PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOUR IN SOUTH AFRICAN STUDENTS: A QUALITATIVE ENQUIRY

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ABSTRACT

The central aim of this study was to conduct a qualitative exploration of the prosocial inclinations possessed by young South African students.

The literature review argues that traditional approaches to moral responding separate the individual from the social. An alternative approach that reinstates language and ideology is delineated. It is argued that such a paradigm is most appropriate to a study of prosocial responding during a period of social change.

Hypothetical moral dilemmas were administered to twenty-nine students. Six students were selected and each was interviewed on two separate occasions. In this way six case studies were developed. The methodological traditions of phenomenology and hermeneutics were employed to analyze the protocols and subsequent interviews.

Seven themes descriptive of a moral response were identified. These consisted of moral reasoning, empathy, mood, guilt, alienation, a sense of group-identity, and ambiguity regarding the relative interests of self versus other.

These themes are fully discussed in terms of the literature. It is concluded that moral reasoning may be insufficient to motivate prosocial behaviour. Conventional moral narratives may be appropriated in order to make sense of conflicting emotions. Empathy was identified as a necessary but not sufficient condition for a prosocial response. Empathy might translate into either sympathy or personal distress. Mood was found to largely dictate attentional focus. Alienation was found to be a defensive formulation that inhibits the emergence of sympathy. Guilt might precipitate an alienated posture. It was found that guilt might be attributed to group-identity and thereby denied. Tension between a self- and other-oriented response, or between blame and sympathy, was common. It is suggested that this ambiguity reflects ideological contradictions that have been internalized. It is postulated that during periods of social change such contradictions are accentuated.

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CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

In March 1964, a young woman named Kitty Genovese was stabbed to death in a parking lot near her apartment in Queens, New York. Thirty-eight witnesses heard her screams and saw her being murdered, but not one of them did anything to help; no one even called the police until the woman was dead. This event, and the press coverage it attracted, precipitated a flurry of research into why people help, or refrain from helping (Latane' & Darley, 1970).

The past three decades have seen a great deal of valuable research published in the area of prosocial behaviour. Despite the volume of literature, however, it is fair to say that no unequivocal answers have emerged.

Part of the reason for this is that prosocial behaviour does not fall neatly within a single discipline of psychology: it is simultaneously the subject of developmental psychology, of cognitive psychology, of social psychology, even of depth psychology. As such, it exposes the falsehood that human behaviour can be neatly compartmentalized.

The result has been a scarcity of general theories of prosocial behaviour, and a profusion of specific studies that analyze discrete factors believed to precipitate acts of helping. Amongst the general theories, cognitive developmental theory has stimulated more research than other approaches, perhaps because Lawrence Kohlberg (1969, 1976, 1981, 1984) has presented the most systematic approach to moral development to date. One consequence of this is that a multitude of studies have been performed to investigate cognitive factors (such as moral reasoning and role-taking) and the role of affect (particularly empathy and guilt) is perceived to have been neglected.

Another widespread criticism is that the role of social processes in moral action has been neglected. This is widely felt to be due to an individualist bias in social psychology, a bias inherited from the natural scientific paradigm which has led researchers to disregard social and historical contingencies in their pursuit of the fundamental universals of human cognition and motivation. In recent years, an alternative model has begun to emerge, building upon the work of earlier theorists. Although not systematized in any way, this growing body

of thought represents an attempt to move beyond the old assumptions about the individual and his/her relationship to society.

Another prominant debate in the literature is between a more traditional view of human motivation that assumes human beings are social egoists only capable of acting in their own perceived best interests, and a more recent school of thought which suggests that human beings are capable of authentic caring for others and that prosocial behaviour may therefore be genuinely altruistic (Batson, 1990). It is hoped to contribute to this debate.

But why study the possible prosocial orientation of South Africans? Hardin (1968) published an article entitled "The Tragedy of the Commons" wherein he explored the situation in which a number of herdsmen, sharing a common pasturage, must decide how many animals to graze on the commons. This paper has been acknowledged as a seminal one in that it focussed social psychology on the issue of social interdependence and, in particular, on the type of social relationship that embodies a dysjunction between individual and group interests (Messick & Wilke, 1983).

Moreover, Lerner (1981) has argued that the issue of how people respond to situations requiring the allocation of scarce resources was becoming increasingly salient given the contraction in the world economy. She argued that social research should focus on the "justice concerns" implicit in the everyday moral choices that people make. This position is eminantly applicable to South Africa in the 1990s, a country increasingly confronted with issues of redistribution and reallocation of land, wealth and opportunities.

Of particular interest therefore, is the extent to which individuals are able to set aside self-interest, if necessary, and act for the common good. This is particularly relevant given South Africa's present socio-cultural climate, wherein an everyday understanding of what constitutes the "common good" appears to have broadened to include all race-groups.

It is therefore an implicit assumption of this thesis that social responsibility is a "good thing", particularly in a time of transition when many people are competing for limited resources and the potential for conflict and violence is high.

By far the bulk of the research has been done on children below the age of twelve

(Eisenberg & Mussen, 1989). Very little research has been done on the social responsibility of students. This is surprising since it is this age-group which is in the process of coming to terms with a new-found political and social awareness, and whose members are engaged in forming their views. Mayer (1988), however, surveyed 223 Canadian students and concluded: "This study has identified a troubling lack of ethical awareness among students." This is disturbing since it is students who are presumably living towards a career and family-based future, and who, moreover, will be economically empowered and thus in a position to assist others in significant ways.

It is therefore particularly interesting to study how South African students are reacting to the current period of social change and all the rhetoric associated with it.

This emphasis on the social antecedants of a prosocial orientation requires that the researcher describe the deficiencies of traditional approaches that disregard social and historical aspects, and then trace the emergence of an alternative model that might account for such processes. This is necessary in order to provide a philosophical context for the research, and to inform and justify the methodology used. In addition to this, emphasis will also be placed on affectual aspects of a prosocial orientation: this in response to the aforementioned neglect of feeling.

Definitional Issues

Eisenberg (1987) defines prosocial behaviour as "voluntary, intentional behaviour that results in benefits for another" (p. 92). Motivation is irrelevant to the above definition: people may help others out of purely selfish reasons such as receiving rewards or avoiding punishments, rather than out of a genuine desire to benefit the other person.

Eisenberg and Mussen (1989) distinguish between prosocial behaviour and "altruism" which is a subtype of prosocial behaviour. They define altruism as "voluntary actions intended to benefit another that are intrinsically motivated" (p. 3). Batson (1990) describes altruism as an orientation where people are cared for and valued for their own sake, rather

than for the ultimate benefit of the care-giver. In the case of altruism therefore, the motive is known not to be selfish.

Altruism is thought to be motivated by internal motives such as sympathy for others, or by internalized norms and values, such as a belief in the importance of others' welfare (Eisenberg and Mussen, 1989). However, because individuals may reward themselves with feelings of self-esteem or pride when they behave in ways consistent with those values, some researchers have argued that procosial acts motivated by values are actually selfish (Batson, Bolen, Cross, & Neuringer-Benefiel, 1986). Eisenberg and Mussen (1989) reply to this:

> ... we believe that people may act in ways consistent with their internalized values for reasons other than, or in addition to, self-reinforcement or self-punishment (p. 4).

McClintock (1972) has distinguished between four different value orientations: competition (striving to maximize the difference between one's own gain and others' gain), individualism (striving to maximize one's own gain), cooperation (striving to maximize joint gain), and altruism (striving to maximize others' gain). Mills and Clark (1982) distinguish between communal and exchange relationship orientations. The thrust of such distinctions is that people internalize different values which results in different cognitive, motivational, and moral orientations towards helping others (Deutsch, 1982).

The term "social responsibility" refers to the norm or value which prescribes that people should help others in need. Since it is a norm, it can be either accepted and internalized or rejected. When this norm is internalized, helping becomes an end in itself. Adherence to the norm of social responsibility is therefore closely correlated with an altruistic value orientation (O'Connor & Cuevas, 1982). Conn (1981) traces the historical emergence of the norm. He shows how the term "responsibility" has superceded earlier terms such as "sincerity" and "authenticity" in moral discourse. The effect, he argues, is to:

> ... re-establish concern for the "other" as a criterion at the centre of moral consciousness ... As such, responsibility is rooted in, and symbolizes, the discovery that one can only be true to oneself insofar - and just insofar - as one is true to others ... (p. 5).

Shelton and McAdams (1990) elaborate upon what constitutes a truly altruistic disposition. According to these authors an acceptance of the norm of social responsibility implies a predisposition to respond to others on three disrete levels - the private, the interpersonal, and the social. They write:

> ... a social morality is defined by its emphasis on social issues and humanitarian themes whereas an interpersonal morality incorporates an awareness of others in relation to the moral agent. Private morality stresses the need for prosocial responses even when relationships to others and issues are absent (pp. 927-928).

However, Eisenberg and Mussen (1989) are quick to point out that acceptance of the norm of social responsibility does not imply that one will always respond with prosocial behaviour. To act in accordance with the norm requires firstly that one is able to perceive the other person's needs, interpret them accurately and recognise that the other person can be helped. In other words, one needs the necessary cognitive and affective skills. These will be explored in due course, along with their theoretical antecedents.

Review of the Literature

The Grand Theories

There are three "grand" theories or approaches to the study of the development of prosocial behaviour, "grand" in the sense that they embrace diverse phenomena and incorporate many

interrelated hypotheses. These are psychoanalytic, social learning and cognitive developmental theory (Eisenberg & Mussen, 1989).

In recent years, however, an alternative approach has emerged, largely in response to the perceived limitations and widespread criticism of orthodox social psychological theory and cognitive developmental theory in particular (Sampson, 1981; Haan, 1982; Gergen, 1984; Callero, Howard & Piliavin, 1987).

Accordingly, each of the three "grand" theoretical positions on prosocial behaviour will be briefly delineated, followed by an analysis of what an alternative model might have to offer. The remaining sections of the literature review will concentrate on specific factor-wise approaches which may implicitly draw on a variety of theoretical schools. This reflects the fact that, although the "grand" theories attempt to be as inclusive as possible, there is no single theoretical position that captures the enormous complexity of factors underlying prosocial behaviour (Eisenberg & Mussen, 1989).

Psychoanalytic Theory

According to psychoanalytic theory, there are three systems of personality: the id, ego and superego. The superego is held to be the internalized representative of morality and arbiter of moral conduct and is therefore the most relevant structure for an understanding of prosocial behaviour. The superego is said to develop at about five or six years of age as the child resolves the Oedipus complex and comes to identify with the father (in the case of the boy) or the mother (in the case of the girl). In this way the child comes to internalise the moral standards of the parent and hence, presuming the parents are good citizens, the "cultural superego" or moral codes of society (Freud, 1917/1961).

The superego, the product of this identification, is believed to consist of two subsystems, the conscience and the ego ideal. The conscience judges and regulates the individual's behaviour, punishes transgressions through guilt, and suppresses or redirects instinctual drives which, if acted upon, would violate the moral codes the child has internalized. The ego ideal represents a more positive dimension, encouraging moral behaviour by setting moral ideals and goals (Freud, 1923/1961).

This is not the place for an exhaustive analysis of Freud's writings on moral development. Suffice it to say that in classical psychoanalytic theory, moral behaviour is seen to be instigated largely through self-gratifying motives, particularly instinctual drives and

guilt. It is for this reason that psychoanalysis cannot readily account for the development of altruistic predispositions (Eisenberg & Mussen, 1989).

The major contribution of classical psychoanalytic theory to an understanding of the origins of prosocial orientations, remains its focus on the potentially enduring effects of childhood experiences and the role of identification, a concept adopted into practically all personality theories (Simmons, 1981).

Erikson (1963) has moved away from the classical view to stress the dominant role of ego processes rather than instincts. He identifies eight stages of ego development covering the total lifespan, stages which unfold in interaction with influential experiences mediated by significant adults. In this view identification and moral development is an ongoing creative process rather than a once-off occurrence at the age of five or six. More recent ego psychologists have continued in this vein:

> The acquisition of conscience and moral standards is, thus, part of the more general process of self or ego development; a process characterized by the creative, stage-wise transformation of self through the internalization of new roles (Breger, 1973, pp. 256-257).

This position is philosophically much closer to the other theoretical approaches to be discussed below.

Social Learning Theory

Social learning theorists, in contrast to the Psychoanalytic focus on internal factors, emphasize the acquisition and development of overt responses and maintain that most human behaviour, including moral behaviour, is learned, moulded and shaped by environmental events, especially rewards, punishments and modelling. From a traditional social learning perspective therefore, prosocial responses are interpreted simply as the consequence of direct reinforcements (Eisenberg & Mussen, 1989). Where such reinforcements are not immediately apparent, the assumption is that such controls were originally external but that the individual has since come to administer his/her own rewards and punishments (Maccoby, 1968).

Social learning was originally developed by Bandura (1969) but, spurred by criticism directed at his initial emphasis on observable behaviour and a corresponding neglect of

possible intrinsic sources of motivation, his ideas have changed somewhat to take internal cognitive processes into account (Simmons, 1981). External influences are now believed to affect behaviour through mediating cognitive processes, such that people may symbolically manipulate information gained from experience (Bandura, 1977, 1986). Bandura (1977) has described this interplay as "reciprocal determinism": behaviour is seen to be the result of continuous interaction between the person, the environment and the behaviour itself. A good recent example of this type of theorizing is demonstrated in the work of Sattler and Kerr (1991) who propose that "social motive differences reflect differences in cognitive knowledge structures" (p. 756) which may be "primed" by sympathetic experience.

It is perhaps because of this shift in emphasis that social learning theory is today often referred to as social cognitive learning theory. It is certainly a shift that brings this particular school closer to the cognitive developmental school (discussed next). To summarize: the contribution of social learning theory to an understanding of moral action is twofold: on the one hand, the role of socializers is emphasized, particularly in relation to the learning of moral values and behaviour, while on the other hand, contemporary approaches stress the self-regulation of behaviour in accordance with internalized rules and standards (Eisenberg & Mussen, 1989).

This tension between social forces and the individual's changing cognitive capacities is not peculiar to this school alone: it goes to the heart of practically all contemporary theorizing on the topic of moral development and represents the bone of contention that has provoked the emergence of an alternative model. Moreover, it is a theme that will re-emerge throughout the remainder of this literature review.

Cognitive Developmental Theory

Cognitive developmental theorists use underlying processes of cognitive development as a starting point in their attempt to explicate moral development (Simmons, 1981). As in more recent social learning theory, children are believed to act on the environment, often in creative ways, just as the environment acts on them. Social influences are nevertheless assigned a much smaller role than in traditional learning theory (Eisenberg & Mussen, 1989).

According to Piaget (1932/1965) there is a relationship between cognitive and moral development. Cognitive development, the result of interaction between maturing mental structures and environmental events, proceeds through a universal invariant sequence of

stages. Each stage provides a framework for, and imposes a limit on, the level of the child's moral judgements. Moral reasoning and judgement are therefore seen to grow and change just as other cognitive functions do. Although the social and cultural environment may afford novel information and hence provide opportunities for growth, the individual must nevertheless construct knowledge actively on his/her own behalf. The idea of self-regulation is therefore at the heart of his theory (Donaldson, 1978). The self-regulatory mechanism suggested by Piaget to explain how changes in cognitive structure take place is "equilibration" and this is said to consist of the complementary processes of "assimilation" and "accomodation". Phillips (1986) describes this process:

> Thus, in Piaget's model of moral development, exposure to more adequate patterns of moral reasoning may result in cognitive disequilibrium for the individual. In trying to *assimilate* new information, he may have to alter his present structure of thinking to *accomodate* to greater complexity. Then the building of a new structure begins, resulting in development to the next higher stage of moral reasoning (p. 140-141).

For Piaget, the building of a "new structure" depends largely upon the active construction of moral knowledge by the individual. In this endeavour the individual is restricted to building upon the platform of development that he/she has already reached. Piaget theorizes that action is integral to this process ie., individuals do not develop more sophisticated cognitive structures until they test a new perspective by actually putting that perspective into practice. True learning is therefore always subordinate to the level of development that has been realized through action.

Kohlberg (1976) has expanded greatly upon Piaget's work in the field of moral development. Following a series of interviews in which he presented people with a series of hypothetical moral dilemmas, Kohlberg has amplified Piaget's sequence of stages. Based on the quality of the moral judgements offered by the respondents, Kohlberg describes several explicit stages in the development of moral reasoning and judgement, starting with an obsessive or magical view of authority and culminating in principled moral reasoning, a stage allegedly reached by only a small percentage of mature adults. This will be expanded upon in the section on cognition. As in Piagetian theory, Kohlberg's stages are held to be invariant, universal and hierarchical. The same developmental processes are held to apply.

This view, in contradistinction to social learning theories, implies that moral reasoning does not develop through direct learning leading to the internalization of moral standards. Rather, interaction with significant others acts as a kind of catalyst for structural changes which must preceed authentic moral development (Phillips, 1986). Development, as in Piagetian theory, therefore depends upon the working through of experiences that contradict, or are somehow at odds with, one's preconceptions and expectations.

Kohlberg (1981, 1984) considers that social role-taking (the ability to take the perspective of another person), is the most important experiential factor precipitating moral development, in that it enhances the individual's ability to empathize with others and to become aware of moral conflicts between one's own and another's judgements and actions, thereby fostering cognitive disequilibrium and necessitating an active period of equilibration.

The major contributions of cognitive developmental theorists are considered to be their illumination of age changes in moral development, their emphasis on moral reasoning, and their focus on the importance of role-taking abilities (Bar-Tal, 1982).

Cognitive developmental theory is widely regarded as the most influential of the three "grand" theories discussed above. As Damon and Colby (1987) state:

> ... we have found structural-developmental models (as in Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental theory) more nearly adequate for our purposes than either social learning theory or psychoanalytic frameworks. Cognitive-developmental theory is the only one of these perspectives that takes seriously an individuals' moral thinking on its own terms rather than treating it as a reflection of unconscious processes or external influences of which the individual is not aware (p. 5).

There has nevertheless been much criticism of cognitive developmental theory. This is included in the following section which details the emergence of an alternative model.

An Alternative Model

A Critique of the Grand Theories

The major criticism directed at all three of the approaches outlined above, is that such

approaches ignore, or otherwise fail to deal adequately with, the role of socio-historical forces impinging on the individual. This is felt to be largely due to the value biases inherent in the scientific paradigm that is said to dominate the field of moral behaviour and action (Gergen, 1973; Gibbs, 1976; Levine, 1976; Sampson, 1978).

Sampson (1978) refers to this dominant paradigm as the natural-science paradigm and questions its applicability to a study of morality. His argument is that one cannot pursue any inquiry into the values people hold as if those values were acontextual and ahistorical, properties he attributes to the dominant paradigm. Such an individualistic approach will always be culture- and history-bound.

> When equity is treated as a universal property of the human mind, we fail to see the ways in which the equity principle is more meaningfully understood to be a sociohistorically created and sustained ideal (Sampson, 1981, p. 98).

It is felt that classical psychoanalytic approaches to the development of conscience fall into this trap through their preoccupation with intrapsychic conflict anxieties and defensive processes leading to identification with the feared adult. Although social learning theory is acknowledged to examine social communication, it is also criticised for bleaching it of all content and meaning except the bare essentials of reward and punishment. (Shweder & Much, 1987). Cognitive developmentalists, on the other hand, are criticised for their inadequate depiction of the change-processes that supposedly precipitate stage-wise development. Social factors are felt to be vaguely defined and underemphasized (Damon & Colby, 1987). Shelton and McAdams (1990) write:

> Kohlberg clearly situates his own moral theory in the ethical tradition dominant since the writings of Kant - thinking that enshrines the primacy of the autonomous self ... (p. 925).

Piaget's insistence on the importance of autonomous action and his depiction of language as a consequence rather than a cause of development, attests to this view. Bruner (1986) is scathing in his criticism:

> Particularity, localness, context, historical opportunity, all play so large a role

> that it is embarrassing to have them outside Piaget's system rather than within .... the system failed to capture the particularity of Everyman's knowledge, the role of negotiations in establishing meaning, the tinkerer's way of encapsulating knowledge rather than generalizing it, the muddle of an ordinary moral judgement (p. 147).

A consequence of these approaches is that most studies have concentrated on temporally isolated instances of prosocial behaviour with reference to one or two circumscribed variables. The social context of helping behaviour has been neglected (Callero, Howard & Piliavin, 1987).

An alternative model would therefore build upon an interpersonal rather than an intrapsychic approach to human behaviour. Such an approach should reflect an understanding that the properties of the individual are also the emergent properties of social interaction, not transhistorical certainties. In this way, contextual and socio-historical effects (including social change such as South Africa is experiencing in the nineties) could be built into a more meaningful conceptual model (Sampson, 1981).

As it turns out, the elements of such a model have been in existence for several decades.

Elements of an Alternative Model

George Herbert Mead

Mead (1934) offers a somewhat different approach to the theoretical schools discussed thus far. Rather than being a product of intrapsychic development or external reinforcement, thought and identity are held to emerge from an interpersonal field and are believed to be inherently referential. His thesis is that there can be no thinking apart from a society of others to whom such thinking is addressed. Even if one is alone, thought is always in the nature of an inner conversation with an imaginary other, a dialogue in which we adopt the perspective of this other and from whose standpoint we view ourselves. This idea bears some resemblance to the concept of socio-moral perspective-taking advanced by Kohlberg (1981, 1984). Both theorists would agree that an ability to adopt the perspective of another is a necessary precondition for moral thought.

Mead (1964) has written specifically about helping behaviour. He identifies three stages of social development. In the first stage, helping does not involve self-consciousness, but is reflexive and driven primarily by emotional arousal. He gives the example of an animal protecting its young. In the second stage, self-awareness emerges along with rudimentary role-taking capacities. It is in this stage that action takes on a moral quality. However, since behaviour is motivated largely by the moral laws and norms of society (in the sense that the individual is self-consciously aware of the necessity of conforming to such norms), such action is not yet intrinsically moral. It is only in the third stage that actors may manifest an internalized morality as they become capable of taking on the roles of specific and generalized others.

This is achieved by the internalization of such social roles which are both perspectives that filter perception, structuring the social world for the actor but are also social objects in that these perspectives are constructed by society. Although these roles may conform to social norms, their incorporation into the individuals sense of self implies that action at this level therefore goes beyond a normative basis and becomes self-motivating as well (Callero, 1986).

