hence, although just compensation technically implies that the changes that are forcibly imposed on people should be equitably compensated, questions of who determines what the losses are, how much they are worth and who the affected people are, are in many cases determined by those not directly affected by forced resettlement. That is, those who typically wield power over those directly affected. This, therefore, subjects resettlement processes to unequal and at times unfair power dynamics and practices. An example relates to benefit-sharing, which many scholars including Cernea (2009), Egge, et al. (2008), Scudder (2005), and Van Wicklin (1999), have argued that is one of the most effective ways of rebuilding affected people's livelihoods after resettlement, yet in many cases, it is not implemented as a mandatory requirement by implementing authorities (Maldonado, 2012:199).

4.6 Conclusion

DIDR as a phenomenon and practice has come a long way, from the time when the needs of the forcefully resettled and displaced were not institutionally recognised by implementing authorities, nor incorporated systematically as a matter of policy. Although many who advocated for the development of resettlement-specific policies had hoped that policies would address many of the challenges and atrocities imposed on involuntarily resettled people, research would later show that the negative consequences of forced resettlement go beyond policy provisions. The inherent complexities associated with forced resettlement became clearer with the persistent difficulties in implementing resettlement processes in a manner that ensured improved livelihood beyond resettlement, despite the provisions of policies.

In particular, it has become clear that while the earlier resettlement policies – such as those of the World Bank as the first institution to develop a set of resettlement guidelines – were more inclined towards recovering tangible, economic losses, the complexities of resettlement had more to do with its qualitative impacts on affected people. These intangible, qualitative losses incurred by affected people, were for a long time – and in some cases still are – not factored in, not only in resettlement practice but also in policy. Although theories such as the above discussed Scudder's stage framework and Cernea's impoverishment model, do take note of the intangible, social losses, for example, the challenge remains how these losses are effectively factored into policy, and more so into policy implementation, taking into account the complexities outlined in De Wet's complexity approach and other complexities.

As a result, resettlement policies developed at different levels from international to local, are constantly improved as the practice of resettlement evolves and more issues arise, or new ways of dealing with persistent issues come up. In addition, not only are policies being improved to advance a more constructive practice of resettlement, but there is also a paradigm shift, in the manner in which resettlement is viewed, both as a concept and in practice. The studied cases in this research bear testimony to the evolution of resettlement, where certain components of a developmental approach are being adopted in resettlement cases.

An example includes a more participatory approach adopted in resettlement projects, as in the studied Mohale Dam and Chandil Dam cases. Also, the above discussed Three Gorges Dam case, planned in the early 1990s and implemented from the early 2000s, is also reflective of a developmental approach, where resettlement was accompanied by development measures for affected people after resettlement. The same applies to the studied Chandil Dam case, where rehabilitative, developmental measures were incorporated into policy and partly implemented in practice. The Aswan High Dam is an exceptional case of dam projects implemented in the 1960s, prior to the development of resettlement policies, which was designed and implemented in a manner that systematically took into account the losses of affected people, and sought to mitigate them.

The practice of resettlement has also been transformed into one that incorporates certain ethical issues, which were for a long time neglected in policy and practice, such as customary rights and entitlements of indigenous groups. As later discussions on policies of resettlement will show, the customary rights of indigenous affected people are now incorporated as a matter of policy. However, as the discussions in the ethnographic chapters will show, the implementation of policies – though the policies have been significantly improved to drive a more responsible, constructive approach to resettlement – continue to show deficits related to persisting complexities such as the wider social, political and economic contextual dynamics.

Issues of political will, impeding social undercurrents, resource allocation, and a lack of available opportunities after physical resettlement, remain some of the challenges of resettlement, that compromise the implementation of policies. This makes the call for the development of a national resettlement policy all the more pertinent as a way of advocating for governments to commit to a developmental, participatory approach to resettlement, or to avoid resettlement, where it is evident that such an approach may not be realised due to a

variety of inhibiting factors. This forms the basis for this research. In the next chapter, the discussion will focus on the policies of resettlement, both at the international and local levels.

5 Chapter Five: Policies of Resettlement

5.1 Introduction

Following widespread outcry across the globe for international organisations – who funded resettlement-inducing developments projects – to address the inadequate manner in which implementing agencies were undertaking resettlement projects, the World Bank developed its first ever resettlement policy document in 1980 (Fox, 1998:308). However, the document was only made available to the public in 1988 (ibid.:1998:308). The earlier discussed inconsistencies, injustices and in some cases blatant disregard of the rights and well-being of affected people in resettlement situations drove social movements, civil society organisations, and other groups to advance the call for the development of structured guidelines and policies that could inform responsible resettlement practice across the world. It was also hoped that these policies would serve as an instrument through which implementing agencies across the world could be held accountable for the impact of their projects on affected people.

The development of World Bank guidelines in 1980 marked the first of many resettlement policy documents that would be developed at different levels from international institutions, governments, sectors, and parastatals. The World Bank guidelines to involuntary resettlement have been revised over the years; in 1986, 1990, 1997, 2001, and 2013 (De Wet, 2001:4638; Fox, 1998:308; The World bank, 2001; 2013), as more research and further recommendations came up, each time informed also by the implementation of earlier policy versions. In 2016, the World Bank released a framework for social and environmental standards in Bank-financed projects. Part of this framework – the Environmental and Social Standards 5 (ESS5) – deals with involuntary resettlement, and is aimed at informing a sustainable, socially and environmentally sensitive practice in development projects that involve involuntary resettlement (The World Bank, 2016:ESS5). This framework, and the ESS5 in particular, replaces an earlier document named OP/BP 4.2, which was revised in 2013 to incorporate new recommendations at the time (The World Bank, 2013).

Subsequent to the development of the World Bank resettlement guidelines, other international financial institutions followed suit in the development of resettlement policies, propelled by their obligations based on their role as funding agencies. These institutions include the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the African Development Bank (AfDB), and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), among others. Different countries, notably China and India, which, as indicated earlier, are two of the countries with the most number of large

dams in the world, later developed their own resettlement-specific policies at the national level. In other countries, such as Lesotho, where there are no resettlement policies at the national level, implementing authorities are obligated to develop their own resettlement policies.

In this chapter, the policies of resettlement are discussed, taking into account some of the pertinent issues, which have come out of policy implementation in different contexts, as reflected in the literature. This thesis focuses on the impact of policy implementation, with the overarching goal of providing a basis for the development of a national resettlement policy in Lesotho. Hence, the discussion in this chapter will focus on the issues that came out in this research, which highlight the differences between a parastatal resettlement policy in one case, and a state policy informed by national policy in the other. These issues include; how affected people, who are entitled to compensation and rehabilitation are defined, and how compensation and rehabilitation measures are designed and implemented. In discussing these issues, the role of policy in resettlement processes will be highlighted, as well as the manner in which it necessitates the commitment of governments to a developmental approach to resettlement, through the formulation of national resettlement policies.

For the purpose of this thesis, as a Lesotho-Indian comparative study, the discussion of policies will be limited to those of the Indian government and Lesotho's parastatal – the LHWP. At the international level, the discussion will be limited to policies of the World Bank, as one of the major funders of the studied Mohale dam case, as well as those of the AfDB, a co-funder of the LHWP (LHDA, 2004:34; Morse and Berger, 1992).

5.2 The Project-Affected People

The development of the World Bank policy document in 1980, titled “Social Issues Associated with Involuntary Resettlement in Bank-Financed Projects”, was informed by long-term research on cases of involuntary resettlement, including those conducted by pioneers such as Chambers, Nelson, Colson and Scudder, mentioned earlier in Chapter Three (Kardam, 1993:1782). These policy guidelines were aimed at informing measures to re-establish living conditions among the forcibly resettled and displaced people in Bank-financed projects (Fox, 1998:308).

However, one of the issues that arose from such efforts to make up for losses of affected people was how those affected were defined by implementing authorities in different contexts. For some authors, one of the causes of the impoverishment of affected people was

the underestimation of the total number of affected people, and by extension the exclusion of some affected people in compensation and livelihood re-establishment processes (Choudhary, 2000:2668). The construction of the Sardar Sarovar Dam in India, for instance, was widely criticised for what others have termed a gross under-accounting of the impact that the dam would have on the people (McCully, 1996; Ram, Sangvai, in Routledge, 2003:247). Research conducted by Johnston in relation to the Chixoy Dam in Guatemala, found that a significantly larger number of people were affected by the dam than had been originally estimated by the implementing authority – the National Institute for Electrification (2009:215).

The conventional way of assessing the impact of resettlement was to only recognise the losses of those who would be physically relocated, thereby disregarding all the people who would be economically and socially displaced, even if they were not themselves physically relocated (Berger, 1993:35; Routledge, 2003:247). This kind of underestimation of the impact of development-related resettlement has been regarded as a contributing factor towards the emergence of new forms of poverty among the affected people (Downing, 2002b). In addition, as indicated in the previous chapter on ethical issues, some of the affected people were often excluded – and in some cases still are – on account of procedures such as legal measures, which may not necessarily be compatible with customary rights and entitlements.

In response to this, and in an attempt to prevent the creation of new forms of poverty, involuntary resettlement policies – many of which were informed by those of the World Bank – began to provide for the inclusion of those whose means of income and livelihood were affected by displacement, even if the affected people were never explicitly relocated (The World Bank, 2013: Section 3(iii)). In addition, the policies provide for the recognition of the rights of those with no legal entitlements, but who are dependent in some way on the land being acquired. The World Bank provides in its policy (2013: Section 15) that eligibility for compensation towards livelihood re-establishment extends to those with not only legal and customary rights, but also those who may not have legal rights but “who have a claim to such land or asset”. The same point is reiterated in the Indian national resettlement act, which replaced the colonial Land Acquisition Act of 1894 – “The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act” of 2013. The law provides for compensation and rehabilitation for the loss of access to the means of livelihood such as agricultural land, even if such affected people do not have legally recognised rights (Government of India, 2013: Section 3).

However, the applicability of this recognition of entitlements is dependent on the commitment of not only the implementing agencies, but also other stakeholders such as traditional leaders and other government institutions. As the discussion of the findings in Chapter Thirteen will show, in some instances, the affected people in the studied Chandil Dam resettlement were excluded from compensation even though they had customary rights, due to complexities related to the lack of proof of such entitlements. In addition, the recognition of customary rights was conditioned by timeline restrictions, which in the end, excluded some of the affected people who fell outside the set timelines.

5.3 Compensation and Rehabilitation

Compensation as a mechanism for making up for losses suffered in involuntary resettlement has been one of the most debated issues in the study and practice of forced resettlement and displacement. Compensation is usually geared towards making up for losses suffered at the individual household level, and in some cases also for the loss of common property resources. Although this is a basic element provided for in resettlement policies, much of the contention has been on its inherent limitations, some of which will be discussed in the next chapter. Cernea, (1999:9; 2003:41) provides an exhaustive list of different ways in which compensation can be compromised, and by extension, limited from improving the standard of living among affected people.

Two limitations related to compensation, as Cernea (2003) has argued, are its proneness to administrative distortions, and that if it is cash-based and not asset-based, it can be easily spent on immediate expenses without replacing lost fixed assets (Cernea, 1999:20). In many cases where policies provide for asset-based compensation, such as land-for-land, a number of implementation complexities, such as land scarcity, inhibit the execution of this compensation approach. The findings from the studied Mohale and Chandil dams resettlement will reveal that, in the majority of affected households, cash compensation was resorted to, partly due to the scarcity of arable land in the new settlements.

The LHDA's compensation policy implementation exemplifies these limitations. The policy provides for the loss of household assets such as arable land, buildings, trees, etc. (LHDA, 1997: Section 8). Also provided for is the loss of access to common property resources such as grazing land, useful grasses, brushwood fuel, medicinal plants, etc. (ibid.: Section 8). Although the policy provides for a fairly comprehensive form of compensation, including aspects such as a relief grant for landless resettlers during the initial transition period, most

compensation packages come in the form of cash or grain. Even though there is a land-for-land option in the policy, for example (LHDA, 1997: Section 11.2.1), the implementation of this policy feature was largely impeded by issues of land scarcity. As a result, apart from the asset-based house reconstruction, which ensured that lost houses were sufficiently replaced, lost common property resources and other fixed assets were not sufficiently recovered in the majority of cases in the studied population.

The Indian National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Policy and the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act also provide for the loss of household assets such as houses and land (Government of India, 2007: Section 7; 2013: Chapter 5). Similar to the LHDA's Mohale Dam resettlement case, the implementation of assets-based compensation was inhibited by contextual socio-economic complexities, which will be reflected in the ethnographic chapters. Although there is a recent Indian Act on resettlement, for the purpose of assessing the impact of policy implementation, this research focussed on the state policy informed by the Indian National Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy of 2007. This was mainly because much of the implementation of compensation and rehabilitation aspects of interest in the studied case was based on the 2007 policy. Further justification in this regard will be provided in a detailed discussion of both the national and state level policies in Chapters Eleven and Thirteen respectively.

Hence, in consideration of the limitations of compensation as a mechanism for making up for losses associated with forced resettlement, resettlement policies at the international level, such as those of the World Bank and the African Development Bank, provide for a developmental approach to resettlement. This approach is one that focuses on the development of or re-establishment of livelihoods among affected people, beyond the physical resettlement component, in addition to sustainably addressing social and environmental concerns (The African Development Bank, 2003; The World Bank, 2016). In this regard, beyond compensation measures, borrower countries are obligated to provide the basis for rehabilitating affected people beyond the physical relocation component of a resettlement process.

In this regard, the strength of the Indian national policy lies in its rehabilitation component for individual households and communities, which is more explicit than in the case of the LHDA compensation policy (Government of India, 2007; 2013; LHDA, 1997). The LHDA policy's component which can be regarded as rehabilitation is compensation for communal

property losses, which allocates a certain amount of money towards community development projects. However, community development projects in the form of small enterprises, which was the approach of many of the undertaken community projects, have proven to be highly unsustainable in low income, low skill, rural contexts such as those in which the projects were undertaken in Lesotho. The findings discussed in Chapter Ten will attest to this assertion.

Unlike the LHDA compensation policy, the Indian national policy of resettlement makes use of available opportunities to rehabilitate affected people, such as granting commercial fishing rights in the reservoirs to affected families or communities (Government of India, 2007: Section 7.5 (a); 2013: Chapter 5). Additionally, there are other rehabilitation measures provided in the Indian policy, such as professional training, educational scholarships, and employment, which have a potential to provide for more sustainable livelihood re-establishment than small enterprises. These rehabilitation measures, which in addition to compensation, provide for livelihood re-establishment, are more feasible in a context where there is a multi-stakeholder buy-in, including government departments, private sector, etc., to all contribute towards the implementation of such rehabilitation measures. Hence, the commitment of national governments – through national resettlement policy making – is essential, as governments are better positioned to facilitate collaborative efforts in implementing rehabilitation measures to re-establish lost livelihood among the resettled people. Later discussions in Chapter Sixteen on a case for national policy development will articulate this argument in greater detail.

However, despite the developmental approach indicated in resettlement policies, one of the persistent, yet fundamental challenges, in relation to compensation and rehabilitation, is that while resettlement policies at both the international and local levels provide for measures to improve living standards among affected people, they also give an allowance for implementing agencies to “at least restore” living standards. The World Bank provides in its involuntary resettlement policy, that “resettlement activities should be conceived and executed as sustainable development programs...” (2013: Section 2 (b)), yet in the same section, it is provided that affected people will be “assisted to...improve their livelihoods and standards of living or at least restore them...” (2013: Section 2 (c)). This is also indicated in the 2016 environmental and social framework of the World Bank, as well as the studied LHDA policy (LHDA, 1997: Section 3.1; The World Bank, 2016:77). This is despite the earlier presented argument (in Chapter Three), that a policy measure that provides for

restoration, and not solely improvement of living standards, will almost always lead to impoverishment, due to the inherent and active complexities in resettlement, that often set the outcomes of policy implementation below the target.

Hence, a developmental resettlement approach cannot be attained in the context where implementation accommodates restoration of prior living standards, instead of only aiming to improve them. The Indian resettlement policy provides a good example in this regard, as it provides for the assurance of “...adequate rehabilitation...” and “better standards of living...” than those prior to resettlement (Government of India, 2007: Section 2.1(b) and (d)), as opposed to merely restoring them.

Furthermore, in its 2016 environmental and social framework, the World Bank presents a vision tied to the sustainable development vision, underpinned by environmental sustainability and social sensitivity (The World Bank, 2016:5). However, the provision of options assessment is presented as foremost about avoiding or minimising physical and economic displacement, over social and environmental costs. This can be seen in the wording of the policy provision, that “The Borrower will consider feasible alternative project designs to avoid or minimise land acquisition...especially when this would result in physical or economic displacement, while balancing environmental, social, and financial costs and benefits, and paying particular attention to gender impacts and impacts on the poor and vulnerable” (The World Bank, 2016:80). As argued earlier, research has shown that the complexities of resettlement are largely underpinned by qualitative losses, which are often difficult to make up for, and these qualitative losses include environmental and social costs. Discussions on the limitations of compensation in the next chapter will also show this. While the physical relocation component of the resettlement process undoubtedly has its own difficulties, the greater and long-term difficulties are those associated with long-term negative consequences imposed by the inherent complexities of intangible losses. Yet, the provision of options assessment in the environmental and social framework places emphasis on physical and economic losses over those cited as central to the framework.

Despite there being some limitations to resettlement policies, one of the positive aspects is that resettlement policies have begun to address some of the complexities inherent in resettlement processes, such as pre-existing socio-cultural complexities. Examples include the mitigation of gender biases entrenched in socio-cultural dynamics, provided for in policies at both international and local levels, including the World Bank’s 2016

environmental and social framework as stated in the above paragraph. In many patriarchal societies – Lesotho and India included – land holding is the exclusive privilege of males in the family, and this was also reflected in resettlement policies, where land would be allocated to a man in a household, by acknowledging him as the owner of the property. However, recently, policies such as the Indian National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Policy (2007: Section 7.8), prescribe joint ownership of property for both husband and wife. The implementation of this and other policy provisions will be discussed in the ethnographic chapters.

5.4 Conclusion

The development of resettlement policies, first by the World Bank, and then other institutions and governments, has been instrumental in advancing a more responsible, human rights-observing approach to resettlement. One that takes into account the rights of affected people, including indigenous people, and in particular their customary rights, as opposed to only recognising legal entitlements. Policies have also paved a way for a developmental approach to resettlement, as it became clear that compensation alone is inadequate in making up for losses and ensuring that the loss of livelihoods of affected people are re-established. The complexities of resettlement often render efforts to compensate affected people for lost assets and resources insufficient in ensuring replacement of such assets and resources.

Consequently, efforts to make up for losses in resettlement have had to be aimed at a higher standard than that experienced prior to the disturbance imposed by resettlement, through long-term rehabilitative measures after resettlement. However, it remains a challenge that in many cases, policies continue to also provide for the restoration of living conditions and standards to the level of pre-resettlement. This, in fact, disregards the evidence provided in a wide range of studies that reveal that such efforts often fail to match up to previous standards and conditions. The unavailability of equivalent natural resources, for example, due to the inevitable separation of resettled people from their physical environment, and a lack of opportunities in the new settlements, are some of the reasons why livelihood re-establishment may be inhibited.

This, therefore, makes pertinent the provision of options assessment. However, as argued earlier in the previous chapter, the implementation of options assessment continues to be undertaken in a significantly minimalistic manner, partly due to a lack of commitment from both the funding and implementing authorities. Issues of competing priorities between the

economic benefits of development projects – which is fundamentally the business of funding and implementing institutions – and social and environmental concerns of resettlement-inducing development projects, often bring out a conflict, which may lend options assessment to partial commitment on social and environmental concerns, on the part of funding and implementing authorities. Thus, the avoidance or minimisation of involuntary resettlement will remain compromised, as long as commitment is lacking on the part of implementing and funding agencies, to explore alternative development projects design that do not involve forced resettlement.

6 Chapter Six: Theories, Policies and Policy Practice

6.1 Introduction

The previous chapters have discussed and outlined theories and policies of resettlement. The complexities that affect the outcomes of the implementation of resettlement policies, or policy practice as Rew (1996; 2006) puts it, were also deliberated. In this chapter, the role of theories will be linked to policies in resettlement practice. The chapter will explore how the earlier discussed complexities of resettlement find expression on the ground, and influence the direction and outcomes of policy implementation. The chapter takes into account, among other issues, the contextual and administrative dynamics that are at play in resettlement processes, and how they may hinder efforts to implement relevant policies. While the development of policies may be informed by a wide range of comprehensive theories, the outcomes on the ground do not always reflect harmony between theories and policy practice. Although there are many complexities which have already been deliberated in the previous chapters, this chapter focusses specifically on the political and economic dynamics related to the implementation of resettlement policies.

6.2 Theories, Policies and Policy Practice, an Interconnected Continuum

Theories, policies and policy practice are interwoven and feed off of one another. The development of theoretical tools in the field of resettlement, discussed in Chapter Three, was informed by the evidence of real-life experiences of affected people (Cernea, 1990; 1997; 2000; De Wet, 1995; 2006; Scudder, 1965; 1973; 1981; 1993; Scudder, and Colson, 1982). Theoretical tools then informed the development of resettlement policies and guidelines, which were meant to inform the practice of resettlement (The World Bank, 1980; 2001; 2013; 2016). New evidence and the lessons learned from policy implementation were then used – and continue to – to refine theories and to develop new ones (Yan, et al., 2005:712-713). Figure 6.1 below is an illustration of this cyclical process.




Figure 6.1 A Research-Theory-Policy-Practice Continuum

However, in practice the cycle does not always follow a predictable path. As shown earlier, Scudder's FSF, for example, has been evolving over the years, informed mainly by research, even before there were resettlement policies, although policy practice also informs his theorising. His publications on the framework such as those cited earlier (Scudder, 1981; 1993; 2009), are partly informed by the Kariba Dam resettlement project, which was undertaken in the absence of formal policies. However, the amendment of the framework over the years, as outlined earlier in table 3.1, has been influenced by research in other cases, where resettlement policies were implemented.

The development of policies may also be informed by both theory and research. In some cases, the call for the development of resettlement policies is triggered by evidence on the impacts, usually negative, of the construction of dams on those affected, even with little to no recognition of theories. In an interview in one of the case studies, a leader of one activist organisation in Jharkhand, India, cited numerous cases of displacement in India, where people were subjected to serious atrocities and blatant disregard of their rights and well-being, as the main reason that prompted their movement to advocate for the development of resettlement policies in the Jharkhand State.

Nevertheless, in some cases the development of policies is informed by theory, which, in turn, is informed by research, as shown in the figure above. Cernea's theoretical model, the IRR, was informed by his research on a wide range of resettlement projects across the world.

In his research, he observed a pattern of the consequences of resettlement in various cases, and how the established pattern could be developed into a tool that is applicable in other cases (Cernea, 2000:23). The model has since been used to inform the development and refinement of policies and guidelines in different contexts (Cernea, 2000:20; Downing, 2002a:8; Sapkota, 2000:147). These theory-informed policies have, in turn, influenced the practice of resettlement across the world, even if they do not always yield expected returns (Scudder, 2005:61). More theoretical tools have also come out of such policy-informed practice, such as the inherent complexities approach (De Wet, 2006; 2015).

Although theoretical tools may be informed by research, particularly on real-life experiences, theories, in turn, are instrumental in cultivating an understanding of resettlement experiences, and enable not only planners and implementers but also the people directly affected, to make sense of resettlement and its effects (Cernea, 2000:20; Downing, 1996; Koenig and Diarra, 2000; Mahapatra, 1999). Policies on the other hand, have the potential to bridge the gap between theory and reality, by informing responsible and constructive practice for more positive results. As stated by McDonald, et al. (2008:84), policies are crucial in informing practice and potentially mitigating the impoverishment and other negative consequences associated with forced resettlement and displacement.

However, the reality is that policies, and not only resettlement policies, do not always work the way they are intended to (Mosse, 2004:640). A few issues have already been highlighted, which reveals the difficulties in implementing policies in a manner that guarantees the intended results. As it has been shown, and will be reiterated in more detail in the findings, although policy implementation is generally a complex process, the implementation of policies in resettlement is further complicated by the fact that resettlement is, in itself, a problematic process (De Wet, 2006:185). Cernea (2004:10) describes it as “a process of many unknowns and unpredictable events”. In this sense, even with proper planning, resettlement processes often take on a life of their own (De Wet, 2006:199). In the next section, the discussion will explore why resettlement policy implementation does not always follow the expected trajectory. This is of particular interest in this study, as one of the objectives is to explore how the problems of resettlement policy implementation were negotiated in the cases studied.

6.3 Why Resettlement Policies do not Always Work as Intended

Resettlement occurs in the context of wider political, economic and ideological settings; as such, its processes are influenced by these contextual dynamics. As Devitt and Hitchcock (2010:71) assert, even where the resources and expertise are adequate, and the responsible authorities are sympathetic of affected people and the consequences they incur, the processes are subject to “political, economic and ideological pressures, which drive them on an unpredictable and uncharted path”. The inherent complexities approach highlighted some characteristics of resettlement, which make it a complicated process to navigate. The IRR model also outlines the features embedded in the nature of forced resettlement, which makes it a naturally damaging process that needs to be actively controlled in a particular way, if its negative effects are to be reversed. The discussions below will be centred on issues entrenched in the political and economic factors of resettlement programmes, which can interfere with processes and outcomes of resettlement policies and policy practice.

6.3.1 The politics of resettlement projects and policy implementation

As indicated earlier, although the effects of forced resettlement are felt on the ground by affected people, resettlement processes – policy formulation, resettlement planning and implementation – typically adopt a top-down approach. In fact, forced resettlement by its very nature is a top-down process. As shown earlier in the discussion of Scudder’s FSF, decisions to construct dams and resettle people are high-level decisions that tend to exclude affected people (Scudder, 1993:130). In the case of Lesotho, with regard to the construction of a series of dams, as in many other cases, the decision had already been made by the governments of the two involved countries, Lesotho and South Africa, although the implementation would require a renewed agreement (LHDA, 2017b). Any deliberations that lead to the gazetting of the construction of a dam are customarily exclusive of the public. This top-down approach also tends to extend to all processes from project design, implementation, and monitoring.

Although in some cases, such as India, the National Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy was developed with some contributions from stakeholders such as local activists and affected people (Fernandes, 1998:2703), in many cases policy development is an exclusive process. China’s amendment of its resettlement policy in 1999 in relation to the Three Gorges Dam, was the result of a long process that had been going on as an exclusive project of the government (Heggelund, 2017:4). Some of the implemented changes had a significant effect

on the people on the ground. The changes included resettling people from the reservoir region, including from areas that, initially, were meant to be settlements to which some people would be relocated (ibid.:4). Because the people resettled from the reservoir areas were mainly rural populations, many of them depended on agriculture as their main form of livelihood. And since resettlement was large-scale, in the context of land scarcity, the re-establishment of livelihoods and lost assets such as land became difficult to achieve, leading to jeopardised food security (Heggelund, 2017:4). While the government did engage a semi-governmental organisation to conduct a study that would inform the resettlement plan, evidence suggests that the study was merely a survey and not a participatory activity (Yuefang and Steil, 2003:426).

A lack of participation in resettlement, not only in policy implementation but also formulation, is a first indication that resettlement is often designed from a top-down approach, with little to no contribution from the primarily affected people. Even in cases where the affected people are involved, participation is typically solicited at a later stage, mainly to implement project activities designed by officials. The implementation of communal compensation through community development projects in the studied Mohale resettlement case exemplifies this assertion, where the affected people were invited to come up with ideas and implement projects, but were not involved in the design of this approach to communal compensation. Hence, the findings will show that although the affected people were involved in the implementation of these projects, there was a notable lack of continuity from policy design to implementation.

In the inherent complexities approach, De Wet describes resettlement as a problematic institutional process (2006:185). To add on to that, Mosse (2004:641) argues that what makes resettlement problematic is that, as a process, it is mainly about attempting to fit policy prescriptions into institutional values, culture, and reality. These institutional aspirations and reality are often highly politically motivated. In this context, participatory methods in resettlement processes will always be designed to fit institutional structures and culture, and not to primarily deal with the dynamics on the ground. Hence, when the LHDA developed a framework for communal compensation in the Mohale case, it was based on the institutional values of technical project design, and the affected people had to come up with project ideas, based on the approach that suited the institutional culture. Consequently, the complexities on the ground such as a lack of technical expertise, a lack of economy to support the designed

projects, etc., became inhibiting factors, irreconcilable with the institutional culture of routine planning.

Furthermore, in some cases, as in the case of the LHDA, the development of policies follows a prerequisite for securing financial support from funding institutions – mainly the World Bank in the case of the LHDA. Hence, the design of such policies and their provisions will also likely follow an institutional culture of those funding institutions, since the primary function of policy in that case is to legitimise projects, through mobilising and maintaining political and economic support, only secondary being to orientate practice (Mosse, 2004:648).

If policies are fundamentally about practice, whose effects are felt at grassroots level, Rew, et al. (2006:49) argue that it should not be a top-down process, but a negotiated process, between those implementing policy and the people directly affected. The LHDA has permanent offices, for example, in the reservoir areas, where some implementing officials are based, and maintain contact with the affected people. The decision to have permanent implementing officials in the reservoir areas, where some resettled people remain, was part of the recommendations from the lessons learned in the previous Katse Dam resettlement (Thamae, 2006:89). However, although this has ensured increased access for people who would have been, otherwise, far from the head office in Maseru city, what remains a challenge is that decision-making is still centralised, which makes a local office less efficient in as far as the outcomes are concerned. It may be argued that this is to prevent inconsistencies, and to ensure proper control of processes and procedures. However, decentralised decision-making can work efficiently if proper monitoring systems are put in place. Otherwise, decentralising offices with no decision-making power defeats the very purpose of decentralisation.

Despite that many resettlement policies incorporate public participation, particularly those of borrower countries of institutions such as the World Bank, who have to comply with World Bank policies, the implementation of this aspect is mainly managerial in nature, with a top-down approach. According to Devitt and Hitchcock (2010:71), two principles are central to many resettlement policies and programmes: the first is that affected people must be actively engaged in resettlement processes from the beginning to the end, and be allowed to shape the affairs of their own future. The second is that the lives and living standards of affected people must not be led to a worse-off condition. Yet, when policies are implemented, these two

principles seem to sometimes, if not often, be secondary to institutional values such as profit maximisation and expenditure minimisation, even if it comes at the cost of human suffering.

Although a development-focussed, participatory approach to resettlement is claimed in resettlement policies, both at international and local levels of implementing agencies, a predominantly top-down approach which resettlement projects adopt, remains a fundamental challenge and an inhibiting factor to active resettler participation. The commitment to a participatory approach to resettlement is not only necessary at the level of implementing authorities, but also at the level of funding institutions, who have an influence on how projects are designed and implemented.

6.3.2 The economics of resettlement projects and policy implementation

The economics of resettlement and policy implementation, particularly with regard to compensation as the main mechanism for making up for the losses suffered in forced resettlement, has been widely engaged with, including in Cernea (1998; 1999; 2003; 2008; 2009), Fernandes (2008), Kanbur (2008), Maldonado (2009), Slater and Mphale (2009), Witter and Satterfield (2014). Arguably, there is now a consensus from this body of research, on the inadequacy of compensation to re-establish livelihoods and increase the standards of living. While it is widely acknowledged that compensation is not only necessary but also obligatory in resettlement cases, writers such as Cernea argue that on its own, compensation is incapable of providing the necessary long-term benefits of livelihood and income recovery (2008:16). According to Fernandes (2008:1), due to its proneness to distortions, compensation does not have the capacity to perform the function of livelihood restoration, not to mention improvement.

As indicated earlier in the discussion on ethical issues, compensation is one of the two prerequisites for land to be acquired involuntarily under the principle of *eminent domain*. Thus, the question is, if this does not live up to its function of making up for losses in a fair and economically effective way, what are the alternatives? Cernea argues that fundamental reform in how forced resettlement is conceived and undertaken is necessary, particularly with regard to economic foundations of resettlement planning (2008; 2009). In this regard, not only do compensation levels need to be raised, but also other mechanisms need to be incorporated to facilitate development among affected people after resettlement (Cernea, 2009). This sub-section explores why compensation alone is an insufficient mechanism for improving standards of living, leading to the failure of policies to deliver on their intended

objective to enable the recovery of experienced losses. The subsection will also explore other forms of livelihood re-establishment.

As indicated earlier in Chapter Five, central to the limitations of compensation is that it is prone to administrative distortions. These include delayed compensation payments, difficulty with measuring intangible losses, corruption on the part of officials managing resettlement finances, and the use of cash compensation by affected people for immediate and other expenses other than replacing lost assets (Al Atahar, 2014:262; Cernea, 2003:41; Eguavoen and Tesfai, 2012:49; Slater and Mphale, 2009; Vanclay, 2017:13).

Delayed compensation payment is one of the common factors that contribute to the shortcomings of compensation. As previously noted, in one case in the earlier discussed Sardar Sarovar Project in India, research shows that some people only received their subsistence allowance three to four years later, even though the allowance was meant to assist the resettlement people with their immediate expenses during the initial transition phase (Parasuraman, 1999:193). As can be expected, by the time the funds were disbursed, many had experienced significant difficulties surviving without their fundamental, productive assets, which were lost to resettlement. The findings from the Chandil resettlement case study will also reflect some of the challenges related to delayed compensation payment. The implementation of compensation in the Katse Dam resettlement, one of the first two projects of the LHDA, was also riddled with delays (‘Matli, 2004:45).

In addition to declining living standards due to delayed compensation, where compensation is given in a form of cash, affected people tend to use it to meet their immediate expenses as opposed to replacing lost assets. This can be worsened in cases where provision for transitional expenses has not been made by implementing authorities. A research by Slater and Mphale (2009), in relation to the Katse Dam resettlement in Lesotho, revealed that among the resettled people, the majority had not been able to replace their lost fixed assets with compensation funds, due to the use of funds for competing immediate expenses.

Furthermore, compensation is limited in providing effective recovery of losses due to its economic-based administrative processes, which tend to omit non-material assets, or at best, devalue them (Downing, 1996:34). In their study among affected people resettled from Mozambique’s Limpopo National Park, Witter and Satterfield (2014:1398) highlight the inability of compensation to fully capture non-material losses. They illustrate this point using socio-cultural losses experienced by affected people, showing how, in attempting to make up

for losses, compensation measures are incapable of factoring in social benefits derived from the socio-cultural base of lost resources and assets, and the long-standing mechanisms to utilise such resources (Witter and Satterfield, 2014:1398). Their examples include the loss of access to the *Makwakwa* trees, which the locals valued for not only the fruits they produced – prepared using specific skills – but also for what the locals described as “saving them in times of drought and war” *ibid.*:1398). Owing to the fact that the practice of resettlement is a highly institutionalised, top-down process, usually with limited participation from the people on the ground, it is subject to conflicts between administrative and socio-cultural realities at grassroots level. And because of the power dynamics between implementing institutions and the forcefully resettled people, institutional values typically win over local realities and culture.

Institutional corruption is also one of the factors that have been proven to impede the already inadequate mechanism of compensation. One of the inherent, yet inhibiting features of administrative procedures is that they are subject to bureaucratic processes, commonly leading to delayed service delivery. In the process, financial mismanagement can further impede the ability of cash compensation to improve or restore living conditions in the long-term. Heggelund (2008) explores what he calls “the disappearance of money” in the Three Gorges Dam resettlement programme, where funds that were meant for the resettlement and rehabilitation of affected people were misappropriated. Supported by financial audits of the programme, over 270 million yuan meant for housing, training of the resettled people as part of the rehabilitation programme, etc., was reported to have been diverted to activities such as personnel salaries and other expenses unrelated to resettlement (Heggelund, 2008). Jackson and Sleigh (2000:236) also reveal in a similar Chinese case, what they refer to as the “China’s corruption problem”, which has also been revealed in many other large dam projects.

In a study of the Jamuna Multi-Purpose Bridge Project resettlement in Bangladesh, Al Atahar (2014:262) reflects that a number of respondents admitted to have paid between 10% to 15% of their compensation money in bribing officials to speed up the release of compensation funds – something they should have been doing anyway. In the end, the majority of respondents in Al Atahar’s study – about 90% – indicated that they were either unable to acquire land after displacement, or were unable to acquire the same size of land as they owned before (2014:262). A combination of two factors was behind the inability of some resettled people to replace land. These were the scarcity of land and the shortage of finances

from their compensation. These factors played a particularly negative role to the extent that of the 72% of resettled households who claimed to have been significantly reliant on agriculture prior to resettlement, only 28% acquired agricultural land after resettlement (Al Atahar, 2014:263).

Where corrupt practices are rampant, the delivery of services is retarded, delaying normal access to services, unless an unofficial fee is paid to speed up the process that officials are paid to do anyway. This is a result of both the political and economic landscapes that allow corruption to thrive; because either people are extremely desperate for such services – and they often are – or there are no serious repercussions for officials who are found to have violated professional and administrative principles; or a combination of the two.

To complement compensation in the efforts to recover losses that resettled people experience, and to enable them to improve their living standards, more long-term measures are prescribed, not only in research but also in certain policies. Cernea (2009) presents mechanisms of benefit-sharing for projects, which have the potential to enable the development and improvement of the conditions of resettled people in the long-term. Van Wicklin (1999) had also earlier presented an argument for benefit-sharing in involuntary resettlement. Due to the earlier mentioned complexities associated with a lack of resources in most resettlement projects, particularly in developing countries (De Wet, 2006:186), the argument for benefit-sharing is that it enables the development of affected people, through the benefits generated from the very project that displaced them (Cernea, 2009:57; Van Wicklin, 1999:233). Not only does this have economic benefits but also have ethical implications, based on enabling equitable gains from a development project, by resettled people and those for whom a development project is constructed (Van Wicklin, 1999:234).

One of the mechanisms proposed for sharing the benefits of development projects with affected people is through the redistribution of revenue in the form of royalties to local or regional authorities (Egre, et al., 2008:318). Although the LHWP is an example of a case where royalties are received from dam revenues, the limitation is that in this particular case, this kind of benefit does not directly profit the affected people, but is part of the national revenue that contributes towards the national budget. In this regard, there are no direct, long-term and sustainable benefits exclusive to the affected groups.

Other mechanisms for benefit-sharing include giving access to economic opportunities, services or resources generated from a development project, such as electricity, irrigation,

transport infrastructure, fishing rights, preferential employment, etc. (Egre, et al., 2008:318; Van Wicklin, 1999:241-249). The studied Chandil Dam resettlement in India provides a good example of a case where economic opportunities such as fishing rights are offered primarily to the benefit of the affected people. The earlier discussed Aswan High Dam project also exemplifies a case where the primary benefits of the project were channelled towards improving the lives of affected people, by giving access to irrigated land to the resettled people.

However, Cernea (2009:59) warns that benefit-sharing is not only a matter of resource availability but also of political will. As argued above, resettlement projects are often executed as top-down, institutionally controlled projects, heavily influenced by political powers. As such, major decisions such as sharing the benefits of development projects are typically made by high-ranking officials. Hence, where there is no political will for one reason or another, the proposed mechanisms for benefit-sharing may not be taken into consideration, even when they are economically feasible. Hence, it is significant that policies, particularly at the national level, be developed to indicate the commitment of governments to the process of responsible, constructive resettlement, as well as to enable such commitment to be put into action. With reference to the Shikou Hydro-electric Project, Trembath (2008:377) argues that where the standards of living among resettled people have been improved, it often can be attributed to the approach of implementing authorities to plan for and implement a development-driven resettlement process. Hence, the availability of resources and the will on the part of funding and implementing authorities, are two sides of the same coin, when it comes to advancing resettlement projects with the potential for developing not only the people for whom a development project is undertaken, but also of those forcibly moved to make way for such a development project.

6.4 Conclusion

There is a clear and direct relationship between research, theory and policy, irrespective of the order in which they inform each other. However, research has shown that on the ground, policies do not always lead to the desired or intended objectives. While this is the case in many areas or fields other than resettlement, the practice of resettlement has specific complexities that relate to the evident pattern of negative consequences on affected people, despite the development, improvement and implementation of resettlement policies. What has become clear over the years is that, this disconnect between policy and practice, is not only –

or mainly – a result of the inadequacy of policies in themselves, but also of the inherent complexities of resettlement as discussed in previous chapters.

This chapter has specifically focussed on the political and economic features of resettlement and its implementation processes, and how this relates to the difficulties in arriving at the intended or desired outcome of policies in resettlement practice. Despite the complexities associated with resettlement, there are mechanisms that, based on research on real life experiences, many scholars have proposed to bridge the gap between policies and policy practice. These mechanisms require intentional efforts to plan for and implement resettlement projects, based on a specific approach that is consistent with inclusive development. Hence, the commitment and will of not only implementing authorities but also their funding agencies, towards a developmental practice of resettlement, is a crucial factor. The emphasis on ‘practice’ is pertinent because, as indicated in the previous chapter, policies such as those of the World Bank and those of borrower countries have aspects of a developmental approach to resettlement, but what remains a challenge is ensuring that such policy provisions are also reflected on the ground.

7 Chapter Seven: The Research Methodology

7.1 Introduction

The previous chapter explored some of the challenges and complexities of resettlement policy implementation, which may affect the effectiveness of policies, leading to unintended consequences. The earlier chapters discussed the literature and theories related to the phenomenon of DIDR and its consequences, and explored some examples of large dam cases in other parts of the world. Using the insights acquired from the literature and theories, this thesis aims to explore the impact of resettlement policies on resettlement processes in two dam cases, taking into consideration some of the complexities of resettlement, and what the outcomes of the policies have been on the ground. The thesis explores the dynamics of policy implementation, and how the different stakeholders in the implementation processes – the implementing agencies, the resettled people, the hosts, community leaders, etc. – negotiated the challenges on the ground. This chapter presents a discussion on the methods used to explore policy implementation processes and their outcomes.

This chapter consists of seven sections: research objectives, study sites, theoretical frameworks, research design, data analysis, ethical considerations, and limitations of the study. The research objectives present an overview of the study being undertaken, and the study sites section describes the two case studies. The theoretical framework section will describe how the earlier discussed theories that inform the undertaking of the study, will be incorporated into the ethnographic discussions. The research design will outline the techniques engaged in the adopted case study enquiry, and the data analysis section will show how the data generated from the fieldwork and documents analysis was analysed. The ethical considerations section will outline some ethical issues, which were taken into cognisance in the interactions with the study participants and the presentation of the information they provided. The chapter ends with a consideration of the limitations of the study and the conclusion.

7.2 The Research Objectives

This research forms a Lesotho-Indian comparative enquiry, aimed at understanding and providing an analysis of the social and economic consequences to resettled communities of policies governing resettlement. The thesis undertook a selective comparison of the experience of the implementation of India's Jharkhand State's resettlement policy – informed by the Indian national resettlement policy – with the experience of the LHDA's resettlement

policy implementation in Lesotho. The overarching goal of the research is to provide a basis for developing a framework for a comprehensive national resettlement policy in Lesotho, and potentially in other countries in Southern African. As indicated in Chapter One, some African countries – Mozambique, Zambia, and Namibia being exemplars – have recently formulated policies at the national level, which are aimed at informing resettlement processes in their specific contexts. However, other countries in the region have no policies targeted at planned and/forced resettlement at the same level. For the purpose of this thesis, the focus of the empirical research was on two dam cases in India and Lesotho. In achieving these goals, the research was guided by the following research objectives:

- To analyse the social and economic consequences of policies on resettlement processes and outcomes in selected geographical areas
- To identify local participatory strategies employed in the planning and implementation of resettlement processes, and factors facilitating or impeding such participation
- To analyse the factors and processes influencing the formulation and outcomes of resettlement policy in selected geographical areas
- To examine the extent to which policy dimensions and contexts are transferrable from the Indian to the Lesotho case – and potentially to other Southern African contexts

7.3 The Study Sites

The undertaking of this research was focused on resettlement in two dam cases; the Mohale Dam case of the LHWP in the Maseru District of Lesotho, and the Chandil Dam case of the Subarnarekha Multipurpose Project (SMP) in the Jharkhand State of India. The LHWP is a multi-phased project based in the rural areas of Lesotho, and one of the largest dam projects in the African continent (Lerer and Scudder, 1999:114). The project consists of two phases, of which, to date, two parts of the first phase – Phase 1A and 1B – are complete, while Phase 2 is currently underway. Phase 1A entailed the construction of the Katse Dam and ‘Muela Hydropower plant, and Phase 1B entailed the construction of the Mohale Dam. The forced resettlement imposed on the previous inhabitants of the Mohale region, where the Mohale Dam has been constructed, forms part of the subject of this study. The SMP is a two-phased project based in the Chandil Block of the Seraikela Kharsawan District in Jharkhand, India, consisting of two dams – the Chandil and Icha dams – and two barrages (Gupta and Mitra, 2004:434). The resettlement propelled by the construction of the Chandil Dam forms the other part of the subject of this research.

Because the study was aimed at analysing policy implementation and its outcomes, the two dam cases were selected for their resettlement policy components, which have been used to inform resettlement processes in the two contexts (LHDA, 1997; State of Jharkhand, 2008). Since the overarching goal of the research is to provide a basis for the development of a national resettlement policy, India was selected for having not only a longstanding experience in forced resettlement, but also for having a resettlement policy at the national level (Diaz, 2012; Fernandes, 1997; 1998; 2000; Government of India, 2007; 2013; Mathur, 2013; Parasuraman, 1999; Sharma, 2014). Hence, the research sought to acquire insights from the experiences of policy development and implementation in the Indian context. The Chandil project in the Jharkhand State was selected for practical purposes, based on a pre-existing working relationship on which the researcher was able to capitalise, between the host of the researcher during fieldwork in India, and the thesis supervisor.

In the Southern African region, Lesotho was selected as the study site for having one of the largest dam projects in Africa, and because, unlike in the Indian case, Lesotho does not have a national resettlement policy; hence it provided the basis for comparison. Furthermore, Lesotho was a favourable site for practical reasons; being the researcher's home country, it enabled her to draw from accumulated cultural capital and language competency. As Neuman (2006:153) argues, personal insights can be instrumental in enabling a fuller understanding of the subject matter under exploration. Furthermore, it is argued here that language competency facilitates easier and more engaged interactions, whereas the use of a translator can create a barrier between the researcher and the subjects of the study. The outline of the study limitations in section 7.8 will speak more to the issue of language barrier and how it affected this research.

Once in the areas where the fieldwork was undertaken, the actual villages for fieldwork were selected for various reasons. According to Fontein (2014:70), although in some cases the researcher may have already finalised the details of the fieldwork in advance, it may be advantageous to only finalise such details when already in the field. This may allow the researcher to apply changes as may be necessary, when issues which may have not been apparent prior to the fieldwork arise (ibid.:70). In this study, although in the case of Lesotho the initial plan was that fieldwork would be undertaken in two villages situated in two broad geographical regions – the highlands and the lowlands – changes had to be applied once it occurred that the targeted number of resettled respondents could not be reached in only two villages. The discussion of the findings in Chapter Nine will show why this was the case.

Lesotho, as a country, is divided into two broad geographical regions; the highlands, which are mostly rural and mountainous, and the lowlands, consisting of the peri-urban foothills and the urban areas (Devitt and Hitchcock, 2010:65).

In the case of Lesotho, six villages were selected as study sites in the two regions of the country, three in the highlands and three in the lowlands. The Mohale region, in which the dam was constructed, is situated in the highlands. Three villages in which the most number of people were resettled to within the region, were selected as the study sites. These were Ha-Mohale (the village, and not the wider regional area), Ha-Ts'iu, and Ha-Koporala. In the Thaba-Bosiu region in the lowlands, one village – Ha-Ratau – one of the two villages in which the most number of people were resettled to outside the Mohale region - was initially selected as the study site in the lowlands. However, two other villages within the Thaba-Bosiu regional area were added to the study sites, because many of the people resettled to Ha-Ratau could not be reached during fieldwork; at least two had passed away while others had migrated in search for jobs or were already working elsewhere. Of the 34 households initially resettled to Ha-Ratau, only 18 were reachable at the time of fieldwork. Hence, the two other villages added were Ha-Mosalla and Ha-Makhalanyane, also in the Thaba-Bosiu region.

In the Chandil area, four villages were selected from a list of 15 villages, which were said to have been rehabilitated, in accordance with the applied Jharkhand Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy (SMP, 2016; State of Jharkhand, 2008). These four villages are all situated less than 20km from the Chandil Dam site. As the ethnographic discussions in Chapter Thirteen will show, there are some rehabilitative economic activities that have been undertaken in the Chandil Dam site for affected people, which have, arguably, made these the preferred areas of resettlement by affected people. Hence, for the purpose of analysing the impact of policies, of which rehabilitation is a significant component, the areas in which the policy provisions of rehabilitation have been more extensively implemented were more favourable. These selected villages are Chilgu, Sukhsari, Gangudih, and Chotalakha.

7.4 Theoretical Frameworks

This research is theoretically predicated upon the two main theories discussed earlier in Chapter Three, Cernea's IRR model and Scudder's FSF. To analyse the impact of resettlement policies, the analysis is framed within the risks of impoverishment outlined by the IRR model. According to the model, these risks are inherent in forced resettlement situations, and in order to mitigate them resettlement policies and strategies must be

implemented in a manner that prevents the risks from materialising (Cernea, 2000:19). Hence, the analysis is guided by the IRR model to test the effectiveness of policy implementation processes in preventing or mitigating these risks, and what the outcomes of these processes have been. Within the stage-based framework by Scudder, the discussions analyse the outcomes reflected on the ground, in consideration of the stages that the affected people were at, at the time of fieldwork, and what could have been expected of their behaviour in those stages (Scudder, 2005:32). To analyse the dynamics on the ground, the analysis also incorporates De Wet's inherent complexities approach to resettlement, and his socio-spatial analysis, as complementary approaches in the analysis of the empirical data (De Wet, 2006; 2015). In this regard, the study explores how the social, economic and environmental settings in the two contexts, were influential in enabling or impeding policy implementation and outcomes.

7.5 The Research Design: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches

The empirical research for this thesis was undertaken mainly through a case study enquiry, exploring resettlement in two dam cases, the Mohale Dam in Lesotho and the Chandil Dam in India. However, in order to fully understand the impact of policies, that is, how the implementation of policies has influenced resettlement processes, and what the impact has been on the ground, the research also engaged quantitative research methods. Although the research is mainly qualitative, quantitative methods were used complementarily, to answer different kinds of questions from those addressed qualitatively.

Qualitative methods are often used to understand social phenomena, behaviour, and social relations in more depth than quantitative methods would allow (Silverman, 2001:32). Whereas on the other hand, quantitative methods allow a researcher to gather numbers and map out outcomes in a way that qualitative methods may not be able to. While quantitative methods have been criticised for their inability to capture social realities and the construction of "social and cultural variables", used alongside qualitative methods, their strength in enabling measurements can be instrumental in understanding the impact of social phenomena (Neuman, 2006:149; Silverman, 2001:29). As a result, this research capitalised on the complementary strengths of both approaches.

The case study inquiry was employed as the main approach of the study, but household surveys were complementarily engaged to collect quantitative data. As asserted by Baxter and Jack (2008:544), case studies facilitate explorative research on phenomena in their real-

life contexts, through multiple data sources. The engagement of a triangulation approach – assessing the subject matter from multiple angles – ensures that the phenomenon under investigation is understood from different perspectives (Baxter and Jack, 2008:544; Neuman, 2006:149). Triangulation can be undertaken through the employment of multiple measures, observers, theories and/or methods (Neuman, 2006:149).

In this research, the triangulation approach was adopted through the use of multiple theories and methods of data gathering. As indicated earlier, the multiple theories used are the IRR model, which was engaged to understand the nature of the losses experienced by the affected people, and the FSF, engaged to understand the experiences of the affected people as a collective, and how that relates to their behaviour. The complexities and socio-spatial approaches were also engaged to understand the dynamics on the ground, and how that relates to the outcomes of policy implementation. The multiple data gathering techniques employed include quantitative approaches – content analysis and household surveys (Silverman, 2001:27; 2004) – and qualitative approaches; in-depth interviews, informal conversations, focus group discussions, participant observation and oral histories. The subsections below describe how these methods of data collection were employed.

7.5.1 Data Collection Techniques

7.5.1.1 Content Analysis

Content analysis is a systematic method in which written material and visual communication are analysed in order to acquire historically relevant information and insights about a phenomenon, which may not be available in the present (Elo and Kyngas, 2008:108). Content analysis is also advantageous in providing readily organised descriptions of the subject matter, which oral communication may be incapable of (ibid.:108). In order to understand policy dimensions, resettlement planning, as well as implementation processes, content analysis was engaged through the analysis of written material relevant to the research (Elo and Kyngas, 2008:107-108; Macdonald and Tipton, 1993:188). The analysed documents include the policies applied in the implementation of resettlement processes in both the Mohale and Chandil cases, as well as feasibility studies and progress reports. In the case of Mohale, the census report which was undertaken by the LHDA prior to resettlement was also reviewed.

7.5.1.2 In-depth Interviews

According to Bernard (1995:166), interviewing is “an integral part of ethnographic” studies, and involves asking relevant questions of informants. Informants are people who are knowledgeable about the phenomenon, or are the subject of the matter under investigation (ibid.:166). In this regard, interviewing is a means of gathering first-hand empirical data related to social realities, by asking questions to people in real life contexts (Holstein and Gubrium, 2004:140).

In this research, interviews were conducted with respondents, who included resettled people, host community members, community leaders, representatives from civil society organisations, as well as personnel from implementing agencies. Resettled people provided first-hand information on the effects of forced resettlement, as they are the ones on whom the consequences were imposed. The hosts, though not among the primarily affected people, were also affected in that they now have to share not only the resources, but also the living environment with the resettled people, and the dynamics of shared social spaces affect them all. Community leaders were interviewed to acquire insights on issues of local and/or shared spaces governance, and how that has been influenced by resettlement. Representatives from civil society organisations, particularly in the case of Chandil, India, were interviewed to understand the role that other stakeholders, apart from the government, have played in shaping or influencing resettlement policy development and implementation processes. Officials from the implementing agencies were interviewed to gather insights from directly involved actors on how the policies were implemented, what the problems encountered were, what the rationale behind certain approaches was, as well as how any encountered challenges were navigated.

Interviews have the advantage of being flexible, allowing the researcher to probe for more responses in order to gain a better understanding of the subject (Babbie and Mouton, 2001:289). Given the complex nature of resettlement and policy implementation, as the subject matter of this research, interviews were effective in allowing the researcher to probe for more information, in order to get a better understanding of subtle or indirect policy dimensions, policy implementation processes as well as the challenges. In the case of Chandil, however, because of the language barrier, the researcher had to engage the use of a translator, and later discussions will reflect the limitations associated with this.

However, unlike written documents that provide consistent information, which cannot be changed depending on the context or the researcher, interviews can generate potentially inconsistent information, even when respondents are key informants (Bernard, 1995:168; Silverman, 1997:15). Hence, the use of multiple data sources is advantageous in that differently generated data can complement each other and flag inconsistencies. Later discussions will show how various data gathering techniques complemented each other in this study.

Interview guides

Semi-structured interview guides were used for different categories of respondents. Semi-structured interview guides consist of a set of major questions posed to respondents in a particular category, and depending on the responses given, varying yet focused follow-up questions may be asked (Babbie and Mouton, 2001:253; Fielding, 1993:136). The advantage of a semi-structured interview is that it allows respondents to open up more to a conversation, by allowing the researcher to probe for more responses, while also enabling respondents to express themselves in the way they prefer (Babbie and Mouton, 2001:289; Bernard, 1995:209). The benefit of using a semi-structured interview guide is that it helps to focus the interview, without taking away the flexibility of the interview process.

In the case of Lesotho, different interview guides were designed for the hosts, including the community leaders, and for the LHDA officials. While for the resettled people, survey questionnaires were administered instead, which will be discussed later in this section. However, informal interviews – discussed below – were engaged with both the hosts and the resettled people. Although the same set of questions were posed to both ordinary hosts and the community leaders, there were also other separate questions posed only to chiefs. Some of this set of questions were not pre-designed, but came up during the fieldwork, as interviews and conversations were had with different categories of respondents. For the LHDA officials, there were two different interview guides for senior officers and for junior officers who work in close contact with affected people. In the case of India, there were different interview guides for the hosts, including the community leaders, the SMP officials, as well as respondents from a local activists' organisation. Semi-structured interviews were complemented by other data gathering methods, including informal interviews, which are discussed below.

7.5.1.3 Informal Interviews

The researcher spent a total of three months in the field in each of the specific research regions in Lesotho and India. During this time, informal interviews were engaged as part of the data gathering techniques. Informal interviews may resemble casual conversations, and as Fontein (2014:77) argues, often the line between informal interviews and a normal/casual conversation is blurred. In this research, however, informal conversations were engaged more actively in the context of Lesotho, where there was no language barrier, and the researcher was able to spontaneously engage in conversations which became informative, with the hosts, the resettled people, as well as some LHDA officials. In order to remain within the ethical boundaries of informed concerned – discussed below under ethical considerations – such conversations were had within the context of established casual relationships between the researcher and the respondents, who were fully aware of the intentions of the researcher about the information gathered from the conversations (Fontein, 2014:77). The advantage of informal interviews is that they allow for the gathering of information from respondents in their natural contexts, with little to no inhibitions that may arise from planned interviews. Furthermore, informal interviews allow the researcher to guide conversations towards the themes and issues relevant to the research (Fontein, 2014:78).

7.5.1.4 Participant Observation

The above described informal interviews were undertaken in the context of participant observation, which was undertaken while in the field. Participant observation involves the immersion of the researcher in a social context in which the study is undertaken, over a period of time (Silverman, 2001:47). The advantage of this method is that it allows for the collection of data from observing activities and subjects in their natural environment, while also enabling the researcher to gain greater insights from participating in these activities (Silverman, 1997:15). While in some cases anthropological researchers can spend several years in the field, Bernard asserts that participant observation fieldwork may be done in a few weeks (2017:277). Due to constraints of time and resources in this research, the entire fieldwork could only be undertaken over a three months period in each study context.

Participant observation involves more than just being in the field and observing subjects in their natural environment – which is purely observation, and only a part of participant observation – it is also about playing a role in the activities being undertaken and engaging in conversations with the subjects (Bernard, 2017:276). Due to the fact that participant

observation involves engaging in the activities of informants, Taylor, et al. (2015:59) assert that a researcher must be sensitive to the routine of informants, and their way of doing things. Hence, in this study, the researcher engaged in activities with informants, as dictated by the routine of the subjects.

Bernard distinguishes between two types of participant observation, and in each, the researcher plays one role more than the other, although both roles of observing and participating are engaged (Bernard, 2017:276). The first is the participating observer role, where the researcher observes more, takes notes, engages in conversations to seek clarity, while at the same time participating in the social life of the subjects, but the role observation is emphasised. (ibid.:276). On the other hand, the observing participant role involves more active participation in social activities, while at the same time observing, but the role of participation is emphasised to a greater extent in this context (Bernard, 2017:276).

In this research, the two roles were expressed differently in the two case studies, with one coming out more in one context than the other, and vice versa. In the context of India, the role of participant observer was constrained by the language barrier, and the researcher observed more than participating. Whereas in the case of Lesotho, the observing participant role came out more strongly in the interactions than in the case of India. Nonetheless, the engagement of the participant observation method was instrumental in generating complementary data in the research.

During the three months that were spent doing fieldwork in Lesotho, the first two weeks were spent making logistical preparations for the field; including arranging for places to stay, negotiating access to the field, as well as purchasing the basic items to use during the stay in the field, such as cooking and heating equipment, bathing basins, etc. The next two weeks were spent in the LHDA offices in Mphahle, where the researcher acquired the participating observer role (Bernard, 2017:276); observing the officials in their roles of implementing policy, as well as having casual conversations and conducting planned interviews with them. Although this exercise was undertaken over a short period of time, it enabled the researcher to gain insights into processes of policy implementation, and the challenges encountered in this regard.

The remaining two months were spent doing fieldwork in the villages, with one month spent in Mphahle and the other at Ha-Ratau in the Thaba-Bosiu region. During this time, the researcher lived in the community, where she interacted on a daily basis with both the hosts

and the resettled people. The researcher also participated in social activities, such as *letsema* in one occasion, in which community members gather at each other's homesteads to cooperate in labour-intensive activities. A discussion of the findings will unpack this in greater detail. On this particular occasion, one of the host families had recently harvested beans from their field, and was in need of labour to thresh the beans. The researcher took part in helping the women cook and serve the men, who had been threshing a pile of beans outside. The researcher also took time in between the cooking and dishing out, to observe the men as they threshed dry beans off the pods on the floor with the sticks, and singing traditional Sesotho songs. Conversations between community members and the researcher were also engaged during this event.

On another occasion, the researcher participated in a walking day trip with three other women in the community, visiting the Metolong water project, a two or three hour walk from Ha-Ratau. During this trip, the researcher engaged in insightful conversations with the women, probing and directing discussions towards topics of interest every now and then, in between their other normal conversations unrelated to the research. Household surveys and planned interviews with the resettled people and hosts, in the other two villages – Ha-Makhalanyane and Ha-Mosalla – were undertaken on scheduled days, since these were not the villages in which the researcher lived. Hence, most of the rich qualitative data was gathered at Ha-Ratau in the Thaba-Bosiu region. In the Mohale region, most of the rich qualitative data was gathered at Ha-Mohale, while in addition, household surveys and planned interviews were also undertaken at Ha-Koporala and Ha-Ts'iu in the Mohale region on scheduled days.

Lastly in the case of Lesotho, the researcher participated in neighbourly visits with, especially, groups of women in the resettlement side of the villages at Ha-Ratau and Ha-Mohale, who regularly visited each other in small groups and engaged in casual conversations. The researcher was able to gain insights from engaging in these conversations with the resettled people.

As indicated earlier, in the case of Chandil, the role of participant was not intensively engaged by the researcher. However, the researcher did engage in a few social activities such as Holi at Chilgu, as an outsider and an observer. Holi is an annual Hindu religious festival celebrated every March, where people come together and perform religious rituals and prayers. Although the researcher had a translator at this event, the level of engagement with

the event was relatively low, as, understandably, the translator, who is also Hindu and, therefore, an insider in this regard, was more engaged in the activities.

The researcher also participated in a cooperative meeting – a rehabilitation programme for the resettled people to be discussed later in Chapter Thirteen – with the committee members, as an outsider and an observer. The meeting was held at the Chandil Dam site, where there were other tourist activities in which the researcher also participated. However, although the researcher was in the company of her host who is competent in Hindi, the language used in the meeting, they were not allowed to talk, participate in the conversations, or take notes during the meeting. Hence, not much insight could be gathered from the conversations in the meeting, although some data was gathered from the conversations outside the meeting and from general observations.

7.5.1.5 Focus Group Discussions

Due to the language limitations highlighted in the case of Chandil, more data collection methods were employed to increase the strength of complementary data sources (Baxter and Jack, 2008:544). Because of the concern that in some cases the interviews may have been compromised by translation (Bujra, 2006:175), one more method of data collection was engaged in the Chandil case. The limitation of translation is that in the process of communication, some meaning may have been lost (ibid:175); hence, further data collection techniques were engaged to increase the number of data sources (Bernard, 2017:179). Focus groups discussions (FDGs) were employed in the Chandil case, not only to gather more collective opinions on the effects of resettlement and the outcomes of policy implementation, but also to supplement data from the individual interviews (Fielding, 1993:141). FDGs involve bringing together a small group of people into a semi-formal or informal conversation about a particular theme or issues (Bernard, 2017:179; Wilkinson, 2004:177).

Group discussions were conducted with groups of resettled people in three of the villages studied in the Chandil area – Chilgu, Sukhsari and Gangudih. In Chotalakha, no more than two respondents committed to attending the group discussion, hence the discussion was cancelled. Additionally, a group discussion was held with five representatives of the cooperative committee at the Chandil Dam site. Group discussions with resettled people provided insights into the consequences of resettlement imposed on communities as a collective, such as lost common property resources, which, as the findings will show, are not sufficiently available in the host areas. Insights were also gained regarding the establishment

of social or community networks in the new areas. From a group discussion with the cooperative committee, the data that was gathered informed the research on the economic activities in the dam area, how they are administered, as well as their effectiveness in providing livelihood re-establishment for the affected people.

7.5.1.6 Oral Histories

Oral histories are instrumental in facilitating the recollection and understanding of historical accounts, which may provide insights into the experiences of the subjects and their response to their current environment (Nueman, 2000:372). Oral histories were incorporated into the interviews and informal conversations, where respondents were asked descriptive, open-ended questions about historical occurrences (ibid.:372). These included certain aspects of their life before resettlement, how resettlement planning was undertaken leading up to the move, and how they transitioned into the new areas during the early days. This allowed respondents to recall and narrate historical accounts, describing how they understood their past (Nueman, 2000:372). This helped the researcher understand how the behaviour of resettled people, and their response to forced resettlement and its consequences, may have been influenced by their past and how they understood it. Additionally, in informal conversations, oral histories came out spontaneously, where, in answering particular questions or talking about certain issues, respondents would narrate historical accounts, of which they were reminded through the conversation or questions.

However, because oral histories are based on subjective recollection of events by respondents, not only after a long period has passed, but also being influenced by current experiences, the accuracy of information may be compromised. Neuman argues that in narrating historical accounts, respondents may “reconstruct or add present interpretations” to their story (2000:372). Nevertheless, Neuman (2000:372) asserts that the accuracy of the details in the story is less significant than the story itself. Hence, for example, when respondents recounted their food sufficiency prior to resettlement when they still owned land, the exact details of how many bags of grain they used to harvest was immaterial. The significant part of the story was, for instance, whether or not they ever needed to buy grain or mealie meal from the store, and if or how that changed after resettlement.

7.5.1.7 Household Surveys

As noted earlier, the household level surveys were undertaken to gather more quantitative data, to understand the statistical impact of resettlement, as well as to map outcomes in the studied cases. These were conducted among resettled people in both the Lesotho and India cases. Survey questions were meant to cultivate an understanding of the economic conditions of affected families. The questions were designed to gather data on: households' demographic profiles; individual households' assets lost to resettlement, and those regained after resettlement; the compensation they received for their lost assets and livelihoods; as well as the kinds of choices they had in resettlement processes. Different survey instruments were used in the two cases, depending on the content of the applied resettlement policies. However, the instruments were designed in a manner that allowed for comparison on policy implementation in the two case studies.

Households' demographic characteristics provided insights on the economic context of the families, and included aspects related to family members' occupation, educational qualifications, family size, etc. The questions on assets lost and those regained were meant to shed some light on the economic losses experienced by the families due to resettlement. The questions on compensation provided to the affected families and the types of compensation given – whether cash or assets – were aimed at understanding the responsibility taken by the implementing agencies for the losses suffered by affected people, and the ability of the affected families to recover from those losses in this regard. The questions on the kinds of choices that resettled households had in resettlement processes provided insights on how those households were affected by resettlement processes, and how that influenced the way in which they experienced the consequences of resettlement.

Due to the limitations of quantitative methods to provide a comprehensive understanding of social dynamics (Silverman, 2001:29), the earlier discussed qualitative methods were engaged to better understand the socio-cultural effects of forced resettlement, and the impact of policies in this regard. However, some questions in the survey were related to social and community ties, aimed at identifying social networks and the level of access to common spaces and resources. Nonetheless, the logic and strengths of using both qualitative and quantitative methods notwithstanding, it also contributed to some of the limitations of the study, as will be shown in the section on the limitations of the study.

The survey questionnaires

The surveys were undertaken through the use of questionnaires in each of the two case studies administered by the researcher. The questionnaires in both cases consisted of structured questions, which means the same set of questions were asked to all participating respondents. The questionnaires consisted of a combination of closed-ended and open-ended questions. Closed-ended questions were pre-coded, and entailed a set of options from which respondents could choose a response most applicable to them (Bernard, 1995:268; 2017:195; Newell, 1993:101). Open-ended questions were those that enabled respondents to provide an explanation of their choice in the previous closed-ended question, or to give their opinions (Bernard, 1995:268; Bernard, 2017:195; Newell, 1993:102). However, because the aim of the survey was to map out the outcomes of policies, most of the questions were closed-ended, to enable a more efficient identification of trends or variations for easier comparison (Neuman, 2006:287). This was also instrumental in the data analysis process, as later discussions on data analysis will show.

7.5.2 Samples and Sampling Methods

Both probability and non-probability sampling methods were engaged in this study, for the selection of respondents in different categories, and when using different methods of data collection. In the engagement of qualitative data gathering methods, a purposive or judgemental non-probability sampling technique was adopted (Bernard, 1995:73; Neuman, 2000:198; 2006:222). A purposive sampling method is applicable in exploratory or ethnographic research, both of which aspects represent this study (Neuman, 2000:198; 2006:222). This technique involves selection based on the purpose of the study, and the researcher's knowledge of specific attributes about the targeted participants (Babbie and Mouton, 2001:166; Neuman, 2000:198; 2006:222).

In this research, respondents were selected based on their characteristics or roles as the resettled people, the hosts, the SMP or LHDA officials responsible for policy implementation, or community leaders. The community leaders, who were the first point of contact into the villages, were instrumental in assisting the researcher to identify resettled households, particularly in the case of Chandil. In the Mohale case, identifying resettled households was much easier because the houses are identical, and in most cases they are situated in one area. Additionally, for the purpose of comparing landed hosts with landless resettlers, landed hosts were selected for further interviews and informal conversations in

both case studies, once they had been identified by the researcher through interactions with community members. In Chotalakha, in India, 11 host community members who hold land temporarily through leased state land, were interviewed individually, to understand the dynamics of leasing agricultural land from the government by landless people, the details of which will come out in the discussion of the findings in Chapter Thirteen.

For the selection of resettled households for participation in the survey, a simple random method of probability sampling was engaged in the case of India (Babbie and Mouton, 2001:189-190; Bernard, 1995:73). A list of resettled households was obtained from the SMP official documents, and was used to randomly select the sample, ensuring that the sample was representative of specific attributes relevant to the research. Because the purpose of the research was to explore the impact of resettlement policies, and because of the distinct feature in the Chandil Dam resettlement where households were resettled over a period of time during which the applied policy documents had been changing, representation in this case was based on, among other aspects, the period in which the households were resettled.

The broad periods of resettlement were: i) 1985 to 1990, during which resettled people were moved on the basis of the LAA of 1894, in the absence of a national resettlement policy (SMP, 2016) – later discussions in Chapter Thirteen will outline in greater detail the issues and timelines of policy development in the Jharkhand State of India. ii) From 1990 to 2003, when resettled people were moved in the context of the first version of the Jharkhand State (formerly Bihar) resettlement policy. iii) 2003 to 2009, when people were moved in the context of revised versions of the Jharkhand State policy, the latest version being informed by the Indian national policy of resettlement (SMP, 2016). Hence, the sample was selected in such a way that it was representative of people resettled during these three time periods, to understand the effects of policy on resettlement and how policy implementation has been changing over time.

However, one of the limitations was that households resettled during each period were scattered across the resettlement region, hence it was difficult to locate them in order of the period they were resettled. The bulk of the resettled people, 48% of the total affected households, were resettled during the first phase, 27% were resettled during the second phase, while 25% were resettled during the third, and final phase (SMP, 2016). In the studied cases in the four villages, 46% of respondents were resettled during the first period, 44% were resettled during the second period, while 10% were resettled during the third period. Twenty

households in each of the 4 selected villages were surveyed, with the heads of the households, or their representatives in the absence of the family heads, were interviewed. Thus, a total of 80 respondents were interviewed in the household survey, from the four villages – Chotalakha, Sukhsari, Chilgu and Gangudih.

In the case of Lesotho, however, where the number of people who were resettled was smaller, all the resettled people who could be reached by the researcher at the time of fieldwork, in the six studied villages – three in the Mohale region and three in the Thaba-Bosiu region – were surveyed. As the discussions in Chapter Nine on the findings will show, some of the resettled people migrated from their initial resettlement areas in search of employment opportunities elsewhere, while others had passed on. For example, of the 34 households that were initially resettled to Ha-Ratau as reflected in the LHDA official documents, only 18 still had members living in the area fulltime, while other houses were vacant, some temporarily, and at least two permanently due to death. A total of 40 respondents from 40 households were thus interviewed in the household survey in the case of Lesotho.

For focus group discussions in the case of Chandil, a total of 31 participants took part in four different categories. Five members of the cooperative committee, all men, participated in the group discussion held at the dam site. Nine resettled people, five of whom were men and four women in Chilgu, participated in a group discussion held at their village. Eleven resettled people, seven of whom were women and four men, participated in a group discussion held at Gangudih, while six participants, three women and three men, took part in a discussion held at Sukhsari. These were all selected using a purposive method of sampling. In the case of the resettled people, all participants had been interviewed during the household survey, and were then subsequently asked to participate in the group discussions. The cooperative members had earlier interacted with the researcher twice before the group discussions, during the visits that the researcher paid to the dam site, where the cooperative economic activities take place. During these initial interactions, in which some committee members were interviewed individually, members were asked to participate in the group discussion at a later stage.

In addition, six LHDA officials were interviewed in the case of Mohale, and two SMP officials were interviewed in the case of Chandil. Also interviewed were community leaders as indicated above. In relation to the Mohale resettlement, four chiefs from Ha-Ts'iu, Ha-Mohale and Ha-Koporala in the Mohale region, as well as Ha-Ratau in the Thaba-Bosiu region, formed part of the interviewees. In relation to the Chandil resettlement, four

community leaders (or their representatives) were interviewed in the four studied villages. Ten and eleven hosts were interviewed in the Mohale and Chandil cases respectively. Lastly, a representative of a civil society organisation in the case of Chandil was interviewed. All the interviewees in these various groups were selected through a purposive sampling method.

7.5.3 Gaining access to the field site

Gaining access to a field site is a negotiated process throughout the fieldwork process. Although certain key players may be instrumental in facilitating access to the research site, the responsibility of negotiating access to respondents lies with the researcher (Neuman, 2000:353). Key players, or “gatekeepers” as Neuman (2000:352) refers to, are those who have some influence or authority, whether formal or informal, in facilitating access to the field. This could be community leaders, or other influential personalities in the area.

In the case of Chandil, India, the researcher capitalised on a pre-existing working relationship between the research supervisor at Rhodes University, Professor Chris De Wet, and a Professor at the Xavier School of Management in India, Professor Tata Raghu Ram, who was the host and supervisor during fieldwork in India. Professor Ram facilitated a meeting for the researcher with one representative of the activist organisation, which has been influential in resettlement processes, including in policy development in the Jharkhand State. This representative, who may be considered as a “gatekeeper”, through his own influence, was able to arrange for a meeting with some groups of resettlers who are part of the cooperative – a rehabilitation programme which will be discussed later in Chapter Thirteen. Access to other respondents within the studied individual households was facilitated by the heads of the respective villages, who were the first point of contact into the villages.

In the case of Lesotho, access to the field was also through “gatekeepers” – the local chiefs – who are the heads of the villages. The chiefs were the first point of contact into the communities in which the fieldwork was undertaken. This is also a cultural practice with which the researcher was well familiar. However, although the village heads initially facilitated access to the households in both the Lesotho and Indian cases, continuous access to respondents was negotiated by the researcher on a continuous basis through, among other means, the assurance of ethical representation of the information provided (Neuman, 2000:353-354). Ethical concerns will be discussed later in this chapter.

7.6 Data Analysis

Data was extracted from field notes, interview recordings, images/photos, documents and household survey questionnaires. Qualitative data was analysed by reading and listening to the interviews and noting down themes, anecdotes, as well as statements relevant to the objectives of the study (Bernard, 1995:363; Fielding, 1993:228; Neuman, 2004:460). Quantitative data from the survey questionnaires was analysed through a computer spreadsheet. The process of analysing both qualitative and quantitative data is described below.

7.6.1 Qualitative Data Analysis

Data from field notes, recordings and documents was analysed continuously throughout the fieldwork. Data collected from interviews and conversations with respondents was checked on a regular basis for consistencies or inconsistencies, and against policy provisions (Bernard, 1995:361). Where variations were noted, further interviews or conversations were arranged to seek clarity. Data was organised by theme based on the objectives of the study (Bernard, 1995:363; Fielding, 1993:228; Neuman, 2004:460). Once qualitative data had been organised by theme, it was then interpreted against the selected theoretical frameworks, deriving meanings and developing arguments based on the theories, the literature and the policies relevant to the study objectives (Bernard, 1995:365; Neuman, 2000:420). Lastly, selected quotes and stories from respondents were included in the discussion of the findings, to illustrate and support arguments and analysis. Images captured during the fieldwork were also included in the discussions for the purpose of illustration.

7.6.2 Quantitative Data Analysis

Quantitative data was analysed using an Excel spreadsheet. Data collected from the surveys was entered into the spreadsheet, with the variables entered horizontally or on the x-axis, and the studied cases (household information) entered vertically or on the y-axis (Fielding, 1993:220; Neuman, 2004:344). Thus, the values for each case were marked by a combination of a letter on the x-axis and a digit on the y-axis (Fielding, 1993:220). The frequencies, which indicate the sum of a particular attribute for all cases, were then entered at the end of each variable along the x-axis (Neuman, 2004:349). To incorporate triangulation in the analysis of the data, both sets of data – qualitative and quantitative – are presented concurrently in a complementary manner in the research findings, discussed in Chapters Nine and Ten for the Lesotho case, and Thirteen and Fourteen for the Indian case.

7.7 Ethical Considerations

To ensure the protection of the privacy of the information that was gathered in this study, and to accord respect to the subjects whose lives were under investigation, certain ethical considerations were taken into account during the course of the fieldwork and in presenting the findings (Anthropology Southern Africa, 2005; Ryen, 2016:32).

Integrity: In presenting the findings, the researcher was continuously mindful of maintaining the integrity of the information, ensuring that the generated information is presented as fairly as possible. Qualitative studies are underpinned by first-hand knowledge created through engaged interactions with the subjects, where the researcher taps into “personal insights...and human perspectives” to fully understand the subject matter under investigation (Neuman, 2006:152-153). However, this does not mean subjecting the data to selective, prejudiced interpretation based on unfounded personal opinions, but that data is interpreted with utmost integrity and sensitivity to the subjects and the information (ibid.:152-153). Hence, in interacting with the participants and in dealing with the generated data, the researcher maintained sensitivity, honesty and integrity as much as possible.

Informed consent: This involves full disclosure to the subjects, in ways meaningful and understandable to them, the purpose of the research, and how the generated information will be used and disseminated (Anthropology Southern Africa, 2005:142; Berg and Lune, 2004:87; Hornsby-Smith, 1993:63; Ryen, 2016:32). Furthermore, potential participants must be afforded an opportunity to decide whether or not they wish to participate in the study, at their own discretion and terms. Moreover, consent entails a process of ongoing negotiation, and the recognition that participants are at liberty to withdraw from the study, should they change their minds or feel that their terms are not adhered to (Hornsby-Smith, 1993:63; Ryen, 2016:32).

The purpose of the study was explained to all participants at the beginning of interactions, in a language they speak and fully understand – Sesotho in the case of Lesotho and Hindi in the case of India. However, because the researcher does not speak nor understand the Hindi language, the onus to explain the purpose to participants in the case of India was entrusted on the interpreter. Furthermore, all participants were asked to participate in the study voluntarily, and were made aware that the decision to participate was theirs to make, and that declining was an available option for them. In negotiating access to the field site with the “gatekeepers”, the researcher made known the intentions of the study, and the kinds of

information that would be generated from the interactions and conversations with different groups of respondents, as well as how the information would be used.

No harm: While all participants were involved in the study voluntarily, the researcher was still bound by the ethical requirement to cause no harm to participants (Anthropology Southern Africa, 2005:142; Babbie and Mouton, 2001:522; Society for Applied Anthropology, 1983). Hence, the researcher was constantly conscious about not imposing any form of harm on participants, whether emotional, social, psychological or otherwise. This included not disclosing information that could humiliate or endanger people's lives to others, or in the findings of the thesis (Babbie and Mouton, 2001:522).

Confidentiality: All collected data was used for the purpose of this research, and all respondents were made aware that they are at liberty to disclose certain information off record, which would not be included in the thesis. Because this research engaged qualitative methods – alongside quantitative methods – which means that in some cases data was collected from identifiable respondents, anonymity could not always be ensured, but the researcher ensured that no respondent's identity attached to certain information was disclosed, whether to others or in the thesis (Anthropology Southern Africa, 2005:142; Berg and Lune, 2004:91; Neuman, 2000:376).

7.8 Limitations of the Study

The first and fundamental limitation of this study was the language barrier in the case of Chandil, because the researcher does not speak nor understand Hindi, the local language spoken in the study area. Hence, in this case, some of the data collected may have been compromised by the language barrier, where meanings could have been lost in translation (Bujra, 2006:175). However, one more method of data gathering – FGDs – was engaged in the case of Chandil, increasing the sources of data.

Second, because the study was mainly qualitative, the quantitative survey was allocated less time than qualitative data gathering. As a result, the sample in the survey in the case of Chandil was rather small, in relation to the total number of households resettled. However, despite the small sample, some valuable information was generated from the survey and important findings were made from the use of this method. Nevertheless, the strength of this research is in its extensive qualitative analysis, as opposed to the quantitative analysis, which was mainly employed to complement qualitative methods.

Third, one of the limitations of the study was that the households resettled in the Chandil case during each of the three periods mentioned earlier, were scattered across the resettlement region; hence it was difficult to locate some of them according to the period they were resettled. Furthermore, some of the households could not be located from the SMP documents, because they were offered cash compensation instead of having a homestead constructed for them, and had to arrange their own living arrangements independently. The discussion of findings will unpack this in greater detail.

Lastly, another limitation of the study was the limited fieldwork period due to time and financial resource constraints. As indicated earlier, only three months in each study area was spent by the researcher in the field, including making arrangements for the field. However, because the researcher was conscious of the time limitation in the field, time allocated for fieldwork was utilised efficiently and rigorously. Despite all the noted limitations, the study has generated valuable information relevant to the objectives of the research.

7.9 Conclusion

This research aims to explore the impact of resettlement policies on resettlement processes and outcomes. As such, it is underpinned by theoretical frameworks that inform the study on the typical or inherent consequences of forced resettlement observed from a wide range of contexts and over a long period of time. Based on this theoretical knowledge, the study then seeks to understand how policies have been effective in mitigating these effects, and what challenges arose, as well as how they were dealt with. The strength of the study is in comparing two very different contexts with rich, complementary aspects; one with the longstanding experience in forced resettlement and national resettlement policy development, and the other with one of the largest dam projects undertaken in the absence of a national resettlement policy, although with an important LHDA resettlement policy, influenced by World Bank policy. These features have been instrumental in the comparison of the two different settings of the study.

Additionally, another strength of the study is in its engagement of not only multiple theoretical frameworks that inform the study itself, but also of complementary research methods that informed how the research was undertaken. The use of both qualitative and quantitative methods has enabled the incorporation of triangulation, facilitating the creation and acquisition of knowledge from multiple perspectives. This has also complemented the

small sample of the survey in the case of Chandil. Although the sample size was smaller in the case of Mohale, it was not in the same proportion as the Chandil case, as the total number of resettled people was much smaller in the Mohale case. The research was also undertaken in consideration of the ethics of the research process, which adds to the strength of the study. Despite the limitations noted above, the different aspects that define the strengths of the study have retained its integrity and that of its outcomes, and ensured that the findings are not compromised by the weaknesses which were difficult to avoid.

8 Chapter Eight: The Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP)

8.1 Introduction

The main goal of this thesis is to explore the impact of resettlement policies on resettlement processes and outcomes. As indicated in Chapter Seven, the study explores two cases of dam-related resettlement, one of which is the Mohale Dam project of the LHWP. The next chapter will discuss the implementation of a specific resettlement policy in the Mohale Dam resettlement, and how that influenced resettlement processes and the outcomes experienced by people affected on the ground. This chapter presents an overview of the LHWP, as well as the context in which it is implemented. The chapter will also outline a brief profile of the people affected and/or resettled on account of the Mohale Dam construction, for these are the people on whom the consequences of forced resettlement were imposed, and who experienced its outcomes.

8.2 An Overview of the LHWP

The Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) is a multi-phased water project co-owned by the governments of Lesotho and South Africa. Established in 1986, the project is aimed at providing cheaper water to South Africa's economic hub – the Gauteng province – in which the biggest city and the administrative capital of the country are situated, as well as to provide hydro-electric power to Lesotho (LHDA, 2017a; 2017b). The project was designed to provide water to South Africa through a series of five dams built in Lesotho, two of which have been completed, the Katse and Mohale dams, and the construction of the third – Polihali Dam – is currently under way (LHDA, 2017b). The provision of hydro-electric power to Lesotho would be undertaken through a power plant built in 'Muela Lesotho, aimed at reducing Lesotho's dependence on power supplied by the South Africa-based power utility, Eskom.

For Lesotho, this project has become an important means of generating revenue, through annual royalties paid by the government of South Africa, according to an agreement entered into by the two countries in 1986. The agreement stipulates that South Africa would bear the full costs of water transfer borne on both sides of the border between the two countries (Trans Caledon Tunnel Authority, 2013). Additionally, South Africa would pay royalties to Lesotho on an annual basis, the sum of which was estimated to be over 7.5 billion Maloti in January 2017, calculated from January 1998 (LHDA, 2013; 2017a). Loti (plural - Maloti) is the Lesotho currency and is equivalent to the South African Rand. These royalties from South

Africa are estimated to contribute 14% of the Lesotho government's revenue and 5% of the country's GDP (Manwa, 2014:640).

The two countries both have implementing authorities – the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority (LHDA) and the Trans Caledon Tunnel Authority (TCTA) – responsible for executing the project's operations in each of the two countries (LHDA, 2014). As may be expected, the construction of the dams and other operational infrastructure would see the displacement and resettlement of people who live in the relevant localities, affecting different aspects of their socio-economic, cultural and environmental settings. The two countries are, therefore, responsible for ensuring that the lives of affected people are maintained to a standard not inferior to that obtaining prior to resettlement (LHDA, 1997: Section 3.1). The financial costs of resettlement and rehabilitation are borne mainly by the South African government, and the LHDA is responsible for the overall implementation of resettlement, as the affected people are based in Lesotho, where the construction of the dams and related infrastructure takes place (LHDA, 2017b).

When the LHWP was planned in 1986, it was designed to be implemented in four phases, Phase 1 of which was in two parts and has been completed. Phase 1A entailed the Katse Dam in the Thaba-Tseka District, which stores water diverted from the Senqu/Orange River, and transferred to South Africa's Gauteng Province. The Senqu River flows through four countries in Southern Africa, originating in Thaba-Putsoa in the highlands of Lesotho, flowing through South Africa and Botswana, and finally to Namibia where it meets the Atlantic Ocean. The other part of Phase 1A consists of the 'Muela Hydro-electric power plant in the Leribe District of Lesotho, for the supply of electricity to Lesotho. Phase 1B comprised the Mohale Dam and its associated tunnels in the mountainous part of the Maseru District, to feed water into the Katse Dam. The Mohale Dam resettlement forms one of the two case studies of this thesis. Phase 2, which is currently underway since 2011 and is anticipated to be completed in 2024, includes the construction of the Polihali Dam in the Mokhotlong District, and is also aimed at supplying water to the Katse Dam for transfer to South Africa, as well as power generation for Lesotho (LHDA, 2017b). Phases 3 and 4, consisting of the Tsoelike and Ntoahae dams respectively, will be implemented subject to the agreement of the two countries (Ramaili, 2006:65).

The history of the LHWP began in the mid-1950s, when the South African government, through its Department of Works, engaged an engineer, Ninham Shand, to determine the

feasibility of importing water from Lesotho to areas in South Africa, mainly the then Orange Free State goldfields (Meissner and Turton, 2003:118; Thabane, 2000:633). In 1956, Shand released a report outlining a plan to divert water from the Orange River in Lesotho to the Orange Free State goldfields in South Africa, under what was then known as the Oxbow Scheme (Meissner and Turton, 2003:118; Thabane, 2000:633). The Oxbow Scheme, with similar characteristics to the LHWP, would also contribute to infrastructure development in Lesotho, and the production of hydro-electric power for both Lesotho and South Africa (Meissner and Turton, 2003:118). At the time, the demand for electricity was much lower in Lesotho, and it was believed that the scheme could produce sufficient power for both countries (ibid:118).

As more investigations were done, it became clear that the water from Lesotho would not be sufficient for the growing demand in South Africa, and that South Africa could not depend on Lesotho alone for the supply of water and electricity (Meissner and Turton, 2003:118). Not only did the Free State goldfields need augmented water supply, but so also did the Vaal area, which has today become an industrialised area comprising Vereeniging, Vanderbijlpark and Sasolburg (ibid.:118). This, therefore, meant that alternative means of water supply had to be sought. However, the possibility of advancing the Oxbow Scheme was left open, even though South Africa did not make a commitment at the time, while exploring alternatives (Meissner and Turton, 2003:118).

The more viable alternative was to pump water from the Orange River within the South African territory into the Vaal Dam, through a network of pipelines that would enable the supply of water to some of its areas, without Lesotho's participation (Mirumachi, 2007:560). Needless to say, South Africa had some reservations towards being dependent on another country for its water supply, and the growing political tensions between the two countries at the time did less than motivate South Africa to pursue the water project with Lesotho (Klaphake and Scheumann, 2006:11; Mwangi, 2007:7).

However, in the end it became clear that it would be more costly for South Africa to pump water from the Orange River into the Vaal Dam – the evidence showing that sourcing water from Lesotho would cost 44% less – hence, the Oxbow Scheme was a more favourable alternative for South Africa (Boadu, 1998:397; LHDA, 2017a). On the other hand, Lesotho needed the project to continue in order to benefit from the revenue it would generate. At the dawn of Lesotho's independence in 1966, the first democratically elected Prime Minister,

Leabua Jonathan, indicated that the Oxbow Scheme was one of his top priority development areas, which, if implemented, would see “Lesotho’s budget showing a positive balance for the first time” (Meissner and Turton, 2003:119). Thus, the implementation of the project was perceived by the authorities to be in the interest of both countries.

It was not until the early 1970s that negotiations between Lesotho and South Africa commenced, with regard to what is now known as the LHWP (Meissner and Turton, 2003:118; Tilt et al., 2009:3). At this time, the focus had shifted from water supply into the Orange Free State to what is now known as the Gauteng province. These early negotiations were further delayed over disagreements on the control of water flows into South Africa (Mwangi, 2007:8). The then Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan held the position that Lesotho should have full control over the flow of water, which included controlling the amount of water transferred to South Africa, and that at any given time, upon the discretion of Lesotho, the flow of water from Lesotho to South Africa could be stopped by Lesotho (ibid.:8). This was a position opposed by the government of South Africa, which was of the view that the two countries must have equal control of the water flow (Mwangi, 2007:8).

Parallel to these intergovernmental disagreements on a project which was considered to be mutually beneficial, there was looming political instability in Lesotho, which later led to a coup d’état in 1986. The coup d’état was followed by years of military regime between 1986 to 1990, led by the then military commander Major General Metsing Lekhanya (Gill, 1993:240). In this context, analysts argue that the then South African apartheid government, which had had disagreements with the overthrown Prime Minister Leabua, took advantage of the political instability in Lesotho, to convince the then military commander to sign the water project deal in a “rushed” negotiation in October 1986 (Mwangi, 2007:8; Thabane, 2000:634). Some critics, potentially controversially, assert that the signing of the water deal was likely the main motivation for the advancement of the coup d’état by the then military commander, in collaboration with the South African apartheid government (Mwangi, 2007:8; Thabane, 2000:634).

In the end, the treaty which was signed in 1986, stipulates that both countries will equally have control over the flow of water, through a dual control device which allows the flow to be mutually controlled by two devices, each of which would be in the possession of the two countries (LHDA, 1986). Furthermore, it was agreed that South Africa would be responsible for water transfer costs, and Lesotho would be responsible for the costs of the hydro-electric

power component, which generates electricity for its own citizens (LHDA, 2013; Matete and Hassan, 2006:248). In addition, the two countries would share the cost of resettlement, although South Africa currently incurs between 80-90% of the resettlement costs (LHDA, 2013). As indicated earlier, in its present form, the project has been designed to be implemented in four phases (LHDA, 2017a). The pictures below depict the two completed dams, the Katse and Mohale Dams.



Figure 8.1 The Katse Dam, in Thaba-Tseka, Lesotho.

Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Katse_Dam-001.jpg



Figure 8.2 The Mohale Dam, in Maseru, Lesotho.

Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Mohale_Dam-001.jpg

8.3 The Context: A Short History of Lesotho

As indicated earlier, this research's focus is on resettlement that took place in Phase 1B of the LHWP. The Mohale region is in a mountainous area, also known as the highlands of Lesotho or Maloti. Until the late nineteenth century, these mountainous areas were not occupied for residential purposes. The then chief of the Bakoteli lineage Moshoeshe I who later founded the present-day Basotho nation, leading to the Bakoteli/Bakuena becoming the traditional ruling lineage to date, preferred that the area be preserved for pasture of their livestock (Gill, 1993:71; Thabane, 2000:636). Having moved from Botha-Bothe with his brother Mohale in the early nineteenth century, in search of defensive mountainous areas after attacks by the Batlokoa from present day Harrismith, Moshoeshe settled with his people in Thaba-Bosiu, in the present-day Maseru district (Gill, 1993:68; Thabane, 1974:282).

Due to the mid-nineteenth century wars between Basotho and the Boers, Basotho were driven further away from their land into the interior, forcing them to move about looking for more arable land (Thabane, 1974:282). As a result of this loss of land, coupled with deteriorating land fertility in the lowlands, more Basotho were forced further up to the mountainous regions (Gill, 1993:178; Murray, 1981:22; Thabane, 2000:637). During this migratory wave, Mohale, son of Seqobela of the Bakoteli lineage, settled along the Senqunyane River on land which, due to its proximity to the river, was more fertile (Thabane, 2000:637). This is the land which, to date, is known as the Mohale area.

As more people heard of this place, particularly those who, at the time inhabited the southern part of the country – Mafeteng, Mohale's Hoek and Quthing – known to-date as the driest region in the country, they began to make their way to Mohale and other mountainous areas, where they would settle and cultivate the land for crop production (Thabane, 2000:637). The region was also favourable for livestock keeping, and it became a home for many Basotho who were pastoralists and land cultivators (Ferguson, 1990:26).

By the turn of the 1920s, the lowlands of Lesotho (referred to as Basutoland prior to its independence in 1966) began to experience the first signs of low crop production due to soil erosion and environmental degradation (Gill, 1993:178). However, the highlands remained fertile and highly productive, enabling farmers in the Maloti areas to produce enough to have surplus to sell to the lowlanders (ibid.:178). Prior to the 1920s, Lesotho had been food secure to the point of being able to produce surpluses as cash crops for the South African market in the late 1800s to the early 1900s (Ferguson, 1990:27). According to Ketso (1991:247), in the

1800s, Lesotho supplied thousands of bags of grain annually, estimated at 100,000 bags in the year 1873, to the South African market. Additionally, Lesotho was also an exporter of wool and mohair to South Africa in the late 1800s to the early 1900s (Ferguson, 1990:27; Ketso, 1991:247), a practice which continues to date in the highlands of the country, albeit only a small fraction of the population still exports these products. As asserted by Murray, in the early twentieth century, wool and mohair were “by far the most important exports” from Lesotho (1981:14).

The historic pattern of grain exports was, however, short-lived, with declining soil fertility in Lesotho, which saw a decrease in agricultural production, coupled with competition from Australian and American grain exports, which was significantly inhibiting to Basotho farmers (Gill, 1993:178; Ketso, 1991:247). The decline in agricultural production propelled labour migration to the South African mines, which had begun in the late 1800s, but increased steadily in the early twentieth century (Ferguson, 1990:27; Ketso, 1991:247; Stichter, in Mochebelele and Winter-Nelson, 2000:145). According to Murray, labour migration of Basotho men to South Africa started in the early 1870s, shortly after King Moshoeshoe I died, and the number of Basotho immigrants continued to rise for about a century until the early 1970s (1981:22). The introduction of South Africa’s labour policy, which prescribed the reduction of foreign labour supply in the mid-1970s, saw many Basotho men losing their jobs, and even less joining the labour force in South Africa (Ketso, 1991:249-250).

While many Basotho men were retained in the South African mines, for some families agriculture was still the main source of livelihood, which defined in many ways, the “self-sufficiency” of the people of Lesotho (Gustafsson and Makonnen, 1993:51). Statistics show that in the 1980s, about 60% of the male labour force in Lesotho were migrant labourers in South African mines, although other statistics show that in the 1970s, about 45% of Basotho men were engaged in labour in South Africa, not only in the mines but also in farms and other industries (Thahane, 1974:286). The point of consensus, however, is that labour migration from Lesotho, particularly to South African mines, has been declining, such that only 17% of Basotho men were reported to be employed in the South African mining industry in 2006 (Crush, et al., 2010:12).

In this context, for most households in rural areas, including the Mohale region, agricultural production remained a significant source of livelihood (LHDA, 1995d: Section 2.1; Safilios-Rothschild, 1985:303). According to Safilios-Rothschild (1985:303), only about 30% to 35%

of rural households had access to remittances, which supplemented agricultural production in the 1980s. These numbers dropped in the context of declining labour migration, although for some families, both remittances and agriculture formed their means of livelihood (Ketso, 1991:250). Thus, where agricultural production required financial input, remittances were used to facilitate agricultural production.

In other areas, however, particularly in the Maloti mountains, agricultural production required little to no financial input, as the next section will show. The Mohale region, from where the people were resettled due to the construction of the Mohale Dam, had some of the most arable land in the country (LHDA, 1995d: Section 2.1; Thabane, 2000:638). Land cultivation in this context required little to no financial input, as costly inputs such as fertilisers were not essential, and seed was reserved from the previous season's produce (Thabane, 2000:638). In one of its feasibility study reports, the LHDA indicated that the inundated area in the Mohale region had some of the best soil in the region (LHDA, 1995d: Section 2.1).

8.4 A Profile of the Resettled Mohale Inhabitants: Before the Move

At the time when the construction of the Mohale Dam and its associated resettlement were implemented, the pattern of livelihoods in these mountainous areas continued to follow that of crop production and livestock keeping, as the main sources of livelihood for the majority (LHDA, 1995d: Section 2.1). While writers such as Ferguson (1990), Gustafsson and Makonnen (1993) and Murray (1981) emphasise that labour migration has been the main source of income and has played a significant economic role in Lesotho – an argument which cannot be disputed – it is also true that, until recently, agriculture and livestock remained core sources of livelihood for many people in the Maloti areas including those in Mohale, as will be seen in the next chapter (LHDA, 1995d). Notably in Mohale, in addition to the major crops – maize, sorghum, wheat, beans and peas – which were grown mainly for consumption, *cannabis* was a common cash crop that many people in the region subsisted on, and it played an important economic role for those people (Devitt and Hitchcock, 2010:66; LHDA, 1995d:9; Thabane, 2000:639). A study conducted by Sets'abi and Mashinini (2006:121) among the people resettled by the Mohale Dam, shows that at least one in three households indicated that *cannabis* was their major source of income prior to resettlement.

Furthermore, due to the fertility of the soil in the region, land cultivation was much less costly in comparison with other areas in the country (Thabane, 2000:638). The findings in the next chapter will confirm this claim. According to Devitt and Hitchcock (2010:66), the

fertility of the land in the Mohale region “encouraged a degree of food self-sufficiency unusual in Lesotho”. As Thabane (2000:638) asserts, the arrangement of settlements in relation to arable land in this region was conducive for sustaining land fertility.

“Homesteads and kraals were located on higher-lying stony ground where crop production would have been difficult, while fields were located on flatter, low-lying ground. As one resident put it, this made it possible for animal manure, ash and other manure generated by households to be washed down to the fields when rains fell” (Thabane 2000:639).

Added to this was the proximity of fields to the river banks, which ensured sufficient retention of moisture, necessary for crop production (Thabane 2000:638).

Another significant aspect which sustained livelihoods in the Mohale region, was livestock keeping. According to the 1993 Phase 1B census report of the LHDA, and also as indicated in the Phase 1B feasibility study report on agriculture, 75% of households affected by the Mohale dam construction owned cattle, of which the average number was 7 per household; 46% owned sheep, with an average of 31 per household; 43% owned goats with an average flock size of 18 per household, and most families had at least 1 horse and/or a donkey (Tshabalala, 1993; LHDA, 1995d). For many rural dwellers in Lesotho, livestock keeping has both economic and socio-cultural significance (LHDA, 1995d: Section 5.4; Khoabane and Black, 2009:3).

Cattle were used for multiple purposes, including household consumption and by-products such as milk, cow dung which was used as a source of fuel and garden or field manure, and cattle were also used for ploughing (LHDA, 1995d: Section 5.4; Khoabane and Black, 2009:4; Turkon, 2003:148). As a long-term economic investment, cattle were sold on rare occasions, to pay for major expenses such as children’s education, or in cases of emergency such as paying for funeral expenses (Ferguson, 1992:63; Khoabane and Black, 2009:5; Turkon, 2003:148).

Culturally, cattle are used in the payment of the bridewealth or *bohali* as it is known in Sesotho (Ferguson, 1992:67; Turkon, 2003:148). The significance of bridewealth in Sesotho culture does not consist merely in the exchange of cattle for a wife, but the social arrangement which includes the joining together of two families – the bride’s and the groom’s – as well as the social agreement regarding the family name which the children born from the marriage will take – the groom’s family name. In addition, the payment of bridewealth affirms exclusive rights and privileges between the man and the woman being

joined together in marriage, including conjugal rights (Ferguson, 1992:68). Moreover, cattle are used in the Sesotho culture during funerals to send-off a late person's spirit. Feasts and other celebratory gatherings often involve the slaughtering of cattle, both for ritual purpose and for consumption by feast attendants.

Sheep and goats were used more as the source of annual income through the sale of wool and mohair. As stated in the LHDA feasibility study on agriculture, about 50% of households that owned sheep and goats indicated that they had received a cash income annually from the sale of wool and mohair (LHDA, 1995d: Section 5.4). Because they are socially less valuable than cattle, sheep and goats were slaughtered and consumed more often than cattle (Swallow, et al., 1987:77).

Horses and donkeys are common means of transport in rural areas, particularly in remote areas where access by car is inhibited by a lack of road infrastructure. The Mohale region was one such area, until the construction of the Mohale Dam and associated road networks; if they were not walking on foot, people in the region were largely reliant on horses and donkeys as their form of transport within the region (Devitt and Hitchcock, 2010:6). Donkeys are ordinarily used in rural and peri-urban areas for transportation of heavy or bulk items such as bags of grain or mealie meal, luggage, etc.

One of the aspects that this research explored was whether or not resettlers were able to transfer their social and economic statuses into the new areas. That is, whether the household that had a comparatively better standard of living – be it because they owned more land, or had livestock – would continue to be economically better off and maintain their social status after resettlement. Cernea (2000:26) argues that in forced resettlement, affected people may lose their economic power, which may lead to perceived inferiority of social status. As the ethnography will show in the next chapter, it does not appear to always be the case that a family which had a better standard of living, will continue to be better off after resettlement. With regard to ownership of livestock, many of the studied households who owned livestock and resettled with them into the new areas, reported to have rapidly lost their livestock to death subsequent to their arrival in the new areas; due to factors such as a lack of grazing land and the inability of livestock to adjust to the new environment.

There also seems to be only a marginal difference between families that owned land prior to resettlement, and those that did not, with regard to their economic status after resettlement. Because most resettled people lost land (or part of it) to resettlement, and many of them never

regained it, the effects of landlessness such as food insecurity affect both previous landholders and those who held none alike. Although some people still get annual cash compensation for the loss of their land, the findings show that the monetary compensation is not able to sufficiently sustain the households, whose only source of income is that annual compensation. What evidently helps households improve their standard of living is sustainable access to an income, or ownership of arable land which ensures some extent of food sufficiency. The findings in the next chapter will show this in detail.

Another important aspect of livelihoods in the Mohale area prior to resettlement was that of reliance on natural resources. As will be revealed in detail in the discussion of the findings in Chapter Nine, natural resources such as grasses, rivers, natural spring water, grazing land, traditional medicine, wild vegetables, etc. were some of the resources upon which the affected people had established their livelihoods (Tilt, et al., 2009:3). Research by Sets'abi and Mashinini (2006:125) among the people resettled by work on the Mohale Dam, shows that about 97% of respondents indicated that prior to resettlement, they were mainly reliant on cow dung, brushwood and firewood for cooking and heating their homes; while only less than 3% showed that they used paraffin as their fuel source. Although the rate of cash income among households was low in the region, many families were able to sustain their lives partly through the use of natural resources. The evidence from Sets'abi and Mashinini's study indicates that about 70% of the studied households revealed that their main sources of income prior to resettlement were cash crops and livestock (2006:121).

The use of natural resources extended to the built environment, in which people used specific soils, stones, thatch and wood to build houses. In many cases, only limited access to financial resources were needed for building traditional houses. As one resettled respondent from the current study indicated:

"We used to build our own houses using mud, wood, thatch...some used stones...building was about using your own hands and not about money, my husband and I built both our houses ourselves..."

Hence, while most households had limited access to cash income, natural resources, arable land and livestock were the main assets that primarily sustained livelihoods among the Mohale inhabitants, prior to resettlement. This illustrates that the people in the area had established and organised their livelihoods around resources at their immediate disposal, and how this established order was dismantled by forced resettlement is reflected in the next two

chapters. Most importantly, the research focusses on how the applied resettlement policies were implemented in an attempt to mitigate the negative effects of this disruption, and assesses how effective resettlement processes were in re-establishing lost livelihoods, as reflected by the outcomes on the ground.

8.5 Conclusion

The dawn of Lesotho's independence in 1966 came with the pressing need for sustainable national income, to cater for not only the administrative and governance needs of the newly independent country, but also for the welfare of its people (Meissner and Turton, 2003:119). Having experienced the decline in agricultural production, which was historically the major form of livelihood for grain-exporting Basotho, subsequent to which labour migration became central to economic activities – which also declined due to factors beyond Lesotho's control – the country needed to establish new ways in which revenue could be generated. It is not surprising, therefore, that the LHWP became one of the key priorities of the country in the post-independence era.

However, the implementation of the LHWP would come at a cost borne by those in the vicinity of the dams' site. The cost of forced resettlement which accompanied the construction of the dams included the disruption of social, economic and environmental aspects of affected rural communities, and the next chapter will unpack these in more detail. In addition, the inundation of the original settlements, particularly in the Mohale Dam case, which is the focus of this study, forcefully displaced the predominantly agrarian and pastoral communities from some of the most arable land in the region. As argued in Chapter Two and in the subsequent chapters of this thesis, development that comes at the cost of other segments of the population "creates winners and losers" (Hanlin and Brown, 2013:31). Development which results in the resettlement of other groups of the population is a typical example of development that divides people into winners and losers, and in the case of the LHWP, the local people who bore the cost of resettlement became the losers.

When Lesotho gained its independence, it had already been set on a trajectory of macro-economic development, which had begun earlier with its trade relation with South Africa (Gill, 1993). The decline of agricultural production, coupled with external trade competition, and inhibiting trade legislative mechanisms by South Africa (Ketso, 1991:247), all affected Lesotho's ability to continue exporting crops, creating an economic void in the country. While this void was filled for a short while by labour migration to South Africa, further

legislative mechanisms that reduced foreign labour supply to South Africa created further economic vacuum (Ketso, 1991:250).

This economic gap necessitated macro level strategies that would generate revenues to sustain economic development in the country. This included creating employment for many who had either lost their jobs in South African industries, as well as for those joining the labour force for the first time. The development of infrastructure to facilitate the perceived need of economic growth, coupled with the need for revenue to maintain the administration of the country, was also essential to the programme of development. In this context, the wellbeing of certain segments of the population, who would face forced resettlement to make way for infrastructure development such as large dams, were subordinated to the perceived needs of the nation at large. However, to make up for losses that the people primarily affected would incur on account of forced resettlement, resettlement policies were developed to guide how such people could be recompensed and their livelihoods recovered. Chapters Nine and Ten below explore in detail the human cost of forced resettlement in the Mohale Dam resettlement case, and the impact of policies in this regard.

9 Chapter Nine: The Mohale Dam Resettlement Case

9.1 Introduction

This research focuses on the impact of policies on resettlement processes and outcomes in the Mohale and Chandil dams' resettlement cases. The research explores the implementation of policies, and how the manner in which the specific policies implemented in these two cases led to the outcomes experienced on the ground. In exploring the effects of policies, the study uses the IRR Model, discussed earlier in Chapter Three, to make sense of the outcomes on the ground. In this regard, this chapter explores and discusses how the applied resettlement policy informed the mitigation of the risks of impoverishment among affected people. In consideration of the inherent complexities of resettlement, also discussed in Chapter Three, the study seeks to understand how the dynamics on the ground were negotiated in the implementation processes of the applied resettlement policy.

In this chapter, the case of the Mohale Dam resettlement, one of the projects of the LHWP, is explored. The chapter forms a discussion of the findings on the application of the LHDA compensation policy in the Mohale Dam resettlement case. The discussion reflects that the manner in which the policy was implemented, and how pre-existing socio-economic dynamics were (or not) negotiated, relate to the outcomes reflected at grassroots level. The outcomes of resettlement are demonstrated in the ability/inability of affected people to recover from experienced losses, and re-establish their livelihoods after resettlement. In this regard, the factors impeding or facilitating resettlement processes form part of the discussion.

9.2 Resettlement in the Mohale Dam Case

Planning for the resettlement of affected people in the Mohale region was implemented in the mid-1990s, with the feasibility study undertaken between 1995 and 1996 (Devitt and Hitchcock, 2010:70). Resettlement processes in the Mohale Dam were spread over 15 years from 1995 until 2010, although the implementation of certain aspects of compensation and rehabilitation are ongoing. Table 9.1 below, Adapted from Devitt and Hitchcock (2010:70), outlines key events in the Mohale Dam construction and resettlement processes. The stages of resettlement indicated in the table below are not to be confused with those discussed earlier in Chapter Three on Scudder's stage framework.

Table 9.1 Milestones in the planning and construction of the Mohale Dam.

Year	Milestones
1995-1996	Feasibility study and resettlement planning for Phase 1B of the LHWP begin
1996-1998	Stage 1 resettlement and relocation implemented
1997	Adoption of the revised compensation and rehabilitation policy based on the LHWP Phase 1A experience
1998	Construction of Mohale Dam begins
2002-2006	Stage 2 resettlement and relocation implemented
2003	Completion of Mohale Dam construction
2004	Official inauguration of Mohale Dam
2008	Decisions reached by LHDA and LHWC on Stage 3 resettlement
2009	Final visit of Panel of Environmental Experts on Phase 1 of the LHWP
2010	Workshop on lessons learned from LHWP

Adapted from: Devitt and Hitchcock, 2010:70

As stated in the LHDA Phase 1B Compensation Policy of 1997, discussed later in Section 9.4 of this chapter, the LHDA uses the terms ‘relocation’ and ‘resettlement’ distinctly to refer to the process of moving people within the localities of the Mohale Dam site, and beyond the boundaries of the Mohale region respectively (LHDA, 1997:iii). Up to this point, this thesis has used the terms “resettlement” and “forced resettlement” to refer to the process of moving people involuntarily, and making provision for the recovery of associated losses. However, in the discussions specific to the Mohale Dam resettlement, the terms will be used distinctly, as defined in the LHDA Compensation policy. Later discussions will show how the distinct use of the terms is applicable to the implementation of the policy.

Resettlement in relation to the construction of the Mohale Dam primarily affected a total of 321 households – initially estimated at 424 – as reflected in Table 9.2 below. This is clearly a much smaller number compared to thousands of households affected in the construction of the Chandil Dam, in Jharkhand, India, discussed later in Chapters Twelve, Thirteen and Fourteen. Hence, the time taken to resettle affected people was comparatively shorter. The people affected by the construction of the Mohale Dam were relocated and resettled in three stages before, during and after the construction of the dam. People were resettled from nine villages in the Mohale region, to a total of forty-five host communities located in the three broad regional areas; the Mohale basin, foothills/peri-urban, and urban areas of the capital

city (Maseru). Table 9.2 below accounts for the number of households that were planned to be resettled at different stages and the regions to which they would be resettled.

Table 9.2 Households planned to be resettled by destination and stages in phase 1B.

Stage	Destination			
	Basin	Foothills/peri-urban	Maseru urban	Total
Stage 1	37	38	24	99
Stage 2	27	190	5	222
Stage 3	103			103
Total	167	228	29	424

Adapted from: Devitt and Hitchcock (2010:85)

However, although the total number reflected in the table above is 424 households, the actual number of households who ended up being resettled was 321 (LHDA, 2007: Appendix A). In stage two resettlement for instance, the number of households resettled was reduced from the initially estimated 222 to 216 due to deaths (LHDA, 2004). In stage three, less than ten households were resettled; some households that were initially identified for possible resettlement were not resettled in the end, because of the realisation that they would not be affected directly by the construction of the dam, and also four people had passed on (Devitt and Hitchcock, 2010:85).

As shown in Table 9.1 above, the feasibility study for Phase 1B was undertaken over a period of about one year. Stage 1 resettlement and relocation, undertaken in roughly two years between 1996 and 1998, involved the resettlement of 99 households prior to the construction of the dam (LHDA, 1998:1). These were the families that were previously situated within the fully inundated reservoir area, and the areas in which the tunnel between the Mohale and Katse dams was constructed. The Mohale reservoir is meant to feed into the Katse reservoir, constructed earlier in Phase 1A, which stores water to be transferred to South Africa.

Although 99 households is a relatively small number, stage 1 resettlement in the Mohale case was not undertaken without any challenges. In a report on the review of Stage 1 resettlement in the Mohale case, it is noted that infrastructural development in the new settlements had either not been implemented, or not completed by the time the affected people were moved (LHDA, 1998:3-4). This included the construction of or expansion of schools, particularly in areas where a larger number of people were resettled or relocated, such as Ha-Makotoko,

where 36 households were resettled, the largest number of households resettled to one village (ibid.:4). Water supply was also not readily available at Ha-Makotoko at the time of resettlement. The irony of the construction of a large dam is that the people who suffer the negative consequences of forced resettlement often do not share in the benefits of water supply. The findings from the Chandil Dam resettlement will also bear testimony to this reality.

Even though after the completion of Stage 1 resettlement in Mohale a review was undertaken to learn from the experience in order to improve the process in subsequent stages, similar challenges were experienced in the following stages. As the findings of this research will attest later in this chapter, the reflected shortfalls in the studied areas included a lack of water supply, unavailability of essential infrastructure such as road networks, community halls, etc. This is despite that the fieldwork for the current study in the Mohale case was undertaken in 2015, when resettled people were in stage three of the four stages of resettlement according to Scudder's stage framework discussed in Chapter Three. According to Scudder, at this stage – of Community Formation and Economic Development – the signs of livelihood re-establishment and development should begin to manifest, if resettlement processes were undertaken in a constructive manner (Scudder 2005). However, the reality on the ground does not reveal much development of affected people in the studied Mohale resettlement case.

9.3 Demographic Characteristics of Respondents in the Mohale Dam Resettlement

This research was undertaken in two regions, the Mohale Basin among the relocated people, and in the peri-urban areas in the lowlands, where people were resettled. A total of 40 respondents among the relocated and resettled households in the two regions were interviewed, typically the head of the household or their representative in the absence of the head of the household. Interactions also went beyond scheduled interviews, to more open-ended conversations during the time spent in the field. Fifteen of those interviewed among the affected were relocated to three villages – Ha-Koporala, Ha-Ts'iu, and Ha-Mohale (the village), in the Mohale region, and the other twenty-five were resettled to Ha-Ratua, Ha-Mosalla and Ha-Makhalanyane in the Thaba-Bosiu region.

Based on the earlier-stated distinction between relocation and resettlement in the LHDA context, those who remain in the Mohale Basin, i.e. those who were relocated, are said to be in the same socio-economic milieu as prior to their relocation. Hence, in this sense, the manner in which they experienced forced relocation and the outcomes they are likely to

display are not the same as those who are resettled beyond the Mohale region, who, by the LHDA definition of resettlement, will experience significant socio-economic changes (LHDA, 1997:ii). However, contrary findings show that, because of the environmental, economic and social changes imposed by forced resettlement, there are people who were relocated, who still experienced significant losses in relation to their socio-economic and environmental conditions, even though they remained in the Mohale regional area. Yet, the challenge is that some aspects of the policy take into account the distinctions, and, therefore, apply differently to the relocated and resettled people, as shown in the discussion of the findings.

All the 40 relocated and resettled people interviewed were aged thirty years and older; 10 of whom were males and 30 were females. As indicated earlier, respondents were typically the heads of the households, or those who represented the heads of the households in their absence. In 27 of the 40 studied households, the heads (or their representatives) were females whose husbands had either passed on, or were not present at the time of the fieldwork for various reasons, including employment. In three households headed by females, two were never married, while one is a divorced woman. Hence, there are more female respondents than males in this study. Table 9.3 below depicts respondents (the resettled and relocated people) by age, and Table 9.4 that follows, shows respondents by sex and the villages in which they live. In addition to the relocated and resettled respondents, there were respondents in other categories such as community leaders, hosts, and LHDA officials, as indicated in Chapter Seven of the research methodology.

Table 9.3 Respondents by age

Age category	Number of respondents	Percentage
30 – 39	11	27.5
40 – 49	7	17.5
50 – 59	7	17.5
60 – 69	6	15.0
70+	9	22.5
Total	40	100

Table 9.4 Respondents by sex and village of residence

Respondents No.	Sex		Village	
	Male	Female	Mohale	Thaba-Bosiu
Respondents 1 - 5	0	5	Ha-Mohale	
Respondents 6 - 11	3	3	Ha-Ts'iu	
Respondents 12 - 15	1	3	Ha-Koporala	
Respondents 16 - 33	3	15		Ha-Ratau
Respondents 34 - 35	1	1		Ha-Makhalanyane
Respondents 36 - 40	2	3		Ha-Mosalla
Total	10	30	4	3

Other demographics of respondents include employment status. As discussed in the previous chapter, the predominant means of livelihood among the relocated and resettled Mohale inhabitants prior to resettlement was subsistence agriculture and livestock keeping. This means that by occupation, many people were small scale farmers prior to resettlement. However, having lost their productive assets and resources to resettlement, many have had to seek employment as alternative livelihood. The discussion of the findings in Subsection 9.4.7 of this chapter will engage this in detail. In the studied cases, 70% of the households had no members who worked for income, 10% had members who worked part-time, 5% had members who were self-employed, while 15% had members who were fully employed. The 5% classified as self-employed were occupied in small, informal businesses; hence, had irregular means of income. Table 9.5 below reflects households by occupation of members. As can be seen, the overwhelming majority of the households do not have working member(s). Data collected from all respondents and documents in this study are presented and discussed in the next section.

Table 9.5 The studied households by occupation of their member(s)

Occupation	Frequency	Percentage
Employed	6	15
Self-employed	2	5
Unemployed	28	70
Part-time employment	4	10
Total	40	100

9.4 The Application of the LHDA Compensation Policy

The objectives of the LHDA compensation policy are underpinned by its obligation to ensure that the standard of living of affected people is not brought to a level lower than what was the case at the time of first disturbance (LHDA, 1986: Section 44(2); LHDA, 1989: Section 1; LHDA, 1997: Section 3.2). The first compensation policy of the LHWP was developed in 1989, three years after the signing of the agreement between the governments of South Africa and Lesotho on the multi-phased water project (LHDA, 1989). The policy was developed to fulfil the obligation of the implementing authority, the LHDA, to protect those who would be negatively affected by the project. The policy, as it was in 1989, was applied to Phase 1A of the LHWP, mainly among the people affected by the construction of Katse Dam in the Thaba-Tseka District of Lesotho. Upon the implementation of the policy many issues arose, which begged a revision of the policy based on the lessons learned from the evidence provided in the first project of the LHWP.

Among other matters, four principal issues arose from the implementation of the 1989 Phase 1A compensation policy, and resulted in the improvement of the 1997 Phase 1B compensation policy of the LHDA. These are compensation for arable land, compensation for houses, the re-establishment of livelihoods, and disturbance allowance. In the 1989 compensation policy, cash or grain compensation were provided for the loss of arable land, instead of alternative land for lost land; and this, as the policy states, was because “alternative arable land is not available in Lesotho” (LHDA, 1989: Section 2.2). The fundamental shortfall of this policy provision was that on many levels, it would inevitably induce impoverishment, and later studies after resettlement revealed significant decline in food security and self-sufficiency among affected people (see for example Braun, 2010; Slater and Mphale, 2009; Thamae, 2006).

Compensation for arable land

There are two main factors related to the way compensation for land was implemented that contributed to the failure of the policy to maintain standards of living among affected people. First, as argued in Chapter Six, research has shown that, by and large, cash compensation is incapable of enabling the re-establishment of livelihoods in a sustainable manner. Reliance on money requires regular, consistent income, because money is often used for a variety of expenses, particularly those related to immediate, everyday needs. Conversely, cash compensation for lost assets is usually given for a certain period of time, consequently

leading to impoverishment in the absence of other means of reliable income. A study by Slater and Mphale (2009) confirms this assertion, where for many people affected by the Katse Dam resettlement, cash compensation only resulted in impoverishment, as many could not afford to replace lost fundamental assets, nor save money for future use. In addition, money in this context was often used for expenses such as clothing, educational costs, etc., which, as important as they are, jeopardised food security and, by extension, led to other kinds of impoverishment (Braun, 2010; Slaghter and Mphale, 2009).

The second factor that led to the insufficiency of cash or grain for land compensation in Phase 1A of the LHWP is that it was implemented on a medium term basis. This is despite that in the same clause, the policy notes that land is transferable from generation to generation, and therefore, alternative, sustainable means of income are necessary to replace the loss of this durable asset (LHDA, 1989: Section 2.2). Annual grain or cash instalments were provided for a period of 15 years, which is a short period if there are insufficient opportunities available for affected people after resettlement. Although the LHDA implemented programmes such as the Rural Development Programme in an attempt to capacitate people affected in Phase 1A, the programme failed to deliver on livelihood re-establishment, due to limitations associated with the wider socio-economic context in the region (Ramaili, 2006:73-78).

As a result, the revised version of the LHDA compensation policy of 1997 incorporates changes to compensation provisions for arable land. In the revised version of 1997, the policy applied in Phase 1B included two fundamental changes; first, an increase of the duration of annual cash or grain compensation from 15 to 50 years (LHDA, 1997: Section 11.2.2(a)). Second, Phase 1B compensation policy provided for affected people to have a choice of land-for-land compensation, annual compensation of grain, or cash compensation, which could be implemented as a lump-sum or on an annual basis for a period of 50 years (LHDA, 1997: Section 11.2). However, the reality of land scarcity could not be resolved only by this policy provision, and as later discussions will show, it was implemented with significant challenges.

Compensation for lost houses

The second of the four principal issues that arose from the implementation of Phase 1A compensation policy relates to compensation for housing. In the 1989 policy, the resettlement of affected people was confined to within the reservoir region, and for each affected household, their resettlement was limited to within their local chief's area of jurisdiction

(LHDA, 1989: Section 3.1), i.e. what is referred to as “relocation” in the latter policy. Even where a whole village was resettled, a new village had to be designed within the locale, and specifically within their local chief’s area of jurisdiction (ibid.: Section 3.2). In this regard, the affected people could not, with the assistance of the LHDA, seek to resettle beyond the region. Research would later reveal that the approach to confine housing reconstruction within the region put immense pressure on already pressed natural resources (Thamae, 2006:78). The acquisition of land for the construction of the dam denied certain inhabitants of the region access to certain natural resources, leading to significant pressure on whatever resources were available to them.

Consequently, Phase 1B compensation policy incorporated a new provision, to allow affected people either to relocate within the Mohale region, or to resettle elsewhere within the boundaries of the country (LHDA, 1997: iii). This would allow affected people to seek other opportunities further afield (Thamae, 2006:78). However, while there were challenges related to only relocating affected people within the dam region, the amendment to the policy came with new challenges. As research would later show, some of the challenges experienced by the affected people who chose to resettle outside their original areas include conflicts with the hosts and new community leaders (Willemse, 2007:466). The discussion of the findings will show how such challenges were negotiated in the implementation of Phase 1B compensation policy.

The re-establishment of livelihoods

The third of the four principal issues that arose from the implementation of Phase 1A compensation policy relates to livelihood re-establishment beyond physical resettlement, which is termed rehabilitation in the Indian National Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy – to be discussed later in Chapter Thirteen. However, the changes in Phase 1B compensation policy regarding livelihood re-establishment relate not so much to the amendment of the policy provision, but its implementation. As noted earlier, Section 2.2 of the 1989 Phase 1A compensation policy already provided for the establishment of alternative means of livelihood or means of income generation for affected people, who lost productive assets such as arable land, common property resources, etc. However, that policy provision was implemented with significant shortcomings during resettlement as part of Phase 1A (Mashinini, 2010:6; ‘Matli, 2004:102-103), and thus affected people were not assisted to transition out of dependency into self-sufficiency. As Scudder (2005:38) argues, the loss of

fundamental assets experienced in forced resettlement without the creation of alternative economic opportunities in the new areas, inevitably leads to what can be seen as a dependency syndrome.

Hence, in Phase 1B, compensation for lost community assets such as grazing land, useful grasses, medicinal plants, brushwood, etc., was implemented in the form of community development projects aimed at income generation and livelihood re-establishment for affected communities (LHDA, 1997: Section 11.5). These community development projects were implemented under the new Community Infrastructure Development Programme, the implementation of which will be discussed in Chapter Ten (LHDA, 2007). The implementation of these community development projects was, however, very complex, riddled with irregularities, and exhibited a disconnect between the plans of the projects and the outcomes on the ground. Further discussions in Chapter Ten will reveal in greater detail, how community development projects were implemented in Phase 1B, and what the outcomes were.

Disturbance allowance

The last of the four principal issues which arose from the implementation of Phase 1A compensation policy, resulting in the improvement of Phase 1B compensation policy, relates to disturbance allowance. The 1989 compensation policy did not provide for losses incurred by those who owned neither houses nor arable land, or other assets such as kraals, trees, etc. Whether or not affected people experience material losses as a result of it, forced resettlement always leads to negative effects on those forced from their original areas to new ones, and in some cases, the effects can be permanent. This is because, as argued earlier, apart from material losses, forced resettlement imposes negative socio-cultural and environmental consequences suffered by all affected, even those who own no fixed assets (Cernea, 2000; De Wet, 1995; 2015; Downing, 1996; Evrard and Goudineau, 2004; Tilt and Braun, 2009). At the core of it, forced resettlement disrupts the established socio-cultural order, in which some of the affected people's livelihoods and other invaluable resources are embedded. Hence, even without material losses, other kinds of loss, which may lead to certain forms of destitution, are inevitable.

Upon this realisation, the 1997 Phase 1B compensation policy incorporates a disturbance allowance, targeted particularly at affected people who owned no assets for which they could be compensated (LHDA, 1997: Section 13.2). This, as the policy stipulates, would be

implemented over three years from the date of physical resettlement or relocation into the new area (ibid.: Section 13.2). However, the findings from this current research show that disturbance allowance was, instead, granted to affected people annually for a period of ten years. Further discussions will engage this in greater detail later in this chapter.

Central to the policies of resettlement is the fundamental need to protect affected people, and to ensure that the inherently negative consequences imposed on them by involuntary resettlement are mitigated. Cernea's IRR model, on which this thesis is theoretically predicated, reflects that underlying the inevitable, predominantly negative consequences of forced resettlement are the inherent risks associated with resettlement. Cernea, therefore, argues that for these inherent risks to be mitigated, counter strategies must be employed to "turn resettlement on its head" (Cernea, 2000:20). That is, resettlement processes should be carried out in such a way that the inherent impoverishment risks of resettlement do not become a reality (ibid.:20). In many ways, as will be seen when the different aspects of the LHDA compensation policy are unpacked, the policy has aspects that evidently seek to mitigate some of the impoverishment risks of forced resettlement.

The goal of this research is to explore how the applied policy has been implemented in resettlement processes, and what the outcomes have been on the ground. In this regard, the implementation of Phase 1B compensation policy is explored below, as well as how, against the inherent complexities of resettlement, the dynamics on the ground were negotiated in implementation processes. The discussion of the findings will be framed within the IRR model's proposed reconstruction strategies to prevent the inherent risks of resettlement from materialising. The risks-prevention strategies highlighted by Cernea (2000) are discussed against the provisions of the LHDA Phase 1B compensation policy.

9.4.1 From homelessness to house reconstruction

According to Cernea's IRR model, one of the inevitable losses that people suffer in forced resettlement is that of their homes (Cernea, 2000:25). Although Cernea argues that homelessness tends to be only temporary for many resettlers, when adequate measures to recover lost houses are not put in place, homelessness can be long-term for some (ibid.:25). In some cases, the loss may present itself in the form of reduced standard of housing. The findings from the Chandil Dam resettlement case in Chapter Thirteen will reflect the reality of declined standards of housing at the time of resettlement, which in some studied households had not improved at the time of the fieldwork in these areas. This is despite that

the studied resettlers were in stage three of resettlement in terms of Scudder's Stage Framework – which includes economic development.

In consideration of the inevitable loss of homes in forced resettlement, the LHDA's Phase 1B compensation policy – henceforth referred to as “the policy” – provides for the replacement of houses of equal floor area, and of a standard not lower than the original building (LHDA, 1997: Section 11.1(1)). In this thesis, Cernea's description of the standard of housing is adopted, which encompasses the size of the house in square footage, the materials used for building the house, and the availability of essential facilities such as cooking, heating, and sanitation facilities (2000:39). In this regard, the policy provides that functional services such as heating, cooking and sanitation will be provided with the houses, or cash compensation may be offered to affected people for heating and cooking equipment (LHDA, 1997: Section 11.1(4) & (5)).

Although Cernea's description includes services such as electricity (2000:39), in the context of rural areas in Lesotho, the provision of electricity may be essential, but is not the highest priority for the majority of the people. In 2014, over 80% of rural households in Lesotho did not have access to electricity; even in the urban areas, coverage is just above 60% of households (Bureau of Statistics Lesotho, 2014:27). Furthermore, among the less than 20% of rural households which have access to electricity, nearly 90% reported that they cannot afford to purchase electricity on a regular basis (ibid.:27). Hence, the installation of electrical equipment will not be factored in as part of the indicators of improved or reduced standard of housing in this context. In an interview with one of the LHDA officials responsible for the implementation of the policy in Phase 1B, this is what he indicated regarding the lack of electricity in the houses built for affected people.

“Electricity is an ongoing cost, an expensive one at that, many of the resettled and relocated people do not have regular income, installing electricity for them would have [likely] created an unsustainable expenditure for them.”

However, later discussions will show that in one of the villages in the Mohale region, community members decided to use their community development funds for the installation of electricity in their homes. However, as the discussion will show, the project had not been completed at the time of the fieldwork, owing to misappropriation of funds by community representatives, who were responsible for financial management and implementation.

In the studied areas, all the resettled and relocated households had new houses of equivalent floor area constructed for them. A house-for-house approach to the replacement of lost houses was implemented as a compulsory measure in this case. In this regard, as far as the provision of housing of affected people is concerned, the LHDA was successful in sufficiently recompensing affected people for the loss of their houses. In addition, the reconstruction of houses was undertaken using a participatory approach, one that incorporated the involvement of affected people, although certain decisions, such as the design of the houses, were not open to individual preferences.

In accordance with the amendment of the policy discussed earlier in this chapter, the affected people in Phase 1B were allowed to relocate or resettle to any area of their choice within the confines of the country (LHDA, 1997:iii). The LHDA was responsible for negotiating and purchasing resettlement sites for affected people, in the areas in which affected families chose to move. Once the sites had been secured, the respective families were engaged in choosing their plots within the demarcated areas. Affected people were further engaged in making decisions such as the type of roofing (whether with thatch or corrugated iron), the types of cooking and heating facilities, etc.

With regard to the choice of area of resettlement, there were a variety of factors that influenced the thinking of affected people. One of the common factors is that people chose areas where they already had family members, as the excerpts below attest. In this sense, resettlement in other instances provided an opportunity for people to reunite with some of their family members. The excerpts below show the responses of some respondents as to why their families chose to move into the specific areas.

“I already knew this place; I used to visit my family members who live close by, so when we were asked to choose the places, I chose to come here where I would be close to them.”

“My children already lived in this area; they are the ones who persuaded me to move here”

“I have family here; you know it is better to be closer to family”

One of the fundamental consequences of forced resettlement is that it disrupts and dismantles the existing social fabric, by destroying established social networks and community ties from which people benefit socially, culturally, economically, and otherwise (Cernea, 2000:30;

Eguavoen and Tesfai, 2012:55; Tabucanon, 2012:9; Witter and Satterfield, 2014:1395). In view of retaining the established social networks and community ties, where affected communities decided to move into one area as a collective, as in the case of Ha-Ratau (one of this research's study sites), the new settlements were designed to resemble the old ones. In such cases, the resettled and relocated families had the same neighbours as in their original places. This allowed them to sustain some of their social networks and to transfer the social capital embedded in the networks into the new areas. Detailed discussions on social networks, community ties and social arrangements will follow in the subsection on community re-articulation. It is common cause in Lesotho that extended family members tend to be clustered in one residential area, more so in rural and peri-urban areas. Hence, it is predictable that where the affected people moved in as a group, families would be located together. The picture below depicts a new village at Ha-Ratau comprising resettled people, and was one of the study sites in which the researcher lived during fieldwork in Lesotho.



Figure 9.1 A village designed for Phase 1B resettled people at Ha-Ratau, Maseru, Lesotho

Other factors that influenced affected people's choice of a resettlement area relates to issues of local governance, where people indicated that they did not want to move to areas in which they would be governed by a different chief. Some reports in the review of the initial resettlement in Phase 1B reveal that in some cases, there were tensions between the resettled people and local leaders in the new areas (LHDA, 1998; Thamae, 2006:79). Hence, in subsequent resettlement stages of Phase 1B, one of the recommendations the affected people claim to have received from the LHDA officials was to consider moving to areas where they would be under the same leadership. The excerpt from one of the interviewed resettlers below is an example of such.

“’Na ne ke sa batle ho busoa habeli ke bue ‘nete...le bona batho ba morero ba ile ba re eletsa joalo...” (I didn’t want to have a different chief to be honest...and the LHDA officials also advised so).

Other kinds of choices that affected people had, as mentioned earlier, include the types of roofing, whether with thatch or corrugated iron. The significance of the roofing in the context of Lesotho, particularly in the rural and peri-urban areas, is based on the functionality of the house. Thatch-roofed houses are preferred in rural areas because people can make a fire in them, both for heating and cooking purposes. On the other hand, corrugated iron roofing is perceived from a social perspective as indicative of a higher standard of living. In the rural areas of Lesotho, households typically have traditional houses, built with stone or mud, and are thatch-roofed. Although these houses are useful in supporting the livelihood of rural populations, they are considered to be of a lower standard, because they are built from cheap or free, natural materials. Hence, either of these two factors – the functionality of the house or its perceived standard – partly influenced the people’s decisions in choosing the type of roofing.

However, there is a more complex factor regarding the choice of roofing by affected households. The sizes of the houses built for affected households were based on the total square footage of the old houses, and this also determined the number of rooms built for each household. For example, if a household had one house in the old area that was big enough to possibly be divided into two smaller rooms whose total square footage was equal to the old single house, the family would be built a two roomed house, with their approval. As a result, some people who owned multiple houses in the old areas were built a single house with more rooms than the number of their previous houses, but with equal square footage. What this meant, however, is that in cases where people chose a single house with more rooms, they forfeited the opportunity to have a thatch-roofed house.

Furthermore, although the choice of thatched roofing was available for affected households, and indeed some people were built thatch-roofed houses, corrugated iron roofing was evidently preferred by the LHDA, most likely for practical reasons. Buying corrugated iron was logistically easier than arranging for the supply of thatch. This was confirmed by a conversation the researcher had in which one of the LHDA officials narrated some of the practical limitations in the construction of houses.

“...ha ke etsa mohlala, joang bo a sokolisa Ha-Ratau, joale ho rulella batho ka joang ene e le bothata.” (...if I can make an example, there is scarcity of thatching grass at Ha-Ratau, hence thatch roofing was problematic).

However, in the new settlements, some people built their own thatch-roofed houses in which they could make a fire for cooking and heating, as depicted in the picture below. In the stage framework, Scudder argues that resettled people tend to “cling to the familiar” in stage two of resettlement, where affected people hold on to old practices that are familiar to them (Scudder, 1981:14; 2005:34; 2009:40). However, in this case, the underlying factors for maintaining this way of life have more to do with sustaining a livelihood than merely clinging to what is familiar. Because many of these resettled people are unemployed, as reflected in Table 9.5 above, which means they have no reliable means of income, using financially costly forms of fuel such as gas or paraffin for cooking and heating can be unsustainable. Hence, making a fire using natural fuels such as firewood, cow dung, etc., may be more cost-effective for them. Moreover, because traditionally, people do not make fire inside corrugated iron-roofed houses, additional thatch-roofed houses are preferred.



Figure 9.2 A homestead belonging to a resettled household at Ha-Ratau, Maseru, Lesotho

The areas of decision-making in which the affected family's preferences were not incorporated include the design of the houses, the floors, and other aspects of that nature. All such decisions were made by the LHDA. The reason for this was that it was logistically easier for the LHDA to make collective decisions regarding such details, as opposed to catering for various individual preferences. However, some of those decisions had significant implications on the lives of affected people. Some matters causing discontent among affected people are tiled floors in thatch-roofed houses. These houses were preferred by affected

people specifically for making a fire in them, but tiling the floors defeated the purpose. One respondent, who was built two separate houses, including a thatch-roofed one, had this to say.

“Ke itse ba nkhaele ntlo ea joang hobane ke ne ke batla ho besetsa ka ho eona, joale ha hona thuso ba e kentse lithaele” (I asked them to build me a thatch-roofed house in which I could make a fire, but now I cannot make a fire in it because the floors are tiled).

The long-term challenge of living in modern, brick and painted houses such as the ones built for the relocated and resettled people in this case, is the high cost of maintenance. In a low to no income context, as in the studied communities – and the subsection on employment will speak to this in greater detail – the affected people are already stretched thin to sustain their living in the absence of natural and other resources that support their livelihoods. Thus, maintaining a house that requires ongoing financial resources may be a luxury they do not have. For example, many respondents indicated that their houses were last repainted by the LHDA, about three years after resettlement, which means that for some, the houses had not been repainted in over ten years. While traditional houses also require maintenance, the materials used for doing so are mainly natural resources requiring no financial costs, and hence are more sustainable in this regard.

However, all the issues and challenges notwithstanding, the LHDA was, by and large, successful in preventing the risk of homelessness in the studied areas, where affected people were not led to either reduced housing conditions or homelessness. In accordance with its policy, the houses provided for affected people are of “equivalent floor area and a standard not lower than that of the original [houses]” (LHDA, 1997: Section 11.1(1)). The floor area was the criterion used in building the houses, and in some cases it meant that people got more rooms than the number of houses they previously had. Having a house with more rooms is advantageous in that it allows people in the household enough space for privacy. As one resettled mother of four children indicated – she previously had two houses and now has a three-roomed house.

“Ne ke inela le matlo a mabeli, e ‘ngoe e le kichine e ‘ngoe e le ea boroko, empa bonyane hona joale bana ba na le kamore ea bona, le rona re na le ea rona, haholo hona joale ha ba se ba le baholo” (We previously had two houses, one we used as a kitchen and the other as a bedroom, but at least now the kids have their own bedroom and we [the parents] too our own, especially now that they are older).

Furthermore, the processes of constructing houses were relatively participatory. The affected people were involved in most decisions regarding the houses, even though there are certain decisions that the LHDA assumed the authority of making on behalf of the affected people. The issue of the standard of housing is debatable; however, based on the criteria that include the use of good quality material, the size of square footage, and the availability of sanitation services, the houses built for affected people were of an improved standard.

Nevertheless, the houses fell short of meeting the requirement for heating and cooking. The policy provides that households should be provided with a cooking/heating facility or have the option of cash compensation (LHDA, 1997: Section 11.1(5)). In five of the forty studied households that took the option of a cooking facility, which was a stove that uses firewood or coal, the stoves were dysfunctional. The common reason for the dysfunction was that the chimneys were seemingly improperly installed, hence could not evacuate smoke from the houses, leading to the release of smoke inside the house.

In terms of house reconstruction, the LHDA has a good policy provision, one that is asset-based, and participatory – although not fully participatory. While in some resettlement cases – and the discussion of Chandil resettlement case will show this in Chapter Thirteen – the resettled people experience difficulties with house reconstruction due to the use of cash compensation instead of house replacement, the LHDA offers a good example where such a risk was avoided. The manner in which compensation for housing was undertaken in the LHDA case took into account the limitations associated with cash compensation as discussed in Chapter Six, which may jeopardise asset replacement.

However, there was a mixture of feelings expressed by affected people, with some indicating that they were satisfied with the quality of their houses, and that they see the houses as an improvement from the traditional mud/stone houses they previously lived in. While on the other hand, there were respondents who expressed dissatisfaction with their new houses, citing factors such as the financial cost of maintaining them, and the cold temperatures inside the houses during winter. Nevertheless, the majority indicated satisfaction with their new houses.

9.4.2 From landlessness to land-based re-establishment

As stated in Cernea's IRR model, one of the fundamental losses that affected people are exposed to in forced resettlement is the loss of arable land (Cernea, 2000:23). In agrarian societies, as in the case of Mohale, the loss of productive land can be detrimental. Because of

the strong link between land and livelihood in agrarian societies, the loss of this fundamental asset can lead to several negative effects such as food insecurity, increased unemployment, and can even affect social arrangements tied to land cultivation, as the discussion will show later in this chapter (Cernea, 2000:23; Kirchherr and Charles, 2016).

The construction of Mohale Dam resulted in inundation of approximately 1000 hectares of arable land, affecting not only the 321 households that were relocated and resettled, but also hundreds of others whose livelihoods were attached to the physical environment of the region (Hoover, in Willemse, 2007:466). According to Cernea (2000:23), the recovery of lost arable land through the provision of alternative land in the new areas may have a positive impact on the ability of affected people to re-establish livelihoods after resettlement. In consideration of this significant loss of productive land in forced resettlement, the policy provides for the replacement of lost land with alternative land in the new areas (LHDA, 1997: Section 11.2.1(1)). This policy feature was one of the major improvements from the 1989 Phase 1A policy, as discussed above. The amendment was based on the realisation that cash or grain compensation provided for in Section 2.2 of the 1989 Phase 1A policy, led to a substantial decline in food security among affected people (Akindele and Senyane, 2004; Braun, 2010; Thamae, 2006).

However, the provision of alternative land is one of the most complex measures to prevent the risk of landlessness, generally because of land scarcity, as reflected in many cases across the world, where land restoration fell below the expected or planned outcome. Resettlement in the cases of the Three Gorges and the Sardar Sarovar dams in China and India respectively, are exemplary in this regard (Jackson and Sleight, 2000:234; Morse and Berger, 1992; Whitehead, 1999; Yan, et al., 2005:483). In one case in the Narmada resettlement in India, about 1500 of the 2700 hectares of land cleared for the purpose of resettlement in Maharashtra was found to be unsuitable for cultivation (Parasuraman, et al., 2010:43). The findings from the Chandil Dam resettlement in Chapter Thirteen will also show that land replacement in the new areas was difficult to achieve, partly because of the scarcity of land in the new areas, but also because of other complexities of the implementation process in that context.

Similarly, the implementation of land-for-land compensation in the Mohale Dam resettlement case was inhibited by land scarcity; in fact, as stipulated in Section 2.2 of the 1989 Phase 1A compensation policy, land replacement was not provided for because of arable land scarcity

in Lesotho (LHDA, 1989). Hence, even in the amended Phase 1B policy, the LHDA still provided for other forms of compensation – cash or grain. According to the policy, cash compensation may be given either as a lump-sum or on an annual basis for a period of 50 years, as stipulated in the clauses below. The fifty-year term for annual cash compensation was an increase from the previous fifteen-year term implemented in Phase 1A.

- “Loss of arable land may be compensated with cash in the form of an annual cash payment, or a lump-sum payment with certain provisos” (LHDA, 1997: Section 11.2.2).
- “The total amount of the annual cash paid to each recipient (over a 50 year period) for the loss of arable land, shall be determined on the basis of the established production capacity of the land...” (LHDA, 1997: Section 11.2.2(a)).

As specified in the policy, the value of annual cash compensation for land is determined on the basis of the price of relevant crops each year (LHDA, 1997: Section 11.2.2(a)). That is, every year the LHDA determines the value of the annual cash compensation based on commodity prices. On the other hand, in order for households to be granted a lump-sum for compensation of their land, they ought to first present a viable means of income generation, through the use of the cash compensation as seed funding for a project (LHDA, 1997: Section 11.2.2(b)). The LHDA through its experts would then assess the feasibility of the project against associated risks. Only once the planned investment is proven to be viable would a lump-sum be granted to the household (ibid.: Section 11.2.2(b)). However, due to the complexities that arose from the implementation of this policy provision, in some cases once-off compensation payments were granted to affected households without a viable long-term investment.

To demonstrate the difficulty of implementing land-for-land compensation, in the studied Mohale resettlement cases, only two out of forty households received land in the new areas for their lost land. As indicated by one of the LHDA officials responsible for the implementation of resettlement in Phase 1B, the replacement of land in the new areas was dependent on the availability of alternative land, and there were rarely any vacant pieces of arable land or willing sellers among the host community members. One of the two respondents who own land in the new area bought it after resettlement, from a host family that had a financial crisis at the time, and was compelled to sell a field to cover funeral expenses of a deceased family member.

Notwithstanding, some respondents claimed to have chosen cash compensation to avoid costly agricultural practices in the new areas, particularly those resettled in the lowlands. According to these respondents, the need for fertilisers due to the lower fertility of the land makes land cultivation more costly than it used to be in their original areas, where land was more arable. Additionally, they would need to hire tractors to cultivate – having lost livestock for various reasons which will be discussed later. The quotes below are taken from interviews with some of those respondents.

“Temo e turu mabalane mona, u tla reka peo, u reke manyolo, u hire terekere...ka chelete e feng?” (Land cultivation is more costly in the lowlands, you need to buy seed, fertilisers, rent a tractor...with what money?)

“Kotulo ea mona ha e na katleho e kalo-kalo joaloka koana” (Crop production in this area is not as gainful as it used to be in our original areas).

“Molika-like e ne e le hlokoa-le-mafi...u ne u oa fumana hore tlaka-tlaka!...” (Where we come from the land was very fertile, we used to get greater yields from the fields...) ”

There were also some respondents who claimed that they were never aware of the land-for-land compensation option, to which one LHDA official says she doubts that is truly the case. For this official, one of the possible explanations could be that, in retrospect, many people were beginning to regret their choice of cash compensation, as the aftermath of resettlement continued to unfold, with predominantly negative effects on affected people’s livelihood. However, this is an issue that should have not come as a surprise to the LHDA, as their experience – and wider research – had demonstrated that the complexities of resettlement are such that its effects are long-term and unfold over time (Cernea, 1997:1569; Scudder and Colson, 2002; Takesada, et al., 2008; Tamakloe, 1994). This is precisely the reason why the predictive function of Cernea’s IRR model enables projects to learn from previous experiences, and anticipate possible risks to prevent them (Cernea, 2000:21). Apart from learning from other resettlement projects elsewhere, the LHDA had previously carried out a resettlement project in Phase 1A, which ought to have provided some learning experience. Because the effects of resettlement unfold over time, it follows, therefore, that its planning – including compensation plans – should also be designed and implemented with a long-term approach.

The long-term effects of resettlement begin to show in stage three of Scudder's stage framework, and are such that they can either reflect development, or chronic impoverishment among the affected, depending on whether or not appropriate strategies were planned and implemented effectively (Cliggett, et al., 2007; Kinsey and Binswanger, 1993:29; Scudder, 1993:130; 2009:29; Scudder and Colson, 1982; Takesada, 2009). Although reduced standards of living are likely in stage two of physical relocation, affected people should begin to transition out of significant poverty into development in stage three of Economic Development and Community Formation (Scudder, 2005:37; 2009:41). However, if sufficient provisions are not incorporated in stages one and two of resettlement, the negative effects will most likely be long-term or even permanent (Kinsey and Binswanger, 1993:29; Scudder, 2005:38).

In the studied communities affected by the Mohale Dam resettlement case, the long-term effects had become noticeable. On the one hand, there were people who had acquired alternative means of livelihood such as employment in the city or even outside the country, and the subsection on re-employment will reflect this in greater detail. On the other hand, there were people who remained in the communities, and in the absence or scarcity of resources and opportunities, were experiencing multiple forms of poverty, including food insecurity, which the next subsection will discuss.

Research on forced resettlement has provided evidence that standards of living are more likely to decline in stage two, when people transition into the new areas, due to the loss of productive assets such as arable land (Jackson and Sleight, 2000; Scudder, 2005:34). In this regard, the implementation of resettlement as part of Phase 1B incorporated a strategy to address this initial decline in living conditions. As discussed earlier, the Phase 1B policy makes provision for "disturbance allowance", which is a temporary annual cash compensation for affected people, as stipulated in Section 13.2. However, there seems to be an inconsistency between what the policy says, as shown in the policy clause below, and how it was understood and/or implemented.

- "Disturbance Allowance: This allowance will be paid to all affected households included in LHDA's resettlement and relocation programme, and is intended to meet the unforeseen but inevitable initial costs of moving. The amount will decrease incrementally to zero over three years, from the date of arrival at the resettlement and relocation destination" (LHDA, 1997: Section 13.2).

Although the policy stipulates that the disturbance allowance is meant to provide for the initial costs of resettlement for all affected people, one senior official of the LHDA indicated otherwise. According to him, the allowance was meant to aid the resettled, as they tend to experience significant changes in their socio-economic and environmental settings, in contrast with those who are relocated, who tend to retain access to some of the environmental resources that support their livelihood. The officer explains:

“Disturbance allowance is given to people who are resettled, it is meant to help them while they are settling in the new areas. Those who are relocated, they still have access to the natural resources in the region, they can still access the same brushwood, wild vegetables, grazing land, and others, some still have their fields, which they continue to plough, unlike those who are resettled outside the region.”

The potential problem with this argument is it assumes that, because relocated people are moved by a shorter distance, the impact of forced resettlement on their lives is less significant. However, research on the environmental impact of the Mohale Dam has revealed that the project has led to not only the loss of agricultural land, but also other natural resources such as fuel, grazing land, etc. (Mwangi, 2007:12; Willemse, 2007:466). Furthermore, both observations around the region and the interviews with affected people in this study confirmed that people who were moved within the locale lost access to some of their natural resources particularly grazing land and fuel. Some of the relocated respondents explained:

“Mona patsi e sokolisa hampe, lifate tsa rona li koaetsoe ke metsi... Baka sena se ne se re fepa hle, ele meroho, e le lifate re besa...hona joale re kobile linala feela...”
(We don't have access to firewood in this area, our trees were inundated...That place was fertile, we had wild vegetables, access to firewood...now we are stranded.

“Ne kena le liphoofole tse ngata, linku ke li baloa ka mashome, joale ha e sale re fihla mona lia shoa mona li bolaoa ke tlala. ‘Me ‘na ke sehoai ke phela ka mobu le liphoofole” (I used to have many livestock, tens of sheep, but since we relocated many of them died of starvation. And as a farmer, I subsisted on land cultivation and livestock.

All the four interviewees at Ha-Koporala in the Mohale region expressed great frustration with the lack of natural resources, more so fuel resources. One respondent, an elderly lady who lives with her elderly and ailing husband, indicated that their preference for the area was

informed by the assumption that they would have greater access to natural resources. But their reality after relocation is not what they had hoped for.