Callero, Howard and Piliavin (1987) in their study of blood donors, have attempted to employ Mead's conceptualization of roles in order to facilitate an analysis of the dimensions of social structure and history implicit in helping behaviour. They write:-

> When self and role merge, analyses that separate individual from society become misleading. A model that accounts for altruism on the basis of role-person merger is essentially sociological (p. 250).

Lev Vygotsky

Vygotsky (1978), a major figure in Russian developmental psychology, shares a similar philosophy: interpersonal formulations precede, and lay the foundations for, the development of the intrapersonal structures of the human mind. Such a view is very different to Piaget (1932/1965) for whom cognitive development is a necessary precursor for true learning to take place. In Vygotsky's formulation, it would appear that this relationship is reversed. "The only good learning" he writes, "is that which is in advance of development" (p. 89). Vygotsky gives the example of a little child who is reaching for a toy beyond his grasp. The

mother enters and comes to the child's aid. She interprets the child's grasping movement as "pointing". In this way, argues Vygotsky, the primary meaning of the child's unsuccessful grasping motion is established by the reaction of another, rather than by the child himself.

> An interpersonal process is transformed into an intrapersonal one. Every function in the child's cultural development appears twice: first on the social level, and later, on the individual level; first, between people (interpsychological), and then inside the child (intrapsychological) (p. 57).

Piaget and Vygotsky are therefore in complete accord regarding the importance of action: understanding occurs in the context of action. They differ in respect of how such action is mediated. For Vygotsky, the meaning of the child's action is mediated by the culture that he/she is a part of. The child does not confront the world as an independent epistemic entity, as Piagetian theory suggests, but is directed through the labyrinth of experience by a cultural guide, usually mum. Experience, plumbed through action, is still the overriding basis for development, but Vygotsky reminds us that experience is structured by the social world.

Thought and meaning can therefore never rise above or transcend the socio-historical locus that gives it birth. Ironically, this may also be true of Vygotsky's own theory which arose as part of a rebellion against the orthodoxy that characterized Russian social psychology prior to the 1917 revolution (Wertsch, 1985). More specifically, his theory represented a necessary corrective to the passive environmental determinism embodied in the Pavlovian concept of "reflexes" (Kozulin, 1984).

Vygotsky's work can therefore be seen as a reaction against the dominant natural scientific paradigm. Like Mead, his emphasis on the social origins of thought implies that any analysis of an individual's behaviour or utterances should take account of the sociocultural context of such behaviour.

C. Wright Mills

Mills (1975), writing specifically about motivation, is another early theorist to offer an alternative to mainstream approaches. For Mills, motives are not conditions that exist prior to action and that serve as springboards to action. Rather, they are public accounting

practices, scripts people use to justify action after the fact, scripts that render our behaviour intelligible to others and to ourselves. The implication, according to Sampson (1981), is that justice motivation (the reasons people give for choosing a particular course of action)

> ... must be understood in terms of the vocabularies of justice that characterize a given society at a given point in its history (p. 103).

In this way the intrapsychic quality of the motive is removed and replaced with a formulation that depicts motivation as having an interpersonal or social basis.

The ideas of the three theorists discussed above have since been taken up by a movement which has swept through developmental psychology generally, and European social psychology in particular. Foster (1991) writes:-

> The crux of the European position was to argue for a more socially relevant social psychology. In other words, theories, methods and models should recognize the historical, social and political context of individual human actions .... They challenged the American bias which tended to reduce explanation to individualistic levels (p. 14).

Although philosophically important for an understanding of moral behaviour, the explicit theoretical insights of many of these theorists are not directly relevant to this thesis. Accordingly, only the work of Serge Moscovici and Michael Billig will be mentioned below in order to illuminate certain dimensions of current thinking about the individual and his/her relation to society.

Contemporary Approaches

The writings of both Serge Moscovici (1984, 1988) and Michael Billig (1988, 1991) fall squarely within the alternative framework described above, a framework that rejects the premise that the individual can be separated from his/her society. Moscovici has challanged the traditional concept of attitudes while Billig has argued for a revised understanding of the notion of ideology. Both authors attack dominant trends and long held assumptions in social psychology, but do so from different directions. The similarities between their respective

positions and the other authors mentioned above, are drawn out below.

Serge Moscovici

Moscovici (1984) claimed that social psychologists should seek to study the "thinking society". In making this assertion, he was taking issue with the classical concept of the "attitude" which he felt left no room for an analysis of the social class structure, the phenomenon of language and the influence of ideas about society (de la Rey, 1991).

Moscovici proposed the concept of "social representations" as an alternative. These refer to structured systems of beliefs and images that stem from social formations and are widely shared. He describes how "social representations" have the function of establishing the meaning of objects, persons and events, and of imposing this meaning upon us in order to render the things of the world intelligible. Once labelled, things appear to have an intrinsic nature and independent existence. It is forgotten for instance, that an "Asian" man is only "Asian" because he is classified as such, and that this process of classification, although not necessarily arbitrary, is a social one.

Moscovici (1988) went on to argue that such "social representations" can be seen as forming the preconditions for attitudes, much as Mead and Vygotsky have argued that society provides the basis for thinking generally.

In this way Moscovici has challenged the paradigm within which attitudes are regarded as inner mental states that have little to do with social processes. His starting assumption is that the thinking of individuals and the society wherein such thinking occurs cannot be separated.

Michael Billig

Billig (1991) also takes issue with orthodox social psychology, pointing out that by reducing thinking to the receiving and processing of incoming stimulus information, the possibility of social critique is removed:

> In this account, no social forces and no patterns of history are flowing through the minds of the individual combiner of stimuli (p. 10).

Unlike Moscovici, however, Billig devotes most of his criticism to those theories of ideology that ignore the thinking of individuals, depicting the ordinary person as the passive recipient of social forces. In a sense, he is attacking the same problem from a different direction.

Billig *et al* (1988) argue that far from inhibiting thinking, ideology actually makes thought possible. This is because ideology is not a unified system but contains contradictions and contrary themes. These contrary themes are passed into common sense and become the materials with which people think and argue about their lives. According to Billig, these contrary themes are necessary for thought to take place because thinking itself is argumentative:

> At the core of this approach lies the connection between arguing and thinking. In the rhetorical approach, the thinker is seen as a debater, engaged in argument either silently with the self, or more noisily with others (Billig, 1991, p. 31).

The similarities between this account and that of George Herbert Mead (discussed earlier) who described thinking in terms of an "inner conversation" are self-evident. Once again, the bottom line is that thinking is social and historical: different patterns of cultural norms and economic conditions will produce different patterns of dilemmatic concerns, and therefore different arguments.

Taking attitudes towards poverty and equality as an example, Billig (1991) demonstrates that there is a tension in everyday discourse between blame and sympathy. The same people are seen to express contrary values, to debate with others and with themselves. Moreover, this tension has a history. He writes:

> ... the modern form of the dilemma has been crucially shaped by ideology. The philosophy of individualism has not resolved the dilemma by vanquishing social mercy in the name of individual justice; instead, new force and discourse has been added to both of the dilemmatic horns (p. 41).

This thesis therefore endeavours to remain sensitive to the ways in which ideological themes are evident in the utterances of the subjects interviewed, based on the assumption that any complete analysis of an individual must include the social structure that establishes that

person's identity and provides the seeds of that person's thought.

The unit of such an integrated account is of course, language, and this is discussed next.

The Importance of Language

Marx and Engels (1847/1970) wrote that "language is practical consciousness" and that "consciousness is ... from the very beginning a social product" (p. 51). This idea, namely that human consciousness is only made possible through the use of language, is shared by Vygotsky (1978) who wrote from within a Marxist tradition. It was his argument that language is the paradigmatic psychological tool which, once internalized, enables humans to think autonomously. Since language is social in origin, the implication is that individuality is also socially constructed. This is not to imply that people are unthinking dupes fated to repeat the rhetoric of their parents: once a language has been mastered it may become disembedded from the social-historical conditions wherein it arose. Language has the nature of a "superstructure" of symbolic representations that are underdetermined by the social forces that have given rise to them (Kozulin, 1984). In other words, people are capable of using language in unique and creative ways.

> For Vygotsky language was an agent for altering the powers of thought - giving thought new means for explicating the world. In turn, language became the repository for new thoughts once achieved (Bruner, 1986, p. 143).

The implication therefore, is that to study language is to study both the society that produces it as well as the individual within whose hands such a language finds expression. This is particularly true of moral beliefs:

> Moral beliefs have their ontogenetic origins in the messages and meanings implicitly conveyed through talk, conversation, discourse, and customary practice ... the inferences we draw about the moral (it's form) and what's moral (it's content) are *personal reconstructions* recreated within a framework of traditional modes of apperception and evaluation represented in everyday discourse (Shweder & Much, 1987, p. 198).

Moreover, since language is both a social product and the mechanism through which individuals' commentate upon their worlds:

> To study language is to shift the locus of study to the communicative array ... and to credit as much importance to what is local and special as to what is general and universal (Shweder & Much, 1987, p. 233).

Growing cognizance of the importance of language has resulted in the emergence of the variegated discipline of "discourse analysis" which comprises a variety of approaches to analyzing language (Fairclough, 1992). A good example is to be found in the work of Potter and Wetherell (1987) who, in rather similar fashion to Moscovici (1984), have challenged the traditional concept of the attitude.

These authors argue that when people use language they are not merely saying things but are in practice *doing* things. They argue that the distinction between attitudes and behaviour is an arbitrary one. Within their framework an utterance is not merely the outward expression of some inner mental state, but is a reality unto itself. Billig (1991) shares this view:

> By paying close attention to the use of language, discourse analysts have shown that people do not have a single "attitude" in the ways that social psychological theory has often assumed. Instead, people use complex, and frequently contradictory, patterns of talk; they will use different "interpretive repertoires" to accomplish different functions (p. 15).

According to Potter and Wetherell (1987) the most basic function of language is to make sense of one's world. They use the example of the term "coloured immigrants" and demonstrate that there is no objective scientific basis for categorizing people in this way. Rather, it is the term itself that is responsible for the person being defined in these terms. It is through language therefore, that the objects of our world are constituted and given meaning.

This idea, which will be elaborated upon in the chapter on methodology, is a fundamental assumption of this thesis. It is hoped that by studying the functions that language is performing on behalf of those who are using it, some psychological light can be shed not

just upon the individuals concerned, but also upon the society of which they are a part. This hope flows from the earlier assumption that individual and society cannot be understood in isolation from one another.

Social Change

The general point that has been argued so far, is that thinking is socio-historically created and cannot be understood apart from the social context that gives rise to it. As Mead and Billig, in particular, have pointed out, we address ourselves to significant others in our thinking, figures who are embedded within socio-historical contexts. The most obvious implication of this line of thought is that if our circumstances change, then so will these interpersonal others. Hence, our inner conversations will change as will our ideas.

As Sampson (1981) points out, it is a mistake to assume that conceptions about justice are unchanging, particularly where social change is marked:

> Most of our present social-psychological views of justice ignore the sociohistorical context by taking the contemporary form for granted; thus, they have not, to my knowledge, even attempted to study the circumstances under which justice is introduced as a relevant issue. This endeavor would appear to be a crucial matter, however, if our goal is to understand the relationship between social change and justice; changed social arrangements should facilitate the reasonableness of certain formulations of justice motivation while casting others aside (p. 112).

South Africa (at the time of writing) is certainly facing the prospect of "changed social arrangements". Moreover, issues such as the persisting imbalance of wealth and privileges, the need to redress the perceived wrongs of the past, and affirmative action are constantly confronting people of all persuasions with fundamental moral dilemmas. The concept of justice itself is under close scrutiny as politicians contradict each other and claim the moral high-ground. Throughout this period, certain fundamental questions will remain uppermost: will South Africans learn from the past? Will South Africa be a more moral society in which to live? Are individuals capable of outgrowing outmoded ways of relating to others? Are we on our way to a more authentic existence? Or, more pessimistically, are we just going

through the motions (psychologically speaking)?

Kitwood (1990) uses two dimensions to describe four different kinds of moral situation that might exist in a society. These are, firstly, a dimension of structured domination ranging from high to low, and secondly, a dimension of expressivity ranging from extreme inhibition and defence to the open expression of desires, emotions and feelings. There are four possible combinations of these two variables giving rise to four different levels of "moral space" which Kitwood roughly defines as every person taking every other person's subjectivity seriously (p. 98). In such a system Apartheid would correspond to Kitwood's first quadrant, where structured domination and expressivity are both high (where those who have power are unrestrained in exploitation, ruthlessness, cruelty and greed). The question remains whether South Africa can move out of this quadrant into an area where structured domination is low, and people can still express themselves openly. Kitwood's prognosis is bleak:

> Thus domination both breeds deep psychopathology, and creates patterns of defence that work powerfully against therapeutic change. This is the most fundamental obstacle to the long-lasting growth of persons as moral beings (p. 219).

He is supported in this contention by Baker Miller (1976) who argues that the members of the dominant group cannot risk the development of their feelings, or they might become sensitive to the pain of those whom they are oppressing. The social status quo thereby comes to depend upon an elaborate system of psychic defenses. The subordinate group are equally psychologically impoverished: their low status translates into low self-esteem and because they are continually exploited and denied a voice, they carry a weight of unexpressed resentment as well. Kitwood points out that a consequence of all this is a reduced ability to trust others, particularly in a time of transition:

> To trust other persons is, in a sense, risky even under the best of circumstances, since it carries the threat of betrayal, or even of annihilation. For those who have learned not to trust, but either to dominate or be dominated, it might be too terrifying to face (p. 224).

In this connection one thinks of the various radical organizations on the fringes of South African politics. It is, nevertheless, the intention of this thesis to explore how certain young people feel about the past, present and future, in the hope that they will prove capable of overcoming the legacy of the past.

But what kind of moral system are we moving towards and what kind of moral system is appropriate for South Africa? Sampson (1981) makes a distinction between two types of justice motivation: universalism and particularism. Universalism describes a disembedded approach to justice, based upon abstract universal principles of the type described by Lawrence Kohlberg. Particularism describes a contextual approach that acknowledges particular historical realities.

According to Sampson, particularism dominated the Western world prior to the sixteenth century as individuals qualified for special privileges based upon background and class. The Enlightenment introduced a more universalistic orientation, based upon the philosophy of individualism, and the present era is best characterized as a partial return to particularism, particularly where it concerns those groups that had originally been excluded from universalistic formulations. The tension between universalism and particularism is demonstrated by the work of Gilligan (1978) who has criticized Kohlberg's assertion that moral maturity is defined by adherence to abstract ethical principles. Her contention is that there is more than one moral voice and that a morality rooted in the context of subjective relationships is every bit as sophisticated as an autonomous approach to morality.

A good practical example of this clash of moral systems is the current debate (not just perculiar to South Africa) between proponents of affirmative action (who acknowledge the need to redress the imbalances of the past) and those who invoke universal principles and label this practice as "reverse racism". The relative strengths of these two moral voices comprise another dimension that will be explored by this thesis.

This is not to suggest that South Africa's moral dynamics can be neatly divided into two competing formulations. Radley and Kennedy (1992) compare the attitudes towards charity held by individuals from three different economic classes. They describe how the location of people in the social structure is reflected in their orientation to the needy and to the suffering of the needy. They conclude that the act itself, and the reasons people give for donating to charity, are both inherently ideological:

> ... giving money to charity can be understood as a way of dramatizing group

> bounderies .... This implies that charitable giving is an expression of people's beliefs about the society in which they live (p. 114).

The implication of all this, of course, is that if the social structure changes then it is likely that people's beliefs about their society will change, perhaps even their moral beliefs, and this might lead to a change in their behaviour. Once again, the need to study the social context of people's ideas about the world is reinforced.

Factor-wise approaches

As mentioned earlier, there is no single theoretical position that does justice to prosocial behaviour in all its complexity. Most research has been predicated upon one of the three major theories (Psychoanalysis, Social Learning Theory, Cognitive Developmental Theory), the pitfalls of which have already been described. Such studies have sought to isolate one or two factors hypothesised to underlie prosocial behaviour. Taken collectively, such studies have contributed to an overall picture of prosocial behaviour, rather like the pieces of a jigsaw-puzzle. By themselves, however, the results are often less than meaningful. What follows is a brief description of the various areas such studies have attempted to penetrate, together with criticisms where necessary.

Culture

Perhaps the most informative studies are those that have not sought to operationalize "culture" in a narrow sense but have taken a more descriptive or anthropological approach, often utilizing participant observation as a research method.

Margaret Mead (1935) provides an early example of this type of approach. She describes two tribes living on the island of New Guinea with strikingly different patterns of personality and behaviour. In the Arapesh tribe a strong group orientation was found to be encouraged from infancy resulting in cooperative, helpful behaviour. In the Mundugamor tribe, by contrast, aggressive, competitive behaviour was found to be the norm. More recent studies have shown that societies in developed countries also differ quite radically in the extent to which prosocial, helping behaviour is normative. Israeli kibbutz culture (Spiro, 1965) and Soviet society (Bronfenbrenner, 1970) have been singled out as cultures wherein

social responsibility is highly valued.

To say that in some cultures prosocial behaviour is more common than in others, however, is not a particularly profound statement. The more difficult question to answer is "why?". In other words, what makes one culture more generous and altruistic than another? What processes account for these observed differences. It is only then that we may develop a yardstick against which to compare South African society.

Instead of concentrating on the reasons for cultural differences, however, much research has gone into the attempt to quantify these differences. The result has been a tradition of research that is confined to asking only those questions that could be substantiated by measurement. Such research is disconnected to everyday moral life. Liebrand and van Run (1983) provide a good example of this type of study and of the difficulties in operationalizing culture and prosocial behaviour in an experimental setting. Their method was to select 131 subjects fron California and 139 subjects from the Netherlands who participated in social-dilemma games. No statistically meaningful cross-cultural differences were noted. The authors concluded that previous research, which suggested that Americans were more competitive than their Dutch counterparts, was faulty:

> It is clear that differences in social milieu, as well as differences in experimental procedures or in subject recruitment procedures could account for the differences obtained in prior research (pp. 99-100)

Fortunately, not all cross-cultural research is as far removed from everyday life as this. Although broader naturalistic studies (described earlier) have the drawback of remaining at a fairly descriptive level, they have provided a wealth of correlational data which could be further investigated. Eisenberg and Mussen (1989) claim to have synthesised the findings from a variety of such studies. They conclude:

> Children apparently are likely to develop high levels of prosocial behaviour if they are raised in cultures characterized by (1) parental and peer stress on consideration for others ... (2) a simple social organization and/or a traditional rural setting, (3) assignment to women of important economic functions, (4) living in an extended family, and (5) early assignment of tasks and responsibility to children (p. 53).

Of these five variables, Eisenberg and Mussen argue that the early assignment of responsibility is the factor most closely associated with altruism. The work of Whiting and Whiting (1975) appears to have been influential in leading them to this conclusion. Exactly why there might be a relationship between task assignment and prosocial behaviour will be explored in subsequent sections. As with the other factors summarized above, specific studies have fleshed out the skeleton provided by anthropologists and cross-cultural psychologists. These studies are reviewed forthwith.

Socialization

It is, perhaps, social learning theory that has concentrated most thoroughly on the teaching and learning of prosocial behaviour. Much research gone into the subtle processes of imitation and identification that may occur without the parent's intention, as well as the self-conscious attempt by parents and educators to teach children prosocial responses.

Imitation and Identification

As far as imitation is concerned, the bulk of the evidence would suggest that children are likely to imitate the altruistic actions of models they observe and thereby enhance their own prosocial behaviour (Rushton, 1975). Moreover, even relatively brief exposures may have some generalized and lasting positive effects, but only in situations that are similar to the situation in which the original behaviour was observed (Elliot & Vasta, 1970). Obviously, some models are better than others. In particular, models who are perceived as powerful, competent and nurturant are more effective than those who are perceived to lack these qualities (Radke-Yarrow *et al*, 1983).

Unlike imitation, which refers merely to the copying of another's behaviour, identification is more deep-seated. It refers to a subtle process of incorporating broad patterns of behaviour, motivation and thought in an unconscious effort to mould one's own ego after the fashion of the person who has been taken as a model. As mentioned earlier, the term "identification" was originally a psychoanalytic concept that has since been adopted by just about every other developmental theory (Simmons, 1981). Research has demonstrated that identification with the same-sex parent at about the age of six is a particularly powerful window of opportunity for the inculcation of prosocial values (Hoffman, 1975a). Parental

warmth is believed to foster strong parental attachment and hence strong parental identification while simultaneously providing a model of how the child should relate to others (Eisenberg & Mussen, 1989).

Discipline and Parental Style

A great deal of research has gone into the role of parental disciplinary techniques in the facilitation of moral development. It has been demonstrated that reward and punishment, even physical punishment, does lead to increased generosity and helpfulness, but that this may not generalize to other domains of prosocial behaviour. In other words, rewards and punishments by themselves will have limited success in the settings where they are originally administered, but will not result in a generalized intrinsic prosocial disposition (Moore & Eisenberg, 1984). The consensus is that explanations and reasoning are neccessary to achieve this, particularly if these are emotionally toned (Eisenberg & Mussen, 1989). Cognitive developmental theory suggests that explanations facilitate role-taking and the autonomous construction of rules (Kohlberg, 1969). This will be expanded upon in the forthcoming chapter on cognition.

Hoffman (1975a), however, contends that role-taking comprises both cognitive and affective aspects. Good explanations will therefore activate both thought and emotion:

> Techniques that ... encourage the child to imagine himself in the other person's place may help put the feelings and thoughts of the victim into the child's consciousness and thus help guide his future actions in an altruistic direction (p. 938).

Kochanska (1991) also focusses on the relationship between parental style and affective development which she contends is crucial for the development of an internalized conscience:

> ... rearing that is based on parental warmth and open expression of emotions and that deemphasizes the use of power assertion is conducive to the development of the child's internalized guilt feelings (p. 1380).

The central idea here is that the most effective punishments are those that are self-

administered or "internalized". The role of affect in prosocial behaviour will also be elaborated upon below.

It should be noted that it is not only parents that play a part in socialization: it is an all-embracing process that includes siblings, peers, teachers, as well as the media (Eisenberg & Mussen, 1989). Rushton (1979, 1981) has demonstrated that television in particular arouses emotions, communicates norms and values, and provides models whose actions will be imitated.

One of the problems with research into socialization is that there are few naturalistic studies that show the intricate interaction of the variables mentioned above. Most studies operationalize their variables in fairly simple ways in the interest of producing significant results. Consequently, the complexity is lost. It is perhaps another weakness of the research paradigm that research has concentrated almost exclusively on children. The ongoing moral development of young adults appears to be an area that has been neglected. The present research addresses itself to these issues.

Cognition

Most of the research in this area is based upon cognitive developmental theory and has concentrated upon three topics: role or perspective-taking, attributional inferences (inferences about the motives and behaviours of others) and moral reasoning. These will be dealt with in turn.

Role-taking

The most common explanation for age-related changes in prosocial behaviour is that these changes are a consequence of increased ability on the part of the child to take the perspective of others (Eisenberg,1991). In a meta-analysis of available literature on the subject, Underwood and Moore (1982) detected a highly significant correlation between perspective-taking and prosocial behaviour. It would therefore appear that the ability to understand and infer another's feelings and emotional reactions, thoughts, perspectives, motives and intentions, is a prerequisite for the ability and willingness to act altruistically. Equally, socialization techniques that foster this ability (through the use of explanations, for instance) will improve the child's chances of developing a prosocial disposition.

The idea that role-taking is essential in the development of prosocial behaviour is theoretically underpinned by the relation between cognitive and moral development first suggested by Piaget (1932/1965). It was his contention that cognitive growth is characterized by an increasing ability to "decenter". This refers to an initial ability to distinguish between one's own and another's needs which leads in turn to the ability to attend to a problem from a variety of perspectives, not just one's own. The move is from a more concrete, selfish style of thinking to a more abstract, less egocentric style. Kohlberg (1969, 1976, 1981, 1984) has predicated much of his work upon this view of human development.

Despite empirical support for Piaget's theory, it is nevertheless clear that role-taking by itself is necessary, but not sufficient for a prosocial response (Eisenberg & Mussen, 1989). This is because there is no attempt to address the issue of motivation in a purely cognitive formulation. Role-taking is clearly necessary if people are to understand the situation of those less fortunate than themselves, but merely taking their perspective does not imply that the person will feel compelled to assist in any way. This is why researchers such as Hoffman (1975a, 1975b), and more recently Batson (1990), have urged that more attention be devoted to the role of emotion in motivation and in relation to perspective-taking. Batson (1990) writes:

> ... values, motives, and emotions set the agenda that cognition follows ... we need to bridge the widening chasm between cognitive approaches and motivational-emotional approaches to understanding human behaviour (p. 339).

The role of emotional factors will be elaborated upon in a forthcoming section.

Attributional processes

Weiner (1980, 1986) has shown that the attributions we make concerning the reasons for another person's need will influence whether or not we behave altruistically towards them.

Specifically, the perceived cause of another person's need is shown to be a crucial factor in determining whether the individual will help or not. If the cause of another person's need is perceived as being controllable (ie., if the person is thought to be responsible for his/her need), then aid tends to be withheld. A typical attribution might be that the person

is "lazy". Conversely, if the cause of the need is perceived as being uncontrollable (ie., if the person is not held responsible), then help may be offered. A typical attribution might be that the person is "ill" (Weiner, 1980).

Again, emotion is believed to mediate between cognition and response. If the cause is perceived as being uncontrollable, then feelings of sympathy result which lead to a greater willingness to assist. If the cause is perceived to be controllable, however, then anger may be the dominant emotional reaction (Weiner, 1986). By including both cognitive and affective elements in this way, Weiner's attribution-affect model is a good example of the recent attempt to "bridge the widening chasm" referred to by Batson (1990).

Brown and Smart (1991) contend that self-attributions also play a significant role in prosocial behaviour when they write that:

> ... a proximal determinant of helping behaviour is the immediate perception that one is a helpful person (p. 368).

This perception is said to be potentially evoked by a variety of possible factors. These range from internal factors such as mood, to external factors such as a social environment that may require a person to behave in a certain way. The authors focus specifically on the relationship between self-attributions and social life. They conclude:

> Public behaviour serves two functions: impression management and self-construction. The former term refers to the use of public behaviour to create a particular impression in the eyes of others; the latter term refers to the use of public behaviour to create and solidify one's private view of the self. From this perspective, the audience for public behaviour can be both others and the self (p. 374).

This view is similar to that of Mead (1964) (discussed earlier) who describes how social roles may become incorporated into one's sense of self. This would suggest a possible link between perspective-taking ability and positive self-attributions. In other words, the ability to take the perspective of a generalized other and act in a spirit of generalized reciprocity, may result in the internalization of such a role along with the self-attribution that one is a helpful person. After all, Kohlberg (1976) did contend that principled moral reasoning is associated with the

ability to take the perspective of a generalized other, which is surely close to what Mead defines as a social role. Furthermore, the ability to take the perspective of another will surely influence the attributions one might make regarding that person. All things considered, it is clear that there is a definite relationship between the ability to take the perspective of a specific or generalized other, and the attributions that are subsequently made.

The general point, however, is that the attributions individuals make about themselves and others arise out of the interaction between the individual and his/her social arena. Once again, this exposes the falsehood that individual factors and social factors are properly held separate. One of the goals of the research will therefore be to explore the relationship between the attributions we make and the changing society of which we are a part, and to ask how such attributions might affect our prosocial behaviour.

Moral reasoning

As has been mentioned, much of the empirical research done in the field of cognition is underpinned by the theories of Piaget (1932/1965) and his adherent, Kohlberg (1969, 1976, 1981, 1984). Their general theoretical tenets have been discussed in the earlier section on cognitive-developmental theory. It was their specific contribution, however, to explore age-related changes in the form of moral reasoning and judgement. This aspect is discussed below.

Both theorists postulate that moral judgement develops through a specific sequence of universal and invariant changes. Through a series of interviews with children, Piaget (1932/1965) was led to conclude that there are two successive stages in the development of moral judgement, as well as a transitional, intermediate stage. The first stage, that of "heteronomous morality", is characterized by a kind of moral realism where acts are evaluated in terms of their consequences. Children below the age of about eight fall into this category. They act morally, not because they understand that it is "right" to do so, but because of external rules and obligations that carry the threat of sanctions. At about the age of seven or eight, an intermediate period ensues where the child starts to develop a sense of autonomy. Equality and reciprocity start to take priority over authority in matters of distribution. The most mature stage, that of "autonomous morality", emerges at around eleven or twelve years of age. The principle of equity dominates the child's thinking about justice

at this stage, and the motivations and intentions of actors figure heavily in his/her moral judgements.

Piaget's work is predicated upon the assumption that cognitive growth is a prerequisite for more sophisticated levels of moral reasoning. This is because cognitive growth involves a progressive decrease in egocentrism and a corresponding increase in the ability to understand the needs and feelings of others (to role play), which is in turn necessary for an understanding of the equity principle.

Kohlberg (1969, 1976, 1981, 1984) shares this assumption. Based on a series of interviews wherein he presented people with hyothetical moral dilemmas in story form, he has expanded upon Piaget's two basic moral stages. Of critical importance to Kohlberg was not the way the individual might behave in the hypothetical situation, but rather the kinds of reasons offered by the individual in the attempt to justify his/her behaviour. According to Kohlberg (1976), moral development passes through a sequence of six stages, ordered into three levels of moral orientation. These are summarized in table one.

This schema is more complex than Piaget's in that it follows moral growth beyond late childhood and deals also with changes that might occur in adolescence and adulthood. Like Piaget, however, stages are believed to be universal and intrinsic to the human species. An individual's moral development may nevertheless cease at any stage. Indeed, principled moral reasoning, the highest level of moral development, is believed to be characteristic of only a small proportion of mature adults.

It has been described how there are strong links between perspective-taking and cognitive attributions. This is also true of the relationship between perspective-taking and moral reasoning. This flows from assumption shared by both Piaget and Kohlberg, that moral development is predicated upon cognitive development and that role-taking is an important catalyst for change in the cognitive structure of the individual. Specifically, role-taking is believed to precipitate cognitive change directly by fostering cognitive disequilibrium so that the individual must "accomodate" rather than merely "assimilate" new stimulus information. Such disequilibrium is the result of the individual becoming aware, and indeed empathising with, perspectives that are not his/her own. This in turn, may lead to more sophisticated moral reasoning.

Piaget and Kohlberg have nevertheless been criticized on various theoretical grounds. Their emphasis on cognitive development as a prerequisite for moral development has been called into question (Walker, 1980) as has their corresponding neglect of social processes

Table 1: Kohlberg's Classification of Levels and Stages of Moral Development	
*I **Preconventional level***	
Obedience and punishment orientation	*Egocentric deference to superior power or prestige, or a trouble avoiding set, objective responsibility.*
Instrumental hedonism	*Right action is that instantly satisfying the self's needs and occasionally those of others. Naive egalitarianism and orientation to exchange and reciprocity.*
*II **Conventional level***	
Good-boy orientation	*Orientation to approval and to pleasing and helping others. Conformity to stereotyped images of majority or natural role behaviour, and judgements by intentions.*
Law-and-order orientation	*Orientation towards authority, fixed rules, and the maintenance of the social order. Right behaviour consists of doing one's duty, showing respect for authority, and maintaining the given social order for its own sake.*
*III **Postconventional level***	
Contractual-legalistic orientation	*Right action is defined in terms of individual rights and/or standards that have been initially examined and agreed upon by the whole society. Concern with establishing and maintaining individual rights, equality, and liberty. Distinctions are made between values having universal, prescriptive applicability and values specific to a given society.*
Universal-ethical principle orientation	*Right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency. These principles are abstract; they are not concrete moral rules. These are universal principles of justice, of the reciprocity and equality of human rights, and of respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons.*

(Turiel, 1974)

(Damon & Colby, 1987). The idea underlying both these criticisms is that the mere fact that cognitive development and moral development coincide does not necessarily imply that one causes the other. It is possible for instance, that both are expressions of a third process, perhaps located more properly outside of the individual, in the social world. Gilligan (1978) has has questioned Kohlberg's definition of moral maturity. She contends that women may conceptualize the world differently from men, such that their moral reasoning is contextual and subjective rather than abstract and objective.

Various methodological criticisms have also been made. Eisenberg and Mussen (1989) have drawn attention to the neglect of prosocial issues that require self-sacrifice. The dilemmas presented by Kohlberg, for instance, never require the individual to make a choice between self-interest or helping others. Shelton and McAdams (1990) have also criticised Kohlberg's dilemmas for being too hypothetical ie., not representing concrete situations that the actors might actually face in everyday life. Another criticism they level is that Kohlberg neglects the role of affect in moral decision-making. These criticisms will all be taken up and addressed in the chapter devoted to methods.

One final salient criticism is that moral reasoning has frequently been found to be poorly correlated with prosocial behaviour (Eisenberg & Mussen, 1989). The principle reason for this, which Kohlberg himself acknowledged, is that moral reasoning is only one factor determining an individual's moral behaviour. The broader question of motivation is not properly addressed:

> ... what seems to be missing in the cognitive-disequilibrium [Kohlberg's] view, is a concept of a mature motive force that may underlie moral action (Hoffman, 1980, p. 307).

Many authors feel that affect is the major motive force driving prosocial behaviour. This sentiment is discussed next.

Affect

Various forms of affect have been hypothesised to influence and motivate prosocial behaviour. These include empathy, sympathy, personal distress, shame and guilt. The relationships between these affective categories have also been studied. Each of these concepts

will be defined and discussed and its relationship to other types of affect, and prosocial behaviour, drawn out.

Empathy, Sympathy, and Personal Distress

Empathy has been defined by Eisenberg (1986) as the vicarious experience of another persons emotional state. In other words, a kind of "emotional matching". She distinguishes empathy from sympathy which involves feelings of concern for another person's situation or emotional state, but that does not necessarily involve an emotional "match". Thus, one may feel concern for an angered individual without being vicariously angered oneself (an empathic response). Eisenberg and Fabes (1990) have suggested that sympathy, the other-oriented desire to make the other person feel better, often *results* from empathy ie., feeling what that person feels. Many authors, however, neglect to make this distinction and use the two terms interchangeably.

Although empathy is primarily an emotional response, it also involves cognitive skills as Hoffman (1975b) points out:

> ... the empathic reaction must depend heavily on the actor's cognitive sense of the other as distinct from himself ... (p. 610).

This again highlights the artificiality of separating cognition and affect. Clearly, the ability to experience the emotional state of the other person is contingent upon the ability to put oneself into their shoes ie., to role-play.

Hoffman (1975b, 1980, 1981, 1982) has elaborated on the idea of a link between empathy and cognitive role-taking. The developmental theory he proposes embraces both cognitive and affective aspects, and as such, represents an alternative to Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental approach. According to Hoffman, as a child develops, a cognitive sense of the plight and distress of others merges with an affective response to their suffering. Moreover, this affective response in turn fosters an understanding of a personal self that is distinct from others. Psychological development therefore encompasses two complementary processes:

> The development of a sense of the other ... interacts with the individual's

> early empathic responses to lay the basis for altruistic motivation (1975b, p. 610).

By the time the child reaches adolescence, his/her empathic responsiveness has broadened to include care and concern not only for another individual, but for wider social groupings such as races or classes of people. Hoffman argues that empathy therefore incorporates a cognitive component which comprehends the suffering and plight of another person, an affective component which is aroused by the other person's suffering and which responds with inner distress and turmoil, and a motivational component that induces action to alleviate the other's distress.

But how exactly does empathy or sympathy translate into prosocial acts? Batson (1990) suggests four possible explanations: firstly, one may act to reduce aversive-empathic arousal; secondly, one may act to avoid self-punishments such as shame and guilt (to be discussed next); thirdly, one may act out of a desire for social and self-rewards; and finally one may act out of a genuine desire to help the other person by alleviating their distress. This last possibility is described by Batson as the "empathy-altruism hypothesis". After having reviewed a number of experiments designed to test these possibilities he concludes:

> I believe the evidence is very strong indeed that that the ultimate goal of empathically aroused helpers is to increase the welfare of the person for whom they feel empathy, as the empathy-altruism hypothesis claims .... We can seek their welfare for their sakes and not simply for our own (p. 344).

Batson proceeds to make the claim that although there are various sources of prosocial behaviour, empathy is the only source of genuine altruistic behaviour. It should be noted that Batson is one of those theorists who does not make the distinction between empathy and sympathy, and therefore that he would probably also classify sympathy as an altruism-inducing emotion. Eisenberg and Fabes (1990) certainly classify sympathy in this way.

In contrast to empathy and sympathy which are other-oriented reactions, personal distress is said to be self-oriented. Batson (1987) defines personal distress as an affective reaction to another's emotional state or condition that is experienced as a personally aversive emotion such as anxiety, alarm or worry. Eisenberg and Fabes (1990) theorize that, like sympathy, personal distress also has its roots in empathy. They postulate that personal distress

is a kind of empathy-gone-wrong: rather than resulting in other-oriented sympathy, the focus shifts immediately to the self and what can be done to alleviate the empathic discomfort. Hoffman (1984) has termed this process "egoistic drift". Personal distress is therefore only associated with prosocial behaviour when there is no easier way to reduce one's own distress. Such helping is therefore egoistically rather than altruistically motivated.

This dimension of egoism-altruism, the subject of much debate in the literature, will be explored in the present research, as will the three emotional categories outlined above as they relate to motivation.

Shame and Guilt

Current psychological theories distinguish between shame and guilt in terms of the role of the self. Lewis (1971) defines guilt in terms of the self's negative evaluation of specific behaviours, and shame in terms of the self's negative evaluation of the entire self.

Tangney (1990) contends that although guilt involves the perception that one has done something "bad" and that one is therefore a "bad" person", self-concept and identity remain essentially intact. Motivation and behaviour arising from the guilt experience therefore tend to be oriented toward reparative action. The shame experience, however, can be devastating, since it is the entire self that is painfully scrutinized and negatively evaluated. A sense of worthlessness and powerlessness may result. Rather than make reparation, the person in the midst of a shame experience is most likely to want merely to escape from the interpersonal situation that gave rise to the experience. Miller (1985) has even suggested that shame can motivate anger while Tangney (1991) reported a link between shame and externalization of blame (another defensive maneuver). The link between shame and prosocial behaviour is therefore hypothesized to be tenuous.

Hoffman (1982) has suggested that there is an important link between guilt and empathic distress. He argues that interpersonal guilt consists of an empathic awareness of and response to someone's distress coupled with an awareness of being the cause of that distress. Tangney (1991) contends that there might be a similar relationship between empathy and shame. In other words, an initial empathic response followed by the realization that one is to blame, may lead to the painful experience of shame rather than mere guilt. Therefore, in the same way as empathy by itself is believed to lead to either sympathy or personal distress (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1990), empathy together with a feeling of personal responsibility is

hypothesized to lead to either guilt or shame. Tangney (1991) goes on to discuss the possible inter-relationships between guilt, shame, empathy, and cognition. A complex picture emerges:

> ... the capacity for both empathy and guilt stems from a more general level of psychological differentiation or cognitive complexity. The perspective-taking component of mature empathy requires the ability to make a clear distinction between self and other .... Guilt requires making a clear distinction between self and behaviour .... Thus both guilt and empathy hinge on a robust capacity for differentiation ... it is precisely this robust capacity for differentiation that the shame-prone individual lacks. In the shame experience there is no clear distinction between self and behaviour .... This global, undifferentiated style may be reflected not only in a blurring of the boundaries between self and behaviour, but also in the boundaries between self and other (p. 605).

The distinction between self- and other-orientedness is again uppermost. Quite obviously, this is the most important factor separating sympathy from personal distress, and guilt from shame. This self-oriented/other oriented dimension is another focal point of the present research.

Perhaps the most important insight to be gleaned from the above discussion is that no single factor can be meaningfully studied in isolation. The ability to experience guilt for instance, is intimately related to an ability to empathise which, in turn, depends on the cognitive ability to distinguish self from other. The development of this cognitive ability depends heavily on parental socialization strategies which are often circumscribed by the culture within which the family lives. Clearly prosocial behaviour is not reducible to a single formula.

But this does not mean that we should not study prosocial behaviour, in all its complexity. After all, the future of South Africa may just depend on the capacity of ordinary individuals to set aside self-interest and act for the common good.

The Goals of the Research

This study is not formulated in terms of a specific research question. Rather, it is a qualitative exploration of the prosocial inclinations possessed by young South African students. Prosocial inclinations should be understood to refer to the likelihood of *voluntary intentional behaviour that results in benefits for another.*

The investigation will be based upon intensive case-studies of a specific sample of selected South Africans. Particular focus will be on the self-reports of students presently being educated at tertiary institutions in South Africa. Within the limited context of this sample, two broad questions are implied:

(1) What is the possible basis of a prosocial orientation, or lack thereof?
(2) What factors might account for differences and similarities in prosocial orientation?

These questions clearly have several dimensions, as the literature review has highlighted. Consequently, the thesis will focus explicitly on several of the more common determinants of prosocial behaviour as proposed in the literature. These include the cultural antecedents of prosocial behaviour, with particular emphasis on the extent to which social responsibility is acknowledged as a norm and the ways in which this norm is manifested in the lives of the subjects chosen; the socialization experiences reported by the subjects, with particular emphasis on family, school and social milieu; the cognitive responses of the subjects including their attributions, role-taking skills and moral reasoning; their affective responses, with particular focus on the presence or absence of empathy; and the mediating role of specific personal characteristics and immediate contextual determinants. Clearly, these are all interrelated aspects and only an open-ended inquiry can do them justice.

To this end, the approach adopted will be holistic. The intention is not to study the various factors in isolation from one another as previous studies have done, but rather to develop an overall picture of the prosocial orientation of each subject chosen. In particular, the analysis will neglect to treat social and individual factors as distinctly separate processes. By focussing explicitly on the language discourse of the subjects, it is hoped to remain sensitive to the ways in which broader ideological and social themes are manifested through individual lives.

Flowing from this analysis it is hoped to shed light upon the following related questions:

(3) What factors might account for the internalization and/or rejection of the norm of social responsibility?

(4) What factors might account for an other-oriented altruistic orientation and/or a self-oriented egoistic orientation?

(5) What impact is the current period of social change having on the subjects chosen, with reference to their social orientation.

The implications of the above will then be elaborated and discussed in terms of relevant theory and as the results pertain to the current South African situation.

CHAPTER TWO: METHODS

The approach adopted by this thesis is argued to be both phenomenological and hermeneutic. In other words, the present research is argued to be an interpretive exercise that is at all times guided by the phenomenon as it emerges and that holds the phenomenon itself as an ultimate point of reference. Such an approach is felt to be appropriate to the task at hand, namely, an explication of the prosocial orientation of selected subjects towards others.

It has become customary in phenomenological research to introduce the methodology by, firstly, discussing the limitations and failings of the experimental method and approach, and secondly, by describing the rationale for the "new" method and related approach. Both these ways of introducing the approach adopted here will be bypassed, since they have already been extensively discussed. Giorgi (1970) and Stones (1979) discuss the phenomenological approach in some depth. In 1979 the editors of Duquesne Studies in Phenomenological Psychology, Volume III themselves dropped these issue, noting that: "There is a growing acceptance of phenomenological thought and approaches within traditional psychology" (Giorgi *et al*, 1979, p. 2). Furthermore, there is growing agreement that research into moral phenomena in particular, is best served by an approach that is not subsumed under the banner of positivism. Giorgi (1992a) notes that:

> ... ever since psychology aspired to become a natural science, the study of moral experience or behaviour has been very sparse, until very recently. The dearth of studies in the area of moral experience indicates that there is, at least, a tension between the scientific approach and the characteristics of moral phenomena (p. 51).

The attempt to understand a prosocial orientation is best served by an approach that addresses

itself to the lived phenomena that constitute human existence. The associated method should therefore not precede, and hence prescribe, the content of the research, but should develop in a continual *dialogue* with it (Giorgi, 1970). This approach is consistent with the principles of phenomenology which hold that it is a mistake to impose a preconceived methodology upon the phenomena in question. As Stones (1985) says:

> The fundamental point of departure of phenomenologically based research from traditional natural scientific research is that priority is given to the phenomenon under investigation rather than this being secondary to an already established methodological framework (p. 63).