“Re khethile baka sena re lebelletse hore bonyane re tla fumana libeso. Empa ha ho letho. Ke ts’okolo e na e ts’abehang. Joale ha u itsofalletse joalo ka rona tje...u ka hauha!” (We chose this area believing that we would have access to fuel resources, but they are scarce. It is a serious challenge, and when you are elderly like us, it is worse).

“...ha re na libeso...mane moo re neng re lula libota e ne e le lithaba...re besa re be re khathale...mona re phela ka ho reka patsi, kapa lihala-hala ho bashanyana bana ba theohang motebong koana...u oa utloa ba re ke bo M25 bo M30” (we struggle with fuel resources, in our old settlements we used to have reserves of natural fuel resources...now we have to buy brushwood from the young men who source it from the mountain...we pay about M25 to M30).

Still in the same village, another family that lives with a physically disabled family member expressed the same sense of frustration with the lack of fuel resources. In addition, the interviewee indicated that she had also hoped to get into sharecropping when they moved into the new area, as that was her means of subsistence in the old area in Molika-liko. However, they had not been able to secure any partnerships with host community members, and that contributed to their inability to recover from the loss of mainly natural resources and social arrangements that supported their livelihood. However, in her opinion, the lack of resources is not an exclusive problem of the relocated people in the area, even the host community members were experiencing the same lack of resources.

“Mona ha ho na masimo, ke matsoatlara feela, le batho ba mona baa lapa...le libeso ha lieo” (Arable land is scarce in this area, even some of the hosts don’t have land to cultivate...there are no fuel resources too).

One of the fundamental effects of forced resettlement is that because it is predicated on the acquisition of the land on which affected people relied, it puts pressure on resources in the areas to which they are moved; as more people are brought in to compete for the same resources with the host community. Research has shown how conflicts between the resettled people and the host community have ensued as a result of competition for scarce resources (Willemsse, 2007:466). Evidently, there was already a scarcity of resources at Ha-Koporala, in Mohale, even before resettlement; however, the arrival of some 22 households into the area

resulted in even greater pressure on already stretched natural resources. A conversation with the chief at Ha-Koporala bore testimony to this.

“Bothata ba mona ke hore ‘m’e mobu ha o eo, le batho bana ba mona ha se hore bana le masimo kaofela. Joalo ka ha u bona hore karolo e ‘ngoe ea sebaka sena ke matsoapo...ho ne ho ke ke hoa ba bonolo hore batho ba fihlang, ba fumane masimo”
(The problem is that arable land is scarce in this area, even the hosts don’t all have fields to cultivate. As you can see, part of this area consists of infertile dongas...it would not be easy to give arable land to the relocated people.)

However, although the LHDA official indicated that disturbance allowance was meant for the resettled people and not the relocated, the implementation of the policy provision evidently took a different approach. In conversation with some relocated people in the Mohale region, it became clear that there were some relocated people who received a disturbance allowance, while some did not. A closer look revealed that the people who received disturbance allowances were those who did not have fields, whereas those who had them were only compensated for their lost land and were not granted disturbance allowance to cover initial costs, as stipulated in the policy. Also, although the policy indicates that the disturbance allowance was to be provided for a period of three years (LHDA, 1997: Section 13.2), interviews with affected people who benefited from the allowance revealed that they received it on an annual basis for ten years instead.

Table 9.6 below depicts households that received disturbance allowances and those who did not, among the relocated households in the Mohale region. As shown in the table, of the fifteen people interviewed from the relocated households in the Mohale region, six received disturbance allowances, all of whom did not have fields in their old settlements, while nine households who lost arable land and were, therefore, compensated for it, did not receive disturbance allowance.

Table 9.6 Households who received disturbance allowances by village

Village	Received	Not received
Ha-Mohale	1	4
Ha-Ts’iu	2	4
Ha-Koporala	3	1
Total	6	9

One LHDA senior official indicated that they decided to give disturbance allowance to people who had no land because they did not have any compensation, apart from that of constructed houses and smaller items such as trees, gardens, etc. However, the manner in which this policy provision was implemented had a negative impact on those who were excluded. Because of this exclusion, affected people were compelled to use their compensation funds to cover transitional costs, instead of replacing lost assets. Ultimately, this approach resulted in insufficient compensation for lost assets, and led to impoverishment among affected people.

Due to the limitations associated with replacing land with alternative land, cash compensation for lost arable land was implemented as a replacement in the majority of cases in the studied areas. However, as discussed in Chapter Six, cash compensation has been widely criticised for its incapacity to re-establish livelihoods in a sustainable manner, after resettlement (Cernea, 1999; 2003; 2008; Downing, 2002a; Fernandes, 2008; Mulugeta and Woldesemait, 2011). An account below, given by one respondent relocated in the Mohale region is indicative of this limitation. The respondent's family had eight fields on which they subsisted.

“I used to live on agriculture, I had eight fields. On top of growing maize and sorghum, I used to plough cannabis as a cash crop. We used to sow cannabis in between the main crops, and it was highly profitable. Initially my husband did not agree with it, one day I sent him to a client to deliver bags of cannabis. He did not want to but I persuaded him. When he came back he could not believe it, he was so happy. He said; I did not know that this thing makes so much money, it was 3000 Maloti...Since then, he supported me, we were now working together, we never struggled financially...the money we got for our fields is much less than what we used to gain, land benefits you for life, but LHDA will not support us for life...Now I can't even afford to pay for my granddaughter's education. She had to drop out because I could not pay her school fees...her mother passed away...”

Although there were many people in the Mohale region who cultivated *cannabis* as a cash crop (Thabane, 2000:638), some were reluctant to declare it as one of their means of subsistence, because its cultivation is illegal in the country. Consequently, as the LHDA stated in one of their resettlement planning progress reports, this made it difficult to arrive at

an accurate estimation of the crop value (LHDA, 1995a:10). As a result, there is a likelihood that some affected people were under-compensated in this regard.

Furthermore, the amount of cash compensation for the loss of arable land is determined by the value of commodities such as grain, as indicated in Section 11.2.2(a) of the policy. However, the reality is that the amount of cash compensation offered may not amount to as much food security as sufficient crop production does. Table 9.7 below shows estimated yields for the main crops cultivated in Phase 1B region – Mohale – Adapted from the LHDA progress report on resettlement planning (LHDA, 1995d:9).

Table 9.7 Yield estimates for the four main crops grown in the Mohale region (kg/ha)

Crop	Source				
	Phase 1B Area	Bureau of Statistics Thaba-Tseka District	Semonkong Rural Development Project	Bureau of Statistics Mohale Sampling Area	Mean
Maize	740	547	560	670	629
Wheat	525	621	530	750	606
Peas	390	473	420	292	394
Beans	425	270	-	-	348

Source: LHDA progress report on resettlement planning (1995d:9)

The values under the column ‘Phase 1B area’ are the averages of the annual yields indicated by the interviewed people during the planning phase, as the affected people gave different figures. Although equivalent values of cash compensation were provided to the affected people who lost arable land, it is argued here that food security declined in the absence of sustainable income opportunities. The discussion in the next subsection will explore this in detail. This is partly because, as it has been argued earlier, when affected people are offered cash for the loss of productive assets, rarely do they use it to replace those lost assets. While the money may be used for daily expenses including food, it may not amount to food security, because it also covers other expenses such as educational costs, clothing, etc. Additionally, even in cases where people use compensation funds to replace or acquire new forms of livelihood, such as income generating projects, success rates are often low in contexts where complementary economic activities are absent. Later discussions in the next chapter will attest to this assertion. This, therefore, explains why the loss of land to forced

resettlement may lead to food inadequacy among affected people, if alternative land is not granted after resettlement.

In the studied households, the majority of respondents indicated that they used their cash compensation to cover daily expenses, and not to re-establish alternative means of livelihood. As shown earlier, only two of the forty studied resettled and relocated households acquired alternative arable land after resettlement. The inability of affected people to replace lost assets with their cash compensation is tied, in part, to two factors. The first is the change of lifestyle, particularly for those resettled from rural to peri-urban (or urban) areas, where the expenses are higher, owing to greater reliance on financial resources. The second is the loss of access to productive assets such as land to resettlement, which requires affected people to purchase all their food from the stores.

As demonstrated by the excerpts below, from interviews with some resettled people, the need for financial resources was increased by the cost of living attached to the change of lifestyle in the new areas. While people had always needed money for items such as clothes, educational expenses and other consumables, agricultural production supplemented their income by satisfying the food requirement of the households.

“Mona bophelo ba teng ke chelete...u reka ho tloha ka papa” (Everything here costs money; including basic items such as mealie meal).

“Oa tseba le ha u sena chelete, ha feela u na le papa ka tlung, ho betere, joale ha u tlameha le ho reka papa, ha u chonne ke tsietsi” (You know even if you do not have money, it is better to have food in the house, but if you have to buy everything including food, then when there is no money you are in trouble).

Consequently, some affected people who had initially opted for annual compensation for lost land, from which they would benefit for 50 years from the time of physical resettlement, changed to once-off payments in order to meet their immediate, growing needs in the new areas. One resettled respondent indicated:

“Ne ke khethile ho e nka ka selemo, empa lilemo tse peli ka morao hore ke fihle mona, ka bona ho le thata hoo, eaba ke e hula kaofela hang...” (I had initially chosen annual compensation but two years into our resettlement I struggled so much financially, hence I opted for a once-off lump-sum instead...).

This confirms Cernea's assertion that when the basic need of food is not met in a sustainable manner, it extends to other forms of impoverishment, which, in the long-term, make it difficult for affected people to transition out of poverty into growth (2000:27). The fundamental limitation of cash compensation for land is that land is a more enduring asset, whereas money, because of its fluidity, can be easily exhausted on expenses for which it was not originally intended. Hence, land-based resettlement or assets replacement is favourable in mitigating the risk of landlessness and its associated forms of impoverishment (Cernea, 2000:23; Koenig, 2006:108). However, the reality is that land scarcity makes it difficult for implementing authorities to achieve the goal of land-for-land resettlement.

For this reason, there is a need for more sustainable approaches to livelihood re-establishment such as benefit-sharing, to ensure that the living conditions of affected people are supported through more gainful initiatives. On the other hand, the prerequisite of options assessment in resettlement policies remains a significant aspect, which needs to be more adequately and transparently engaged, to minimise forced displacement or to avoid it, in cases where there are no adequate opportunities to support the re-establishment of livelihoods. Later discussions in Chapter Sixteen will further speak to this issue. While other opportunities such as employment are alternative means through which livelihoods can be re-established, the reality is that a lack of resources is often linked to a lack of other opportunities for development; because ultimately, a closer look will reveal that these inherent risks of impoverishment are interconnected. Discussions on re-employment will reveal some of the limitations attached to the use of employment opportunities as an alternative to the loss of livelihoods in forced resettlement.

9.4.3 From food insecurity to adequate nutrition

Owing to the complexities associated with facilitating the re-establishment of alternative means of livelihood for affected people after resettlement, forced displacement and resettlement tend to result in the reality of food insecurity on those forcibly moved (Cernea, 2000:27). Cernea, however, argues that if measures are taken by implementing authorities to mitigate the risk of food insecurity, it may be only a temporary reality; but permanent undernourishment may follow where adequate food security measures are not implemented (2000:27).

Scudder in his FSF asserts that general standards of living are more likely to drop in stage two of resettlement, during the transition phase (Scudder, 2005:32). It is argued here that

because food is the most basic of the fundamental needs for survival, food inadequacy may be an indication of declined standards of living. Resettlement-caused food insecurity may be more prevalent in agrarian societies whose economy is based on land cultivation, or contexts in which livelihoods are linked to natural resources (Hakim, 2000; Horowitz and Salem-Murdock, 1993; Muggah, 2000). In such contexts, the loss of these foundational assets can be extremely detrimental, and may even lead to permanent food insufficiency. In order to prevent this inherent risk from materialising, sustainable forms of livelihoods and opportunities must be created in the new areas for affected people (Koenig, 2006:112; Vithayathil and Sunny, 2009:33). In this regard, the LHDA policy provides for alternative land or cash compensation for lost arable land as discussed above (LHDA, 1997: Section 11.2.1(1); Section 11.2.2).

In exploring the issue of food insecurity in the Mohale Dam resettlement case, and how it relates to the failure to replace lost productive land, the living conditions of specific cases of the studied households at Ha-Ratau will be in focus in this subsection. Ha-Ratau was selected partly because a larger number of resettled respondents, 18 of the 40 interviewees from 6 villages, were from Ha-Ratau; hence, in order to establish whether the socio-economic conditions of affected people in this case were a direct result of forced resettlement, the discussion focuses on a group of people within the same geographical setting. Furthermore, Ha-Ratau is one of the two villages in which the researcher lived during the execution of the fieldwork, and this enabled more frequent and in-depth interactions with respondents, and ultimately a better understanding of the situation was derived from this experience.

To undertake this exploration, a comparison of two sets of households – both landed hosts and landless resettled people – is incorporated. The socio-economic conditions of five host community members and five resettled households are compared and discussed. The selection of the households was based on certain similarities in terms of their socio-economic characteristics. The analysis in this regard is of a qualitative nature, and is based on observations and data from interviews and conversations. The analysis compares landed hosts with landless resettled households. However, other attributes, such as the size of the family and the number of employed family members in the household, are also taken into consideration. Table 9.8 below outlines the composition of the families under exploration. On the one side are the landed host community households, and on the other side are landless resettled households. The two sets of five households each are paired according to the similarities of their family composition, although there are minor variations.

Table 9.8 The composition of the ten landed hosts vs the landless resettled explored at Ha-Ratau

	Landed host community households	Landless resettled households
1.	A nuclear family of five with one fully employed member	A nuclear family of six with one fully employed member
2.	A nuclear family of four with no employed member	A nuclear family of five with no employed member
3.	A nuclear family of two with no employed member	A single unemployed individual
4.	An extended family of seven with one fully employed member	An extended family of eight with two fully employed members
5.	An extended family of three with no employed member	An extended family of six with one fully employed member

Although there are many aspects that impinge on one's standard of living, for the purpose of the discussion in this subsection, the main aspect that will be explored is that of food security. There are various definitions of food insecurity, some of which may apply to specific contexts. However, for the purpose of this subsection, definitions from the World Food Summit and by Cernea will be adopted. In this regard, food insecurity is defined as a lack of sustainable access to sufficient, balanced (calorie-protein) food (Cernea, 2000:27; World Food Summit, 1996). Hence, a household can be food-secure at one point in time due to access to sustainable means through which they can acquire food, and be food-insecure at another point in time, when such means are lost.

In the Mohale case, most resettled and relocated people had arable land prior to resettlement, through which they, arguably, has access to sufficient food. Even those who had no arable land had access to it through social networks and arrangements, as later discussions on social re-articulation will show. In the studied 40 households, nine respondents indicated that they did not have agricultural land prior to resettlement. Even so, they had access to productive land through social ties and networks. The LHDA's baseline survey report for Phase 1B revealed that some of the farmers in Molikaliko in the Mohale region used to produce enough crops to have surpluses, which could be sold or exchanged for other commodities (LHDA, 1995:5). Molikaliko a low-lying area along the Senqunyane River, which is known for its

fertile land, from where some affected people were resettled, due to inundation (Thabane, 2000:638). The studied households from Ha-Ratau were resettled from this area.

Conversations with families revealed that access to sufficient food was more likely in families that were either landed, or those that had at least one fully employed member in the household. By ‘sufficient food’ what is meant is that they have access to three meals a day, and for a few days in the week, their meals included protein-rich food such as eggs, beans and meat. A respondent from a landed household in category two in Table 9.8 above, with no employed member, indicated that although their harvested crops did not always last until the next harvest season, they had access to sufficient food for most of the year. In her assertion, as shown in the excerpt below, she estimated that they may run out of food approximately a month or two before the next harvest season, during which time, they would rely on extended family members for support. Their crops, at the time the fieldwork was undertaken, were mainly maize, beans and sorghum from their three fields.

“Boholo ba nako re lula re na le lijo...che mohlomong ho tloha ka bo April/May, re se re felletsoe, empa ka nako eno re se ntse re lebelletse ho kotula hape mariha...Ha re felletsoe rea lapeng mane, rea thusana, le bona ha ba se na letho ba tla mona”
(Most of the year we have sufficient food from the fields...perhaps around April/May we start running out of food, but by that time we are already close to harvest season in winter...When we run out of crops we get some from our extended family, we help each other, they also ask for assistance from us when they need help.)

In Lesotho, winter starts officially in June, which is also the time during which people harvest crops such as maize and sorghum from the fields. However, although this respondent expressed satisfaction with their food supply, particularly of high-energy foods such as maize (a staple food from which people make mealie meal to cook as a starch) and beans for protein, she indicated that sustaining a living was generally difficult, because of their household’s unemployment situation.

“Ha ho se na motho ea sebetsang ka tlung ho thata, u ka ba le papa, empa ha u hloka sesepa, mafura, tsoekere, o oa ts’oenyeha” (When there is no one who is employed in the family, it makes for a difficult life, you can have food, but when you don’t have other necessities such as soap (or washing detergent), cooking oil, sugar, you suffer).

Conversely, unlike this landed family, the landless family in the same category – category two – were experiencing far worse difficulties. For this household of five with no employed

member of the family, mere access to food was a struggle. Only two meals a day was normal for them, and rarely did they have access to protein-rich foods. Their meals generally consisted of starch and vegetables, mainly cabbage. To put this family's situation into context, they were resettled from Molikaliko in Mohale. Prior to resettlement, they owned one field. However, to support their livelihood, they also had a garden, and access to natural resources from which they accessed brushwood, water, etc. In the new settlement, they have very limited access to natural fuel resources, they have a small garden from which they grow vegetables, but they have no field. They were given a once-off cash compensation for their single field, which, according to the respondent, was only enough to sustain their living during their initial transition stage.

As a result, their standard of living had deteriorated significantly in comparison to their previous life. Their plight was exacerbated by a lack of natural resources in the new areas, which would have ideally supplemented their lack of financial income. In comparison with the landed family in the same category, this landless family was far less food-secure, while the landed family was relatively food-secure. The two families were in a similar employment situation, with none of the adults in the household being employed at the time. The households were also not significantly different in terms of the family sizes, but their level of food sufficiency differed, partly due to the differences in access to arable land.

Another landless family in category four, a family of eight with two fully employed members, demonstrated a contrasting situation from the landless family in category two, presented above. This family was also resettled and owned no land in the new area, and although it is a bigger family, their level of food sufficiency was higher in comparison to the landless family discussed above. They had access to three meals a day, including protein-rich food a few days a week. While the respondent from this family expressed disappointment with forced resettlement, owing to their experienced losses, their food supply was relatively more sufficient than many in the same community, and this she attributed to two of her adult children in the household, who were both employed full-time. However, according to her, in terms of being self-sufficient, their living standard had deteriorated compared to their previous life, where, as a family, they had five fields, tens of livestock, and gardens in the yard from which to subsist.

“... 'na ne ke le morui 'm'e oaka, le ha ke fihla mona ke fihlile ka 37 ea likhomo...ke na le masimo...hona joale ke phela ka ho khaketsoa ke bana ba na baka, ha e ne e se

ka bona nkabe ke bolaoa ke tlala...” (I used to be self-sufficient, I had fields, livestock, even when I arrived in this area I had 37 cattle...now I am fully dependent on my kids, if it wasn’t for their support I would be starving).

The landed family in the similar category 4, with one employed member, also demonstrated a relatively better standard of living. Not only were they food-secure from being able to produce crops enough to last them nearly the whole year from their multiple fields, but they also had a regular income from the single bread winner. Because they were able to meet their basic food needs in a more sustainable manner, they were also able to develop in other areas, such as accumulating furniture, extending their house, etc.

The general analysis of the families and their standard of living showed that there is a direct link between landlessness and food insecurity. Notwithstanding, the analysis also showed that families that did not own arable land but had reliable sources of financial income, also demonstrated sufficient access to food requirements. However, it was also revealed that productive land alone is not adequate in sustaining a living, particularly in the context of peri-urban and urban areas where living expenses are higher than in rural areas. Some landed households with no reliable means of financial income demonstrated difficulties in meeting basic needs other than food. The inability of affected people to acquire alternative arable land after resettlement – as discussed in the previous subsection – or to acquire other sustainable means of livelihood, may be linked directly to the reality of food insecurity, a basic form of impoverishment.

9.4.4 From community disarticulation to community reconstruction

The involuntary resettlement of families from their original areas to new ones not only dismantles longstanding means of livelihood, but also disrupts established social networks, social institutions, and kinship ties (Cernea, 2000:30; Eguavoen and Tesfai, 2012:55; Tabucanon, 2012:9; Witter and Satterfield, 2014:1395). People, particularly in less economically developed contexts, rely significantly on established social networks and the social capital embedded in them to sustain their livelihoods. This can be expressed through acts of cooperation, financial assistance among neighbours and family members, or providing community-based health and social care (Bayat, 2005:6; Cernea, 2000:30; Portes, 2000:48; Rogers and Wang, 2006:52). This established order may be disrupted when people are involuntarily resettled. Yet, implementing agencies rarely implement measures to address such non-material losses (Cernea, 2000:30). As a result, the consequences of community

disarticulation in forced resettlement tend to be long-term and have deeply rooted effects (Cernea, 2000:30; Takesada, 2009; Tamakloe, 1994).

The studied resettled and relocated people in the Mohale resettlement case indicated various ways in which social networks and community ties were an integral part of their livelihoods. This includes social arrangements through which people cooperated in land cultivation, community-based healthcare, and financial assistance among neighbours and family members. Although this aspect is often greatly disrupted in forced resettlement, this study reflects a less significant disruption of kinship ties that resulted from forced resettlement. This is largely due to the manner in which resettlement was implemented, where the affected communities had an option to resettle as groups. Also, as shown earlier, in many cases where people chose to resettle as individual households, it was to reunite with other family members.

In consideration of the inevitable dislocation of communities in forced resettlement, the LHDA put in place a number of measures to mitigate the negative effects of social disarticulation among affected communities. One such measure was to resettle people in groups, and to create new communities for them in the new areas, where they could maintain their community ties. Ha-Ratau, one of the study sites in this research, is an exemplar in this regard, where 34 households were resettled into the area, and a new village was designed for them on the periphery of their host community, as shown in Figure 9.1 above. As one LHDA official stated, this was meant to ensure that affected people were able to transfer their social networks and social ties into the new areas.

“We wanted to ensure that people do not lose their neighbours, their families, and other important networks in their lives...people were free to choose wherever they wanted to be resettled, and some people wanted to relocate or resettle with their neighbours or families, so we made sure to move people in groups where they chose so”.

As far as the objective of resettling people in groups was concerned, in ensuring that people maintained their community and kinship ties, the studied households reflected that this objective has been successful in most cases. The excerpts below retell some of the replies from respondents regarding their neighbourly arrangements in the new areas.

“Boholo ba rona mona re tloha bakeng se le seng, re ne ntse re phela ‘moho koana moo re tlohang” (Most of us here are from the same area, we were neighbours in our original areas).

“Mona ha re le tjena re lelapa, ke moholoane ka ngena, mane ke lapeng, che ‘m’e o s’a setse a le mong esale ntate a re siea...” (We are all clustered here as a family, this side is my brother’s house, and over there is our parents’ house, our mother lives there by herself since our father passed on).

“Bobeli ba ona matlo ana ha a le joalo ke a bara ba ka, le Matebeleng koana ba ne ntse ba haile haufi le lapeng” (Both of those houses belong to my sons, even in our old area in Matebeleng their houses were closer to ours).

The four studied households at Ha-Mohale are part of a group resettled together into the area. The 18 studied households at Ha-Ratau were all resettled from the same area consisting of smaller villages. Hence, people from the same villages were placed together in such a way that households kept the same neighbours as prior to resettlement. For example, people from Matebeleng are clustered in one area and those from Ha-Seotsa in another, within the same village of Ha-Ratau. The two studied households from Ha-Makhalanyane are a part of an extended family that was resettled as a group. The five households studied at Ha-Mosalla, two of which are closely related families, were also resettled from the same area. As a result, most resettled and relocated people were able to transfer their community and kinship ties into the new areas, through which they could continue to provide social support amongst each other. The studied people also derived economic benefits and livelihoods from their social networks.

However, because some of those social networks were facilitated by the use of productive assets and common property resources prior to resettlement, the loss of such resources had an impact on such networks after resettlement. An example is the social arrangement known as *letsema* (plural - *matsema*), which translates to ‘working together’, where community members cooperate in labour-intensive activities, such as land cultivation, the threshing of dry crops, etc. (Robertson, 1987; Turner, 2005). In the event where people lose arable land and access to common property resources to resettlement, such an arrangement may lose its relevance. In the studied households, 31 out of 40 households owned land prior to resettlement, and only two of them were able to acquire alternative land after resettlement.

Conversations and observations with some hosts revealed that among landed host community members, social arrangements such as *matsema* were prevalent, and that people relied on them when working in the fields or in other labour-intensive activities. At the time of the fieldwork at Ha-Ratau, one host family organised *letsema* to thresh their harvested beans. The excerpt below was extracted from a conversation with a respondent from that household.

“...motho u ke ke oa etsa mosebetsi oa masimong u le mong...rea kotulisana, le matsema re ntse rea etsa ha re pola...” (...you cannot really work alone in the fields, we help each other when harvesting and in threshing dry crops).

Hence, although many among the resettled and relocated people maintained their community and kinship ties after resettlement, many were not able to transfer some of their social networks and arrangements that supported their livelihoods into the new areas, due to their inability to recover lost arable land and common property resources, which facilitated those networks. This outcome is reflective of the strong link between the social and spatial aspects of people’s lives and livelihoods, particularly in a rural milieu. As De Wet argues in the socio-spatial change analysis, discussed earlier in Chapter Three, when people are resettled, not only are they separated from their physical environment, but they also lose the resource base that supported their livelihoods, facilitated by established social networks and arrangements (De Wet, 2015).

In order to deal with the reality of landlessness, some of the resettled people resorted to sharecropping (*seahlolo* or plural - *liahlolo*) with their landed hosts, in order to mitigate food insecurity and related forms of impoverishment. Although it was argued earlier that in many cases, resettled people are often left to their own device to re-establish disrupted social networks after resettlement (Cernea, 2000:30), in the studied Mohale case this process was a combination of both the initiative of affected people and that of the LHDA. Later discussions in Chapter Ten on participation will discuss the programmes initiated by the LHDA in this regard.

However, sharecropping was not a new practice among the affected people in this case, as it had always been part of the means of livelihood among landless households prior to resettlement. As shown earlier, 9 of the 40 studied affected households did not hold land prior to resettlement, and respondents from these households indicated that they used to rely on sharecropping with landed family members or other community members. One of the respondents from such a household relocated to Ha-Koporala in Mohale indicated:

“Ts’imo eona ne ntse ke sena eona, feela ne ntse re phela ka lihloho...” (I had no field but we used to subsist on sharecropping...).

Sharecropping is a social arrangement that two parties enter into – the landless and the landed – to collaborate in land cultivation, and can be based on different conditions. In the studied Mohale case, the conditions usually included the exchange of labour by a landless party for a share in the produce, the use of the landless party’s livestock to cultivate for a share in the produce, or the landless party contributing towards seeds and ploughing costs for a share of the produce with the landowner, as also indicated by Robertson (1987) and Turner (2005) in their writings on sharecropping in Lesotho. The sharing of yields does not necessarily have to be equal, as it is dependent on the agreed rate between the two involved parties, based on the contribution from each stakeholder. The types of contracts people enter into in sharecropping varies from one context to another; see for example Kassie and Holden (2007) on sharecropping among kinsmen in Ethiopia, Sadoulet, et al. (1997) on sharecropping in a specific context in the Philippines, and Sharma and Drèze (1996) on sharecropping in a specific Indian context. Some of the resettled people at Ha-Makhalanyane, who used to sharecrop when they first arrived in the new area indicated:

“Seahlolo se sebetsa feela ka hore na uena le motho oa hau le lumellana joang...le ka lumellana ka hore ea se nang ts’imo o tla sebetsa ebe o fumana lijo ha ho kotuloa, kapa ha u na le liphoofoho u sena ts’imo le ka kopanela temo ebe le arola lijo...” (Sharecropping depends on what the two parties agree on...the two can decide to exchange labour for a share of yields with a landless partner, or if one person has livestock but no land, one can broker an agreement with a landed partner to cultivate together and share the produce at the end...).

“Ha le lema lihloho, e mong a ka fana ka ts’imo e mong a lefella peo, ebe le arola lijo...” (When you sharecrop a landed partner offers a field and a landless one incurs seed and cultivation costs, then the two share the harvest at the end...)

However, like many other forms of social networks or arrangements, sharecropping is reliant on mutual trust. Therefore, the effectiveness and sustainability of sharecropping is dependent on sustained social relations. That is, sharecropping is likely to be sustainable if it is integrated into pre-existing social ties between the involved parties and not initiated as an isolated partnership. Kassie and Holden (2007:180) and Sadoulet, et al. (1997:395) argue that kinship networks are often most effective in facilitating sustainable sharecropping

partnerships, based on the permanency of the relation, and the likelihood of mutual trust embedded in the relationship.

Because relations between kinsmen or other longstanding social ties are significant in more ways than one in the social existence of the involved parties, there is often a socially-reinforced incentive to remain loyal to each other; and this sense of loyalty can be instrumental in sustaining sharecropping. In the studied cases, people used to sharecrop with family members or other community members with whom they had strong, usually long-term social ties prior to resettlement. As some respondents indicated, sharecropping in such contexts was customarily accompanied by trust and mutual loyalty between partners, which sustained relations, and by extension, sustained the livelihood facilitated by those relations.

“Re ne ntse re phela ka liahlolo, empa rona koana batho ba ne ba ts’epahallana”
(Sharecropping has always been a part of our livelihood, but in our old areas people were faithful to their agreements).

“Liahlolo tsa rona koana li ne li le monate ka hore motho o n’a kopanela le batho bao a ba tsebang, bao le thusanang ka lintho tse ngata, joale mona o tla bo kopane le batho bao o sa ba tsebang ho qeta...ba sa ts’epahaleng...” (In our old areas, sharecropping was easier because we used to collaborate with those we knew well, and were inter-dependent upon, but now one may enter into partnerships with unfaithful people he barely knows).

As a result of losing land to resettlement, many landless families had to find sharecropping partners outside their longstanding social ties, mainly with landed host community members. As some respondents stated, the landed partners were those with whom the resettled people had no pre-existing social relationships, and the only connection that existed was the sharecropping arrangement. Hence, there was no social incentive for landowners to be loyal to their partnerships, and this resulted in the breaching of the terms of agreement by landed partners. As one respondent at Ha-Makhalanyane narrated, he identified a number of abandoned fields that belonged to some host community members in the new area. Through his interactions with the hosts, he identified one landowner with whom he pursued a partnership in sharecropping.

“We decided to cultivate some maize and agreed that we would share the yields equally, even though his only contribution was the field. My family incurred all cultivation costs [both labour and financial] from buying the seeds, hiring a tractor

for ploughing, weeding, etc. but we had no choice, the land was his...when the time for harvesting drew close, I started hearing stories that there were people who were stealing from the field at night...upon an investigation it turned out that he was behind all the stealing, that he was the one who was selling the maize to the people who roasted and sold it in town...In the end we did not even get half of the financial value we had spent on the whole cultivation process... ”

In another case at Ha-Makhalanyane, the landless family had a fall out with the landed partner close to the time of harvest. According to the landless respondent, the initial agreement was that the landless partner would cover the financial cost of buying seeds and hiring a tractor, but the two parties – the landed and the landless – would both work in the fields to weed and harvest. Then the two families would equally share the produce. However, as the time drew nearer to the harvest season, the landed partner began to raise issues that were never part of the agreement:

“...then he told me that he had to employ extra people for weeding, but the agreement was that each person would bring his own team to weed, and how one pays those people is between each partner and their team...my children helped me to pay people who contributed to weeding, but he wanted us to share the produce with the people he involved from his side...I said that is not what we agreed on...he took the issue to the chief, and he knew that he had a better advantage in the case because he is the landowner, and we did not write down our agreement, so it was going to be my word against his...eventually I decided to let him have his way...My heart is broken, I want nothing to do with sharecropping in this area.”

In the absence of trust and reciprocity, sharecropping arrangements can be susceptible to a breach of promise or social contracts (Kassie and Holden, 2007:180; Sadoulet, et al., 1997:395). Long established social relations and the trust embedded in them often help to sustain reciprocal, mutually beneficial agreements among individuals who rely on the networks – whether wholly or partially – for their livelihood (Bagnasco, 2004:230). Hence, where there is no mutually reinforcing sense of belonging to a network, it becomes an isolated arrangement with no social value.

Another important issue that came out of the conversations with respondents on sharecropping – from those who were able to find relatively reliable sharecropping partners – was a new dynamic that resulted from the national initiative by the government of Lesotho to

sharecrop with landowners. This initiative by the government was implemented due to the evident decline of crop production resulting from both the unpredictable, changing climate and the land under-utilisation (Kingdom of Lesotho, 2004:40). Some of the reasons for the decline of land utilisation include reduced agricultural revenue as a result of lower production (Kingdom of Lesotho, 2004:36). This was confirmed by some respondents among the landed hosts at Ha-Ratau – some of whom are presented in Table 9.8 above – who showed that although they have land from which they were able to subsist, employment opportunities remained their greatest need. This is because with land alone as a means of livelihood, they are unable to meet other basic needs apart from food.

Additionally, soil degradation, rural-urban migration resulting from industrialisation – among other factors – as well as education and career aspirations among young people, are some of the reasons cited for the decline of crop production and land under-utilisation (International Monetary Fund, 2012:89; Kingdom of Lesotho, 2004:36; The Lesotho Review, 2015). Although male labour migration to South Africa, which was the main form of migration in Lesotho in the 20th century, declined drastically since the turn of the 1990s, new migration patterns have arisen (Gordon, 1981:59; Van Blerk and Ansell, 2006:6). From an estimated 60% of the Basotho male workforce who were engaged in the South African mining industry in the 1980s, the number had gone down by half in the mid-1990s, and down to only 17% in 2006 (Crush, et al., 2010:12).

However, in parallel with the decline of male migration, new migration patterns arose. These new migration patterns have resulted in mostly young people, and in particular young women, migrating internally or to South Africa, to work in the textile industry, and as domestic workers respectively (Boehm, 2006:154; Rocchi and Del Sette, 2016:22). Traditionally, women have largely been the ones who were actively involved in agricultural production in Lesotho, within the context of male labour migration to South Africa (Safilios-Rothschild, 1985). In this context, the contribution of men to agriculture took mainly a financial form, while the actual labour was the contribution of the women and children who were left behind (Kingdom of Lesotho, 2004:37; Safilios-Rothschild, 1985). However, writers such as Kishindo, et al. (1993:7) argue that only about 40% to 50% of landholdings were managed by women whose husbands were away working outside the country. Nevertheless, despite these variations, the contribution of remittances towards agricultural production in Lesotho, and the active involvement of women in agriculture in the absence of

their husbands, are indisputable (Kingdom of Lesotho, 2004:37; Kishindo, et al., 1993:7; Makoa, 1997:9; Safilios-Rothschild, 1985).

As a result of the decline in male labour migration to South Africa, and therefore the reduction of remittances, the financial support that facilitated agricultural production has, in turn, declined nationwide (Kingdom of Lesotho, 2004:37; The Lesotho Review, 2015). This, together with the factors mentioned above, have all contributed to the decline of land utilisation and of crop production in Lesotho (International Monetary Fund, 2012:89; Kingdom of Lesotho, 2004).

To put the decline of crop production in Lesotho into context, the contribution of agricultural production to the country's GDP dropped significantly from 20% in the 1980s to 8% in 2012 (International Monetary Fund, 2012:89). By 2004, Lesotho was producing only "thirty percent of its total food requirement" (Kingdom of Lesotho, 2004:37). That means 70% of the total food requirement was imported, typically at a higher regional market price (ibid:37). By 2015, the demand for imported food had gone even higher, reaching up to 90% of the total food requirement per year, particularly for crops such as wheat and beans (The Lesotho Review, 2015). This decline led to a resolution by the government to subsidise small farmers in order to improve agriculture in the country, by providing financial support towards production of main crops – maize, sorghum, beans, and wheat (International Monetary Fund, 2012:89; The Lesotho Review, 2015).

As testimonies from two landed hosts who have benefited from this subsidy indicated, under this arrangement, the government incurs the costs of seeds, fertilisers, ploughing, and weeding. Then the harvest is shared on a 70:30 ratio, with the state getting 70% of the crops and the landowner getting the remaining 30%. The programme, which was first implemented in the 2012/2013 agricultural season, resulted in increased grain production that year, reaching "154 000 metric tonnes compared with an average of 42 000 metric tonnes in previous years" (The Lesotho Review, 2015).

While the programme provided much needed financial relief for landowners and was evidently successful in improving national crop production, in the studied cases, specifically at Ha-Ratau, it affected some social arrangements that had until then contributed to the livelihood of landless families. The programme destabilised sharecropping arrangements between landless sharecroppers and landowners, as the former's contribution toward crop production was no longer needed by government-subsidised landowners. As one resettled

respondent stated, she had been sharecropping with one landed host family for about three years prior to the implementation of the government subsidy, after which she had not been able to secure an alternative sharecropping partner.

“Re ne ntse re lema seahlolo empa mong’a ts’imo o ile a re nyahlatsa ha ‘muso o se o ba lemela” (We used to sharecrop but the landowner deserted us when the government implemented agricultural subsidies).

Another respondent from the host community who benefited from the government subsidy indicated that, prior to the government’s intervention, she used to engage people to assist her with weeding, and she would pay them with grain. For each day they worked, they received one bowl measure (approximately 5 to 7 kg) of grain at the end of the harvest season. The assistants were landless members of the host community, who were unemployed, and, therefore, this formed part of their livelihood. With the government’s intervention in place, their services were no longer needed, because the government engages the use of machinery to weed. As a result, people who relied on exchanging their labour for grain are excluded in this regard.

While this outcome is not the direct result of resettlement, landless resettlers who benefited from sharecropping, and those who could potentially benefit in the future, are excluded from benefiting as a result of this intervention. As indicated earlier, social networks had always constituted part of the means of livelihood amongst the affected people prior to resettlement. However, interventions such as this government subsidy influenced the ability of the resettled people to re-establish livelihoods attached to social networks and arrangements. The complexity of forced resettlement is such that the implementation of resettlement policies, and the initiatives of the resettled people to re-establish their lost livelihoods, is always undertaken within the wider social, economic, and political contexts (Devitt and Hitchcock, 2010:71; De Wet, 2006). Hence, the policies, programmes, and interventions implemented at the national, regional and even community levels, may influence resettlement processes, and the ability of affected people to re-establish their lost livelihoods after resettlement.

Interdependence creates an environment conducive for cooperation and the establishment of networks, but where there is no mutual reliance, cooperation becomes less appealing. Sharecropping patterns, for example, shifted from a situation where resettled people sharecropped with those in their longstanding community ties or kinsmen, to sharecropping with less known, landed host community members. Because in many cases extended family

members and longstanding neighbours all lost arable land, those who wanted to continue with land cultivation had to find alternative sharecropping partners. As illustrated above, the sense of loyalty and reciprocity in the newly formed social networks did not resemble those of the previous, stronger social networks.

Hence, although many resettled people continued to live in close proximity to their old neighbours and family members, their social networks and ties could not allow them to transfer all the benefits after resettlement. This is partly because, as argued earlier in reference to the socio-spatial relationship analysis, while some livelihoods were sustained by these social networks, they were also linked to the physical environment from which the resettled and relocated people were separated.

Prior to resettlement, the use of natural resources, which were mutually owned by the community, facilitated social networks and community ties. These communally owned resources were not only used for survival, but also as the proverbial glue that bound members together and strengthened their social fabric. For example, grazing land created a common space in which users co-existed, and through traditional rangeland management mechanisms such as seasonal grazing, people had arrangements and structures that regulated the common use of these shared spaces (Government of Lesotho, 2014:8). However, these were dismantled by forced resettlement.

In the next subsection, common property resources in the studied Mohale region are explored and how forced resettlement affected their availability and use. In addition, the discussion will explore the implementation of the policy provision aimed at addressing the loss of common property resources. The LHDA initiated community development projects, which were aimed at compensating affected communities for lost common property resources, and for community infrastructure development in the new areas. The initiative was designed in such a way that it would also facilitate the integration of resettled and relocated people within their host communities. However, in some cases the same projects became a source of conflict between the hosts and the resettled people, and the discussion in the next chapter on participation will discuss this in detail.

9.4.5 From expropriation to restoration of community assets

In less economically developed areas, common property resources (CPRs) form a significant part of people's livelihoods, and are often based on the natural environment, such as grazing

land, water bodies, forested areas, etc. (Beck and Nesmith, 2001:119; Cernea, 2000:29). Where livelihoods are significantly reliant on these resources, the failure to either provide alternative ones or to establish new forms of livelihood after resettlement, can have devastating consequences on those affected (Cernea, 2000:29). Although Cernea (2000:29) argues that the loss of CPRs is often not incorporated into compensation strategies by implementing agencies, the LHDA's Phase 1B policy presents a contrasting case in this regard.

As stated in the policy, the LHDA recognises the loss of CPRs including grazing land, brushwood, medicinal plants, useful grasses, and wild vegetables, and makes provision for compensation accordingly (LHDA, 1997: Section 11.5). In addition to compensation for lost community assets in the form of natural resources, the policy makes provision for community infrastructure development in the new areas, or renovation of old ones where necessary, in terms of lost or affected public amenities such as schools, church buildings, dips, clinics, woolsheds, and water infrastructure (ibid.: Section 12). This subsection forms a discussion on the implementation of this policy provision.

In the studied cases, resettled/relocated people indicated that they lost access to natural resources such as river water – as they were situated along the Senqunyane River – and natural springs, from where they collected drinking water. The region also had grazing land, which enabled many people to keep livestock. Twenty-seven of the 40 studied households indicated that they kept livestock prior to resettlement, and of the 27, only 8 still had livestock at the time in which the fieldwork was conducted. The scarcity of grazing land in the new areas, as well as difficulties in adjusting to the new environment, were indicated by respondents as possible reasons for the subsequent deaths of their livestock after resettlement, as indicated in the excerpts below.

“...ha ke fihla mona ke fihlile ka 37 ea likhomo, eaba ntse li shoa li bolaoa ke tlala ke ho hloka lekhulo, hona joale ke setse ka tse tharo...” (...when I first arrived in this area I had 37 cattle, and they died of starvation due to a lack of grazing land, now I only have 3 left...).

“...le liphoofolo ne li le teng, kea bona ke ho hloloa ke sebaka tsa shoa...” (...we had livestock too but I think they could not adjust to the new area, so they died...).

“Liphoofolo! Ne li le ngata, joale mona ke lehoatata, li bolailoe ke tlala...”
(Livestock! I had a lot, but due to a lack of grazing land in this area they subsequently died ...).

Both the resettled and relocated groups cited the scarcity of grazing land. This means that even for those who relocated within the Mohale region where they had hoped to have better access to natural resources including grazing land, as reflected in the excerpts in Subsection 9.4.2 above, the consequences were not significantly different from those who were resettled outside the Mohale region.

Some writers argue that where livelihoods are heavily reliant on CPRs, the degradation of such resources over time is predictable (Jodha, 1985; 1989). For Jodha, the decline of CPRs can be a result of a combination of factors, including the inevitable growth of the population, general physical degradation due to regular, unregulated utilisation, and in some cases institutional reforms of land use (1985:253; 1989:263; 1990: A68). In this regard, even outside the context of forced resettlement, the availability of CPRs may be expected to decline over time.

Hence, in some cases, communities that rely on natural resources have, for a long time, engaged traditional or indigenous mechanisms to regulate the use of natural resources, in an attempt to sustain these resources (Berkes, 1993:67; Kellert, et al., 2000:706). However, the challenge with traditional resource management mechanisms is that, in the neo-liberal, macro-economic context, attached to industrial and infrastructure development, as well as institutionalised environmental conservation, local interventions may be undermined by economically-driven market or state interventions (Leach, et al., 1999; Mehta and Kellert, 1998, 321). Therefore, the efficiency of local resource management mechanisms may be hampered in this regard.

In the case of the Lesotho highlands, of which the Mohale region is a part, traditional natural resource management, such as rangeland management, were inhibited by, among other issues, a lack of adherence to seasonal grazing patterns, physical barriers created by the development of new settlements, changing land use patterns, as well as the Lesotho government’s policy that prevents transhumance (Government of Lesotho, 2014:8). In this context, it may be argued that the scarcity of grazing land in the Mohale region is not a direct result of forced resettlement. However, it is argued in this thesis that while it may be the case, the acquisition of land for the construction of the dam, which reduced access to natural

resources for affected people, coupled with the development of new settlements for the relocated people, put greater pressure on remaining natural resources. As a result, the scarcity of resources in the relocation areas may be a combination of a variety of factors, including forced resettlement.

Brushwood also formed part of the significant forms of fuel resources for affected people in Phase 1B. Access to natural fuel resources such as brushwood and firewood were some of the reasons why some chose to be relocated within the Mohale region, as they believed that they would still have access to these resources. However, as reflected in the excerpts in Subsection 9.4.2 above, respondents from areas such as Ha-Mohale, Ha-Koporala and Ha-Ts'iu, all in the Mohale region, raised serious concerns over a lack of natural fuel resources. As one elderly respondent at Ha-Koporala indicated, at times they are compelled to buy brushwood from people who collect it on the mountain, for M25 to M30 per bundle. However, the respondent is one of the few households with fully employed member(s), as depicted in Table 9.5 above; for the majority of the unemployed, buying brushwood is an unsustainable expense.

Ha-Koporala is the area in which the third largest group of people were resettled – 22 households – after Ha-Makotoko and Ha-Ratau, with 36 and 34 resettled households respectively (LHDA, 2007: Appendix A). Hence, although respondents, including the local chief in the area, indicated that the area is generally dry and rocky, the additional 22 households resettled into the area added to the demand for natural resources from the already burdened landscape. Hence, it is argued that the scarcity of natural resources is a combination of factors including forced resettlement.

Useful grasses were also indicated by respondents as one of the natural resources that supported their livelihoods prior to resettlement. It is common cause in the rural areas of Lesotho that houses are ordinarily thatch-roofed, hence thatch formed a fundamental resource that contributed towards the construction of houses prior to resettlement. In addition to building their own houses, some people also used to collect thatch and roofed houses for other people as their means of livelihood prior to resettlement. Hence, forced resettlement which denied affected people access to such resources has, in turn, deprived them of a livelihood; as one respondent indicated.

“Ha u phela sebakeng, u ithuta maleba-leba a teng...’na ke ne ke hela joang ke rulella batho matlo, joale mona ke hloka maneri...” (When you live in an area, you

learn certain survival skills...I used to collect thatch and roof other people's houses, but in this area I have no options).

Prior to resettlement, the survival skills upon which many people relied were attached to the natural resources embedded in the physical environment. In the absence of such resources, such survival skills are rendered unusable. This corroborates Cernea's assertion in the IRR model discussed in Chapter Three, that when people lose access to their physical capital, their acquired skills may lose relevance in the new areas, where no supporting resources are present (1997:1574). As indicated earlier in Subsection 9.4.4, even in cases where people were able to transfer their social networks and ties into the new areas, in the absence of certain natural resources, such as land, some of the networks could no longer yield the same benefits as before. In the same manner, the survival skills attached to the availability of resources such as thatch become unhelpful to those who possess them, when they move into areas where people ordinarily use corrugated iron to roof their houses, as is the case in the peri-urban and urban areas of Lesotho. Other useful grasses lost to resettlement were those used for making traditional Basotho hats, which some people sold to tourists and even to the local people.

Wild vegetables were also part of the losses that resettled people experienced as a result of forced resettlement. As some respondents indicated, prior to resettlement, basic food resources were seldom the reason to spend money. Not only did they rely on land for crop production, but also on the natural environment for the provision of wild vegetables. Wild vegetables such as *tenane*, *leshoabe*, *bobatsi* and *theepe*, were mentioned by the resettled respondents as some of those they had access to before resettlement.

"Ne re kha meroho ea Sesotho bo tenane, leshoabe..." (We used to get Sesotho vegetables such as *tenane*, *leshoabe*...).

"Meroho ea Sesotho, bo bobatsi...le theepe ha kere e ne e le teng hohle moo, hona joale motho o lakatsa le theepe..." (Traditional vegetables, such as *bobatsi*...and *theepe* were easily accessible, now one craves even the mere *theepe*).

In accordance with all these and other losses at the community level, the LHDA's Phase 1B policy makes provision for the establishment of new forms of livelihood after resettlement (LHDA, 1997: Section 11.5). As indicated in the policy, compensation for lost communal resources is provided to resettled communities in a form of cash, either on an annual basis or

as a lump-sum (ibid.: Section 11.5). The policy, however, does not indicate the number of years that are covered in this regard.

The amount offered for lost communal assets is calculated on the basis of the estimated cost of alternative resources or services in the resettlement areas, and then multiplied by the number of households resettled or relocated into a particular area (LHDA, 1997: Section 11.5). That is, for the loss of brushwood, the cost would be equivalent to the cost of alternative fuel in the designated areas, converted from the estimated energy value of the lost brushwood resources (LHDA, 1997: Section 11.5.2). For the loss of medicinal plants, the amount offered is equivalent to the estimated cost of medical care in the new areas (LHDA, 1997: Section 11.5.3). However, the complication with regard to the cost of medicinal plants is that, unlike fuel resources, where the estimation may be based on the most commonly used type of fuel in the designated area, such as paraffin, gas, or electricity, there are different types of medicine, and at any given time, people require different medicines for a variety of reasons. Even within households, medicines used by members and the frequency at which it is needed, broadly vary. Hence, to estimate the cost of alternative medicine in the new areas as the policy stipulates is a rather complex provision.

The compensation amount for lost useful grasses and wild vegetables is estimated on the basis of the cost of alternative resources in the designated areas (LHDA, 1997: Section 11.5.4 & 11.5.5). For lost grazing land, the policy does not clarify how the calculation is undertaken (ibid.: Section 11.5.1). As indicated by both the resettled/relocated respondents and LHDA officials, all the estimations were calculated by the LHDA officials, and the affected people were only informed of the amount due to each affected group.

In addition to compensation for lost common property resources, Section 12 of the policy provides for compensation for all lost public infrastructures such as schools, clinics, church buildings, water sources, woolsheds and dips (LHDA, 1997: Section 12). Compensation for lost community infrastructure is provided through the construction of alternative infrastructure in the new areas, or by repairing old ones where necessary (ibid.: Section 12).

The implementation of communal compensation was undertaken through community development projects, which were meant to help establish alternative means of livelihood for affected people in the new communities. One LHDA official indicated:

“We realised that there are scarce natural resources in the areas where people were resettled or relocated...Because the affected people depended on natural resources, there was a need for other means of livelihood after being moved. So income generating projects and other community development projects were meant to help improve their lives after resettlement. The policy says we have to make sure that the lives of the people are, at least, restored or improved after resettlement and relocation...”

The implementation of compensation for the loss of both common property resources and community infrastructure, in a form of community development project and community infrastructure development in the new areas, will be discussed in detail in Chapter Ten on participation.

As with the loss of arable land due to forced resettlement, the loss of common property resources is one of the most difficult forms of impoverishment to prevent. The provision of alternative common property resources is dependent on the availability of natural resources in the new settlement. Furthermore, the inevitable consequence of forced resettlement is such that the acquired land denies people access to land and natural resources on which they were reliant, putting more pressure on the resources in the areas to which they resettled. Hence, even in cases where natural resources are or were available, the added pressure from more users can lead to a speedy degradation of such resources in the areas of destination.

As reflected in the Mohale region, the people who relocated within the vicinity of their old areas indicated that they chose those areas believing that they would have better access to natural resources; instead, they found that the resources were scarce. While the scarcity of resources in areas such as Ha-Koporala did not begin with the arrival of the relocated people, as the chief indicated that the area is generally a natural resource deprived area, the arrival of more households put even greater pressure on the already burdened resource base. This, therefore, defeated the objective of the relocated people of having better access to natural resources such as fuel resources, grazing land, etc.

Furthermore, as argued in the above subsection in reference to De Wet's Socio-spatial change analysis, discussed in detail in Chapter Three, the spatial changes that come with forced resettlement not only affect access to natural resources embedded in the physical environment, but also disrupt the social arrangements that are organised around the use of such resources. The complexity of forced resettlement is such that its consequences are

interlinked. Hence, the loss of access to land and natural resources in the studied cases affected social arrangements such as *matsema* and sharecropping among affected people, because these arrangements are organised around the use of land and natural resources. As a result, as argued earlier, even in cases where affected people were able to transfer their social ties and networks into the new areas, they were not able to derive the same benefits as before resettlement from these networks, because their benefits in those networks were strongly linked to the physical environment

Cernea (2000:29) thus recommends that due to the limitations related to the provision of alternative common property resources after resettlement, alternative means of livelihood should be sought instead, to re-establish lost livelihoods in the new areas for affected people. As the discussions in the next chapter on participation will show, the LHDA designed and implemented a strategy that was meant to establish new forms of livelihood in the new areas for the affected people. The outcomes of such initiatives are reflected in the next chapter. The next subsection presents a discussion on the risk of marginalisation, and how the LHDA, through its policy implementation, attempted to mitigate this risk.

9.4.6 From marginalisation to social inclusion

The economic and socio-spatial changes that come with forced resettlement impose the risk of marginalisation on affected people in the new areas (Cernea, 2000:26; De Wet, 1995; 2015). The risk and reality of marginalisation is multi-faceted, which means it can be expressed in various forms. Economically, the risk of marginalisation can be imposed on affected people when they lose access to fundamental resources, including household and community assets and resources, which leaves them economically vulnerable and less secure (Timsina, 2002). Socio-spatially, resettled people become marginalised when they lose access to the physical environment in terms of which they organised their social and cultural lives (Mburugu, 1994:49; Thanju, 2007:4). Furthermore, resettled people may be displaced and marginalised by new spatial arrangements in the new areas, which are different from the ones they are accustomed to (De Wet, 1995).

In the studied Mohale Dam resettlement cases, the factors that caused marginalisation among the affected people were multi-dimensional and interwoven. The forms of livelihood sustained by affected people prior to forced resettlement were organised around a combination of the physical environment, social networks, and social arrangements. Hence, the removal of the affected households from the physical environment and the resources

embedded in it dismantled the system as a whole, affecting the social, economic and spatial aspects of the affected groups of people.

In accordance with the risk of marginalisation, the LHDA used its common property resources compensation strategy – discussed in the next chapter on participation – to facilitate the integration of resettled people into new communities (LHDA, 1997: Section 11.5). This was implemented through joint community development initiatives, which sought to bring together the resettled/relocated people and the hosts into a common space (LHDA, 2007). As one LHDA official explains:

“...these initiatives [from common property resources compensation] were the means of contribution of the resettled [or relocated] people to the development of the new communities, to also encourage the hosts to be willing to share their existing resources with the incoming members...”

However, the implementation of these initiatives brought with it new issues, which in some cases, resulted in conflict between resettled/relocated people and their hosts. This dynamic was more pronounced in the cases of Ha-Ratau, Ha-Makhalanyane and Ha-Mosalla. Interviews with both resettled people and the hosts revealed that in these areas, the shared benefits of lost common property resource compensation became a source of conflict. As one resettled respondent at Ha-Ratau indicated, the resettled people were the ones who suffered the loss of access to natural resources, and not the hosts. Hence, she could not understand why they had to share the benefits of compensation, when they suffered the losses exclusively as described in the quote below.

“...joale ho thoe re arole chelete le baamoheli, empa ke rona ba lahlehetsoeng, bona ha ba lahlehelo ke letho” (...and they say we must share compensation for common property resources with the hosts, but we are the ones who suffered the losses, the hosts lost nothing).

Other comments taken from among the resettled from Ha-Mosalla, Ha-Ratau, and Ha-Makhalanyane indicated that, although they were told they needed to share their compensation with their hosts because they (the resettlers) would also benefit from access to natural resources – grazing land, natural fuel resources, etc. – in the new areas, there was insufficient natural resources in the new areas.

“Ho ne ho itsoe re arole chelete hobane le rona re tlo sebelisa lihloliloeng tsa bona ha re fihla mona, empa ha lieo le ho ba teng lihloliloeng mona” (We were told to share our compensation funds with them [the hosts] because we would also be using the natural resources in this area, but there are no adequate natural resources in this area).

“...lihloliloeng tseno tseo ba neng ba buile ka tsona ha lieo ha nka ka u joetsa...ne re na le liphoofolo ha re fihla mona, likhomo li supile, linku re li bala ka mashome, ha re na letho hona joale, li bolailoe ke tlala hobane ha hona lekhulo mona...” (...the natural resources they spoke about are not even there...if I can tell you, we had livestock when we arrived in this place, seven cattle and tens of sheep, but now we have none...they all died of starvation because of the scarcity of grazing land...).

“Ntho’e re e sokolang ka ho fetisisa mona ke libeso...ha re tsebe na re li nka kae, joale le ha u na le phoofo-nyana, ha u tsebe hore na u e pheha ka’ng” (...our biggest struggle in this area is fuel resources...we don’t know where to get them...even when one manages to get some mealie meal, the problem is fuel resources to cook).

On the other hand, one LHDA official showed that the rationale behind sharing common property resource compensation between the hosts and the resettled/relocated people was that, when people are resettled into an area, they share pre-existing resources with the hosts. Whether it is water resources, grazing land, or other community resources that the resettled people find in the areas to which they are moved. Hence, as the implementing agency, they saw it fit to also allow the hosts to share the benefits of compensation with resettlers. Furthermore, the official indicated, as quoted below, that this was also meant to prevent conflicts over resources between the hosts and resettled community members, which could result in the marginalisation of the new members.

“In the past, there were incidents of conflict ensuing between the resettled people and their hosts over resources; the hosts complaining that now more people are being brought into their areas to exploit their resources...This strategy was, therefore, meant to ensure that there are shared benefits and cooperation between the two parties, to avoid conflicts and the exclusion of the resettled people.”

This outcome of the shared benefits strategy causing the very conflict which the implementing agency was planning to avoid, is indicative of the complexity of forced

resettlement presented by De Wet, as discussed in Chapter Three. According to De Wet (2006:187; 2015:88), some aspects of resettlement appear to be potentially unamenable to the technical nature of resettlement planning. This is partly because the implementation of resettlement processes takes place within the wider contexts, which have their own pre-existing social, economic and political dynamics. While in some cases such factors may facilitate the implementation of policies on the ground, in others they may actively impede implementation processes.

In addition, the rationale for shared benefits notwithstanding, one limitation with sharing compensation benefits between the two groups in this case is that the estimations and calculations for cash compensation amounts were done on the basis of the number of people resettled/relocated into an area, as provided for in Section 11.5 of the policy. These amounts were not inclusive of the hosts (LHDA, 1997: Section 11.5; 2007: Section 10.6). As later discussions will show, there were also some inconsistencies regarding the shared benefits strategy, as in some cases, the designed projects were implemented to only benefit the resettled people, and not the hosts. Consequently, in terms of the financial value for lost common property resources, the resettled people received less than the value of their losses, because they had to share their compensation with hosts who were not included when the financial value of those losses were calculated.

Hence, the objective of the LHDA to encourage cooperation between the resettlers and the hosts – which in itself is a positive initiative – came at the expense of resettlers' compensation, fundamentally because of how it was calculated. This reflects that, as argued earlier in Chapter Five on the discussion of policies, policy measures which are aimed at restoring previous living conditions and not to improve them, will almost always lead to impoverishment. This is, in part, due to the inherent complexities of resettlement, which De Wet (2006; 2015) outlines in greater detail, that may actively set the outcomes of such policy provision below the target.

Furthermore, because of a lack of natural resources in the new areas, resettled people did not receive the promised benefits of pre-existing natural resources. In addition, because resettled people lost productive assets such as land from which they derived their livelihood, their plight of food insecurity was worse than that of their landed counterparts. The subsection on food insecurity demonstrated this assertion. As a result of a combination of the loss of land and natural resources suffered by the resettled people, and a lack of alternative resources in

the new areas, resettled people found themselves economically displaced and marginalised after resettlement.

Moreover, resettled people in some cases are socially and spatially marginalised in the new areas, because of the way in which their new settlements are organised. In particular, at Ha-Ratau and Ha-Mosalla, where new villages were designed for resettled people on the periphery of the host villages – naturally because of where available land was situated – the new spatial arrangement reinforced a sense of segregation between old and new community members. As a matter of perception, this came out in conversations with both resettled people and their hosts, from the language they used to refer to each group, as well as the observed reluctance of the two groups to socially interact with each other, across the resettler-host boundaries.

The issue of social intermingling is especially pertinent because the resettled/relocated communities in the studied cases are now in their third stage of resettlement, that of Community Formation and Economic Development, as outlined in Scudder's stage framework. At this stage, as discussed in Chapter Three, resettled people are expected to begin experimenting with new forms of livelihood and initiating the establishment of new social networks (Scudder, 2009:41). Although the initiation of new social networks is partly influenced by the amount of time resettled people have lived in the new areas, it is also dependent on the behaviour and attitudes of both the resettlers and the hosts (ibid.:37). Hence, some people take longer than others to integrate with their hosts, depending on the availability of opportunities, activities that facilitate interactions between the two groups, as well as the attitudes of the people involved (Scudder, 2009:41).

In the two cases of Ha-Ratau and Ha-Mosalla, for example, relations between the two groups – resettlers and hosts – were evidently weakly tied, even though resettled people had been in the area for over ten years. This could be construed from some of the hosts' and resettlers' narratives exemplified below:

“..likarohano tsona li ke ke tsa fela ha feela bafalli ba ntse ba inka e se batho ba mona...ha likhohlano li ba teng, oa utloa e ntse ele lona batho ba mona tjena...le rona baamoheli ka ho ts'oana, oa utloa e ntse ele, bafalli tjena...ha li ahe lipuo tse joalo...” (...divisions will not end until the resettlers see themselves as part of this community...whenever conflicts arise, each group blames the other ...that approach is not constructive).

“...re qelisana le batho bana bao re fihlang le bona feela, ka motseng ka mane teng boholo ba rona mona ha re kopane le bona...le ho ea ‘na ha nkebe ke ee...” (...most of us resettlers, we help each other amongst ourselves, we do not really mingle with the hosts...personally I never even go that side...).

“Ache, ha re kopane oa tseba le batho baa ba fihlang...ke hore ba phela koana re phela koana...nkeke ka re ke batho bao re phelisanang le bona...” (Well, we [the hosts] do not really associate with the resettled members...we live separate lives...I cannot say we cooperate).

The spatial arrangement in these cases reinforced the sense of division, in that the defined lines of physical separation between the new and old settlements did not encourage frequent interaction between the groups. Although one respondent indicated that when there are funerals among the hosts, the resettlers do attend and vice versa, this seemed to only enable occasional interactions, and could not facilitate any lasting relations. However, within each group – the resettlers and the hosts – community ties were evidently stronger, with members of each group interacting frequently, even spending long hours visiting each other, and helping each other with basic needs.

Marginalisation is one of the long-lasting consequences of forced resettlement. As Cernea (2002:26) asserts in his analysis of the risks of impoverishment – discussed earlier in Chapter Three – marginalisation may result when people lose economic power through the loss of assets, resources, and opportunities, leading to both socially and economically defined forms of segregation. The effects of socially defined forms of marginalisation can be prolonged by the fact that, because of its intangible, complex nature, it is often not correctable through financial or technical means. Also, even where activities are designed to encourage cooperation and inclusivity, the effectiveness of such activities is significantly dependent on the willingness of both groups to bridge the gap of division. A sense of interdependence is essential in this regard, and can only be channelled when there is a mutual understanding between the involved groups. In this regard, implementing agencies may be unable to ensure that resettled people are not socially marginalised, if either or both groups have no will to eliminate exclusion.

Economically-defined marginalisation is often a result of a lack of opportunities available for resettled people. In the studied cases, economic marginalisation was reinforced by the loss of resources and assets upon which livelihoods were dependent, and not being able to establish

new ones after resettlement. As the next chapter will show, due to the inability of the planned alternative means of livelihood to live up to the objectives of the implementing agency, resettled people continued to be subjected to further economic hardship.

Often there is no clear line of distinction between economic and social marginalisation, because the two can be mutually reinforcing. An example is where resettled people are denied resources and opportunities in the new areas, because they are regarded by hosts as outsiders, and therefore not entitled to resources and opportunities. This can prevent resettled people from transitioning out of economic hardship, which may, in turn, perpetuate socially-defined marginalisation, based on the economic status of excluded resettlers. In the studied cases, although there was no evidence of resettled people being denied resources in the new areas, their loss of fundamental assets such as land put them a notch below their landed counterparts, in terms of attaining food security, particularly in cases where resettlers were unable to re-establish new forms of livelihood.

Spatial arrangement is also an important factor that can either facilitate or deter inclusiveness. This, however, brings out the issue of complexity in forced resettlement, because the manner in which new communities are designed may be a direct result of where land is available for resettled people, and often this is outside the control of implementing agencies. Where residential plots within the old villages are all occupied, the resettled people can only be situated on the periphery.

9.4.7 From joblessness to re-employment

The risk of joblessness is more prominent in urban areas, where people lose their jobs in the cities and surrounding areas to resettlement (Cernea, 2000:24). However, in rural areas, the risk of joblessness is still applicable, where people lose employment in the agricultural sector or in forested areas (ibid.:24). In contexts such as India, agricultural employment of labourers in rural areas is quite common; hence, some segments of the rural population can lose jobs to forced resettlement in such contexts (Mahapatra, 1999:203), and the discussion of the Indian ethnography in Chapter Thirteen will later show this. In the studied Mohale Dam resettlement case, however, the risk of job losses was predominantly inapplicable among the affected people, but rather, of the loss of other means of livelihood attached to land and natural resources.

As previously indicated, the majority of the affected people who inhabited the Mohale region subsisted on small scale agriculture (LHDA, 1995d; Thabane, 2000:639). Because of the limited income generating economic activities in the Mohale region, employed members of households would have taken up jobs outside the Mohale region, either in the urban areas of Maseru city, or elsewhere outside the country, likely in the mining industry, or as domestic workers in South Africa, as indicated earlier. The South Africa Department of Home Affairs, through its amnesty for Basotho living and working in South Africa illegally, was able to document nearly 130,000 Basotho living in South Africa, many of whom were employed as domestic workers (Department of Home Affairs, South Africa, 2016). In addition, labour migration to South African mines constitutes about 17% of the male labour force in Lesotho (Crush, et al., 2010:12). As testimonies from respondents reveal, at least five of the studied households had members who were employed in South African mines at some point in their lives. However, forced resettlement would have not resulted in the loss of jobs in this regard.

Nonetheless, because resettled people lost certain aspects of their means of livelihood to resettlement, this subsection explores alternative means of living that affected people resorted to after forced resettlement. It can be argued that because people did not lose jobs on account of forced resettlement, there is no obligation on the part of the LHDA to make provision for alternative forms of employment. However, that people lost their livelihoods attached to land and natural resources to resettlement, even if they were predominantly non-monetary, obliges the LHDA, as an implementing agency, to provide for alternative means of subsistence. The next chapter will explore in detail the measures taken by the LHDA to establish alternative forms of livelihood for affected people after resettlement, and how that unfolded in practice. As the chapter will show, because of the failure of these initiatives to re-establish livelihoods for affected people, many of them were forced to find alternative means on their own.

As reflected in Table 9.5 above, only 6 of the 40 studied households had fully employed members, 2 had self-employed members, 4 had members employed on a part-time basis, while the majority, 28, had no employed member of the household. Among the households that had either employed (part-time or full-time) or self-employed members, 2 were part of those relocated within the Mohale region, while the rest were part of those resettled outside the Mohale region.

There are a number of factors that enabled affected people, particularly those who were resettled in the peri-urban (and urban) areas, to seek and possibly secure employment or self-

employment opportunities, more than their counterparts who remained in the rural Mohale region. Among these factors was the change of lifestyle that the resettled people were subjected to in the new settings, which came with significant reliance on financial resources. Another factor that facilitated employment or other income opportunities in the peri-urban (and urban) areas is proximity to the city, where there are more economic activities than in the rural areas such as Mohale.

In this context, people who were resettled in the urban and peri-urban areas were more likely to secure employment or other means of income than those who remained in the rural areas. To demonstrate this assertion, in the studied peri-urban areas, there were many of the resettled people who had migrated internally or outside the country, in search for job opportunities. Of the 34 households resettled to Ha-Ratau, for example, only 18 houses had people who lived in on a full-time basis. Two houses were permanently vacant because the owners have passed on, while the rest were only occasionally occupied because the owners had migrated in search for wage labour. Many of the resettled people who migrated in search for jobs were reported to have gone to either Maseru city or to South Africa.

In line with Scudder's FSF, in stage three of resettlement, that of Economic Development and Community Formation, resettled people can be expected to start exploring alternative means of living and initiating economic development, both within and outside their initial areas of resettlement (Scudder, 2009:41). Hence, as evident in the studied cases, resettled people were exploring other income opportunities including seeking employment opportunities elsewhere. Although this is not an isolated trend, as indicated earlier that internal labour migration has been slowly, but steadily growing in Lesotho, it is argued here that in this particular case, the incidences of migration among the resettled people were largely a result of resettlement; as the affected people were compelled to find alternative means of living, having lost fundamental productive assets to forced resettlement.

However, employment opportunities were said to be generally scarce, as some respondents who remained unemployed indicated that they had been searching for jobs to no avail. This can be linked to two factors; the first is the scarcity of employment opportunities nationwide, such that in the 2014/2015 financial year, the Bureau of Statistics Lesotho reported that the national unemployment rate had risen to 40%. The second factor is that in its policy, the LHDA made no provision for employment-based rehabilitation measures, in light of the permanent losses of productive assets imposed on affected people. Nevertheless, in

consideration of the first factor, employment-based rehabilitation could have possibly been extremely difficult for the LHDA to achieve. In particular, it would have been difficult in the context where there is no national resettlement policy, which could provide a framework for collaborative efforts between key economic players such as the private sector, government institutions, etc., to partake in implementing measures such as employment-based rehabilitation. Later discussions in Chapter Sixteen will explore this argument greater detail.

9.5 Conclusion

The reality of forced resettlement is that it is often accompanied by unavoidable losses for those who are forcibly moved. Although implementing agencies may commit to mitigating the negative effects of forced resettlement, as outlined in Section 4 of the LHDA compensation policy of 1997, the complexities of resettlement and policy implementation are such that the outcomes do not always reflect the intended objectives. As the above discussions have shown, among some of the most difficult negative consequences of resettlement to mitigate are landlessness, loss of common property resources, marginalisation, joblessness and community disarticulation. However, this is not to indicate that the others are trivial to re-establish or to mitigate, but the ones identified above are more difficult to address because they are partly dependent on factors which may be beyond the control of implementing agencies.

The prevention of landlessness through land-based resettlement is dependent upon the availability of land in the areas of destination. In many cases, however, including in the above discussed Mohale resettlement case, the scarcity of land can be inhibiting. In the studied cases, the scarcity of arable land was so impeding that only less than 10% of the studied households were able to gain alternative arable land in the new areas. The same outcomes apply to the recovery of lost common property resources, which is also dependent on the availability of natural resources in the new areas. Although Cernea (2000:29) prescribes that alternative forms of livelihood, such as employment, be sought to replace lost forms of livelihood, the implementation of these alternative measures may also raise new challenges.

The provision of employment is a complex form of livelihood to re-establish because its implementation is influenced by the wider economic climate, which can either facilitate or deter the provision of employment. The high rate of unemployment at the national level in Lesotho is an example of one of the inhibiting factors that can prevent the effective implementation of this objective. In the case of the LHWP, however, the provision of

employment is not incorporated in the policy. Instead, alternative forms of livelihood were implemented in the form of community development projects, to make up for lost common property resources, and the next chapter on participation will explore this matter in more detail.

The prevention or mitigation of the effects of marginalisation and community disarticulation can be complex to implement, partly because they are not only dependent on the ability of the implementing agency to initiate measures to mitigate them, but also on the response of the affected people to such initiatives. In this regard, as reflected in the above discussion, resettled people and their hosts may be reluctant to initiate social integration, even when they have been in the same areas for a long time. Notwithstanding, the facilitation of community building and community integration requires an enabling environment, of which the arrangement of settlements is a part. The arrangement of new settlements in relation to those of the hosts can either facilitate or deter interactions between the two groups. Hence, the spatial arrangements in the new area can be instrumental in the processes of community re-articulation and resettler integration into the host community. However, the complexity of this is such that the design of new settlements is dependent of where available residential land is available for the resettled people.

The complexity of preventing food insecurity stems from the fact that it is reliant on the ability of households to transition out of poverty after resettlement, because food insecurity is a basic form of poverty or reduced standards of living. However, the resettled households can only transition out of the predictable decline of living standards shortly after resettlement, if there are enabling factors such as provision of employment or other forms of livelihood, provision of land in the new areas, provision of common property resources, etc., all of which, as indicated, are dependent on factors which may be beyond the control of implementing agencies and affected people.

Conversely, homelessness may be the least complicated form of impoverishment to overcome, provided there is political will to commit sufficient resources towards house reconstruction. As the case of LHWP has demonstrated, of which the Mohale Dam is a part, compulsory provision of house reconstruction as opposed to cash compensation is an effective way to ensure that homelessness is prevented. The implementation of the LHDA Phase 1B policy has proven to be effective in preventing homelessness in this sense. The

studied case of the Chandil Dam resettlement in India, discussed in Chapter Thirteen, presents a contrasting case with a different outcome in this regard.

The inherent, negative consequences of forced resettlement, coupled with the inability of implementing agencies to mitigate them all, or even most of them, calls for a paradigm shift in the way development projects that induce forced resettlement are viewed, and the approaches adopted to implement them. The pragmatic stance employed in most decision-making processes during the initial planning stage of resettlement, is an area that begs for more exploration. To support this assertion, discussions on participation in the two case studies in the next chapter and in Chapter Fourteen will engage this in greater detail.

10 Chapter Ten: Participation in the Mohale Dam Resettlement

10.1 Introduction

The participation of affected people in development projects remains one of the key factors associated with the effectiveness and sustainability of projects (Chifamba, 2013; Dungumaro and Madulu, 2003; Isham, et al., 1995; Narayan, 1995; Stein, 2001). Earlier discussions have revealed some of the fundamental limitations that have come out of forced resettlement projects, one of which is a lack of participation of the affected people (Dwivedi, 1998:147-148; Fahim, 1983:169; Gandhi, 2003:487; Scudder, 2005:195). The participation of affected people enables implementing agencies and other stakeholders to better understand the magnitude of the impact of a project, and how to mitigate the negative effects inherent in forced resettlement (Cernea, 2000:2).

Hence, to improve resettlement processes, some projects have begun to engage the affected people more actively in the planning and implementation of resettlement projects, and the policies of resettlement have been instrumental in this regard (LHDA, 1997: Section 15; The World Bank, 2016: Section G.53). The LHDA has not been an exception in this area of improvement, and has incorporated strategies to engage the participation of the people primarily affected by processes of resettlement (LHDA, 1997: Section 16; 2007: section 11). In this chapter, the discussion forms an exploration of participation strategies provided for in the LHDA policy of Phase 1B, how the policy provisions were implemented, and the outcomes reflected on the ground. The chapter will focus on two areas of implementation; the implementation of participation strategies in resettlement planning and compensation, as well as in rehabilitation processes.

Although the LHDA Phase 1B compensation policy does not have a component specified as rehabilitation, some aspects of its compensation provisions are meant to re-establish lost livelihoods of affected people in the long-term. Of particular interest is communal compensation which, as will be shown below, was meant to establish alternative livelihoods for affected communities who lost access to natural resources that supported their livelihoods to resettlement. To implement communal compensation for lost natural resources, the LHDA initiated community development projects that were thought to have the potential to provide alternative livelihood for affected people after resettlement (LHDA, 1997: Sections 11.5 and 12). These community development projects resulting from communal compensation will, therefore, be discussed in this thesis as rehabilitation measures under Phase 1B.