A good phenomenological method therefore, is simply the method that works best ie., the method that does justice to the phenomenon under investigation, the method which enables us to answer the question that was originally posed in a manner that is both valid and reliable (these concepts will subsequently be discussed). Consequently:

> ... it would be a gross misunderstanding of phenomenological insight to argue that there is a phenomenological method. There is no such thing! Rather there is a certain philosophical framework or approach within which phenomena are understood at a certain level of complexity (Stones, 1985, pp. 67-68).

The phenomenological approach therefore, does not preclude the possibility that interpretive modifications may be made to what might otherwise be a purely inductive account. The only proviso is that such modifications be appropriate to an explication of the phenomena under scrutiny. Moreover, Miller and Crabtree (1992) point out that one's choice of research style should also be dictated by the overarching aims of the research, in other words, the research

goals as embodied in the research question. It is the question, after all, that specifies the manner in which the phenomenon is to be approached. Accordingly, it is argued that the goals of the present research fall not just within the domain of phenomenology, but also within the research tradition of hermeneutics.

Phenomenology seeks to understand the lived experience of individuals and their intentions within their life-world. As such, phenomenology purports to be a descriptive enterprise (Giorgi, 1992b). Hermeneutics on the other hand, represents a movement beyond phenomenology in that the goal of hermeneutic research is to use the *interpretation* of lived experience to better understand the political, historical, and sociocultural context within which it occurs (Miller & Crabtree, 1992). As has been stated, it is the researcher's intention to both describe the lived moral experience of subjects, and to develop a plausible line of meaning attribution to account for that experience. In particular, it is hoped to render intelligible both the differences and similarities between accounts given, with particular emphasis on the social antecedents of such differences and similarities. In moving beyond description in this way, into the realm of attribution and interpretation, the researcher inevitably moves into the realm of hermeneutics.

But this does not imply that the experience of the subjects is relegated to a secondary position in the interpretive process. Since it is the narratives of the subjects that at all times guide the interpretive effort, it is argued that the researcher remains also within a broad phenomenological framework. Steele (1982) writes:

> The method of the interpretive sciences is consonant with the hermeneutic view of understanding experience. The method is simple: it is *dialogue*. We come to understanding, we establish meaning - mutual co-understanding - by the age-old dialectic method of question and answer (p. 346).

Thus, it is through continual dialogue with the phenomenon that a valid understanding may be established. Such a dialogue, according to Packer and Addison (1989), consists of "... the forward arc of projection, and the return arc which we shall see is a movement of uncovering ..." (p. 275). They define interpretation as:

> ... the working out of possibilities that have become apparent in a preliminary, dim understanding of events. And this pre-understanding embodies a particular concern, a kind of caring. It provides a way of reading, a preliminary initial accessibility, a stance or perspective (a fore-structure) that opens up the field being investigated (p. 277).

It is this "way of reading" or "fore-structure", they argue, that makes it possible for the phenomenon to emerge. In other words, the phenomenon is opened up for scrutiny according to the perspective of the researcher. Dialogue may then proceed from this engaged point of departure. The researcher therefore has a responsibility to make explicit his/her world view, since it is this world view which provides the initial semantic common ground where dialogue with the phenomenon may take place. This process of making explicit one's preconceptions and theoretical expectations is termed the phenomenological reduction (Stones, 1985).

The return arc, in contrast to the forward arc of projection, is deeply phenomenological. The return arc refers to the uncovering of the phenomenon, the movement back from the raw stuff of experience towards an understanding that is continually shaped and refined. Packer and Addison (1989) write:

> We must show the entity or, more precisely, let it show itself, not forcing our perspective upon it. And we must do this in a way that respects the way it shows itself (p. 278).

In other words, the more phenomenological the return arc, the better (more valid) the interpretation will be. The contradiction of course, is that the phenomenon will only show itself according to the access that has been developed, the kind of entry into the interpretive circle that has been achieved. As Heidegger (1927/1962) said: "... an entity can show itself from itself in many ways, depending in each case on the kind of access we have to it ..." (p. 51). There is therefore an inherent circularity in any interpretive account.

The question remains as to how to keep this interpretive circle from spinning wildly out of control ie., how to avoid being caught up in an eternal cycle between the interpretive possibilities offered up by the raw data and the continually evolving understanding of the researcher. The answer is that one must be guided by the research question itself. Just as the research question informs the choice of research style, so must it set the broad parameters for the research process. Hence:

> ... a good interpretation, one that gives an account we can call true, is one that answers the concern that motivated our inquiry in the first place (Packer & Addison, 1989, p. 290).

Thus, by attempting to combine the insight of hermeneutics with the rigour of phenomenology the researcher moves tentatively towards the position attributed to Paul Ricoeur by Louw (1990):

> Ricoeur's own thought develops into what may be termed a "hermeneutic phenomenology". From the hermeneutical tradition ... he obtains insight into the *content* of reflection so that his reflection focuses on the fundamental questions about the meaning of being. And from phenomenology he gains insight about the *form* of reflection: namely the need for methodological

rigour, certainty and necessity (p.147).

The method set out below aspires to these ideals. It is a method that takes cognizance of both the affectual, cognitive and social aspects of a prosocial orientation. It is a method that forms part of a disciplined effort to explicate the ways in which a prosocial orientation is experienced (or not experienced), and then account for these experiences in terms of processes that may or may not be immediately visible. In this endeavour, it is the research problem that dictates the research method. Romanyshyn (1971) elaborates:

> ... it means that the method becomes an integral part of the problem studied, and that it develops in accordance with, rather than independent of the ways in which that problem is approached .... It is the unique demands of the problem which indicate the method rather than the method which limits the problem (p. 107).

Thus, although interpretive-hermeneutic modifications are made and a variety of methodological techniques are employed, it is argued that the present research remains within the broad phenomenological research paradigm.

Selection of Subjects

An appeal was made for students not older than 25 years to volunteer to write a protocol in response to a hypothetical moral dilemma, and then to participate in an interview with the researcher. This appeal appears in appendix one.

The research sample was limited to students for various reasons. It was felt that a student sample would be most appropriate given that students are presumably living towards a career and family-based future. This implies that they have a vested interest in a peaceful

social transition (and something to lose if social anarchy eventuates). Moreover, it is a fair assumption that students are likely to be economically and socially empowered and therefore in a position to assist others in significant ways. The students of today have a significant role to play in the society of tomorrow. Furthermore, because of the ethos of a liberal arts education, students tend to be more politically and socially aware than non-students. Indeed, the early student years are a widely acknowledged window of opportunity for the inculcation of values, and hence a window of opportunity for a researcher to observe this process. Rest (1993), having reviewed the literature on the moral development of college students, concludes that:

> Dramatic and extensive changes occur in young adulthood (the 20s and 30s) in the basic problem-solving strategies used to deal with ethical issues .... These changes are linked to fundamental reconceptualizations in how the person understands society and his or her stake in it .... Formal education (years in college or professional school) is a powerful and consistent correlate with this change (p. 201).

The age-restriction imposed by the researcher was felt to be the best way to avoid the problematic situation where a much older student (perhaps someone returning to study) wishes to participate in the research. This is not to imply that older students, or indeed other social groups, do not have a contribution to make towards a better society, merely that for the purposes of the research it is deemed necessary to create parameters within which to study social responsibility (for all the reasons outlined above).

Twenty-nine student-subjects came forward and each was asked to submit a written protocol. The questions posed and accompanying instructions appear in appendix two. It should be noted that two separate moral dilemmas were posed: fourteen subjects responded to one dilemma while the remaining fifteen responded to the other. The reasons for the use

of moral dilemmas, and specifically for the use of two separate dilemmas, will be set out below.

Of the twenty-nine subjects who originally came forward, six were selected for case-study interviews. These six were selected according to the following four criteria as set out by Stones (1985):

(1) Subjects must have had experience relating to the phenomenon being researched.

(2) Subjects must be verbally fluent and able to communicate their feelings, thoughts and perceptions in relation to the researched phenomenon.

(3) Subjects must express a willingness to be open to the researcher.

(4) Subjects should be naive with respect to psychological theory.

For the purposes of the research, the first criterion can be rephrased as: has the subject ever experienced a situation where he/she was compelled to make a (moral) choice characterized by a trade-off between self- and other-interest (this being the defining moment of a prosocial response). The difficulty that confronted the researcher is that the answer to this question is not self-evident from the collected protocols which, after all, are based on hypothetical moral dilemmas, not actual experience. The solution to this complication is simply to take the protocols on their own terms ie., to start with the assumption that the dilemmas themselves, hypothetical though they may be, provide a window through which the moral sensibility of the subject can be discerned. There are distinct parallels, for instance, between an appeal for a consumer boycott that appears in the newspaper and a similar appeal that appears in the context of research: both are abstract, removed from the "actual" conditions they refer to,

and carry no stigma or social sanction for a selfish response (other than internally-applied sanctions such as guilt).

Therefore, as regards the first criterion, subjects were considered to have had experience relating to the phenomenon being researched, if it was felt that they had demonstrated a *capacity* for moral responding as per their written responses to the moral dilemma posed. This does not imply that only those subjects who exhibited prosocial responses were selected. Following Giorgi (1992a), a subject was considered to have experience in making moral discriminations if they exhibited any of the "four fundamental points for morality" discussed by McGlynn and Toner (1962). These encompass an attempt to distinguish between good and bad actions, a sense of obligation in choosing a particular course of action, a sense of freedom in choosing to act in a particular way, and finally, a sense of responsibility for actions taken and a similar inclination to hold others responsible. In other words, if a subject exhibited any cognizance whatsoever of a moral realm, no matter where they located themselves within such a realm, they were considered to have had experience relating to the phenomenon under investigation and therefore to be suitable for further research.

As it turned out, every single subject fulfilled one or more of these criteria, suggesting that a moral sense is fundamental to social life. It should be added that the criteria for moral responding set out above are not taken as an ontological starting point for the research. This is primarily because the above four aspects set out by McGlynn and Toner do not touch on the psychological correlates (such as guilt or empathy) of the moral sense they refer to. It is these correlates, after all, that the researcher is primarily interested in. Nevertheless, these four criteria do afford the broadest possible parameters for defining the phenomenon of prosocial responding while also providing useful guidelines for dialogue with the data.

Each subject was then assessed in terms of the remaining three criteria on the basis of a preliminary reading of each subject's protocol, followed by an initial discussion with him/her. The researcher used his judgement to determine whether or not a given subject was

reasonably articulate and open to the researcher. The fourth criterion was met by simply asking each subject whether or not they had ever completed a course in psychology and then excluding those who answered in the affirmative. This was necessary to ensure that answers given were spontaneous and not constructed on the basis of prior psychological knowledge. Familiarity with Kohlberg's theory, for instance, might transform an otherwise innocuous question into a powerful demand effect.

On the basis of these deliberations, the six richest protocols were selected for further analysis, and the respective subjects were then interviewed.

Collection of Data

The primary source of data was a single hypothetical moral dilemma administered to each subject. Two separate dilemmas were employed. The response of subject one to the first of these dilemmas appears in appendix three. Two follow-up interviews were then conducted with subject one (and with each of the other five subjects) in order to expand upon aspects of the original protocol.

It should be noted that data collection and analysis were not two discrete, chronologically-separate processes. Rather, they were implemented concurrently in a circular fashion and therefore complemented one another. The significance of this will be drawn out in the section on reliability and validity.

The rationale for the use of dilemmas and subsequent interviews requires some immediate elaboration.

Moral Dilemmas

As has been stated, it is the intention of this thesis to explore the prosocial orientation of

young South African students. This has been described as a predisposition to voluntarily and intentionally behave in a way that might benefit another person (Eisenberg, 1987). This definition, however, does not suggest an access point into the phenomenon itself. How, after all, does one observe a *predisposition* which by definition only contains the *potential* for a particular experience, rather than a ready-made field of reference?

The answer is to operationalize the predisposition, both theoretically and in practice, by deliberately eliciting a response to a contrived situation that calls these potentials into being. This is why subjects were confronted with a hypothetical moral dilemma. The nature of the response then provides clues to the underlying psychology of the subject. This is an approach that has been employed in the past by a variety of researchers (see Eisenberg, 1977; Kohlberg, 1975; Shelton & Mcadams, 1990) and will subsequently be discussed in more detail.

The obvious criticism is that because the dilemmas are hypothetical, the response can never be completely authentic. How can one claim to be doing phenomenological research when the phenomenon itself is not "real" but a contrived response to an imaginary situation?

The philosophical rejoinder to this argument is that just because a verbal response is not derived from a physical situation, does not imply that it is not empirical or "real" and therefore unworthy of psychological investigation. As Potter and Wetherell (1987) point out, the use of language is itself a form of action ie., when people "say things" they are in practice "doing things" as well. Merely because the language used does not refer to a physical situation, or is not immediately correlated with behaviour, does not render it irrelevant. Billig (1991) takes the position that the study of language is an end in itself:

> Too often, social psychologists have assumed that an "attitude" is a mental reality, and that in speaking their attitude people are giving an outward expression to an inner mental state .... this assumption needs to be theoretically inverted; the giving of the attitude - the use of attitudinal

language - is the reality which needs to be studied (p. 15).

Moreover, this is not as far removed from traditional phenomenological methods as one might think. Duquesne phenomenological method (Fischer & Wertz, 1979; Giorgi, 1975, 1985; Stones 1986; Wertz, 1985) takes as its raw data the verbal or written accounts of the subject, accounts that refer to an experience the subject has had in the past or is presently immersed in. The starting point is not the experience itself, but rather the subject's reflections upon that experience, often removed in time and place. To put it succinctly: there an unavoidable distance between the experience itself and the articulation that follows. The phenomenological researcher attempts to bridge this divide by asking questions that he/she hopes will guide the subject and facilitate the accurate description of the original experience. The correct methodological yardstick to employ is therefore whether the questions asked provide an access point into the experience ie., are they appropriate questions? This basic problem is shared by the present research.

Hence, the question becomes: do the hypothetical moral dilemmas posed provide access to everyday experience? Do they evoke the experience of moral choice and confrontation ie., do they reflect actual situations that might be experienced in everyday life and which can now be vicariously relived? Alternatively, are they an abstraction from reality that leave the respondents cold? Two reasons are advanced to support the view that the hypothetical dilemmas used do provide access to the phenomenon of prosocial responding:

(1) The dilemmas used are "everyday dilemmas".

(2) Even if subjects have not experienced exactly the same dilemma in their everyday lives, even the most rudimentary empathic ability allows them to respond as if this were indeed the case. Furthermore, this empathic ability (or

lack thereof) forms part of the empirical data of the research.

These points will be dealt with in turn.

The Moral Dilemma as Research Instrument

Kohlberg (1969) was the first to use moral dilemmas in psychological research. Following Piaget (1932/1965), he uses a modified clinical method of interviewing subjects. Various semi-projective stories describing moral dilemmas were used, all involving a character who finds himself in difficult circumstances. Each story was read to the subject who was then asked a number of standardized questions. Specifically, the subject was asked *how* the central character should resolve the problem, and *why* this would be the right way to act under the circumstances. Kohlberg's most famous moral dilemma appears below:

> In Europe, a woman was near death from a very bad disease, a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium for which a druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to make. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together about half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it." So Heinz got desperate and broke into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife. Should the husband have done this? Why? (Kohlberg, 1979, p. 259)

Based on the analysis of his subjects' reasoning, Kohlberg (1969) identifies the three levels

of moral development that have been discussed (see table one). As noted earlier, it is the reasons given to justify the decision, and not the decision itself (ie., whether or not Heinz should have stolen the drug) that determine the level or stage of moral reasoning.

This approach has been criticized on various grounds. Eisenberg (1977) argues that Kohlberg neglects the "prosocial domain", referring to situations where there is conflict between one's own needs and those of another. Her contention is that Kohlberg puts too much emphasis on the prohibition-oriented aspects of morality ie., the dilemmas he poses focus too exclusively on issues of punishment, rules, laws, authorities' dictates and formal obligations. Positive aspects of morality are ignored (Eisenberg, Lennon & Roth, 1983). Eisenberg (1977) therefore introduces moral dilemmas where one must decide between one's own interests versus the interests of another. Her dilemmas include substantial costs associated with helping.

Shelton and McAdams (1990) criticise the abstract and extremely hypothetical nature of the dilemmas Kohlberg poses. Their contention is that people simply cannot relate well to such highly stylized dilemmas. Allied to this criticism, and following Haan (1982), they criticise Kohlberg's exclusive focus on reasoning processes and his corresponding neglect of affect. According to these authors, the scientific study of morality should be based upon concrete situational realities which are experienced by moral agents in everyday life. Their unspoken assumption (an assumption shared by the researcher) is that everyday moral decisions are made from an engaged stance, rather than from some lofty spire of rationalistic detachment. This is also the contention of Gilligan (1978).

At the opposite end of the scale are those numerous studies, usually performed in laboratories, where moral thinking is measured in terms of behavioural responses during experimentally-contrived games. The rationale for this is that by operationalising moral choices one avoids the problematic issue of whether an expressed attitude reflects a genuine behavioural predisposition. Billig *et al* (1988) write:

> ... the social nature and contents of the dilemmas have been abstracted from the situation ... what is missing is the great moral and ideological complexities of the original dilemmas ... the psychologist has abstracted the clash of historic values (pp. 11-12).

Shelton and McAdams (1990) appear to have struck a balance between such useless empiricism and Kohlberg's unrealistically hypothetical approach. They have devised what they have termed the "Visions of Morality Scale" (VMS), a scale consisting of 45 dilemmas that purports to be sensitive not only to the emotional dimension of moral responding, but also to the various levels at which an everyday morality can be experienced. They define three such levels of prosocial responding, each in terms of the relationship between the care-giver and the recipient of his/her care. *Private* morality refers to anonymous prosocial responding where one has no knowledge of, or relationship to, the person benefiting. *Interpersonal* morality is defined as a prosocial response directed toward someone personally known to the respondent. Finally, *social* morality is defined by its emphasis on humanitarian themes and social justice concerns and incorporates a general awareness of disadvantaged others and their relation to the moral agent. The authors confront their subjects with fifteen dilemmas for each level of prosocial morality, measuring their responses (the likelihood of responding positively) on a seven point *Likert* scale. Additional scales are also employed, to test empathy for instance.

The two dilemmas used in the present research were dilemmas adapted from the VMS, specifically, from those designed to test for a *social* morality. The social dimension was considered to be most appropriate given South Africa's current socio-political climate, and that the primary focus of the present research is on feelings of social responsibility. The dilemmas were adapted in such a way so as to be relevant to students living in the area in which the research was conducted. Being confronted by a beggar for instance, is a phenomenon that every subject had experienced and was familiar with. Their responses were

consequently less speculative. The adapted dilemmas appear in appendix two.

It will be noted that the second dilemma is more abstract than the first in the sense that the subject is not physically confronted by the person making the appeal. Whereas a "concrete" appeal is more likely to elicit emotions, an abstract appeal lends itself to a more rational, considered response. It was felt that by engaging the subjects on different levels in this way, greater variability might be introduced into the data and hence reliability would be improved.

The dilemmas were intended to provide access to the phenomenon of prosocial responding and as such, were accompanied by three broad questions rather than the somewhat limited Likert scale. The questions asked were:

1. How do you feel upon being confronted by this appeal?
2. How would you behave in this situation?
3. What reasons can you give to justify your behaviour?

In this way, a preliminary analysis of affect, behaviour and cognition (and the inter-relationships between these concepts) was made possible.

Demand effects in general, and socially-desirable responses in particular, were countered in three ways. First, all subjects were guaranteed anonymity. Second, subjects were instructed that there were no right or wrong answers and encouraged to respond honestly. Thirdly, since the dilemmas presented were typical, everyday occurrences which the subjects had frequently encountered, failure to subscribe to a prosocial response was less likely to cause feelings of moral inadequacy inasmuch as they were less likely to be sensitive to the need for social approval over ordinary, typical behaviours.

Nevertheless, the principal reason for using "everyday" dilemmas is that such dilemmas allow for a more authentic response on the part of the subject. Such dilemmas are "sensitive to the everyday experience of people in ordinary life situations" (Haan, 1982, p.

1096) and do not require an imaginative leap that might render the response unreliable. It is this "everyday experience" that such dilemmas attempt to open up for further scrutiny.

Empathy in Research

Empathy has been defined as "emotional matching" (Eisenberg, 1986) This refers to an affective state that stems from the apprehension of another's emotional state and that is congruent with it. Such an affective state consists of "the vicarious experiencing of a range of emotions consistent with those of others" (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987, p. 91).

It is therefore empathy that allows the subject to respond realistically to the moral dilemma posed. He/she does this by imaginatively assuming the role of the decision-maker in the dilemma (eg. the pedestrian confronted by a beggar) and then acting on that person's behalf. Obviously, it is easier to empathize with a situation similar to one that has also been encountered by oneself - there is less cognitive effort required since one has an immediate referential field (of memories, associations etc.) at one's disposal. It is far more difficult for instance, to imagine oneself considerably removed in time and place (such as Kohlberg's dilemmas might require). Once again, this serves to highlight the value of employing "everyday dilemmas." Even if the subjects have not experienced identical situations in their own lives, the everyday nature of the dilemmas posed go far enough to make an empathic response possible.

Moreover, since empathy (or the absence thereof) is critical for a meaningful response to a moral dilemma, it is psychologically interesting in its own right. Moral dilemmas and picture/story narratives have frequently been used to assess empathy (Feshbach & Roe, 1968; Liebhart, 1972; Eisenberg-Berg & Lennon, 1980). In each instance, the subject is considered to have responded empathically if she/he reports an emotion identical to the story protagonist.

Clearly, moral dilemmas and semi-projective stories, whether hypothetical or not, are regarded as valuable research tools inasmuch as such stories provide an opportunity for the

expression of empathically-induced emotion. Moreover, the extent to which subjects are capable of taking up this opportunity (to the extent that they may fail to respond empathically at all) is itself worthy of psychological investigation. Needless to say, this is the approach adopted here.

Consequently, where a subject reported little or no feeling-response to a moral dilemma, this was not automatically attributed to the abstract nature of the dilemma and disregarded, but was considered to be relevant to that person's social orientation and emotional status. This possibility was then pursued in the interviews.

Interviews

Having selected the six richest protocols in the manner described above, the respondents were then each interviewed on two separate occasions. This was in order to provide greater depth and insight into the prosocial feelings of the subjects. Stones (1985) has also suggested that questionnaires and written methods of data collection result in responses that are distant, highly reflective and removed from the original experience. The spoken word by contrast, is considered to bring the speaker much closer to their lived experience.

> Each word a participant speaks reflects his or her consciousness. The participants' thoughts become embodied in their words (Ely *et al*, 1991, p. 87).

The link between language and consciousness, highlighted by Vygotsky (1987), has already been remarked upon. In order to preserve the integrity/validity of subjects' expression, the ensuing interviews were conducted in an informal, nondirective manner, the interviewer attempting to influence the subject as little as possible.

Specific questions were nevertheless formulated based on an intensive reading of the

subjects' original protocols. These and other areas were explored in an open-ended fashion during the interviews which were self-determining in duration. The interview-structure is perhaps best described as "semi-structured":

> Semi-structured interviews are guided, concentrated, focused, and open-ended communication events that are co-created by the investigator and interviewee(s) and occur outside the stream of everyday life. The questions, probes and prompts are written in the form of a flexible interview guide (Miller & Crabtree, 1992).

The interviews were tape-recorded and subsequently transcribed. The two transcribed interviews conducted with subject one appear in appendix four. The interviews were then subjected to analysis, tentative hypotheses were constructed, and the subjects were then engaged in a further cycle of interviews.

By the end of the process therefore, the researcher had access to textual material from three sources: the original protocol and two successive follow-up interviews. This was considered to be both sufficient for the research and in an appropriate form for further analysis. Brown *et al* (1989) agree with Ricoeur's insight that the reading of text is the most appropriate methodology for a human science:

> Ricoeur argues for what he calls the "paradigm of the text" and then shows how "meaningful human action" as the object of the human (social) sciences conforms to the paradigm of the text (p. 144).

Such a paradigm is clearly predicated on the assumption that there exists a practical identity between text, language and consciousness. Since the analytic techniques employed here amount to nothing more sophisticated than an interpretation of a text (the protocols and

transcribed interviews), it is fair to say that the present research falls squarely within such a paradigm. This is also what renders the present research "hermeneutic".

Analysis of Data

Miller and Crabtree (1992) point out that good qualitative research is not based upon the imposition of some preconceived analytic framework. Rather, the analysis style should proceed on the basis of the needs posed by the research question, the constraints set by the raw data, and the benefits afforded by prior research:

> The initial choice of analysis style depends, for the most part, on the research question and goal, on what is already known about the topic of interest, and on the data collection techniques used. When the goal is subjective understanding, exploration, and/or generation of new insights/hypotheses and when scant knowledge already exists, the more interpretive styles are preferable (p. 20).

Accordingly, the researcher found himself in a kind of methodological no-man's-land - on familiar territory (given the volume of research that has been done in the field of prosocial behaviour) but nevertheless on unsure footing (given that few researchers' have attempted to look holistically/contextually at the phenomenon). The solution was to adopt an approach that is both phenomenological and hermeneutic. It was hoped to honour the self-reports of the subjects while still retaining a critical connection to the literature throughout the interpretive process.

An alternative way of conceptualizing this relationship is to imagine the researcher occupying a middle-ground between the raw data (protocols and transcripts) and pre-existing theory, and connected to both by virtue of what Packer and Addison (1989) describe as the "hermeneutic circle". This is said to consist of the forward arc of projection and the return

arc of uncovering.

> The former makes understanding possible, and the latter, we shall see, provides the possibility for evaluating an interpretive account (p. 275).

Evaluation (ie., evaluating validity and reliability) is the subject of the next section. Understanding, notwithstanding whether such understanding is rigorous or not, is dependent on what Packer and Addison refer to as the "fore-structure" of projection. It is this "fore-structure" that guides interpretation, that delimits the range of possible interpretations, so that these do not become mere conjectures. But what exactly is a "fore-structure" and how is it operationalized in the present research?

Packer and Addison describe a "fore-structure" as "a preliminary initial accessibility, a stance or perspective ... that opens up the field being investigated" (p. 277). Edwards (1993) in his discussion of the phenomenological case study method, emphasises how pre-existing case-law can be utilized to provide such a perspective. Such case-law acts as a "hermeneutic frame" and has the effect of opening the eyes of researchers to the range and depth of new phenomena. However, given that there is no tradition of case-law in the field of moral responding, the researcher was compelled to turn to the literature for an appropriate "hermeneutic frame". As Edwards (1993) writes:

> ... complex theoretical frameworks from the existing literature are appropriated as a means of deepening our understanding of a case for which there is not a readily applicable case law (p. 14).

Miller and Crabtree (1992) use the term "template" to describe this type of hermeneutic frame. They also caution against using a "template" uncritically and without regard for the

text that one is seeking to interpret:

> Templates can be a theoretical, behavioral, or linguistic structure. Whatever the template, it is applied to the text with the intent of identifying the meaningful units or parts. The units are behaviour or language units ... If the text reveals inadequacies in the template, modifications and revisions are made and the text is reexamined (p. 19).

A fundamental idea here is that there must be *interaction* between the text and the "fore-structure", "hermeneutic frame", or "template" of the researcher. Dialogue with the text is the only way to avoid forcing an interpretation upon the data. It is for this reason that data collection and analysis proceeded concurrently - so that the researcher was able to confirm or disconfirm hypotheses arising out of the application of a loose theoretical framework to the initial data. By going back to the subjects and again letting them have their say, the researcher was able to modify/discard aspects of his "hermeneutic frame". This feature of the research (continually turning back to the text to consult the raw data) may be described as phenomenological.

Blumer (1954) introduces the term "sensitizing concepts" to give expression to the middle ground occupied by the researcher ie., that continually refined space between theory and data.

> ... sensitizing concepts give the user a general sense of reference and guidance in approaching empirical instances. While definitive concepts provide prescriptions of what to see, sensitizing concepts merely suggest direction along which to look ... the sensitizing concept is more responsive to empirical data (p. 7).

To this end the researcher utilized a number of "sensitizing concepts" in his initial readings

of the protocol and interview texts. These concepts were drawn from the literature on prosocial responding and provided a language with which to make sense of the complex moral content of the texts analyzed. Ely *et al* (1991) write:

> It is important, however, that researchers also try to form and articulate their criteria for the winnowing and sorting process (p. 100).

Accordingly, it must be stated that the concepts used fall into two categories: cognition and affect. Specific concepts include *role-taking*, *cognitive attributions* and *moral reasoning* as well as *empathy*, *sympathy*, *personal distress*, *shame* and *guilt*. These are all fairly well described in the literature review.

It must be emphasized that the use of these terms was merely intended to provide what Packer and Addison have described as "an initial accessibility" to the data. Thereafter, interpretation proceeded by rigorous interrogation of applied concepts and emerging themes through reference to the raw data. Bulmer (1979) describes the process clearly:

> Concept and observation are interdependent ... Concepts are not just developed out of observations, but neither are they imposed *a priori* categories ... for theories are not developed deductively or inductively, but both deductively and inductively. There is a constant interplay between the observation of realities and the formation of concepts, between research and theorizing, between perception and explanation (p. 659).

The fourteen steps described below represent an attempt to operationalize the principles described above.

The Research Sequence

In the light of the above discussion and given the range of experiences activated by the initial dilemma, it was considered appropriate to modify the traditional Duquesne phenomenological method (that progressively synthesizes a "general structure" out of "natural meaning units"). Edwards (1993) refers to the inability of the Duquesne method to explicate complex phenomena adequately:

> Instead of an account of the essence of a phenomenon, all that is achieved is an unhelpful lowest common denominator. In such cases what is needed is a differentiated description ... (p. 5).

The steps set out below therefore represent a partial amalgam of the method employed by Giorgi (1992a) and the method described by Stones (1985), and also incorporate additions and alterations made by the researcher. The sequence of steps were:

1. Each of the initial six protocols was read in its entirety to obtain a global sense of the whole.

2. A closer reading of each protocol was conducted. Potentially relevant or meaningful statements were identified (in this the researcher utilized his judgement).

3. Subjects were engaged in semi-structured interviews wherein they were requested to elaborate upon those aspects of their protocols that had been identified as psychologically interesting. The interviews were nevertheless

open-ended and occasionally touched on other areas the subject deemed to be important.

4. These interviews were transcribed and added to the original protocols to form a combined data source (referred to hereafter as the "transcript") .

5. Each of the six transcripts was read in its entirety. Again, the purpose was to achieve a holistic sense of the text.

6. Each transcript was read with a more reflective attitude, the goal being to establish analyzable constituents. Each time a transition in meaning was experienced by the researcher, a mark was made on the transcription. This continued until the entire transcript was broken into meaning units.

7. Each meaning unit was interrogated and ultimately classified into one of three categories:

(i) expression relating to affect
(ii) expression relating to cognition.
(iii) expression relating to behaviour.

It should be noted that these categories correspond to the initial questions posed in conjunction with the moral dilemma. When it was unclear where a particular meaning unit might most appropriately be placed, it was drafted into two or even all three categories. It was at this stage that the researcher first employed the "sensitizing concepts" referred to above, using them as an

implicit guideline with which to interrogate the meaning units already identified and so classify them.

8. The original meaning units were transformed into a language expressive of the psychological import of the subject's original words. "Sensitising concepts" were again employed. Any inferences the researcher made ie., conclusions that are not self-apparent from the subjects' own expression, were bracketed in the text. The transformed meaning units of subject one appear in appendix five.

9. Tentative profiles (three for each subject) were then condensed on the basis of the analysis of natural meaning units. Further questions were synthesized and subjects were engaged in a second round of semi-structured interviews. The primary purpose was to confirm or refute any inferences made, specifically the use of conceptual terms (such as "cognitive role-taking" or "shame"), by once again cross examining the subjects regarding their experience. The secondary purpose was to generate more data.

10. Based on the analysis of these second interviews (which repeated steps five to eight), each of the three profiles developed for each subject were refined or added to. The three part profiles of subject one appear in appendix six.

11. The three distinct profiles were then integrated into a single profile for each subject. At this stage the researcher attempted to synthesize all the expressed intentions derived from the meaning units and combine them into a single account expressive of the subjects' general prosocial orientation. As Dilthey (1900/1976) puts it:

> ... the whole must be understood in terms of its individual parts, individual parts in terms of the whole ... So understanding of the whole, and of the parts, are interdependent (p. 259).

General themes or contradictions (between affect and cognition, for instance) were fully described. Inferences were again supported by reference to the transcripts and where aspects were unclear, these were described as such.

12. The raw data, part-profiles and synthesized profiles were submitted to a co-researcher for scrutiny. Additional insights resulted in further modifications or were assimilated into the synthesized profiles.

13. These profiles were submitted to the original subjects for their perusal. Where subjects disagreed with interpretations made, this was noted in the profile (in an addendum). The final six profiles appear in appendix seven.

14. In the final stage, the synthesized profiles were again rigorously interrogated in order to identify and extract common themes descriptive of the response of each of the six subjects. Seven themes were so identified. Each was fully described in terms of the articulated experience of each subject. A general synopsis of each theme was then explicated. These appear in the following section.

By the end of the process, the researcher therefore possessed seven themes descriptive of the affectual, cognitive, and hypothesized behavioural response of each subject to a hypothetical moral dilemma, a moral dilemma requiring a trade-off between the interests of self and others.

It should be noted that the final thematic profiles are not purely descriptive. In the first instance, the expression of the subjects had been transformed into a language depicting the psychological perspective (consisting of the "sensitizing concepts" already referred to), and in the second instance, general themes had been inferred through comparison of the original meaning units. The result was not so much a condensed description, as a thorough-going interpretation rooted in the raw data and supported by argument. Ely *et al* (1991) describe the result:

> The participants have spoken and now the interviewer is responding to their words, concentrating his or her intuition or intellect on the process. What emerges is a synthesis of what the participant has said and how the researcher has responded (p. 100).

The validity and reliability of the final thematic profiles are discussed below.

Reliability and Validity

Validity in traditional research refers to the degree to which the results obtained are an accurate reflection of the phenomenon under scrutiny: do the results measure what they purport to measure? Reliability refers to the degree to which the results are reproducible: given the same methodology, will another researcher produce identical results? Failure in either sphere implies that the research lacks rigour and is therefore unscientific.

Brown *et al* (1989) question the applicability of these criteria to interpretive inquiry:

> The interest in interpretive methodologies among psychologists at present calls for a redefinition, in hermeneutic terms, of these basic notions of research

practice - a rethinking of what reliability and validity mean (p. 156).

Packer and Addison (1989) concur. They argue that interpretive research differs from the natural sciences inasmuch as the starting point is one of engagement with the phenomenon rather than detachment (in the service of objectivity). Validity is therefore a matter of getting this relationship right, rather than appealing to some objective standard of truth. They declare that it is useless to claim that one's interpretation reflects "the way things really are", because "the way things really are" depends ultimately on the perspective one adopts.

> Only in this century has there been a general recognition that the search for epistemological security can never succeed. This suggests that we would be better employed working to open up new perspectives, rather than trying to justify whatever perspective we currently hold (p. 291).

But this does not imply that there are not good and bad interpretations. Indeed, Packer and Addison are clear that some interpretations are better than others. Just because a correspondence theory of truth is untenable in the human sciences, does not mean we should surrender to the chaos of "anything goes". But what criteria should be adopted to separate the theoretical wheat from the chaff?

According to Billig (1991) the yardstick to employ is one of "reasonableness" or "persuasiveness". In other words, one must *argue* on behalf of one's interpretation. A good (more valid) interpretation may therefore be distinguished from a poor one by virtue of its rhetorical vigour. Argument is the key:

> There is one thing common to these different reconstructions of rhetorical meaning; they are themselves arguments. The analyst cannot stand back from

> argumentation ... Because of this, and not despite it, there is the possibility of critique (p. 23).

Traditional approaches to evaluation, such as the requirements that an interpretation be internally coherent, supported by external evidence, validated by intersubjective agreement and capable of predicting future events, are not dismissed as irrelevant. Rather, these aspects are merely incorporated into the argument with the proviso that they should not be considered to refer to some timeless and objective standard of truth. As Polkinghorne (1983) puts it: "There is no pure truth that lies outside human engagement in the world" (p. 224). Following this line of thought, it is argued on various grounds that the final profiles are indeed valid.

Internal coherence (Packer & Addison, 1989) or logical consistency (Knapp, 1981) is often regarded as essential to validity. Given that the synthesized profiles are the outcome of analyzing the part-profiles in relation to each other and the emerging whole (as Dilthey (1900/1976) described), it is argued that the interpretations fulfil this criterion. Moreover, since this process entailed subjecting the use of specific terms (such as guilt or empathy) to examination, it is argued that construct validity was also improved.

Hirsch (1967) proffers a dissenting view regarding coherence. He argues that the perspective adopted by the researcher shapes his/her reading of the text so that any coherence that emerges is often illusory and due to the researcher's predisposition to look only for confirming evidence. It is for this reason that the researcher's perspective was made explicit and operationalized in the form of "sensitizing concepts". Similarly, it is because of this concern that the researcher was particularly careful to look for *dis*confirming evidence (evidence that might contradict emerging themes) and to document any contradictions and ambiguities that might inhere in the data.

The criterion of intersubjective agreement, most appropriately operationalized through the establishment of consensus among researchers (Stones, 1985), is also argued to have been

met. This was achieved by submitting all the raw data, part-profiles and synthesized profiles to a co-researcher who then subjected the raw data and profiles to independent analysis. It should be noted that the co-researcher was not familiar with the literature on prosocial responding and therefore did not share the "hermeneutic frame" of the researcher. "Access" to the data was therefore different. This was a deliberate attempt to avoid the possibility of what Packer and Addison (1989) refer to as "collective delusion" (p. 285).

> We would seem to be setting a tougher test of an interpretation if we tried to convince others who have a different perspective. We would then need to show that our interpretation was viable, and also that it acknowledged the possibility of other perspectives ... (p. 285).

Consequently, the co-researcher was engaged in dialogue with the intention of addressing any criticisms and incorporating any insights offered by the co-researcher where this was agreed to be appropriate. Brown *et al* (1989) write:

> The logic of validation is operationalized most clearly when readers are able to discuss their respective interpretations of the same interview text (p. 162).

Hirsch (1967) suggests that it is necessary to move out of the text and search for external evidence to support one's interpretation. This is said to be necessary to avoid becoming "trapped in the hermeneutic circle" (p. 165). Hirsch proposes that the author of the text should be consulted as to his/her intentions. Needless to remark, this is highly problematic:

> If our research participants disagree with us we may indeed have made significant errors of interpretation. But we cannot rule out the possibility,

> perhaps small, that they disagree because they misunderstand their own activity ... (p. 284).

Such misunderstanding might arise because of unconscious activities such as denial or because of ideological factors. Clearly, the author's intention cannot function as an evaluative norm. Nevertheless, the authors (subjects) were consulted regarding their intentions, both in the second round of interviews, and at the end of the process when they were presented with the synthesized profiles. Their comments and criticisms were briefly noted in an addendum to each profile and these were then incorporated into the subsequent discussion where they were addressed. In this way it was hoped to make the profiles more comprehensive and hence a better reflection of the phenomenon they purport to reflect.

The traditional natural scientific criterion of prediction does not apply in its conventional form to interpretive accounts. Taylor (1979) maintains that it is impossible to predict the course of human affairs or behaviour in a precise manner because to do so would require that one preempt all cultural innovation and transformation. This does not imply that interpretive research should not intend the future. Packer and Addison (1989) write:

> Interpretive research is a kind of praxis or practical activity, and its aim is not to describe the world in a detached manner but to act in the world, in an engaged manner. Interpretive inquiry has an emancipatory interest, not an instrumental one (p. 287).

Lather (1986) understands emancipation of this variety to refer to the fostering of an awareness of contradictions (social or otherwise) and a concomitant attempt to draw attention to the possibility of social transformation. Whether this has been achieved or not is debatable. Nevertheless, this was one of the reasons the synthesized profiles were shown to the subjects - to hopefully catalyze a deeper understanding of themselves on their part.

Regarding reliability, it is fair to say that the inclusion of a co-researcher goes some way toward satisfying this requirement. Beyond this, however, the researcher has included raw data in the appendixes and has made the hermeneutic frame clear so that the interpretive process may be reenacted by anyone with an impulse to do so.

In this way, it is argued that the present research is both valid and reliable, not necessarily because it conforms to any objective standard, but because it was carefully done and performed always with an ear to the raw data itself.

CHAPTER THREE: RESULTS

Synopsis: Moral reasoning

Reason is highly valued. The subject reflects upon the situation and his/her reaction to it. This may be for its own sake or because the subject does not want to be perceived as being stupid. Alternatively, reasoning is employed because the subject distrusts an emotional response. An appeal that is reasonable also merits a more favourable response.

Moral reasoning typically encompasses two realizations: firstly, awareness of a wealth or status differential between the subject and the person/s making an appeal, and secondly, that the subject's position of privilege is not deserved. The status differential is regarded as essentially arbitrary although the subject may acknowledge social and historical forces.

Moral reasoning may be underpinned by a value system of which the subject is more or less cognizant. An explicit belief in the equality of all human beings may underlie the reasoning process. An ethic of care may also be invoked. The latter value may flow from the religious identity of the subject.

Reasoning gives rise to a sense of moral obligation or conscience. This may be a generalized feeling of indebtedness towards a particular group, or may be more specific ie., directed towards the person making the appeal. Conscience may also manifest as a voice. Having a conscience may depend upon the internalization of values coupled with a capacity to feel.

Failure to honour this felt obligation may result in feelings of embarrassment, self-consciousness, and more commonly, guilt. Where the subject has consciously embraced a particular value system (eg. the Christian injunction to care for others), a feeling of obligation is less generalized and guilt may not be endemic. Where the subject is less cognizant of the values that underlie his/her reasoning, a sense of obligation may be attributed to historical

circumstance and guilt may be correspondingly more debilitating. Paradoxically, helping behaviour may be less likely.

Coupled with moral reasoning, a process of role-taking may occur whereby the subject takes the perspective of the person making the appeal, or takes the perspective of a fictitious other (an imaginary third person who stands outside the situation). This may facilitate awareness of the existing status differential. The subject may become aware of the person's helplessness. This may evoke feelings of sympathy but also personal distress such as a sense of powerlessness. Moral reasoning also plays a role here since personal distress implies that the subject is aware that the situation is unfair and that social change is unlikely. Equally, sympathy requires an awareness that the person making the appeal is not in a position to help themselves.

Synopsis: Empathy

Empathy is felt if the subject has shared a similar experience to the person making the appeal. It is easier to empathize with someone if the subject can relate to that person. Empathy is enhanced if the person is known to the subject. A more general recognition of shared experience (eg. a recognition of shared powerlessness) also facilitates empathy. In this respect, empathy is closely related to role-taking: shared experience makes it possible for the subject to take the perspective of the other and feel equivalent emotions. Dialogue is acknowledged as facilitating empathy.

Empathy may give rise to feelings of sympathy, particularly where the subject has personal experience of the issue or can relate well to the person making the appeal (eg. an aged beggar may serve as a reminder of one's own grandfather). Moral reasoning may also play a role in the emergence of sympathy: reasoning is necessary in order to deduce that there is some shared experience (eg. the beggar is powerless) and that the appeal is authentic and

valid. Feelings of sympathy result in helping behaviour and may override irritability or a bad mood.

Empathy may also give rise to a sense of moral obligation ie., conscience is not necessarily the outcome of moral reasoning alone. Empathy may heighten the subject's awareness of the unfairness of the situation and enhance feelings of obligation. This feeling of obligation may be felt to be more authentic than an obligation that is arrived at by reasoning alone: an empathic reaction is more spontaneous, is not motivated by guilt, and springs from within. In this sense, empathy is closer to an expression of free will. For this reason giving out of an empathic sense may be joyful: one is fully acknowledging the other. This may give rise to intrinsic rewards.

Powerful empathic feelings may threaten to overwhelm the subject if he/she has intimate experience of the issue. A careful process of reasoning may be necessary to manage these emotions. Alternatively, empathy may be limited by the life experience of the subject. An inability to identify with the experience of the other may result in a feeling of alienation.