To inform the implementation of communal compensation through community development projects in the areas of destination, the LHDA developed a separate, specific policy under Phase 1B, the Community Infrastructure Development Policy (CIDP) of 2007 (LHDA, 2007). Sections 11.5 and 12 of the Phase 1B compensation policy make provision for compensation of lost common property resources – as discussed in the previous chapter – and the CIDP provides the basis for implementation, through community development projects (LHDA, 1997; 2008). Hence, the implementation of communal compensation, in accordance with the CIDP, as well as Sections 11.5 and 12 of the Phase 1B compensation policy, will be discussed later in this chapter under participation in rehabilitation processes.

The LHDA had earlier implemented training programmes in the Katse Dam resettlement project from 1990, under the Rural Development Programme, which subsequently failed, and later a new programme was launched under the CIDP. The Rural Development Programme was meant to capacitate affected people, many of them farmers, in skills development such as mountain horticulture and crop production, range management, intensive livestock production, and artisan skills (Ramaili, 2006:73-78). The programme was mainly targeted at rural, highland resettlers, as in Phase 1A, where all the relocated people were moved within the local region of the Katse reservoir in the Thaba-Tseka District (Thamae, 2006:78). Most of these skills were meant to create opportunities for self-employment, by upgrading the skills of affected people, based on the livelihoods they already had, such as livestock keeping, mountain horticulture, etc. Although the affected people had lost some of their land and access to natural resources, because they remained within their local regions, they still had access to some of the resources on which they previously relied. Hence, this programme was meant to enhance the capacity of affected people to increase productivity from these resources. This programme was later implemented during the initial stage of Phase 1B resettlement in the Mohale region.

However, after a series of assessments, it became clear that, partly due to funding constraints and the realisation that the developed skills were neither translatable into income generation nor to livelihood improvement, running the programme was no longer sustainable nor cost-worthy (Makoro, 2014:101). The programme was, therefore, closed down in 2002 (*ibid.*:101). Hence, in 2007, the LHDA launched a new strategy for community development in Phase 1B, one that included new income generating projects. The implementation of these programmes and the participation of affected people in this regard are discussed later in

Section 10.3 of this chapter. In the next section, the participation of affected people in resettlement planning and compensation processes is discussed.

10.2 Participation in Resettlement Planning and Compensation Processes

As with many development projects, the decision to construct a series of dams under the LHWP, one of which would be the Mohale Dam under Phase 1B, was made as an executive decision between the two governments of Lesotho and South Africa in 1986 (LHDA, 1986; Mwangi, 2007:8; Thabane, 2000:634). In this regard, the participation of potentially affected people was not incorporated at that stage. The participation of the affected people in Mohale Dam began with a feasibility study and planning of Phase 1B in 1995, as reflected in Table 9.1 above (Devitt and Hitchcock, 2010:70; LHDA, 1995b:1). Although the amended Phase 1B compensation policy was only launched in 1997, the feasibility study of Phase 1B had already started in 1995.

Retrospectively, Section 14 of the Phase 1B compensation policy prescribes the undertaking of a baseline study, which should provide an overview of the impact of dam construction and resettlement (LHDA, 1997: Section 14). At this stage, the affected people were involved in gathering all the information that would inform the implementing agency – the LHDA – and other stakeholders, of the magnitude of the potential impact of the dam construction and its accompanying resettlement (LHDA, 1995c:4). The information gathered from affected people included, among other aspects, the assets, resources and means of livelihood that they were going to lose as a result of forced resettlement (ibid.:4).

To facilitate the participation of affected people in resettlement processes, the LHDA initiated, in collaboration with affected communities, the establishment of committees at the local level, which would facilitate communication between affected communities and itself (Devitt and Hitchcock, 2010:78). These local committees are structured in two tiers; at the bottom is the Community Liaison Committee (CLC), comprising representatives of a cluster of villages (Devitt and Hitchcock, 2010:78; Thamae, 2006:90). At the top layer, representatives from each CLC make up a Combined Area Liaison Committee (CALC), elected by affected community members (Devitt and Hitchcock, 2010:78).

To ensure harmonious collaboration between the CALCs and mainstream local government, committees were integrated with pre-existing local government structures (Devitt and Hitchcock, 2010:78). At the community/village level, the governance structure consists of the chief, who is the head of the village, and the Village Development Committee (VDC)

responsible for planning and executing grassroots level development activities (Mofuoa, 2005:4). Hence, the local chiefs and representatives from the VDCs are part of the CALCs (Devitt and Hitchcock, 2010:78-79).

In implementing individual households' compensation, the LHDA interacts with individual households through its officials, including the Compensation Officer and Community Participation Officers based in Mohale. The LHDA also employs a Social Worker who is responsible for providing psycho-social support to affected families. During the planning phase, LHDA officials went to each affected household and recorded all their assets, resources, means of livelihood, etc., which would be lost to forced resettlement (LHDA, 1995a; 1995b; 1995c). For each family, two copies of the records were made, one to be taken by the LHDA, and the other to be kept by the affected family. These reports/records were later used in executing compensation.

There were mixed reactions from respondents concerning the manner in which the process of data collection was undertaken in the planning stage, and the implementation of compensation. Some respondents expressed satisfaction, while others indicated that it was not transparent, and some of their assets were omitted. As reflected in the excerpts below, some respondents complained about the omission of their fields, while others complained about the house, which had one less room than it ought to have had.

"I still have an abandoned field (moshoqa) which I have not been compensated for...they had not included it in the records...we took the matter to the Ombudsman...after some investigations, the Ombudsman ruled that, although the field is not inundated, I should be compensated for it because I have been resettled, hence will no longer be able to plough the field...the LHDA has still not compensated me for it, it has been years.."

"...we had two houses, but they were big in terms of floor sizes, and we were supposed to have been built a three roomed house of the same floor size...they only built a two roomed house...they [the LHDA] agreed afterwards that it was a mistake, but even today, they still haven't given us the money...all we get is empty promises..."

"I had eight fields...one was omitted...they said it was not affected, although part of the field was affected...we went to the Ombudsman...the investigation

did confirm that the field was affected...they [LHDA] compensated me for the field five years after relocation.”

However, although there were procedural flaws which negatively affected implementation processes, exemplified by the accounts stated above, the Ombudsman provided an avenue for the affected people to seek remedy from the LHDA. Nonetheless, as stipulated in the policy, external mediators ought to be the last resort, when all internal options for dispute resolution have been exhausted, and the complainant is still not satisfied (LHDA, 1997: Section 15). In the event that an affected person felt that they had not been fairly compensated, they had the option to communicate their grievances to internal structures, starting with the CLC, that would take the matter to the CALC, and then to the relevant LHDA official.

As respondents indicated, CALCs have been instrumental in facilitating communication between the affected people and the LHDA. There is also an option for affected people to personally go the LHDA offices to communicate their grievances, particularly for the relocated people who remain in the Mohale region, and can more easily access the local offices at Mohale. However, the challenge for many people is what they believe is the lack of responsiveness on the part of the LHDA in dealing with grievances effectively. As some respondents stated:

“Bothata ke hore o tla lula o ntse o ngola mangolo o sa qete, ho se na mohla o tla fumana thuso...mangolo ona khale re a ngola re a fa makomiti...” (The problem is that you will keep writing letters and giving them to the committee, but the LHDA does not respond effectively to the grievances...we have been writing letters to no avail).

In response to the above assertion, one senior officer at the LHDA indicated that in some cases, the problems are a result of misunderstandings. The officer gave an example of one respondent who regularly went to the offices complaining about an omitted field.

“...we tried to explain to her that the field she was complaining about had been compensated for, but the money was included in the compensation of the other fields for which she was already being paid annually...we even showed her the copies of the cheques, to show her that on certain years she received more than other people with the same field sizes, because her funds retrospectively included those of the omitted field...but she did not understand that.”

The planning and implementation of resettlement processes in Phase 1B were accompanied by some discrepancies. In some cases, people felt that the internal structures were incapable of bringing real solutions to the errors; as communicating their grievances through the committees yielded no positive outcomes. However, the availability of external structures provided needed avenue for the affected people. In other cases, and later discussions will show, affected communities had to seek legal recourse where the LHDA failed to provide their compensation accordingly.

10.3 Participation in the Rehabilitation Processes

As indicated earlier, rehabilitation measures in Phase 1B were implemented in the form of communal compensation for the loss of common property resources (LHDA, 1997: Section 11.5). These resources formed fundamental assets upon which the livelihoods of the affected communities were predicated. To make up for the loss of these resources, the LHDA initiated community development projects, which were aimed at generating income for the benefit of affected communities. These community development projects, developed from communal compensation, were designed to benefit both the resettled/relocated people and the host community members alike. The implementation of these initiatives and the outcomes thereof, are discussed below.

10.3.1 Communal compensation

In implementing the projects, each community was to come up with three plans, either as income generating projects, or those that would meet other needs or services such as water, electricity, roads, etc., based on the needs priorities of each community, as stipulated in the CIDP (LHDA, 2007: Section 11). As the LHDA official stated, the LHDA, through its officials and consultants, worked in collaboration with community members in developing the plans, to ensure that the plans were not only feasible, but could also be implemented in a manner that would ensure sustainability and long-term benefits for affected people.

The implementation of planned community development projects was to be undertaken by the affected people – both the resettled/relocated and the hosts. Although compensation was meant for all parties involved, to participate in and benefit from the projects, community members had to organise themselves in groups, and register a cooperative in each community through which implementation processes would be undertaken. In order to be a member of a cooperative, each household in each community had to pay a registration fee, which ranged from M10 to M15 depending on the community. Once the cooperatives had been registered,

respective amounts of compensation funds were deposited into the bank accounts of each cooperative.

Each cooperative had to elect, at a community gathering, a committee that would facilitate implementation processes, including financial management, and to liaise with the LHDA concerning those processes. Other committee responsibilities included sourcing and liaising with service providers, as well as purchasing equipment and resources. As one host respondent at Ha-Makhalanyane indicated, the elected committee was to be equally representative of both the resettled people and the hosts.

“Ha re khetha komiti, ho be le tekano ea bafalli le baamoheli...” (When we elect the committee, it must be equally representative of both the resettled and the hosts).

In the case of Ha-Mohale, in the Mohale region, cooperative members decided to embark on an electrification project to provide electricity to each household. Compensation funds would be used for wiring and for connecting each household. However, although the initial plan, as the LHDA official indicated, was that the projects would benefit all community members, in this particular case, only the relocated households benefited directly. As one of the former committee members asserted (shown in the excerpt below), because of the costs attached to this project, the funds were not sufficient to provide electricity for every household in the community. Hence, they concluded, in collaboration with the LHDA, that only the relocated households should benefit directly in this project.

“Ka ha ho kenya motlakase ho tura haholo, re ile ra lumellana ka hore re tla kenyetsa rona ba fallisuo a feela, le LHDA re ile ra lumellana le bona” (Because electricity installation is very costly, we decided that we would install it only in the relocated people’s households, we agreed with the LHDA on this matter.

However, because the cost of electricity installation is associated with the proximity of a house to the nearest power connection pole, having electricity in the village would also, indirectly, benefit the hosts, by bringing connection poles closer to them, and thus reducing connection costs for host community members.

In the cases of Ha-Ts’iu and Ha-Koporala, also in the Mohale region, planned projects included the purchase and installation of hammer mills in the communities, which would be available for use by all community members, at a small cost. Cooperative members in the two communities – Ha-Ts’iu and Ha-Koporala – also planned small income generating projects

such as chicken and pig breeding. In order to capacitate members of the cooperatives, whose previous livelihoods were primarily based on natural resources and subsistence farming, as shown earlier, the implementation of income generating projects was preceded by training-of-trainers workshops. These workshops were organised and paid for by the LHDA, for the selected group of people, chosen by a cooperative body in each community. As one respondent who took part in the training stated:

“Na ne ke le e mong oa ba ileng ba koetlisoa...re ne re ithuta ka khoebo ea likhoho le lifariki, hore na re li hlokomela joang, khoebo e tsamaisoa joang, joalo-joalo...”
(...I was one of the people who attended the workshops...we learned about the business of chicken and pig breeding...).

In the case of Ha-Ratau, cooperative members also decided to use compensation funds to purchase a hammer mill, and to install community water taps, which would benefit all members of the community. The hammer mill was a means of income generation, as community members would make use of it at a cost of M5 per 20kg of grain. The plan was that these funds would be saved into the cooperative bank account, controlled by the elected committee, who were accountable to the LHDA. The accumulated profits would then be shared among members of the cooperative periodically. Collected funds would also be used to pay two staff members, a cleaner and a mill operator, on a monthly basis.

In the case of Ha-Makhalanyane, cooperative members decided to have water taps installed. In addition, members decided to a certain portion of the compensation funds to cultivate a communally owned field, which was offered by the local chief, and all members of the cooperative would share the yields at the end of the season.

Lastly, in the case of Ha-Mosalla, seven years since the launching of the project, community members had still not decided on a project to undertake, as the two sides of the community – the resettled and the hosts – could not reach a consensus on key priority areas. The implementation of the projects was based on the requirement that community members decide on the projects that would meet their needs as communities, as shown below from the CIDP.

- “Each host community and its relocatees/resettlers will together determine sustainable development project(s) that they intend to implement with the funds available...” (LHDA, 2007: Section 11.1).

However, as one Community Liaison Committee member from Ha-Mosalla indicated, the two sides could not reach a consensus with regard to the project to be implemented.

“...bona ba batla metsi, rona re batla motlakase, joale e ile eahla eaba qhaqhang-qhang...” (...they [hosts] wanted water, we [resettlers] wanted electricity, and that led to a conflict).

Another point of contention that arose at Ha-Mosalla was a disagreement concerning which of the surrounding host villages should be included as beneficiaries. The area, to which the new members had been resettled, is closely surrounded by a number of villages, all under the governance of a common chief. The chief wanted to include all the villages in the sharing of benefits of communal compensation, a position that resettled people did not agree with. It was not clear, even from conversations with LHDA officials, what the measures for recourse were, in cases where people did not agree on their needs and priorities. However, an interview with an LHDA official revealed that, at the time the fieldwork for this study was undertaken in 2015, all projects had been put on hold; while the LHDA was revising their strategy for implementation, due to the failure of the already implemented projects across the different areas, as the next subsection reveals.

10.3.2 The outcomes of communal compensation projects

Three factors were behind the negative outcomes that resulted from the implementation of projects for communal compensation: (a) misuse and misappropriation of funds, (b) unsustainability of projects, and (c) a lack of capacity of community members to undertake the projects.

The elected committee members, elected by community members at a community gathering, were given control over all financial matters in a cooperative. That is, they had authority to withdraw money from the relevant bank accounts to use in the implementation of planned projects, and generally to exercise all relevant fiduciary duties. Where community members had agreed on installation project of electrification, for example, the committee was mandated to source service providers, purchase equipment needed for the installations, as well as to pay service providers when the job was done. This procedure applied to all projects. In cases where income generating projects were implemented, the committee was also mandated to collect revenues from the projects, and to deposit it into the cooperatives' bank accounts on a regular basis. The profits generated from the projects would be shared

among cooperative members periodically, although there was no specific time frame defined for the sharing of profits.

The lines of accountability were clear; the committees would account to community members at community gatherings organised by the local chiefs in each community, in collaboration with the committees, on a quarterly basis. At these gatherings, the committees would present progress and financial reports detailing the activities that had been carried out, how much money had been spent within a given period, and how much was left, if any. Additionally, the gatherings would serve to facilitate further planning for project development. At the end of each financial year, annual community gatherings would be organised, also by the local chiefs in collaboration with the committees, where the committees would present progress and financial reports for that financial year. The committees were also to submit progress and financial reports to the LHDA at the end of each financial year. From the interviews conducted with the resettled people, the hosts, as well as LHDA officials, there was no evidence that there were agreements in any of the projects, regarding how the profits generated from income generating projects would be shared among the members, and how often. As one resettled respondent stated:

“Re ne re so lumellane na lichelete re tla li arola joang, ha kere re ne re sa le qalong, e le hona re tla bona na re etsa bokae ka mor’a nako e kae, joale ebe re lumellana na re e arola joang...” (We had not yet agreed on how we would share the profits, we were only starting, and were yet to find out how much revenue we would generate, and then decide how to split the profits amongst ourselves...).

An important point to note is that, apart from the community gatherings, there were no other mechanisms put in place for community members to hold the committee members accountable, should they fail to account, and to do so timeously. The committees were to account annually to the LHDA, which meant that there were insufficient accountability measures beyond community structures. The issue of accountability is of particular significance, not only because of the risks associated with inadequate checks and balances, but also because the people who were given the responsibility to manage the finances, were those who had no prior experience of financial management. Moreover, there was seemingly no prior provision to ensure that they had the capacity to undertake the task – of financial management in particular.

Conversations with committee members revealed that, apart from the training-of-trainers workshops undertaken for those who managed chicken and pig projects, committee members were not exposed to any form of training related to financial management. This is despite their mandate to oversee large budgets, amounting to hundreds of thousands of Maloti, and millions in other cases, depending on the number of people resettled/relocated into an area (LHDA, 2007: Appendix B). As one of the committee members indicated:

“...che ha re ka ba ra fua koetliso...re ne re ts’epiloe feela hore re tla etsa mosebetsi ka bo ts’epahi...” (...we were not given any training; we were only entrusted to do our work faithfully...).

The procedure for electing committee members was based on perceived skills and knowledge. To put this into context, research undertaken by Sets’abi and Mashinini (2006:117), using a sample of the people resettled from the Mohale region, found that the educational levels of the resettled people were generally very low, with 31% indicating that they had no formal education, 61% having only primary education, and only 8% having some secondary schooling. In the studied cases in this thesis, the highest educational levels of the committee members was a secondary qualification, or a high school qualification, as it is known in Lesotho.

In electing the committees, community members were advised by the LHDA to take into cognisance the abilities that elected representatives would need to possess. These abilities include: the ability to read and write, at least in their home language, Sesotho, as they would need to read the agreement documents between the LHDA and the communities, as well as to write letters and to keep records. They were also advised to elect people who would be able to negotiate with other stakeholders, such as service providers, on behalf of communities. Some resettled/relocated and host community respondents indicate:

“Ba ne ba re re khethe batho ba tsebang ho bala le ho ngola...ba tla tseba ho bala litokomane tsa litumellano, ba tsebe ho boloka libuka, le ho ngola mangolo joalo-joalo.” (They [the LHDA officials] advised us to elect people who know how to read and write, who would be able to read agreements, to keep records, write letters, etc.).

“Ne re khetha batho ba khonang ho bua...beo re nahanang hore ba tla khona ho re buelella le ho oona morero...empa aoo!” (We chose people who are

articulate...whom we thought they would be able to represent us, even to the LHDA...but they disappointed us”

“E mong oa bona mono o na le form five, eena ehlile o oa li tseba lipalo” (One of the committee members has a form five [high school qualification], she has good numeracy skills).

While the ability to read and write is useful in understanding agreements and keeping records, which were essential in the implementation of the projects, it did not address the need for skills in managing finances and in fundamentals of project management. Evidently, the members of the committees did not possess the skills related to financial and project management. Therefore, the task which was allocated to the committee members, which was essentially to manage projects and large budgets, for which the committee members were not qualified, was one that required close monitoring and strict accountability measures.

As argued earlier, community participation in community development projects is often associated with the projects’ effectiveness and sustainability, in comparison with non-participatory development projects (Chifamba, 2013; Dungumaro and Madulu, 2003; Isham, et al., 1995; Narayan, 1995; Stein, 2001). This means that the involvement of primarily affected people in the affairs of their own development cannot be overstated. In an interview with one senior official at the LHDA, this was his take on the issue of public participation in the projects implemented by the LHDA:

“The plan was to allow communities to be in the forefront of their own development...to ensure that they take ownership of the projects. The LHDA provided support through training at the beginning, and communities had to take over from there...”

However, in order to enable the effectiveness of participatory measures, and therefore, the sustainability of community level projects, the capacity of those involved at the local level must be incorporated as part of the ongoing implementation process (Schouten and Moriarty, 2003:97). Hence, although community participation is vital in cultivating sustainability and in improving effectiveness, without ongoing institutional support, it becomes difficult for communities to stand on their own, particularly when they are not fully capacitated for the task. As Schouten and Moriarty (2003:97) argue, in many community development projects, the capacity-building component for those at grassroots level focuses mainly on “operation

and maintenance” and excludes management. Yet, certain categories of people at the local level are mandated to oversee or to manage implementation processes. As such, providing management skills to those responsible for overseeing implementation processes is an essential component of a community development project.

The above-stated argument by Schouten and Moriarty (2003) resembles the implementation of development projects in the studied Mohale case, where even though the committees were mandated to oversee and manage projects, including financial management, capacity building was not provided in this regard. As stated earlier, there is no evidence that – apart from the training workshops for those who undertook projects in chicken and pig breeding – there was any training for committee members who were to manage other projects and finances. In addition, regular monitoring and accountability measures, beyond community levels, were not put in place to provide the necessary, ongoing, support for the committees that were undertaking a responsibility of that magnitude for the first time.

Hence, the outcome on the ground reflected significant shortfalls in the implemented projects. Finances meant for community development projects were misappropriated in some cases, and in other cases, projects could not be sustained. In the case of Ha-Mohale, where misappropriation of funds became apparent, while houses of all relocated families were wired as planned, electricity could not be connected due to the shortage of funds. Conversations with relocated respondents, one of whom was a former committee member, revealed that funds were misappropriated. As a former committee member stated:

“’Na ne ke le e mong oa makomiti...chelete eona re e jele ke sitoa le ho qala maka...feela he e seng M25,000...M25,000 motho u ka be u entse ntho e kholo hampe!” (I was one of the committee members...we did embezzle money, I cannot even deny it...but it could not have amounted to M25,000...M25,000 is a lot of money, I would have done something substantial with it).

The specific amount of M25,000 came out of the cooperatives court, where the members of the committee were charged and convicted of fraud. However, the committee members took the matter on appeal, not because they denied committing the act, as the respondent stated, but because they disagreed with the amount the court concluded on. The issue of a lack of capacity in financial and project management was more pronounced in this regard, as it became clear that record keeping was poorly done, and finances were mismanaged. As one resettled respondent related:

“...ha re batla libuka, u utloa ho sa hlake hore na chelete e sebelitse joang hore ebe e se e felile...chelete eno e ne e le ngata ‘m’e!’” (...when we ask to see the records, it is not clear how all the money was spent...it was a lot of money).

It also became clear that other community members were aware that funds were being misused by committee members, as the excerpt below, from an interview with one community member, reveals.

“U n’u tla ba bona ba kena ka “4+1” ba kakatetse li plastic tsa li grocery...ba e nka kae chelete ba sa sebetse ba ts’oana le ‘na tje?’” (You would see them [committee members] arriving in a taxi with many plastic bags of groceries...and one would wonder where they got the money from because, just like me, they are unemployed).

A lack of ongoing monitoring and accountability is also evident in this regard. A significant amount of time passed, during which suspicious acts were observed by other community members, but actions were never taken timeously to address this financial misconduct. As one relocated respondent indicated, the committee members were observed in suspicious conduct over a significant period of time. One respondent, who was a committee member at the time, indicated that the electrical wiring of the houses took a couple of months, and a few times when they went to buy equipment, they also bought their own groceries with part of communal compensation funds.

“Ne re reka grocery ea rona ka thoko ha re ilo reka thepa... ho nkile li khoeli ho ntse ho oaearoa...joale e ne e re ha re ilo reka thepa, ebe ha re qeta re reka grocery ea rona...” (Whenever we went to buy wiring equipment, we would also buy our own groceries [with compensation funds]...it took a couple of months for all the houses to be wired).

Although it is not clear at what point the LHDA was informed about these matters, it is argued here that the absence of ongoing institutional monitoring and accountability mechanisms on the part of the LHDA is partly to blame for their delayed response. While the projects were left to the care of community members to allow them to take ownership of their projects, as an LHDA official was quoted saying earlier, the LHDA also has a mandate, as stipulated in the policy, to ensure that affected people are not led to inferior standards of living after resettlement (LHDA, 1997: Section 3.2). Hence, it was also the responsibility of the LHDA to ensure the effectiveness and success of the projects. The rationale for the active

participation of affected people did not strip the LHDA, as an implementing authority, of its responsibility to ensure the success of community projects, through ongoing monitoring and institutional support, particularly to the committee members who were hands-on in the implementation process.

In other cases, the failure of the projects was the result of not only poor management and a lack of accountability, but also of the unsustainability of the projects themselves, largely linked to the economic contexts in which they were implemented. In the cases of Ha-Ts'iu and Ha-Koporala, the hammer mills that were purchased as a means of income generation, were no longer operating at the time in which the fieldwork was conducted. This was due to the shortage of funds to maintain their operation, both in terms of paying personnel and servicing the machines. Although the hammer mill at Ha-Ratau was still being used by community members, evidence from the interviews revealed that the financial revenues from the use of the mill had not benefited either the resettled people or the hosts. As the excerpts from respondents at Ha-Ratau reveal below, the community gatherings in which the committee was to account financially had not been organised in years, and community members were left in the dark concerning financial matters of the project.

“Oa tseba ‘na ha esale ke qetela ha ho thoe ho tla etsoa pitso, re lo bolelloa na lichelete li eme joang, le hona joale re ntse re so utloe letho...” (You know we were last told that a community gathering would be organised, at which we would be updated concerning financial matters of the project, to this day the gathering has yet to be organised...).

“Taba ea lichelete tsa leloala e ts’oarisa hlooho hampe...ho lilemo esale re lebelletse hore sechaba se tla bitsoa, re bollelloe hore na chelete e se e ele bokae, le hore na lelapa ka leng le tla fumana bokae...ho thotse tu!” (The issue of the finances of the hammer mill is a stressful one...it has been years since we were promised that a community gathering would be organised, where we would be updated on financial matters...we are still waiting).

“...morena le makomiti ke bona ba lokelang ho bitsa sechaba, re tsebisoe hore na taba tsa leloala li tsamaea joang...empa ha ba bitse kopano ha hona ntho eo re e tsebang” (...the chief and the committee members are the ones who should call a community gathering, and let us know what the state of affairs is regarding the mill...but they have not called the gathering, we are left in the dark).

Although conversations with some resettled people revealed that there was a perception that the chief had been an ally in the misuse of funds by the committee – hence their reluctance to organise a community gathering – an interview with the chief revealed otherwise. According to the chief at Ha-Ratau, financial problems with the milling project had started with the previous committee, which had seemingly used the funds for their own gains.

“Bothata ba taba ena bo qalile ka komiti ea pele e ileng ea ipha chelete...” (The problem started with the first committee which embezzled community funds).

As a result, the operation of the mill is continuing under unclear circumstances, with regard to the management of finances. Although there was some revenue generated from the milling operation, there is no evidence that the funds were being used to support the livelihood of community members, as was the original plan.

Other small income generating projects had also fallen apart. The plan for the chicken and pigs project at Ha-Ts’iu and Ha-Koporala was that, after the first cohort had been sold which had been purchased through compensation funds, the returns would be used to buy more stock, and the profits would be saved to accumulate for the members to share periodically. However, these projects were short-lived, and a variety of reasons were cited for this. Some of the reasons for the failure of the projects are linked to the predominantly rural context in which the projects were implemented, and include a very small market, and the purchase of goods on credit, often leading to delays in payment or non-payment. These factors made it difficult for the projects to self-sustain.

“Ache! Batho ba ne ba reka ka sekoloto, e be ha ba patale ka nako, ba bang e be le ho patala ha ba sa patetse, joale ra qetella re sitoa ho boela re reka likhoho tse ling...” (Well, people used to buy on credit and did not pay on time or not pay at all, so we ended up not being able to purchase more stock ...).

Small businesses often survive and grow when they have a combination of a solid market and strong financial support at the beginning, to cushion them against any unexpected setbacks. But in this particular case, both factors were lacking. On the one hand, there were no recurring funds that could support the projects before they started generating sufficient profits to self-sustain; compensation funds used to start the projects were limited. On the other hand, these rural areas generally had limited economic activities, and they consisted mainly of unemployed populations. Just from the combined ten households studied in the two villages,

for example, only one had a member who was fully employed. As a result, the economic landscape in which the projects were undertaken could not aid these businesses to grow.

As a result of the failure of these community development projects, the intended objective of establishing alternative means of livelihood for affected people had not been realised at the time of fieldwork. In both sets of cases – where funds were misappropriated and where the projects were unsustainable – the targeted beneficiaries had not benefited financially from the initiatives. However, even the committee members who were engaged in the acts of financial misappropriation had seemingly not managed to re-establish their own livelihoods. As one respondent who was also in a committee indicated earlier, misappropriated funds were used to buy groceries, which is only a short-term gain with no lasting benefits.

Notwithstanding, while the failure of the strategies to re-establish livelihoods in this case can be attributed to the aspects discussed above, at the core of these limitations are the earlier discussed inherent inadequacies of cash compensation to make up for long-term losses (Cernea, 2000:23; 2003; 2008; Karimi, et al., 2009; Koenig, 2006:108; Maldonado, 2009). As Cernea argues, cash compensation may be susceptible to irregularities and delays (2003:41). Added to these likely limitations is that cash can also be used for purposes for which it was not initially intended, as the discussed cases revealed.

Moreover, where monetary forms of alternative means of livelihoods are pursued, the socio-economic context in which implementation takes place may impact on the outcomes of the initiatives. In poor or rural communities, where economic activities are limited, the impact of the social and economic setting can lead to negative outcomes. The above discussion clearly shows that the wider socio-economic context in the Mohale case was not conducive to the establishment of sustainable, income generating projects.

Although a lack of community participation has been cited by many writers as one of the key factors behind the failure or ineffectiveness of initiatives (Dwivedi, 1998:147-148; Gandhi, 2003:487; Scudder, 2005:195; Thamae, 2006:90), in the studied cases, the failure of the projects resulted, in part, from a lack of accountability measures to facilitate community participation. In addition, a lack of capacity, and the failure of the implementing agency, the LHDA, to make sufficient provision for capacity building, has also contributed to shortfalls in the establishment of alternative means of re-establishing livelihoods.

The LHDA bestowed an enormous amount of responsibility to small groupings of people who had inadequate capacity to carry out that responsibility, with limited accountability

measures put in place. The outcomes of these failed rehabilitation processes continue to show, in that the people who were affected, whose livelihoods had been taken away from them, continued to suffer, with no benefits yielded from the initiatives that were meant to improve their livelihoods in the long-term. In some cases, powerful, external, organisations are the ones that inhibit progress in community development initiatives, by designing and implementing projects in an exclusive, non-participatory manner (Cooke and Kothari, 2002). However, these studied cases show that even within communities who are invited to participate, power dynamics can be expressed amongst different groups of people, and where accountability measures are lacking, the results can be detrimental.

However, what these outcomes also reveal about resettlement is that, as De Wet argues in the inherent complexities approach to resettlement (2006), it is a problematic process, and some of its aspects may be potentially unamenable to routine planning. As the discussions above have shown, these community development projects were planned at an institutional level, and also involved the participation of affected people in an attempt to ensure effective and grassroots ownership of projects. However, the end results, partly due to contextual dynamics, have been significantly different from what was planned. It is important, therefore, that the implementing authority learns from previous experiences, and incorporates those lessons into future initiatives, taking into account a need for an open-ended approach to cater for the complex, multi-dimensional nature of resettlement processes (De Wet, 2005:277; 2006:199; Rew, et al., 2006:45).

10.3.3 The new approach to communal compensation

Following the evident failure of communal compensation projects, the LHDA resorted to a new strategy. As indicated by one of LHDA's senior officials, the LHDA decided to adopt an alternative and more controlled approach without diverging from the principle of community participation. In the new approach, instead of funds being in the possession and control of community members themselves through committees, the funds will remain in the LHDA accounts. All decisions concerning projects and their prioritisation remain the mandate of the affected communities. That is, community members will still decide what projects they want to implement with their funds, and which ones should be implemented first. Furthermore, procurement processes and the selection of service providers will be done in collaboration with community representatives. However, all aspects of financial management will be undertaken by the LHDA. All service providers will be paid directly by the LHDA, using the

money allocated for communal compensation, and community members will receive proof of payments in this regard.

Additionally, based on the evident unsustainability of income generating projects, partly due to limited economic activity in most affected communities, such projects will no longer be undertaken using communal compensation funds. Instead, community infrastructure such as road networks and other basic services such as water, electricity, etc. may be provided as according to the needs and priorities of the concerned communities. This, as the LHDA official stated, is meant to ensure that no money is lost to high-risk income generating initiatives, as has been the case before.

However, this new approach to communal compensation, informed by the 2007 Community Infrastructure Development Policy of the LHDA, does not address the need for the establishment of alternative means of livelihood among affected people after resettlement, leaving the communities exposed to greater risk. While community infrastructure is a necessary aspect of community development, it does not create the means for income among affected people who have lost their livelihoods to forced resettlement. The discontinuation of small income generating projects without an alternative means of income for affected people only leads to impoverishment.

In addition, the new approach does not address the issue of power asymmetries and power dynamics, particularly between the LHDA and the affected people. The LHDA, as an implementing organisation, wields power over the affected communities. Hence, further questions arise on what measures are available to community members to hold the LHDA accountable, should it fail to account or to do so timeously. There have been cases where the LHDA failed to deliver on their obligation to compensate communities, as well as individual households, for the loss of their assets. Examples include communal compensation funds which were not released timeously to the affected communities in Phase 1B – not included in this study – as stated in the submission of the Lesotho-based Seinoli Legal Centre to the World Bank (Seinoli Legal Centre, 2016:4). These communities include “Ha Lesaoana, Ha Nkhema, Masapong Ha Ntsi, Ha Sekete, Ha Phaloane, Ha Tsolo and Thuathe”, and some of them were only compensated after seeking legal recourse on the matter (ibid.:4).

Furthermore, evidence from this thesis revealed that administrative procedures and flaws have, in some cases, led to omissions of some affected people’s assets, which resulted in community members seeking intervention from the office of the Ombudsman. As reflected in

the excerpts below, a decade since the last group of people in the Mohale resettlement were moved, there were still outstanding settlements, which the Ombudsman had ruled in favour of the affected people, for which the LHDA was yet to implement remedial actions accordingly. The excerpts, from the interviews with the resettled respondents from Ha-Ratau, were corroborated by the households' reports filed during the feasibility study, and the reports of the Ombudsman. These excerpts are restated for emphasis on this matter.

“...we had two houses, but they were big in terms of floor sizes, and we were supposed to have been built a three- roomed house of the same floor size...they only built a two roomed...they [the LHDA] agreed afterwards that it was a mistake, but even today, they still haven't given us the money...all we get is empty promises...”

“I still have an abandoned field (moshoqa) which I have not been compensated for ...we took the matter to the Ombudsman...after some investigations, the Ombudsman ruled that, although the field is not inundated, I should be compensated for it because I have been resettled, thus will no longer be able to plough the field...the LHDA has still not compensated me for it, it has been years..”

This is indicative of the fact that there are limited options that community members have, through which they can hold the LHDA accountable in situations where the agency fails to account or to deliver on its obligations. Even so, there are no viable means through which affected people can enforce any recommendations or rulings against the more powerful entity – the LHDA – when it delays or fail to apply those remedial actions. In this context, further matters arise on power relations between the LHDA and affected communities, and how such dynamics will play out when the LHDA has all control on the management of funds. As some LHDA officials responsible for community engagement indicated, in some instances, bureaucratic procedures delay implementation processes. It remains to be seen, therefore, how the new approach will play out once it has been set in motion, and how the LHDA intends to ensure accountability and timeous delivery on their part.

10.4 Conclusion

While many writers agree on the necessity of public participation in ensuring effectiveness, some question the manner in which participatory approaches are implemented, and whether such approaches are capable of living up to the promises of participation (Buchy and Hoverman, 2000; Cleaver, 1999; Cooke and Kothari, 2002; Reed, 2008). In all development projects at the community level, there are factors that may facilitate or impede the

participation of affected people. Aspects such as: a lack of capacity; a lack of institutional will of implementing agencies to actively involve affected people; a lack of trust between affected people and implementing agencies; as well as a lack of clear structures or strategies to facilitate participation at the local level, have been identified by some writers as possible deterrents for active community participation (Narayan, 1993:43; 1995:48-49; Schouten and Moriarty, 2003:67).

Some of these deterrents applied in the studied Mohale resettlement cases, and came into play in the implementation processes. A lack of capacity was one of the major issues that came out in the above discussion. The committees at the community level, who were mandated to facilitate the implementation and management of the projects, were evidently incapable of delivering on their mandate. This was not only the result of not being qualified for the task and not having prior experience, but also of not being afforded the relevant training by the LHDA prior to taking up the assigned duties. In addition, a lack of ongoing monitoring and regular accountability measures added to the challenge that inhibited effectiveness in the implementation of planned community development projects.

While a lack of institutional will to actively engage affected people is one limitation, actively involving affected people without sufficient capacity building is another; the latter is applicable in the studied Mohale cases. The two limitations are likely to yield different results but with similar outcomes – ineffectiveness and unsustainability of the projects. On the one hand, when affected people are not fully involved in the projects, it creates barriers between them and the implementing agencies. These barriers may include a lack of trust, and therefore, non-participation towards achieving the goals of the project on the part of affected people (Narayan, 1995:48). This can, thus, likely lead to a collapse of the project, because the participation of affected people is essential in ensuring the sustainability of the project (Paktar, 1995:158; Wodajo, et al., 2014:10). On the other hand, where affected people are engaged without prior and continuous capacity building, they are likely to make costly, and/or irreversible errors, which can have the same outcome of inefficiency, ineffectiveness and unsustainability of the project.

In the studied Phase 1B case, affected people were involved without prior and continuous relevant training, particularly with regard to the management of the projects they were implementing. Hence, they made poorly informed decisions and misappropriated funds, which negatively affected the outcomes of the projects, in a potentially irreversible manner.

Although some of them had been legally convicted in this regard, many of them were not financially in a position to make up for the losses they imposed through misappropriation of funds.

According to Cleaver (1999:598), participation is both a means and an end. It is as much about improving effectiveness as it is about enhancing the capacity of affected people to improve their own lives (ibid.:598). Yet, many implementing agencies engage public participation for the benefits it is purported to have in enhancing effectiveness and ensuring the sustainability of projects (Cleaver, 1999:598), without aiming to capacitate affected individuals for their own good. In this regard, the empowerment of affected people is rarely at the heart of public participation. Where certain groups of community members are given managerial responsibilities, for example, management skills are rarely provided; instead, operational skills are a common aspect of capacity building afforded to people at the grassroots level (Schouten and Moriarty, 2003:97). The studied Mohale case is exemplary in this regard, where the evidence from this thesis shows that the only aspect of training that was given to the affected people related to the maintenance of the projects, and not management, even though management was part of the mandate of the committees.

11 Chapter Eleven: Displacement, Resettlement and the Indian Context

11.1 Introduction

As highlighted earlier, this research explores the implementation of resettlement policies in two dam cases. The previous two chapters have explored the implementation of resettlement processes in the context of the Mohale Dam of the LHWP, which is one of the two cases under investigation in this study. The second resettlement case studied in this research is related to the Chandil Dam of the Subarnarekha Multipurpose Project (SMP) in Jharkhand, India. Before the findings of the implementation of the Chandil Dam resettlement are discussed, the wider context in which the project was implemented is explored.

This chapter forms an exploration of the Indian context of forced resettlement and displacement on account of the construction of development projects, both from an historical perspective, and in the present-day context. The chapter will first explore land acquisition and the associated forced resettlement in the wider Indian context. As later arguments will reflect, the majority of forced resettlement imposed in the different contexts of the Indian society takes place among tribal communities (Asif, 1999:1564; Jewitt, 2008:70; Lahiri-Dutt and Balakrishnan, 2012:40; Sharan, 2005:4443; Upadhyay, 1999:235). Hence, the chapter also explores tribal groups in India and how they have been affected by forced resettlement and displacement over a long period of time.

The forced resettlement and displacement of tribal groups on account of development projects in India propelled many instances of resistance by affected groups, against further construction of projects that displaced them (Bijoy, 2003; Dwivedi, 1997a:2; Guha, 2007:3307; Morris and Pandey, 2007:2083; Shah and Oommen, 2011:33). This chapter will, therefore, also explore the phenomenon of grassroots resistance among tribal groups in India, and relate some examples in various instances in this regard. In some cases, however, social movements and campaigns were geared towards advocating for the development of a resettlement policy that would, supposedly, inform more constructive resettlement, and ensure effective rehabilitation of affected people (Personal interview, February, 2016; Bharti, 1991:1385). Therefore, the chapter will conclude with a discussion of resettlement policy development in India, in response to various calls by multiple stakeholders.

11.2 Land Acquisition, Displacement and Resettlement in the Indian Context

Displacement and resettlement in India need to be understood within the context of the long-standing history of forced land acquisition (Guha, 2007:3307; Patwardhan, 2000:2), in order to appreciate the progress, or lack thereof, made regarding the manner in which displacement and resettlement are undertaken. This section focuses on the history of land acquisition and displacement, particularly within the context of tribal areas. It gives a background that will lead to an exposition of the dynamics that led to on-going resistance and social revolt in relation to forced displacement, which will be discussed later in this chapter.

The history of land acquisition and displacement in India predates the country's independence which was attained in 1947 (Asif, 1999:1564; Fernandes, 1998:2703; Ghatak and Ghosh, 2011:66; Morris and Pandey, 2007:2083; Bijoy, 2003:58). While the first national resettlement and rehabilitation policy was promulgated for the first time in 2004 (Guha, 2005:4799), development-induced resettlement and displacement had long been taking place in different parts of India, against the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act (LAA) of 1894 (Desai, 2011:95; Nielsen, 2010:146; Sarkar, 2011:35; Singh, 2012:2). Developed during the British colonial era in 1894, the Act has been criticised by many writers for being incapable of ensuring the protection of the rights and wellbeing of primarily affected people (Desai, 2011:96; Fernandes, 1998:2703). This section seeks to tease out some of the limitations of this Act as the basis upon which land acquisition was undertaken, and the outcomes imposed on those affected by it.

However, although the LAA is the starting point for the purpose of this discussion, the genesis of development-induced displacement in India can be traced back long before, notably, to the early 1800s, with the expansion of the East India Company, which led to the development of the first legislation on land acquisition in 1824 – the Bengal Code (Fernandes, 1998:2703; Mohan and Shiju, 2011:14). Decades later, the LAA became the major legislation that informed land acquisition in many parts of India for over a century.

The point of departure in understanding the LAA and its provisions is appreciating one of its key principles – the principle of *eminent domain* – which gives the state the entitlement to acquire private land for public use (Desai, 2011:96; Singh, 2012:2). As discussed earlier in Chapter Four on ethical issues in DIDR, the principle of *eminent domain* is underpinned by two conditions: that land must be acquired for public purpose, and that fair or just compensation must be afforded to those affected by forced land acquisition (Diaz, 2012:6;

Morris and Pandey, 2007:2086; Sarkar, 2007:1440). Under the Act, the state, through the judiciary, has the power to decide on what is considered to be public purpose (Asif, 1999:1564; Desai, 2011:27; Diaz, 2012:6).

However, the LAA was criticised for not being clear on what constitutes public purpose, which often raised contentions among different stakeholders, regarding the application of the notion of public interest, based on differing priorities among stakeholders in a given context (Asif, 1999: 1564; Desai, 2011:96; Morris and Pandey, 2007:2086). The understanding of the term differs from one stakeholder to another, depending on the interests of that particular group. In many cases, the priorities of the acquiring body and affected people at the local level are divergent (Bijoy, 2003:58; Choudhuri, 2007:10). Because of this conflict, where there is no consistent understanding of public purpose, the interpretation and application of concepts become susceptible to power dynamics, where the interests of the more powerful actor are likely to prevail.

In this regard, the state, which has absolute power over land acquisition bestowed by the principle of *eminent domain*, often gets its way in the face of conflicting priorities (Nielsen and Nilsen, 2015:203). Later discussions on grassroots resistance will show how affected local communities in the Indian context have, on many occasions, clashed with the government over the construction of large dams and forced resettlement. In many of such cases, the government had the upper hand. Hence, critics argue that by not being clear on what constitutes public purpose, the LAA essentially perpetuated a fluid, liberal use of the concept of public purpose, often to the detriment of affected local communities (Asif, 1999: 1564; Desai, 2011:96; Morris and Pandey, 2007:2086).

One of the consequences of the liberal use of the term public purpose is the excessive acquisition of land. Land is said to have been acquired excessively, thus resulting in excessive or unnecessary displacement and resettlement, when more land than is needed at any particular point in time is acquired (Diaz, 2012:6). In some cases, private land is acquired in the name of public purpose, but remains unused for an extended period of time, or eventually is diverted for private use (*ibid.*:6). This has been the case in some instances in India, as in the case of West Bengal, where the government had been a target of public criticism for acquiring land from ordinary citizens and selling it to industrialists, with little to no compensation provided for associated losses (Sarkar, 2007:1439).

The second limitation of the principle of *eminent domain* relates to its second condition, which is that the acquisition of land must be accompanied by just compensation. As discussed earlier in Chapter Four, two issues among others, have been raised by many writers regarding compensation; one relates to the entitlement of affected people to compensation, and the other relates to the value or measurement of compensation (Asif, 1999:1566; Desai, 2011:97; Ghatak and Ghosh, 2011:66; Sarkar, 2007). Issues of land and property entitlement in the Indian context are significantly complex, particularly among indigenous groups, and later discussions will bring this out in detail. Hence, one of the fundamental limitations of the LAA relates to the power bestowed to the state to determine who is or is not entitled to land, and therefore to compensation (Asif, 1999: 1564; Desai, 2011:96; Diaz, 2012:6; Morris and Pandey, 2007:2086).

The LAA was developed during the colonial era, during which the rights and entitlements of indigenous groups were disregarded on account of different systems of land holding; one recognised by the state and the other by local groups (Balagopal, 2007:4030; Bijoy, 2003:57). Consequently, many indigenous people were forced out from what they believed to be their land without compensation, where their entitlement to land was not recognised by the colonial government (Balagopal, 2007:4030; Bijoy, 2003:57). However, land acquisition on the basis of the LAA continued to be undertaken even after the attainment of independence in India. (Asif, 1999:1464; Lobo and Kumar, 2009:18; Nielsen, 2010:146; Sarkar, 2007:1430).

Although the history of forced resettlement and displacement in India predates its independence, land acquisition and the accompanying resettlement increased significantly in the post-independence era. With the objective of the new government to augment development attached to industrialisation and infrastructure development, more land was involuntarily acquired, leaving many of the affected in dire socio-economic conditions (Fernandes, 2007:203; Gogoi and Lahon, 2014:133; Mohanty, 2005:1318; Siddiqui, 2014). Research shows that over 60 million people have been displaced and resettled on account of development projects since independence in India in 1947 (Fernandes, 2006:111; Hind, 2016:111; Mathur, 2011:1; Neef and Singer, 2015:603; Terminski, 2013:15).

The Bhakra Nangal Project in the Himachal Pradesh state was the first large dam project to be developed in democratic India between 1951 and 1963 (Kendra, 2009:133; Pirta, et al., 2014:2). The development of the project led to the displacement of over 7,200 households, or approximately 36,000 people from 371 villages (Kendra, 2009:134). The construction of the

dam inundated over 1,780 hectares of land on which local communities lived and subsisted (ibid.:133). Involuntary resettlement among affected people resulted in significant decline in their socio-economic conditions, going well into the second generation (Kendra, 2009:134). Roughly 30% of displaced families were compensated with land for the loss of their original land, while others received cash compensation, which many claimed could not afford them the recovery of lost assets after resettlement (ibid.:133).

However, on the other hand, the project has evidently contributed to food security not only in the northern region of the country, but also at the national level, through an irrigation system set up in several districts in the states of Haryana, Punjab, and Rajasthan (Bhatia and Malik, 2008:143). The project ensured that over 80% of geographical land in the states of Punjab and Haryana is arable (ibid.:143). In the early 2000s, the two states – Punjab and Haryana – contributed 80% of the 21 million tonnes of wheat procured by different suppliers for consumption all over the country (Bhatia and Malik, 2008:146). The states further contributed a combined 13 million of the 19 million tonnes of rice produced commercially across the country (ibid.:148).

The inconsistent degrees to which the effects of development projects are felt by different stakeholders in a given context, are indicative of a predictable conflict between the needs and priorities of local communities at the micro level and national priorities at the macro level (Asif, 1999:1566; Maitra, 2009:191; Siciliano, et al., 2015). The earlier discussed resettlement cases in relation to the Kariba, Sardar Sarovar and Three Gorges dams are exemplars of cases where the priorities of affected people at the local level are in contradiction with those of the state; leading to resistance towards resettlement. This also brings out ethical issues of power dynamics, where the needs of certain segments of the population are provided for at the expense of those of others.

One of the biggest and most noteworthy dam projects in India is the Narmada Valley Development Project (NVDP), comprising the construction of a total of 3165 small, medium and large dams along the Narmada river valley, which flows through the states of Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Gujarat (Aravinda, 2000:4002; Routledge, 2003:244). The Narmada River valley is home to some 21 million people, and 80% of them come from agrarian communities in the rural areas (Narula, 2008:354). The project was one of the government of India's first large dam projects since independence, commencing in 1961, designed to contribute towards the national project of development (Routledge, 2003:244).

In Gujarat, one of the three states affected by the NVDP, research shows that from the beginning of India's independence until the year 2000, over two and a half million people were displaced – socially and economically – on account of development projects, 90% of whom were tribal people (Gandhi, 2003:483; Kurian, 2000:846). Of these cases, 60% were due to the construction of dams (Lobo and Kumar, 2009:62). During the said period, a total of 3.3 million hectares of land, in approximately 18,700 villages in the Gujarat state, was acquired for development purposes (ibid.:62).

Between 1947 and 1960, about 100 small and medium dams were constructed in the Saurashtra and Kutch regions of the Gujarat state, which saw hundreds of thousands of people displaced and resettled (Lobo and Kumar, 2009:7). Between 1960 and 1970, the development of petrochemical complexes in Sachin, Naroda, Vadorada, Vatva, Ankleshwar, Nandesari and Vapi, which are cities, districts and constituencies in the Gujarat state, again saw the displacement and resettlement of more people (ibid.:7). From the 1970s to the 1980s, the construction of the Ukai dam along the Tapi River, the largest reservoir in the Gujarat state, resulted in the displacement and resettlement of tens of thousands from approximately 170 villages, who were resettled to four resettlement sites (Lobo and Kumar, 2009:7). During the period of 1991 to 2004, about 100,000 people were resettled and displaced in the Gujarat state, 61% of whom were displaced due to water resource projects (ibid.:7).

From the dawn of India's independence until the beginning of the 21st century, six of the states with the highest number of tribal groups – Orissa, Jharkhand, West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, Kerala and Assam – accounted for nearly 20 million people displaced (Fernandes, 2006:110). During the same period – from the late 1940s to the early 2000s – over 25 million hectares of land was acquired for development projects all over India (ibid.:110).

Resettlement in many of these cases was hastened and very poorly executed, leading to predominantly negative socio-cultural and economic consequences (Fernandes, 1997; 1998; 2008; Khan, 2015; Maitra, 2009; Mathur, 2013; Mohanty, 2005). Many of these dam constructions were accompanied by displacement without resettlement and rehabilitation, and where there was resettlement, it occurred within the context of poorly conducted or non-existent socio-economic assessments, making the validity of impact assessments for compensation and rehabilitation purposes questionable (Fernandes, 2006; 2009). Not unexpectedly, research on such cases reveals that the impact of the construction of dams was significantly underestimated (Routledge, 2003:247). The impact of the construction of one of

the largest dams in India, the Sardar Sarovar Project, for instance – discussed earlier in Chapter Four – was found by many researchers to have been significantly underestimated (Berger, 1993:35; Fisher, 1995:13; McCully; 1996; Morse and Berger, 1992:1-2; Parasuraman, et al., 2010:41; Ram and Sangvai, in Routledge, 2003:247).

In Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra, as many as 23,000 people from 3,000 households were resettled by the Sardar Sarovar Project, many of whom were tribal communities, significantly reliant on subsistence agriculture (Morse and Berger, 1992:4). Some of the affected people in Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra held no legal, but customary land rights, also known as “encroachment”, through which they had access to and relied on crop production (Fisher, 1995:31). However, in these two states, encroachers were treated as though they were landless (Fisher, 1995:31; Morse and Berger, 1992:4).

The negative effects of forced resettlement can be worsened in cases where customary land entitlements are not recognised, such that people who were dependent on land are left with no recourse for the loss of their livelihood – a common problem among tribal groups in India. According to Morse and Berger (1992:4), thousands of encroachers in Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra were left distressed when no compensation was provided for them, despite the evident loss of their livelihood. Land use patterns among tribal communities in India have customarily been disregarded through the use of legal frameworks and records, which implementing agencies used to calculate compensation among resettled and displaced people (Fisher, 1995:31). Hence, many of those who lost access to arable land to resettlement in the Narmada Valley were left stranded, and their welfare severely compromised (Morse and Berger, 1992:4; Routledge, 2003:247). Estimates suggest that at least 60% of the so-called landless people in Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra were excluded due to flawed, exclusive compensation procedures (Morse and Berger, 1992:4).

In addition, even in cases where compensation was awarded, it was mainly for those who formally owned land, yet the Narmada region hosted communities with multiple supplementary forms of livelihoods, such as “sand quarrying, fishing, ferrying, and draw down agriculture” (Routledge, 2003:247). These other means of livelihoods are said to have accounted for 7,000 to 8,000 families, whose established living patterns were disrupted with no recourse for re-establishment, leaving them more prone to impoverishment (ibid:247). And all these happened in a dam project involving three states, out of the many others that occurred in other parts of the country.

These extensive omissions of losses suffered by the forcibly resettled and other affected people (Fernandes, 1997; 2006; 2008; Maitra, 2009:203; Mathur, 2013; Mohanty, 2005:1319; Randeria, 2003:305), are partly the reasons for grassroots resistance against displacement and resettlement in the many parts of India. The next section forms a discussion on the tribal groups and castes in India, and the unique ways in which the effects of forced resettlement manifest in their context. The section that follows will discuss issues of grassroots and social resistance, in relation to displacement and resettlement in India.

11.3 Tribes, Castes and Displacement in India

Tribes and castes are integral to the Indian society. One can almost never talk about the social aspects of the Indian society without making mention of tribal and caste groups. However, the discussion in this section is not merely to describe tribes and castes but most importantly how, based on their specific characteristics, they are displaced in unique ways by resettlement. According to Chauhan (2008:220), there are over 3700 castes in India, and about 460 groups officially categorised as scheduled tribes, constituting 8% of the total Indian population (Hasan, 2016:83; Kapoor, 2012:405; Xaxa, 1999:1519). The first time the term “tribe” was used was in 1881 in the first official census of the Indian population under British colonial rule; then termed “forest tribes” under the broader category of agricultural and pastoral castes (Xaxa, 1999:1519). A more distinct classification of tribes was later coined in the next censuses, where tribes were specifically described more on the basis of religion, as animists, then later as “tribal religions” (Xaxa, 1999:1519). For this reason, some writers have argued that the term “tribe” is, in fact, a colonial construct.

Dirks (2001:5) argues that, while colonialists did not invent the lifestyles, livelihoods and social organisation of the tribal people, they made tribes to be what they are today, through the invasion into their spaces, and through imposing administrative reforms, most of which led to the exclusion of the tribal people from the ownership of property, and from access to other resources. The colonial land administration resulted in the transferring of land from tribal communities into the hands of non-tribal landlords (Patwardhan, 2000:3; Sen, 1992:78). This systematic dispossession of property and exclusion is, arguably, what has confined tribal people to lower socio-economic statuses, even to-date.

The term “backward” was associated with the tribal people by colonialists, in reference to the customary land regulations, conservative lifestyles and traditions maintained by the tribal people for a long time (Chaube, 1999:524). However, today the term “backward” – used

administratively in the demographic category OBC, for Other Backward Castes – is still used to refer to other groups due to their comparatively lower economic statuses (Government of India, 2011). Nonetheless, the term “scheduled” has been coined in the democratic India to refer to areas, and groups of people within such areas, who because of previous, structural exclusions, were deprived of access to socio-economic resources and opportunities (Dubey, et al., 2006:8; Mitra, 2008:1202; Sedwal and Kamat, 2008:3; Sujatha, 2002:87). Hence, the scheduled groups are generally economically less developed, and are in the process of catching up with non-scheduled groups of the population.

Features such as economic characteristics and geographical location are often used to describe and distinguish tribal people from the non-tribes (Hasan, 2016:83; Mondal, 2015). Beteille (in Kijima, 2006:371) defines a tribe as “a small and named group of persons characterized by marriage within a group, hereditary membership, and specific style of life such as ritual status or a particular occupation.” The Scheduled Tribes (ST), also known as the *Adivasis*, are the indigenous groups who lived – and in some cases, continue to live – in isolated, forested and hilly areas, and primarily engaged in basic means of livelihoods, such as land cultivation, reliance on forest resources, etc. (Dubey, et al., 2006:8; Mitra, 2008:1202; Sinha, 1981:66; Sujatha, 2002:87). Today tribal people are scattered all over India, mostly in the rural but also in the urban areas; however, they are mainly concentrated in the states of Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Bihar, Jharkhand, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Rajasthan, Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Assam and West Bengal (Chaube, 1999:525; Fernandes, 2006:110; Mitra, 2008:1205).

The Scheduled Castes (SC) are the previously socially disadvantaged groups, who were excluded on the basis of the Hindu hierarchical social structure, which afforded certain privileges to some groups on the one hand, and excluded others on the other (Dubey, et al., 2006:7; Mitra, 2008:1205; Sedwal and Kamat, 2008:3). The exclusion of certain groups of people within the Hindu caste system – the lower castes – was based on the notions of purity and impurity, and created barriers to certain privileges to those considered to be impure (Chanana, 1993:70; Dubey, et al., 2006:).

The caste system is divided into five hierarchical levels; “the Brahmins (priests), Kshatriyas (warriors), Vaisyas (traders), Sudras (menial workers), and Ati Sudras (the former untouchables, who engaged in the most menial jobs)” (Kijima, 2006:371). This social hierarchy translated into significant effects on who is afforded what opportunities, and who

has access to what resources and property. Even though the government of India has committed, as according to the constitution and other legal frameworks, to counter the socio-economic realities that came with this structural exclusion of certain groups of people, and has abolished the label assigned to the “lower castes” – the untouchables – the effects are long-term and continue to show in the lives of the SC to-date (Banerjee, et al., 2005:647; Government of India, 1949: section 17; Malik, 1979:6).

Dwivedi (1990:5) argues, however, that the caste system has not always been an exclusive, oppressive system. According to him, in its original form, the Hindu caste system was more elaborate, and encompassed four main categories and hundreds of sub-categories, which have, over centuries, “degenerated into a very rigid, hereditarily determined, hierarchical, and oppressive social structure” (ibid.:5). Conversely, authors such as Bidner and Eswaran (2015:2), borrowing from the work of Bougle (1971), contend that in its 3500 years of existence, the Hindu caste system has always been distinguishable as a hereditary, endogamous, and a well-established hierarchical system. For the purpose of this thesis, caste groups will be considered within the framework of their hereditary and hierarchical characteristics, and the outcomes of those characteristics on those structurally excluded, based on the notions of purity and impurity. The outcomes of this structural exclusion will be later linked to the effects of forced resettlement among these scheduled groups.

Although the ST and SC were previously excluded from different perspectives or frameworks, the outcomes of these systematic exclusions are manifested in similar forms, through deprivation of access to economic opportunities and other material resources (Kijima, 2006:369; Thorat and Newman, 2007:4121). The ST were excluded administratively on the basis of their geographical settings and customary property and land use patterns, whereas the SC were excluded, from birth, on the basis of the Hindu social hierarchical system (Mitra, 2008:1205-1206; Mohanty, 2001:3859; Rao, et al., 2006:5401; Sundaram and Tendulkar, 2003:5263). However, the end result in both cases has been socio-economic deprivation manifested in low levels of education, disadvantaged access to the labour market, and deprived access to other economic opportunities (Thorat and Newman, 2007:4122). These similarities in the socio-economic conditions and realities of the ST and SC confine them to the same category – scheduled – in the design of government administrative reforms in the democratic era (Halim, et al., 2016:122).

Furthermore, while the caste and tribal systems have distinct origins, over the centuries the groups of Hindu and tribal societies have been integrating through political, economic, and social interconnections (Chaube, 1999:525). Religiously, many tribal groups have been assimilated into the Hindu belief system, adopting the practice of Hindu rituals and believing in the gods observed in Hinduism (Chaube, 1999:525; Mitra, 2008:1205). Xaxa (1999:1520), in reference to the work of Bose (1941), also affirms the assimilation of tribes into the Hindu system. Additionally, Hinduism itself has interwoven religious and socio-cultural aspects, which means that the lines between practicing the Hindu culture and religion can be blurred. While some aspects of it are clearly religious or cultural, others, such as those related to marriages, purity or impurity, have both aspects of religion and culture (Kijima, 2006:371).

Because of these similarities and integration of tribal and caste systems, the groups have become noticeably interconnected, such that, in analysing their socio-economic realities of the present day, some authors analyse them as though they are indistinguishable (Bhagavatheeswaran, et al., 2016; Chanana, 1993; Dunn, 1993; Halim, et al., 2016; Kijima, 2006; Mohanty, 2001; Sedwal and Kamat, 2008; Van de Poel and Speybroeck, 2009). Later discussions on the findings from the studied Chandil resettlement case in India will show that some people from tribal groups identify socially as tribes (ST) but religiously as Hindu, and in some cases the lines are even more blurred.

As a result, the ST and SC will be discussed in this thesis as an integrated set of groups, who, because of their comparable economic and social conditions, are affected by resettlement in identical ways. Notwithstanding, the majority of resettlement-inducing dam projects occur in tribal areas (Dubey and Lahiri, 2014:34; Judge, 1997:847; Morse and Berger, 1992). According to Patwardhan (2000:5), only 20% of large dam constructions happen among the SC, while nearly 60% happen in tribal areas. Hence, it is acknowledged here that the extent of the impact of large dam projects among the ST and SC is incomparable. Thus, the point of integration in the analysis of the two groups is only related to their comparable socio-economic conditions.

The beginning of British colonialism in India saw many of the tribal people being forced out from their original places, either through planned development projects, or through livelihood displacement that forced them to migrate in search for better, naturally resourced areas to sustain their lives (Gadgil and Guha, 1994:105; Kapoor, 2012:406; Mitra, 2008:1205; Mohanty, 2001:3859). This displacement continues to characterise much of the lived

experiences of many of the tribal people, who continue to be forced out from their land on account of development, more so post-independence, as indicated earlier (Bisht, 2009:301; Guha, 2007:3307; Fernandes, 1997:78; 2007:203; Mathur, 2013; Routledge, 2003).

Involuntary resettlement is a process that inherently imposes significant suffering and inconvenience on those who are forced out from their homes into what are initially foreign places (Cernea, 2000). Studies have shown that forced resettlement is often followed, at least at the initial transition stage in stage two of Scudder's Stage Framework, by declined standards of living (Fahim, 1983:33; Scudder, 2005:74). However, depending on the availability (or lack thereof) of resources and opportunities in the new areas, the living standards may either improve or worsen (Scudder, 2005:41).

Because of the reliance of tribal communities and some caste communities on land and other natural resources such as forests and rivers, which support their livelihoods (Hasan, 2016:88; Patwardhan, 2000:14; Sajem and Gosa, 2006:4; Voggesser, et al., 2013:615), the recovery of affected people from their lost livelihoods after resettlement is largely dependent on the availability of alternative natural resources in the new areas, or comparable, equivalent resources. Research conducted by Bisht (2009:305), among mainly the caste communities displaced on account of the Tehri Dam in the Uttarakhand state of India, reveals that the resettled people were reliant on natural resources to support their livelihoods; such as fuel resources (wood and fodder), edible roots and vegetables, timber, medicinal plants, and other raw materials that create baskets, brooms, and agricultural equipment. Land cultivation has also been a basic form of livelihood for many tribal communities for a long time (Shilee and Shailee, 2002:78).

In the absence of alternative resources to replace lost livelihoods tied to the natural environment, forced resettlement can have devastating consequences on affected groups. As research has shown, in many resettlement cases in India, the resettled and displaced people experience difficulties with recovering from losses of livelihoods attached to land and the natural environment, partly because in many cases, they are moved to areas with no equivalent land and natural resources (Maitra, 2009:200; Mathur, 2011:3; McCully, 1996:67-68). Additionally, the acquisition of land for development in itself may result in denied access to the natural environment, on which the affected people were reliant for such uses as fuel resources, river water, grazing land, etc., as shown in the two cases studied in this thesis.

Moreover, lost land replacement in forced resettlement situations, particularly among tribal groups, may be inhibited by the limitations of legal frameworks often used to determine those who are entitled to land (Fisher, 1995:31; Morse and Berger, 1992:4; Rao, et al., 2006:5406; Routledge, 2003:247). Legal frameworks often discard customarily organised land use patterns, which are predominant in tribal areas (Fisher, 1995:31; Hasan, 2016:91; Morse and Berger, 1992:4; Rao, et al., 2006:5406; Routledge, 2003:247). There are a number of customary arrangements of land use, on which many tribal people are reliant, and some of them are explored below.

One of the common land arrangements is what is commonly known, in some tribal areas, as *bhorna*, which is an exchange of money or grain for land, in a given crop season (Rao, 2005:4439). Given the historic land disposessions of many tribal communities, which left many landless (Gadgil and Guha, 1994:105; Kapoor, 2012:406; Mitra, 2008:1205; Mohanty, 2001:3859), coupled with the growing population and subsequent land scarcity, *bhorna* is a common practice in many villages in the Jharkhand state, among both tribal and caste groups (Rao, 2005:4439). However, this also means that many who are reliant on this arrangement do not have legal entitlement to the land they use, and the arrangement is on a short-term basis, which may be insecure and undependable. In forced resettlement situations, those who depend on this arrangement have no legal claim to land, for they do not own the land on which they subsist, and are, therefore, not legally entitled to compensation, where legal measures are employed to determine entitlements.

Similar to *bhorna* is the *bhugatbandh* arrangement, whose main difference from *bhorna* is the legal agreement between the landowner and the lessee. In this case, a legally registered piece of land is leased out for a given period of time not exceeding six years, for a financial fee or grain given to the owner (Rao, 2005:4440). However, ethnographic studies in areas where this practice is prevalent, such as in Deogarh district in Odisha state, have revealed that in practice, this form of arrangement is often accompanied by omissions of legal registration requirements, and subsequent exploitation of lessees (ibid:4440). This can, thus, leave lessees in vulnerable positions as legal recourse becomes complex in the absence of proper legal registration, and in some cases lessees may have no resources to seek legal intervention. Also, because this is a temporary arrangement, those who are reliant on this form of land holding may be excluded in compensation and rehabilitation procedures.

Another arrangement is what is known as the *bhag*, which is basically sharecropping (Rao, 2005:4439), similar to what many people engage in, in Lesotho as discussed earlier in Chapter Nine. In this arrangement, “land is the contribution of the owner, while the seeds and labour are provided by the sharecropper” (ibid:4439). In India, in areas where this arrangement is common, it is mostly practised among kinsmen; in situations where the head of the household is a female, with limited human capital for land cultivation, such land may be given out on *bhag* arrangement to male relatives (Rao, 2005:4440). This means that social ties are a key factor in sustaining this arrangement, an elements which may be disrupted by involuntary resettlement. Forced resettlement removes people from their geographical locations and dismantles their established social networks and ties (De Wet, 2015:86; Tabucanon, 2012:9; Witter and Satterfield, 2014:1395). However, social losses are typically not compensated in resettlement cases, largely due to their qualitative nature, making it difficult to quantify for the purpose of compensation (Downing, 1996:34; Mahapatra, 1999:210).

One of the most controversial land arrangements in the Indian society is the *bhoodan* land, also known as land gifts. This concept was coined in the 1950s, by a movement started by Acharya Vinoba Bhave, founded upon the religiously-influenced ideologies of Mahatma Gandhi (Jha, 2002:4; Raju, et al., 2005:2). The fundamental element of this movement was to advocate for voluntary redistribution of land from private owners to non-landowners (Jha, 2002:4; Raju, et al., 2005:2). Based on Gandhi’s philosophy of unity and equality within the Indian society, this movement was meant to give access of mainstream opportunities to disadvantaged groups, who had been long deprived of a vital productive asset – land. The movement was so well-received that by 1955, landowners in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh had voluntarily surrendered over 4.3 million acres of land, to be given to the landless (Jha, 2002:4). By the turn of the millennium, approximately 42,199 people in the Andhra Pradesh state were beneficiaries of *bhoodan* land, the majority of whom were disadvantaged tribal and caste members (Raju, et al., 2005:3).

However, many people among the tribal and caste groups who had benefited from this arrangement continue to suffer significant insecurity with regard to the recognition of their entitlement. This is exemplified by the case of Sahariya in Madhya Pradesh, a predominantly tribal area, where, as stated in Bhatia (2012:161), residents who owned *bhoodan* land were officially denied title deeds. As the discussion of the findings will show, with regard to the Chandil resettlement case, some respondents indicated that they previously had *bhoodan*

land, an assertion also confirmed by an SMP official; however, compensation for *bhoodan* land among the studied households had not been awarded. This is despite that the arrangement of *bhoodan* land is commonly known in the Indian society.

These customary land holding arrangements, which are predominant among the ST and SC, are indicative of some of the ways in which these groups are affected by resettlement in unique ways. As a result, many of affected ST and SC who lose access to land in resettlement are forced to take agricultural wage labour as an alternative form of livelihood, leaving them food insecure and often economically vulnerable (Rao, et al., 2006:5404). This may also be a result of low educational levels – discussed later in this section – which makes it more difficult for ST and SC resettlers to compete in mainstream labour market after resettlement, having lost their fundamental assets and livelihoods. The discussion of the findings in Chapter Thirteen will later show that the majority of the studied resettled people, who lost their land on account of the Chandil Dam construction, have resorted to agricultural wage labour. The main limitation with being an agricultural labourer in this case is that, because many of them work on small farms, their work is only seasonal and economically less rewarding.

In addition to lost livelihoods, some cultural and social aspects of tribal communities are strongly linked to the natural environment; and this relation is typically disrupted in forced resettlement (Diaz, 2012:145; Hasan, 2016:89; Shilee and Shailee, 2002:80). Hence, apart from the irreversible destruction of the physical environment imposed by the construction of dams, the cultural identity of affected people is significantly, and often negatively, affected by forced relocation from their physical environment (Hasan, 2016:89; Shilee and Shailee, 2002:80). According to De Wet (2015:86), forced resettlement involves the removal of people from their physical environment, which not only provides a resource base to support their livelihoods, but also to which their social and cultural aspects are linked. Shilee and Shailee (2002:81) argue that nature and its resources are intrinsic to the identity of tribal communities. However, in cases of forced resettlement from the natural environment in which communities are, as De Wet (2015:86) puts it, “socially and culturally emplaced”, this fundamental aspect of their identity is dismantled.

Therefore, forced resettlement imposes a loss of not only fundamental material assets, but also disrupts social networks, cultural landscapes, and established relationships between affected people and their natural environment. This may be more pronounced in areas, such

as in tribal areas, where affected people are significantly reliant on their physical environment to sustain their livelihoods and social lives. In the case of Odisha, for instance, where roughly 1 million hectares of land was acquired over 40 years for development purposes, mainly from tribal communities, over 50% of the acquired land constituted common property resources, on which the resettled and displaced people were significantly reliant (Hasan, 2016:89).

A fundamental challenge with making up losses associated with common property resources is the difficulty in quantifying damages tied to space and the natural environment, in order to compensate affected people accordingly. Even in situations where such losses are recognised for the purpose compensation, as in the earlier discussed Mohale Dam resettlement case, the long-term effects are often underestimated and, therefore, undercompensated. Additionally, as reflected in the case of the Mohale Dam resettlement, cash compensation for the loss of long-term assets can fall short of providing alternative means of livelihoods because of procedural flaws and other shortcomings. Research by Mariotti (2012:284-289), among the Polavaram Dam resettled people in Andhra Pradesh, India, demonstrates the market value limitations in compensating lost land or common property resources by means of cash compensation. Cash compensation is often an alternative for providing lost physical assets in the new areas, in cases where such assets are unavailable, or cannot be accessed by affected people due to other factors (Mathur, 2011:11).

For a long time in India, the resettled people were not compensated for the involuntary separation from their natural environment, as in the case of the Tehri Dam resettled people, who, according to Bisht (2009:314), were not compensated, nor provided with alternative measures, for the loss of common property resources to resettlement. This is despite the fact that caste groups, who were the most affected among the studied resettled people in the Tehri Dam (Bisht, 2009:305), were known to have had a very strong reliance on natural resources prior to resettlement. Research has also shown that among tribal people, significant reliance on the natural environment and its resources remains a reality (Hasan, 2016:88; Patwardhan, 2000:14; Sajem and Gosa, 2006:4; Shilee and Shailee, 2002:81; Voggesser, et al., 2013:615). Yet, as Karanth (2007:320) argues, based on her research in Bhadra in Karnataka state in India, despite perceived successes of the resettlement project in this case, limited access to common property resources such as firewood, grazing land, and fodder, remained some of the inhibiting factors indicated by affected people.

The last factor which distinguishes the way the ST and SC are affected by resettlement, in comparison to their counterparts in the non-scheduled category, referred to as the “general” demographic category, is lower levels of education (Diaz, 2012:145; Corbridge, 2000:62; Mitra, 2008:1202). The term “general” demographic category denotes areas or groups of people, who were historically not structurally excluded – at least not to the same extent as the scheduled groups – and are, therefore, collectively more developed than the scheduled groups (Corbridge, 2000:62; Mitra, 2008:1202). As indicated earlier, the previous structural exclusion of the scheduled groups has, in turn, led to persistent socio-economic marginalisation, including access to good quality education (Thorat and Newman, 2007:4122).

Research has shown that the historical social marginalisation of the SC students among their higher caste peers has resulted in many of the marginalised students dropping out of schools, and in some cases, this continues to be a reality to-date (Kumar, 2012; Malik, 1979). In the mid-1990s, the school drop-out rate among SC students at primary level was on average 70% (Kumar, 2012:9). Consequently, the representation of SC at senior school level is significantly low and is even lower at tertiary level (Ramaiah, in Kumar, 2012:3). Some research has shown that educational levels are comparatively lower among both SC and ST, against their counterparts in the general category (Bhagavatheeswaran, et al., 2016; Rajasenani, et al., 2016; Srivastava and Sinha, 2008:103). However, research by Bhagavatheeswaran, et al. (2016) shows that the plight of social discrimination and exclusion is even worse for girls than boys among the ST and SC.

According to the Indian National Sample Survey (NSS) of 2000, approximately 40% of those classified under ST, SC, and OBC had below secondary level education, while only about 20% had some secondary schooling and higher, and the remainder were non-literate (Gang, et al., 2008:52). This is despite the measures taken by the government to address lower levels of education among disadvantaged groups – SC, ST and OBC – to improve their educational levels, and potentially, their economic statuses (Chauhan, 2008:223). The government implemented policy measures such as reservation for SC, ST and OBC in schools, relaxation of age limit for these groups, the reduction of pass mark requirement for students from scheduled populations, scholarships targeted at ST, SC and OBC, provision of funds for mentorship programmes, etc. (Chauhan, 2008:223; Kumar, 2012:3). However, progress in this regard has been rather slow, as attested by the statistics revealed in the NSS.