A concurrent feeling of powerlessness and frustration may arise out of the cognition that the subject does not share any common ground with the other person: they are from different worlds. Alternatively, these feelings may arise as a consequence of a reasoning-process that leads to the realization that firstly, the situation is unfair, and secondly, the problem is too great for the subject to tackle alone. This may paralyse any attempt to assist.

Under these circumstances initial empathic feelings that arise out of identification with the victims give way to a personal distress reaction: empathic emotions such as frustration and helplessness are appropriated in an undifferentiated fashion as one's own emotions. These may then become endemic. Depression may result.

Synopsis: Mood

Mood was agreed to exert a major influence over behaviour. Mood may also condition the subject's emotional response to a situation. This may occur irrespective of the subject thinking about the situation.

A bad mood is associated with lessened feelings of empathy/sympathy, greater irritability and heightened self-focus. The manner of the appeal may exacerbate irritability, particularly where the person is experienced as intrusive. The subject will therefore be less likely to help. A bad mood may be the result of an unpleasant experience or event, or a response to unusual circumstances. Alternatively, the causes of a bad mood may be unclear to the subject. A self-focused state may lead to personal distress which then feeds back into a bad mood such that a bad mood becomes self-perpetuating. Alternatively, empathy may override a bad mood and result in helping behaviour.

A good mood by contrast, increases the probability of the subject donating. The subject may feel moved to assist. This posture may be regarded by the subject as more authentic than that of being self-focused. A positive response is more spontaneous ie., it arises from within. A good mood may be the result of good fortune which the subject will then be inclined to share with the person making the appeal. A good mood may be regarded by the subject as his/her natural state.

Where mood does not appear to play a major role, this may be due to a preoccupation with the necessity to override one's emotions because of perceived dangers associated with an emotional response. The abstract nature of the appeal may mitigate against mood exerting a major effect.

Synopsis: Guilt

The subject may refer to feelings of guilt, self-consciousness, embarrassment or shame. These feelings may be attributed to his/her group-identity, specifically: membership of the "white" race-group. Alternatively, he/she may understand guilt to arise out of a process of moral reasoning.

Where guilt is attributed to group-identity, guilt-feelings are considered to lack validity and to be inappropriate. The subject may attempt to deny guilt-feelings on this basis. The subject may argue that he/she is not personally responsible for the suffering of others and may postulate that guilt is the unconscious outcome of an unwanted group-identity and therefore imposed unfairly. The media may exacerbate this process. Anger may be expressed at the contention that the subject has an obligation because of his/her group-identity.

Guilt may also be understood to arise out of a process of moral reasoning that encompasses two realisations: firstly, that one has an obligation towards those who are less fortunate, and secondly, that insufficient is being done to honour this felt obligation such that there is a discrepancy between one's actions and convictions. Such a sense of obligation is colour-blind.

Where a feeling of obligation is constituted through a positive attempt to embrace certain values (eg. Christian values) rather than a retrospective awareness of indebtedness (because of one's position of privilege), guilt is a less likely outcome. Under such circumstances, charitable behaviour is both more likely and more likely to be judged as sufficient. The same may be said of a felt obligation that arises out of an empathic connection with the needy person. Helping behaviour may nevertheless also be initiated in order to reduce possible guilt and negative self-evaluation that might arise if the subject does not heed the dictates of his conscience. This type of behaviour is less spontaneous (it is the outcome of intellectual reflection) and may therefore be regarded by the subject as less authentic.

Alternatively, the subject might anticipate guilt and self-resentment if he/she does assist, or assists but then attempts to withdraw from the situation. This might arise out of the cognition that one has done insufficient to help. Under such circumstances the subject may become self-focused (as a way of avoiding emotional involvement). Guilt might then be attributed to one's group-identity in order to deny the validity of resulting guilt-feelings.

It is also possible that an awareness of one's own selfishness (arrived at through moral reasoning) is constituted through an awareness of failing to live up to a wider obligation. Whether this wider obligation is the outcome of a felt group-identity or is itself constituted through a process of moral reasoning (or a combination of both) is unclear.

Synopsis: Alienation

Alienation is described in terms of being a self-focused state that diminishes the subject's ability to feel empathy for the other, or take that person's perspective. Helping behaviour is therefore less likely. A feeling of alienation may result from an inability to identify with the experience of others because the subject has not shared that experience. Alternatively, alienation might arise because of the perception that one's values are vastly different to those of the other ie., there is an awareness of a unsurpassable moral gulf. Alienation might also be the outcome of a bad mood. There is a danger that alienation may become self-perpetuating: it leads to a self-focused state that gives rise to unpleasant feelings that may promote further self-preoccupation or exacerbate a bad mood.

In the absence of empathy, intellectual reasoning may be necessary in order to make sense of the situation, although this may be regarded as less authentic/spontaneous. Moral reasoning may nevertheless break the cycle referred to above. Similarly, dialogue may be acknowledged as a possible way of establishing some common ground and thereby reviving empathic feelings.

Alienation may give rise to feelings of powerlessness (the subject feels he/she cannot alter the situation) and hence to frustration. The perception may arise that the other person occupies a different world. It may be acknowledged that this difference stems from social and historical processes ie., that different people have been exposed to differing experiences as a consequence of social structure. This realization (that encompasses some moral reasoning and may heighten awareness of one's own privilege) may exacerbate feelings of helplessness. Personal distress is therefore likely to result from a sense of alienation (as one's initial empathic feelings become self-focused).

Because further personal distress might be anticipated by the subject if he/she attempts to assist the other person, the subject may adopt a defensive self-focused posture that mitigates against further emotional involvement and promotes withdrawal from the situation. This posture exacerbates a subjective sense of alienation. The subject may then become angry or irritated at the person who attempts to intrude upon this state by making demands upon the subject. If alienation is coupled with blame intense hostility may be felt.

Where the subject does not feel alienated, it would appear that feelings of empathy translate naturally into sympathy and that this then motivates helping behaviour. Feelings of personal distress are not reported.

Synopsis: Group identity

A group-identity may be acknowledged by the subject. A sense of group-identity may be understood to arise out of the reactions of others towards the subject or as something that is given to the subject by others ie., socially constructed. This identity nevertheless becomes internalized. Group-identity may even come to be regarded as so intrinsic that any ethical judgement regarding its appropriateness is precluded.

A sense of obligation may be understood to arise from one's group-identity or from

general patriotic feelings towards one's country. It is more likely, however, that a felt obligation arises out of a process of moral reasoning (awareness of an unfair status differential) or because the subject embraces certain values that require charitable behaviour. Patriotic feelings may lead to empathy and sympathy.

Irrespective of how a sense of obligation is understood to arise, guilt feelings may be attributed to one's group-identity. They may also be understood to flow from the reactions of others (the way in which the subject values his/her group-identity depends upon how others view his/her group). Because guilt is understood to arise externally, guilt feelings may be described as inappropriate, invalid and irrational. Guilt may be understood to be the outcome of an unconscious process. The subject will typically argue that he/she is not personally responsible for past injustices that his/her group may have perpetrated. These injustices may be at odds with the subject's own values. The subject might maintain that his/her birth into a privileged group was an accident of history ie., arbitrary.

There may even be anger at the contention that one has incurred an obligation because of one's group-identity. The subject may also be angry that guilt-feelings are seemingly thrust upon him/her despite the fact that these feelings are not deserved.

As an alternative to preoccupation with group-identity, the subject may emphasise the importance of free will. There is the suggestion that it may be necessary to devalue the importance of group-identity (in favour of free will) in order to preserve self-esteem, particularly where one's group has been historically denigrated.

Giving freely (out of a sense of empathy or compassion or freely chosen values) may be understood as more ethical than giving because one wishes to avoid guilt-feelings (the outcome of group-identity). The latter type of behaviour is externally motivated. Change should therefore take the form of an inner renewal.

In a similar vein, the subject may regard it as important that he/she establishes his/her own identity, goals and values rather than being dictated to by outside factors. Reason may

be necessary to achieve this, particularly the working through of experiences that are at odds with one's expectations and beliefs. Social action that flows from this type of identity will be more authentic. Moreover, such action need not be narrowly judgemental ie., authentic self-identity need not be bound by a particular set of values that dictates a single perspective.

Synopsis: Self versus Other

The subject may acknowledge an obligation towards other people. This may stem from a process of moral reasoning and role-taking that encompasses an awareness of not deserving one's position of privilege. This may be described as a sense of conscience.

Feelings of empathy and sympathy may also be reported. These may be aroused by shared experience with the other person or may arise out of the perception that the situation is unjust (moral reasoning). Sympathy may be the outcome of a conscience that requires an empathic connection be established. Dialogue may be used to achieve this.

Despite a feeling of obligation and/or feelings of sympathy, the subject may not necessarily engage in helping behaviour. The subject may defend a self-interested response on the grounds that he/she has a right to ignore the appeal. Self-interest may be argued to be necessary for one's own well-being. Class and wealth stratification may be argued to be inevitable. Utilitarian arguments may also be presented to justify a lack of charity: nothing is achieved by the donation of one person; the cost may be prohibitive; charity may be claimed to perpetuate the problem by fostering dependency; the apparent need of the person may not be urgent.

There may therefore be a tension operating between an other-oriented response that is demanded by feelings of obligation and sympathy, and a self-oriented response that the subject attempts to defend. This tension may exist despite the cognition that being other-focused is rational and moral while being self-focused is irrational and selfish.

Self-focus may be understood as a simple expression of self-interested desire (ie., greed) or as a consequence of a bad mood. It is also possible that being self-focused is a defensive posture aimed at avoiding feelings of personal distress, particularly helplessness and frustration, by impeding any further role-taking and empathy (and hence emotional investment in the needs of the other). Rationalizing the situation (as the above arguments attempt to do) may therefore be a defensive strategy. An attempt on the part of the other to intrude upon this self-interested state may result in irritation. Guilt-feelings may nevertheless follow upon the resulting self-interested response. A cycle may ensue.

This need not be the case, however: reservations regarding donating may arise out of genuine reflection upon the presenting situation and may guide helping behaviour rather than preclude it. In this event it is likely that neither personal distress nor guilt will eventuate. A self-focused state may be overcome through dialogue.

Feelings of sympathy may be mitigated by various factors: the frequency of encounters with others in need may reduce sympathy in specific cases; suspicion may arise regarding the integrity of the person making the appeal and the apparent urgency of his/her need. A further source of ambiguity may be the recognition that although dishonesty and fraud are to be reproached, they are nevertheless a consequence of poverty. A tension between blame and sympathy is therefore apparent, a tension that typically resolves itself into the opposing views that individuals are responsible for their own actions but are also the victims of society. Consequently, a reasoning process may be necessary to make sense of the situation.

The relative balance of blame against sympathy has implications for social action: the subject is more likely to respond positively if he/she believes the person is not responsible for their fate.

CHAPTER FOUR: DISCUSSION

Seven central themes have been identified in the response of students to a hypothetical moral dilemma. *Moral reasoning* would appear to play an important role much as Kohlberg (1981, 1984) would have anticipated. *Empathy* as described by Hoffman (1981, 1982, 1984) also plays a major part. *Mood* is important too, which at first glance makes simple common-sense. *Guilt* was another recurrent theme. But what of a debilitating sense of *alienation* from others? And what of the ways in which *group-identity* was represented? And how do all these factors constellate into a single orientation, perhaps even a single moment, when one human being decides in favour of *self or other*?

In the discussion that follows each of the above dimensions will be explored in relation to the literature, in relation to each other, and in relation to the broad questions that inspired this research in the first place, namely, what factors form the basis of a prosocial response and why do such responses differ?

Moral Reasoning

According to Kohlberg (1969) moral reasoning defines the level of a person's moral development. He makes an important distinction between the content of a person's thinking and the form of their thought. Content refers to the rules, values or standards that someone advocates, while form refers to why that person holds a particular value or how he/she justifies a particular stance. Kohlberg believes that it is the form or underlying structure of reasoning that guides moral thinking (see table one).

The distinction between form and content is a valuable one given that five of the six subjects interviewed demonstrated remarkably similar moral content. Specifically, they asserted that a sense of moral obligation arose out of two complementary realizations: firstly,

that they were aware of a wealth or status differential between themselves and the person making the appeal, and secondly, that they were aware that this differential was not deserved ie., that they were not intrinsically entitled to a position of relative privilege. Underlying this argument was an explicit or implicit adherence to the value of equality. Taken at face-value, this would require that each subject employing this line of reasoning be assigned to Kohlberg's stage five (which refers to a concern with equality and mutual obligation). Such an interpretation would, however, be premature.

In the first instance, three subjects demonstrated different categories of moral reasoning at different times, and in relation to different issues. Subject one recognized the indebtedness he has vicariously incurred because of the violation of the principle of equality (a consequence of his birth into a privileged class). Elsewhere, however, his arguments more closely resembled stage four moral reasoning: he defends a lack of charity on the grounds that his contribution would have little impact on broader social problems ie., social action is only ethical if the social order can be thereby transformed. In a similar vein, subject five acknowledged her Christian values that dictate selfless behaviour, but subsequently defended a self-interested response in terms that Kohlberg would probably describe as "instrumental hedonism" (level two). Subject three's response was also equivocal in this respect. The upshot of these irregularities is that the subjects' overall level of moral reasoning may be ambiguous.

A paradox emerges: on the one hand, the subject may speak quite eloquently about moral principles but on the other hand may readily fall back into less "mature" forms of reasoning. But does this imply that Kohlberg's scheme is fundamentally flawed? Gilligan (1978) has taken this to be the case and has proceeded to develop an alternative scheme that does not equate moral maturity with abstract moral reasoning. She nevertheless shares the assumption that someone can be *at* a particular moral stage ie., that there is something tangible about the arguments one makes. This assumption merits some discussion.

Subjects two, four and six were consistent in their adherence to the value of equality. They were significantly consistent in two other respects: a common emphasis on the ability to feel for the other person and a shared likelihood of actually behaving in a prosocial manner. It would therefore appear that a person will more consistently express particular types of moral reasons to the extent that he/she is emotionally invested in the values that underlie those arguments. Mere awareness of those values is clearly insufficient for the purpose of classifying someone in terms of a particular stage. One might as well be faking an authentic belief in the equality of persons: a kind of moral malingering. Emotion is therefore the seal of validity. By focusing on the play of affect, the apparent contradictions in the responses of the other three subjects are rendered more intelligible: they are capable of "regressing" from a higher level of moral reasoning precisely because of a relative paucity of emotional investment at that level. This also explains why prosocial behaviour is more likely when adherence to a belief in equality is coupled with affect. Affect, as Hoffman (1980) suggests, is what binds us to our expressed values and motivates us to actually do something. He refers specifically to the development of empathy in this regard:

> ... the resulting co-occurrence of the empathic affect and moral principle creates a bond between them that is strengthened in subsequent co-occurrences. Moral principles, even when initially learned in cool didactic contexts, may in this way acquire an affective charge and take on the characteristics of a *hot cognition* (Hoffman, 1993, p. 177).

The role of empathy will be elaborated upon in the following section.

It could be argued that Gilligan's (1978) scheme, a reaction against Kohlberg's allegedly masculine emphasis on autonomous reasoning and the ethic of justice, embodies a similar insight. She contends that a definition of moral excellence as rational and objective

rather than emotional and intuitive is a social construction, and argues instead in favour of an ethic of care which embraces the qualities of connectedness and relatedness to others. But what is it that facilitates connectedness if not a *felt* connection with the other? Subject four illustrates an ethic of care quite clearly: his sense of obligation is infused with empathic feeling. The adage he employs that "by giving, you receive" does not refer to a kind of base reciprocity but communicates the recognition that the well-being of himself and the other person are intimately bound together.

It should be bourn in mind that an ethic of care is precisely that: an ethic ie., a value that can be articulated and defended. It is here that Gilligan and Kohlberg overlap theoretically. This ambiguity would suggest that it is possible for someone to articulate a particular value while not necessarily feeling bound to that value, in other words, to separate the cognitive and motivational aspects of a moral response.

Further theoretical connections can be discerned through an examination of the role-taking process which would appear to accompany moral reasoning. In the first instance, a degree of role-taking is clearly necessary in order to discern that there is a status differential between self and other. This may entail taking the perspective of the person making the appeal or perhaps taking the perspective of a fictitious third person (who stands outside the situation). Following Mead (1934), Kohlberg (1976) has emphasized that higher stages of moral development are characterized by an increasing ability to engage in reciprocal role-taking. The ability to take the perspective of the other, in Kohlberg's view, is synonymous with development given that an autonomous self, clearly differentiated from others, is the hallmark of cognitive maturity. What he loses sight of is that role-taking is typically not a purely cerebral affair. As the results of this research demonstrate, one cannot simply adopt the cognitive perspective of the other without taking on some of the associated emotion. Kitwood (1990) writes:

> In general Kohlberg's approach has given relatively little attention to the emotions and feelings in role-taking, where empathy might be regarded as the key element (p. 137).

Therefore, although role-taking may be correlated with a "decentered" autonomous self, it also facilitates an empathic connection with the other. Although predicated upon separation from the other, it is at once a bridge back to that person.

Another interesting paradox is that adherence to an authentic felt obligation is experienced as an act of free choice. The subject is typically more conscious of the values that underlie his/her sense of obligation. Such an obligation is perceived as the spontaneous outgrowth of one's own identity rather than an imposition from without. The subject is therefore less likely to adopt a defensive posture and correspondingly more likely to honour this felt obligation.

But none of this explains why three subjects employed manifestly different moral arguments in their responses. A recognition of affect may reinstate desire into the theoretical equation, but it does not explain why someone might employ forms of reasoning that are not felt to be binding.

One possible solution is offered by Mills (1975) who maintains that expressed motives are merely public accounting practices that are used to justify action to others (and to ourselves) after the fact. In this view, people draw upon a repertoire of conventional moral narratives that are deemed acceptable to society. Hogen (1975) refers to this as "moral rationalization" rather than moral reasoning. But this does not imply that people cynically select an appropriate moral argument and then use it to pull the wool over the eyes of the unsuspecting interviewer. Although limited demand-effects may exist, it is far more likely that the subjects are themselves in the dark. The central difficulty is that the moral choices people make are often spontaneous and intuitive, particularly where an appeal is immediate

and concrete. This may leave the subject struggling to render intelligible an assortment of conflicting emotions: empathy, helplessness, guilt etc. Billig (1991) contends that people draw upon dilemmatic ideological themes manifested in a social store of "common-sense" in order to make sense of their world and their role in it. This perspective does not completely contradict Kohlberg's Piagetian view of development since greater cognitive sophistication would be required in order to grasp such themes in the first place.

It is, nevertheless, clear that the arguments appropriated by the subjects serve particular functions that go beyond mere illumination of their subjective inner states. Subject one defends a lack of charity by arguing quite reasonably that donating money to beggars perpetuates the problem by reinforcing the idea that begging is a feasible lifestyle. It subsequently becomes apparent that an uncharitable response on his part may represent a refusal to attend to the other because of painful empathic arousal. Subject five openly concedes that she uses intellect as a type of "band-aid" for her emotions, presumably referring to guilt-feelings or personal distress. This does not serve to invalidate the arguments themselves, but it does imply that other goals are being achieved by what may initially masquerade as autonomous moral reasoning.

This leads to one final complication: it is clear that the subjects who employed different moral arguments for utilitarian reasons also feel a sense of obligation and even a sense of guilt if this obligation is not honoured. Clearly some value has been infracted. For these subjects it may simply be the case that they possess a different emotional configuration wherein affect is invested at different levels or in the service of different interests. Competing moral voices then become the hallmark of that person's moral responsiveness. This will be elaborated upon below.

Empathy

Empathy, understood as the vicarious experiencing of a range of emotions consistent with those of others (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987), would appear to be the primary affective response to another's need. It is likely that every subject experienced empathy, although empathy may have instantly been transformed into sympathy or personal distress. This process and the subsequent raising of defensive formulations in response to a personal distress reaction, may not have been conscious to the subject.

Shared experience (referred to by four subjects) would appear to be an important factor precipitating empathic feelings. As Hoffman (1975b) has suggested, this may be due to simple conditioning processes:

> ... cues of pain or displeasure from another or from his situation evoke associations with the observer's own past pain, resulting in an empathic affective reaction (p. 613).

It is also likely that higher order processes are involved. In the first instance, a degree of reasoning is required in order to deduce that some shared experience exists. Subject two, for instance, reports that empathy arises out of the intellectual recognition that the beggar is compelled to beg. In this respect language may also mediate an affective response: verbal cues may semantically trigger off associations in the observer's past (Hoffman, 1993). This implies that language may be *consciously* employed to engender empathy, not just on the part of beggars and welfare organizations, but also by the subject himself/herself. Subject four describes how he deliberately engages in dialogue with beggars in order to facilitate empathy on his own part. In this way his initial aversive feelings are overcome.

In a more general vein, it is clear that role-taking is a vital catalyst to the emergence

of empathy and sympathy. Hoffman (1993) maintains that although infants may experience a kind of global undifferentiated empathy, a cognitive sense of self as distinct from other is necessary for a mature empathic response. Cognitive differentiation is necessary in order to take the perspective of the other and in order to act constructively on the basis of vicariously induced emotion. This is also what underlies the ability to take the perspective of broader social groupings and to act on their behalf. Eisenberg and Fabes (1990) maintain that:

> ... cognitively taking the perspective of the other often leads to empathy, which then, in combination with additional cognitive processing, frequently results in sympathy and/or personal distress (p. 132).

This conclusion would appear to be bourn out by the results. Role-taking was invariably accompanied by associated affect. Moreover, subjects one and five relate that empathy is enhanced where the other is "concrete" ie., personally known to themselves. Presumably this facilitates easier role-taking. Shared experience is also important in this regard.

As Eisenberg and Fabes suggest, empathy seems to take one of two possible routes: sympathy or personal distress. As alluded to above, role-taking is seemingly necessary for empathy to translate into sympathy, possibly because an awareness of the other as distinct from oneself is necessary for an other-oriented reaction:

> Once children are aware that others are distinct from themselves, their own empathic distress, which is a parallel response - a more or less exact replication of the victim's presumed distress - may be transformed, at least in part, into a reciprocal feeling of concern for the victim (Hoffman, 1993, p. 163).

Moreover, sympathy is a more likely outcome where the victim is personally known to the subject. Subject one feels sympathy toward an aged beggar he recognizes and subject five reports that she feels more sympathy for street-children than she does for businesses. It would therefore appear that enhanced opportunities for role-taking give rise to both empathy and sympathy. Under ordinary circumstances therefore, greater empathy should translate into greater sympathy.