Research has shown that in many cases, school drop-out, and subsequent low education levels among scheduled groups, is attributable to social dynamics related to discrimination and social exclusion, which are much more complex to capture in policy (Kumar, 2012; Bhagavatheeswaran, et al., 2016). Furthermore, most policy provisions are implemented at tertiary level, whereas other challenges that lead to learner drop-out manifest at the primary or secondary levels (Bhagavatheeswaran, et al., 2016; Chauhan, 2008:223). Harassment of ST and SC students by their counterparts in non-scheduled groups, a lack of proper school facilities and infrastructure, and a lack of family support, have been cited by some researchers as among the factors that compromise education, and may lead to subsequent learner drop-out at primary and secondary levels (Bhagavatheeswaran, et al., 2016; Kabra, 2003:3077).

As a result, low education levels can be an inhibitive factor in providing alternative means of livelihood re-establishment, such as employment, in resettlement situations, where people lose their assets and livelihoods. When people are resettled from the natural resources on which they subsisted to new areas, the alternative is to move them to areas with comparable resources, or to establish other forms of livelihoods. Cernea (2000:35) asserts that in cases where alternative means of livelihoods re-establishment based on natural resources cannot be provided, other alternatives, such as employment opportunities, need to be established. However, in cases where resettled people predominantly have low education levels, the provision of employment may only be confined to manual or casual labour. This may be a constraint in achieving sustainable, long-term employment for affected people after resettlement.

The Chandil ethnographic chapter – Chapter Thirteen – will show that the majority of the studied affected people had not acquired full-time employment after resettlement. As the findings will show, one of the significant factors affecting the implementation of re-employment, which is one of the rehabilitation measures provided for in the policy applied in the Chandil resettlement case, is low education levels. A number of respondents indicated that none of their household members were eligible for the provided post-secondary school vocational and technical training, which would, supposedly, increase their chances of employment in the new areas.

In conclusion, while resettlement is a process which induces inherently negative consequences on those affected, populations which are dependent on arable land natural resources tend to be affected in more complex ways. Tribal and some caste communities tend

to experience resettlement differently from the “general” communities, due to their significant reliance on land and natural resources, two resource bases which are often difficult to recover after resettlement. Furthermore, the complexity of land use patterns among tribal communities makes it more difficult for them to recover from related losses, where such losses are disregarded on the basis of incompatible procedural or legal requirements.

The widespread forced acquisition of land from mainly tribal communities, and some caste communities, without sustainable rehabilitation, continues to subject these groups to impoverishment and economic vulnerability (Asif, 1999:1565; Mathur, 2006:36; Patwardhan, 2000:5). This is exacerbated by the fact that the majority of scheduled populations are unskilled, making it difficult for them to transition into the labour market, when resettled to areas with less to no access to natural resources, on which they were accustomed and reliant.

In the post-independence India, a national policy of resettlement has been developed – discussed later in this chapter – and subsequently a legal framework, to regulate land acquisition, and to protect the rights of those affected by forced resettlement and displacement, particularly tribal communities (Fernandes, 1998:2703; Government of India, 2007: Section 1; 2013; Patwardhan, 2000:3). This is with the recognition that tribal communities had continuously been largely alienated from mainstream development measures, and negatively affected without proper rehabilitation and compensation in resettlement projects, through the engagement of procedures that discarded their customary rights and under-account for their losses (Mathur, 2006; Morris and Pandey, 2007:8; Patwardhan, 2000:3).

The manner in which resettlement had been undertaken in many parts of the broader Indian society, and the effects it had on those affected, first during the colonial era, and continuously in the democratic dispensation, propelled revolt and resistance among the predominantly affected tribal communities. In the next section, grassroots resistance and social movements in response to forced resettlement and displacement in different parts of India are discussed, leading to the subsequent discussion of the development of the Indian National Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy.

11.4 Grassroots Resistance and Social Movements in India

Tribal communities across India have historically been in constant conflict with the state on account of forced displacement propelled by the project of development, tied to infrastructure development and administrative reforms of land use patterns (Guha, 2007:3307; Patwardhan,

2000:2-3). The conflict between the resettlement – and displacement – people with the authorities continued in the democratic era (Bhatia, 2005:1536; Dwivedi, 1997a:2; Kujur, 2011:134; Patwardhan, 2000:3). This section presents an exploration of some local movements and campaigns initiated across the different parts of the country. The positions of these various movements have, however, not been consistent throughout the existence of the movements. In some cases, the movements and campaigns which started off being against the manner in which resettlement was undertaken, over time changed their position to complete opposition to development projects and their resultant displacement, or vice-versa (Stanley, 2004:21).

The colonial era was characterised by revolts among tribal groups of India, in response to unjust land dispossessions by colonialists. These uprisings include; “the Kol and Bhumij revolts of the early 19th century, the Santal ‘hool’ of 1855, the Birsa Munda-led ‘ulugulan’ in the 1890s, the uprising in Bastar in 1911, the protests in Gudem-Rampa in the 1920s, and the Warli revolt of 1945-46” (Guha, 2007:3307; Sahoo, 2016:60). With regard to the construction of dams, dam-induced protests began as early as the 1920s, with the launch of an organised group against the construction of dams and forced displacement in Maharashtra (Kothari, 1996:1480). In 1878, the government of India, under British governance, passed the Indian Forest Act, which gave the state absolute power over tribal forest land that was historically community property to the tribal people (Patwardhan, 2000:2). This was followed by the development of the LAA in 1894, which, as indicated earlier, appropriated all power for land acquisition to the state, and was the major instrument used in this regard for over a century (Asif, 1999:1564; Goyal, 1996:1462; Patwardhan, 2000:2; Sharma, 2003:907; Thukral, 1996:1500).

The tireless revolt of the tribal people against the colonial dispensation and forced removals of indigenous groups, led to the formulation of legal frameworks such as the Chhota Nagpur Tenancy Act of 1908, and Central Province Land Alienation Bill of 1916, aimed at responding to the alienation of indigenous groups (Patwardhan, 2000:2; Raza, 2015:13; Sundar, 2005:4430). However, these measures evidently did not satisfactorily respond to the grievances of tribal communities, as evidenced by the continued revolt of tribal groups against the British administration and forced land dispossession (Sharma, 1976:39). Tribal resistance thus, continued to mount for another three decades until independence, which saw relative restoration of peace – albeit for a short-term – with many hoping that the new

government would deliver on its promise to forge an inclusive development project across the Indian society (Guha, 2007:3307).

A decade into democracy, agitation among tribal communities was resuscitated, owing to the continued land acquisition that further saw many more affected people, mainly tribal groups, land dispossessed and impoverished by development projects (Kothari, 1996:1476; Mathur, 2006; Thukral, 1996:1500). By the late 1960s, the growing discontent among affected tribal communities paved a way for further social action in response to the perpetual forced land acquisition (Bharti, 1991:1385; Kothari, 1996:1481; Sharma, 2003:907). Such social action and resistance were in some cases informed by the poorly designed and implemented compensation and rehabilitation for affected people, which left many in worse-off conditions (Goyal, 1996:1461; Sharma, 2003:907; Thukral, 1996:1500). In other cases, they were informed by an outright opposition to development projects and their associated displacement (Nielsen, 2010:146).

For some of those who opposed development projects, their struggle was partly about the affirmation of their identity as a group, and legitimisation of their right to land, as equal citizens of the country (Basu, 2012:1296; Shah and Oommen, 2011:33). As indicated earlier, for tribal communities, their natural environment, in which they were socially and culturally implanted for a long time, formed not only their residential areas, but was also attached to their cultural identity (Hasan, 2016:89; Shilee and Shailee, 2002:80). Hence, it can be argued that in the democratic India, many had hoped that the state would be more sensitive to customary rights than the colonial government, in pursuing the project of development. However, the new democratic state continued – and fast-tracked – the project of development tied to infrastructure development and its resultant forced displacement, as had been the case in the colonial era. In fact, the government of India continued to undertake land acquisition and resettlement on the basis of the LAA developed by the colonial government.

As a result, development projects that induced resettlement and displacement were continuously punctuated by grassroots resistance. The 1970s and 1980s were marked by constant protests against the construction of large dams and other big projects that inevitably resulted in forced displacement and resettlement (Bharti, 1991:1385; Ghosh, 2006:506; Guha, 2007:3307-3308). The tribal people in the Karo and Koel regions in the Jharkhand state (formerly Bihar), for example, organised in the 1970s in response to the construction of the Karo-Koel project, which was estimated to acquire about 55,000 hectares of land from at

least 112 villages, threatening to displace and resettle over 150,000 people (Madhukar, in Ghosh, 2006:506).

However, at this initial stage, the protests were aimed at negotiating fair compensation in relation to resettlement, and not at opposing the construction of the dam. In the memorandum which they submitted to the government through their joint movement – the Koel-Karo Jan Sangathan – the affected people clearly stated that “they were willing to welcome the project” on condition that they will be given land-for-land compensation in return (Bharti, 1991:1385). Other issues of concern included the pre-resettlement surveys, which the local people believed had been poorly undertaken by the relevant officials, and proposed that the work be handed over to some of the local people, with a better understanding of local dynamics (Mathews, 2011: unpagged). Issues of poorly undertaken pre-resettlement surveys have been cited in many cases of resettlement in India, largely associated with the omissions of some losses suffered by affected people, resulting in under-valuation of losses and, therefore, under-compensation (Fernandes, 2008; Khan, 2015; Maitra, 2009:203; Mathur, 2013; Mohanty, 2005:1319; Scudder, 2005:195).

After a decade of irreconcilable negotiations with the authorities, the nature of the protests in the Karo and Koel regions changed from that of negotiations to open opposition to the project and its accompanying land acquisition (Ghosh, 2006:506). In 1984, the matter was taken to court, which later ruled that land could only be acquired when an agreement had been reached between the involved parties (Mathews, 2011: unpagged). All construction activities were halted in 1986, pending the fulfilment of some of the state’s government promises in relation to resettlement (ibid.). An attempt to continue with the project was begun over a decade later, and in 2003, the Koel-Karo Hydro-electric Power project was deferred, once again, following a tenacious struggle against the project by the communities of the Karo and Koel regions (Ghosh, 2006:506; Mathews, 2011: unpagged). The project was, however, revived in 2011, with some changes promising less power generation and, by extension, scaled-down displacement and resettlement (Biswas, 2011: unpagged).

The Indian National Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy (2007: Section 2) provides for the minimisation of displacement, and the exploration of alternative ways to provide public resources and services. Although it is not clear that this policy provision was informed by cases such as the Koel-Karo project, such policy provisions are evidently consistent with the advocacy of the people on the ground. The discussion of the Indian national policy of

resettlement below will show that, to a large extent, the policy development was driven by the advocacy of local organisations.

Similarly, in the state of Gujarat, protests by local groups in relation to the Sardar Sarovar Project were initially aimed at negotiating a participatory approach to resettlement processes with the authorities. Some of the demands stated by the protesting local groups included; the right to information regarding resettlement and its impact, the implementation of land-for-land compensation, commitment to sustainable rehabilitation measures, and the affirmation that the rights of those affected would be protected (Dwivedi, 1997a:7), based on which the construction of the dam would proceed without resistance. Between 1986 and 1987, strike actions were driven by a number of activist groups, including Arch-Vahini (otherwise known as Vahini), Rajpipla Social Service Society (RSSS), Khedut Mazdoor Chetna Sangath (KMCS), Narmada Dharangrasta Samiti (NDS), all based in Gujarat and Maharashtra, and inspired by the above-mentioned demands (Dwivedi, 1997a:7). The struggle resulted in substantial policy reforms, described by international institutions such as the World Bank as “admirable” and “excellent” (ibid.:7).

The two notable policy features modified in this regard in the Gujarat case, were: eligibility of landless labourers for two hectares of irrigated land and other infrastructure amenities; and land compensation for major sons, who were to be treated as separate families (Dwivedi, 1997a:7-8; Thukral, 1996:1501). The Maharashtra government followed with policy reforms about five years later, with similar features as those of Gujarat, with regard to land compensation for landless labourers and major sons, but also adding to their policy reform, land compensation for major unmarried daughters (Dwivedi, 1997a:7-8; Thukral, 1996:1501).

The consideration of major unmarried daughters for land compensation in the Maharashtra case was, undoubtedly, a remarkable policy feature, considering the patriarchal underpinnings in many resettlement processes in India, and indeed in many societies around the globe. As indicated earlier, gender has significant implications on how people of different genders are affected, and experience the effects of forced resettlement (Koenig, 1995:21; Mehta and Srinivasan, 2000:8). Gender bias in resettlement situations is not an isolated issue, but is underpinned by systemic social and economic partialities legitimised by international, national and regional policies, and by laws, as well as shared values (Koenig, 1995:21; Mehta and Srinivasan, 2000:8; Thukral, 1996:1500). The LAA, for example, the major law which

has been informing land acquisition in the Indian society for over a century, was riddled with gender biases that perpetuated the exclusion of women from access to opportunities and resources such as land and property (Thukral, 1996:1500). It is not surprising, therefore, that such a policy provision in the Maharashtra case could be hailed internationally as excellent, for it was truly rare.

Nonetheless, as with policy provisions in other areas, the true commitment towards a particular cause lies in the implementation. Contrary to the remarkable policy provisions in the cases of Gujarat and Maharashtra, the implementation of the aforementioned and other policy features was later reported as reflecting “innumerable and unacceptable inadequacies” (Scudder, in Dwivedi, 1997a:8). Some of the shortfalls included the failure to implement land compensation for major sons and daughters (Morse and Berger, 1992:4). In actuality, land compensation was generally inadequately implemented, as some main households who were previously landed were also reported to have not been compensated with land after resettlement (Whitehead, 1999:1942). These implementation deficits propelled a change of position on the side of activist groups in the SSP case, from that of willing to negotiate resettlement processes, compensation and rehabilitation, to opposing the continuation of the project and the inevitable resettlement (Dwivedi, 1997a:8).

The year 1990 was marked by what other writers have termed “unprecedented events” of demonstration in the capital city, New Delhi (Gadgil and Guha, 1994:101). Propelled by, among others, the Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA) – discussed earlier in Chapter Four – a well-known activist group in India, which attracted significant national and international recognition (Narula, 2008; Rajagopal, 2005:195). During this demonstration, the local communities who were to be displaced by the construction of the SSP, mainly from Madhya Pradesh, were gathered in a peaceful *dharna*, in the capital city – New Delhi (Gadgil and Guha, 1994:101). This demonstration lasted for days, and was followed, a few months later, by more demonstrations, marches, and hunger strikes, all meant to oppose the construction of the SSP (ibid.:102). However, the failure of this movement to secure the commitment of the involved states’ governments to stop the construction of the dam projects in the Narmada Valley invoked an escalation of resistance, through collaboration with other stakeholders in India and abroad, as discussed in Chapter Four (Jacob, 2017:492; Narula, 2008:359).

The state of Jharkhand is known to be one of those most affected by forced displacement and resettlement. This is owing to its wealth of mineral resources, which attracted big

development projects, inevitably leading to forced displacement and resettlement (State of Jharkhand, 2003:1-2). It is for this reason that it is also known as the “mineral capital of India” (Hind, 2016:109). Ironically, it is also one of the least developed regions of the country, and has seen a significant number of its population bearing the cost of development through forced displacement and resettlement over the years (Hind, 2016:109; State of Jharkhand, 2003:1-2). The Subernarekha Multipurpose Project (SMP), for example, the implementing authority of the Chandil Dam, in which an empirical research for this study was undertaken, has had an impact on the lives of over 13,000 families from 116 villages in the state of Jharkhand (SMP official documents, 2016).

Land acquisition in this case did not take place without any difficulties and resistance at grassroots level. The conceptualisation of the SMP in the early 1970s sparked a series of protests on the ground, which came to their peak in 1978, when the police reportedly violently attacked protestors, shooting four of them dead, and leaving others injured (Chadha, 1993:2196; Sharma, 2014:31). At this stage, the protests were mainly driven by demands for just compensation and rehabilitation packages (Personal interview, February, 2016). Research by Upadhyay (1999) in relation to the people affected by the SMP in the Singhbhum district in Jharkhand, reveals that the majority of the studied affected people considered the allocated cash compensation to be grossly underestimated. As revealed by the research, many of them indicated that they were unable to acquire new houses immediately after resettlement, due to the higher cost of house construction in the new areas (ibid.). The findings of this thesis undertaken in Chandil are consistent with this revelation.

In the early 1980s, land acquisition and the construction of some of the components of the SMP commenced, and at that stage, protesters had shifted their position to opposing land acquisition (Patra, 2015: unpagged). Nevertheless, as indicated earlier, the consent of affected people is not a prerequisite if the state acquires land for public purpose, as provided for by the principle of *eminent domain*, on which the LAA was based (Desai, 2011:96; Diaz, 2012:41; Singh, 2012:2). At the time, land acquisition and resettlement in the SMP were undertaken on the basis of the LAA, as in other parts of India. However, the implementation of the project was constantly punctuated by persistent opposition from the affected people on the ground (Das, 1991:276).

In 1987, after fruitless protests and campaigns opposing the construction of dams under the SMP, a new local organisation – the Visthapiti Mukti Vahini (VMV) – was formed by

affected people and independent civil society activists. The organisation was aimed at advocating for the development of a comprehensive state level resettlement and rehabilitation policy, to guide land acquisition and resettlement within the then Bihar state – now Jharkhand (Patra, 2015: unpagged). The discussion of the findings, under participation of the affected people in policy development in Chapter Fourteen, will outline the involvement of the VMV in the advocacy of policy development in this case.

Contrary to resettlement cases that involved grassroots resistance, there are states which, for a long time, have been characterised by a lack of resistance towards big development projects that induced forced resettlement. According to Judge (1997:849), unlike in states such as Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Jharkhand, Punjab has generally been unresponsive to forced displacement and resettlement that have taken place in the region. This is despite the fact that resettlement implementation processes in the case of Punjab have not been any significantly different from many other cases in India, in terms of the manner in which compensation and rehabilitation were undertaken (ibid:849). This begs the sociological question of why in some societies people resist different forms of subjugation, while in others people surrender to such subjugation. In other words, oppression invokes varying kinds of responses in different societies, if forced resettlement and displacement can be taken as certain kinds of oppression, based on their involuntary nature and inherently negative consequences.

Judge (1997) attributes these differences in response to a number of factors including that there are no alternative development paradigms in Punjab, which makes it more favourable for the people in the region to accept big development projects. However, this falls short of explaining contrasting responses in other parts of India, as this reasoning could be applicable to other parts of the country, where resistance has been experienced. In fact, by Judge's own assertion "India has tried to fit into a world-system based on an industrial culture and growth" (1997:850), hence the "single development paradigm" rationale is not unique to the state of Punjab.

Secondly, Judge ascribes a lack of resistance in Punjab to the green revolution that resulted in higher agricultural production in the state, which made such projects as irrigation schemes worthwhile to the locals, even if they invoked involuntary resettlement (1997:850). The green revolution was, in effect, so successful that it significantly improved the state's economy in per capita terms, despite undiversified economic activities – the state's economy was

primarily based on agriculture (ibid:850). However, again this does not fully explain social inaction in this case. In many cases, the benefits of development projects accrue to certain segments of a given population, and not to others – usually not to vulnerable, marginalised groups. Hence, economic growth generated by development projects does not always indicate that such growth is inclusive.

In conclusion, the British colonial era was marked by constant revolt of indigenous groups against exclusive land use patterns and development projects implemented by the colonial government. However, infrastructure development, which was seen as the driver of development in the democratic India, was augmented post-independence, much to the disapproval of many of those against whom development induced land acquisition, resettlement and displacement.

As a result, several movements and campaigns were undertaken in different parts of India, with some opposing the construction of dams, while others only seeking to negotiate the terms of resettlement and rehabilitation. As shown above, some of the movements were successful in their pursuit of better land acquisition terms, such as in the case of the Koel-Karo project, whereas others, as in the case of the SSP, were not successful in influencing the implementation of resettlement processes, although they were successful in influencing policy reform.

As demonstrated in the above discussions, the determination of protesters is not the only factor necessary for campaigns or movements towards a particular cause to succeed. Institutional support and political will must also be present for the efforts of those who are aggrieved to bear fruit (Judge, 1997:851; Stanley, 2004:21). In the case of Koel-Karo project, for example, protesters enjoyed the indirect support of the court, which ruled that the government could not acquire land unless there was an agreement between the affected people and the implementing agency. Furthermore, the implementing agency, in the end, demonstrated political will to down-scale the project to reduce its impact on affected people, even though it was at the cost of less power generation. However, the opposite was the case in the situation of the SSP, where the implementation of some fundamental policy provisions, such as that of land-for-land, were poorly implemented, and the government was also not willing to give in to the demands of protesters.

Notwithstanding, issues of land-for-land compensation have been shown to be complex in many cases, not only in the case of India. The above discussed Lesotho case is also consistent

with this assertion. Cernea (2000:36) asserts that in densely populated areas where land is scarce, land-for-land compensation requires innovative ways of land reclamation. However, the challenge with this approach is that such measures can be financially costly, and as De Wet argues in the inherent complexities approach, in many cases the implementation of development projects is constrained by financial resources (2006:186). Hence, the minimisation of development projects to reduce the impact of resettlement may, in some cases, present a more favourable alternative to forced resettlement, as demonstrated by the Koel-Karo project case. The cost of sustainable resettlement is generally high, leading to the deficits, which are mainly felt by those forcefully resettled.

11.5 National Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy Development in India

The development of the national resettlement policy in India was begun amidst the long-term discontent of different groupings among the Indian population. This process was started in 1985, following the development of the first resettlement policy of the World Bank in 1980 (Fernandes, 1998:2703; 2004:1191; Iyer, 2003:3103). Against the backdrop of the earlier mentioned limitations of the LAA to provide the basis for meaningful and sustainable resettlement and rehabilitation for affected people, the call to the government by multiple stakeholders was to develop a policy that would not only ensure that affected people are fairly compensated, but also sufficiently rehabilitated (Asif, 1999:1564; Desai, 2011:96; Fernandes, 1998:2704; Guha, 2005:4798).

It was not until 2004 when, after much deliberation by different, relevant departments of the government, the central government of India released its first policy of resettlement and rehabilitation – the National Policy on Resettlement and Rehabilitation for Project Affected Families (Fernandes, 2004:1191; Government of India, 2004; Guha, 2005:4799; Mathur, 2011:6-7). Prior to the release of the first policy document in 2004, two drafts were circulated for public opinion in 1994 and in 1998 (Asif, 1999:1564; Fernandes, 1998:2703). The 2004 national policy was further revised and the second version released in 2007 – the National Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy (Government of India, 2007; Mathur, 2011:7).

At the core of it, the objective of the National Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy – henceforth “the policy” – was to ensure adequate compensation and rehabilitation of affected people, and to do so with expeditiousness (Government of India, 2007: Section 2). The policy was also meant to provide the basis for incorporating contextual complexities in the process of ensuring sufficient rehabilitation, contrary to the LAA, which was criticised for failing to

capture the needs of affected people on the ground (Government of India, 2007: Section 2; Mathur, 2011:7).

However, it is important to note that the national policy provides the framework upon which land acquisition and resettlement processes must be undertaken, but the actual implementation at the state levels ought to be carried out on the basis of specific states' policies developed at that level to capture some variations applicable in given contexts (Government of India, 2007: Section 1.7). As the discussion in Chapter Thirteen will show, the State of Jharkhand also has a state specific policy upon which part of the implementation of resettlement in the studied Chandil case was undertaken (State of Jharkhand, 2008). This state policy, which was first developed in 1990, prior to the development of the national policy, as will be outlined later in Chapter Thirteen, was revised on the basis of the national policy, and its latest 2008 version resembles the 2007 national level policy. Hence, although the national policy was later developed into an Act in 2011 and passed in 2013, to replace the LAA of 1894, as shown earlier in Chapter Five (Ghatak and Ghosh, 2011; Government of India, 2013; Samanta, 2015; Sarkar, 2011), this section focuses on the 2007 national policy, as it is the one upon which the investigated 2008 policy applied in the studied Chandil Dam case was based.

The studied Chandil resettlement case was a long-term project, which was implemented over time under changing policy documents – first the SMP guidelines developed on the basis of the LAA, then the first state policy developed in 1990, and the latest version developed in 2008, on the basis of the 2007 national policy of resettlement. The development of resettlement policies in the studied case will be outlined in greater detail in Chapter Thirteen. Based on the goal of this research, which is to assess the implementation of resettlement policies, with a specific focus on comparing a national policy in India, and a parastatal policy in Lesotho, the investigation was confined to the version of the state policy that was informed by the national policy. Hence, the Jharkhand Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy of 2008 provides the basis for the investigation of policy implementation in this thesis.

Also, as will be shown in Chapter Thirteen, although the state's policy was first developed in 1990, and revised in 2003, before the latest revision in 2008 (and resettlement in the Chandil case had started in 1985 on the basis of the LAA of 1894), significant changes with regard to compensation and rehabilitation in this case were implemented on the basis of the 2008 state policy, informed by the 2007 national policy. Hence, for the purpose of this thesis, the

discussion of the national resettlement and rehabilitation policy in this section will focus on the 2007 national policy, and not the 2013 Act.

The policy serves to inform the undertaking of resettlement at three main levels; land acquisition, compensation and rehabilitation (Government of India, 2007). In relation to the process of acquiring land, two key issues are central to the provisions of the policy in Section 4, these are the undertaking of social impact assessment (SIA), and the dissemination of information to affected people regarding the extent of the potential impact of land acquisition on affected people. According to the policy, the SIA ought to be undertaken when the project involves the resettlement of “...four hundred or more families *en masse* in plain areas, or two hundred or more families *en masse* in tribal or hilly areas...” (Government of India, 2007: Section 4.1). The SIA is meant to inform implementing agencies about the impact of land acquisition, including “public and community properties, assets and infrastructure...” that will be lost to resettlement (ibid.: Section 4.2.2). However, the aforementioned number of families required to be resettled to necessitate the SIA, raises questions on what constitutes a community, and what would inform the impact of losses incurred by communities in cases where there is less than the stipulated number of families affected by forced resettlement.

Furthermore, in many cases of resettlement, the undertaking of the SIA is compromised by, among other issues, minimal to no participatory approaches to resettlement, which in some cases has led to conflict between affected people and the implementing authorities, as in the case of the SSP (Dwivedi, 1997a:7; Paktar, 1995:158). In India, this limitation has been cited in some cases, and often affects the adequacy of the information that is meant to guide resettlement processes (Asif, 1999:1564; Scudder, 2005:195). However, the policy falls short of providing for community participation in SIA processes. At best, the policy provides for consultation as stipulated in Section 4.3.2, in a form of public hearings, and consultation of local government structures – *gram sabhas* – regarding land acquisition, in Section 7.21.2. Yet, consultation is but an entry point to participation, and often does not allow the consulted people to influence processes in a way that is meaningful to them (Cornwall, 2008:272; Paktar, 1995:158; Wodajo, et al., 2014:10).

With regard to compensation, two notable policy features include house compensation for homeless affected families who live below the poverty line, and land compensation for landless families who resided in the affected areas for a period of not less than three years (Government of India, 2007: Section; 1.2 and 7.3). Evidently, this provision was designed

with cognisance of the fact that there are people whose livelihoods are based on their access to land, even if they do not have legally recognised rights to that land, particularly in tribal areas (Government of India, 2007: Section 1.2). This is a remarkable feature, as issues of land holding in the Indian context are significantly complex, as discussed in Section 11.3. The provision of land compensation for the landless had earlier appeared in state level policies such as in Maharashtra and Gujarat, where in 1979, the Narmada Water Dispute Tribunal prescribed land compensation for landless households, with major sons and daughters regarded as separate households. However, the national policy provides a standard prescription for all cases across the Indian nation.

The policy emphasis in this regard has been on the provision of land-for-land, in the first instance, with cash compensation as the last resort when land cannot be provided for affected families (Government of India, 2007: Section 7). However, as has been argued earlier, the provision of land is one of the most difficult forms of compensation to undertake, particularly in highly populated areas which tend to have scarce agricultural land. In the state of Jharkhand for instance, which is of empirical interest in this thesis, only 27% of the landscape consists of arable land (Jewitt, 2008:74). As a result, the implementation of a land-for-land policy provision may be impeded by the complexity that comes with land scarcity. As Sen (1995:3057) asserts, such policy provisions, although well-intended, are tantalising as their implementation may be riddled with limitations beyond the control of implementing agencies.

In terms of rehabilitation, some of the notable measures in the policy include provision of technical and professional skills through formal training, and entrepreneurial development support for affected people (Government of India, 2007: Section 7.13.2). In response to land scarcity, which may hinder the implementation of land-based livelihood re-establishment, the exploration of other forms of livelihood is favourable and commendable. However, to partake in the benefits of these kinds of rehabilitation measures, affected people ought to possess certain kinds of skills and qualifications, such as a completion of secondary schooling, the absence of which can be an inhibiting factor to the implementation of this policy provision. As argued earlier in Section 11.3, in many cases where the affected people are predominantly the scheduled tribes and scheduled castes, they are more likely to fall short of the required skills and qualifications, due to historical and, to some extent, present realities of social and economic exclusion (Kijima, 2006:369; Thorat and Newman, 2007:4121). This exclusion from mainstream economic development may have snowballing effects, such as deprived

access to skills development opportunities. Although the policy measure under Section 7.13.2 of the policy is meant to provide for the improvement of skills among affected people, access to such training is conditioned by specific minimum requirements. Hence, the implementation of this policy provision may be inhibited by pre-existing realities, and the discussion of findings will attest to this assertion.

The policy also remarkably incorporates the reversal of other systemic subjectivities such as gender biases. Although some writers argue that the status of women in tribal areas is equal to that of men and applies to issues such as day-to-day decision-making, such equality could not translate into areas such as property ownership in legal frameworks exemplified by the LAA, which, due to its gender biases, excluded women in relation to property ownership (Maharatna, in Mitra, 2008:1206; Sah, 1995:3056; Thukral, 1996:1500). Section 7.8 of the policy, therefore, provides that compensation in a form of land or a constructed house may be in the joint names of both the husband and the wife (Government of India, 2007).

Given the inevitably disruptive nature of forced resettlement on those who are forced to make way for development, and the difficulty of implementing sustainable compensation and rehabilitation measures, such as land-for-land and long-term job creation due to their complexities, the policy has also emphasised the requirement of options assessment (Government of India, 2007: Section 2.1(a)). However, even though this feature has been factored into mainstream resettlement policies internationally and locally, its implementation remains rather sketchy. This is partly because in many cases, development projects that induce resettlement are part of wider political agendas (Devitt and Hitchcock, 2010:57; De Wet, 2006:187; Fahim, 1983:25; Pankhurst, 1992), often not open to external negotiations or public influence.

In 2010, the VMV and other local organisations in the Jharkhand state opposed the construction of the Icha Dam, another SMP project. In view of the requirement of options assessment, the organisations were calling for a transparent, participatory exploration of alternative means to provide water resources (Personal interview, February, 2016; Patra, 2014: unpagged). However, while the implementation of the Icha Dam was deferred in response to the disruption, it was later revived in its original form a few years later, against the will of affected people, and construction was underway at the time of the fieldwork of this research in 2016.

In the case of the LHWP, decisions regarding the construction of a series of dams remain an exclusive affair of the executive. Although the implementation of each phase is subject to the agreement of the involved states, the major decision to undertake the project was made over 30 years ago, under very different economic, political, environmental and social circumstances (Ferguson, 1990:108; LHDA, 1986; Mwangi, 2007:8; Thabane, 2000:634). Thus, for options assessment to be meaningful, the alternative means of providing the necessary resources and services must be an ongoing process, in cases of multi-phased projects.

11.6 Conclusion

The project of development in the British colonial era in India was underpinned by such elements as infrastructure development, macro-level trade, and administrative reforms on landownership and use. The resultant impact of this on indigenous tribal groups was forced land dispossession and displacement to make way for development and land reforms, which saw the revolt of tribal groups in retaliation (Guha, 2007:3307; Patwardhan, 2000:2-3; Sahoo, 2016:60). Different policy reforms and legal frameworks were implemented in response to tribal uprisings. However, tribal disruptions of what they believed was an unjust system continued to mount, well into the period of independence in 1947 (Guha, 2007:3307; Sahoo, 2016:60).

Although many had hoped that the transition towards independence and a democratic dispensation would bring a change in the practice of land acquisition, forced resettlement and displacement (Guha, 2007:3307), an acceleration of infrastructure development and the accompanying land acquisition and displacement continued, instead. When the Indian democratic state was installed in 1947, it inherited an economic system which was already set on a particular development path, i.e. that of commercialised agriculture, industrialisation and infrastructure development, including the construction of large dams (Morrison, 2010:189; Nilsen, 2010:5). When Prime Minister Nehru said, at the dawn of India's independence, what has become a famous phrase, that "dams are temples of modern India" (Morrison, 2010:192; Narula, 2008:351; Nilsen, 2007:274), his sentiments resembled what had begun long before the colonial epoch, but was accelerated in the colonial era – the construction of large reservoirs (ibid.:185). Between 1919 and 1934, the colonial government constructed at least nine reservoirs in India, largely aimed at facilitating commercial agriculture and contributing towards economic development (Morrison, 2010:189).

According to Morrison (2010:189), many of the large dams implemented in the first few years of a democratic India were either planned or partly constructed during the colonial era. The Tungabhadra project is one such example, conceptualised since the mid-nineteenth century and only concluded in 1954 (ibid.:189). Official figures show that the project displaced over 65,000 people (Morrison, 2010:189). The Bhakra Nangal Project is another example, launched with the signing of an agreement in 1944, but only completed in 1963 (Kendra, 2009:133; Pirta, et al., 2014:2). The project involved the displacement of over 36,000 people from 371 villages (Kendra, 2009:134).

In the newly independent India, national planning continued to be influenced by the plans of the colonial government. When the National Planning Committee was established in 1950, to development the “First Five-year Plan” – the foundation of national planning in the Indian society – many of the development projects, particularly those related to agricultural augmentation through irrigation, and the generation of power to facilitate economic development, had already been planned and some partly executed (Morrison, 2010:191; Singer, 1952:97; Rao, 1952). As a result, it made economic sense to build upon such projects in order to realise the benefits of the financial expenditure, which had already been incurred in setting up such projects (Rao, 1952:5).

In 1938, the earlier National Planning Committee was convened by the British colonial government, comprising representatives of different stakeholders in the economic development fraternity, including industrialists and merchants, economists and scientists (Morrison, 2010:191). Also a part of the committee were three Indian politicians, one of whom was Jawaharlal Nehru, who would become the first Prime Minister of an independent, democratic India (ibid.:191). The purpose of this committee was to instigate a process of developing what would become the “First Five-year Plan”, launched in 1951 (Morrison, 2010:191; Singer, 1952:97; Rao, 1952).

As a result, the development trajectory in the independent India followed the foundation of development planning laid in the colonial era. Even the colonial LAA, as indicated earlier, continued to be used as a framework for land acquisition and resettlement for a long time in the democratic Indian state. Hence, some colonial approaches to land acquisition and resettlement for development purposes remained structurally intact in the new, democratic government system. In addition, land acquisition, resettlement and displacement were

accelerated, much to the disapproval of many affected groups on the ground (Fernandes, 2007:203; Gogoi and Lahon, 2014:133; Mohanty, 2005:1318; Siddiqui, 2014).

This intensified the tension between affected people at grassroots level and the state post-independence, as had been the case during the colonial era. The end result of the advocacy and social actions of different stakeholders in the Indian society – including the people at grassroots level – was the development of the national policy and the Act for rehabilitation and resettlement, which replaced the widely criticised LAA.

The resistance and social actions at grassroots level in the case of India provided the basis for the development of a resettlement policy that incorporated some pertinent contextual dynamics, significant to the affected people on the ground. As the discussion in Chapter Thirteen will show, when the development of the Jharkhand State's policy is outlined, the process was fairly participatory, and incorporated some inputs from other stakeholders, including the primarily affected people. The ethnographic findings in the next chapters will, therefore, unpack how the developed state policy, whose latest version was informed by the national policy, interacted with the dynamics on the ground, and how such dynamics were negotiated in implementation processes, as reflected by the outcomes on the ground.

The next three chapters will form a discussion of the Chandil Dam and its associated resettlement in the Jharkhand state, in which the empirical study was undertaken. The first of the three chapters presents an overview of the Chandil Dam project and the context in which it was implemented. The second of the three chapters explores the implementation of a specific resettlement policy applied in the Chandil resettlement case. Then the last of the three chapters discusses participation of affected people in the Chandil Dam resettlement processes.

12 Chapter Twelve: An Overview and Context of the Chandil Dam Case

12.1 Introduction

The previous chapter has provided some background on the context of displacement and resettlement by development in the Indian society. It sought to highlight some of the issues related to the widespread critique, dissatisfaction and resistance towards forced resettlement and its associated, predominantly negative consequences. The chapter then presented the development of the national policy, which was aimed at addressing some of the fundamental issues related to the consequences of forced resettlement, on the basis of which, state level policies would be developed to inform implementation processes in resettlement. The next two chapters will present the ethnographic findings based on the investigation of the implementation of the Jharkhand State policy of resettlement in the Chandil case. Before the discussion of the findings, this chapter presents an overview of the Chandil Dam case, and of the profile of the people affected by the construction of the dam. This contextual overview will be linked to the manner in which the investigated resettlement policy implementation played out, and how it affected the resettled people.

12.2 The Overview of the Chandil Dam

The Chandil Dam project is a part of the tripartite initiative by the states of Jharkhand (formerly part of Bihar), West Bengal and Orissa, in India – the Subarnarekha Multipurpose Project (SMP). The project was first conceptualised in 1973, with the intention to augment water supply in large agricultural lands and urban areas in the three states' biggest cities, as well as to prevent flooding in these states (Bharti, 1991:1385; Chadha, 1993:2194; Gupta and Mitra, 2004:435). The approval of the project was, however, only secured in 1978, with the signing of an executive agreement between the states. The Subarnarekha River, along which the Chandil Dam was constructed, goes through the three states, with its source in Chhotanagpur in Jharkhand, flowing through the Singhbhum District of Jharkhand, the Midnapore District in West Bengal, and the Balasore District in Orissa, through to its mouth at the Bay of West Bengal (Gupta and Mitra, 2004:432). The dam itself is, however, situated in the Seraikela Kharsawan District in Jharkhand.

The State of Jharkhand became a separate state on November the 15th in the year 2000, after a long secessionist battle orchestrated mainly by tribal people, who form about half of the total inhabitants in the region (Corbridge, 2002:58; Government of India, 2011; State of Jharkhand, 2003:1). The post-Indian independence history of the fight for a separate state

began in 1950, accelerated by the founding of the Jaipal Singh led Jharkhand Party, mandated to advance an agenda of the establishment of a separate state in the Bihar State Congress (Corbridge, 2002:58). For half a century, the tribal people in Jharkhand, represented by the Jharkhand Party in the Congress of the Bihar state, fought for the recognition of their rights to land and natural resources, a battle which had begun long before independence in India (Basu, 2012:1295). The establishment of a separate, smaller state was, therefore, seen by these tribal people as a way of ensuring that their rights and entitlements are recognised.

At the dawn of its independence as a separate state, the State of Jharkhand released its 'Vision 2010' document, which reflected the short-term aspirations of the new state (Basu, 2012:1291; State of Jharkhand, 2003). In the opening of the vision statement, the state sets out inclusive, sustainable development as its principal mandate, against a backdrop of the historical structural exclusion of certain sections of its population, notably scheduled tribes and scheduled castes (State of Jharkhand, 2003:1).

"This State came into being with a commitment to an all-round development and prosperity of its people in general and scheduled tribes and scheduled castes in particular...This document sets out the vision and aspirations of the people of Jharkhand for achieving social equity, prosperity and involvement of the weakest and most backward sections of the society in the developmental process" (State of Jharkhand, 2003:250).

As part of its inclusive development plan, the state aimed to intensify industrialisation in the region, exploiting its abundant natural resources and minerals, which the state believed would augment economic growth and allow more previously disadvantaged people to transition from being economically excluded, to being partakers in modern development (State of Jharkhand, 2003:1-2). Although this was the plan of the newly formed Jharkhand state, it was aligned with the Indian national vision of modernisation and industrialisation, and the fundamental need to include previously disadvantaged tribal groups in the process of such development (Wyatt, 2005:466). To support this vision, the need for resources such as water and electricity became significant. Thus, the generation of hydro-electric power and the preservation of water through the construction of large dams became part and parcel of the industrialisation and macro-economic development vision, of not only the state government, but also of the Indian society at large (Basu, 2012:1292; Mawdsley, 2002:3; Wyatt, 2005:466). It was from this vision that a plan to build a series of dams (Chandil and Icha) and barrages (Kharkai and Galudih) along the Subarnarekha River, in what was then the Bihar state, was born (Gupta and Mitra, 2004:434).

When the SMP project was planned in 1978, it was designed to be implemented in two phases. During Phase One, 50% of the Chandil Dam would be completed, 20% of the Icha Dam would be completed, and 36% of the Galudih Barrage would be completed (Gupta and Mitra, 2004:434). Phase Two envisioned the completion of the remaining parts of the construction, together with the construction of the Kharkai Barrage (ibid.:434).

Although the tribal populations of Jharkhand were hoping for a paradigm shift after Jharkhand's independence, with regard to land acquisition, the commitment of the newly formed state to the continuous cause of industrial development and the exploitation of natural resources led to a different reality (Basu, 2012:1292). When the Jharkhand Party was formed in 1950 to advance the cause of a separate state, it was with the view of advancing a rights-based approach to development, one that would fundamentally protect the rights of tribal people on land holding and natural resources (Basu, 2012:1295; Mawdsley, 2002:2).

However, after achieving its independence, the Jharkhand State continued on the same macro-economic development trajectory, which had been set by the central government and the State of Bihar (Ahmed, 2008:198; Basu, 2012:1292; Wyatt, 2005:466). This partly manifested in the continuation of the construction of large dams and their associated resettlement, such as the continuation of the Icha Dam in the Kuju village. As indicated above, the Icha Dam is one of the two dams constructed under the SMP, which was yet to be completed when Jharkhand became a separate state in 2000 (Gupta and Mitra, 2004:434; Khagram, 2004:51; Sen, 2017). While it may be argued that the rights-based and macro-economic, liberal approaches to development are not necessarily always mutually exclusive, the evidence presented in many forced resettlement and displacement situations in India and elsewhere in the world confirms that in many cases, there is an irreconcilable dichotomy between the rights of local people and the objectives of macro-economic development projects (Bharti, 1991:1386; Basu, 2012; Dwivedi, 1999; Mohanty, 2005:1319; Price, 2009:273; Zaman, 1996:692).

The construction of the Chandil Dam is an example of this divide in development approaches. When the dam was constructed, it was aimed at providing water to a private company, Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd, and surrounding urban areas in the city of Jamshedpur in Jharkhand, as well as to supply water to the big agricultural lands in Odisha and West Bengal (Gupta and Mitra, 2004:435; Puthucherril, 2009:100). All this was believed

to have the potential to contribute to or to facilitate economic development through industrialisation and commercialised farming.

However, the benefits of this water supply have, arguably, not been shared by the majority of the tribal people who were forced from their lands on account of the project. Although there are some who have benefited from the fishing project in the dam site, as later discussions will reveal, and some have benefited from job opportunities created by the construction of the dam; however by and large, the majority remain on the periphery of this development. Many of the people primarily affected by the construction of the dam are themselves without reliable water supply in their resettlement areas. In three of the four villages in which the empirical research for this study was undertaken, water provision was visibly inadequate.

A lack of sufficient compensation and development measures for the directly and negatively affected people in resettlement is cited by many writers as one of the major causes of the continuous exclusion of the affected from partaking in the benefits of planned, macro-economic development (Bharti, 1991; Chadha, 1993; Sharma, 2014; Sharma, et al., 2015:68). Of the over 1,000 households surveyed in the study assessing the implementation of compensation among the Chandil Dam-affected people, only 124 were found to have received cash compensation of over Rs. 50, 000 and the majority received no more than Rs.15, 000 per household (Gupta and Mitra, 2004:441). At the time during which the fieldwork was conducted in 2015, one Indian Rupee was equivalent to roughly four South African Rands.

For writers such as Basu (2012:1292), it is disingenuous, therefore, to claim inclusive development in rationalising macro-economic development policies, when the majority are deprived of the benefits of the envisaged or attained economic growth. The figure below depicts the Chandil Dam, constructed in the Chandil Block of the Seraikela Kharsawan District in Jharkhand, India.



Figure 12.1 The Chandil Dam in Jharkhand, India

Source: <http://tourism.gov.in/jharkhand>

As stated earlier, the empirical research of this thesis was undertaken in four villages within the Chandil area – Chilgu, Sukhsari, Chotalakha and Gangudih – to which the people were resettled due to the construction of the Chandil Dam. The section below outlines a profile of the people in the Chandil area in the Jharkhand State of India, some of whom were directly affected by the construction of the dam.

12.3 A Profile of the People in the Chandil Block in Jharkhand, India

12.3.1 Social and demographic characteristics

The Chandil Block is situated in the Saraikela Kharsawan District of the Jharkhand State in India, and according to a recent Indian census, the district is home to just over 1.2 million people (Government of India, 2011). The majority of residents in the Saraikela Kharsawan District – over 75% – live in the rural areas, while the remaining 25% live in the urban areas (Government of India, 2011). The average literacy rate in the rural areas of the district is comparatively lower than in the urban areas, which are approximately over 63% and over 81% respectively (Government of India, 2011). The disparities in the literacy rates within the district are also expressed between genders, with approximately 67% for males and 47% for females.

Of the total population in the district, about 37% are classified as Scheduled Tribes, roughly 5% as Scheduled Castes, and the remaining 58% is a combined percentage of those classified as General and Other Backward Castes (Government of India, 2011). As indicated earlier in Chapter Eleven, the term “scheduled” is used administratively to denote areas with mainly previously disadvantaged groups, who, because of the legacy of structural exclusion – though with different bases for exclusion – continue to be economically disadvantaged and less developed than their counterparts in the ‘general’ category (Corbridge, 2000:62; Mitra, 2008:1202). The disadvantaged status of scheduled areas can manifest in many aspects such as literacy, and, by extension, employment opportunities, poverty levels, etc., as later discussions will attest.

In the Chandil Block, where the four villages in which the empirical research was undertaken are situated, of the total population of 159,160 people in 104 villages, 47,748 (30%) are classified as ST, while 7,755 (5%) identify as SC (Government of India, 2011). Some 116 villages in the Chandil Block were affected by the construction of the Chandil Dam, 32 of which were completely inundated, and residents resettled to other areas within the Chandil Block, while others were only partly affected (Upadhyay, 1999:235). Table 12.1 below reflects the population in scheduled areas in the Chandil Block by gender. Although not included in the table below, there are groups of OBC, who, like those in the scheduled areas, are also economically less developed than those in the ‘general’ category.

Table 12.1 Population in scheduled areas of Chandil by gender

	Male	Female	Total
Scheduled Caste	3,888	3,867	7,755
Scheduled Tribe	23,998	23,750	47,748

Source: (Government of India, 2011: unpagged)

Targeted development programmes have been designed to expedite economic progress in scheduled areas, such as scholarships aimed at improving educational levels among ST and SC (Chauhan, 2008:223; Xaxa, 2001:2767). However, the literacy rate in these areas remains significantly lower in comparison with non-scheduled areas. As reflected in the 2011 census, the overall literacy rate in the Chandil Block sits at 67%, and the majority of the non-literate are in scheduled areas (Government of India, 2011). Research has shown that this delayed progress is largely tied to deeply rooted socio-cultural dynamics that perpetuate the exclusion of certain groups of people, even in the context of programmes designed to fast-track

economic development in scheduled areas (Bhagavatheeswaran, et al., 2016; Desai and Kulkarni, 2008; Ramachandran, 2003; Roy, 2015:240-241). That is, transformation in scheduled areas is partly deterred by the inability of communities to transition out of socially exclusionary beliefs and practices, into an inclusive co-existence.

The disparity between genders in literacy for example, is an indication of underlying gender inequalities central to the patriarchal system, which in many ways, empowers boy children more than girls. A recent study by Bhagavatheeswaran, et al. (2016), exploring the barriers and enablers of access to and completion of secondary education among ST and SC adolescent girls, bears testimony to this. According to the study, among other issues, child marriages, harassment of female students at school by both teachers and male students, a lack of facilities for girls, a lack of support from the family, are some of the deterrents to the success of girl children in school (Bhagavatheeswaran, et al., 2016). In the Chandil Block, although the overall literacy rate is 67%, it is 47% among women and 65% among men, which is representative of the gender disparity prevalent in scheduled areas (Government of India, 2011).

A study by Ramachandran (2003) further revealed that poverty levels, which are higher in scheduled areas – hence they are also referred to as backward regions – can also account for the inability of, especially, girl children to succeed in school. According to the study, girls, particularly those from poorer backgrounds, tend to do more work at home than their male counterparts, which affects their school work and, by extension, their performance at school (ibid.:23). A study by Dreze and Kingdon (2001:14) confirms that the gender inequality which disadvantages girl children over boy children is more applicable in poorer, scheduled areas than in more affluent, non-scheduled areas, as girls from well-off backgrounds tend to perform better in school than boys from poorer backgrounds. Both studies indicate that the status of girls among poorer, scheduled areas, is directly linked to that of women in general in the backward regions, and has implications for other aspects related to development in these areas. Later discussions will show that, indeed, women are affected differently by forced resettlement, and in many cases, get the short end of the stick compared with their male counterparts.

In the empirical study in this thesis, the majority of the studied resettled households (95%) identified as ST, SC, and OBC, and only 5% were classified as ‘general’. The economic characteristics of scheduled groups – discussed below – are reflective of high poverty levels,

low literacy rates, high unemployment rates, etc., all the result of previous exclusion from mainstream economic activities (Dreze and Kingdon (2001). As a result, the ability of affected people to re-establish livelihoods after forced resettlement is significantly hindered by these social and demographic characteristics, and underpinned by the fact that people lose fundamental assets and means of livelihood in resettlement, which may not be recovered in the new areas.

12.3.2 Economic characteristics

The State of Jharkhand is one of the natural resource and mineral rich regions in India; yet ironically, it is one of the poorest regions in the country (State of Jharkhand, 2010:1). Due to its abundance in natural resources, the Jharkhand State has been one of the fastest industrialising states in the post-WWII era, in line with the project of development tied to the expansion of industrialisation and infrastructure development (Sen, 1992:85). One of the Indian government's positions on development – and by extension that of its states' governments – was that industrial expansion holds the potential to fast-track economic growth in backward regions such as Jharkhand (Sen, 1992:85; State of Jharkhand, 2010:1).

The move from small scale agrarian to industrial economies has been expressed not only by the commitment of the Indian government to infrastructural and industrial expansion, but also widespread land acquisition and its accompanying forced resettlement and displacement in industrialising areas such as Jharkhand (Bharti, 1991; Chadha, 1993; Jewitt, 2008; Sharan, 2005). As indicated in Chapter Two, India is in the top three countries – together with China – with the most number of large dams constructed in the post-WWII era, accompanied by massive resettlement and displacement (McCully, 1996:2; Termiski, 2015:104). The consequences of such dam constructions have included deprived access to land for previously agrarian societies, and restricted or deprived use of forest resources in tribal areas (Bharti, 1991:1386; Jewitt, 2008:70; Sen, 1992:85; Sharan, 2005:4443).

Consequently, land acquisition for the purposes of developing industries, mining companies and the construction of large dams increased significantly in these so-called backward regions after India's independence. In the 1950s, 112,000 acres of arable land was acquired for the purpose of the Hirakud dam construction in Odisha, affecting over 3,000 families (Asif, 1999:1564). A further 12,000 acres of land was acquired for development purposes between the 1960s and 1980s in the same state (ibid.:1565). In the State of Jharkhand, substantial tribal land has been acquired for the purposes of dam construction and industrial

development. Between 2005 and 2009, over 30 private companies were allocated pieces of land for the establishment of coal mines, forcefully resettling over 210,000 families in Jharkhand (Lahiri-Dutt and Balakrishnan, 2012:40). The construction of Chandil Dam, which is the subject of this thesis, submerged over 17,000 hectares of land, affecting 116 villages, 32 of which were fully inundated, and others only partially affected (Upadhyay, 1999:235). In this process, over 13,000 families were forcefully resettled and displaced by the construction of Chandil Dam (SMP, 2016).

As a result of land acquisition for macro-economic development, small-scale agricultural activities have been on the decline in the Jharkhand region, particularly among tribal areas such as Chandil, where these development projects were taking place (Sharan, 2005:4446). In 2011, the Indian census revealed that only about 3% of the population in the Chandil Block were classified as cultivators, that is, they either owned or co-owned land from which they derived their livelihood (Government of India, 2011). However, although the pronounced shift towards industrialisation has led to the inevitable decrease of investment in the agrarian economy, some writers argue that the move away from rural livelihoods tied to natural resources and land cultivation has been rather slow in the Indian context (Haan, 1997:36). Despite the rapid loss of arable land to development projects, India, for a long time, remained largely rural and agrarian, with 74% of its total population still living in rural areas in the 1990s, and 62% of its labour force working as either landed cultivators or as landless agricultural labourers (ibid.:36). As the discussions in the next chapter will show, this is likely the result of a combination of factors including a lack of alternative opportunities in the urban areas for the majority of rural dwellers, and a lack of skills to transition out of rural forms of livelihood.

Notwithstanding, over the years, more people have lost access to arable land due to development-propelled land acquisition, either as landowners or as labourers (Asif, 1999:1564; Jewitt, 2008:70; Lahiri-Dutt and Balakrishnan, 2012:40; Sharan, 2005:4443; Upadhyay, 1999:235). As the statistics from the Indian 2011 census show below in Tables 12.2 and 12.3 on employment patterns in the Saraikela-Kharsawan District and the Chandil Block respectively, there are significantly less people engaged in agricultural activities, with the majority falling in the non-working category. As a consequence of high rates of unemployment, food insecurity and high levels of inequality are some of the main characteristics of the Jharkhand region (Jewitt, 2008:74; Sharan, 2005:4444).

In addition to land acquisition, due to its uneven, rocky landscape, Jharkhand has only 27% arable land, with few opportunities for large-scale irrigation (Jewitt, 2008:74). Hence, displacement by environmental conservation and other development projects, coupled with the inevitable population growth, has put enormous pressure on already scarce arable land (Jewitt, 2008:74; Sharan, 2005:4444). Consequently, the region has seen a decline in agricultural production, with the resultant food insecurity (Sharan, 2005:4446).

In the Saraikela-Kharsawan District, for example – of which the Chandil Block is a part – over 50% of the population of working age is classified as either non-working or marginally employed, which means they are only employed for less than six months in a year (Government of India, 2011). Table 12.2 below depicts employment patterns in the Saraikela-Kharsawan District. Although these traits may be applicable and generally detrimental to the wider district population, they are more unfavourable to those who are forcibly moved and displaced from their areas, with no prospects for employment or other means of livelihood in the new areas. The discussion of the findings in the next chapter will reflect employment patterns in the studied areas in the Chandil Block, and the factors that contributed to the ability or inability of the resettled people to re-establish their livelihoods after forced resettlement and displacement. The forms of livelihood after resettlement will be discussed in line with not only the opportunities availed through the resettlement process informed by the applied policy, but also the opportunities available in the new areas, enabled by pre-existing socio-economic conditions.

Table 12.2 Employment patterns: Saraikela-Kharsawan District

Employment category	Total	Male	Female
Main workers	228,598	181,056	47,542
Cultivators	57,441	43,996	13,445
Agriculture Labourers	32,167	19,060	13,107
Household Industries	6,061	3,802	2,259
Other Workers	132,929	114,198	18,731
Marginal Workers	201,453	102,225	99,228
Non-Working	635,005	261,130	373,875

Source: (Government of India, 2011: unpagged)

The high rates of unemployment in the region are also indicative of the region's low literacy rates, as shown above. The majority of residents in the district belong to three of the social classes, considered to be backward – ST, SC, and OBC (Government of India, 2011). It follows, therefore, that the majority are unemployable due to their lack of skills, and are less likely to find alternative employment when they lose access to their land-tied livelihood to involuntary resettlement. Furthermore, literacy rates usually indicate the ability to read and write, and hence, even fewer people have qualifications above secondary level. The findings from this thesis will show that in the studied cases, many did not have secondary school education, and even fewer underwent tertiary education.

Notwithstanding, a closer look will also reveal that, even apart from the question of literacy and employability, employment opportunities are scarce in the Chandil Block. Table 12.3 below, Adapted from the Indian 2011 census, depicts employment patterns in the Chandil Block. As the findings from this study will also confirm, not only from the statistics but also from anecdotes, even those who were trained through the SMP initiative to re-establish their livelihoods after resettlement had not been able to secure employment after the completion of their training. Moreover, as reflected in the SMP official documents, the SMP was only able to provide employment to roughly 2,000 of the affected people from over 13,000 families affected by the Chandil Dam resettlement. Hence, unemployment in the Chandil Block is a combination of land acquisition – which stripped people of their productive assets – a lack of skills, and the general scarcity of job opportunities, as further discussions will attest.

Table 12.3 Employment patterns: Chandil Block

	Total	Male	Female
Main Workers	35,476	29,363	6,113
Cultivators	5,899	4,998	901
Agriculture Labourers	4,314	2,849	1,465
Household Industries	687	453	234
Other Workers	24,576	21,063	3,513
Marginal Workers	22,607	12,090	10,517
Non-Working	99,866	39,547	60,319

Source: (Government of India, 2011: unpagged)

Less than 20% of the population of working age in the Chandil Block are considered to be working full-time, while the remaining, over 80%, are either unemployed or employed part-time or seasonally. In the studied households, over 50% have family members who are employed as agricultural labourers, which means that their work is only seasonal, and is also less financially rewarding. About 3% of the population in the Chandil Block are classified as cultivators, that is, they either own or co-own land on which they derive their livelihood (Government of India, 2011). This is indicative of a substantial decline in land holding, in a region whose economy was previously both agrarian and forest resources-based.

12.3.3 Socio-spatial relations

Like most societies, tribal groups are not static in nature, they transform with the inevitable changes that come with the dynamism of social, economic, and spatial features of society (Feather, 2013: xiii; Mandelbaum, 1970:4; Popenoe, 1988). However, for many years, tribal groups had sustained an isolated way of life, mainly in forested and hilly areas (Malhotra, et al., 2001b:1; Sujatha, 2002:87). Historically, most tribal villages were situated near the forests, where natural resources that supported their livelihoods, such as wood, jungle fruits, leaves, etc. were easily accessible (Sen and Lalhrietpui, 2006:4204; Sinha, 1982:73). In this regard, livelihoods among the tribal people were largely linked to their natural environment, with no significant need for financial resources. Trees such as *Mahua*, *Bel* (also known as *Aegle marmelos*), *sal* (also known as *Shorea robusta*) and *Kendu*, are indigenous in regions such as Jharkhand, and formed part of the means of livelihood in forested areas in the Chandil area before land acquisition (Fernandes, 1997:82-83; Sareen, 2016:6; Sinha, 1982:73).

Houses were built with natural resources such as the wood of *Sal*, as well as with grass, paddy straw and mud (Sinha, 1982:73). The wood of *Sal* is known for being hard and durable, hence a source of hardwood timber, suitable for construction of houses. Houses were built to withstand rain and wind, and to form protection from the cold, particularly in villages situated on high lying areas (Gautam and Devoe, 2005:83; Sinha, 1982:72-73). In Hindu tradition, *Sal* also has religious significance; with its name originating from Sanskrit, meaning 'house', it is considered to be the abode of spirits (Edwardes and Edwards, 1982:85). This religious link to the tree can thus have implications to those who are forcibly moved from their original forested areas to new, open areas, with no access to this indigenous resource. Although these trees may have seemed to others as simply sources of timber, to those culturally emplaced in

such forested environments, they meant more than their mere material significance (Fernandes, 1997; Sareen, 2016). As Downing (1996:37) argues, the physical environment can have social and cultural meanings, highly prized to those who derive or construct such meanings.

For the resettled people in the Chandil Block, forests and rivers formed key sources of livelihood, which also had significant socio-cultural values. As attested by the excerpts below, these continued to be the resource base in the areas until the resettled people were forcefully moved on account of the construction of the Chandil Dam. In the next chapter, the findings will show how those who were moved on account of the construction of the Chandil Dam were socially, culturally, and physically displaced from the natural environment they had established as their own. From the natural environment, they derived not only physical resources to support their livelihoods, but also their socio-cultural significance (Sharma, 2004:80).

“...we depended on nature...rivers, land, forests...land gave us food, we had water...our children didn’t starve, now we live in poverty, this is poverty.”

“...rivers, ponds, forests...all those were our way of life...things we do not have in this place...we do not have water, those taps, the taps are not working.”

The Subarnarekha River, which flows along the Chandil Block, served as a source of water for many villagers in the Chandil Block prior to resettlement (Bharti, 1991:1386). Forced resettlement took them away from abundant, running river water sources, to areas where they are deprived of water resources. The ponds in the studied villages in the new areas, for example, where people do their laundry and bathe, contain stagnant water which retains dirt and pollutants, unlike river water which is constantly flowing. Rivers and forests also have some spiritual significance in Hindu religion, a predominant religion in the region, as reflected in the subsection below. Resettlement thus not only had material effects on those directly affected, but also an impact on the affected people’s religious and cultural lives.

12.3.4 Religious affiliation

The predominant religion in the Chandil Block is Hinduism, with just over 55% of the residents in the area identifying religiously as Hindu, as reflected in Table 12.4 below (Government of India, 2011). The second most popular religion in the block is the Islamic

religion, with over 25% identifying as Muslims. Then other religions form the remaining 20%.

Table 12.4 Chandil Block population by religious affiliation

Religion	Total		Male	Female
Hindu	87,584	55.45%	45,134	42,450
Muslim	39,784	25.19%	20,555	19,229
Christian	1,667	1.06%	802	865
Sikh	91	0.06%	46	45
Buddhist	15	0.01%	7	8
Jain	10	0.01%	5	5
Other Religion	28,539	18.07%	14,311	14,228
No Religion Specified	259	0.16%	140	119

Source: (Government of India, 2011: unpagged)

For the purpose of this thesis, only the Hindu religion will be discussed. As will be seen later, the studied areas were predominantly Hindu, and this could be observed even in aspects such as the way of dressing, but also in defined means such as artistic elements and artefacts found in the homes, which are observed or used as forms of worship in Hinduism. Although Hinduism is a religion, the religious and socio-cultural lines are not clearly separated, hence, there are certain aspects of the religion which are both socio-cultural and also serve spiritual purposes (Malhotra, et al., 2001a:14). As a religion and as a cultural system, Hinduism is strongly linked to the spatial environment, such as forested areas, bushes, rivers and mountains (Malhotra, et al., 2001b:1). Thus, a significant cultural and spiritual impact was felt by those who were forcibly moved from the natural environment in which they were not only residents, but had also established a significant cultural and spiritual relationship with it.

Although there are distinctions between castes and tribes as social groups, one based on the religion, Hinduism, and the other on a socially and culturally defined tribal system, in some cases there is nearly no distinction between people who practice tribal rituals and Hindu rituals (Flood, 1996:6). While the history of Hinduism is undoubtedly long and complex, some historical accounts indicate that the modern-day history of Hinduism began in the 18th century, as a reference to Indians who resided in Hindustan in Northwest India (ibid.:6). Over time, many Indians began to espouse the religion as their identity, and also incorporating other cultural beliefs, rituals and practices in the process, to which extent Hinduism has become complex and multi-dimensional, integrating certain aspects of tribal religions (Flood, 1996:5-6). Today, although there are groups that identify as scheduled tribes and others as

scheduled castes, some scheduled tribes practice Hinduisms not only as a religion, but also as an acquired cultural practice. The text below, Adapted from Adhikary (in Malhotra, et al., 2001b:1) reflects certain aspects of tribal beliefs, which a subsequent brief discussion will show that they are similar to some attributes of Hinduism.

“The members of each clan of Birhor tribe think themselves to have descended from a common ancestor belonging to a particular hill or mountain and feel kinship relation among all of them. Each clan has a deity or Buru Bonga who is supposed to live in its traditional site or sites on forest clad hills or mountain. They worship and make sacrifices to their respective Buru Bonga from time to time facing the direction in which their traditional home is situated. Members of each clan not only affiliate themselves with a particular territory in jungles but also sacrifice animals to their clan deity. All the malevolent spirits are included within the category of Churgin, including the spirits of the dead who wander around and live in uninhabitable places on the earth. The Draha and Khut live beneath the big trees or big boulders while small bushes are abodes of the Bhulah and the Bhulah Chandi” (Adhikary, in Malhotra, et al., 2001b:1).

The text above is about the tribes of Bihar, and reflects elements such as spaces and the physical environment – forests, trees, mountains – which are considered to be the abodes of spirits, an aspect central to Hinduism as well. In Hinduism, certain trees such as banyan, peepal, neem, and tamarind are regarded as divine or sacred, based on their perceived healing powers and symbolism concerning certain attributes of gods (Dwivedi, 1990:4; King, et al., 1997:464; Swamy, et al., 2003:54). Also, plants such as *Tulasi* for example, are considered sacred in the Hindu religion, and are believed to represent the manifestation of gods, similar to the tribal belief that certain trees are the abodes of ancestral sprits, as reflected in the text above. Furthermore, reverence of forested areas is an attribute common to both tribes and Hinduism. There are beliefs around sacred groves, which are patches of trees in forested areas dedicated to ancestral sprits and deities in Hinduism, and some tribal clans also have deities (*Buru Bonga*), who are believed to reside in traditional sites or forests (Adhikary, in Malhotra, et al., 2001b:1; Arora, 2006:60). The worship of the dead or ancestral spirits is also a common element in both tribal and Hindu religions, as also reflected in the text above (Adhikary, in Malhotra, et al., 2001b:1; Arora, 2006:60).

Based on these similarities between the two systems of belief, coupled with the fact that in tribal areas, they are practiced within a complex and intertwined context, with a high likelihood of social and geographical co-existence, the lines of distinction have been blurring over time (Hasnain, 2008:16-17; Xaxa, 1999:1520). Hence, some scheduled tribes may only identify as such by social classification, but identify religiously as Hindu, observing and practising Hindu rituals and traditions (Mondal, 2016). Furthermore, the terms scheduled castes and scheduled tribes are more applicable in administrative processes, distinct from Hinduism and tribes, which are religious and cultural systems (Corbridge, 2000:62; Mitra, 2008:1202).

Forced resettlement dismantled this established religious and cultural order for many and, as the findings will show, the affected people were left to their own device to re-establish their lost cultural and religious artefacts, especially those of individual households. The strong relation between Hinduism, as a religious and cultural system, and the physical environment, deepened the impact felt by affected people on the ground, more so in the context where they were resettled to open, non-forest, low-lying areas, as in the case of the four studied villages. Nevertheless, some people had rebuilt artefacts and planted trees which are religiously meaningful in Hinduism, in their new homesteads, as a way of re-establishing the religious and cultural aspects of their lives. Community religious buildings were also provided in the new areas at the expense of the implementing authority.

12.4 Conclusion

This chapter has briefly provided an overview of the Chandil Dam case in the Jharkhand State of India, as well as some aspects of the people in the wider context in which the project is based. These aspects, such as demographic and economic characteristics, as well as social characteristics such as religious affiliations and socio-spatial relations, will be linked to the effects of resettlement and displacement in the studied Chandil Dam resettlement case in the next chapter. The next chapter explores resettlement processes in the Chandil Dam case, with a specific focus on the application of the resettlement and rehabilitation policy of the Jharkhand State, as indicated earlier. As the findings will show, in forced resettlement, contextual dynamics in the wider context in which the project is implemented tend to have an impact on the outcomes. The same point was reflected in the earlier discussed Mohale Dam resettlement case, where pre-existing socio-economic dynamics on the ground interplayed with resettlement implementation processes and affected the outcomes on the ground.

13 Chapter Thirteen: Resettlement and Rehabilitation in the Chandil Dam Case

13.1 Introduction

This chapter presents a discussion of the findings from the empirical study undertaken in the context of the Chandil Dam resettlement case in the Jharkhand State of India. In line with the objectives of the thesis, the findings presented and discussed explore the social and economic consequences of policies on resettlement processes, and how that reflects on the ground. Chapters Nine and Ten presented and discussed the findings from the LHDA's Phase 1B compensation policy implementation in the Mohale Dam resettlement. This chapter will focus on the implementation of the Jharkhand Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy of 2008.

As indicated earlier in Chapter Eleven, the Jharkhand State's policy on forced resettlement was developed to inform land acquisition and its associated resettlement in relation to development projects within the state (State of Jharkhand, 2008: Section 1.4). The State's policy was derived from the Indian National Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy of 2007 – discussed in Chapter Eleven – which was later developed into the Land Acquisition Act of 2013 (Government of India, 2007; 2013; State of Jharkhand, 2008). Hence, the implementation of resettlement and rehabilitation processes in the Chandil Dam has been informed by the Jharkhand State's policy over the years. Although the State's policy was first developed in 1990, and revised in 2003 and 2008 – when resettlement in the Chandil case had started in 1985 on the basis of the LAA of 1894 – significant changes in compensation and rehabilitation of affected people were implemented on the basis of the state's policy of 2008, informed by the 2007 national policy. In this regard, the analysis in this chapter focuses on implementation processes in terms of the 2008 Jharkhand state's policy of resettlement and rehabilitation.

In exploring policy implementation in resettlement processes, the discussion will take into account the factors facilitating or impeding these processes, and how that affects the outcomes, against the objectives of policy provisions. Ultimately, this thesis aims to draw a comparison between the two case studies in Mohale and Chandil. The comparison of the two cases will be presented later, in Chapter Fifteen. The next section explores the demographic characteristics of respondents in this study.

13.2 Demographic Characteristics of Respondents in the Chandil Dam Resettlement

The majority of land acquisitions related to development projects happen in tribal areas; thus, tribal groups in the Indian context are the most affected by forced resettlement (Asif, 1999:1564; Jewitt, 2008:70; Lahiri-Dutt and Balakrishnan, 2012:40; Sharan, 2005:4443; Upadhyay, 1999:235). This renders tribal people more vulnerable because of their significant reliance on natural resources. Furthermore, due to the relatively low levels of formal education and skills acquired by people in tribal areas, it is more difficult for them to fare well when they are forcefully resettled into urban areas, or into other areas where natural resources are scarce (Bhagavatheeswaran, et al., 2016; Halim, et al., 2016). The findings from the current study are representative of this reality, where the majority, constituting 97.5%, of the 80 respondents, belong to previously disadvantaged social groups; the ST, SC, and OBC. These categories form 45%, 26.25% and 23.75% of respondents respectively. Only 5% of the studied population belong to the General social classification. Table 13.1 below portrays the social categories of the studied households and their frequencies. Table 13.2 that follows, Adapted from the SMP official documents, depicts all the affected families by their social classifications.

Table 13.1 Affected families by social classification

Category	Number of respondents	Percentage
Scheduled Tribe (S.T.)	36	45
Scheduled Caste (S.C.)	21	26.25
Other Backward Caste (O.B.C.)	19	23.75
General	4	5
Total	80	100

Table 13.2 Classification of the affected families in the Chandil Dam

Total number of caste including fully and partially affected villages	Classification of affected caste				
	S.T.	S.C.	General	O.B.C.	Others
35500	7507	2254	830	24656	253

Adapted from official documents of the Subarnarekha Multipurpose Project (SMP) (2016)

In the absence or scarcity of natural resources that support livelihoods, employment or other means of income may present alternative ways in which livelihoods can be re-established among affected people after resettlement. In the studied cases, the households that demonstrated improved living standards were typically those that had members who were gainfully employed, or had established other income generating initiatives, mainly on a full-time basis. However, only 27.5% of the studied households had members who were fully employed, while the majority, 53.75% of households, had breadwinners who were only casually employed, mainly as agricultural labourers. As indicated earlier in the previous chapter, agricultural labour provides seasonal employment and is typically less financially rewarding. In other households, constituting 13.75% of the studied households, none of the members within the working age group were employed, while 5% represented households with members who were engaged in self-employment – either formally or informally. Table 13.3 below reflects employment patterns of the studied households.

Table 13.3 Respondents by occupation (or that of the household head/bread winner)

Occupation	Frequency	Percentage
Employed	22	27.5
Casual employment	43	53.75
Unemployed	11	13.75
Self-employed (formal business)	2	2.5
Self-employed (informal business)	2	2.5
Total	80	100

The employment patterns in the studied cases are representative of the wider Saraikela-Kharsawan District in which the Chandil Block is based, minor variations notwithstanding. As shown earlier in the previous chapter, just over 20% of the population within the working age group in the district is fully employed, with over 60% considered as unemployed, while the rest are only casually employed in agriculture, domestic work or other marginal work environments (Government of India, 2011).

Other demographics include respondents' age and sex. As reflected in Table 13.4 below, males and females represent 55% and 45% of respondents respectively. One of the factors that contributed to the higher number of male respondents is that where both the husband and

the wife were present, the husband, as the head of the family from the cultural perspective, would assume the responsibility of answering the questions on behalf of the household.

Table 13.4 Respondents by sex and village of residence

Respondents No.	Sex		Village
	Male	Female	
Respondents No. 1 - 20	13	7	Chotalakha
Respondents No. 21 - 40	10	10	Sukhsari
Respondents No. 41 - 60	12	8	Chilgu
Respondents No. 61 - 80	9	11	Gangudih
Total	44	36	4

Table 13.5 below depicts respondents by age. The ages of respondents are distributed across four different age groups, which helps to create an understanding of resettlement processes and their outcomes from the perspectives of people of different age groups. The ages of respondents range from 36 to over 66 years.

Table 13.5 Respondents by age

Age category	Number of respondents	Percentage
36 - 45	15	18.75
46 - 55	19	23.75
56 - 65	22	27.5
66+	24	30
Total	80	100

13.3 Land Acquisition and Reallocation in the Chandil Dam Resettlement

The construction of the Chandil Dam, covering over 17,028 hectares of land, affected over 13,000 families in 116 villages – some wholly and others only partially (SMP, 2016; Upadhyay, 1999:235). Hence, some people were physically relocated, while others remained in the vicinity, but lost their livelihoods – whether wholly or in part – to inundation and other related processes (Upadhyay, 1999:235). For the purpose of this thesis, however, the studied cases involve only those who were physically relocated, in order to explore the application of the policy as well as the outcomes, in relation to resettlement and rehabilitation. Resettlement

processes in relation to the Chandil Dam case commenced in 1985 and were concluded in 2009.

Of the 116 villages affected by the construction of the Chandil Dam, 13 were said to have been rehabilitated, in accordance with the applied resettlement and rehabilitation policy of the State of Jharkhand, and 4 of those 13 villages formed the study sites for this thesis. The application of the policy will be discussed in detail in the next section. The discussion on the application of the policy will be predicated upon the earlier discussed IRR model, with reference to the inherent complexities approach and the FSF. As the discussion of the findings will later show, the general picture painted by the studied villages reflect significant shortfalls in re-establishing livelihoods for the majority of affected people. Table 13.6 below depicts the 13 villages which, according to the SMP, had been rehabilitated.

Table 13.6 Description of residential plots in 13 rehabilitated villages in Chandil Block

No.	Name of village	Number of plots	Number of plots allocated and inhabited	Number of plots allocated but uninhabited	Number of plots inhabited without allocation	Encroachment of plots by non-displaced number
1	Gangudih	463	63	10	191	6
2	Sukhsari	289	146	36	40	3
3	Kukdu	861	4	22	0	1
4	Berashishirum	473	16	2	5	1
5	Kataiya	150	9	0	14	4
6	Kandarbeda	289	4	0	40	0
7	Chotalakha	65	2	4	23	4
8	T.M.C.	374	30	5	18	4
9	Choulibasa	290	88	58	51	6
10	Chilgu	470	54	9	195	13
11	Bankati	248	27	1	22	7
12	Kpali- A	127	24	13	32	12
13	Kpali -B	174	38	5	16	69
	Total	4273	505	165	647	130

Adapted from official documents of the Subarnarekha Multipurpose Project (SMP) (2016)

As the above table shows, there are a number of plots which were allocated by the SMP to resettled people, which were not inhabited by the expected families. In line with the objective of maintaining community ties and social networks, Section 6.10 of the applied policy provides that affected people be resettled in groups as much as possible (State of Jharkhand, 2008). This, as the policy provision rationalises, enables resettlers to transfer their social networks and the social capital embedded in them into the new areas, in keeping with “the desire of each group to preserve its own identity and culture” (State of Jharkhand, 2008:

Section 6.10). If undertaken effectively, the approach could potentially ease the process of community formation in the third stage of resettlement, as according to Scudder's stage framework (Scudder, 2005; 2009). By extension, this can mitigate the risk of community disarticulation associated with the predictable dismantling of the established social units, as will be discussed in detail later in Section 13.4.6 of this chapter.