It is nevertheless clear that empathy does not necessarily translate into sympathy. The process may be confounded. As Weiner (1980, 1986) has proposed, the attributions made by the subject regarding the source of the other person's need would also appear to be a critical element in the emergence or absence of sympathy. Where the person making the appeal is thought to be responsible for his/her plight, anger is the dominant reaction. Where the person is felt to be the victim of social forces, sympathy is evoked. Interestingly, five of the six subjects experienced a tension between sympathy and anger or irritation, suggesting that ambiguity and contradiction are the hallmarks of an emotional response, just as differing levels of moral reasoning may be manifested in a cognitive response. The idea that competing voices and emotions reflect social contradictions that have become internalized will subsequently be expanded upon.

Being confronted by a moral appeal may also give rise to an unpleasant personal distress reaction. A sense of powerlessness would appear to be at the heart of this process. In the first instance, the subject may feel alienated from the person making the appeal. Subject one reports that he cannot identify with the experience of beggars: they are from "different worlds". This inhibits empathic arousal and further supports the contention that role-taking is critical to the emergence of empathy since it is precisely role-taking that is restricted by a dearth of shared experience. Alienation also mitigates against constructive helping behaviour: subject one reports that he does not know where to start the process of upliftment because he shares no "common ground" with the beggar.

Alternatively, the subject may feel powerless to assist because of a reasoning process leading an awareness of the magnitude of the problem or because the empathic feelings themselves are overwhelming. Hoffman (1978) refers to the latter phenomenon as "empathic overarousal". Under such circumstances excessive role-taking may be the culprit. *Self-focused* feelings of frustration and anxiety are the result. This may in turn precipitate defensive stratagems intended to deflect further emotional involvement in the needs of others. Lasch (1984) in his book The Minimal Self: Psychic Survival in Troubled Times, maintains that this is a cultural phenomenon:

> Selective apathy, emotional disengagement from others, renunciation of the past and the future, a determination to live one day at a time - these techniques of emotional self-management, necessarily carried to extremes under extreme conditions, in more moderate form have come to shape the lives of ordinary people under the ordinary conditions of a bureaucratic society widely perceived as a far-flung system of total control. Confronted with an apparently implacable and unmanageable environment, people have turned to self-management (pp. 57-58).

Withdrawal into the self is therefore predicated upon a feeling of powerlessness in relation to the social structure and a pessimistic view of the possibility of social change. A sense of isolation and alienation can thus become self-perpetuating. A further implication is that discourses of blame can be recast as strategies of empathic disengagement. Subject six, however, rather than retreating from the other, employs moral reasoning as a method of managing powerful empathic emotions. In this way he is able to retain a focus on the other.

One final point of interest in relation to empathy is that two subjects report that empathy gives rise to a sense of moral obligation. It would therefore appear that empathic

arousal may invoke particular values and even trigger associated moral reasoning. As has been argued, an authentic sense of conscience is invariably infused with affect. Hoffman (1993) identifies two major moral principles, the principle of benevolence or caring, and the principle of distributive justice according based on need, equality or equity. He argues that:

> Children who are empathic should be especially receptive to principles of caring, need-based justice, equality, and perhaps effort-based justice. In other words, children may be expected to select from the available moral principles, those that fit their empathic dispositions. Children may then internalize the principles with little external pressure because the principles are in keeping with their preexisting empathic leanings (p. 168).

A sense of obligation is therefore constituted through the empathic activation of moral principles that are themselves affectively charged. Hoffman's theory, which would appear to be supported by the results, therefore offers a perspective wherein the ideas of Gilligan and Kohlberg can be seen as complementary: feeling and caring are reintroduced without losing sight of the importance of moral reasoning.

Although not explicitly elaborated, his account also opens the door for an analysis of social structure. After all, where exactly are available moral principles selected from? The answer is surely what Shweder and Much (1987) refer to as the "communicative array", in other words, the language discourses that are prevalent in society at any particular time. The focus of enquiry should then be on the processes that give rise to the communicative agenda. One might also ask why some principles are then selected over others. If this is purely a function of one's "empathic leanings" as Hoffman suggests, then what underlies these leanings? If it is sympathetic experience, then what is structuring these experiences? Some of these questions will be subsequently explored.

Mood

Five of the six subjects maintained that mood would exert a significant influence over their behaviour. Each of them referred to mood as a transient affective state, usually provoked by a specific unpleasant experience or event. This contradicts the traditional social scientific definition of a mood as an enduring style of expression or disposition to react in a certain way over a variety of situations (Fontaine & Diamond, 1994). Why there should be a significant semantic discrepancy between "mood" as a theoretical term and "mood" in its everyday usage, is unclear. Perhaps this incongruity is a manifestation of a general suspicion regarding everyday knowledge on the part of traditional social science.

Mood would appear to be correlated with self- or other-focus: when in a bad mood the subject is likely to be self-focused and the converse is true if he/she is in a good mood. Subject three for instance, reports that she is inclined to *share* her good fortune with others when she is in a good mood. A good mood is therefore characterized by a state of being where one is conscious of and connected to others. A bad mood by contrast, is distinguished by a self-focus that mitigates against any such connection. Subject four refers to being "blocked" by a bad mood. Rosenhan *et al* (1981) have developed the "attentional focus model" which purports to describe how mood influences helping behaviour. In their scheme, a negative mood will actually result in helping behaviour if attention is simultaneously directed outward toward the problems of others. They view mood and attentional focus as independent processes. The results of this research contradict this assumption: mood would appear to largely dictate attentional focus.

Self- or other-focus in turn has implications for empathy and sympathy. In the case of subject four it is precisely the other-oriented flow of empathy that is "blocked" by his bad mood. A bad mood therefore results in a self-focused state which, perhaps because of reduced role-taking, restricts empathising. This in turn decreases the likelihood of the subject engaging

in helping behaviour. Subject four is nevertheless able to overcome his "blocked" feeling, but only through intellectual deliberation leading to a renewed awareness of a sense of obligation. He then consciously initiates dialogue with the other in order to rekindle empathic feelings. It is therefore his affective relations with others that are particularly impoverished by a self-focused state. A good mood, however, facilitates empathy and hence helping behaviour.

What all this implies is that mood, irrespective of its transient nature, is intimately related to the play of emotion, particularly empathy. It is also embedded in and manifested through one's relations with others. This complexity is not reflected in orthodox social psychological writings. Heidegger (1927/1962) uses the term *Befindlichkeit* to refer to what is ordinarily called "state of mind" or "being-in-a-mood". But Heidegger offers a radically different way of thinking about this experience. Gendlin (1978/1988) refers to Heidegger's concept of *Befindlichkeit* in these terms:

> Heidegger's concept denotes how *we sense ourselves in situations*. Whereas feeling is usually thought of as something inward, Heidegger's concept refers to something both inward and outward, but before a split between inside and outside has been made. We are always situated, in situations, in the world, in a context, living in a certain way *with others*, trying to achieve this and avoid that. A mood is not just internal, it is this living in the world .... For Heidegger, humans *are* their living in the world with others. Humans are livings-in and livings-with (p. 44).

This would appear to be a much more adequate description of mood than those offered by traditional social psychology which is clearly hampered by its philosophical underpinnings. Such an analysis is, however, in keeping with the "alternative" approach exemplified by

Moscovici, Billig and others which also purports to challenge a dualistic view of individual and society, albeit largely in regard to cognition alone.

Subject four unwittingly employs another essential Heideggerian term when he asserts that he is more "authentic" as a result of being in a good mood. Similarly, he associates being in a bad mood with being "inauthentic" which describes an inability to respond positively and empathically to others. According to Heidegger, the realization that one is living inauthentically is necessarily synonymous with guilt-feelings. This is elaborated upon in the following section.

Guilt

Four subjects reported guilt-feelings. In each case these were seen to arise out of an awareness of a failure to honour a felt obligation. This awareness was in turn the outcome of moral reasoning and reflection on the part of each subject. Subject four typifies this process: guilt arises out of the realization that there is a contradiction between his actions and his convictions. By ignoring the appeal of the beggar he perceives himself as acting inauthentically ie., not being true to himself.

According to Heidegger (1927/1962) to be guilty is to fail the self or *Dasein* (meaning "being-in-the-world"). Dasein's essential calling is to be a revelation for the world. But since human beings are "thrown" into the world at a certain point in history and "fallen" into a particular cultural and social milieu, they are unable to reveal the world and themselves in all their possibilities. Dasein surrenders itself to *das Man* (meaning "they"), relieving itself of the burden of authentically choosing the possibilities and potentialities of its own being, and thereby giving itself over to the already understood and interpreted world of the "they" (Parker, 1985). In this way *Dasein* falls into inauthenticity.

Moreover, since *Dasein's* own possibilities are disclosed in feeling or mood

(*Befindlichkeit*), to be inauthentic is to be false to one's feeling-self (Gendlin, 1978/1988). The authentic feeling-self is attuned as "care". Guilt then, is voice of conscience calling upon the inauthentic self to become authentic: to accept the contingency of existence and within these limits, to care for the various beings of the world. Brooke (1985) summarizes Heidegger's position:

> For Heidegger this is man's essential calling: to bring the world into being. This only happens authentically ... as Dasein is attuned as care. To be guilty, therefore, is to fail the self, but the self that is failed is the radical possibility of bringing the world into being in the light of care (pp. 171-172).

But what does all this have to say about subject four? Subject four is acutely aware of the historical contingency of the situation. He is frustrated at the seemingly abstract social and historical forces that have embroiled him in the situation and forced him to respond to it. At the same time these forces are perceived as arbitrary and unintelligible. In short, he feels himself "thrown" into a particular predicament. This is coupled with the impulse to withdraw from the situation, to give himself over to his condition by taking the path of least resistance. It is at this point that his conscience expresses itself as feeling-toned awareness of an impending discrepancy between his behaviour and his beliefs. He concedes that on occasion this is experienced as a voice expressive of an injunction against a particular course of action. This is the call of Heidegger's authentic self.

This view is somewhat surprisingly consonant with cognitive development theory. Tangney (1990) defines guilt as the self's negative evaluation of specific behaviours or transgressions. If one accepts Heidegger's description of the self as *Dasein* (being-in-the-world) which also embraces *Mitsein* (being-with-others) then it is clear that behaviour that is harmful to another violates the integrity of Dasein itself. In one's apathy and carelessness,

one is literally transgressing the self. A further connection: do the hyphens in "being-with-others" properly consist of empathic feelings of the sort described by Martin Hoffman? Hoffman (1982) maintains that empathy is a necessary condition for true interpersonal guilt to emerge ie., guilt hinges on an empathic awareness of someone's distress coupled with an awareness of being the cause of that distress. Empathy, like *Mitsein*, is therefore the ground within which guilt is embedded. This is not to reify Heidegger's ontology into a prescriptive ethical system, but merely to suggest an area where dialogue might be possible.

How the call of the self is answered varies from subject to subject. Subject four heeds the call of conscience: he initiates dialogue with the other in a conscious effort to revive empathic feelings. Prosocial behaviour follows, even if only in the form of more dialogue. Guilt-feelings are thereby curtailed. Although she is less explicit, subject three clearly initiates helping in order to reduce aversive guilt-feelings.

Subjects one and five, both young "white" South Africans, employ a different strategy when confronted by guilt-feelings. Both attribute their guilt-feelings to their group-identity and in this way deny the validity of their guilt. Subject one argues that his feelings of shame and embarrassment stem from the reactions of others. He maintains that other people regard him as a racist, although he does not regard himself as such and in fact argues vehemently that he is not responsible for the wrongs of the past. He nevertheless feels guilty. This implies that the value he attaches to being an Afrikaner is at least partly determined by others' perceptions of this category. Subject five takes a similar line. She argues that her guilt-feelings are the unconscious outcome of a "white" group-identity and contends that these feelings are inappropriate because she is not personally responsible for Apartheid.

Taken at face value, this explanation would appear probable were it not for the fact that at other times in their interviews both subjects conceded that their guilt-feelings arose from the felt infraction of a genuine moral obligation. There are two possible ways of interpreting this apparent contradiction.

Firstly, one could argue that in contrast to subject four, subjects one and five give themselves over to Heidegger's "they" by casting themselves as victims or passive consumers of ideology. In contrast to subject four who felt guilty because of an imminent or immediate moral failure, both subject one and subject five became aware of their indebtedness retrospectively as the result of looking back upon their lives in the knowledge that they had been privileged. This would appear to be a more debilitating experience. Such guilt is perhaps easier to displace onto others (those who are responsible for the construction of group-identity) than to alleviate through prosocial action, the parameters of which may seem undefined. In this way they deny the call of the feeling-self and of conscience. Lasch (1984) argues that this is explicable given the anguish and demands of modern life. Such anguish seeks to be owned, it seeks someone to take responsibility for it. Hence:

> ... people no longer see themselves as subjects at all but rather as the victims of circumstance; and this feeling of being acted on by uncontrollable external forces prompts another mode of moral armament, a withdrawal from the beleaguered self into the person of a detached, bemused, ironic observer. The sense that it isn't happening to *me* helps to protect me against pain ... (p. 96).

It this is the case, then the irony is that this is quite an active process. As Billig (1991) contends, people draw upon ideological themes (such as the concept "group-identity") in order to make sense of their experiences. That such themes may be employed defensively does not weaken his argument.

A second possibility is suggested by subject five herself. Having admitted that her guilt-feelings stem from an awareness that she has acted selfishly and thereby infracted her Christian values, she suggests that her feeling of selfishness is constituted through a failure to live up to a wider obligation. The two are possibly co-constituted. This implies that a sense

of obligation towards another group, once internalized, may become the basis for moral discrimination and judgement. But this need not alter the fundamental contention that there is something "inauthentic" about her response. Given that her guilt-feelings are phenomenologically real it is clearly still the case that she is alienated from her feeling-self.

It may be that the source of her "inauthenticity" lies "outside" the traditionally defined individual (as an encapsulated ego-self). Yygotsky (1978) has shown how social relations may become internalized and may then mediate the psychological praxis of the individual. But what if social relations are contradictory, or at least at odds with the associated discourse? Kitwood (1990) argues that:

> By the end of childhood most persons have become to some extent divided and alienated. The self as it is known in consciousness is only partially grounded in authentic personal experience, and involves a great deal of adaptation to the prescriptions and seductions held out by others through the use of language (p. 87).

According to this argument, guilt is therefore authentic to the extent that it is grounded in lived experience but inauthentic to the extent that it is the outcome of what has been learned at a purely verbal level. In the latter sense, our feelings are usurped by the discourse we participate in and we become alienated ie., cut off from the authentic ground of our being. The problem of course, is that it is difficult to discern where this is the case. Participation in language is also an experience and, as theorists from Marx onwards have argued, is even fundamental to the emergence of consciousness. This brings us back to Heidegger's argument that guilt is not a transitory state but is ontological.

This is nevertheless not the place to pursue a discussion of "false consciousness" or ontological guilt. Suffice it to say that in each case guilt-feelings were phenomenologically

real and precipitated attempts to alleviate or displace such feelings. Prosocial action resulted where the subject felt that he/she had clearly infringed a felt obligation towards the other. Where guilt arose as an awareness of retrospective indebtedness, the subject felt alienated from his/her own guilt, argued as such, and was henceforth more likely not to assist. The relationship between emotional alienation and alienation from the other is explored below.

Alienation

Five of the six subjects reported or implied a sense of alienation. They claimed to feel alienated from the person making the appeal, or alternatively, from the person implicated as responsible for the plight of the victims. This condition was described in terms of an inability to relate to the experience of the other, or as an awareness of a crippling moral chasm between the subject and the other person, characterized by an extreme lack of shared values. Alienation would appear to be typified by a turning away from the other in favour of a self-focused state. In every case this mitigated against engagement with the other, either in terms of empathically-based helping or in terms of an attempt to initiate dialogue in order to foster attitude change on the part of that person. Batson (1990) writes:

> On reflection their certainly seem to be strong forces working against the arousal of empathy. These include anything and everything that makes it difficult for us to attend to or value another person's welfare: self-preoccupation or absorption in an ongoing task; seeing the other as an object or "thing", as a statistic and not a person who cares about his or her own welfare; seeing the other as a person but as different from ourselves, as one of "them" not "us" ... (p. 344).

But why should an alienated posture be so common? Subject one reports that he feels powerless to assist the beggar. He argues that social problems are too great for him to solve. Moreover, such is the magnitude of poverty and suffering that he does not know how to assist. Hoffman (1978) refers to "empathic overarousal" in this regard. Because of the subject's perception that helping would be worthless, his empathic feelings do not have an outlet through prosocial behaviour and therefore give way to feelings of personal distress. He anticipates that any attempt to help the other would precipitate further distress. He contends that he would experience extreme distress at the negligible effect his emotional commitment would have. Consequently, he perceives a need to defend himself against further unpleasant feelings. A self-focused alienated state ensues.

The irony is that this essentially defensive state does not work ie., it unwittingly promotes what it sets out to avert. Subject one reports that his inability to identify with the beggar is precisely the cause of his distress. He and the beggar come from "different worlds" and the subject is therefore unable to effect change in the alien life-world of the other. Feelings of powerlessness and frustration are intensified. Kitwood (1990) describes the result:

> People tend to remain with familiar, although ultimately unsatisfactory ways of coping with life, for in the short term these are the least anxiety-provoking. This, then, is the life-course of a person who remains in the state of typical alienation; whose experience is not well integrated, and who is to that extent impaired as a moral agent (p. 90).

Alienation from one's empathic feelings and alienation from the other are therefore synonomous and mutually perpetuating. The outlook is not necessarily bleak, however. Subject four describes a process whereby he is able to overcome his "blocked" state. In the first instance, he reports that he is capable of moral reasoning: he recognizes that he has an

obligation that flows from his position of relative privilege and his identity as a Christian. Such reasoning may operate even though there is an initial vacuum of feelings. The subject's conscience then compels him to initiate dialogue with the other person in a self-conscious effort to revive empathic feelings. The fact that dialogue succeeds in this respect clearly demonstrates an identity between the emotional "inner" sphere and the "outer" sphere that is inhabited by others. Subject six also displays this style of response: potentially painful feelings are subordinated to and managed by a process of moral reasoning.

The fact that Kohlbergian moral reasoning, oft criticized for dissociating the subject from lived experience, is effective in revitalising an emotional connection is itself noteworthy. Wright (1983) contends that Kohlberg's approach, although narrowly intellectual, may elicit the conscious realization of a person's lived morality. In other words, moral reasoning may force one to attend to morally relevant cues in the environment which might then trigger empathy.

Apart from general feelings of personal distress such as helplessness, frustration and anxiety, it is also the case that guilt may precipitate a defensive withdrawal from others and the feeling-self. As outlined in the previous section, subjects one and five deny the validity of their guilt-feelings by arguing that these are the outcome of an unwanted group-identity. In the case of these two subjects, moral reasoning is unable to bridge the divide, and in fact supports and entrenches the detached positions they have taken up. This would suggest that guilt, at least in the form that these two subjects experienced it, is an altogether more debilitating emotion. The manner in which group-identity is employed in order to deflect unwanted feelings is discussed below.

Group-identity

Three subjects referred specifically to a sense of group-identity. A fourth subject referred to

a more general sense of patriotism, while subject six demonstrated that he was at least cognizant of the group-dynamics that had structured his history. The "alternative" approach in social psychology, characterized by an emphasis on the historical and social context of human action (discussed in chapter one), has addressed itself explicitly to the issues of intergroup relations and group-identity.

Henri Tajfel, writing at about the same time as Serge Moscovici, developed "social identity theory" to describe the process whereby the individual becomes part of a social group while the group becomes part of the individual's self-concept. According to Tajfel and Turner (1979), group-membership becomes internalized as part of one's self-concept. Identity is thereby cast in terms of a continuum ranging from personal identity to social identity. In any given situation either aspect will be more or less salient. In this way Tajfel attempted to overcome the duality inherent in earlier formulations which kept separate the analysis of individual and group. According to social identity theory, changes in identity are only possible if social relations are perceived to be unstable and illegitimate. In such a case, particularly where the superior status of the group is seen to be the result of injustice, membership of the group might not contribute positively to social identity. If change is considered possible, the individual would then attempt to align himself/herself with a different grouping and would behave accordingly.

This view is problematised by the admissions of subjects one and five. Both acknowledge a group-identity and attribute guilt-feelings thereto, but then deny the validity of these feelings arguing that the group-identity from which such feelings spring has been unfairly imposed upon them. They are therefore at odds in some way with their own group-identities. Group-identity is seen as something "external". Subject one postulates that his shame at being an Afrikaner is due to the reactions of *others*, while subject five suggests that since her guilt is irrational it must be that her group-identity is exerting an *unconscious* influence. It should be noted that this is vastly different to a desire to change a negative and

illegitimate group-identity. The category itself is being denied. An initial reading of this state of affairs would suggest that Tajfel and other like-minded theorists were misguided in their project to transcend a dualistic approach. The very fact that subjects can stand off and critically discuss their own group-identities would suggest that dualism is well entrenched. After all, how can one disown oneself?

Billig (1976) has criticised social identity theory for its inadequate depiction of ideological processes. He argues that the source of social categories (such as "black" and "white" race groups), of criteria by which we value those categories, and of perceptions *viz a viz* legitimacy, is given by the ideology of the day. The kind of group-identity that is internalized is in large part a function of the dominant sets of ideas in society. Where there are apparent contradictions in group-identity, it is therefore appropriate to examine the ideology that has produced the identity. In this view, the contradiction inherent in simultaneously acknowledging and then standing apart from one's group-identity can only be explained by analogous contradictions in ideology itself. This is indeed what Billig *et al* (1988) argue:

> Ideological heritage is not a simple one .... ideology may not donate a series of solved problems to common sense. Instead, it may provide the conflicting themes of theoretical dilemmas to common sense, where dilemmas can be re-created and experienced in practical terms (p. 40).