In this regard, the allocation of plots for resettled people was done in such a way that people from the same community could be resettled together as a group. Additionally, the allocation of the plots was based on the availability of resources in the new areas. A senior official in the SMP confirms this:

"...you may have seen as you came along that in the surrounding areas there is about 12.5 decimal of land, with social infrastructure. There are roads, ponds, hand pumps, temples, masjid (mosques), wells, schools and so many facilities. In spite of that, people did not come...most people preferred cash compensation" (one decimal is equivalent to 40.46 square metres).

Evidently, there were other factors that influenced the choice of resettlement areas for affected people. As asserted by the SMP official, many people chose to move in with their families elsewhere, against the policy provision to resettle people as groups.

"Many people wanted to move to where their relatives were living, it could be their grandfather, their uncle, some relatives, everyone looks for some kind of security."

There were a number of respondents in the studied cases who indicated that the family, in particular the head of the family – in many cases the man – made a decision regarding where the family resettled to, despite the implementing authorities having allocated them residential plots in other villages. The excerpts below reflect some of the responses on who made a decision regarding the area to which the family relocated.

"My husband chose this place, they [the authorities] wanted us to go to Choulibasa, and we don't know anyone there, what were we going to do?"

"We wanted to be closer to our children...my children helped me build this house, no one was going to help me if I had resettled farther from them."

"My husband chose this place, where he could get a job"

From the families' perspective, the reasons for choosing certain areas of resettlement included being closer to the city, which some believed would improve their prospects of employment or informal business opportunities. However, as the findings on the re-establishment of livelihoods will show, although it can be argued that proximity to the city increases the prospects of better living conditions – and indeed the areas closer to the cities were better structurally developed than those farther away from the cities – there was no significant difference attached to closer proximity to the city, in terms of opportunities for resettled people. Nevertheless, people seemed to hold a belief that proximity to the city was more favourable, as reflected in the excerpts below. This may partly explain why areas such as Chilgu, Gangudih and Sukhsari, all situated in closer proximity to the city and the Chandil Dam site, were the most preferred areas. The popularity of an area can be determined by the number of residential plots inhabited by resettled people, either allocated to the family by the SMP, or inhabited without being formally allocated, as reflected in Table 13.6 above.

“...people can't find work if they are far from the city...”

“...my son is working in Jamshedpur, he was still a student when we moved here, now he is working, you don't get a job when you are far from the city.”

Notwithstanding, there were other complexities with regard to land re-allocation for affected people, as later discussions will reflect in detail in Section 13.4.1, which explores compensation for houses. As the findings will reveal, other groups of affected people were resettled on the basis of the LAA of 1894, prior to the development of the state's or national policies of resettlement. In that context, there was no provision for a house-for-house compensation; hence, affected people were given cash compensation instead. This means that the allocation of residential plots, depicted in Table 13.6 above, could not have applied to them.

Earlier discussions in Chapter Six highlighted some inadequacies of cash compensation for lost fixed assets. One of them being that oftentimes, and for a variety of reasons, people are unable to acquire assets of the same value or utility in the new areas after resettlement. In the studied cases, some respondents indicated that they had to move in with their family members, or had to move into rented houses, because they had not been able to rebuild houses at the time of resettlement. When the first group of people were resettled, in the mid-1980s, the total compensation for lost assets, including land and houses, was Rs.5250, which

for many people was not sufficient to reconstruct houses in the new areas. Further discussions on compensation for houses will explore this in greater detail.

However, according to an SMP official, as shown in the excerpt below, even when resettled people were given a choice between homestead land with a re-constructed house or cash compensation, some people chose cash compensation. In the context of the investigated state policy, and improved compensation package, resettled people were entitled to Rs.2 lakhs (Rs.1 lakh is equivalent to Rs.100,000) or land, both for homestead and for crop cultivation.

“People were entitled to Rs.2 lakhs if they didn’t take land. Most people preferred the cash compensation”.

This assertion was supported by responses from some respondents – reflected in the excerpt below – who indicated that they chose cash compensation in order to pay for other expenses such as children’s education or dowry.

“...I needed the money to pay for my daughter’s dowry...the youngest needed school uniform and other things...land could not get me all those things.”

However, issues of compensation for lost fixed assets are rather complex in this case. Although the SMP official indicated that people had a choice of either property re-construction or cash compensation, evidence suggests that the implementation process was riddled with complexities, and later discussions will reveal. The next section forms a detailed discussion of the application of the applied resettlement policy of the Jharkhand state.

13.4 The Application of Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy in the Chandil Dam Resettlement

The Jharkhand Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy of 2008 (henceforth the JRRP-08 or the policy), was formulated to guide the implementation of land acquisition and resettlement in the State of Jharkhand. The JRRP-08 was developed on the basis of the Indian National Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy of 2007, discussed earlier in Chapter Eleven, which serves as a framework upon which states’ policies can be developed for the purpose of implementation. Therefore, for the purpose of this thesis, the JRRP-08 is explored, with regard to its implementation in the Chandil Dam resettlement. Furthermore, because the overarching objective of this study is to provide the basis for the development of a national policy of resettlement in Lesotho, the implementation of a national policy, or in this case a state’s policy informed by the national policy, was of particular empirical interest.

Resettlement processes in relation to the Chandil Dam case were undertaken over a 24-year period – from 1985 to 2009 (SMP, 2016). Hence, the discussion explores the implementation of resettlement processes in the Chandil case, both from an historical perspective, and the present-day context. However, as indicated earlier, there are significant changes with regard to compensation and rehabilitation, which were implemented on the basis of the JRRP-08 in the Chandil Dam resettlement. Hence, the focus of the thesis is on compensation and rehabilitation implemented in the context of the JRRP-08. A historical perspective will be considered to make sense of contextual dynamics over time, and how they have influenced the implementation of the current policy.

In a broader sense, the JRRP-08 consists of two parts, one that deals with the compensation of affected people and the other with their rehabilitation after physical relocation. In this regard, the policy provides for reparation for losses associated with forced resettlement of affected people, and also for the facilitation of adequate rehabilitation measures and sustainable income generation, to improve the lives of affected people after relocation (State of Jharkhand, 2008: Section 2.1(b), (d), (e)). These two major objectives of the policy – compensation and rehabilitation – can further be broken down into several aspects that together speak to the goal of the policy, which is to mitigate the effects of forced resettlement on affected families (State of Jharkhand, 2008). These policy aspects are discussed within the framework of the IRR model, to assess how the implementation of the policy sought to mitigate the earlier discussed inherent risks of resettlement. The same approach was adopted in the discussion of the policy implementation in the Mohale Dam resettlement case.

The SMP has over the years improved compensation packages for lost fundamental assets of affected people, such as arable land and houses, including those resettled by the Chandil Dam. In 1987, the total package for lost houses and arable land was Rs.5250. The earlier discussed grassroots resistance among affected people in Jharkhand in the 1980s, in relation to the construction of the Chandil and Icha dams was underpinned by, among other issues, the position of affected people and activists that this amount was grossly inadequate (Gupta and Mitra, 2004:434; Khagram, 2004:51; Sen, 2017). Discussions in the next chapter on participation will show how local organisations and affected people were involved in the struggle for improved compensation, and for the incorporation of rehabilitation measures in resettlement processes in the State of Jharkhand.

In 1990, the government of the State of Bihar (of which Jharkhand was a part) announced the first ever version of the state's resettlement and rehabilitation policy (Chadha, 1993:2195). The events surrounding the development of the policy will be discussed later in the next chapter on participation. With the development of the state's policy in 1990, the SMP revised and increased the compensation measure for lost assets including houses and land from Rs.5250 in 1987 to Rs.52500 in 1990. Further advocacy for the improvement of resettlement practice continued, with a wide range of stakeholders including affected people and local organisations, calling for improved compensation and sustainable rehabilitation strategies (Personal interview, February, 2016). At the core, these calls were compelled by the evident impoverishment that affected people in various contexts within the state, and in the Indian society at large, were subjected to, due to inadequate compensation and rehabilitation measures (Banerjee, 2006; Lahiri-Dutt, et al., 2012).

In 2003, the state's policy was revised in the newly carved State of Jharkhand. Upon this policy review and amendment, the compensation measure was increased again from Rs.52,500 in 1990 to Rs.189,000 in 2003. Although it may seem as if the increase was substantial, from the Rs.5250 compensation package that had been offered 16 years earlier, when put into context, the initial amount was significantly inadequate, and had led to serious consequences of impoverishment among affected people. Hence, even after the increments, the package was still not sufficient to make up for losses imposed on the affected. Research by Upadhyay (1999), undertaken in the Singhbhum region in the then State of Bihar, among the people affected by the construction of the Chandil Dam, shows that compensation for lost assets was significantly inadequate, riddled with procedural irregularities, and lacked a standardised tool to ensure uniform valuation.

In 2007, the amended version of the National Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy, which was first released in 2004 as indicated earlier in Chapter Eleven, was promulgated (Government of India, 2007). Upon this broad national resettlement policy framework, the State of Jharkhand, once again, amended its policy, and released the JRRP-08 – in line with the provisions set in the national policy (State of Jharkhand, 2008).

In 2012, the SMP revised its compensation measure again and increased to Rs.657,000. However, over the years, increased compensation measures benefited the affected people who either had not received all their compensation at the time an increment was approved, or those who were resettled after the approval of an increment at a given time. Hence, as stated

by an SMP official, out of a total of over 13,000 families affected over the years, the recent 2012 increment of compensation would only benefit 1200 families, who had not yet received their compensation or part of it.

“There is a total of Rs.6,57,000 in which 1200 families will benefit. There are many people who have received the money...they will receive it at today’s rate. Those who have not received their compensation, they can claim it today.”

However, there are other complexities that arose from ongoing amendments of processes when the people had already been resettled, such as a lack of information, and therefore, a lack of evidence to support proper decision-making – which the findings below will discuss in detail. Hence, improved compensation packages, together with the improved administration of resettlement, did not necessarily benefit all affected people.

As indicated earlier, the discussions below on the application of the policy in the Chandil Dam resettlement case are predicated upon the framework of the IRR model, considering how the policy – through its implementation – has attempted to mitigate the risks. The discussions will also take into account the inherent complexities of resettlement and how they have been negotiated in the implementation processes.

13.4.1 From homelessness to house reconstruction

In consideration of the inherent risk of homelessness associated with forced resettlement and displacement, the JRRP-08 provides for compensation for houses lost to forced relocation. The policy in its current state, having been revised in 2008, provides for both the house-for-house and cash-for-house compensation, as stated in Section 7.2 of the policy below.

- “Any affected family owning house and whose house has been acquired or lost, may be allotted free of cost house site to the extent of actual loss of area of the acquired house but not more than 10 decimal of land in rural areas, or 5 decimal of land in urban areas... The requiring body shall construct on the allotted house site a *pucca* house... if any family does not want any constructed house in the resettlement area, or desires to relocate itself elsewhere, then that family shall get onetime financial assistance of Rs.3.00 lakhs” (Rs.300,000) (State of Jharkhand, 2008: Section 7.2).

The Open Government Data (OGD) India describes a *pucca* house as a one made of strong or long-lasting materials such as bricks, stones, cement, concrete, timber, etc. whereas houses made of mud, thatch, or non-refined wood are called *kutch*a houses.

The main argument for compensation in a form of a constructed house instead of cash is that in many cases, cash compensation can more easily lead to under-compensation due to, among other limitations, its susceptibility to accounting irregularities, and also cash can be used for other expenses other than the recovery of lost assets (Cernea, 1999; 2003; 2008; Downing, 2002a; Fernandes, 2008). Moreover, research has shown that, in some cases, it may cost more to obtain or build a house in the new areas in comparison to the house of the same value in the previous areas, partly because, as discussed earlier, resettlement may have a negative effect on the value of properties in the areas from which people are moved (Scudder, 1993:130-131). Hence, when it comes to house reconstruction, an asset-based approach is more favourable than cash compensation.

However, in the Chandil resettlement case, there was a significant number of people who were given cash compensation instead of constructed houses in the resettlement areas. As reflected in the SMP official documents, of the 116 villages resettled by the Chandil Dam construction, 56 were resettled in the 1980s when only a cash compensation of Rs.5250 was payable for lost fixed assets, 31 were resettled in the 1990s when the cash compensation payable was Rs.52500, while 29 were resettled in the 2000s, during which time (after 2003) the resettled people were entitled to either cash compensation or a homestead land with a constructed house, as indicated in Section 7.2 of the policy stated above. As a result, the majority of the resettled people were given cash compensation for their lost homesteads and arable land, many of them not out of choice.

In the 80 studied households, 35 were resettled in the 1980s, 37 in the 1990s, while 8 were resettled in the 2000s. Because the resettled people were moved at different phases, during which different policy instruments were applied, the rate of compensation they received was not the same. Those who had not received all their compensation at the times increments were implemented automatically qualified for adjusted compensation packages. On the other hand, there were some of the respondents who claimed that they were yet to receive their compensation.

Furthermore, there was a discrepancy between what the policy provides for in Section 7.2, which is a cash compensation of Rs.3 lakhs in lieu of a house, and what both an SMP official and SMP official documents indicated, which is a cash compensation of Rs.2 lakhs. Table 13.7 below depicts the numbers of respondents who had received compensation for lost houses, or part of it, and those who claimed to have not received it.

Table 13.7 Compensation for housing

Compensation for lost houses		
Received	Not received	Received part of it
22	26	32

Of the 80 respondents from the studied households, 22 indicated that their households had received all their compensation for land and houses, 26 showed that they had not received any compensation, while 32 respondents indicated that their households had received only a part of it.

In exploring some of the factors that contributed to the delay of compensation processes, the findings revealed that with the implementation of the latest version of the state policy, the SMP implemented a new administrative process, aimed at updating a database of affected people, and at improving the implementation of compensation and rehabilitation. This was undertaken through the use of a *Vikas Pustika* – a “development report” – which was used to record relevant details of affected households, including whether or not they had received compensation – or a part of it – what the compensation entailed, and how much of the compensation due remained. An SMP official described:

“Each family has been given a Vikas Pustika [Development Report]. In the Vikas Pustika all the details of the family will be noted. The Vikas Pustika has an Identity No.: like 1, 2, 3, and so forth. If one family has been given only land or a house, that is noted in the Vikas Pustika...out of a total of 13,811 families, 12,877 have been given Vikas Pustika. 924 families are left.”

It also appeared that, in addition to the long process that the implementation of the new administrative process had been, and its associated complexities, there was also a fundamental challenge of a lack of institutional capacity. An SMP official indicated:

“We are short of officers. We are keen to complete this [process] by March 2018, but sometimes the problem is that the wrong people come. We are asking people to get Vikas Pustika ready....653 people still remain. They can take land or cash, choice is theirs”

In response to why some people had not received their compensation, the SMP official indicated:

Interviewer: “Some of the resettled people whom I have interviewed have indicated that they have not received their compensation. To your knowledge, why would that be the case?”

Answer. “We are not responsible for this. The villagers thought that if they don’t take Rs.2 lakh [for house compensation] the government will give them a job. But that was not the case. Now people are realizing their mistake and are taking cash as there is no job opportunity for them. People do not realize the value of money when it is offered to them. But slowly they are becoming more conscious of reality.”

This raises possible issues of communication breakdown, where the SMP said one thing, and the affected people understood the other. A similar issue was raised in the discussion of the Mohale Dam resettlement, where an LHDA official indicated that some of the challenges raised by affected people regarding compensation stemmed from communication breakdown.

It also emerged from the findings that, while there were people who were resettled prior to the implementation of the policy, who may have not had a choice between house reconstruction and cash compensation, even among those who were given choices, some chose cash compensation instead of a reconstructed house. As stated by the SMP official:

“Out of 12,877 [households], a total of 1317 has taken land. The rest of them, 10907 have been given cash. 653 people still remain. They can take land or cash, choice is theirs. Most of them will take cash (Rs.2 lakhs). They prefer not to take land.”

This means that, 85% of the affected households received cash compensation and not homestead land and houses. However, some of them fall into the category of those resettled before any of the state’s or national policies were developed, who did not have an option of a constructed house.

In the studied households, where 8 families were resettled between 2006 and 2009, and 37 resettled in the 1990s, 64% of all 80 respondents stated that they opted for cash compensation, while only 4% took a house-for-house option. A third (33%) declared that they had not received their compensation. Table 13.8 below shows households by their choice of compensation for housing.

Table 13.8 Households' choice of compensation for housing

Description of compensation	Frequency	Percentage
Cash	51	63.75
Homestead land and house	3	3.75
Not received compensation	26	32.5
Total	80	100

There are a variety of reasons why people, when given a choice, would prefer cash in place of a house. As quoted earlier from the interviews, some respondents indicated that they preferred cash because they needed to pay for other expenses such as children's education. On the other hand, there were also cases of imprudent use of cash compensation. One respondent indicated that it was her husband's decision to take cash instead of a constructed house, which, in her opinion, was a bad decision.

"...that money didn't even help, we don't even know what he did except for drinking and gambling...if it was up to me we would have taken up a house option."

Although the policy provides for equal treatment of the husband and the wife with regard to compensation for lost assets such as houses, as stipulated in Section 7.7 below, cultural dynamics evidently influence the manner in which this aspect of the policy is implemented.

- "The land or house allotted to the affected families under this policy shall be in the joint names of wife and husband of the affected family. The monetary amount shall be disbursed through a joint account in the name of husband and wife" (State of Jharkhand, 2008: Section 7.7).

It is understood here that the objective of the policy provision to jointly compensate both the husband and the wife for lost assets, is to ensure that both partners equally share in the benefits of the compensation. However, as the above excerpt shows, in some cases the dynamics of male-dominated cultural systems override policy provisions. This shows that resettlement as a multifaceted and complex process, is influenced by pre-existing contextual undercurrents of the setting in which it is implemented.

A similar finding is revealed by research undertaken by Sharma among the people affected by the Chandil and Icha dams, where high rates of alcohol abuse were reported, mostly among

men, who had received cash compensation for their lost family assets (2014:30). Sharma argues that prior to forced resettlement, households who owned land worked it as a family, and the produce from the land was used to the benefit of the family as a collective, whereas with cash compensation, some household heads adopted an individualistic approach to ownership, and therefore, usage of compensation funds (ibid.:15). Hence, this indicates that forced resettlement not only dismantles the external social order or community ties, but also within family units, it can disrupt an organised family structure, particularly when such a structure is predicated upon a livelihood tied to natural resources.

In another case, compensation funds were used to buy a three-wheeler (locally known as an Auto – see the picture of a different but similar vehicle below), which according to a respondent, was meant to create a form of income to help a family re-establish their livelihood. However, the three-wheeler had since broken, and the eldest son, who used to drive it, opted to work for someone else as a driver.



Figure 13.1 A three-wheeler, known locally in Jamshedpur and surrounding areas as an “auto”, and a common mode of transport among the local people.

As a result of not being able to recoup the funds used to buy the three-wheeler, the family was not able to build a house immediately after their relocation, and for some time they lived in a rented house. As reflected in the excerpt below, when they finally built a house, they started with only one room and a veranda, and then extended it over time. The significance of a veranda in this context is that in summer, people sleep outside on the veranda.

“...we did not build a house immediately...it took us a long time to extend the house...initially we had one room and a veranda, now we have two rooms...”

Many resettled people who were without houses at the time of resettlement had to move in with family members, putting immense pressure on the already strained families trying to deal with the effects of forced resettlement. The inability of affected people to reconstruct houses at the time of resettlement was a result of two factors; one was the time factor, and the other was the limitations of cash compensation. The limitations of cash compensation have been discussed earlier. In this particular case, the issue was with both the insufficiency of the cash compensation granted to affected families, and delayed compensation payments by the implementing authority – SMP. As noted above, in the studied cases there were still households whose compensation – or part of it – was yet to be received. In addition, people claimed that there was not enough time to construct houses between the time part of the cash compensation was paid to them, and the time they were expected to have relocated.

Consequently, of the 80 studied households, 42 indicated that they were not able to reconstruct houses before moving into the new areas. 28 of them said they moved in with family members, 13 moved into rented houses, while 1 moved into a previously vacant house belonging to a friend, who had moved to Jamshedpur, a nearby industrial city. The excerpts below show some statements from respondents, whose families could not immediately afford house reconstruction.

“We didn’t have a house... building a house takes time, even when you have money you still need to work...but the money came late...”

“We were only lucky that we had family who could live with us for some time...”

“...we didn’t have a place to stay, they told us we needed to relocate, but the money came late”

Some of those who were not able to reconstruct houses are those who did not legally own homestead land in the previous areas, and therefore received no compensation for houses. Although Section 7.3 of the JRRP-08 provides for compensation for landless affected people, there is a conditional timeline, based on which affected people may be eligible for compensation in this regard. According to the policy provision, households who live below the poverty line are eligible for house compensation, whether or not they owned a house prior to resettlement (State of Jharkhand, 2008: Section 7.3). However, as shown in the same policy

clause, the family should have lived in the area for a continuous period of no less than 15 years in non-scheduled areas, or no less than 30 years in scheduled areas. Hence, in the implementation process, some affected people who did not fall within the stipulated timeline were excluded.

As a result, for some people the risk of homelessness became a reality. Moreover, older, married sons who were not eligible for house compensation continued to live with their parents after resettlement, together with their (the sons') own wives and children in some cases. As a result, in the studied cases, over 50% of the households were extended family structured. Of the 80 households, 15% had between 11 and 15 members, 44% had between 6 and 10 members, while 41% had 5 members or less.

In the context of the economic climate presented by the findings, with high rates of unemployment or only casual employment, as the section on re-employment will reveal, large family sizes can put enormous pressure on households' economic conditions. In agrarian societies, where livelihoods are predicated upon land cultivation, big families may present an advantage from a physical labour perspective. However, when families lose access to that land, without obtaining alternative means of sustainable livelihoods, big families may be burdensome on breadwinners or heads of the households. Table 13.9 below, depicts structures and sizes of the studied households in the four villages.

Table 13.9 Studied households by family size and structure

		Frequency	Percentage
Family structure	Nuclear family	36	45
	Extended family	44	55
Family size	5 or less	33	41.25
	6 – 10	35	43.75
	11 – 15	12	15

Furthermore, even of the households who indicated that they were able to reconstruct houses before or shortly after relocation, many of them showed that they were not immediately able to rebuild houses of the same sizes as their previous ones. Hence, they had to extend or improve the conditions of their houses over the years, as shown in the excerpts below.

“Initially we only had one room and a veranda...the other two rooms we built in 2006 and in 2009”

“We had a bigger house before relocation, when we moved here we had to build a small one quickly, but we have been extending it over the years.”

However, despite the discussed challenges with regard to compensation for houses, housing conditions across the studied villages had generally improved. Many of the respondents indicated that their houses had more rooms than their previous ones, although there was at least one family in the studied cases, who indicated that they had not been able to reconstruct a house since their relocation. The studied households were now in stage three of resettlement according to Scudder’s stage framework – Community Formation and Economic Development – in which it may be expected that resettlers will begin to experience some level of improved living conditions.

The inability of the majority of affected people to re-construct houses in the new areas at the time of resettlement, led many to temporary homelessness. Even among those who were able to reconstruct houses before or shortly after relocation, many could not rebuild houses of the same standard, at least not initially. A study undertaken in the same project site, Chandil, in relation to resettlement in the Chandil Dam, confirms that for many who were affected by the project, the houses constructed after resettlement were smaller, with no space for livestock keeping, and with no front spaces (verandas) (Sharma, 2014:31).

This is reflective of the inherent limitations of cash compensation in re-establishing lost fixed assets, more so in contexts where there are other competing, immediate expenses, resulting from forced resettlement (Cernea, 1999; 2003; 2009; Downing, 2002a; Mulugeta and Woldesemait, 2011). When resettled people are not given sufficient financial support to cover initial transitional expenses, they are forced to use their compensation funds to cover immediate costs, which inevitably lead to impoverishment. Hence, in terms of mitigating the risk of homelessness in forced resettlement, house reconstruction, as opposed to cash compensation, remains a favourable strategy. The LHDA took the approach of house reconstruction in the implementation of Phase 1B, and it resulted in more positive outcomes than in the Chandil resettlement case. Later discussions on the comparison of the two cases in Chapter Fifteen will engage further on this issue.

Delayed compensation is also one of the major setbacks in resettlement processes that can lead to impoverishment. Evidence has shown repeatedly, as Scudder (2005:34) argues in the FSF, that the period following physical relocation – stage two – is always followed by

declined standards of living. Delayed compensation in the case of the Chandil resettlement, undoubtedly, led to greater difficulties among affected people to re-establish their lives and livelihoods after resettlement.

In addition, the implementation of housing compensation in the Chandil case is reflective of the complexities inherent in forced resettlement, as outlined by De Wet in Chapter Three, that resettlement is a process with certain aspects that may be incompatible with routine planning (2006:187; 2015:88). As the above discussed findings show, the SMP had a plan for resettling affected people to specific areas, where houses would be constructed for them, in line with the applied policy. However, due to a variety of factors – those resettled before the development of the applied policy notwithstanding – some people chose cash compensation, which compromised the implementation of house reconstruction. In this regard, the complexities of resettlement were not taken into account in the Chandil case, where the resettled people had to either choose the allocated plot to resettle to, or forfeit a constructed house, and receive cash compensation instead. Whereas in the case of the LHDA, households' preferences of resettlement areas were factored in, by allowing households to choose a site anywhere, without forfeiting the option of a constructed house. The negative outcomes in the Chandil Dam resettlement notwithstanding, the majority of the studied households had managed to improve their housing conditions over the years, despite the initial decline in housing conditions.

13.4.2 From landlessness to land-based re-establishment

In agrarian societies, arable land is the fundamental productive asset, on which people's primary livelihoods are based; Chandil area presents such an example. Prior to resettlement, the people in the area were predominantly reliant on arable land and natural resources as the main sources of livelihood (Bharti, 1991:1386). When people are forcefully resettled from this vital form of capital without being provided with equivalent alternative forms of livelihoods, the effects can be devastating. In an effort to mitigate the significant risk of landlessness, the JRRP-08 provides for land-based rehabilitation. As stipulated in Sections 6.11 and 6.12 (a) and (c) below, the acquiring body is responsible for identifying available land in the new settlements to be allocated to resettled people.

- “...the Administrator for resettlement and rehabilitation shall draw up a list of lands that may be available for resettlement and rehabilitation of the affected families” (State of Jharkhand, 2008: Section 6.11).

- “The lands drawn up under paragraph 6.11 shall consist of:
 (a) land available or acquired for the project and earmarked for this purpose; ...
 (c) lands that may be available for purchase or acquisition for the purposes of resettlement and rehabilitation scheme or plan” (State of Jharkhand, 2008: Section 6.12).

The implementing authority ought to not only identify available land but also facilitate the process of purchasing the land for resettlement and rehabilitation purposes.

- “The Administrator for resettlement and rehabilitation, on behalf of the State Government, may either purchase land from any person through consent award and may enter into an agreement for this purpose, or approach the State Government concerned for acquisition of land for the purposes of resettlement and rehabilitation scheme or plan” (State of Jharkhand, 2008: Section 6.13).

It is upon this policy provision that the SMP took the responsibility to assign resettled households to specific areas of resettlement, due to the availability of land and other resources in those areas. However, land-for-land compensation does not suggest that affected people should be deprived of their freedom to choose their own areas of resettlement, based on their own preferences. As the findings show below, there were multiple factors that influenced the choices of affected people with regard to the areas of resettlement. The allocated pieces of land in the areas of resettlement were for the purposes of both homestead and crop production. However, as indicated earlier some affected people resettled to their own preferred areas, and forfeited the allocated land. An SMP official confirmed in an interview:

“Plots were allocated based on available resources...you may have seen as you came along that in the surrounding areas there is about 12.5 decimal land, with social infrastructure. There are roads, ponds, hand pumps, temples, masjid (mosques), wells, schools and so many facilities. In spite of that, people did not come to the areas they were allocated...”

Some of the common reasons respondents indicated which influenced their choice of resettlement areas included closeness to the city, and by extension better services, which many believed would increase their prospects of employment, as reflected in the excerpts below.

“I chose this place because my children were studying in the city at that time, now they are working. It’s good to be close to the city”

“They chose a place with no water, no, we were not going to go to a place with no services...we have better services here...water, shops...”

“If they move you so far away from the city, where are you going to find a job?”

However, although many may have preferred the areas believed to have better prospects for employment and other living opportunities, the reality reflected on the ground revealed that such proximity to the city had not translated into significant livelihoods re-establishment among the majority of affected people. Discussions in next subsection will show this in greater detail.

Due to the fact that the implementation of the land-for-land compensation in the Chandil Dam case was in such a way that homestead and arable land compensation were combined, and depended on people resettling to the assigned areas, the choices of people to move to other areas – other than those allocated – also meant that they forfeited arable land. As shown earlier in Table 13.6, depicting the 13 rehabilitated villages in which people were allocated pieces of land, 505 plots were taken up by those to whom they were allocated, 647 plots were inhabited in the different villages by those to whom they were not allocated, while 165 plots were allocated but were not inhabited (SMP, 2016).

As reflected in the table – Table 13.6 – two of the three most popular areas, in terms of the number of inhabited plots (both those allocated by the SMP and those not allocated), were Gangudih with a combined total of 254 inhabited plots, and Sukhsari with 186 inhabited plots. These villages are situated within 4km and 7km of the Chandil Dam site respectively. As the findings will later show, there were some economic activities undertaken in the dam area, and this may partly explain why the areas surrounding the dam site were preferred by most resettled people. Another one of the three most preferred villages was Chilgu, with 249 inhabited plots. Chilgu is situated closer to the largest city in the State of Jharkhand – Jamshedpur – less than 20km away. These preferred popular villages are also three of the four villages in which the empirical study of this research was undertaken, the other being Chotalakha.

Although arable land is considered by many writers to be the fundamental resource and form of livelihood in tribal and other rural areas (Bharti, 1991; Chadha, 1993; Diaz, 2012; Guha,

2007; Sen, 1992), trends towards urbanisation and the associated reprioritisation of needs are also worth acknowledging. Productive land may still be valued by many for enabling food security, and research has shown that declined land holding or cultivation in previously agrarian societies often result in food insecurity (Ahmad and Lahiri-Dutt, 2006; Eguavoen and Tesfai, 2012:54; Horowitz and Salem-Murdock, 1993; Sharan, 2005:4446). However, evidently people also prefer to have access to financial resources, because food is not their only basic need. Hence, resource prioritisation is not always the same for all affected people. Some people want land first, others want job opportunities and other services more than they do land. The excerpt below from an interview with one respondent, a father in a household of eight, two of whom were sons working as agricultural labourers, is reflective of this assertion.

“My sons and I work as labourers in other people’s fields, we are able to get food, but I needed the money to pay for my daughter’s dowry...the youngest needed school uniform and other things, land could not get me all those things.”

Other reasons that respondents indicated for their choices of residential areas included moving in with family members, particularly among those who, for one reason or another, had not received any compensation. As reflected in the excerpts below, issues of delayed or denied compensation may have also affected people’s ability to recover from the loss of access to land.

“We did not have money to build a house, they did not give us any compensation...we moved in with our relatives...”

“They (the SMP) did not give us any money, we are still waiting, they said they are going to help us...we came here because we didn’t know where else to go, my sister said come and stay with us. We were only lucky that we had family who could live with us for some time...”

Due to the complexities of land use and landholding among tribal people in India, the policy provides for a targeted Tribal Development Plan, when people are involuntarily resettled from tribal areas (State of Jharkhand, 2008: Section 7.18.1). According to the policy, this plan must outline in detail, how land rights will be restored among resettled tribal inhabitants (ibid: Section 7.18.1). Issues of land rights among tribal groups are in many cases quite complex and require sensitivity to local context.

One of the arrangements discussed earlier in Chapter Eleven, under which some of the tribal people in the Indian society have access to land is *bhoodan* land, also known as land gifts (Jha, 2002:4; Raju, et al., 2005:2). In the studied Chandil case, some resettled people were beneficiaries of this arrangement. However, in some cases, land entitlement where *bhoodan* land is in question is often subjected to official scepticism or blatant denial of ownership rights (Bhatia, 2012:161). As in the case of Sahariya resettlement in Madhya Pradesh, in connection with the Sardar Sarovar Project, where *bhoodan* landowners were denied title deeds, and thus could not claim lost land (Bhatia, 2012:161), some people in the Chandil Dam resettlement were subjected to the same deprivation.

“We have been in a dispute with the SMP, they know we had land, but they did not want to compensate us for it. They say bhoodan is not compensated, how? If it was my land, which I cultivated and my family depended on it, why shouldn’t they compensate it...?”

“No, they didn’t compensate us for land. We had bhoodan land, but when we were resettled they did not compensate us for it. Now they are saying it is not in their records.”

An interview with the SMP official did, in fact, reveal that the issue of *bhoodan* land is well-known and documented. Yet there seems to be little consideration given to the matter.

“In Chandil, land revision was complete. Some people had bhoodan land. Work was done on land revision 20 years ago. Whatever survey work was done, it is all documented. It is a very long process. Now people want to bring those issues. We tell the people, if you had any problem with compensation, you could have checked with us at that point of time, but not now, not after 15-20 years”.

One of the main challenges of resettlement is that, although it is a complex, long-term process, compensation – and even rehabilitation – mechanisms are often planned on a short-term basis, such that after a certain period of time, resettled people are expected to move past their losses, even when their grievances have not been fully dealt with. While for some people the issue of uncompensated *bhoodan* land may have been a past whose effects continued to affect their current reality, the implementing authorities seemingly expected them to move on.

As a result of the challenges associated with land-for-land compensation in the studied cases, many of the studied resettled people who owned or had access to agricultural land prior to resettlement, were subsequently without land or access to it. Many had to find alternative ways to meet their basic needs, including food, as will be unpacked in the next subsection. Table 13.10 below depicts respondents who owned land prior to and after resettlement, in the four studied villages.

Table 13.10 Agricultural land owned before and after resettlement

Land previously owned			Land currently owned		
1 - 3 B	4 - 6 B	7+ B	1 - 3 B	4 - 6 B	7+ B
21	13	10	14	2	4

(B is an abbreviation of Bigha, an equivalent of 27,225 square feet)

Although the above data is all classified under “land owned”, in some cases people had access to land through rented government land, but they did not own it. Hence, there were less people who permanently owned land in the studied households than shown in the table above. The arrangement of land rent became apparent in Chotalakha. Although it is possible that it could be practiced in other areas too, none of the respondents in the other three studied villages indicated any knowledge of it. Residents, both hosts and resettled, could rent land owned by the government for a renewable three-year term. To rent a plot for agricultural production, villagers have to pay between Rs.40 to Rs.60, depending on the size of the plot. Because there were many more people in need of land than there were available plots, this arrangement was said to work on a first-come first-served basis. However, some respondents claimed that the land allocation process is not transparent; hence there had been allegations that people had access to land through their personal connections or through bribery.

“They say they give land to those who come first but we know they give it to their families and friends first, only when there is some land left then you can get it, sometimes you don’t even get it”

In addition to 3 resettled people interviewed at Chotalakha, who indicated that they had access to land through land rent, 11 host community members, who also had access to land through the same arrangement, were interviewed. However, although allegations of corruption and nepotism could not be confirmed, it became apparent that there were people who had had access to land through rent for many consecutive terms, even though some

respondents indicated that it was difficult to get access to the land, and conservative terms were not guaranteed.

Similar to the LHDA's Mohale Dam resettlement discussed in Chapter Nine, the risk of landlessness in the Chandil Dam resettlement was evidently one of the most complex to prevent. This was partly because of land scarcity in the areas preferred by the studied resettled people, but also because of the manner in which land compensation was implemented, which limited the resettled people from choosing any area of their preference, without forfeiting a piece of land. Hence, as far as this study is concerned, overcoming the risk of landlessness was not successfully implemented in the Chandil Dam resettlement. The negative outcomes resulting from the implementation of land compensation in the Chandil resettlement case are indicative of the need for open-ended approaches to the development and implementation of policies, as De Wet (2006) argues, in order to capture the inherent complexities of forced resettlement.

Furthermore, the assessment of the implementation of the policy in this case was complicated by the changing policy versions throughout the implementation of resettlement processes. Thus, some issues, which could have possibly been considered more favourably in the context of the current version of the policy, such as compensation for *bhoodan* land, were evidently not undertaken sufficiently in the past. This assertion is based on the evidence that there were people who had *bhoodan* land in the past, who were never compensated for it. In the next subsection, issues of employment and/or re-employment after resettlement in the Chandil case are explored. The discussion will also reveal other means of livelihoods, which affected people had acquired in the new areas, as well as measures of rehabilitation that the SMP employed to develop affected people after resettlement.

13.4.3 From joblessness to re-employment

As the discussion of the FSF earlier showed, resettlement is often followed by a significant decline of living standards (Scudder, 2005; 2009). Not only do people lose their assets to forced resettlement, but also their means of livelihoods. In the absence of productive resources and opportunities in the new areas, the deterioration of the standards of living can be long-term (Cernea, 2000:37). While in some cases cash compensation is provided to make up for the loss of livelihoods and assets, research has proven that cash compensation is not a sustainable means to ensure recovery from the losses in the long-term. In an attempt to

mitigate the inevitable loss of livelihoods and the decline of living standards, the JRRP-08 prescribes that job opportunities be granted to those who are forcefully moved by the acquiring bodies:

“In case of a project involving land acquisition on behalf of a requiring body-

(a) The requiring body shall ensure employment in the project at the rate of at least one eligible person per nuclear family, among those affected families who are losing some land due to land acquisition. If additional employment opportunities are available, then priority shall be accorded to the displaced persons. In providing employment, top most priority shall be accorded to those affected families who have lost all their agricultural and homestead land due to acquisition of land” (State of Jharkhand, 2008: Section 7.11.1).

Factors that affect the implementation of re-employment

As the above policy clause specifies, priority in employment opportunities must be given to those who lost all their fundamental assets and productive resources to forced resettlement. However, the challenge with these kinds of policy provisions is that they have to be implemented within wider socio-economic and political contexts; and, beyond the technicalities of implementation at an institutional level, the setting within which implementation is undertaken influences the outcomes. Thus, as De Wet (2006:190-193) argues in the inherent complexities analysis to resettlement discussed in Chapter Three, the implementation of resettlement is a multi-layered process influenced by dynamics at the community, institutional and national levels. The implementation of re-employment as a rehabilitation strategy requires not only planning by the implementing agency, but also the contribution of other stakeholders such as the private sector, government institutions, civil society organisations, etc., and this may be outside the control of the implementing agencies.

In the studied Chandil resettlement case, there were at least three factors which were found to have negatively affected the implementation of this policy provision. The first was the economic landscape of the wider context in which the policy was implemented. The second was the educational levels, or broadly the human capital, among the primarily affected groups. The last was the institutional capacity of the implementing agency – the SMP.

In less developed regions, governments and development institutions are already burdened with significant problems to solve, in the context of insufficient resources. In the economic climate where unemployment rates are generally high – over 60% of persons within the

working age group in the Chandil Block are classified as either unemployed or marginally employed, as indicated earlier in the previous chapter – the provision of alternative employment opportunities was significantly compromised. As an SMP official indicated in an interview, shown in the excerpt below, employment was seemingly a preferred means of re-establishing livelihoods among resettled people. However, the reality of scarce employment opportunities made it difficult for the majority of affected people to secure employment after resettlement.

“The villagers thought that if they don’t take Rs.2 lakh [as cash compensation], the government will give them a job...Now people are realizing that there is no job opportunity for them...slowly they are becoming more conscious of reality.”

The policy further provides for prioritisation of employment in the construction phase of the project for resettled people, as depicted in Section 7.11.1 (e) below.

- “(e) the requiring body shall give preference to willing landless labourers and unemployed affected persons while engaging labour in the project during the construction phase” (State of Jharkhand, 2008: Section 7.11.1).

However, by virtue of being a temporary form of employment, construction work always falls short of providing the necessary recovery in the long-term. Hence, although this kind of employment may afford the needed relief to affected people at the initial transition time to overcome the decline of living standards, this kind of relief is incapable of having long-term impact. Thus, this kind of employment cannot be classified as one of the strategies for rehabilitation, because short-term solutions are insufficient in addressing long-term challenges.

Added to this quandary is the fact that employment also requires the possession of certain skills, and in some cases, of formal education. It is a widely acknowledged reality that, because of the legacy of the historical structural exclusion from mainstream opportunities related to education and economic development, tribal communities are predominantly less developed, with low levels of educational qualifications (Diaz, 2012:145; Guha, 2007:3307; Kijima, 2006:371; Thorat and Newman, 2007:4121). A lack of appropriate skills associated with low levels of education among affected people can negatively affect the implementation

of the provision of alternative employment after resettlement. Table 13.11 below reflects the highest level of educational qualifications held by members in the studied households.

Table 13.11 Highest level of educational qualifications of members in the studied households

Village	Tertiary education	Secondary education	Below secondary education
Chotalakha	5	4	11
Sukhsari	3	10	7
Chilgu	3	8	9
Gangudih	1	3	16
Total	12	25	43

As reflected in the table, in the studied cases, 12 of the 80 households had family members with tertiary educational qualifications, 25 of the households had members with secondary educational qualifications, while 43 of the households had members with no formal education. Partly because of the predominantly low levels of education – and the previous chapter reflected educational levels among residents of the wider Saraikela-Kharsawan District and Chandil Block – the majority of affected people could not secure reliable, full-time employment after resettlement. In the majority of the studied households, members were either casually employed – mostly as agricultural labourers – while others had no employed or self-employed member.

As reflected earlier in Table 13.3, in the studied cases, 22 of the 80 households had members who were fully employed; later discussions will show how the households with fully employed members were distributed by village, 43 of the households had casually employed members, many as agricultural labourers, 11 had no member who was either fully or casually employed, while 4 had members who were self-employed. As indicated earlier, agricultural labour provides seasonal, low paying employment, which may not translate into improved, sustainable livelihood among affected people.

As noted earlier, over 13,000 households were affected by the construction of Chandil Dam, which put enormous pressure on the implementing agency to facilitate the re-establishment of livelihoods for a significantly large number of people. In the context of scarce employment opportunities, the implementing fell short of facilitating the provision of alternative employment or other means of income for the majority of affected people. According to the SMP records, depicted in Table 13.12 below, of the 13,000 households affected by the

Chandil Dam construction, only 1185 benefited from permanent employment facilitated by the SMP as a form of rehabilitation for affected people (SMP, 2016).

Table 13.12 Number of individuals from affected families who received employment

Number of households who received employment in the SMP	Category - 3	Category - 4	Total
	448	737	1185

Adapted from SMP official documents (2016)

In this context, the selection process of beneficiaries was critical in recruitment processes, as many more affected people had to compete for significantly less job opportunities. The policy stipulates that the selection process must be undertaken in consultation with the communities involved (State of Jharkhand, 2008: Section 7.11.1). While community involvement may be one of the ways to ensure that there is transparency in recruitment processes, it can also result in irregular (or perceived irregularity of) selection processes (Véron, et al., 2006:1924; Widmalm, 2008:20). The excerpts below are a reflection that some people had lost confidence in the recruitment process.

“...it’s pointless, they want to do as if they involve us but we know they already have their preferred candidates for the jobs...their friends, family”

“We don’t know how they choose people; we have been applying but have received no jobs, the process is not transparent”

The perceived nepotism in this case is representative of similar cases in the series of SMP projects. In the research undertaken by Chadha (1993) in Singhbhum, one of the districts of the State of Jharkhand, in relation to resettlement in one of the SMP projects, the SMP administrator was said to have admitted that job prioritisation for resettled people was compromised by nepotism.

“... jobs meant for oustees have gone to northern Bihari due to 'bhai-bhatija' syndrome...” (Chadha, 1993:2195).

As explained by one respondent, *Bhai-bhatija* is a Hindu phrase loosely translated “brother-nephew”, but is commonly used to refer to nepotism. According to Chadha, in addition to recruiters employing their own family members in place of resettled people, the recruitment process involved the transfer of internal staff from other divisions – mainly those who were

employed on a temporary basis – to other divisions, to make them permanent (Chadha, 1993:2195-2196). The Singhbhum study further revealed that some people reported to have paid Rs.2, 000 to officials, in exchange for jobs (ibid.:2196).

This practice is reflective of a wider social problem, where implementation processes are compromised by corrupt practices and nepotism. Institutionalised corruption and nepotism tend to thrive in contexts where unemployment rates are high; compelling many who are desperate for jobs to go through unconventional means to acquire employment (Widmalm, 2008:20). Where there are many people with equivalent capabilities competing for fewer job opportunities, it becomes difficult to rely on merit alone.

Subsistence allowance

In the absence or scarcity of job opportunities, the policy provides for a subsistence allowance as an alternative means of re-establishing livelihoods after resettlement. This form of compensation, as the policy specifies, shall be no less than Rs.1000 per month for every acre of land lost to resettlement, “for thirty years from the date of displacement or until the provision of employment to the affected families” (State of Jharkhand, 2008: Section 7.12). In addition, the policy makes a special provision for vulnerable groups, identified at the discretion of the project authority, to be granted annuity for life, of about Rs.1000 per month (State of Jharkhand, 2008: Section 7.15). It is not clear from the policy, whether these amounts are subject to adjustment with inflation.

The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act of 2013 (Section 45) identifies vulnerable groups as inclusive of women, SC and ST. In the context of the Chandil Dam, and many other cases of resettlement in India such as the earlier discussed Sardar Sarovar Project, which mainly involved the resettlement of tribal groups in scheduled areas (Baviskar, 1999; Fisher, 1995; Wood, 1993), the majority of affected people fit at least one aspect of this description. According to an SMP official, over 80% of eligible affected people in the Chandil cases had already received their subsistence allowance.

“...there are 11,692 people who are entitled to subsistence allowance. Out of this number, 9,741 have been given.”

However, in the 80 studied households, all respondents indicated that their families had not received any subsistence allowance in a form of cash. In fact, many claimed to not know about it. Instead, some respondents indicated that their households had received subsistence in kind, i.e. food and other basic items. The frequency of the provision of these food parcels seemed to be arbitrary, as different answers were given by respondents regarding how often the households received the food parcels. Also, many of the respondents claimed to have no recollection of when the households first received these food parcels. The items received in kind, according to respondents, included rice, cooking oil, sugar, and kerosene (also known as paraffin – used as fuel for cooking). Many people, however, used kerosene only occasionally, such as when it rained; otherwise they often used traditional outside ovens (pictured below).



Figure 13.2 Traditional outside oven in one resettled household in Gangudih

Although the SMP official indicated that 9,741 of the 11,692 eligible households (83%) had received subsistence allowance, the findings from this study do not support the claim. However, it is acknowledged that one of the fundamental limitations of this study is its significantly small population of respondents; hence, generalised claims cannot be made, particularly in reference to the significantly larger number of affected people. Nonetheless, claims can be made on the basis of what the data presents. As far as this study is concerned, similar to the policy provision for employment as a form of livelihood re-establishment for

affected people, subsistence allowance fell short of providing relief for many of the eligible affected people.

The wider economic context, a lack of skills predominant among affected people, and the inability of the SMP to facilitate employment for the majority of affected people, largely due to the wider economic context, are all indicative of the fact that the implementation of policies is a complex process influenced by pre-existing contextual dynamics. Later discussions will show some of the SMP rehabilitation strategies through which the complexities associated with a lack of employment opportunities were navigated in the Chandil resettlement case.

Occupational training

To address the limitation of predictable low levels of education among affected people as indicated earlier, the policy provides for educational development for affected people. The provision of employment provided for in the policy, as discussed above, is largely influenced by the possession of suitable skills. Hence, to afford affected people access to the labour market, the land acquiring body is obligated to provide scholarships for suitable affected people, as reflected in Sections 7.11.1 (b) and (c) below.

- “Wherever necessary, the requiring body shall arrange for technical/vocational training of the affected persons, so as to make them suitable persons to take on suitable jobs preferably in the project” (State of Jharkhand, 2008: Section 7.11.1(b)).
- “The requiring body shall offer scholarships and other skill development opportunities to the eligible persons from the affected families as per the criteria as may be fixed by the State Government” (State of Jharkhand, 2008: Section 7.11.1(c)).

According to the SMP records, at the time when the fieldwork was undertaken in 2016, 279 individuals from affected households had received occupational training organised by the SMP, as part of the rehabilitation strategies. In the studied households, 9 of the 80 respondents indicated that they or their family members had benefitted from the training organised by the SMP. However, according to these respondents, none of those who had received training had been able to subsequently secure employment at the time of the fieldwork. The training courses undertaken included basic and advanced computer studies, welding, entrepreneurship and retail management.

From the interviews with some of those who had received training, some respondents attributed the inability to secure employment to corruption. However, there were some for whom the basic explanation for not getting jobs was that there simply were not enough jobs. The excerpts below, from interviews with respondents who indicated that they benefited from the training, confirm:

“I have been applying for many vacancies...there are no jobs”

“I have been applying, I have never been short-listed”

“Yes, I have been applying, but they want us to pay them to get a job, if you are not working, where do you get the money from?”

The reality of forced resettlement is that, not only are its negative consequences inherent in all cases of resettlement (Cernea, 2000), but also that the wider socio-economic landscape in a given context determines the success, or lack thereof, of any plans to mitigate the consequences. In the studied Chandil resettlement case, prevalent unemployment rates were representative of the reality of the wider society, which compromised many of the plans and efforts to address the loss of livelihoods to forced resettlement.

Oftentimes, these contextual socio-economic dynamics that influence the implementation and outcomes of resettlement policies are beyond the control of implementing agencies. Although in some cases the wider economic context may create favourable conditions for the success of resettlement policy implementation – as in the earlier discussed Aswan High Dam case – in many cases, particularly in developing regions, the wider economic contexts inhibit effective implementation of long-term rehabilitation measures. In the subsection below, the discussion will be centred on the economic opportunities in the Chandil Dam area, established for the purpose of rehabilitating affected people after resettlement.

Economic opportunities in the Chandil dam area

As part of rehabilitation strategies, the policy provides for prioritisation of affected people in economic opportunities in and around the dam site. There were a few economic opportunities which had been established in the Chandil Dam site, some as a direct result of the dam itself, others as an extension of the services and activities that were undertaken in the dam area. Section 7.11.1 (d) below reflects a policy clause which outlines this provision.

- “The requiring body shall give preference to the affected persons or their groups or cooperatives in the allotment of outsourced contracts, shops or other economic opportunities coming up in or around the project site” (State of Jharkhand, 2008: Section 7.11.1(d)).

In 2000, the State of Jharkhand became a separate state, and it was also the time when Phase Two of the SMP commenced; comprising the completion of remaining parts of the project – 50% construction of the Chandil Dam, 80% construction of the Icha Dam, and the construction of the Kharkai Barrage (Gupta and Mitra, 2004:434). At the time, representatives of affected people and other local organisations, engaged in negotiations with the implementing authorities, concerning the rehabilitation of the people who would be affected by the construction of the dams.

At the time, the national policy of resettlement had not been launched, but the state policy, which was first promulgated in 1990, informed the undertaking of resettlement in the SMP. However, even in the context of the current policy, although it provides for economic opportunities to be afforded to affected people, the actual details of the economic activities still need to be designed by the implementing authority, in collaboration with affected people and other stakeholders such as government institutions, the private sector, etc., as the discussion below will reveal. The excerpt below was extracted from an interview with one of the leaders of the activist groups which were active in the negotiations.

“In 2000, the Subarnarekha Multipurpose Project started some construction work....After that we demanded that just as the dam area increases, we should revise the rehabilitation package, and that it should be revised each year.”

Apart from compensation of lost assets, issues of long-term economic activities from which affected people could re-establish their livelihoods were discussed. One of the fundamental agreements that came out of the long negotiation processes with various stakeholders was that preferential access to economic opportunities in and around the dam site must be given to affected people. The affected people proposed that the natural resources available in the new areas, as well as in the dam area, must be utilised to benefit them. Out of this negotiation, the fishing and boating projects run and managed by representatives of the affected people were born, as stated by the leader of the activist group interviewed.

“Another issue was raised, the natural resources which are available, one of them is water...and we said fisheries and tourism should be encouraged.”

The agreement was, therefore, that affected people would be given priority to run the fishing and boating projects in the dam area. In comparison to other cases of dam-related resettlement, as also seen in the earlier discussed case of the LHWP, this is quite a remarkable development on the part of the SMP, where the affected people were enabled to benefit directly from the development project that displaced them. A similar outcome was discussed earlier, in the Aswan High Dam case, where affected people benefitted from the irrigation scheme that was part of the project that displaced them. However, as reflected in the literature earlier, it is not always the case that affected people share in the benefits of the project that displaced them.

As reflected in the excerpt below, from the same leader of the activist group, the next step was for affected people to organise themselves, to form a structure through which the fishing and boating projects could be operated.

“We registered a cooperative. We established our right on tourism and fishery... A cooperative was registered in 2005. This was the first registered cooperative [in the area].”

In 2007, the fishing and boating projects was officially launched, with the affected people securing a license to run the projects. In 2010, the earlier formed cooperative secured a tender to start the project, which started operating effectively in 2013. To acquire this project, the cooperative had to pay a fee amounting to Rs.7,200,000, which the Jharkhand State government subsidized. Although the cooperative generated revenues from membership fees (Rs.110 per household), these funds could not amount to the fee needed to secure the fishing tender.

Once the fishing tender had been secured, the next hurdle was to acquire cages to start operating. Although the cage culture typically has high investment and operational costs, it is believed to have the potential for higher-value yields, potentially ensuring higher returns on investment (Government of India, 2016:1; Noakes, 2014:11). At the time the fieldwork was undertaken in 2016, the cooperative had about 500 cages – pictured below – which were also subsidized by the government of Jharkhand.



Figure 13.3 Cage culture in the Chandil Dam fishing project

There were two ways in which people participated in the fishing project: one was through cooperative-owned cages, and the other was through individually-owned cages for families or groups of people who could afford to buy their own cage(s). However, the individually-owned cages were also regulated by the cooperative, which means that they were subject to the rules that govern cooperative-owned cages. Additionally, while there were over 2000 households registered as members of the cooperative, there were also other people, who were not registered with the cooperative, but participated in the fishing and other economic activities in the dam area as individuals. As one of the cooperative committee members, quoted below, indicated.

“There are individual fish hunters. They are on their own and move around with their fishing rods and nets.”

This had consequently been a source of conflict, stemming from the fact that the cooperative had secured fishing rights, but there were also families or groups who owned cages separately, as claimed by the cooperative committee member.

“Here there is also a conflict. Some people have taken a cage on their own. It is the cooperative that has fishing rights...we know that they also have to benefit from the dam, we all want to benefit...but rules are rules. It is good when people work by the rules...but we cannot stop them, they must also benefit, they are also displaced.”

The source of conflict was not only that the cooperative had fishing rights, but also that people who were registered members had to pay a fee, which non-members did not pay, yet they were benefiting the same way in the dam-related economic activities.

Apart from operational conflicts, issues of financial mismanagement had also been implicated in some of the conflicts that had arisen in the past. One of the members of the cooperative, who was a former committee member, stated:

“Earlier, the conflicts were normally on small issues...But once the Cooperative is confirmed and as money came in, matters are getting a little more complicated. Whatever profit is there, some shareholders say they are not getting the dividend... we can call it corruption or financial irregularity, financial irregularity can easily convert into corruption. This is the crisis we are facing...but we are trying to develop a situation where even if there is a challenge, there will also be a solution to the problem...During the days of the struggle, it is about sacrifice; but once success has been achieved, then the question is how to share the spoils of the win.”

Issues of financial misconduct also came out in the discussion of the Mohale Dam case. In the majority of the community development projects in the Mohale case, the planned projects were not successful, partly due to misappropriation of funds. However, unlike in the Mohale Dam case, where there was evidently a lack of oversight, there was a clear line of regular accountability in the Chandil Dam case. This had partly enabled the sustainability of the economic activities in the Chandil Dam site, despite ongoing operational challenges. The committee, whose mandate was the overall management of the operation, and to oversee the workers responsible for daily activities from feeding the fish, preparing it, distribution, etc., was accountable to an Executive Body, which also accounted to the Fisheries Department. One committee member indicated:

“There is an Executive Body. There are General Body meetings, and also an annual conference. On April 4 each year, there is a General Body meeting. There is a Fisheries Department and the committee is accountable to it...They have to produce financial reports at the General Body meeting.”

This ongoing oversight had partly been instrumental in the sustainability of the project, based on ongoing performance and financial accountability. However, this had not been without any challenges. Many of the affected people involved in the cooperative, whether as

committee members or daily workers, were part of the wider social context, predominantly from tribal areas. As discussed earlier, the majority of these affected groups of people have lower educational and formal skills. When the project started, the fundamental challenge for affected people was learning how to run a relatively big enterprise. One member of the cooperative, who was the former committee member, had this to say:

“Once the cooperative was registered, there was another problem: they [affected people] are from a rural background, first they were all farmers, and then they went into fishing. Farming is a traditional system...The problem with farmers in India is management problem and entrepreneurship...so they had to be trained. Right now they are producing; but they have to know about not just production, but storage, processing, distribution and market control...But now they have slowly gone into the modern system ...”

As discussed earlier with regard to the case of Mohale resettlement, one of the shortcomings of the implemented community development projects was a lack of skills, particularly from the financial management perspective, among the committee members who were responsible for implementation. Conversely, in the Chandil case, the committee members and the workers responsible for the day-to-day operation of the project were evidently more sufficiently equipped, more so in relation to the management side of the project. As shown above, the necessary training in the Chandil case was not only about production but also the management of the entire chain of the business.

In this regard, training was offered by the Department of Fisheries of the Jharkhand State, to the members of the cooperative. The training course was meant to equip the members with relevant skills to effectively run the fishing project. However, equally significant was ongoing oversight of the daily activities by the committee, which itself was accountable to the cooperative society, and to the Fisheries Department of the State of Jharkhand. Among other factors, a combination of capacity building, ongoing oversight, and the collaboration of multiple stakeholders, all created a more conducive environment for the sustainability of the project.

For the boating operation, the cooperative had acquired four boats, used by tourists to sail on the lake when they visit the dam site. Of these four boats, two were bought by the cooperative from their own funds, and the other two by the government. The project contributes to some of the activities that have made the Chandil Dam area a tourist attraction site, and is,

therefore, economically beneficial to the local people. The revenue generated from the boating project, contributes towards the income that, supposedly, benefit affected families who are members of the cooperative. In the picture below, tourists can be seen sitting on chairs looking over the lake, while others sail away on the boats.



Figure 13.4 Tourists overlooking the Chandil Dam, in Jharkhand, India

The projects under the cooperative in the Chandil Dam site employed about 50 people on a full-time basis, who worked in both the fishing and boating projects, and earned between Rs.4500 and Rs.6000 per month. On a daily basis, there were workers who were responsible for fishing, feeding caged fish, preparing it for packaging, before distributing to businesses within the Jharkhand State and to other states such as West Bengal. In the picture below, one of the workers can be seen holding a fish.



Figure 13.5 One of the workers holding a caught fish in the Chandil Dam, in Jharkhand, India

As part of the extended economic activities in the dam area, there were also food stalls run by the locals, who catered for tourists and other visitors in the dam site. These activities contributed to the economic pursuits in the surrounding areas, and created alternative means of livelihood to many of the locals, including the resettled people who lost their means of livelihood to the construction of the dam. This partly explains why, as illustrated in Table 13.6 above, the areas surrounding the dam site, including three of the four study sites in this research, were preferred by many of the resettled people.

The significance of the economic activities facilitated by the cooperative projects notwithstanding, issues of gender representation are pertinent in the implementation of rehabilitation activities in the Chandil Dam. Involvement in the cooperative and its economic activities was one such area in which women were not well represented.

An observation around the dam site revealed that there were more women involved in small businesses such as food stalls around the dam site. While research has shown that women, especially in rural areas, tend to be excluded from economic activities outside the home, and in turn, do more work in the home (Dunn, 1993; Mitra, 2008:1203; Sarkar, et al., 2006), the economic activities in the Chandil Dam site present a different reality. However, this may also be related to the domestic role of women. In the context of economies largely reliant on natural and forest resources, as in tribal areas (Dubey, et al., 2006:8; Mitra, 2008:1202; Sujatha, 2002:87), women make use of these resources to fulfil their domestic responsibilities. However, in the absence of such resources, women have to find alternative means of livelihood to fulfil their home-making responsibilities. The establishment of informal businesses is evidently one such an alternative for many women in this area.

However, in the activities directly linked to the cooperative projects, women were less represented. In the fishing and boating projects, over 70% of the workers were males. In addition, the committee consisted of mainly males. The committee was responsible for the overall monitoring and oversight of the projects, and it was also where operational decisions were made. Hence, the under-representation of women means that the needs of women within implementation processes may have not been fully captured in decision-making. A picture below was taken on a day the committee was having a meeting, and as can be seen, with an exception of the researcher in the middle, the ten committee members in attendance were all

males, excluding Professor Ram (dressed in all black) whom the researcher was in company of.



Figure 13.5 Members of the fishing and boating cooperative in the Chandil Dam site, with the researcher and her host

A lack of employment opportunities or other viable means to enable the majority of affected people to improve their living standards after resettlement in the Chandil resettlement case, led to the reality of impoverishment among affected people. Livelihood re-establishment requires long-term strategies to create sustainable income opportunities among affected people. Although the majority of affected people had not been able to re-establish their livelihoods in a sustainable manner in the studied Chandil case, the economic opportunities in the dam site provided sustainable forms of livelihoods for some segments of the affected people. This is reflective of the benefit-sharing approach, where, as discussed in Chapter Six, affected people can be enabled to benefit directly from the projects that resettled them to improve their lives (Cernea, 2009:57; Egge, et al., 2008:318; Van Wicklin, 1999:233). As Cernea (2008; 2009) argues, the approach of benefit-sharing is more effective in recovering losses of affected people to resettlement, than compensation can be able to. In the next subsection, the discussion explores the risk of food insecurity among affected in the Chandil resettlement case, and how the policy was implemented to mitigate it.

13.4.4 From food insecurity to adequate nutrition

When people lose their means of livelihoods to resettlement without being able to acquire new ones afterwards, their standards of living inevitably decline, a basic manifestation of which is food insecurity (Cernea, 2000:27). As indicated earlier in the discussion of Scudder's stage framework, forced resettlement is always followed by declined living

standards among affected people; and in some cases the living standards improve after a certain period of time into the new areas (Hakim, 2000; Samanta, 2015; Scudder, 2005:32). This subsection explores how the risk of food insecurity was manifested in the Chandil resettlement case, and how the policy was implemented to mitigate it, as reflected by the outcomes on the ground.

In consideration of the loss of land and other productive assets on which affected people had established their livelihoods, the JRRP-08 provides for subsistence allowance to meet the needs of affected people, in the absence of alternative forms of livelihoods in the new areas (State of Jharkhand, 2008: Section 7.14). Although subsistence allowance was discussed in the previous subsection, this subsection focuses on how the manner in which it was implemented (or not implemented) impacted on food security. There are two kinds of subsistence provided for in the policy; one is short-term, recommended for one year from the date of resettlement, as stipulated in Section 7.14 of the policy, and the other is long-term, recommended for thirty years from the date of resettlement, as stipulated in Section 7.12 of the policy.

However, as indicated earlier in Subsection 13.4.3, there was evidently no subsistence allowance in the form of cash that was granted to the affected people in the studied cases. Neither the twelve-month allowance nor the thirty-year annuity had seemingly been implemented in the studied cases. Nevertheless, it may be argued that some of the affected people were resettled before the current policy was passed, which, therefore, means that this policy provision did not apply at the time they were resettled.

Notwithstanding, as a result of the inability of the SMP to provide subsistence for affected people who had not acquired new forms of livelihood in the new areas, many households were faced with food insecurity. Food insecurity is defined as the insufficiency of adequate, balanced (calorie-protein) food (Cernea, 2000:27; World Food Summit, 1996). Although as mentioned earlier, the government had implemented subsistence in kind for families with no regular income, the provided food parcels were only enough to provide for the most basic needs of food, without enabling affected people to transition out of dependence. The nature of subsistence in kind is such that it is often a temporary relief measure, hence, cannot ensure security. Also, as the findings suggested, in the studied cases the provided food parcels were not given regularly, hence, could not ensure food security.

In the studied 80 households, 46 respondents indicated that their households had received food parcels, although it was not clear how often these food parcels were received. Responses ranged from every two months to every four months, which indicates that the frequency at which these food parcels were delivered was arbitrary. While, on average, people managed to eat two meals a day, meals consisted mainly of starch – rice – and occasionally pulses rich in protein, such as lentils. However, protein-rich foods were said to be scarce, due to the high cost of buying them. Hence, ordinarily people ate rice by itself.

A lack of a variety of food items essential for good health in the studied cases was not an isolated case. Studies undertaken amongst resettled tribal groups in India consistently reveal the same trend. A study by Rao (1998) undertaken in Andhra Pradesh, where over twenty dams and barrages have been constructed, resettling multitudes of tribal people, revealed that a lack of access to nutrition-rich foods such as protein, iron, vitamins, was the major cause of nutritional deficiency amongst tribal groups. In another study in Rameshwarpura in Gujarat, where affected people were resettled on account of the Sardar Sarovar Project, severe malnutrition was cited as the fundamental cause of multiple deaths experienced in the area after resettlement, largely associated with the loss of land, and the inability to recover it afterwards (Patwardhan, 2000:16).

Nutritional deficiency among the studied resettled people in the Chandil case was a result of a combination of two factors; the inadequate manner in which rehabilitation measures – such as employment – were undertaken, which did not benefit the majority of affected people, and the manner in which land compensation was undertaken, which inhibited the provision of alternative arable land after resettlement in the majority of cases. The ability to transition out of food insecurity into self-sufficiency cannot be reduced by temporary measures such as subsistence in kind, which in the studied cases, was also not provided on a regular basis.

13.4.5 From expropriation to restoration of community assets

Involuntary resettlement forcefully remove affected people from their long-standing environments to new ones, in some cases with no equivalent natural resources from which to derive livelihoods (Cernea, 2000:29). In less developed regions, such as rural areas, and scheduled areas in the context of India, where financial resources are lacking and the economy is based on other forms of capital such as natural resources, the disruption of this resource base can have devastating consequences on those affected (Beck and Ghosh,

2000:149; Beck and Nesmith, 2001:124; Cernea, 2000:29; Jodha, 1990: A65). In the studied Chandil case, affected people were reliant on a wide range of natural resources that sustained their livelihoods.

In consideration of the loss of natural resources on which affected people relied prior to resettlement, the policy provides that in forced resettlement situations, the implementing authority must draw up and implement a detailed plan on how lost community assets will be re-established (State of Jharkhand, 2008: Section 7.18.1). Furthermore, the policy stipulates that the acquiring body must ensure provision of essential services and infrastructure in the new areas, such as water, sanitation, road networks, healthcare services, fuel resources, religious structures, educational facilities, etc. (ibid.: Section 7.19.1 and 7.19.2). In this subsection, lost common property resources among affected people in the Chandil resettlement case are explored, and how the policy has been implemented to recover the losses.

Water resources and sanitation

Prior to resettlement, affected people, who lived along the river Subarnarekha, had access to river water, with which they washed, cleaned and in other cases drank, while in other villages there were natural springs from which people collected drinking water. Despite being economically deprived, some tribal people were accustomed to their way of life and, arguably, content with their level of self-sufficiency. The physical environment provided them with resources such as fruits, wood, and fish for those who lived close to water bodies such as dams (Banerjee and Madhurima, 2013:128; Patwardhan, 2000:14). In a study undertaken by Sainath (in Patwardhan, 2000:14), in Jalsindhi, one of the villages submerged by the Sardar Sarovar Project, one respondent had this to say about their level of self-sufficiency in the area, and what the consequences of resettlement would be:

“We of the river bank, never go to work as wage labourers...The forest is our moneylender and banker. From its teak and bamboo, we built our houses. From its riches we are able to make our baskets and cots, ploughs and hoes. From its trees, leaves, herbs and roots, we get our medicines. Our cattle and goats, which are our wealth, graze here freely as they have always done. For all these, we would have to pay money in Gujarat”, from a study undertaken by Sainath in 1996 (in Patwardhan, 2000:14).

In the current study, some respondents reiterated the above sentiments on the self-sufficiency of the tribal people, and also reflected on their scepticism towards the promise of better services after resettlement.

“In India, the government doesn’t care about the people...we have seen people suffer because of displacement...when I talk about displacement...it comes a long way...we knew they were going to displace us and forget about us. We were happy in our forested areas, we had water, we had wood from the forest, we didn’t live in poverty...”

“There is no water, the taps are broken, our rivers always gave us water, now we are struggling.”

The picture below shows a broken water pump in Chotalakha, which residents claimed had been broken for years. In this village, although there were a few water pumps, the water supply was so limited that water use restrictions had been put in place, allowing residents only a certain number of buckets in a day.



Figure 13.6 A broken water pump in Chotalakha, Jharkhand, India

In the picture below, residents can be seen bathing and washing in a dirty pond. Different people did their laundry and bathed in this same water, which, unlike the river water, is still,

and was constantly getting more contaminated. Although, in the old settlements the resettled people did their laundry and bathed in river water, the difference is that the river water continuously flows, hence people used different water each time.



Figure 13.7 Residents doing laundry and bathing in a pond in Gangudih, Jharkhand, India

The irony is that these affected people, who were now subjected to serious water deprivation, were resettled on account of a dam construction, which was meant to supply water to the growing, industrialising cities (Gupta and Mitra, 2004:435; Puthucherril, 2009:100). This is despite that the JRRP-08 has made it mandatory for services, including piped water, to be provided in the resettlement areas, as reflected in Sections 7.19.1 and 7.19.2 of the policy.

However, in one of the studied villages, Sukhsari, there was a number of functioning community taps within a short distance of each other, allowing residents sufficient access to water. In fact, in comparison to Chotalakha, Gangudih and Chilgu, Sukhsari was better equipped with proper sanitation and piped water services. In the interviews with respondents from the studied cases, it became apparent that community needs prioritisation may have not been undertaken in a participatory manner in Gangudih.

“We don’t have water, but they built the arch, you saw it as you came into the village, we don’t need it, we want water...”

The excerpt above was extracted from an interview with a respondent from Gangudih, but the picture of the arch below (for illustration purpose) was taken in Sukhsari. In the studied cases, Gangudih and Sukhsari had these arches at the beginning of the villages. However, according to some respondents, there were more significant challenges with regard to basic service provision, such as water and sanitation. Hence, they believed that the arch was a less significant asset, and the funds used to build it should have been channelled towards the services essential to them.



Figure 13.8 An arch at the entrance of the village in Sukhsari

On the other hand, this arch represents a significant milestone for the government. The message on the arch indicates that the establishment of this settlement was a solution to the floods, which the resettled people were at risk of in their old areas. In India, increasing water volumes during the monsoons in the rivers such as the Subarnarekha, along which the resettled people resided, put a number of people at risk; hence the diversion of water through dam constructions presents a solution to this potential catastrophe (Bandyopadhyay, 2002:4109). The Chandil Dam was constructed for the dual purpose of water provision and flood control (Bharti, 1991:1385; Chadha, 1993:2194; Gupta and Mitra, 2004:435). Hence, for the authorities, the construction of the arch was of priority, whereas for some resettlers, basic services of water and sanitation were more significant.

Underlying the dissatisfaction of residents about the construction of the arch is an issue with a lack of participation in implementing development measures. Community development initiatives require community participation to ensure appropriate resource prioritisation

(Kumar, 2002:24). At the core of community participation is the belief that when the directly affected people are actively involved in the affairs that affect them, they are able to not only take ownership, but also to guide development processes, based on their own priorities (Bruch, et al., 2006:6; Fenster, 2016:36; Kumar, 2002:24). Brock (2003:33) argues that participatory development becomes meaningless when the affected, and usually the less powerful, are only passively involved, with no ability to influence the implementation of development projects. Issues of participation in the Chandil Dam resettlement case will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.

In addition to water scarcity, sanitation services remained one of the fundamental challenges in the majority of the studied cases. Of the 80 studied households, 56 had no toilets, and practised open defecation. Table 13.13 below depicts households with toilets, either inside or outside, and those with none, in the studied villages.

Table 13.13 Households with an inside/outside toilet by village

Village name	Number of households with an inside/outside toilet	Number of households with no toilet
Sukhsari	18	2
Gangudih	1	19
Chilgu	4	16
Chotalakha	1	19
Total	24	56

In Sukhsari, where there was the highest number of households with toilets, the government provided the community with toilets, as part of not only implementing the JRRP-08 prescriptions of water and sanitation services provision in resettlement sites, but also as “per the norms specified by the State Government” (State of Jharkhand, 2008: Section 7.19.2). However, the same could not be said about the other three villages, where basic sanitation services were still lacking. In the other villages, where only a few households had toilets, the families had to construct their own.

The problem of a lack of proper sanitation services reflected in the studied cases was neither new nor isolated. According to the UNICEF and World Health Organisation report on the world’s progress on drinking water and sanitation, India is one of the top ten countries with

the highest number of people without access to improved sanitation, with 814 million of its total population without access (UNICEF and WHO, 2012:19). That means, over 65% of the Indian population is without access to proper sanitation. As indicated in the recent 2011 Indian census, the majority of those without proper sanitation services live in rural areas, as approximately 70% of rural populations have no access to proper sanitation (Government of India, 2012).

The statistics from the wider context were confirmed in the studied cases, where 90% of respondents indicated that they had no toilet prior to resettlement. In the context of low income households – the direct result of the evident high unemployment rates in the studied cases – which translates into other aspects of poverty indicators such as food insecurity, access to proper sanitation ranks lower in the hierarchy of needs. This is particularly because proper sanitation has, evidently, not been widely practiced by affected people, even outside the context of resettlement.

However, it is argued here that the JRRP-08 makes provision for proper supply of sanitation services by the acquiring body, for that very reason that there is a widely known gap in the use of sanitation services, particularly in scheduled areas. Hence, a lack of proper sanitation in the studied cases is a direct indication of the failure of the government to implement this policy provision. Section 7.19.2 of the JRRP-08 reflects that the provision of proper sanitation services in resettlement sites is part of the wider mandate of the government, thus, the evident shortfall in the implementation of this policy provision is directly linked to the shortcomings in the implementation of improved sanitation services by the government in the wider society.

In 1999, the Government of India established a campaign known as the total sanitation campaign, to expedite the supply of proper sanitation services across the Indian society (Clasen, et al., 2012:4; Hueso and Bell, 2013:2; Robinson and Raman, 2008:2). According to a water and sanitation programme assessment report of the total sanitation campaign, the programme's main goal was to achieve "universal rural sanitation coverage" by 2012 (2010:13). As a calculated attempt to address the deficits of a centralised rural sanitation programme, the total sanitation programme was designed to be community-led and people-centred (Clasen, et al., 2012:4; Hueso and Bell, 2013:2). Thus, the programme was meant to be implemented by local authorities, in collaboration with community members. To encourage efficiency in this programme to meet the specified goal timeously, the campaign

was driven by the Nirmal Gram Puraskar (NGP), which is an incentive programme for well-performing local structures (Hueso and Bell, 2013:2; Robinson and Raman, 2008:3). Under the NGP, a reward in a form of cash would be given to the *Gram Panchayats* – a local structure that will be described in detail in the next chapter on participation – for achieving defined sanitation outcomes (Hueso and Bell, 2013:2).

The campaign was designed to be community-led and people-centred, to enable the incorporation of user preferences in order to ensure that not only would sanitation services be provided, but also that they would be used by the targeted people. However, although the programme was said to be well-funded and designed, offering a “solid financial and policy framework”, the outcomes were far below the target; not only in terms of the number of latrines built, but also the usage of those latrines (Robinson and Raman, 2008:2). The Department of Drinking Water and Sanitation (DDWS) reported in 2010 that the coverage of improved sanitation services increased from 22% in 2001 to 65% in 2010 (Government of India, 2010:10). However, the Indian Census results in 2011 revealed that the outcomes had been exaggerated by the DDWS’s self-reporting online monitoring system, as the census showed that rural sanitation coverage was sitting at 31% in 2011 (Government of India, 2012; Robinson and Raman, 2008:5).

Qualitative and quantitative studies on both the coverage and use of proper sanitation services under the total sanitation campaign revealed that the total coverage was significantly overstated in many government’s reports, and that many of the constructed latrines were not being used, largely because some were left incomplete, while others did not incorporate user preferences (Barnard, et al., 2013; Hueso and Bell, 2013:12; Routray, et al., 2015:9). A lack of capacity and the active participation of the targeted users have been attributed by some researchers to the failure of the government in this regard (Hueso and Bell, 2013:6).

As a result of the sluggish manner in which the campaign had been implemented, the total sanitation campaign had not reached the studied Chandil areas at the time of fieldwork in 2016, although the programme had been launched 17 years ago. Some of the resettled respondents stated:

“They still haven’t come this side...we only hear that they have built toilets in other places, not here.”

“People build their own latrines here, the government doesn’t help us.”

This shortfall of the total sanitation campaign by the government has directly translated into the lack of sanitation services in the studied cases. However, unlike in other cases – such as those referenced from other studies – where the usage of toilets was low even when people had access to them, as revealed in a study by Routray, et al. (2015:9), usage was much higher in Sukhsari. In 18 of the 20 studied households that had toilets in Sukhsari, respondents indicated that household members used them regularly, and ordinarily did not practise open defecation. However, the general low coverage of proper sanitation services in the other three studied villages, as reflected in Table 13.13 above, is representative of the wider Indian society. This is reflective of the fact that, because the implementation of resettlement policies is undertaken within wider social and institutional contexts, it can be affected by contextual dynamics in a given setting.

Forest resources

One of the fundamental sources of livelihood in tribal areas are forest resources, from which the locals access both timber and non-timber forest produce (NTFP) such as fruits, vegetables, etc. (Jodha, 1985; 1986; Sahoo and Swain, 2013; Mukundan and Chandrakumar, 2013; Beck and Ghosh, 2000). In cases of forced resettlement, affected people may lose part of or all of the forest resources on which they relied. In accordance with this loss, the JRRP-08 Section 7.18.1 provides that alternative resources be established for affected people in the new areas, especially when they are resettled to open areas with no equal forest resources available (State of Jharkhand, 2008).

There are a number of studies which have shown the economic significance of forest resources, both timber and NTFP, in tribal areas, for example, Beck and Ghosh (2000), Jodha (1985; 1986), Mukundan and Chandrakumar (2013), and Sahoo and Swain (2013). Somewhat in opposition to this position, some research – for example, Arnold and Stewart (1991), Heltberg, et al. (2000), and Jodha, (1989; 1990) – argue that, largely due to degradation of natural forest resources, the use of forest resources as a means of income is deteriorating, such that, even where tribal people are still reliant on forest resources, it is mainly to meet non-financial needs. The studied cases in this thesis represent a mixture of both these positions. On the one hand, there were people who presented their old areas as the place in which they had abundant natural resources, which they consumed, as well as leveraged for financial gain.

“We had timber, a lot of timber all over the place...we didn’t struggle like we do now”

“...before displacement, we used to sell timber in our areas, and we had land...now we have nothing, our children are starving”

“We had our own medicine, now we have to go to the clinic, sometimes there is no medicine at the clinic, and you have to buy from the pharmacy...”

On the other hand, there were respondents who indicated that, even prior to resettlement, they were already facing challenges of degradation in general, but in particular of NTFP. Although there were a few respondents who highlighted financial gains as some of the benefits they derived from forest resources, many of the respondents indicated resources such as river water, wells, and agricultural land as the main resources on which they primarily relied on a regular basis. The forest resources that supported their livelihoods were mainly timber, which they used mainly for building *kutch*a houses, rather than as the means of income generation. One of the resettled respondents indicated as quoted below:

“We didn’t buy timber, we could get it for free...we didn’t need money, we had our land, and we had river water...we had no lack...some people say we are poor, I say we were rich, they took away everything we had...”

Having been resettled to open areas with no forests, affected people had little to no access to natural resources in the new communities. Even in cases where people had access to resources such as brushwood, they had to walk long distances. As one respondent indicated, fuel resources in the new areas were generally in short supply, in comparison to their previous settlements.

“We walk a long distance, and still there is not enough brushwood there...but we have to go there because there are no resources close by...”

“We had forests; fuel resources were not a problem, now we are struggling.”

Although the policy provides that alternative means of livelihood be availed to the resettled people to make up for lost ones, this policy provision was poorly undertaken. However, this is partly because of the inherent complexities associated with providing alternative natural resources, because they are largely dependent on factors outside the control of implementing agencies. Individual households had to find their own alternative means to meet their basic

needs such as fuel. One such an alternative was coal remains, which the locals gathered from the coal mine fields close by, and mixed with mud, and then shaped them into small balls, then leave them to dry in the sun before they could be used as fuel, as demonstrated in the picture below. This method was used in lower to no income households, in place of, or to supplement, kerosene, which is financially costly.



Figure 13.9 Coal remains prepared for use as fuel in Chotalakha, Jharkhand, India

As argued earlier, in many societies the responsibility of homemaking often falls on the shoulders of women. Hence, it is usually women who have to find alternative means of homemaking such as collection of fuel, water, etc. (Dunn, 1993; Mitra, 2008:1203; Parasuraman, 1993:1; Sarkar, et al., 2006). Similarly, in the studied cases, the women were the ones who collected coal remains, and prepare them for usage. Although some writers argue that, generally, tribal women have a higher status compared to that of women in other groups within the Indian society, based on the matrilineal structure, which gives inheritance and other privileges to women (Maharatna, in Mitra, 2008:1206), contending arguments assert that in real terms, the status of women in this regard does not translate into economic empowerment and other opportunities (Dunn, 1993; Sarkar, et al., 2006). Tribal women in general, have a much higher work load in the home than men, which translates into lesser involvement in economic and other activities outside the home (Mitra, 2008:1203; Sarkar, et al., 2006). Added to that are socio-cultural constraints that hinder women's personal development. Hence, women and girls in tribal areas are deprived of opportunities that may enable their personal empowerment, such as skills development (Bhagavatheeswaran, et al., 2016). As a result, men have more economic power than women, and that often extends to other areas where the exercise of power is applicable, such as in major household decision-making.

In this context, the effects of the loss of access to common property resources were felt more by women, who had to continue with their home-making responsibilities, regardless of the constraints they faced in the absence of their chief resource base. Although the affected people previously lived in the less developed regions with limited economic resources at their disposal, their lives were cushioned by the natural environment that supported their livelihoods in a sustainable manner. While some writers have argued that claims about the sustainability of natural resources in contexts where there is no comprehensive resources management, are overstated (Kellert, et al., 2000:705), the reality of many of the affected people was that their livelihoods were strongly predicated upon the presence of natural resources, with no other alternatives. Hence, as one elderly resettled woman stated, forced removal from such a resource base has been detrimental to them.

“...we did not have much in our old areas, but we had natural resources...that is all we had, and when you take us away from that, and you don't give us something else to depend on, it is very painful.”

In general, livelihood re-establishment is a more complex goal to achieve, and requires active, collaborative efforts. It is particularly more difficult to re-establish livelihoods in less developed contexts, where skills are lacking and opportunities scarce. The context of the studied cases represents this reality of low skills and fewer economic opportunities, which makes it extremely difficult for implementing authorities to implement alternative means of livelihood such as employment. Additionally, livelihood re-establishment is complicated in cases where the resettled people were previously dependent on natural resources not available in new areas. In the absence of alternative natural resources in the new areas, livelihoods can only be re-established through sustainable, long-term means.

Infrastructure development

Contrary to livelihood re-establishment, physical infrastructure development is a less complex objective to achieve, where there is political will to not only allocate resources for infrastructure development, but also to implement planned activities efficiently. Drawing from the central goal of tribal development in the Indian society, the JRRP-08 provides that infrastructural facilities be allocated in areas where the resettled people are moved, especially where they are moved in groups of one hundred families or more, as articulated in Section

7.19.1 (State of Jharkhand, 2008). However, Section 7.19.2 that follows, makes provision for infrastructural development, even where less than one hundred people are resettled, in consideration of the standards set by the state government (State of Jharkhand, 2008). Infrastructural facilities recommended in the policy include, but are not limited to “roads, public transport, drainage, sanitation, sources of safe drinking water, sources of drinking water for cattle, community ponds, grazing land, land for fodder, plantation (social forestry or agro forestry), Public utilities, such as Post Offices, Fair Price shops” etc., (ibid.: Section 7.19.1).

In the four studied villages, there were seemingly structurally sound, paved roads within the villages, as shown in the picture below. However, in Sukhsari, the road leading up to the village had significantly deteriorated.



Figure 13.10 A road within the village in Chilgu, Jharkhand, India

Concerning public utilities, Chilgu, being closer to the city, was relatively better resourced than the other three villages. Observations around Chilgu revealed that there was closer access to public resources such as shops selling clothing, food and other small essentials. Public transport was also more easily accessible than in the other three villages. There were also a number of restaurants within the area in Chilgu. Electricity was also accessible within the village in Chilgu; however, only 4 of the 20 studied households had electricity in their homes, connected at family expense.

Based on the findings of this study, close proximity to the city, and access to public services and other resources in Chilgu, had not translated into significant access to economic opportunities in the studied households. For example, unemployment levels were prevalent across the four villages, and the village with the highest number of households that had one or more fully employed member(s) was Sukhsari, and not Chilgu. Table 13.14 below depicts households with employed member(s) by village.

Table 13.14 Households with employed member(s) by village

Village	Number of households with employed member(s)
Chilgu	5
Sukhsari	9
Gangudih	3
Chotalakha	5
Total	22

Three of the four studied areas – Chilgu, Sukhsari, Gangudih – were some of those to which more resettled people chose to move, even those who were not allocated plots in the areas, as depicted in Table 13.6 above. There was a variety of reasons why people chose these areas of resettlement. In particular, Chilgu was more popular for its proximity to the bigger city with, potentially, better access to economic opportunities. However, the majority of residents in the area remained on the periphery of this development. There were a few households in the area who were more economically well-off than the majority of those studied in the area. This could be observed from the type of houses, fencing, etc.

It is, therefore, argued here that, based on the findings, close proximity to an area with more economic resources and opportunities does not in itself lead to access to such opportunities, if one does not have the necessary skills and means to acquire them. In this context, closeness to the city can, instead, lead to higher rates of unemployment and inequality in the area, than to enable more people to transition out of dependence into growth.

Understandably, the re-establishment of natural resources such as grazing land, plantations, etc. had not been achieved in a satisfactory manner, largely due to the earlier discussed scarcity of natural resources. In consequence, the scarcity of natural resources in the areas, to

which people were moved, resulted in the prolonged impoverishment of resettled people. Coupled with this were the lack of economic opportunities, and the inability of affected people to participate in some of the available opportunities due to a lack of skills and education.

The scarcity of land and natural resources is indicative of the inherent complexities of resettlement as outlined by De Wet (2006) – discussed in Chapter Three above – that some aspects of resettlement are incompatible with institutional routine planning. These resources are dependent on availability in the areas of resettlement, and in some cases this is a factor beyond the control of implementing agencies. This, therefore, makes the requirement of options assessment more pertinent, to minimise resettlement or to avoid it, where it is clear that the resources to replace those to be lost to development projects or other opportunities, are scarce.

Although infrastructure development has partly been achieved in other areas, such as roads, sanitation services in Sukhsari, and electricity in Chilgu, without the means to access and make use of some of these services, affected people were excluded from benefiting from this type of development. Access to electricity for example, requires financial resources which many of the affected people do not have. Hence, it cannot, in real terms, be considered as re-establishment of livelihoods for the affected people, if many were unable to access the services, and those who were able to access them did so outside the provisions of resettlement.

13.4.6 From community disarticulation to community reconstruction

Social networks

Research in many cases across the world has shown that forced resettlement dismantles the social fabric of societies, particularly in tribal areas, and rural communities in general, which, often have stronger social networks and community ties (Cernea, 2000:30; Schmidt-Soltau, 2003:542; Tabucanon, 2012:9; Witter and Satterfield, 2014:1395). However, a study by Rogers and Wang (2006) undertaken in Inner Mongolia, China, for example, presents a contrast in this regard, indicating that many of the resettled people were able to transfer their social networks and community ties into the new areas. The earlier discussed case of the Mohale Dam resettlement also reflects a contrast in this sense, with many people in the

studied cases revealing a sense of continuity with regard to transferring their networks and community ties into the new areas.

Social ties, social networks and social institutions play a significant role in organising livelihoods and sustaining less developed communities, in the absence of economic and other material resources (Mahapatra, 1999:210; Witter and Satterfield, 2014:1395). Furthermore, social aspects such as culture play a fundamental role in connecting individuals that make up communities, and answer what Downing (1996:36) terms the “primary questions” which inform people’s identity. When this established social order is forcefully dismantled by involuntary resettlement, the loss experienced can be more impactful than compensation can make up for (Downing, 1996:34). In consideration of this inherent risk, the JRRP-08 provides that, as much as possible, affected people be resettled “in a group or as groups” (State of Jharkhand, 2008: Section 6.10).

This policy feature seeks to ensure that, even though the affected people are inevitably removed from the many resources on which they relied, that they are able to retain the social networks and possibly the social capital within the networks, after resettlement. This is especially significant because in the absence of material resources due to other constraints such as a lack of employment opportunities, or a lack of natural resources, as shown in the previous discussions, the affected people may leverage their transferred social capital to facilitate some aspects of their livelihood.

In the studied cases, the government planned to resettle people as groups in accordance with the policy. However, as discussed earlier, some people chose areas different from the ones they were initially allocated. As a result, due to a variety of preferences that people had when choosing the areas of resettlement, the choice to resettle as individual households as opposed to as groups, impeded the implementation of this policy provision to resettle people as groups. This indicates, therefore, that, although certain policy provisions may be designed to address specific issues, other issues – related or unrelated – may come into play and affect the initial resettlement plans.

Notwithstanding, the key to reconstruction in resettlement is to ensure that the risks of impoverishment are prevented, even in situations where the initial plans of the resettlement project are derailed. Thus, when communities are disarticulated in forced resettlement, measures must be designed and implemented to re-articulate them (Rogers and Wang, 2006).

Where social networks are dismantled, the establishment of new forms of social networks in the new areas is essential. As Scudder asserts in his stage framework, the disrupted community structures and networks may be expected to reform in stage three, of Community Formation and Economic Development (Scudder, 2005; 2009). The studied four villages were, at the time of fieldwork in 2016, in that third stage. Hence, some kinds of social networks had already been initiated by community members, inclusive of both the hosts and resettled members.

In Gangudih, community members established a small poultry project, where they bred and sold chickens. This was meant to create and supplement income in low, to no income, households. Although these were open to all interested community members, it was mostly women who participated in this project, as one of the women in the group indicated.

“Anyone who is interested can join, but most of us are women”

This is a contrast to the earlier assertion that women, being compelled to take on homemaking responsibilities, even under difficult circumstances of resource scarcity, are usually constrained from participating in economic activities outside the home (Dunn, 1993; Mitra, 2008:1203; Sarkar, et al., 2006). However, it was also realised from the fieldwork that the involvement of women in economic activities outside the homes, does not take away their responsibility as homemakers. Hence, women who engage in economic activities outside home also do domestic chores at home. It is mostly women who collect fuel, who cook, and do house cleaning, even when they are employed.

A group of women who started this project were all unemployed. They started off rearing chicken individually in their homes, and later decided to merge their small household projects, with the hope of being able to sell together in bulk to businesses. Through this project, they were also hoping to secure a loan from the local Bandhan Bank, which specialises in micro-finance, to expand their initiative, in order to gain the support of big businesses. However, there were serious limitations that impeded the success of this initiative. The fundamental one being that the initiative was based in a high unemployment, low income context, making it difficult for the project to thrive within the community. Secondly, because the participants in the project were unemployed, and the project had not gotten to a point of generating regular income or reliable profits, it was difficult to secure a

loan from a financial institution which requires security and confidence from its clients. The excerpts below, from interviews with the group members, reflect some of the struggles the project faced, and their challenges with getting a loan from a bank.

“Bandhan Bank...they want to know how much we make per month, and if we can't pay them, what is it that they take from us, but we have nothing to offer as guarantee...”

“We don't sell in the community, if we sell to people in the community, no one is going to buy. It is better to go to the market, as there are many people who can buy there.”

“There are only small shops in this community, they sell small items like salt, oil, they will not buy chicken...we wanted to sell to big businesses in the city”

Although in the context of limited employment opportunities, small enterprises can serve as an alternative means of income generation, the ability for such initiatives to thrive is dependent on the economic environment in which they are based. From the observations around the villages and in town, businesses that sold more costly items such as clothing, accessories, etc., were bigger businesses with presumably substantial capital to cater for a larger market. Small businesses that cater for smaller markets, such as community shops, sold basic, essential items that people use on a regular basis. Food items that people can normally live without, such as meat, were not available in small community shops, but were only available in bigger shops or supermarkets. Hence, the respondents indicated that they wanted to pursue partnerships with bigger enterprises, but that in itself is influenced by a number of factors, such as constant supply, which requires reliable income, and the project in question did not seem to have reached that level yet.

In Sukhsari and Chilgu, there were no structured social networks identified at the time of fieldwork. However, that is not for a lack of interest, but due to a lack of financial capital and opportunities. A group of respondents, five of them men and four women in Chilgu, all concurred that if there were opportunities, they would take them.

“...we could have small businesses...there are many of us who are unemployed in the community...the people who are unemployed can be involved, and also the businessmen...to help with their skills and experience”

In interview with an SMP official, he asserted that there were self-help initiatives which had been established by the government, which provided training, initial financial support and space to affected people who were willing to pursue enterprise ventures. However, in the studied cases, there was no evidence reflecting self-help establishments by the government. Having said that, because of the size of the studied population in this research, no generalised conclusions can be drawn, but on the basis of this study, many of the affected people had not benefited from the self-help initiatives implemented by the SMP at the time of fieldwork.

Religious beliefs and practices

In addition to sustaining community and family ties through group resettlement, the policy recommends that the preservation of the identities and culture fundamental to affected people be ensured in resettlement processes, by striving for equality and mutual understanding between the hosts and the resettled people.

- “...However, it has to be ensured that the affected families may be resettled with the host community on the basis of equality and mutual understanding, consistent with the desire of each group to preserve its own identity and culture...” (State of Jharkhand, 2008: Section 6.10).

In accordance with Section 6.10 above, the policy further prescribes that the affected people be resettled, by all means possible, within their regional areas or blocks, to retain their “ethnic, linguistic and cultural identity” (State of Jharkhand, 2008: Section 7.18.3).

For many people, culture plays an invaluable role in their lives, and one that is integrated into their identity (Downing, 1996:36). Identity can entail such cultural aspects as religion, language, etc. When people are forcefully resettled, they can experience a deep sense of cultural loss and deprivation, and the feeling of loss can be prolonged if measures are not taken to sustain their cultural practices in the new areas (Pankhurst, 1992:206).

One respondent in Gangudih expressed that she had feelings of sadness and loss, when they were forced “to leave their forefathers and move into unknown areas”. As reflected earlier in

a discussion on land acquisition and reallocation, the majority of the resettled people were moved to areas within the Chandil block, or within the Seraikela District. In the Chandil Block, 55% of the population are Hindu, and 25% are Muslim, and the remaining 20% consists of other religions and non-religious people, as stated in Subsection 12.3.4 above (Government of India, 2011). The specific four villages studied were, however, predominantly Hindu, as expressed through such things as the way of dressing, the art and artefacts in the homes, etc. Most married women in the villages typically wore *Saris*, and unmarried women and girls customarily wore *Punjabi* dresses, both Hindu women's clothing. The men typically covered themselves with a simple cloth and wore t-shirts. However, there were people within the villages who wore modern clothing, such as jeans, modern tops, pants, dresses, etc.

Homes had religious structures, exemplified by the one pictured below, known as *Tulsi Vrindavan* or *Tulsi Moncho*. On top of the masonry structure (in other cases it is made of mud) is a plant called *Tulasi*, considered to be a sacred plant in Hinduism. The Hindu religion has a strong attachment to nature, such as trees, flowers, plants, etc., which play a significant role in their rituals and beliefs (Mazumdar and Mazumdar, 2009:262). As a result, the disruption caused by forced resettlement was significant at the beginning, when some of the affected people felt vulnerable and insecure, because they had strong beliefs in the manifestation or habitation of deities and gods in certain plants and trees.



Figure 13.11 A religious structure, Tulsi Vrindavan, in a home in Chilgu, Jharkhand, India

“...it is called Tulasi...only the plant is called Tulasi, it is a sacred plant in our religion, we worship it every day, it is protecting our home”

“I was not happy to leave our [old] home, where we had important plants and trees...and we had to leave them...”

The above excerpts were quoted from the interviews with two female respondents, whose families had rebuilt the above pictured religious structures in their homes. Each of the four villages also had a temple accessible to all interested members of the community. Community religious structures were provided for by appropriate government structures, as stipulated in Section 7.21.7 of the policy below.

- “The resettlement areas predominantly inhabited by the Scheduled Tribes shall get land free of cost for community and religious gatherings, to the extent decided by the appropriate Government” (State of Jharkhand, 2008: Section 7.21.7).

Forced separation from the natural environment notwithstanding, generally, the affected people were resettled within the Chandil block, to areas where they continued to speak the same language, and practice similar Hindu religious rituals. As such, with regard to cultural practices, the resettled people were able to reconstruct their own practices in the new areas. These include the rebuilding of new *Tulsi Moncho* within the homesteads. The government provided the religious structures open to both hosts and the resettled people, which enabled the affected people to be integrated into the communities, at least in as far as religious practices are concerned.

However, in relation to community ties and networks, the affected people were left to their own devices, to facilitate the re-establishment of their social networks. There was no evidence of initiatives by government structures to facilitate social re-organisation. In many resettlement cases, as already indicated earlier, non-tangible losses, such as social disarticulation, are often neglected by implementing agencies, and left to affected people to restore that dismantled aspect of their lives and livelihoods (Cernea, 2000:40).

As the two case studies show, over time the affected people find ways on their own to form new networks or community ties in their new areas. However, implementing agencies have a duty to support affected people in this process. This is because in other cases, even when the

affected people attempt on their own to re-establish networks that can be beneficial in reconstructing their livelihoods, resources and opportunity constraints may impeded such initiatives. Hence, implementing agencies have a responsibility to use their institutional resources to help facilitate community reconstruction.

Additionally, another way to overcome community disarticulation may be through resettling affected people within the regional area in which they originate, to ensure that they retain their ethnic, language and, to some extent, religious orientation, as also recommended in Section 7.18.3 of the policy. However, this approach may have dual consequences in that, on the one hand, it can help affected people to retain their cultural capital, and enable them to reconstruct their dismantled social fabric. On the other hand, it can put more pressure on resources within the region, as more people will be compelled to rely on resources within a limited physical space. The latter was indicated earlier with reference to resettlement in the Katse Dam of the LHWP. The resettled people in the Katse Dam, in Thaba-Tseka, Lesotho, were resettled within their original region, and this put significant pressure on the natural resources in the region, leading to a revised policy provision in the subsequent Mohale Dam case, which allowed people to resettle to areas outside the region of the dam site (Thamae, 2006:78).

The experienced disruptions, defined along social and cultural lines such as religious beliefs, particularly in the studied Chandil case, where the majority were Hindu believers and tribal groups, are indicative of the socio-spatial relationship discussed in Chapter Three above (De Wet, 1995; 2015). As indicated in the discussion of the profile of the studied people in the Chandil Block in subsection 12.3.4, Hinduism has a strong link to the physical environment, with some trees and plants regarded as the abode of spirits (Dwivedi, 1990:4; King, et al., 1997:464; Swamy, et al., 2003:54). Also, livelihoods among tribal groups are strongly organised around the natural resources embedded in the physical environments. Hence, as the findings in the Chandil case study reveal – and the next subsection will also show – forced separation from the physical environment had culturally and socio-economically defined negative impacts on the lives of the affected people. In the next subsection, the discussion will focus on marginalisation as one of the risks of impoverishment, and what the efforts have been, towards overcoming this risk, as well as the outcomes reflected in the studied cases.

13.4.7 From marginalisation to social inclusion

Forced resettlement may subject affected people to the risk of marginalisation in the new settlements. There are a number of factors that can result in marginalisation, including the unwillingness of the hosts to share in the scarce local resources with the resettled people (Cernea, 2000:26; Reuveny, 2007:659). If appropriate and effective measures are not put in place by implementing agencies and other stakeholders to manage resources allocation between the parties involved, the resettled people may find themselves vulnerable and insecure in the new areas. Similar to the reconstruction of other non-material losses such as social disarticulation, marginalisation is often left as a responsibility of affected people to integrate themselves into the new areas (Cernea, 2000:40). Often this leads to incidents of conflicts over resources, and it can also inhibit the resettled people from recovering from their losses (Eguavoen and Tesfai, 2012:54; Reuveny, 2007:659).

In line with overcoming the risk of marginalisation, the JRRP-08 provides for the identification and allocation of resources such as land available in the new areas, that may be allocated for the purposes of resettlement and rehabilitation (State of Jharkhand, 2008: Section 6.11). This is aligned with the approach of the SMP to allocate pieces of land for the purpose of resettlement to the resettled people, based on, as rationalised by the SMP official, the availability of resources in the selected areas. However, catering for the needs of the affected, resettled people must not, on the other hand, compromise the rights and needs of host community members, as this can be a source of conflict between the old and incoming members (Reuveny, 2007:659). Hence, the policy specifies that the allocation of land for the purpose of accommodating and providing for the resettled people must not involve further displacement of the families already residing in the resettlement areas. (State of Jharkhand, 2008: Section 6.12).

At the time of fieldwork in 2016, the studied resettled communities in the Chandil Dam case were well into their third stage, in accordance with Scudder's FSF – which include community formation. Although incidents of conflict may be present throughout the life cycles of communities from generation to generation, conflicts between hosts and resettled members may subside over time, as communities transition into the third stage of Community Formation and Economic Development (Eguavoen and Tesfai, 2012:54). At this stage, members begin to find ways to negotiate resource distribution and sharing, and hence,

incidents of conflict over resources may decline to a point where they may no longer be apparent. Interviews and observations from the studied communities confirm this assertion. Incidents of conflict with hosts were reported to have occurred in the past, but respondents affirmed that, by and large, conciliation and mutual understanding had been established between the two groups – hosts and resettled members – over time. This is reflected in the excerpts below, representative of many respondents' opinions on the matter.

“We used to fight over water. They [the hosts] thought we have come here to take their resources, but now we live in peace. They have realised that when there is no water, it's not because of us, the government is the one that has to provide resources to the community, and they cannot blame it on us.”

“Now we live in peace, they are our neighbours; we even help each other...”

In Chotalakha, the land rent arrangement by the government which allows landless residents access to land is open to all members, the hosts and the resettled alike, as asserted by two of the resettled respondents. Although there were allegations of corruption and nepotism in the allocation of land in this context, such allegations could not be confirmed in this study. As shown earlier, it did become apparent that there were some of the host community members who had been getting access to land on a continuous basis over the years, despite that other respondents indicated that in some years, they did not get it because there is not enough land for all. However, that in itself could be a result of other unknown factors, and it is not directly indicative of corruption.

13.5 Conclusion

The implementation of resettlement policies is a complex, multi-dimensional process that requires sufficient time allocation, financial resources and collaborative efforts. However, these are the basic requirements which are often in short supply in the processes of policy implementation. Many resettlement projects are undertaken within constraint, and limited timelines, despite research having shown repeatedly that for resettlement processes to be successful, sufficient time must be allowed for baseline studies to be undertaken sufficiently, for initial construction of the necessary amenities to be put in place for resettled people, and for compensation processes to be undertaken in a comprehensive manner that does not erase

the losses of affected people at grassroots levels. In addition to the above-mentioned resources needed to undertake policy implementation constructively, the complexities of the social, economic and political context within which the policy implementation takes place must also be taken into cognisance in implementation processes.

In the explored Chandil Dam case, the time factor was one of the fundamental limitations that negatively affected the implementation of the applied policy. The project, and therefore, resettlement, was undertaken within a short space of time, which did not allow for comprehensive implementation of resettlement to be undertaken, and the next chapter will show. As the discussion in Chapter Fourteen will show, there was a four year gap between the approval of the project, and the launching of the project. This means that there was not enough time allocated for resettlement processes to be thoroughly planned and implemented in collaboration with affected people. This is despite that the project involved the resettlement a large number of people, in comparison to the Mohale Dam resettlement, for example.

As a result of the short time allocated for the project, and by extension, resettlement processes, the baseline study was undertaken insufficiently, which resulted in the omission of a number of people's losses, and under-accounting of the needed compensation. Although the SMP had implemented a new administrative system to improve their database, and to inform resettlement processes more comprehensively, the time that had already passed between the initial resettlement stage and the time the new administrative system was implemented, contributed to complexities in the implementation process.

The allocation of financial resources for resettlement has also been evidently minimal in the Chandil Dam case. This is evidenced by the inability of the implementing authority to provide compensation for affected people, such that some of the studied affected people indicated that they still had pending compensation. Although this may, on the other hand, serve as a form of financial security, in that the resettled people know that they still have some funds which are due to them, it has also contributed to the impoverishment and decline of living standards among the resettled people.

The complexities of the socio-economic context in which the implementation took place were also not incorporated effectively in the implementation processes. The formulated policy, in its current form, is sufficiently comprehensive in capturing major social and economic complexities of the local reality. However, the same level of comprehensiveness is not evidenced in implementation processes. The complexities of landownership and use were not

fully captured in the implementation, and some people were not compensated for their land and other assets, for which they could not prove ownership, even though such complexities with regard to landownership are well-known. However, this is also related to the changing policy instruments applied over time in the Chandil Dam resettlement, which means that the earlier implementation of resettlement processes did not incorporate some aspects of the current policy.

Complex issues of gender representation also fell between the gaps of social biases and dynamics. Women were not well represented in the implementation of rehabilitation strategies, such as in the fishing project in the dam site. Some women were deprived from benefiting equally in the compensation of their lost household assets, even though the policy provides for equal treatment of husbands and wives in compensation of lost assets.

However, the fundamental shortfall that continues to inhibit the reconstruction of livelihoods beyond resettlement, and hinders the improvement of living standards, is the scarcity of resources and opportunities in the new areas. In the studied Chandil Dam case, a lack of natural resources in the new areas, a lack of employment opportunities for the mostly unskilled resettled people, and their resultant exclusion from mainstream economic activities in the new areas, were some of the factors that affected the inability of the resettled people to recover from their losses. All these limitations indicate that the scope for the justification to forcefully resettle people is becoming narrower, with the apparent inability of implementing authorities to sufficiently recompense affected people for their lost assets and livelihoods, and to consequently improve living standards beyond resettlement. Hence, the requirement to minimise forced resettlement and to explore alternatives more comprehensively and transparently, is becoming more pertinent. Further arguments in later chapters will engage this issue in greater detail.

14 Chapter Fourteen: Participation in the Chandil Dam Resettlement

14.1 Introduction

Participation of affected people and other stakeholders in development processes has been identified by a wide range of research, as one of the key ingredients to successful development projects, including resettlement (Dwivedi, 1999:44; Narayan, 1995; Paktar, 1995:158; Prokopy, 2005). A lack of public participation in forced resettlement associated with large dam projects in India has been a common criticism from multiple writers and researchers; notably the Sardar Sarovar Dam along the Narmada river, which attracted criticisms for being non-participatory at worst, or only superficially engaging of affected people at best (Dwivedi, 1997a:6; Gupta, 2001:142; Paktar, 1995:158; Patel, 1995; Wood, 1993:979).

In development projects, participation of affected people is essential in ensuring the understanding of the different aspects of the projects by all involved stakeholders, to safeguard informed decision-making and implementation (Paktar, 1995:158; Wodajo, et al., 2014:10). Cornwall (2008:272) argues that, based on its multiple typologies, in practice, participation can be expressed in various ways, some of which are only superficial. These superficial forms may include what he terms “manipulative” and “passive” participation or consultation, where the affected people have no power to influence decision-making, and are only involved to be informed of what has already been decided (*ibid.*: 272). Contrary to these passive forms of participation, Cornwall argues that an interactive form of participation is the method that brings the affected people, together with other stakeholder, into a co-design, co-analysis and co-creation process of development projects (2008:272).

In forced resettlement in particular, active participation is required, partly, due to the negative impact resettlement has on affected people (Colchester, 1996: unpagged). Thus, in order to mitigate the negative effects in real terms, there has to be an appreciation of the extent of impact, and the most suitable ways to address the effects. Because the negative effects of forced resettlement are suffered by the most vulnerable group of all involved stakeholders, and also because of the forceful nature of involuntary resettlement, participation is not only a practical necessity, but also an ethical imperative.

Most importantly, to appreciate the impact of forced resettlement and displacement on affected people, participation of affected people must be incorporated from the very beginning of the project, and throughout all the different phases of the project (Cornwall,

2008:272). The challenge with forced resettlement, however, is that the planning of a development project takes place long before the affected people are informed that they would be resettled (Patwardhan, 2000:4; Scudder, 1993:130). Ordinarily, the initial planning stage of a resettlement-inducing development project takes place at the executive level, at which the people to be affected are not represented (Patwardhan, 2000:4; Scudder, 1993:130).

In this chapter, the discussion explores participation strategies employed in the studied Chandil Dam resettlement case. The discussion focuses on the participation of the primarily affected people and other stakeholders, particularly those at the local level. The chapter discusses participation in relation to planning, policy development, and resettlement and rehabilitation processes.

14.2 Participation in Options Assessment and Planning Processes

The options assessment feature of many resettlement policies, including those of the Asian Development Bank (1995: Section 34 (i) and (ii)), the Indian National Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy (2007), and the World Bank (2016:80), provides for an exploration of multiple options to providing resources and services, with an intention to minimise resettlement or to avoid it entirely. Hence, the potentially affected people – or their representatives – must be involved from the very beginning of the project, during the exploration of various, available options, to ensure transparency of processes, as stated in Section 1.4 of the Indian National Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy of 2007 (Government of India, 2007: Section 1.4).

However, the challenge is that in many projects, public participation at this initial stage is omitted, because oftentimes large dam projects are tied to political agendas at the national level (De Wet, 2006:187; Fahim, 1983:25; Pankhurst, 1992; Scudder, 2016:14). This was the case with the Mohale Dam project, as discussed earlier (LHDA, 1986; Mwangi, 2007:8; Thabane, 2000:634), and it was also the case with the Chandil Dam (Sharma, 2014:31; Topno, 2003:124). In this sense, the affected people were not actively involved in the initial decision-making processes about the Chandil Dam construction and its accompanying resettlement. The decision to construct dams under the banner of the SMP, of which the Chandil Dam is a part, was taken by the three involved states of Bihar, West Bengal, and Odisha in 1973, as an exclusive executive decision (Chadha, 1993:2194; Sharma, 2014:31; Topno, 2003:124).

Following the signing of the tripartite agreement in 1978, the project's initial construction phase started in 1982; and this heightened resistance from the people on the ground, which had begun in 1973 when the SMP project was conceived (Gupta and Mitra, 2004:434; Sharma, 2014:31; Topno, 2003:124). At the time, groups of potentially affected people opposed the construction of the dams under the SMP, demanding that the plan of the project that would induce forced resettlement and displacement, be abandoned altogether, as narrated by one of the activists who was involved at the time.

“This project was at the planning level in 1978. In 1973, the multipurpose project was approved. In 1978 there was a movement called “Anti-Dam”, led by a Forward Block Leader... After that it was moving like other movements, like the Satyagrah Movement: first dharna, then fasting. Then on 30th April 1978 the police arrived. Four people died in the firing. Two of them could not even be identified. Some people were injured. After that the movement's leader moved to Calcutta [known now as Kolkata] because the Forward Block headquarters were in Calcutta. He went there for help for this movement. But they explained to him that the dam construction was necessary for development ...”

The above narration is also confirmed in a number of research conducted on dam projects and displacement among the tribal people in India (see for example: Chadha, 1993:2196; Sharma, 2014:31). Despite the non-violent tactics – *dharna* and fasting – engaged by the people protesting against the construction of dams and forced resettlement under the SMP, protesters were met with police repression that saw four of them shot dead and several others wounded (Chadha, 1993:2196; Sharma, 2014:31). *Dharnas* are a commonly engaged form of resistance or protest against various kinds of perceived injustices across the Indian society. The construction of large dams under the banner of the Narmada Project, one of India's largest dam projects, has seen multiple protests, including *dharnas*, by the locals who opposed forced resettlement and displacement (Bose, 2004; Dwivedi, 1998; Gandhi, 2003:487; Turaga, 2000).

From the excerpt above, it is clear that the decision on the construction of the dams under the SMP, and the associated resettlement, was an exclusive process, in which the affected people on the ground could not be actively involved. The project was seen as a necessity for development, and the resistance on the ground was unsuccessful in preventing it from proceeding. The construction of the Chandil Dam began in 1982. Amidst construction work

in the multipurpose project, activists and other groups of affected people continued to resist resettlement, albeit peacefully – as they claim. An activist in one of the groups narrated:

“We have never antagonized anyone...But we have never compromised on our issues. We have faced our problems and looked them in the eye. We have never used murdabad slogan. We have adopted the Satyagrah attitude, a Gandhian philosophy in our approach and behavior. We believe in a democratic approach and treat people respectfully and do not violate them. We talk logically and with dignity.”

There is no evidence that there was a participatory options assessment prior to the construction of the SMP. In an interview with the village head from Chilgu, it became clear that, as far as he was concerned, the initial relations between the SMP and the potentially affected people were more strenuous than cordial.

“First, there was no participation, the people were just informed that the dam will be built, which means displacement...people want to know what they are benefiting from the dam...I can say to you, the SMP was not willing to engage with us, the people of this land...that is why the people resisted, people didn’t want the dam to be built. They knew that even if they are promised compensation, it was not enough, people also don’t get it on time, they knew.”

It seems that at the core of resistance from the affected people – beyond the unwillingness to leave their land and homes for the unknown – what compelled and exacerbated the protests, was the evident insufficiency of compensation that affected people were subjected to in other cases. Forced resettlement is, in itself, an inconvenient process for those directly affected, because it forces them out of their homes into the unknown. However, what aggravates the plight of affected people is inadequate measures to recover their losses after resettlement and in the long-term.

Participatory options assessment processes may be instrumental in facilitating an understanding between the involved parties, and may create a conducive environment for a consensus on the way forward. In such a context, where transparency is encouraged from the beginning, even when there are disagreements, there is a place for negotiation. Hence, grassroots resistance often signifies dissatisfaction on the part of the people on the ground, especially towards excluding development processes. Furthermore, in forced resettlement cases, the people to be affected are the ones with less decision-making power, and when resettlement processes are not undertaken in a participatory manner, it can create an

environment of mistrust between the implementing agencies and the primarily affected people. This can be manifested in grassroots resistance, as it occurred in the case of the SMP projects.

In the mid-1980s, the approach of some grassroots organisations shifted from resistance, to accepting that forced resettlement and displacement are inevitable, once the government has decided on the construction of the dam. Instead, groups such as the Visthapit Mukti Vahini (VMV) began advocating for the development of the resettlement and rehabilitation policy, which would ensure an improvement of compensation packages and the inclusion of rehabilitation for affected people in forced resettlement.

As Oliver-Smith (2010:47) argues, resistance by affected people on the ground may lead to either of the two outcomes; on the one hand, it can lead to repression and retaliation on the part of implementing agencies. On the other hand, it can lead to changes in the strategies and policies related to resettlement, towards more sustainable and socially responsible practices in development and its accompanying resettlement (ibid.:47). In the case of the SMP, the affected people did not succeed in preventing the construction of the dam, as was the initial plan of the Anti-Dam movement. However, this led to the change of their position and strategy, from that of resistance, to that of advocating for a more responsible resettlement approach, which led to the improvement of resettlement practice in the SMP, through policy development over time. The discussion below shows how the practice of resettlement was improved in the case of the SMP through policy development, and what the role of affected people was in policy development processes, in the Jharkhand State.

14.3 Participation in Policy Development Processes

Processes leading towards the development of the resettlement and rehabilitation policy in the Jharkhand State – then part of the State of Bihar – began in the mid-1980s, propelled by the advocacy of grassroots organisations and activist groups such as the VMV, Hazaribagh Andolan, and Netarhat Andolan. The VMV in particular, remains prominent in advocating for more developmental resettlement and rehabilitation in the region. This can be witnessed through the increased compensation packages in 1993, in 2003, and as recently as in 2012, advocated for by the VMV and other affected people (SRUTI, 2013). An interview with one of the leaders who has been active in advocating for better compensation and rehabilitation of affected people reveals:

“We started off engaging different stakeholders, the World Bank, the government, this was in 1987, after the World Bank formulated its first policy on displacement, we thought this is a good time for India to also have a policy.”

“In 2003, the package was revised, and then again in 2012. It is currently a 6.5 lakhs package.”

Prior to the formulation of the Indian national resettlement policy, resettlement in India had been undertaken mainly on the basis of the LAA of 1894 (Rew et al., 2000:60). The LAA has been heavily criticised for, among other issues, not fully capturing the local dynamics of the complex Indian society, and thus erasing the actual impact of forced resettlement and displacement on the affected, in particular, the *Adivasi*, who are the most affected groups (Asif, 1999:1566; Bijoy, 2003:58; Fernandes, 1998:2704; Ghatak and Ghosh, 2011; Morris and Pandey, 2007:2084; Parasuraman, 1999:41). Additionally, land acquisition for water resources and resettlement was informed by the National Water Policy of 1987, which was formulated to inform the designing of water resources management within the Indian society, as stipulated below in Section 1.4 of the said policy:

- “Even the planning and implementation of individual irrigation or multi-purpose projects, though done at the State level, involve a number of aspects and issues such as environmental protection, rehabilitation of project-affected people and livestock, public health consequences of water impoundment, dam safety, etc. On these matters common approaches and guidelines are necessary” (Government of India, 1987: Section 1.4).

On the basis of these and other instruments, implementing agencies formulated their own guidelines, which informed implementation processes in different contexts (Rew, et al., 2000:60). However, the evident insufficiencies of the instruments – or that of their implementation – compelled the development of a more comprehensive instrument to inform resettlement and rehabilitation of affected people across India. Upon the development of the World Bank policy on forced resettlement, grassroots level organisations, such as the VMV in the context of Jharkhand, and other groups of affected people, began to shift their agenda towards the development of a policy that would incorporate improved compensation and sustainable rehabilitation measures in all resettlement and displacement situations within the state. One member of the VMV indicates below:

“We realised that we are fighting a battle we are not going to win, we decided to change our approach. We said we must accept displacement, but they must increase compensation, and they should bring in rehabilitation. For that to happen we needed a policy.”

“We said we don’t want to oppose displacement, we want to work with the government for better compensation and for rehabilitation.”

At the beginning of their campaign, the VMV engaged *dharna* and fasting as their strategies of resistance. As narrated in an article by the Society for Rural, Urban and Tribal Initiative, the VMV occupied, on a weekly basis, the area to be submerged by the construction of the Chandil Dam, which over time became their mobilisation site (SRUTI, 2014: unpagged).

“First we started with dharna and fasting, then we realised that we have to improve our approach.

The difficulty with passive forms of protesting such as *dharna* and fasting is that they do not compel those from whom reparation is sought, to act on the demands of the protests, especially where there is no political will. In some cases this unresponsiveness may impel those who are feeling wronged or unfairly treated, to engage violent means to trigger some response. In the case of the VMV, however, alternative, active but non-violent strategies were engaged to intensify the campaign. However, after the change of strategy, the campaign was targeted at advocating for policy development and improved resettlement practice. A VMV member indicates below.

“Secondly, we bring in a campaign – whoever were the stakeholders: officials, government, World Bank – we address all of them. We made a presentation to World Bank, we made a presentation to government, a presentation to the Multipurpose Project officials. We contacted all segments. They responded positively and gave their full cooperation.”

“The media also cooperated with us, different movements of Jharkhand and nationwide movements. All the anti-displacement movements that were there, we proposed cooperation. It was accepted. Jharkhand Chandil Andolan: first time in the history of Jharkhand, different movements came together for the first time. Hazaribagh Andolan, Netarhat Andolan, etc.”

The VMV resorted to actively engaging with other stakeholders to advance their cause towards resettlement policy development within the Jharkhand State. They also engaged the media to spread their message and call upon other interested parties to join them in their quest for transformation in resettlement processes within the region. Parallel to the call for the development of the state policy, there were other similar campaigns at the national level, calling for the national resettlement and rehabilitation policy, as discussed earlier in Chapter eleven (Fernandes, 1998:2703; Mathur, 2011:29). In 1990, the government of Bihar announced the first version of the state's resettlement and rehabilitation policy (Chadha, 1993:2195).

“The policy which was started in 1987 got completed on December 7, 1990. It took three years to formulate the policy.”

Oftentimes when there is resistance or social action, local, contextual dynamics in a given setting may either facilitate or impede the activities and objectives of the initiative (Dwivedi, 1997b:24). In the case of Jharkhand, not only were the local people willing to advance their cause for more constructive resettlement and rehabilitation, but also the institutional support from a wide range of entities, helped to sustain the movement. Apart from the media support that the activist organisations enjoyed, the World Bank, through its personnel, and some senior officials from the government, were also sympathetic towards the cause of the development of a policy that would ensure transformation in forced resettlement. As a result, this multi-stakeholder support facilitated the advancement of a policy development process, as one of the leaders of a local organisation stated.

“At the time, there were government officials from the Bihar State, and some from World Bank, who were supportive to our movement...they managed to convince the government to develop a policy.”

Arguably, the development of the resettlement policy in the Jharkhand State was fairly participatory, involving the engagement of multiple stakeholders, particularly the affected people – or their representatives. Even though policy development may be a well-defined process which requires specific expertise, it also fundamentally requires a multi-stakeholder collaboration, because it applies to a wider societal context. As it has been argued throughout the thesis, the implementation of policies occurs within the wider social, economic, and political context. Hence, the success, or lack thereof, in achieving the intended objectives, is largely dependent on the context within which implementation takes place. In this regard, the

involvement of not only the experts and officials, but also a wide range of stakeholders, including the people at grassroots level, is a key factor in designing relevant, applicable policies.

As asserted by Agarwal and Somanathan (2005:8), good policy making involves the engagement of up-to-date, relevant information regarding the subject matter and the way it affects the people on the ground. In this sense, up-to-date, grassroots level research is needed to inform the design of policies, on the basis of the real impact felt on the ground. The voices of affected people – the resettled people in this case – must form the basis which directs the design of policies.

Resettlement and rehabilitation policy development in the Jharkhand state was evidently informed by the evidence on the specific consequences of forced resettlement and displacement on those forced out from their homes to new, unfamiliar places. There are a number of policy features, many of which were discussed in the previous chapter, which reflect that the complexities of tribal communities, and how they are affected in specific ways by displacement, were taken into cognisance when the policy was developed. Different policy provisions were incorporated at different stages of the policy development, as further conversations were had between stakeholders, and amendments incorporated in the various versions of the policy. The investigated, recent version of the policy was informed by the national policy; however, state governments are responsible for designing more detailed versions of the policies for implementation purposes. The policy of the State of Jharkhand is a result of both the broader framework at the national level, and insights at grassroots level, which informed certain aspects of the policy, as reflected below.

Issues of land use, ownership and access, which are quite complex in tribal communities, are provided for in the policy to incorporate traditional and customary rights of affected people. Section 7.3 of the JRRP-08, makes provision for resettled families who live below the poverty line, with no homestead land, but who may have had access to a home through other social arrangements, to be compensated. Community ties and social arrangements are disrupted when people are forcibly moved; hence, provisions are necessary to mitigate forms of impoverishment that may result from the disruption. However, the application of this policy provision, as discussed in Subsection 13.4.1 above, was limited by the prescribed long timeframe, based on which affected people may be eligible for compensation under Section 7.3 of the policy.

As also stated by one of the leaders of the VMV, who partook in the presentations and conversations between activist organisations and stakeholders such as the government and the World Bank, issues of land were fundamental in their advocacy of a policy with improved compensation and rehabilitation.

“Land-for-land, house-for-house issues were raised...people said if the government is taking our land, will they give it back to us? At the World Bank level, it was less of a challenge, but with some of the other stakeholders, the government, we had a lot of difficulty. But after some differences, they understood what we meant. They realized that we are also nagriks (citizens) of this nation.”

Issues of gender bias and exclusion, which are prevalent within tribal communities as discussed earlier, were also taken into account in the policy. Section 7.7 of the policy prescribes an equal treatment of husbands and wives in the implementation of compensation for lost assets and resources. However, as discussed earlier, the application of this policy clause is in some cases inhibited by socio-cultural dynamics on the ground. An example is the case discussed in subsection 13.4.1, where a man, as the head of the household, made a decision for the family to get cash compensation for the house, which the wife indicated that he mainly used for his personal pleasure, such as drinking and gambling. In that case, the wife did not share equally in the compensation of the lost house.

Specific forms of livelihood of the affected people were also incorporated in the policy. The rehabilitation package, in accordance with lost livelihoods, provides for training, employment, and other economic opportunities, such as fishing and small enterprise development. These are all informed by the livelihoods sustained by affected people, such as traditional fishing, natural resources, etc., which all get disrupted in forced resettlement situations.

Hence, the JRRP-08 provides for specific means of livelihoods re-establishment. Sections 7.10 and 7.11.1 set out detailed means of livelihoods that should be restored and/or created for affected people in the new areas. These include employment opportunities, compensation for lost small businesses, technical or vocational training, provision of scholarships, as well as fishing opportunities in the constructed dam. The challenges associated with the implementation of these policy provisions are discussed in Chapter Thirteen above. As one of the activists indicated, issues of livelihoods re-established were raised.

“Another issue we raised was [regarding] the natural resources which are available...the issue was concerning water and its resources. We said fisheries and tourism should be encouraged. Also, we said people need training...”

The active participation of affected people displayed in the Chandil case has, largely, been facilitated by two factors; first is the apparent culture of activism by civil society organisations, which has been demonstrated in many other cases across the Indian context, as discussed earlier in Chapter Eleven. Second, specifically in the studied case of Chandil, the space for participation in policy development was created by, as one activist respondent indicated, the empathy shown by some relevant officials, and willingness to incorporate input from affected people on the part of implementing authorities.

14.4 Participation in Resettlement and Rehabilitation Processes

Once the decision to resettle people in a particular area as a result of a development project has been taken, on the basis of the Social Impact Assessment (SIA) to be undertaken before any of the resettlement processes commence, the adopted state policy provides that a declaration must be published within fifteen days post the approval of the SIA (State of Jharkhand, 2008: Section 6.1). The declaration shall be issued when one hundred or more households to be potentially affected have been identified, and it shall be undertaken in a manner described in Section 6.2 below.

- “Every declaration made under paragraph 6.1 of the policy shall be published in at least three daily newspapers, two of which shall be in Hindi, having circulation in villages or areas which are likely to be affected, and also by drum beating & affixing a copy of the order on the notice board of the concerned *gram panchayats* or municipalities and other prominent place or places in the *Gram Sabha* and Panchayat Offices of the affected area and the resettlement area, and by any other method as may be prescribed in this regard by the State Government” (State of Jharkhand, 2008: Section 6.2).

As shown above, the first version of the state policy was released in 1990, when some groups among the affected people in the studied Chandil case had already been resettled. Although some people were resettled after the first policy was released in 1990, the plans for resettlement were already underway, with the construction of the dam having commenced in 1982, and the resettlement process already past its initial declaration stage. As a result, there is no evidence of the declaration provided for as per Section 6.1 of the policy.

After the declaration is published, the policy provides that the baseline study be undertaken, to gather all the information that can give a clear picture on what the extent of the impact identified during the SIA will be. The participation of affected people in this regard is highly pertinent, because the created understanding of the potential impact of the project at this stage has a significant influence on the manner in which subsequent resettlement and rehabilitation process are undertaken, and by extension, the extent to which the losses suffered to forced resettlement will be restored.

- “Once the declaration is made under paragraph 6.1 of the policy, the Administrator for resettlement and rehabilitation shall undertake a baseline survey and census for identification of the persons and families likely to be affected” (State of Jharkhand, 2008: Section 6.3).

The baseline survey includes social and demographic information of affected families, all the assets due to be lost to forced resettlement, and the means of livelihood which the people will lose due to resettlement (State of Jharkhand, 2008: Section 6.4). This is to ensure that there is transparency in resettlement processes, and that affected people are aware of all the losses they will be compensated for. However, while the survey was undertaken in the studied cases, it was not undertaken in accordance with the current policy, but in accordance with the guidelines designed by the SMP on the basis of the LAA of 1894.

The LAA, as indicated earlier, was criticised for its inadequate provision for the local dynamics on the ground. As a result, some of the losses suffered by the people were omitted due to the inadequacy of the instrument and guidelines used. A significant example is how land use, access and ownership dynamics were omitted, leading to deprived compensation for the loss of fundamental assets such as land. Although issues of landownership were revised in the development of the current policy, the inadequacy of the baseline survey impacted on the ability of the implementing authorities to capture all omissions of the past, as reflected in an excerpt below from an interview with an SMP officer.

“When land revision was done, they said they have bhoodan land, but it is not there in the survey, it is difficult to prove...”

As a result, landownership through arrangements such as *bhoodan* land was not recognised, and compensation due discarded on the basis of inadequate records from the baseline study. Even with the current policy in place, the affected people had no recourse for their

grievances, as a long time had passed, and there was evidently not enough information in the records to support their claims. In the studied 80 households, 26 respondents indicated that no compensation was offered for their lost land, some due to disagreements with the implementing authorities, on the legitimacy of their ownership of land. The significance of baseline studies is such that they inform the decisions to be made in the pursuit of restoring livelihoods. Thus, the inadequacy of data, when baseline studies are non-transparent and non-participatory, will always lead to the under-accounting for and under-compensation for losses, because baseline surveys are the basis upon which people are compensated.

As a way of making up for the insufficiency of data from the baseline study undertaken in the context of an inadequate instrument – the LAA – and to ensure transparency in compensation processes, the SMP implemented a new administrative or monitoring system, as discussed in the previous chapter. However, because this process of database management and monitoring is being undertaken years after the physical resettlement, the immediate issue is the reliability of the information collected, on the basis of which people will either be compensated or not compensated.

To facilitate this new process of data collection and record keeping, there is a committee that works with the families to monitor the implementation of compensation. The committee consists of the Land Officer and the Additional Director in the SMP, *Mukhiya* (the village head), and family representatives, as narrated by one SMP official quoted below.

“There is one committee, I am the Additional Director, we call a meeting with the family. In the meeting we call the officers, including the Land Officer, with the whole file. We then update the file. The Adhikari (Officer) will update us further. Then we get the full report on the person and we take a decision that such-and-such persons should get the Vikas Pustika. The Vikas Pustika has two parts: the original is with the villager, and the duplicate is maintained in our office. That is called Master Card. We keep the Master Card in our office so that we can verify all the facts.”

In this context, the committee wields power to decide whether or not the family deserves compensation, and due to the time which has already passed, the reliability of the information generated from this process, and therefore the decisions taken on the basis of that information, might be compromised. Fundamentally, based on the time factor, this process, regardless of how well executed it may be, is somewhat already limited.

To facilitate resettlement and rehabilitation processes, the structures of engagement between affected communities and the SMP are decentralised. Thus, the dissemination of information from the SMP to the people is done through local structures. Hence, the policy provides that the resettlement areas be incorporated into the established local structures, i.e. *gram panchayat* or municipality (State of Jharkhand, 2008: Section 7.19.4). The Indian local government structure is outlined below.

The Indian local government structure in rural areas can be outlined in three tiers, with the bottom level being the citizens within a specified area;

- i) A *Gram Sabha*, which is the assembly of community members, 18 years and above, in a given *Panchayat*, an area constituting a population of 1500 people or more;
- ii) A *Gram Panchayat*, which is an executive at the *Panchayat* level, elected by the *Gram Sabha*, and which serves for a five- year term at a time. The *Gram Panchayat* is responsible for the implementation of development programmes within the *panchayat*. The *Gram Panchayat* has a secretary, elected by government, responsible for the administration of development programmes, including calling the *Gram Sabha*, keeping records of meetings and communicating with relevant stakeholders on behalf of the *Panchayat*.
- iii) A *Panchayat Samiti*, or Block *Panchayat*, responsible for maintaining contact with the *Gram Sabha* through the *Gram Panchayat*. *Panchayat Samiti* consists of both government officials and non-official members.
- iv) Then a *Zila Panchayat*, or District *Panchayat*, which is an executive body consisting of representatives from the *Panchayat Samiti*, the state legislature and the members of parliament (Shodhganga, 2017).

The individual villages, some of which are *panchayats* in themselves, each has a village head, *Mukhiya*, who is an elected member and part of the *Gram Panchayat*, the executive body of the *Panchayat*. In areas where the villages constitute smaller populations, a *panchayat* may comprise more than one village (Shodhganga, 2017).




Figure 14.1 The Indian decentralised local government structure

Source: <https://www.researchgate.net/profile>

In accordance with the JRRP-08, the affected communities – inclusive of the resettled people and the hosts – who form a *Gram Sabha*, shall be involved in the resettlement and rehabilitation processes, as stated in Section 6.15.1 below.

- “The draft rehabilitation and resettlement scheme or plan shall also be discussed in *gram sabhas* in rural areas, and in public hearings in urban and rural areas where *gram sabhas* do not exist” (State of Jharkhand, 2008: Section 6.15.1).

In this sense, the affected communities get to direct and influence decisions made at the *Panchayat* level, as well as to monitor the implementation of development programmes through the *Gram Sabha*. However, the situation on the ground does not reflect this level of engagement or influence. Some community members were of the impression that the meetings of the *Gram Sabha* were mainly to distribute information to them, not to allow them to influence decisions made, as one respondent indicated, quoted below.

“We go to meetings, but we are not the ones who make decisions, Mukhiya, Gram Panchayat – they make decisions, government makes decisions.”

As indicated earlier, this form of engagement is not an active but a passive form, which only involves affected people to inform them of decisions already made (Cornwall, 2008:272). Although information distribution through community gatherings may, in some cases, be

considered as participation, many writers have argued that, in effect, convening community gatherings is merely consultation, which involves engaging affected people to get information on specific issues already decided by the implementing authorities (Cornwall, 2008:272; Paktar, 1995:158). That is, the agenda is designed and controlled by the implementing authorities, and not in collaboration with affected people.

As Paktar (1995:158) states, in a statement regarding participation of affected people in the Narmada project, participation cannot be claimed where people were not able to influence the decisions made in relation to the project that affects them. Even information distribution has to be done in a manner that is relatable and understandable to affected groups of people. Public gatherings in themselves do not constitute participation, particularly if not conducted in a manner that is meaningful to the people on the ground.

“Come to the village and in our language give us information, show us maps, everything that you have, and thereafter discuss all the issues...” (Paktar, 1995:158).

While in the above stated policy clause, i.e. Section 6.15.1, provision is made for resettlement plans to be discussed with the *Gram Sabha* and in public hearings, there seems to be little evidence to suggest that, at grassroots level, people were able to influence decisions that affected them. During the pre-resettlement phase, the SMP officials held public gatherings with affected people, to communicate the plans of the government and other issues related to resettlement. But some resettled respondents assert that the meetings were mainly to tell them what the government had already decided, and not to get input from them.

“They didn’t listen to us...we said we don’t want displacement, but the government said we are moving...we said we want compensation for everything we lost, they didn’t give us compensation for trees, for our bhoodan land...”

Some respondents in the studied cases indicated that they decided to boycott the meetings, not only because they did not find them meaningful, but also because of the inconvenience that came with the long distances they had to travel to the venues. Participatory measures are more meaningful when designed to suit the people from whom engagement is sought. That is, in a manner that is convenient to them, including the venues at which engagement meetings are held, and having the political will to allow them to influence the direction of the initiatives.

Additionally, holding small group meetings within the villages may be more engaging than having a big public gathering at a *Gram Sabha*, as prescribed in Section 6.15.1 of the policy, quoted above. Some people may feel less inclined to engage in discussions when in a big gathering, where there are many people with a wide range of differing opinions. Thus, the space created in a big forum may not necessarily encourage active engagement of affected people, whereas in a small forum, discussions may be more contained and more robust. Hence, to maximise information generation and to cultivate engagement with affected people, participation undertaken in stages and at different levels, from small groups to bigger forums, may be more effective than only engaging affected people at a wider community gathering.

Participation of affected people is a fundamental factor in enabling the success of forced resettlement processes. While this is widely acknowledged, many resettlement projects continue to reflect a lack of active participation by the primarily affected people in resettlement processes. At best, consultation mechanisms are engaged, mainly as platforms for information distribution to affected people, which in itself is inadequate to be considered as participation. There are multiple factors that inhibit active participatory measures through the different phases of resettlement, from policy development, options assessment, planning, and through to implementation.

Participation of the ordinary people in policy development may be inhibited by the perception that policy is an exclusive process, only applicable to experts and officials. Because policies are instruments whose legitimacy, and therefore, applicability, are determined by the expertise and authority of those designing them, the involvement of the ordinary people may be easily omitted, even though they are the ones who experience the direct impact of the policy (Agarwal and Somanathan, 2005:9). Agarwal and Somanathan argue that, although in policy making, legitimacy may be constrained to legal or procedural authority and formal qualifications possessed by those designing a policy, in effect, the involvement of those primarily affected is critical to the legitimacy of policy (2005:9). This is because a policy designed through the minds of affected people is most likely more informed and, therefore, more relevant than a policy whose formulation processes excluded the targeted people.

Although, as indicated earlier in the above subsection, the participation of grassroots organisations in policy development in the Jharkhand State was enabled by the willingness of relevant government institutions to engage the people on the ground, and incorporate their voices, the same level of engagement was not evident in options assessment and planning

processes. In options assessment and planning activities, a lack of political will is more likely to impede the participation of affected people. The difficulty with development projects that may induce resettlement is that they are often not open to approval by the public, particularly if the authorities consider it to be in the interests of the public. As a result, the participation of affected people in options assessment is fundamentally limited, even if resettlement policies provide for it. Ultimately, governments and/or other implementing agencies must be willing to abandon development projects, when alternative means of providing the same resources or services are identified. Also, they must be willing to undertake options assessment in a transparent, participatory manner.

However, the reality of many cases is that, even where there are options, political will is often not present. The construction of the SMP's Icha Dam in Jharkhand is a typical example, where reports show that the initial feasibility study revealed that there were possible alternatives to the construction of the dam (Khagram, 2004:52). In addition, multiple reports by both local and international research institutions revealed that the social, economic, and environmental context in which the Icha Dam would be constructed, would not support efficient resettlement and rehabilitation (ibid.:52). Yet, the state government made an executive decision to proceed with the dam construction nonetheless. Similarly, participation in resettlement and rehabilitation processes may be inhibited by a wide range of factors from a lack of political will, a lack of institutional capacity, a lack of financial and material resources, limited time allocated for the development project, which, by extension, affects resettlement timelines.

14.5 Conclusion

Participation of affected people in this case was not undertaken in a comprehensive manner. The resettled people were not actively engaged during the planning of the project. The level of engagement with affected people during the initial stages of resettlement was of a consultative manner, with the affected people not being able to influence the major decisions that affected them. While the affected people were allowed to influence certain decisions such as where they were resettled to, and the kinds of compensation they wanted, this was undertaken in a constrained, conditional manner. The two options, i.e. between the areas to move to and the type of compensation were, in effect, conditioned by each other. Hence, a choice of one determined the other.

However, the affected people, and other local stakeholders, were actively involved in policy development processes. In fact, the development of the resettlement policy was, in part, initiated by the affected people on the ground, through various local organisations. Moreover, the affected people, through their representatives, were able to influence some compensation packages and rehabilitation measures. This had a significant impact in enabling the improvement of compensation and relevant rehabilitation measures in the case of Chandil, after the development of the State's resettlement policy, and later on, of the national policy, which informed further improvement of the Jharkhand State resettlement policy.

In the next chapter, comparisons between the two studied cases are discussed. The discussions will be centred on the development of the policies in the two contexts, some key features of the two applied policies, and the manner in which these key features were implemented, as well as some policy dimensions that are transferrable from the Indian policy context to the Lesotho context.

15 Chapter Fifteen: The Outcomes of Policies: the Lesotho-Indian Comparison

15.1 Introduction

Chapters Nine, Ten, Thirteen and Fourteen of this thesis have presented and discussed the findings of the empirical research, in relation to resettlement and rehabilitation policies applicable in each of the two studied cases, i.e. the Mohale Dam in Lesotho and the Chandil Dam in Jharkhand, India. The policies were discussed on the basis of their implementation and how they have managed – and to what extent – to mitigate the inherent risks of impoverishment in each context. This chapter forms a discussion that aims to compare and contrast policy features in the two cases, and how they have been implemented. Specific policy features to be explored are those that attempt to mitigate the inherent risks of impoverishment, through the application of compensation and rehabilitation measures as parts of the resettlement process at large, in accordance with the discussions in chapters Nine, Ten, Thirteen and Fourteen.

In accordance with the objectives of the study, the chapter will also explore policy dimensions and contexts which are transferable from the Indian to the Lesotho contexts. As an overarching goal of this thesis, it aims to provide the basis for developing a framework for a comprehensive national resettlement policy in Lesotho, and potentially in other Southern African countries. In this chapter, therefore, applicable policy dimensions and contextual dynamics in the Indian case will be explored, with regard to their applicability in the Lesotho context. The basis for policy development in the Lesotho context is supported by the experience of India, and will be discussed in Chapter Sixteen below, although certain aspects of the Indian policy approach may not be applicable in the Lesotho context.

The two studied cases present very different dimensions, one with a large-scale resettlement – involving a large number of people – and the other with a much smaller number of people. They also have both similar and varying elements in relation to the complexities related to policy implementation and outcomes. Hence, both the similarities and variations will be used as the bases to compare and contrast policy dimensions, implementation processes, as well as outcomes.

15.2 Compensation for Lost Assets

Some notable compensation features in the two studied cases include compensation for houses and land. On housing compensation, in both cases the policies provide for house reconstruction for affected people in the new areas, as also recommended in Cernea's IRR model (Cernea, 2000:38). However, in the case of Chandil, house reconstruction was conditional upon the families moving to allocated plots in a specific area, in which case if the family chose to move to a different area, they would be given cash compensation instead. Whereas in the case of Mohale, the affected people were constructed houses of equal square footage as their previous ones, irrespective of where they chose to resettle. In this regard, in the Chandil case, the manner in which the policy provision on house compensation was implemented, resulted in some shortcomings in preventing homelessness or declined housing conditions, particularly at the initial stages of resettlement. Some of the studied resettled people in the Chandil case could not afford to build houses immediately after physical relocation, and many could not afford houses of the same size.

The inability of affected people in the Chandil case to reconstruct houses immediately after physical relocation was related to some of the limitations of cash compensation offered to over 50% of the resettled people. The limitations of cash compensation were discussed in greater detail in Chapter Six. Specifically in the case of Chandil, the limitations included delayed compensation, and denied compensation in other cases. About one-third of the studied households indicated that they had not received compensation, neither for housing nor for land.

Due to pre-existing complexities applicable in tribal areas, some of the resettled people in this case did not have legally recognisable land rights, and were, thus, excluded from compensation. Earlier discussed land holding complexities in tribal areas, such as an arrangement of *bhoodan* land applied in this case. The resettled people who earlier owned land through *bhoodan* land had not received compensation for their lost land at the time of fieldwork. Between 1985 and 1990, when just less than half of the studied households were moved, resettlement was undertaken on the basis of the LAA, which, as shown earlier, often led to the erasure of losses suffered by many people with customary land rights in resettlement cases, due to the use of strict legal approaches to determine those who were worthy of compensation (Fisher, 1995:31; Morse and Berger, 1992:19; Routledge, 2003:247). However, even in the context of the applied state policy, there were still other dynamics that affected the inclusion of resettled people with no legal claim to land in compensation; notably

the earlier mentioned minimum timeframe requirement. The families who lived below the poverty line were eligible for housing compensation even if they did not own one before, provided they had live in the area for a continuous period of no less than 30 years in scheduled areas, or 15 years in non-scheduled areas (State of Jharkhand, 2008: Section 7.3). This timeframe led to the exclusion of some people, who fell outside the said timeframe.

Delayed compensation also resulted in many people being unable to afford house reconstruction, or reconstruction of the same size and quality of houses, at the time of physical relocation. Just over 25% of the studied households showed that they had received all their compensation for houses and/or land at the time of fieldwork, while about 40% were still awaiting their pending portions of compensation. The portions of the amounts pending ranged from 20% to 50%. The choice of cash compensation in the case of Chandil over house reconstruction, was informed by various circumstances under which the resettled people were moved. Before the implementation of the state's policy, people who were resettled on the basis of the LAA, were generally given cash compensation as a standard form of compensation, valued through market-related approaches (Fernandes, 1998:2704; Ghatak and Ghosh, 2011:66; Ghatak, et al., 2013:10). In the context of the Jharkhand state's policy – throughout the different phases of the policy – the choice of house compensation was limited by the condition of homestead land allocation, as stated above and discussed earlier.

Part of the reason for allocating residential plots to groups of people in specific areas was to enable the resettled people to be moved in groups, to sustain existing social and community ties, which is another provision of the policy (State of Jharkhand, 2008: Section 6.10). While this was informed by the evident and well-known effects of forced resettlement on dismantling existing social networks and communities (Cernea, 2000:40; Downing, 1996; Tabucanon, 2012:9; Witter and Satterfield, 2014:1395), the outcomes of the policy reflect that resettlement is a complex process which does not always follow a predictable path. Some resettled people had other priorities than those of maintaining existing community ties through resettling with their old neighbours in the allocated plots.

The reasons for the affected people to choose areas different from the ones they had been allocated varied, from wanting to move in with or closer to their families, to wanting to be closer to the city or areas with perceived better economic and employment opportunities. Hence, the condition given for people to either go to the allocated areas or be given cash compensation, coupled with other priorities that people had when making the choices for

resettlement areas, impeded the implementation of asset-based house compensation. This confirms De Wet's argument that resettlement is a complex process which, in some cases, appears to be "potentially not amenable" to technical planning (2006:187; 2015:88). This is because, although the general effects of resettlement are known, people do not always respond in the same way to the processes of resettlement. Thus, De Wet (2006:199) recommends that the complexities of resettlement be taken into consideration in policy design and implementation. In the case of Chandil, with regard to the implementation of housing compensation, such complexities of resettlement were not taken into account, which compromised the efforts to overcoming the risk of homelessness or declined housing conditions – at least at the initial stages of resettlement.

The manner in which the house compensation policy feature was implemented in the Mohale case was one that factored in complexities. The resettled people were all constructed new houses in the areas of resettlement, irrespective of where they chose to be resettled. This was partly informed by the previous experience of the LHDA, where it was found that confining the resettled people within their locale, put pressure on resources in the region, and limited the availability of opportunities for development as a result (Scudder, 2006:78). Furthermore, this catered for other factors, based on which the resettled people would prefer various areas of resettlement.

In this regard, the risk of homelessness or declined housing conditions, which often result when cash compensation is offered for lost houses, was sufficiently prevented in the Mohale resettlement case. Hence, all things considered, the reconstruction of houses was implemented more sufficiently in the case of Mohale in comparison to the case of Chandil.

However, despite initial homelessness and declined housing conditions among the resettled in the context of Chandil, the studied households – with the exception of one – had been able to reconstruct and improve the quality of their houses over the years. Cernea (2000:39) asserts that, based on empirical research in other cases, the resettled people often manage to rebuild their lost houses over time, even if they are not able to do so initially. Even in cases where the allocated cash compensation is insufficient to reconstruct houses, people use compensation for other assets to rebuild houses after resettlement (*ibid.*:39). This is partly because shelter is one of the basic and fundamental assets, and as Cernea (2000:25) argues, in many cultures a house is not only a place of living, but it also has some cultural significance. It is a place in which people practice their rituals and it serves to affirm a sense of belonging and identity.

Hence, people often prioritise house reconstruction over and above accumulating other assets (Cernea, 2000:39). In this sense, house reconstruction is comparatively less complicated to achieve than to recover other losses, such as land and common property resources, which may be out of the control of both the implementing agencies and affected people; and this is applicable in both the Mohale and the Chandil cases.

The restoration of land in both cases faced similar complexities of scarcity. However, in the case of Chandil, in one village there was evidence of an alternative for people who did not own land to have access to it – the leasing of government-owned land. Although this did not guarantee that every household resettled into that area would receive a piece of land, as the allocation of land was said to be based on a first-come first-served basis, and the arrangement was also temporary, the arrangement still presented an opportunity for some people to have access to land. Whereas, in the case of Mohale, no alternatives were available in this regard. Even in cases where people resorted to sharecropping as an alternative, a variety of shortfalls were encountered, from the high cost of land cultivation in some of the new areas, to fragmented relations between the landless sharecroppers and their landed partners, due to broken promises and other misunderstandings.

In order to mitigate the inevitable decline of the standards of living during the transitional stage two of resettlement, a remarkable policy feature in the Mohale case provided for what is referred to as a disturbance allowance, especially for landless resettlers (LHDA, 1997: Section 13.2). Although this policy feature is also present in the Chandil case, in a form of a subsistence allowance, the manner in which it was implemented in the Chandil case was seemingly inadequate, such that there was no evidence from any of the studied households that they had benefited from it. Conversely, the manner in which it was implemented in the Mohale case was effective in cushioning the resettled people, during their transition into the new areas. However, because this was a temporary measure which was meant to assist affected people at the initial stage, some of the resettled people fell back into declined living standards as soon as the annual disturbance allowances depleted. Although the implementation of this policy aspect was on a longer-term basis than the policy provides for – the policy provides for three years but evidence suggests that the allowances were provided annually for ten years – in the absence of other development opportunities, it could not provide for the re-establishment of livelihood in a long-term.

According to Scudder (2005:34), based on research on fifty dam cases around the world, on average, the transitional stage two lasts for a minimum of five years up to ten years; in some cases even longer. Hence, the disturbance allowance was terminated around the time when the resettled people would be expected, according to Scudder's stage framework, to start exploring other economic development opportunities. However, as Scudder (2009:41) also argues, the success of stage three, that of Community Formation and Economic Development, is not only dependent on the behaviour and response of affected people, but also on the availability of opportunities in the resettlement or surrounding areas. In both the cases of Mohale and Chandil, a lack of economic opportunities deterred economic development among the majority of resettled people.

While the disturbance allowance appears to have made a difference between the two cases, in that the resettled people in the Mohale case were cushioned by the allowances during the transitional stage – an advantage which the people in Chandil evidently did not have – in the long-term the standards of living declined among the majority in both cases. In addition, the decline of living conditions was a result of the inability of resettled people, in both cases, to recover from the loss of common property resources.

Notwithstanding, although the majority of resettled people demonstrated declined living conditions in both cases, due to a lack of resources and opportunities, there were other people who had taken advantage of available opportunities outside their initial resettlement areas, particularly in the case of Mohale. Furthermore, in the case of Chandil, there were people who benefited from rehabilitation measures in the dam site. The discussions on rehabilitation below revealed this in detail, showing some key policy elements, which may be transferable from the Indian to the Lesotho context.

15.3 Rehabilitation beyond Physical Relocation

Rehabilitation measures in the two cases were meant to counter the effects of the loss of common property resources and other community assets, on which the livelihoods of affected people were partly predicated. This was done through the establishment of alternative forms of livelihoods for affected people in the new areas. However, different strategies were adopted towards the attainment of this goal in the two cases; one with more long-term and sustainable dimensions, and the other with high risk, short-term elements.

In the case of Lesotho, rehabilitation measures involved the establishment of small income generating and community infrastructure development programmes. The limitations in this

regard included the context in which the projects were implemented, which did not have adequate economic activities to support the sustainability of the income generating projects in question. Other limitations were a lack of management skills on the part of affected community members, who were responsible for implementation processes, as well as a lack of ongoing oversight on the part of the implementing agency – the LHDA. In addition, community infrastructure development programmes, as important as they are, could not provide the needed income to support the re-establishment of livelihoods. As a result, the outcomes of rehabilitation strategies in the case of Mohale reflected significant shortfalls and the failure to re-establish livelihoods in a sustainable manner.

Conversely, the approach to rehabilitation in the case of Chandil included benefit-sharing, through the granting of fishing rights, as well as financial and technical support to affected people to undertake commercial fishing in the dam site. As argued earlier in Chapter Six, benefit-sharing presents an effective way of re-establishing livelihoods among affected people after resettlement (Cernea, 2009; Egge, et al., 2008; Van Wicklin, 1999). This involves taking advantage of the direct benefits generated by the development project to support the living of affected people. Moreover, the rehabilitation programme was undertaken with a collaborative approach involving government institutions, the private sector, and affected people. An ongoing oversight at different levels of implementation also created favourable conditions for the sustainability of the programme. Consequently, this rehabilitation programme provided sustainable means of livelihood for some affected people in the Chandil case.

In addition to benefit-sharing, rehabilitation measures in the Chandil case included other long-term plans such as employment, and technical and professional training to improve the capacity of affected people, enabling them to potentially participate in the wider labour market. However, because the implementation of resettlement processes is often influenced by pre-existing economic conditions in the wider context, these conditions may either facilitate or impede effective implementation of resettlement processes. In the case of Chandil, the implementation of employment and training as measures of rehabilitation was undertaken in an inadequate manner, due to unfavourable conditions in the wider economic context. These unfavourable conditions included a lack of opportunities and a lack of skills among affected people.

As shown in Chapter Thirteen, the resettled people were mainly the scheduled groups, with predominantly low levels of education and formal skills. To partake in the training programme, affected people ought to have a secondary qualification, as the minimum requirement for the selected professional and technical training courses. However, in the context where educational levels were low, many were not eligible to partake in the training programme, and therefore, could not benefit from this rehabilitation measure. Furthermore, even among those who benefited from the training programme, employment opportunities were scarce. As the findings from this study showed, none of those in the studied households who completed the training courses had been able to subsequently secure employment at the time of fieldwork in 2016. This was partly owing to a lack of employment opportunities in the region. As the statistics of the Chandil area from the Census report show, over 50% of the population in the region are unemployed, 30% are casually employed, while only 20% are fully employed (Government of India, 2011). As a result, contrary to benefit-sharing, these two forms of rehabilitation – employment and training – were insufficiently undertaken. Of the 13,000 households affected by the Chandil Dam, 1,200 (less than 10%) benefited from employment facilitated by the implementing agency, while only 279 benefited from the training programme, as reflected in the official documents of the SMP (2016).

The benefit-sharing programme in the Chandil dam site was successful in providing sustainable livelihoods for some of the affected people. Contrary to the implemented projects in the Mohale case, the projects in the Chandil case – the fishing and boating projects in the dam site – were low risk, and were based on pre-existing resources; water resources in the dam area. The boating project is even lower risk because it does not involve high operational costs; and because the dam site is one of the popular tourist attraction sites in the region, the boating project has a potential for sustainability.

According to the Indian Department of Animal Husbandry, Dairying and Fisheries, cage fishing presents “new opportunities for optimising fish production from reservoirs and lakes”, and thus increasing the potential for higher earnings (Government of India, 2016:1). Because cage fishing, which is adopted in the case of Chandil benefit-sharing programme, has high capital costs, the government subsidized initial costs as a strategy for rehabilitating affected people. In addition, unlike in the case of Lesotho, where the implemented income generating projects were inhibited by market limitations, as they were implemented in small rural and peri-urban regions, the market was widely accessible in the Chandil case. This was enabled by collaborative efforts between government institutions and the private sector, which were

instrumental in market facilitation. Not only was the fish sold to businesses within the Jharkhand State but also to other states such as West Bengal. Hence, this reflects the advantages of stakeholder collaboration in rehabilitation strategies, where, not only the implementing agency is working towards re-establishing livelihoods among affected people, but also other stakeholders such as the private sector, government institutions, etc.

Furthermore, based on the findings of this thesis, the success of the benefit-sharing programme in the Chandil case – unlike in the Mohale rehabilitation programme – is attributed to an ongoing oversight of the activities in the project, not only by the elected committee, but also by other government departments which have an interest in the project, such as the Department of Fisheries. The same level of oversight was evidently not present in the case of Mohale.

The differences between the Chandil and Mohale cases outlined in this section, in relation to the outcomes of rehabilitation, are a result of both the policies applied in each of the two cases, as well as the implementation of those policies. In the case of Mohale, the policy provides for short-term, high-risk rehabilitation strategies, while in the Chandil case, the provided rehabilitation strategies are more sustainable and long-term.

15.4 Participation Strategies

The participation of affected people in resettlement processes is expressed at different levels of policy development, resettlement planning, and implementation processes. However, as indicated in the discussions in the previous chapter, the processes of policy development are often not undertaken with a participatory approach. This is partly because policy development is seen as a process whose legitimacy is measured through the lenses of authority and expertise, i.e. the authority and expertise that those involved in policy development hold (Agarwal and Somanathan, 2005:9). In this sense, public participation may be viewed as not only unessential but also incompatible with policy development processes.

As Walters, et al. (2000:349) argue, one of the greatest limitations of policy development is that it undermines the involvement of ordinary citizens, in that the officials and experts who undertake policy development see the process “as too complex for the public to understand”. Yet, the complexity of policy development and implementation is precisely the reason why public participation in policy development is essential. This is fundamentally because public participation in policy development, whether through consultations or representation in

discussion groups, informs policy design more comprehensively (Rydin and Pennington, 2000:155), by enabling policies to capture contextual complexities on the ground.

As seen in the case of Chandil – and this was argued in the discussion of the findings – the developed policies, both at the national and state levels, reflect an understanding of certain contextual dynamics applicable at grassroots level. The applied policy recognises and provides for complex issues such as: land rights in tribal areas, provision for the re-establishment of specific forms of livelihoods in rehabilitation processes, such as commercial fishing in the dam site; and also incorporate issues of gender equality in the implementation of compensation for lost assets. These are all issues that apply in many cases of resettlement in India, some more specifically among tribal groups, as earlier discussions on land acquisition and displacement in the Indian context in Chapter Eleven revealed.

As evidenced by the discussion in the above chapter on participation in the Chandil case, the affected people on the ground were more actively involved in advocating for and negotiating certain aspects of the policy, such as land-for-land, rehabilitation measures including employment and training, as well as benefit-sharing. Although the latest version of the Jharkhand State policy was designed on the basis of the national policy, respective states develop policies that fit their particular contexts, within the framework provided by the national policy (Government of India, 2007: Section 1.7). Hence, for implementation purposes, the Jharkhand state policy has some aspects which are more relevant and applicable to the specific context of the state. And some of these specific policy features applicable in the Jharkhand state, were advocated for by the people at grassroots level.

In the case of Lesotho, stakeholder advocacy in resettlement policy development was mainly driven by NGOs such as the Transformation Resources Centre (TRC), which has been involved in mobilising community participation among project-affected communities in the LHWP. The TRC has also engaged with the LHDA regarding some of their findings from interactions with affected communities and households, and even submitting some policy recommendations to the LHDA (Thamae, 2006:89). This area was not incorporated in the discussions on participation in Chapter Ten, as the discussion was mainly focussed on the implementation of community projects for livelihoods re-establishment. Unlike in the case of Chandil, resettlement policy development in the LHWP has not been open to the active participation of external stakeholders. However, the findings from the Chandil case do demonstrate how important it is to incorporate the participation of affected groups in policy

development, a lesson that could be incorporated in the development of a national resettlement policy in the case of Lesotho. The next chapter will engage this in greater detail.

The 1986 Order of the LHWP outlines some of the compensation measures that ought to be undertaken to make up for losses imposed on the project-affected people (LHDA, 1986: Section 44). It was upon these provisions that the policies applied in the different phases of the project were developed. However, partly because the implementation of the LHWP was supported financially by external funders such as the World Bank and the African Development Bank (Tilt, et al., 2008:2; The World Bank, 2010: vii), the project was obliged to develop policies that were not only compliant with the LHDA 1986 Order, but also with the World Bank policies, as one of the major funders (Devitt and Hitchcock, 2010:70; Scudder, 2006:46; The World Bank, 2010: vii).

In this regard, the development of policies in the case of the LHWP was mainly the business of the officials and the employed experts, some of whom were international, World Bank-financed experts (Devitt and Hitchcock, 2010:70; Scudder, 2006:49). The LHDA also learned from its previous experiences in Phase 1A, and amended its policy in the subsequent Phase 1B (Scudder, 2006:78). Although the development of the policy in the Chandil case was also undertaken by experts and officials, the process still allowed the local people, through representatives from local organisations, to influence policy features and compensation packages, as reflected in the previous chapter (Personal interview, February, 2016).

Because of its bureaucratic approach to policy development, which also extended to implementation, the LHDA has been criticised for failing to capture some of the pertinent issues that affect the project-affected people negatively and in the long-term. Such criticisms include that the long-term impacts of resettlement and displacement have been largely misunderstood, and therefore, under-compensated (Scudder, 2006:51). Scudder cites issues such as hastened downsizing of staff through restructuring in the LHDA, shortly after the end of the physical resettlement of affected people, which significantly compromised the capacity of the LHDA to undertake rehabilitation for resettled people in a sustainable manner (2006:51). In 2007, the LHDA implemented the Community Infrastructure Development Programme in Phase 1B, which was meant to roll-out development projects to re-establish livelihoods among affected people in the new areas (LHDA, 2007). However, as the discussion of the findings in Chapter Ten showed, and also reiterated in Section 15.3 above, the implementation of the community development programmes as the strategy for

rehabilitating affected people in the Mohale resettlement led to significant shortfalls and the subsequent failure of the programme.

With regard to participation of affected people in the implementation of compensation, the case of Chandil presents a more complex context in that resettlement was undertaken on the basis of different policy instruments over time. However, the evidence from the discussed findings indicates that the resettled communities were engaged through community gatherings, where they were informed of the dam project and its potential impact. As some of the resettled respondents indicated, for some people these forums did not provide a space for meaningful engagements. Also the baseline study, which was undertaken to gather the information that would inform about the impact of the project among affected people, was undertaken insufficiently in the context of the previously employed LAA. Hence, some of the losses suffered by affected people were omitted. Consequently, even though the SMP was in the process of improving its administrative and monitoring system at the time of the fieldwork, which would inform compensation processes more comprehensively, the process was also undertaken inadequately due to a long period that had already passed since resettlement.

Conversely, the LHDA provides a good example in this regard, where affected people were actively engaged in the implementation of resettlement processes from baseline studies through to the implementation of compensation. As noted in one of the pre-resettlement reports of the LHDA, and as discussed in Chapter Ten, communication with affected communities was undertaken at different levels, from community gatherings to smaller committee platforms (LHDA, 1995). These smaller platforms enabled stakeholders including the affected people to engage more actively and robustly.

15.5 Policy Dimensions Transferable from the Indian to the Lesotho Case

Although there are some policy aspects which may be transferrable from the Lesotho to the Indian context, for the purpose of this thesis, only those transferable from the Indian to the Lesotho context will be explored in this section. Ultimately, this thesis aims to provide the basis for the development of national resettlement policy in Lesotho, and potentially in other Southern African countries. There are a number of policy dimensions that came out in the research, which may be transferable from the Indian to the Lesotho case, and potentially to other Southern African countries. In particular, the issues to be noted in this subsection are those related to rehabilitation measures. The findings from this research – and the literature

discussed throughout the thesis – have demonstrated that, regardless of how generous or well executed compensation measures may be, in the absence of long-term strategies for providing alternative livelihoods for affected people, declined standards of living are predictable. As stated earlier in Chapter Nine, the LHDA implemented a disturbance allowance, which was meant to provide financial relief for, especially, landless resettled people during their initial transition stage. However, despite such initiatives, the affected people in the Mohale case have, by and large, not been able to re-establish their livelihoods.

Although this is due to various factors related to the complexity of resettlement, such as contextual dynamics of the wider economic context, one of the fundamental factors for declined livelihoods in the case of Mohale is the failure of rehabilitation measures to provide alternative livelihood to affected people. Scudder (2005:37; 2009:41) argues that beyond resettlement and compensation, what really determines the ability of affected people to recover from their losses and re-establish livelihoods, is the availability of opportunities in the new areas. While compensation measures are aimed at recovering lost assets, rehabilitation measures ensure that affected people do not inherit the risks of impoverishment after resettlement (Cernea, 2000). Hence, policy dimensions related to rehabilitation from the applied Jharkhand policy, derived from the Indian national policy, will be explored as potential elements transferrable to the Lesotho case.

As noted above, the applied policy in the case of Chandil provides for long-term rehabilitation measures, including employment, scholarships and other economic opportunities in the dam area, as noted in Section 7.11.1 (b) and (c) of the policy (State of Jharkhand, 2008). Provision for employment ensures that affected people acquire alternative means of livelihood after resettlement, particularly in cases where they are unable to replace their lost fundamental assets in the new areas. Hence, this could be applicable in the context of Lesotho, where, as earlier discussions showed, many of the resettled people could not replace lost assets after resettlement, such as land and common property resources.

However, it is acknowledged in this thesis that this form of rehabilitation measure is complex to achieve, particularly in contexts where unemployment rates are already high, such as in the case of Lesotho. The rate of unemployment in Lesotho was estimated at 40% in the 2014/2015 financial year (Bureau of Statistics Lesotho, 2015). Also, in the case of Chandil, as discussed in Chapter Thirteen, the policy provision for employment was inadequately implemented, where – as indicated in the official documents of the SMP – roughly 1200 of

over 13,000 affected families benefited from the initiative. Hence, this shows that rehabilitation must be undertaken in consideration of available resources and opportunities, including those generated by the development project in question, as demonstrated by the benefit-sharing programme in the Chandil case.

The provision of educational scholarships to ensure that the resettled people are capacitated to partake in available job opportunities in the new areas or elsewhere is also a transferable policy feature into the Lesotho context. As indicated earlier, prospective dam projects in the LHWP may be constructed in the districts of Thaba-Tseka and Qacha's Nek (Gleick, 1998:95; Jacobs, 2012:87; Scholvin, 2016:125; South African Department of Water Affairs, 1998). These two districts are both in the highlands of Lesotho, predominantly consisting of rural communities. Livelihood patterns in the rural highlands of Lesotho, and parts of the foothills and lowlands, are generally reliant on a mixture of crop production, livestock keeping, and natural resources (Disaster Management Authority Lesotho, 2012:18). Hence, the implication is that the impact of resettlement – loss of land and access to natural resources, potential loss of livestock, etc. – mean that people would need to find employment in other ways, and this makes skills development a critical factor.

In addition, educational development in predominantly rural areas is compromised by a number of factors including a lack of infrastructure and other resources, and shortage of qualified teachers (Ansell, 2002:92; Mulkeen, 2005:10), which affects the ability of rural learners to complete their studies, even where enrolment rates are higher. In the case of Lesotho, the gross enrolment ratio among the youth of secondary schooling age is just over 50%, but the ratio in rural areas is even lower (Ansell, 2004:186; UNESCO, 2017). As a result, where people are resettled from rural contexts to new areas, as in the case of Lesotho, alternative forms of livelihood may be essential, including that of employment. Therefore, there is a need for skills development through education in such contexts. Hence, the provision of educational scholarships as a form of rehabilitation for affected households presents one of the transferable policy features from the Indian to the Lesotho context.

The scarcity of land and natural resources in Lesotho means that, if land continues to be acquired for development purposes, resulting in resettlement, even more people will be left without land or access to natural resources, among those who currently subsist on these and other resources. This scenario is exemplified by the findings of this research, where the studied resettled people have limited access to natural resources in the new areas, and even

many more have no access to arable land. This necessitates serious consideration of alternative forms of livelihood to make up for the loss of land and natural resources to forced resettlement.

As indicated in the previous section, the strength of the rehabilitation programme in the Chandil case, particularly with regard to the fishing and boating programmes in the dam site, lies not only in its policy initiative, but also in the collaborative aspect of its implementation, which allows policy to be implemented in connection with other key players, such as businesses, the government, etc. Thus, this policy aspect may be transferable to the Lesotho context, where the implementation of rehabilitation measures remains the primary responsibility of the implementing agency – the LHDA – in collaboration with affected people.

Furthermore, through its benefit-sharing programme, the Chandil case takes advantage of existing resources in the dam site. This is potentially transferrable into the Lesotho context, where the constructed reservoirs can also be opened for economic activities such as fishing designed specifically for the benefit of affected people, as in the case of Chandil. Fish currently forms one of the few exported commodities from Lesotho, from the Highlands Trout Farm in the Katse Dam – part of the LHWP Phase 1A (Royale Highlands Trout, 2017). Hence, such projects have a potential to be directed towards rehabilitation measures in cases of resettlement, where people lose their livelihood without being able to acquire alternative ones afterwards.

15.6 Conclusion

The applied policies in the studied cases of Lesotho and India reflect complementary strengths, from which each of the cases could learn. The LHDA has a more comprehensive compensation policy component, and the Jharkhand state policy has a more sustainable, long-term provision for the rehabilitation of affected people after resettlement. However, for the purposes of this thesis, the only transferable aspects discussed above are those considered to be transferable from the Indian to the Lesotho case. The LHWP, as the discussions above and earlier have shown, had a short-term, high-risk plan for rehabilitation measures for resettled people beyond the physical resettlement. Even though there were compensation measures implemented at the beginning to help the resettled people during the initial transition stage, such provisions were incapable of providing long-term solutions for affected people.

Hence, there is room for improvement of rehabilitation measures in the case of Lesotho. The discussions have shown that the failure of the implemented community development programmes was not only related to the manner in which the projects were implemented, but also other factors related to the context in which they were implemented. Hence, comprehensive, long-term rehabilitation measures are necessary to address the complexities associated with establishing livelihoods in a sustainable manner. Additionally, as demonstrated in the Chandil case, long-term rehabilitation measures in resettlement require collaborative efforts from multiple stakeholders in a given political and economic context. In the next chapter, the discussion will focus on presenting a case for national resettlement policy development in Lesotho, and potentially in other Southern African countries.

16 Chapter Sixteen: A Case for National Resettlement Policy Development in Lesotho

16.1 Introduction

The basis for this thesis is to assess the impact of policies on resettlement processes and subsequent outcomes on the ground; this, with the view of providing the basis for the development of a resettlement policy at the national level in Lesotho, and potentially in other countries in the Southern African region. This chapter presents a discussion on the case for the development of a national resettlement policy in the Lesotho context, informed by the experience of Indian rehabilitation and resettlement policy implementation. The discussion will first briefly explore the necessity of development projects, highlighting some complexities, which have already been discussed in greater detail, in a concluding discussion. Then the last part of the chapter will focus on the arguments for the development of a national policy of resettlement in Lesotho.

16.2 The Undertaking of Development Projects

Earlier discussions, particularly in Chapter Four, have shown that forced resettlement is driven by a perceived need for development projects which provide resources and services to the public. However, the concept of development is not always understood the same way by all stakeholders in a given society. The inconsistencies in the understanding of, or values related to development, extend to the differing views that people hold towards resettlement-inducing projects. As discussions earlier showed in Chapter Eleven, on displacement in the Indian context, even in the events of social resistance against resettlement-inducing development projects, the priorities and positions of local organisations are not always the same. In some cases, local groups oppose the entire process of resettlement, while in other cases the opposition is only towards the manner in which resettlement is undertaken (Aravinda, 2000; Bharti, 1991; Dwivedi, 1999; Rajagopal, 2005; Routledge, 2003).

More broadly, there are often opposing priorities between projects-affected local communities at a micro level, and land acquiring entities at the macro level (Asif, 1999:1566; Maitra, 2009:191; Padel and Das, 2011:144; Siciliano, et al., 2015). Public use, greater good, or public necessity, do not always, if ever, mean the same thing to different stakeholders in a given society, nor does the manner in which the interests of the public are ensured, always bear the same image. For some, such as the state, private companies and other development institutions, the conceptualisation of development may be framed through the lens of

economic growth through access to and the accumulation of financial capital (Adams, 2009; Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles, 2003).

In this sense, the establishment of big projects and the construction of infrastructure to facilitate such projects, in order to accumulate economic growth, is a goal of development. And the acquisition of land to facilitate development projects and to augment economic growth is seen as a necessity, and in the interest of the public (Siddiqui, 2014:4; Wichelns, 2014). In actuality, the construction of large dams is often accompanied by some justification related to not only the provision of water resources or the prevention of flooding, but also for economic purposes (Fahim, 1983:25-26; Heggelund, 2008:99; Hwang, et al., 2011:74; Yan, et al., 2005:474; White, 1988:5-6). The development of the LHWP, for example, was justified on economic grounds, seen as having the potential to contribute to the economic development of Lesotho, through the royalties paid by South Africa (LHDA, 2013; 2017a; Manwa, 2014:640; Meissner and Turton, 2003:119).

However, some authors have challenged not only the negative effects associated with the construction of large dams on affected people, but also the very argument of economic growth associated with the construction of large dams (Ansar, et al., 2014). In a study that assessed the economic impact of large dams, Ansar, et al. (2014) highlight that the costs related to the construction of development projects are often underestimated, and therefore, the economic benefits of the projects in the end, are overstated. In this regard, the economic promises of big development projects may be greater than the actual benefits of such projects.

Contrary to stakeholders who view development projects as a necessity, and in the interest of the public, some critics have a more strict approach to development, arguing that the forced acquisition of land for development purposes, which tend to result in the impoverishment of other segments of the population, defeats the very essence of development (Downing and Garcia-Downing, 2007; Padel and Das, 2011) and is, therefore, not in the interest of the greater good. Sen (1988:15) sees development as more than economic activities or GDP indicators, but as also inclusive of the functioning of the people in a given context, and their freedom to do and access the things which are meaningful to them. In this sense, forced removals of the people from the land and natural resources that support their established livelihoods, and their denied freedom to navigate their familiar physical environments, is not affirming their rights and dignity as a people; and therefore, compromise their development. Kurian (2000:847-849) argues that, for development to be meaningful, it has to pay close

attention to not only economic advancement, but also to “context, culture, values and ways of life”, without which the project of development becomes merely an “institutionalised oppression”.

In this regard, blanket, macro-economic approaches to development, by virtue of being applicable to a broad, global context, tend to discard locally contextualised cultural values. According to Bijoy (2003:58), in many cases in the Indian context, for example, the notion of common good among tribal communities is not the same as that held by the state or private companies, who forcibly acquire land for development projects. As reflected earlier in Chapter Fourteen on community participation in the Chandil case, the affected local communities were initially against the construction of the dams under the SMP, which would involuntarily resettle them. However, these local communities were compelled to change their position from that of dam opposition to advocating for policy development and improved compensation and rehabilitation, because they were dealing with a more powerful entity – the state – and had to accept the state’s position. Through the principle of *eminent domain*, discussed earlier in Chapter Four, the state has the power to acquire land for public purposes, even without the approval of private landowners.

Contrary to the two, divergent positions towards development projects and resettlement, some writers argue for a more balanced approach. For such authors, although the negative impacts of projects that forcibly acquire land from private owners cannot be ignored, there are ways in which the benefits of development projects can be shared with affected people at grassroots level (Brown, et al., 2009; Cernea, 2009; Men, et al., 2014; Siciliano and Urban, 2017; Sparkes, 2014). The challenge with this perspective, however, is that the promises of benefit-sharing have proven to be difficult to accomplish in some cases. While in some cases a lack of political will has been cited as one of the fundamental reasons for broken promises of benefit-sharing or other measures of rehabilitation for affected people (Scudder, 2005:195), in other cases, the failure is the result of the dynamics at grassroots level, as shown in the case of the studied Mohale Dam resettlement.

16.3 National Resettlement Policy Development in Lesotho

The investigated policy of the State of Jharkhand was informed by the national resettlement policy of the Indian government. This policy, in comparison to another investigated policy of the Lesotho-based parastatal, the LHDA, presents certain advantages. First, it provides a framework for collaborative efforts among key stakeholders in the wider contexts, including

government institutions, the private sector, as well as the affected people. As it has been indicated that the implementation of policies is often influenced by the wider socio-economic and political contexts, the involvement of multiple stakeholders may address this complexity. In the studied Mohale case, the implementation of community development projects was primarily the role of the LHDA and affected people. Without the contribution from businesses, who could provide access to the wider market, and other government institutions that could provide ongoing technical support to affected people as they implemented projects, the projects could not be sustained.

This, therefore, presents a need for a national policy of resettlement in Lesotho, which could provide a framework for not only a particular approach to resettlement, but also for collaborative efforts among different stakeholders, such as the private sector, government institutions, as well as affected people, in the pursuit of rehabilitating affected people. The discussion of the findings in the two case studies demonstrated that where collaborative efforts are incorporated, the prospects for sustainability of programmes are increased.

Second, the policy of the Jharkhand State, informed by the Indian national resettlement policy, provides for the exploitation of resources generated by the development project in question. As discussed in Chapter Six, benefit-sharing not only requires the availability of resources but also the political will to channel such resources towards the development of the primarily affected people. The development of a national resettlement policy that provides for benefit-sharing in Lesotho would signal the commitment of the government in this regard. In contexts where economic opportunities are scarce, such as in Lesotho, benefit-sharing presents a more sustainable form of rehabilitation, and the studied Chandil case has demonstrated that.

Notwithstanding, the complexities of resettlement are such that, even in cases where there is a national policy that provides for collaborative efforts towards the implementation of resettlement and rehabilitation processes, as in the case of Chandil, there are still some shortcomings related to wider contextual dynamics, such as land scarcity. As shown earlier, the recovery of resources such as arable land, common property resources, etc., is complicated by the fact that such factors may be beyond the control of implementing agencies. These complexities call into question the justification of forced land acquisition and resettlement, as based on the provision of fair compensation and rehabilitation. Where implementing agencies are partly inhibited by factors beyond their control to rehabilitate

affected people more effectively, the resultant impoverishment is predictable. The case of Chandil is reflective of this reality, where, despite the efforts of the government and the strategies put in place to provide long-term rehabilitation measures, through the provision of scholarships, employment, etc., the majority of affected people could not benefit from these measures; largely due to contextual dynamics beyond the control of the implementing agency.

In addition, there is usually a general hesitancy among investors, whether government or private institutions, to provide for long-term and sustainable measures for rehabilitating affected people. In many cases, and the discussions of the two cases have also reflected this, implementing agencies are more inclined to provide short-term compensation for lost livelihoods as opposed to long-term rehabilitation. This approach is, in part, often informed by the desire to minimise project's costs and maximise profits, usually at the expense of the affected people. The implementation of community compensation in the studied Mohale case is reflective of short-term measures aimed at rehabilitating affected communities, which did not yield sustainable benefits for the affected communities.

All these and other complexities of resettlement point to the need for the minimisation of resettlement and displacement by development projects. Governments have a fundamental responsibility to provide public goods for their citizens, but to do so without compromising the welfare of affected people. As provided for in many resettlement policies in different contexts, including in the studied Indian case, the requirement of options assessment requires that alternative means be exhausted before a resettlement-inducing project can be undertaken (State of Jharkhand, 2008: Section 2.1(a)). However, no such provision is made in the case of the LHDA policy. In fact, as indicated earlier, the planned future projects in the LHWP, although still subject to an agreement between the governments of Lesotho and South Africa, have effectively already been decided on when the Treaty was signed in 1986. Also, as argued earlier, even in cases where such a provision is made, its implementation is largely dependent on the decision of the state, as the implementation of development projects is often part of the wider political agenda at the national level (Devitt and Hitchcock, 2010:57; Mathur, 2011:1-2).

In this regard, the requirement of options assessment can only be effectively implemented where governments have committed to a cause of minimising forced resettlement and displacement. The commitment of the government in this regard is particularly indispensable

because, in the context of the state setting the agenda for development, options assessment can only be reinforced through national policy or legal instruments. This can be achieved through the development of policies that can provide the basis for alternative means of development to be explored. Where such alternative means are infeasible, a national policy framework may provide for resettlement to be undertaken only to such an extent as there are feasible ways to provide for rehabilitation opportunities after resettlement.

Importantly, national policies provide the basis upon which laws can be developed. In the case of India, the National Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy of 2007 – which informed the development of the studied Jharkhand Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy of 2008 – has been developed into The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act of 2013, as indicated earlier in Chapter Five. The development of laws provides an advantage in that, as a framework for a specific approach to resettlement, it would be more binding than seems to be the case with policies alone.

The developed policies of the LHDA could provide the basis upon which a national level resettlement policy could be developed. These policies are already designed to abide by the provisions of the World Bank as the major funder of the project, and if Lesotho would continue to seek external funding to implement its future projects, they would need to be aligned with the policies of their funding institutions. More importantly, as indicated earlier, there are some aspects of the studied LHDA policy, which have been demonstrated to be favourable in the manner in which they benefit affected people, such as housing compensation, provision of disturbance allowance, etc. (LHDA, 1997: Section 11.1(1)); Section 13.2), although there is room for improvement as far as rehabilitation measures are concerned. Hence, favourable aspects of the current policies of the LHDA could be incorporated into the national policy.

In addition, the development of the national policy for resettlement could provide a framework applicable to other sectors, such as those related to transport infrastructure development. As recently as in 2017, the Ministry of Public Works and Transport has had to develop a Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF), to meet the World Bank policy requirements, to secure funding for the implementation of the proposed Lesotho Transport Infrastructure and Connectivity (TIC) Project (Mateka, 2017). This policy, along with the LHDA policies, also provides a solid base for the development of national policy, which

would be applicable across various sectors. Not only would this be cost effective in that an all-encompassing policy framework would be used in different sectors in the country, but it would also help to facilitate multi-stakeholder rehabilitation processes.

A national resettlement policy framework would also need to take into account existing laws and other legal frameworks in Lesotho. The LHDA Phase 1B policy, as it stands, takes into account the provisions of the 1986 Treaty between Lesotho and South Africa – upon which the LHDA was established, the LHDA Order of 1986, the LHWP Compensation Regulations, 1990: Legal Notice No.50 of 1990, as well as Article 17 of the Lesotho Constitution (LHDA, 1997: Section 3). These, inter alia, would also need to be incorporated into the Lesotho national policy of resettlement.

16.4 Conclusion

The growing need for infrastructure development and the provision of other basic services such as water, transport infrastructure, etc. is reflective of the fact that many more development projects will need to be constructed, some of which include the forced resettlement of some parts of the population. The inconsistencies between the priorities of affected people on the ground and the acquiring bodies can be expected to always be existent, largely due to the differing outcomes experienced by the two sets of stakeholders, due to development projects. The acquiring bodies – and those for whom development projects are constructed – gain from development projects, while the resettled people lose to development projects that induce involuntary resettlement. However, the point of conciliation between the two sets of stakeholders is the provision of fair compensation and rehabilitation. Nonetheless, in many cases, this has often proven to be riddled with complexities, some beyond the control of either of the parties involved – the acquiring bodies and the affected people.

As a result, there is a need for serious consideration of minimisation of resettlement, which can be done only when there is a commitment on the part of the state to do so. This requires a more transparent exploration of ways in which the perceived needs can be provided without resettling people, or to resettle people only to an extent that their losses can be recovered through sustainable rehabilitation measures. This, therefore, necessitates the commitment of states through the development of policies at the national level, which can mandate the state to minimise resettlement. This is particularly because, as the evidence from this study, and other cases referenced throughout the thesis have shown, regardless of how well-planned resettlement and rehabilitation programmes are, there always are inherent complexities which

seem to associate with forced resettlement. Hence, in the context of natural resources degradation, shrinking economies that struggle to provide sustainable means of income to the majority of the resettled people, and other forms of opportunity deprivation, the question of transparent options assessment remains vital.

Currently, such an expression of commitment does not yet exist in the form of a national level framework in the case of Lesotho, and there is a need for consideration in this regard. Furthermore, where development projects are undertaken – if it appears that all other alternatives have been exhausted – resettlement must be undertaken within the capacity of the state to provide rehabilitation for affected people. The decision to implement a resettlement-inducing development project without the capacity to rehabilitate affected people is tantamount to intentionally leading the affected people to impoverishment. As Cernea (2000:21) argues, implementing authorities can always be able to predict the ability – or lack thereof – of projects to either prevent the risks of impoverishment, or to lead to the reality of impoverishment. Previous experiences have a potential to inform whether or not the risks of impoverishment can be prevented, based on the availability of resources and opportunities – including those generated from the development project itself.

In the case of Lesotho, benefit-sharing – in a way that generates sustainable income – presents a more feasible opportunity for livelihood re-establishment, than the earlier implemented community-based income generating projects, which failed due, in part, to the evident economic limitations in the wider context in which they were implemented. Although the revised strategy for Community Infrastructure Development Programme no longer provides for small income generation projects – as shown in Chapter Ten – due to their evident unsustainability, infrastructure development alone, on the other hand, may not re-establish livelihoods in the absence of incomes, where productive assets have been lost to resettlement. Hence, the need for incomes to be produced is pertinent, and benefit-sharing can provide the means of income. A national policy can, therefore, provide a framework for a multi-stakeholder approach towards the realisation of a development-driven resettlement and rehabilitation programme. Moreover, a national resettlement policy framework may reduce the costs associated with each sector or parastatal developing their own framework each time there is a perceived need for a resettlement-inducing development project.

17 Chapter Seventeen: Conclusions

17.1 Introduction

As indicated in Chapter One, this thesis was aimed at assessing the impact of policies on resettlement processes and outcomes, with the aim of providing the basis for national resettlement policy development in Lesotho, and potentially, in other Southern African countries. Specifically, the research explored the social and economic impacts of policies on resettlement processes, and how that reflected on the ground. These aspects were explored in consideration of the challenges experienced on the ground, and how such challenges were navigated – or failed to be – in implementation processes. On the other hand, the research looked at how the manner in which the policies were implemented, may have raised certain complexities, or have been influenced by pre-existing dynamics. The research further explored the factors which influence the formulation and implementation of policies. Participation of affected people in resettlement projects has been cited in many cases, as one of the factors necessary for effective implementation of resettlement processes. The thesis, thus, investigated participatory strategies employed in the planning and implementation of resettlement processes in the two cases. Lastly, the thesis explored policy dimensions which are potentially transferable from the Indian to the Lesotho context.

The thesis was based on two case studies, the Chandil Dam resettlement in India, and the Mohale Dam resettlement in Lesotho. With an overarching goal of the research being to provide the basis for national level resettlement policy development in Lesotho, the Chandil Dam was selected for the national resettlement policy component that informed part of its resettlement processes. In this context, the study learned from the experience of India in policy development and implementation. This chapter concludes on the findings of the study, in accordance with the four objectives of the thesis, outlined in Chapter One and in the methodology Chapter Seven. The concluding remarks will present suggestions for the way ahead for Lesotho, in relation to national resettlement policy development.

17.2 Social and Economic Consequences of Policies on Resettlement and Outcomes

Research on many cases across the globe has shown that in the majority of cases, the affected people resettled on account of development are left in worse-off conditions afterwards (Cernea, 2000; Diaz, 2012; Eguavoen and Tesfai, 2012; Hakim, 2000; Mahapatra, 1999; Scudder, 2005). This research explored what the impact of policies has been in the studied cases, particularly in relation to the social and economic consequences imposed by forced

resettlement. In both the studied cases, the affected people have mainly been led to economic marginalisation, largely due to the loss of their fixed and productive assets, without being able to replace them after resettlement.

However, in the case of Chandil, the findings have shown that the manner in which resettlement was undertaken prior to the implementation of the investigated State's policy, was much more impoverishing than in the current policy context. In the context of the LAA, based on which resettlement was implemented prior to the development of the national policy, the amount of compensation offered was reportedly insufficient to allow for replacement of lost assets. Such that many people could not afford to rebuild houses in the new areas, or acquire other fixed assets. In the context of the new state policy informed by the national policy, compensation has been significantly increased, and the affected people also have an option of asset-based compensation, which makes lost asset replacement more attainable. However, as the discussions showed in Chapter Thirteen, there are other dynamics which negatively influenced how asset-based compensation was undertaken in the case of Chandil.

Notably, the implementation of a national policy-informed state policy in the case of Chandil has improved rehabilitation measures for affected people. This improvement has resulted from the inclusion of more sustainable forms of rehabilitation, such as benefit-sharing, capacity building through scholarships, as well as employment. While there are other socio-economic factors in the wider context, which affected the implementation of rehabilitation components such as employment, other rehabilitation measures such as benefit-sharing have been instrumental in re-establishing livelihoods for some affected people. Nonetheless, the majority of affected people could not benefit from this policy provision and its implementation, as resettlement in this case involved a significantly large number of people.

In the Mohale case, the implementation of the applied parastatal policy has ensured the replacement of fundamental assets such as housing, in a manner that prevented the risk of homelessness and declined housing conditions. Furthermore, the policy provided for livelihood re-establishment after resettlement. However, the outcomes on the ground in relation to the programmes of livelihood re-establishment in the Mohale case reflected significant failures, such that many affected people had not been able to re-establish their lost livelihoods post resettlement. The failures in this case were largely tied to contextual economic limitations, as well as a lack of capacity on the part of affected people who were

implementing the programmes. Hence, the development of a national resettlement policy could provide the basis for collaborative efforts between relevant stakeholders in rehabilitation strategies, to ensure that more sustainable measures of livelihood re-establishment are incorporated in resettlement processes, as indicated further in Section 17.4.

17.3 Participatory Strategies in the Studied Cases

The participation of affected people in development projects has been shown to have a potential to improve effectiveness and sustainability (Narayan, 1995; Paktar, 1995; Wodajo, et al., 2014). In resettlement, participation is especially necessary because the ability of affected people to recover from their losses is largely linked to whether or not their losses can be replaced with alternative resources and opportunities. The replacement of losses is dependent on the involvement of affected people, to enable a better understanding and incorporation of those losses, as well as how to replace them in an effective manner.

Policy development in the case of Chandil was relatively participatory, incorporating some recommendations from groups of affected people through their representatives. These recommendations were mainly related to compensation packages and rehabilitation measures. Although the applied Jharkhand State resettlement policy – the JRRP-08 – was developed on the basis of the Indian national resettlement policy, which applies to all resettlement projects in the country, for the purpose of implementation, different states develop their own policies, with some aspects relevant to their local contexts. Hence, the development of the Jharkhand State resettlement policy incorporated some aspects related to livelihood re-establishment, relevant to the local dynamics within the State.

In the case of the LHDA policy, although there are some civil society organisations, such as the TRC, which have, in the past, made some recommendations related to policy to the LHDA (Thamae, 2006), policy development in this case is predominantly the business of officials and funding institutions – mainly the World Bank – which has provided funding and technical support towards policy development in the LHDA (Devitt and Hitchcock, 2010:70; Scudder, 2006:49). However, even in the case of Lesotho, there is room for public participation in policy development, and this process could be actively incorporated in national level resettlement policy development.

Participation in resettlement planning was engaged through the involvement of individual households in the baseline studies in both cases. However, in the case of Chandil, there was evidence that, in the context of the previous LAA of 1894, prior to the development of the

state's and national policies, the baseline study was undertaken inadequately, with some respondents indicating that some of their lost assets were not incorporated, due to procedural flaws. Some people who held land rights through customary arrangements, for example, were excluded from compensation, as a result of exclusionary resettlement practices, which, as shown in the thesis, were common in the context of the LAA of 1894.

Conversely, in the case of Mohale, many respondents indicated that the baseline study was undertaken in a transparent manner, and this resulted in a relatively sufficient incorporation of their lost assets in compensation. However, there were a few cases in which the affected people indicated that their lost assets were omitted, but even in such cases, steps towards correcting these irregularities were taken, through internal structures as well as the intervention of the Ombudsman. Nonetheless, in some cases, the recommendations of the Ombudsman were yet to be implemented by the LHDA.

The participation of affected people in rehabilitation processes was incorporated in both cases – Mohale and Chandil – in line with resettlement policies applied in each case. However, in the case of Mohale, the investigated rehabilitation programme failed to deliver on the expected outcomes, due to a wide range of factors, largely related to contextual dynamics and administrative irregularities. In the case of Chandil, rehabilitation programmes related to benefit-sharing were evidently participatory, as they were managed by affected people, who are accountable to relevant external bodies to ensure effective implementation and sustainability. While these programmes are not benefiting the majority of affected people, they have, in general, provided forms of livelihood for some affected people.

17.4 Factors Influencing the Formulation and Outcomes of Resettlement Policy

The development of policies in many cases is propelled by applicable laws in a given context. On the other and, in some cases, the development of policies may lead to the development or amendment of laws relating to a specific area of practice. In the case of Mohale, the development of the LHDA policies were in response to legal frameworks such as the Lesotho constitution, the LHDA Order, The LHDA Treaty, etc. as indicated in the previous chapter (LHDA, 1997: Section 3). In the case of Chandil, the development of a national resettlement policy was driven by the perceived need to fill the gaps evident in the previous LAA of 1894, which informed resettlement implementation across India. In turn, the development of the Indian national resettlement policy has led to the replacement of the LAA of 1894 with The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and

Resettlement Act, promulgated in 2013. Hence, the development of a national resettlement policy in the Lesotho case would predictably also be based on existing laws, as well as current policies.

In addition, the investigated Chandil case has shown that, in some cases, the participation of the people on the ground may propel the development of policies, as was the case in the Jharkhand State. However, in this context, the willingness of other stakeholders such as government institutions, funding agencies, etc., is also necessary to advance the call for the development of policies. In the Jharkhand case, government institutions, the World Bank, and other stakeholders, were positively responsive to the call of local groups for the development of a resettlement policy, which would improve the practice of resettlement across the State. Even at the national level, the call for the development of the national resettlement policy in India started at grassroots level, from various local groups, researchers, civil society organisations, etc. (Fernandes, 1998:2703).

Similarly, in Lesotho, the presence of civil society organisations who are already working with some communities affected by the LHWP – such as the TRC – mobilising public participation in resettlement processes, can be the base from which the participation of affected communities could be incorporated in resettlement policy development at the national level. Moreover, the World Bank, as one of the major funders of the LHWP, has been involved in resettlement policy development processes, through both funding and technical support. Hence, the government of Lesotho could leverage on what the LHDA has already built on, through the support of the World Bank, to develop a resettlement policy at the national level. Also, as indicated in the previous chapter, more recently the Ministry of Public Works and Transport in Lesotho has also started a process of resettlement policy development, based on funding requirements from the World Bank (Mateka, 2017). Aspects of this resettlement policy framework could also be incorporated in developing a national level framework for resettlement in Lesotho.

Furthermore, other legal entities such as the Ombudsman, who have been involved with households and communities affected by the LHWP, with regard to issues related to resettlement, may also form part of the stakeholders in resettlement policy development at the national level. All these and other stakeholders provide the basis upon which a collaborative process of resettlement policy development could be undertaken at the national level, in Lesotho. Moreover, the laws relevant to forced resettlement, which are already taken into

account in the present LHDA resettlement policies, could also form the basis for further policy development, at the national level, which can be applicable in all sectors that deal with resettlement-inducing projects in the country.

This collaborative approach to policy development may also be transferred to implementation processes. As the findings of the studied Chandil case have shown, rehabilitation measures provided for in the resettlement policy, require collaborative efforts by stakeholders such as the private sector, government institutions, etc. Due to the complexity of resettlement, where the implementation of policies is significantly influenced by pre-existing social, economic and political dynamics in the wider context, implementing agencies cannot implement policies in isolation.

Hence, for instance, rehabilitation measures provided for in the investigated Jharkhand State policy, such as employment and technical training, could not be sufficiently implemented by the implementing SMP alone. The participation of other key economic players is also needed to ensure that such measures are effectively undertaken. Rehabilitation measures in a form of benefit-sharing, such as the fishing and boating project in the Chandil case, have also demonstrated that stakeholder collaboration can ensure an effective way of rehabilitating the affected people in forced resettlement. Various government departments have provided the needed support in a form of initial capital, to assist the affected people to start projects in the Chandil dam site. In addition, different stakeholders continue to provide support through monitoring to ensure accountability, market facilitation, etc. All these rehabilitation measures are provided for in the national resettlement policy, based on which the State policy was developed. Importantly, policy features in this regard provide for the role of government and other sectors, which make implementation processes more sustainable.

The implementation of livelihood re-establishment through communal compensation in the Mohale case has also shown that the wider economic context, in which implementation processes are undertaken, influences the outcome of policies. In this case, policy implementation processes are mainly the responsibility of the implementing agency – the LHDA – in collaboration with affected communities. Hence, for example, with regard to income generating projects, which were undertaken under communal compensation, there was a lack of market or trade facilitation to ensure that products were sold widely, beyond the small communities in which the projects were implemented. Therefore, the role of businesses, government institutions such as the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security,

the Ministry of Small Business Development, Co-operatives and Marketing, etc., could play a role in ensuring the sustainability of such rehabilitation measures for resettled people. A resettlement policy at the national level, applicable across different sectors, could provide for such a stakeholder collaboration approach in resettlement implementation processes, particularly those relating to long-term rehabilitation after the physical resettlement of affected people.

17.5 Policy Dimensions Transferrable from the Indian to the Lesotho Context

While there are, undoubtedly, positive aspects in the investigated LHDA policy, which could be transferable from the Lesotho to the Indian case, for the purpose of this thesis, the aspects which have been found in this study to be transferable from the Indian to the Lesotho case, as discussed in Chapter Fifteen, will be summarised in this section.

Benefit-sharing: as argued earlier in Chapter Six, benefit-sharing provides a more sustainable means through which the losses suffered by the forcefully resettled people can be recovered (Cernea, 2009; Egge, et al., 2008; Fernandes, 2000; Van Wicklin, 1999). As research from many cases of resettlement has shown, compensation is not an adequate measure to ensure sufficient recovery of the losses, not to mention the improvement of living standards, after resettlement (Cernea, 2008; Fernandes, 2008; Maldonado, 2009; Kanbur, 2008). The findings from the two case studies in this thesis have also revealed some of the limitations associated with compensation. Hence, more sustainable forms of livelihood recovery are necessary, if the lives of affected people are to be improved after resettlement. Measures such as benefit-sharing present a more viable option in this regard.

As shown in Chapter Six, benefit-sharing include such measures as royalties targeted to the development of affected people or regions, as well as access to economic opportunities, services or resources generated from a development project (Egge, et al., 2008; Van Wicklin, 1999). However, while access to infrastructure such as roads, electricity, etc. – which are provided for in LHDA's CIDP – are significant in ensuring the development of affected people, such services cannot make up for lost incomes or other forms of livelihood. Hence, it is argued here that benefit-sharing mainly results in livelihood re-establishment, when it incorporates the means of income, in cases where people lose their productive assets and livelihoods to resettlement.

Some aspects of the studied Chandil case present an advantage in this regard. The Indian National Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy, on which the Jharkhand State policy applied

in the Chandil case is based, provides for rehabilitation measures such as fishing rights (Government of India, 2007: Section 7.21.10). The studied Mohale case does not have this feature for the affected people. More importantly, the implementation of this policy provision in the Chandil case is accompanied by measures to support the affected people in undertaking fishing for commercial purposes, as indicated in the above section, such as subsidies, monitoring, markets facilitation, etc. This policy feature could be incorporated in resettlement policy at the national level in Lesotho, in a way that applies to other sectors as well. In some cases, affected people are allowed to fish in the reservoir areas, without commercialising fishing activities. The Chandil model is more favourable as a viable means of income, to make up for lost productive assets and resources to resettlement.

Scholarships and employment: In addition to benefit-sharing, the Indian National resettlement policy provides for other rehabilitation means, such as employment and scholarships (Government of India, 2007: Section 7.13.1(a); 7.13.1(c)). Although, as shown in Chapter Ten, the LHDA had earlier implemented a Rural Development Plan from 1990, which included a training programme, the skills acquired were mainly to improve the livelihoods which the affected people had been dependent on prior to resettlement (Ramaili, 2006:73-78). However, partly because the resettled people had lost some of their resources and assets, which previously supported their livelihoods, it became clear that the acquired skills could not be translated to livelihood improvement, nor to income generation (Makoro, 2014:101). Hence, coupled with other factors such as financial constraints, the programme was no longer viable, and was closed down in 2002.

The implementation of the scholarship programme in the Chandil case provides technical skills, which capacitate the eligible resettled people to acquire paid employment. In this sense, where people lose their livelihoods to forced resettlement, they are offered new skills to acquire alternative forms of living. However, because these policy features have implications on the wider economic context, the role of other stakeholders is essential in the implementation processes. This policy feature could be incorporated in a national resettlement policy in the Lesotho context, providing for the collaboration of different stakeholders – government, private sector, NGOs, etc. – to cooperate towards the rehabilitation of the forcefully resettled people. The resettled people are forced out from their homes, and lose some of their assets and resources to make way for development, whose benefits are enjoyed by the wider public. It serves a development purpose, therefore, to ensure that the lives of those who lost to resettlement, are also improved.

Options assessment: this policy feature is not only transferable from the Indian case, but also from policies of funding institutions such as the World Bank (The World Bank, 2016:80). Owing to the complexities of resettlement shown throughout this thesis, the requirement of options assessment remains relevant, and national level resettlement policies must reflect the commitment of governments to undertake this process in a transparent, participatory manner.

17.6 Conclusion

This thesis was aimed at investigating the impact of policies on resettlement processes, as well as the outcomes reflected on the ground. The findings of the research in both case studies investigated in this research have shown that policies have a significant impact in informing resettlement processes, particularly in relation to compensation and rehabilitation strategies. However, in line with other research in the field of resettlement, the study showed that, largely due to the complexities inherent in resettlement, the implementation of policies reflected positive outcomes in certain aspects, and not in others. The loss of homes was one aspect in which, although it was not sufficiently undertaken in the Chandil case, the majority of the studied resettled people were still able to recover from the loss of homes after resettlement. And in the case of Mohale, the risk of homelessness was sufficiently prevented.

Notwithstanding, even in the context of resettlement policies, other consequences of resettlement are much more complex to recover, such as the loss of land, food insecurity, and loss of common property resources. These consequences are complicated by the fact that their recovery is mainly dependent on the availability of resources, which are neither in control of implementing agencies, nor of the affected people. Similarly, the risk of joblessness is a complex one to prevent, because it is dependent on the wider economic context and its ability to provide for employment and other income opportunities. Thus, even in the context of policies, incomes or other livelihood opportunities must be actively created to ensure that the affected people can also benefit. Therefore, a multi-stakeholder approach to resettlement and rehabilitation is necessary to overcome the risk of joblessness.

Losses such as community disarticulation and marginalisation, while also complex in nature, can be provided for in policy, through activities which can bring both the resettled and host communities into a cooperative space to cultivate community formation. However, these are also dependent on the attitudes of both the resettled and host members. In addition, implementing agencies can design new settlements in a manner that allows the resettled people to retain and transfer their community ties into the new areas as much as possible.

However, the case of Chandil has demonstrated that, when it comes to the design of new settlements, an open-ended approach should be maintained, to cater for household preferences and other complexities.

Moreover, the findings have shown that rehabilitation measures, which enable the resettled people to recover from their losses and potentially improve their living standards in the long-term, can be incorporated in resettlement practice through policy, in forms such as benefit-sharing and other measures of creating alternative livelihoods. The Chandil Dam resettlement in the Jharkhand State provides an example for the Lesotho context, from which a national resettlement policy could be developed to incorporate collaborative, sustainable means of rehabilitation for the forcefully resettled people.

The findings of this study indicate, therefore, that policies have a potential to inform the practice of resettlement in a manner that can mitigate its negative consequences. However, in order to deal with the inherent complexities, a developmental approach to resettlement must be incorporated into policy, and in practice. Based on the role of governments to set the national development agenda, it is fundamentally the responsibility of governments, therefore, to develop policy frameworks for resettlement, to drive a developmental resettlement practice. In the absence of a national resettlement policy in Lesotho, this gap remains open.

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Appendices

Appendix 1. Questionnaire for resettled households – Chandil

Section A: Family composition

1. Family members

Family member	Age	Sex	Occupation	Relation to respondent
Respondent				Self

2. Educational levels of children still in school:

Levels: No. in primary/secondary _____ tertiary _____

3. Who is paying for the children' education?

☐ 1= the family ☐ 2= sponsored ☐ 3= the state (free education)

Section B: Other demographic characteristics

4. Village

☐ 1= Village 1 ☐ 2= Village 2
☐ 3= Village 3 ☐ 4= Village 4
☐ 5= Village 5

5. Caste

☐ 1= Scheduled Caste (SC) ☐ 2= Scheduled Tribe (ST)
☐ 3= Other Backward Castes (OBC) ☐ 4= General

6. In what year was the family resettled? _____

Section C: Individual household compensation

7. For what, and how was your family compensated?

	Asset	If cash, amount in Rs.	Asset
1	Homestead land		
2	Farming land		

3	House building		
4	Gardens		
5	Transportation expenses		
6	Other (specify):		
7	Total cash compensation		

8. Why did the family choose that option of compensation (i.e. cash or land)? _____

9. Has the family received (all) compensation?

☐ 1= Yes

☐ 2= No

☐ 3= Part of it

10. If not all, why has the family not received all compensation, and what % or how much is left? _____

11. If some/all compensation has been received, who received it on behalf of the family?

☐ 1= Husband

☐ 2= Wife

☐ 3= Children

☐ 4= Husband and Wife Jointly

☐ 5= Other (specify): _____

12. If cash compensation was received, what was it used for?

☐ 1= To replace lost or buy new assets

(a) Homestead land

(b) Farming land

(c) House building

(d) Gardens

(e) Other assets (specify): _____

☐ 2= To buy consumables (e.g. food, clothing, cosmetics, etc.)

☐ 3= Children's education

☐ 4= Other (specify): _____

13. Who makes decisions on how the money is used?

☐ 1= Husband ☐ 2= Wife

☐ 3 = Jointly ☐ 4= Other (specify): _____

14. Were there other assets that the family lost due to resettlement that were never compensated for (e.g. fruit trees/trees, gardens, kraals, etc.)?

☐ 1= Yes

☐ 2= No

15. If yes, what are they? _____

16. Was there any compensation (or a part of it) given before the move?
☐ 1= Yes ☐ 2= No
17. If so, what form(s) of compensation was/were given before the move? _____

18. Was this (Ques.17) the decision of the government, or your choice?
☐ 1= Family choice ☐ 2= Government's choice
19. If no compensation was given before the move, by whom/what means were the moving expenses paid for? _____

20. If the new family house had not been built yet, at the time of the move, where did the family move into?
☐ 1= Moved in with relatives
☐ 2= Moved into a rented house
☐ 3= Other (specify): _____

21. If the family moved into a rented house, by what means did the family pay rent, and how much/month? _____

22. Did the family receive monthly subsistence allowance after resettlement (in addition to compensation)?
☐ 1= Yes ☐ 2= No (if no, go to Question 27)
23. If so, after how long from the time of the move was the money first received? _____

24. For how long was the monthly subsistence allowance received by the family? _____

25. Who, on behalf of the family, received the monthly subsistence allowance?
☐ 1= Husband
☐ 2= Wife
☐ 3= Children
☐ 4= Husband and wife jointly
☐ 5= Other (specify): _____
26. To your knowledge, how much is/was the subsistence allowance? _____
27. If no monthly subsistence allowance was received, did/does the family know about it?
☐ 1= Yes ☐ 2= No
28. Why did the family not receive the monthly subsistence allowance?

29. Did any member(s) of this family receive training as a form of compensation?
☐ 1= Yes ☐ 2= No (if no, go to Question 36)
30. If so, what did they train for, and at what level (i.e. general certificate, diploma, etc.?) _____

31. Did the trainee finish the course?
☐ 1= Yes ☐ 2= No ☐ 3= Still in progress
32. If course has been completed, has the person got employment as a result of the attained qualification?
☐ 1= Yes ☐ 2= No
33. If not, has he or she been applying for jobs?
34. ☐ 1= Yes ☐ 2= No
35. In your opinion, why has he/she not found a job yet? _____

36. If no member of this family got training, why is that the case?
☐ 1= No suitable candidate in the family (age, needed qualifications, etc.)
☐ 2= A suitable member of the family was never selected
☐ 3= Family not aware of the training programme
☐ 3= Other reasons: _____

37. If there is/are suitable candidate(s) who was/were never selected, why is that the case? _____

38. To your knowledge, what are the selection criteria for trainees? _____

Section D: Current family assets

39. What assets does the family have currently?

☐ 1= House

(a) Number of rooms before	Rooms	Balcony
(b) Number of rooms now	Rooms	Balcony
(c) Did not own one before		

☐ 2= Farming land

	Before			After		
No. of fields						
Sizes each	Acre(s)	Decimal(s)	Bigha(s)	Acre(s)	Decimal(s)	Bigha(s)
1.						
2.						
3.						
4.						
5.						
6.						

☐ 3= Livestock

Type of livestock	Before (number owned)	After (number owned)
Cattle		
Poultry		
Sheep		
Goats		
Horses/donkeys		
Other (specify):		

☐ 4= Other assets

Asset	Owned Before (Yes/No)	Currently Owned (Yes/No)
Bicycle		
Motorcycle		
Car		
Tractor		
Television set		
Mobile phone(s)		
Radio		
Fridge		
Furniture (give details):		

40. Cooking facility:

☐ 1= Kerosene

☐ 2= LPG (Gas)

☐ 3= Fuel wood

☐ 4= Crop residue

☐ 5= Electricity

☐ 6= Other (specify): _____

41. Sources of drinking water:

- ☐ 1= Community tap ☐ 2= Own family tap
☐ 3= From the well ☐ 4= Other (specify): _____

42. Does the family own a toilet?

- ☐ 1= Yes ☐ 2= No

43. If yes, what kind of a toilet?

- ☐ 1= VIP ☐ 2= inside toilet

44. If No, what alternative(s) do family members use? _____

45. Did the family use compensation funds to acquire current assets?

- ☐ 1= Yes ☐ 2= No ☐ 3= Some

46. If not/not all, by what means did the family acquire them (current assets)? _____

47. If the family does not own a house, where do you stay?

- ☐ 1= In a rented house
☐ 2= With relatives
☐ 3= Other (specify): _____

48. If rented house, how do you pay rent, and how much/month? _____

Section E: On social re-organization

49. Who made a choice for the family to move into this particular settlement area?

- ☐ 1= Husband ☐ 2= Wife
☐ 3= SMP authorities/government ☐ 4= husband and wife jointly
☐ 4= Other (specify): _____

50. If yourselves, what were your reasons for choosing to move into this particular settlement area?

51. Did your family move into the new area with the old neighbors?

- ☐ 1= Yes ☐ 2= No ☐ 3= Some

52. Do you/the family maintain relationships with the old neighbors?

- ☐ 1= Yes ☐ 2= No ☐ 3= Some

53. Do you have equal access to water resources as the hosts? (explain your answer) _____

54. Do you have equal access to grazing land as the hosts? (explain your answer) _____

55. Are you able to partake freely in cultural festivals with the hosts? (explain your answer) _____

56. Do you have equal access to religious places as the hosts? (explain your answer) _____

57. Since you moved into this area, have you had any challenges accessing other community resources or had any conflicts with hosts? (If so, please elaborate on the nature of challenges or conflicts) _____

58. How would you describe your relations with your neighbors now? _____

Section F: Monitoring and evaluation

59. Since moving into this settlement area, has any government or SMP official visited to assess your new standard of living?

☐ 1= Yes

☐ 2= No

60. If so, after how long from the time you moved did they first visit?

61. How often were/are the visits? _____

62. What exactly did/do they do when they visit(ed)? _____

63. Are/were they able to respond to your grievances when you have/had them? (Please elaborate/give examples) _____

64. Through which channels did you communicate your grievances to the government or SMP?

65. In what ways would you say your life is better off after resettlement? (give examples) ____

66. In what ways would you say it is worse off after resettlement? _____

Appendix 2: Interview guide for SMP officials – Chandil

Questions related to policies

1. When was the JRRP first developed, and subsequent versions?
2. What were the major changes that were made to the latter version(s) of the policy?
3. What necessitated these changes?
4. What led to the development of the JRRP?
5. Who were the stakeholders in the development of the JRRP?
6. Did the affected communities form part of stakeholders?
7. If so, how were the affected people involved? At what stages?
8. What are the factors that impede or facilitate the participation of the affected people in the (a) policy formulation processes? (b) Policy implementation processes?
9. Rehabilitation in the SMP projects?
10. Before the formulation of the state policy, what drove or informed resettlement compensation and rehabilitation processes in the SMP?

Questions related to implementation

11. When was the first group of people resettled in the Chandil case?
12. When was the last group resettled?
13. What have been the challenges in the implementation of (a) Compensation and (b) Rehabilitation?
14. How has the compensation packages changed over time with the development of the policies? What have been the major changes?
15. How has the rehabilitation programmes changed over time with the development of the state's policy?
16. When the compensation overall package was increased from 189, 000 to 657, 000, it was indicated that 1200 of the 13000 affected families would benefit from the increased package, how were these selected and what happened to the rest?
17. Did the affected people have the opportunity to choose the type of compensation they prefer i.e. land, cash, employment, etc.

18. Did they have to choose one option or could they choose more than one option?
19. Did the resettled people have the opportunity to choose the areas to move into?
20. Did they have an opportunity to choose their own sites in the new areas?
21. What were the challenges of ensuring that all the needed resources are in place before the people were moved?
22. Have the affected people received all their compensation packages? If not, why have they not received all their compensation?
23. Land for land compensation; what has been the challenges of implementing this type of compensation, and how has the challenges been negotiated?
24. How has compensation for those who did not have recognised legal rights of ownership of land been negotiated and implemented? e.g. Bhodan land “owners”
25. What rehabilitation programmes have been implemented so far, and how successful or unsuccessful have they been? (Except for the fishing and boating projects).
26. How many people have benefited from the “monthly subsistence allowance” as provided for in the state’s resettlement and rehabilitation policy?
27. Was the subsistence allowance a universal or selective grant? If selective, what were the selection criteria?
28. How many people have benefited from employment provided as a form of rehabilitation? What were the selection criteria?
29. How many people have benefited from training provided as a form of rehabilitation? What were the selection criteria?

Assessment of the standards of living

30. Whose mandate is it to assess the standards of living of the resettled people, post resettlement (SMP or the government)?
31. Since the move, how often do (have) the officials visit(ed) the resettled households for the purposes of assessment?
32. What do/did they do when they visit(ed) resettlers’ households?
33. What have been the challenges that relate to responding to the grievances of the affected people?
34. Is there a cut-off period after which the SMP or the government is no longer obligated to assess the standards of living among affected people?
35. What communication structures are there to facilitate distribution of information between the officials and the affected people?

Questions on community participation

36. Before resettlement, in what ways were the affected people involved in the planning and implementation processes of resettlement? In what ways were they involved in the designing of rehabilitation programmes?
37. In what ways were the host community members (where applicable) involved?
38. What have been the challenges with regard to the participation of the affected people?
39. How would you describe the relationship between the SMP and the affected people?

40. What have been the major points of conflict between the SMP and the affected people over the years?
41. How have these issues of conflicts been addressed?
42. What are the grievance redressal mechanisms in place?

Appendix 3: Interview guide for VMV – Chandil

1. Before the VMV was started, had there been any other organised groups or movements established in response to land acquisition and displacement in this state?
2. What led to the decision to start the organisation/ an activist group (the VMV)?
3. What were the main objectives of the organisation when it was started?
4. Who were the stakeholders or key players when the organisation was started?
5. What methods or strategies did the organisation use to achieve their objectives?
6. What were the immediate challenges that the organisation faced at the beginning? What new challenges developed over time?
7. How were such challenges overcome or dealt with?
8. Has the mandate or objectives of the organisation changed over time? If so, how? And why?
9. What has been the nature of VMV's interaction/relationship with the authorities, and has this changed over time? If so, how?
10. What have been the main achievements and shortcomings of the organisation since its inception? To what would you ascribe the shortcomings?
11. How were the affected people involved in the work of the organisation?
12. What have been the challenges in engaging the affected people?
13. Have there been tensions between the VMV and affected people? If so, what have been the causes of the tension? How has this been dealt with?
14. In 2010, the construction of the Icha dam was successfully opposed by the VMV, why was the dam construction opposed?
15. What methods of resistance were used to oppose the proposal of the Icha dam construction?
16. Who were the other key players in these actions of resistance?
17. Was there any compensation promised to the people who would have been affected by the construction of the Icha dam? If so, what forms of compensation? Which policy informed this compensation plan?
18. Up to date, have there been any efforts by the government to revive the plan for the construction of the Icha Dam?
19. In your opinion, how successful or unsuccessful has the implementation of the resettlement and rehabilitation policy been? Please explain your answer.
20. Currently what is the work of the VMV?
21. Since the approval of the fishing and boating projects for rehabilitation of the displaced people, what have been the main challenges with regard to implementation?
22. What does VMV see as its role going forward?

Appendix 4: Interview guide for members of the cooperative – Chandil

Membership

1. How many members of the cooperative are there in total?
2. How were the members selected, or what is the procedure for becoming a member?
3. Do members have to pay a membership fee? If so, how much? How often?
4. How many members of the committee are there? (Specify portfolios)
5. How are the members of the committee selected?
6. How long is each term of service for committee members?
7. Can members be re-elected without limit into the committee, if they are still willing to serve?
8. What are the responsibilities of the committee members?
9. What actual activities do committee members engage in?
10. Who do the committee members account to? What are the channels of accountability? How often do they account?
11. Do committee members get incentivized? If so, how much? How often?
12. From which villages are the members of the cooperative? (If possible, specify number of members from each village).

Management and finances

13. From where did the cooperative get funding for auction fee (720, 000 lack)?
14. Can you please outline the management structure of the cooperative?
15. Who manages the finances of the cooperative?
16. On average, how much are the profits from each of the three projects per year (fishing, boating, and tourism)? (Specify amount for each project).
17. Does the cooperative sustain itself financially, or are there other sources of income? If there are, what/who are those sources of income?
18. Who pays the wages of the workers in the different projects?
19. How were the workers employed/selected?
20. Do the workers rotate or has it been the same people since the beginning of the projects?
21. How many workers are there in total? How many in each project?
22. When did the projects start? If relevant, specify when each project started.
23. When was the cooperative registered?

Other projects

24. What are specific activities in the tourism projects?
25. Are there other projects that the resettled people engage in other than the three mentioned? If so, which are they? (Follow-up questions if there are such projects).
26. Were there any other forms of employment that the resettled people were assisted with? (e.g. got employed in the government or other organizations)
27. If so, how many people got employment through being affected by resettlement?
28. What was the selection criteria for the job(s):
 - a. Caste
 - b. Qualifications

- c. Political affiliation
 - d. Affiliation with the cooperative
29. Were all/most villages represented in employment provision?
 30. Approximately, how many people from each village got jobs?

Appendix 5: Interview guide for focus group discussions (service delivery, social safety nets, natural resources, community participation) – Chandil

Availability of services

1. Where do the members of your community get water from?
2. If there are community or household taps, who provided them?
3. Is there a clinic or health care center in your community? If not, how far is the nearest one? Is it a public or private health care center?
4. Would you say there are enough medical staff at the health care center?
5. Does each household have own toilet? If so, at whose expense were the toilets provided?
6. Is/are there school(s) in your community? If not, how far is the nearest one?
7. Is the school a public or private school?
8. Would you say there are enough teachers at the school?
9. On average, how much do parents pay for school fees per year?
10. * Note the conditions of the road networks leading into and within the community.

Social safety nets

11. What social/community organizations are there in your community?
12. What is their role/mandate?
13. What are the specific activities of the organization?
14. Who can be involved in such organization(s)
15. Follow-up questions (e.g. membership fees, committee selection, etc.)
16. Are there other locally-based groups such as health insurances, self-help groups, etc.?

Availability of natural resources

17. What natural resources did you have in the old settlement areas?
18. Were you compensated for the loss of those natural resources in the old area?
19. What resources do you have in the new settlement area?
20. Are the resources sufficient to meet the needs of the community?
21. If the resources are not sufficient, or are not available, were there other alternative provisions that were made to meet the same needs? (e.g. alternative energy...)
22. If so, please explain what those alternatives are.
23. If not, did the resettled people make any demands for such provisions? If so, to whom were the demands made? How were the demands responded to?

Community participation

N.B. Resettlement processes: all activities relating to resettlement, from planning, budget allocation, consultations, negotiations, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation.

24. When preparations for resettlement were made, who were involved in decision making processes, did the resettled people (or their representatives) participate in any of the processes?
25. If the resettled people (or their representatives) took part in any of the processes, please explain what their involvement was.
26. If there were selected representatives, how were they selected?
27. Were the host community members involved at all in any of the resettlement processes?
28. If so, how were they involved? At what stages were they involved?
29. Did the resettled people and/or host community members ever influence any decision making in any of the resettlement (or planned) processes? If so, please give examples.
30. Where was the meetings/community gatherings held, during the preparatory processes of resettlement? Were the venues easily accessible?
31. Did accessibility affect people's attendance of these meetings? Negatively or positively? (Please elaborate).
32. Can you please outline the current local structures through which community members can communicate their grievances to the government or SMP?
33. Are the individuals in these structures elected members?
34. How are they elected?
35. Are they frequently able to facilitate satisfactory response to the grievances of the people?
36. Are these individual members incentivised? If so, how are they incentivised?

Appendix 6: Questionnaire for resettled households – Mohale

Section A: Family composition

1. Family members

Family member	Age	Sex	Occupation	Relation to respondent
Respondent				Self

Section B: Other demographic characteristics

2. Educational levels of children still in school:

Levels: No. in primary/secondary _____ tertiary _____

3. Who is paying for the children's education?

☐ 1= the family ☐ 2= sponsored

4. Village

☐ 1= Ha-Mohale	☐ 2= Ha-Ts'iu
☐ 3= Ha-Koporala	☐ 4= Ha-Ratau
☐ 5= Ha-Makhalanyane	☐ 6= Ha-Mosalla

5. In what year was your family resettled/relocated? _____

Section C: Individual household compensation

6. What was this family compensated for?

i. ☐ House(s) (a) a new house(s)

(b) Cash (annual or lump sum? And why that choice)

What kinds of decisions were the family allowed to make in relation to the new house, and which ones were made by LHDA?

Does the new house have a cooking facility? If so, what type?

Does the new house have a heating facility?

If the household does not have a heating or cooking facility, were they given cash for it?

ii. ☐ Tree(s) (a) new trees planted

(b) Cash (annual or lump sum? And why that choice)

iii. ☐ Grave(s) (if they were moved at the cost of LHDA)

or does this family have an option to still visit old graves?

iv. ☐ Field(s) (a) new field(s)

(b) Cash (annual or lump sum? And why that choice)

(c) Annual food packages

*Discuss issues of sharecropping

v. ☐ Garden(s) (a) new gardens

(b) Cash (annual or lump sum? And why that choice)

vi. ☐ Kraal(s) (a) new kraal

(b) Cash (annual or lump sum? And why that choice)

If the new kraal was made, with whose labour was it built? And did LHDA pay for labour?

Section D: Livestock

7. Did you own any livestock prior to resettlement? (If not, Q.15)
8. If yes, did you keep and resettle with them into the new settlement area?
 - a. Yes b) No (in each case, probe for reasons why) (if no, Q. 34)
9. If yes, what changes are/were the livestock experiencing in the new area, how are they coping with the changes?
10. If no in Q. 8, what did you do with your livestock?
11. Did you get compensated for the loss of your livestock?
12. How were you compensated for livestock?

Section E: Community assets

13. What was your community compensated for?
 - ☐ Grazing land
 - ☐ Brushwood feeder
 - ☐ Useful grasses
 - ☐ Medicinal plants
 - ☐ Access roads
 - ☐ Community property, e.g. churches, etc.
14. Questions on community development projects
 - Specific projects implemented in the community
 - How were the projects planned for? (probe)
 - Implementation processes (open-ended questions)
 - What role did resettlers play in those projects?
 - Committee selection process
 - Meetings (how often, who organises them, where were they held)
 - Training – with regard to specific projects (who were trained, what did training entail, how long was it?).

Section F: Participation strategies

15. Who organised community gatherings? And from the community's perspective?

16. What issues were discussed in the gatherings?
17. Who came up with the agenda for the meeting?
18. Where were they held (accessibility of venues)?
19. Did the affected people ever disagree with LHDA officials or with community leaders during discussions? How were disagreements resolved?
20. What structures have been put in place to facilitate participation?
21. How are the members of such structures elected?
22. Were they given any training? (probe; what kind of training, the frequency, when was the training undertaken, where was it undertaken)

Appendix 7: Interview guide for LHDA Senior Officials

A. Questions relating to implementation:

1. What have been the challenges in the (i) planning and (ii) implementation of;
 - a) Compensation and
 - b) Development projects?
2. What criteria are used to ensure fair and uniform compensation packages?
3. What kind of choices did resettlers have for the types of houses they want?
4. What kind of choices did resettlers have for the places to which they moved?
5. What are the challenges of ensuring that all the needed resources are in place before the people are moved?
6. How has the delaying of compensation packages that were evident in Phase 1A been addressed in Phase 1B?
7. Land for land compensation; how practical is it, in the context of the growing land pressure in Lesotho, what are the alternatives?
8. Arable land compensation extended to 50 years
 - a) What were the reasons for 50 years?

B. On-going assessment of the standard of living

9. After the move, did the LHDA officials ever go to the resettled households for assessment?
10. What does/did the assessment entail?
11. Is LHDA always able to respond to the settlers' grievances when there are any? (probe)
12. What is the understanding of LHDA of what their obligation is in terms of ongoing monitoring?
13. Is there a cut-off period after which LHDA is no longer obligated to assess the standards of living?
14. "Restore or at least improve"- how has LHDA negotiated this policy clause, in terms of the directive versus the practical realities of improving or at least restoring the former livelihoods of the people? (explain the question clearly to the officials)

Appendix 8: Interview guide for host communities – Mohale

1. Were the host community members involved in resettlement processes by the LHDA?
2. At what stage(s) were they involved in the processes?
3. How were they involved?
4. With regard to Community Infrastructure Development (CID) projects, how are the projects planned?
5. Who makes plans for such projects?
6. What are the successes and failures of CID to date?
7. What are the challenges related to the (i) Planning and (ii) implementation of such projects?
8. How has the involvement of the hosting community members in the project affected the relationship they have with the resettled people?
9. How has resettlement affected hosts? (This question will be answered also from observations and interactions).

Appendix 9: Interview guide for Community Participation Officers – LHDA

1. As a CPO, what is your role in the LHDA?
2. What do you see as the main challenges that affect the engagement or participation of communities?
3. What do you see as the main challenges that affect the delivery of services to affected communities?
4. What is LHDA's obligation in as far as post resettlement/relocation assessment is concerned?
5. How is information disseminated to affected communities?
6. How do community members disseminate information from their side to the LHDA?
7. In some cases, people claim that they did not receive certain compensation which they believed they deserve, what would you say is the cause of misunderstandings or inconsistencies between what the affected people believe and what the LHDA undertakes?
8. What is the state of the relationship between the CPO and the affected community members?
9. Since you started in this position, have you received any training related to the implementation of resettlement processes?
10. If so, what kind of training? e.g. a course, workshop, etc.?
11. How long was the training? And how was it structured?