In the case of subject's one and five, the relevant ideological conflict might be between forces that interpellate the individual as a person of colour, and other forces that devalue the classification of people along such lines. The term "white guilt", which is what both subject's were implicitly invoking, captures this ambiguity: guilt attaches to an individual on the basis of his/her colour, but is simultaneously externalized and thereby invalidated because colour

is also considered an inappropriate criterion of value. In this regard, subject five also refers to the unsettling phenomenon of being self-consciously aware of the colour of "black" people whom she might converse with. Clearly, there is a split in subjectivity that corresponds to a contradiction in ideological heritage. The duality has been internalized. It would also seem commonsensical to argue that in a period of social change, such contradictions are to the fore (presumably because they are being redressed).

The thrust of Billig's argument, however, is to the effect that people are empowered by their ideological milieu:

> ... ideology, and indeed common sense, are seen to comprise contrary themes. Without contrary themes, individuals could neither puzzle over their social worlds nor experience dilemmas. And without this, so much thought would be impossible (p. 2).

In this respect social change can be seen as psychologically empowering as individuals are forced to confront social contradictions that are being passed into the ideational array. Subject five for instance, struggles with the contradiction of being a Christian and also acting in her own best interest. Retrospective awareness that an ostensibly Christian community of "white" people were largely responsible for Apartheid is unsettling in her case. The corollary of this is that while living under the Apartheid dispensation such a contradiction may not have been apparent. Psychological life, although less ambivalent, might also be seen as less authentic under such conditions. Perhaps this is where alienation (described earlier) springs from.

Alternatively, it is possible that Billig's schema is inappropriate for a period of social change. Ideological dilemmas may more closely resemble powerful and overwhelming contradictions during social transition. Hence, rather than thinking and debating actively as Billig's model suggests, the contradictions must be denied or repressed. As Kitwood (1990)

predicts:

> There would be enormous resistance, not only because of the threat to naked privilege, but because of the activation of all those psychic defences that keep the status quo in being (p. 224).

This view supports the hypothesis that the denial of group-identity is simply a defensive strategy intended to avoid psychic stress and disequilibrium. At the same time it is also clear that the strategy employed, namely the externalization of group-identity, is a narrative possibility contained in the communicative array. Subjects one and five have appropriated a piece of discourse in order to make sense of a bewildering situation.

This, in turn, highlights the importance of language since it is in our everyday vocabulary that conflicting ideological themes are to be found (Billig *et al*, 1988). The growth of discourse analysis attests to this realization. It is in this respect that Serge Moscovici (1984) refers to shared social representations. The term "white guilt" for instance, might be used to "represent" a particular affective experience. Moscovici maintained that the purpose of a social representation is to render something unfamiliar as familiar ie., to establish meaning. Given the aforegoing discussion, it might be argued that a further possibility has been overlooked in his account, namely that we are active speakers who choose to employ particular representations for our own ends. As Barthes (1982) put it, "the speaker is both master and slave of language" (p.460).

For instance, subjects four and six do not refer explicitly to group-identity at all. Instead they emphasise the importance of free will and self-construction, arguing that action born of "inner" resolve is more authentic than action dictated by the "outer" duress of the group or of politics. Subject six emphasises the role of reason in remaining detached from the group dynamic. At the same time, his frequent use of the pronoun "we" betrays an

entrenched group-identity. In addition, he maintains that were he to respond uncritically to the appeal, he would be swept up in an ill-considered group-response (which implies that at the level of affect at least, there are still powerful feelings of allegiance operating). These two subjects therefore employ a particular view of the self in order to make sense of their social world and their role in it. One possible reason for the devaluing of group-identity is that both subjects ostensibly belong to a race-group that has been historically denigrated. Subject six recalls how during his youth talented footballers were described as playing like "white" men. The rhetoric of individualism may be necessary to preserve self-esteem. Polkinghorne (1988) declares that:

> We achieve our personal identities and self-concept through the use of the narrative configuration, and make our existence into a whole by understanding it as an expression of a single unfolding and developing story .... Self, then, is not a static thing or a substance, but a configuring of personal events into an historical unity ... (p. 150).

Subject six echoes this view, describing how his self-identity has been fashioned by experiences that have challenged his previous beliefs and expectations. The important thing he maintains, is to establish one's "own line" which is as much a personal identity as it is a programme of action.

The implication of this line of thought is that the narrative one fashions grows out of the experiences one has lived through. But we are also active in the process, employing bits and pieces of discourse in ways that render experience coherent and intelligible, and in this

way protecting the integrity of the self or story. Bruner (1990) writes that:

> The culture provides us with guides and stratagems for finding a niche between stability and change: it exhorts, forbids, lures, denies, rewards the commitments that the Self undertakes. And the Self, using its capacities for reflection and for envisaging alternatives, escapes or embraces or reevaluates and reformulates what the culture has on offer (p. 110).

An obvious paradox is hereby highlighted: who or what exactly, is doing the picking and choosing? Even if ideology sets the narrative agenda, one cannot escape the concept of individual agency. This thorny philosophical issue will not be resolved here. Suffice it to say that the solution requires the revisioning of the concept of the "self", perhaps *as* dialogue or *as* interaction. This brings us back to the "alternative" approach in social psychology. It was Mead (1934) who first suggested that the "self" should be seen as a transactional relationship between a speaker and an other, indeed, a generalized other. This serves to introduce the final area of discussion.

Self versus Other

Perhaps the defining characteristic of the responses analysed was that they were ambiguous. Every subject displayed a tension in their thinking and feeling response to either of the prosocial dilemmas posed. This took the form of a tension between a self- and other-oriented response, or a tension between blame and sympathy for the characters in the dilemmas. Two subjects demonstrated both varieties of ambivalence.

This finding directly supports Billig's (1991) contention (discussed above) that thinking is inherently rhetorical. People draw upon the contrary themes of common sense in order to

make sense of their social worlds. Subjects two, three, four and six vacillate between blame and sympathy for the figures in the dilemmas, employing contradictory strands of discourse in the attempt to render intelligible a complex situation. In this endeavour they employ remarkably similar arguments and stories. Subject two for instance, suspects that the beggar's motives may be less than honourable. The beggar may be a trickster who would rather defraud people than attempt authentic productive work. Such dishonesty cannot be excused. At the same time, however, the subject recognizes that such behaviour is a consequence of poverty. In a similar vein, he maintains that the purchase of alcohol by the beggar would be deceitful, but acknowledges that alcohol might represent an escape from debilitating social conditions. Subject three demonstrates the same tension between a belief in individual responsibility and an awareness of social determinism. Clearly, the same stock of common-sense themes is being plumbed by both subjects. In this way the wider ideological patterns of society are reflected in the thinking of individuals.

Billig's theory does not extend to an analysis of affect, however, and it is in this domain that dilemmas were experienced most forcefully. Sympathy and blame are, first and foremost, emotions that may inspire or mitigate against prosocial action respectively. The traditional explanation in social psychology for how our thoughts influence our emotions is the mechanism of cognitive appraisal (Fontaine & Diamond, 1994). According to this view, emotion is a response which is coordinated or steered by our evaluation of a given situation. Sympathy for instance, follows the appraisal that the beggar is not responsible for his fate. Weiner's attribution theory (noted earlier) is a good example of this type of theorizing. According to this view, one might argue that individuals experience a "felt" ambiguity simply because the bits of discourse they have to work with are themselves contradictory. Affect simply follows on the heels of cognition.

Mills (1975) has suggested that this relationship be reversed: appraisals are merely accounting practices that make sense of behaviour that has already been undertaken or

feelings that have already been felt. This approach would appear to be supported by the results, in the first instance because an affective resonse is often spontaneous ie., there is insufficient time for a conscious and deliberate process of appraisal. Every subject except subject six gave the impression of making sense of his/her response after the fact. In this connection, subject five refers to intellect as a "band-aid". Subject six claims that his emotions flow from his analysis of the situation, but also concedes that a process of reasoning is necessary in order to manage his emotions. The implication is that his feelings are primary and that cognitive effort is required to articulate them.

A possible explanation for the apparent primacy of affect is that ideological contradictions have been internalized and that particular forms of discourse are necessary to work these through as they manifest on a "felt" level. Blame and sympathy clearly have ideological antecedents as Billig *et al* (1988) have shown. Subject five for instance, struggles to reconcile the Christian ethic of charity with the ostensibly "capitalist" ethic of self-interest: "Why shouldn't I buy the product?" she pleads.

In a more general vein, Billig's analysis attempts to demonstrate that the philosophy of individualism contains within it an unresolved tension between justice and mercy. Whether one can extend this to claim that empathy (identified as the core affective experience in the emergence of helping behaviour) is itself ideologically situated, is unclear. If this is the case, then ideology is already operating in infancy and the family is surely the primary forum for ideological interpellation. Interestingly, subject five contends that her moral conflict constellates into two conflicting inner voices (moral empathic versus irrational selfish) and speculates that these positions mirror those of her parents.

In any event, empathy was in every case associated with an other-oriented focus and an increased likelihood of prosocial behaviour. Four subjects nevertheless experienced a tension between a prosocial response dictated by empathic feelings and a self-interested response. As with discourses of blame and sympathy, similar reasons were advanced to

support and defend a selfish response: donating money might only exacerbate the problem by fostering dependency; the cost to oneself is prohibitive; one person cannot assist meaningfully etc. This is not to imply that these reasons are necessarily invalid, merely that taken collectively they articulate felt contradictions in a manner that is socially comprehensible. Moreover, other levels of explanation might exist.

Subject one for instance, concedes that his self-interested posture may be a type of defence against psychic pain brought about by confrontation with a magnitude of social ills. Subject five admits sheepishly that the driving force behind her selfish response is plain and simple greed, although it is also clear that her self-focused state may serve to deflect powerful feelings of indebtedness. Irrespective of the arguments employed it is therefore clear that the subjects of this research possess different patterns of emotional investment: they are quite literally "torn" between competing demands and utilize shared bits of discourse to make sense of these.

But what of the possibility of altruism? Can an individual freely choose to assist another despite personal cost or risk? Of the six subjects interviewed, three were unequivocal in stating that they would respond positively to an authentic appeal. This does not imply that such action would necessarily be altruistic, however. Such action might be intended merely to reduce personal distress or alleviate feelings of guilt. Even more pessimistically, one might claim that even the most honourable intention is merely the working out of a particular ideological claim, a value that has perhaps been propagated in the interests of the social order and that has been internalized by the helpless child. Once again the sticky question of human agency raises its head. But surely this is too cynical a position. As the "alternative" approach in social psychology maintains, analysis that separate individual and society are misleading: to a large extent we *are* what we have internalized. Taking the opposite position, one might even dismiss the question of altruism as misleading: if we *are* our social relations then prosocial action that increases our "own" wellbeing is inherently altruistic. Again, this does

not do justice to the subjects of the research. A social relation has indeed been internalized, but this relation with the "other" is an active one. The "other" may be loved, feared, honoured or rejected. One must still *choose* what particular piece of discourse to appropriate. As every subject demonstrated, language is active in this process. As Barthes (1982) writes:

> I am not content to repeat what has been said, to settle comfortably in the servitude of signs: I speak, I affirm, I assert tellingly what I repeat (p. 460).

An appropriate test for altruism might therefore entail the analysis of the ends to which our ideological heritage is put. Subjects two, four and six struggle with the same ambiguities and tensions as the other subjects, but resolve them in favour of the "other". In all three cases an effort of reason is required in order to overcome the perils inherent in responding to the anguish of others. Therefore to answer the question directly: yes, there is such a thing as altruism and South African students are capable of it. Unfortunately, it is a potential that is easily surrendered in the face of widespread suffering and glaring social contradictions. Batson (1990) writes:

> Lest we feel too much, we turn the corner, switch channels, flip the page, or think of something else. Could this apparent necessity to defend ourselves against feeling empathy be a clue to the magnitude of our capacity to care (p. 344).

By the same token, the capacity to overcome the social and ideological legacy of the past, to act *in spite* of fear and contradictory feelings, is surely the hallmark of heroism. Subject six, a Xhosa-speaking student born in a rural town and subject to all the precepts of Apartheid, nevertheless finds it possible to forgive and even assist his erstwhile enemies: "If somebody is a racist, then that is how he feels. It doesn't mean that person is a bad person."

Conclusion

Emotional investment has been identified as essential to a prosocial response. Moral reasoning, even where it is highly sophisticated, is insufficient to motivate prosocial behaviour unless it is accompanied by affect. Conventional moral narratives may simply be appropriated in order to make sense of conflicting emotions and intuitions.

Role-taking underlies a mature response in that it is necessary to grasp a given situation from the perspective of the "other" in order to reason about possible courses of action. Moreover, taking the perspective of the other implies taking on some of the associated emotion. Role-taking, although predicated upon cognitive differentiation and associated with an autonomous self, is therefore a bridge back to the "other".

Empathy has been identified as the necessary but not sufficient condition for a prosocial response. Dialogue may facilitate empathy. This demonstrates a relationship between one's inner emotional life and one's interpersonal world. Empathy may translate into either sympathy (in which case prosocial behaviour is likely) or personal distress (which may precipitate a self-focused reaction). The attributions made regarding the cause of the other person's need are a critical factor in the emergence or absence of sympathy.

Where sympathy fails to emerge, this may be due to a sense of alienation from the other person. Role-taking ability is restricted by a perceived lack of shared experience and further empathic arousal is thereby inhibited. Alternatively, a reasoning process may lead the subject to an awareness of the magnitude of others' suffering. Empathic feelings may be overwhelming and may necessitate a defensive self-focused state. In this way alienation can be self-perpetuating.

Discourses of blame can be interpreted as narrative strategies of empathic disengagement. In a similar vein, moral reasoning may be employed to manage powerful empathic emotions. Given that such discourses are contained in a shared store of language,

such an account opens the door to an analysis of social structure.

Mood has been identified as critical in the sense that it largely dictates attentional focus (self- or other-focus). A bad mood may therefore result in a self-focused state which, perhaps because of reduced role-taking, will inhibit empathy. Mood is therefore intimately related to the play of emotion. Moreover, it is embedded in and manifested through one's relations with others.

Guilt was found to arise out of the realization that the subject had failed to honour a felt obligation. Guilt might also arise out of an awareness of an impending discrepancy between the behaviour and beliefs of the subject. This may take the form of an awareness of having surrendered or given over to the situation ie., a failure to actively choose a course of action in favour of taking the path of least resistance.

Guilt brought about by a retrospective awareness of indebtedness was found to be more debilitating than "imminent" guilt. Under such circumstances, guilt feelings might be attributed to one's group-identity and thereby externalized and denied. In this way the ideological category of "group-identity" is employed defensively in order to make sense of, and manage the subjects' feelings. Alternatively, it is possible that a sense of obligation towards other groups, once internalized, forms the basis for moral discrimination and judgement. This leaves open the question of whether the resulting guilt is authentic or not. In either scenario, the subjects are clearly alienated from their feeling-selves.

Alienation was identified as a major obstacle to the unfolding of empathy into sympathy. It mitigates against engagement with the other. Alienation would appear to be a defensive formulation intended to avert feelings of personal distress (such as perceived powerlessness) that originate in the empathic recognition of widespread suffering. Alienation nevertheless perpetuates personal distress because it is disempowering. From this it can be seen that alienation from the feeling-self and alienation from the "other" are synonymous and mutually perpetuating. Moral reasoning and/or dialogue may overcome this aversive state.

Alienation may also be precipitated by guilt-feelings which may be more debilitating than personal distress. Moral reasoning may fail to overcome a "guilty" alienated state and may even support the detached position that has been taken up.

Group-identity may be acknowledged as the source of guilt-feelings, but such feelings may then be denied on the basis that the group-identity has no intrinsic validity ie., it is an unwanted imposition. This internalized contradiction can be explained by reference to analogous ideological contradictions that are embraced by everyday language (eg. differing representations of "group-identity"). It is possible that during periods of social change such contradictions are salient.

Ideological dilemmas may more closely resemble powerful contradictions during social transition, as old ways of being are revisioned and erstwhile (or enduring) social contradictions are held up for public scrutiny. Such contradictions may be overwhelming and may therefore be denied or repressed. The denial of group-identity can therefore be seen as a defensive strategy intended to avoid psychic pain. This strategy is nevertheless a narrative possibility contained in the communicative array.

The defining characteristic of a moral response was found to be ambiguity. Tension between a self- and other-oriented response, or tension between blame and sympathy was common. This supports the contention that thinking is rhetorical. Again, this may reflect the internalization of ideological contradictions. It may also be that once internalized, such contradictions manifest spontaneously on a "felt" level and that particular forms of discourse are necessary to render these intelligible.

Assuming the existence and validity of human agency, altruism is upheld as a possibility. Such a possibility is nevertheless fragile and represents a triumph of will over ideological and psychological constraints against selflessness.

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APPENDIXES

Appendix One: Appeal for Subjects

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN,

I AM A PSYCHOLOGY MASTERS STUDENT AND I AM CURRENTLY DOING RESEARCH INTO PEOPLES' FEELINGS OF SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY. IN OTHER WORDS, I AM INTERESTED IN PEOPLES' FEELINGS OF MORAL OBLIGATION TOWARDS OTHERS, SPECIFICALLY TOWARDS THOSE LESS FORTUNATE. NATURALLY, I AM ALSO INTERESTED IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY SUCH SENSE OF OBLIGATION.

I NEED A COUPLE OF PEOPLE TO WRITE DOWN A PAGE OR TWO IN RESPONSE TO A HYPOTHETICAL MORAL DILEMMA THAT I WILL POSE, AND THEN TO PARTICIPATE IN AN INTERVIEW OR TWO WITH ME.

I WANT TO EMPHASISE THAT THIS RESEARCH IS NOT ABOUT *JUDGING* THE PEOPLE WHO ARE KIND ENOUGH TO PARTICIPATE. RATHER, THE RESEARCH IS IN THE NATURE OF A QUEST TO UNDERSTAND HOW PEOPLE FEEL, AND WHY THEY MIGHT FEEL THIS WAY. OBVIOUSLY, EVERYTHING YOU TELL ME WILL BE COMPLETELY CONFIDENTIAL.

IF YOU ARE INTERESTED IN PARTICIPATING IN SOME INTERESTING RESEARCH AND DON'T MIND GIVING UP SOME TIME TO HELP ME OUT, PLEASE EITHER PHONE ME IN DIGS (23021) OR CONTACT ME IN THE PSYCHOLOGY DEPARTMENT (I AM IN ROOM 126 ON THE TOP FLOOR). IF I AM NOT AROUND PLEASE LEAVE A MESSAGE/NOTE SO THAT I CAN CONTACT YOU...

THANKS

STEVEN CHOLERTON

Appendix Two: Moral Dilemmas

Moral Dilemma One

You are walking down a South African street on your way to do some shopping. An elderly African man is sitting against a wall holding a tin. As you pass by he rattles his tin and asks you for small change so that he can buy food for his children. You have small change in your pocket.

1) What is your immediate feeling-reaction when you see him sitting beside the wall? In other words, how do you feel towards this man?

2) How do you respond?

3) Why do you respond in this manner? (provide reasons for your behaviour)

Moral Dilemma Two

You read in the newspaper that a South African company has been found to discriminate against a particular race-group in the hiring and promotion of its employees. An appeal has been made for people not to buy the products this company manufactures. This company makes one of your favourite snack foods.

1) When you read about this state of affairs, what is your immediate *feeling* reaction? In other words, what are your feelings towards:-

(i) the victims of the discriminatory policies?
(ii) the management of the company?

2) How do you respond to the appeal, if at all?

3) Why do you respond in this manner? In other words, give *reasons* for your behaviour.

Appendix Three: Protocol of Subject One

Moral Dilemma One

You are walking down a South African street on your way to do some shopping. An elderly African man is sitting against a wall holding a tin. As you pass by he rattles his tin and asks you for small change so that he can buy food for his children. You have small change in your pocket.

Protocol of Subject one

age: 20
sex: male
home language: Afrikaans
degree: B.A.

1) What is your immediate feeling-reaction when you see him sitting beside the wall? In other words, how do you feel towards this man?

If I am to be honest with myself, I would have trouble motivating my feelings. If I walk by, as often happens in Grahamstown with the street-children, I usually experience a kind of embarrassment as well as a certain amount of hostility - you just want them to leave you alone, to disappear. It is hard to say why I feel like that.

2) How do you respond?

I do not think I would give the beggar money in the hypothetical situation described, even though I have small change in my pocket.

3) Why do you respond in this manner? (provide reasons for your behaviour)

I have some difficulty justifying my behaviour, but I am sure that my behaviour in such a situation would depend largely on the mood I am in at that particular moment in time. Usually I do not give beggars any money, because I do not think that it serves any purpose and it does not accomplish anything. (And I do not have the money to throw away). By giving beggars money, you are only reinforcing their idea that begging is a feasible way of life.

The 1 or 2 rand that you can give them is certainly not going to change their lives and rescue them from poverty, the socio-economic problems of South Africa require much more than any single individual can give. I am a realist. I fervently believe that in this life it is "every man for himself", you have to look after yourself because nobody else will. If I were to give money to every homeless beggar that approaches me, I would only destroy myself in the end. As an Afrikaner, I do not feel responsible at all for the situation in which some black people find themselves in (poverty, unemployment etc.). There are some people (both black and white) who feel that the white population (especially the Afrikaners) should be held accountable, and indeed recompense, the blacks for the injustice of Apartheid. I feel that this might be true to a certain extent, but I do not believe that the children should pay for the sins of the fathers. Not all whites were responsible for Apartheid and not all whites are racists. Therefore, as a person who have never committed a racist act against anybody, I do not feel responsible for the plight of the old beggar. In my opinion, this is too complicated a subject to discuss so briefly. I would be happy to participate in any further discussion of this topic, if it would help.

Thank you...

Appendix Four: Interviews with Subject One

Interview One with Subject One

In your protocol you mentioned feeling embarrassment and hostility, but not sympathy. Do you never feel sympathetic towards beggars?

If I am to be honest with myself, sometimes I do, especially when I see a very old person. This one guy comes to mind - this old beggar that is sometimes in town. He walks with a cane. He looks as if he could have been somebody's grandfather - little white beard, old fifties kind of hat and jacket. It just makes me think sometimes: where does that guy come from? What kind of a life did he have before he fell on hard times? Maybe he was that way for his whole life. Then I feel sorry but then I think: "There are hundreds, if not thousands of people like him in South Africa today. What can I do?" So I would say that empathy is also a feeling that comes up.

Are there certain cases that you regard as more deserving than others?

I guess you could put it that way because some of the people who come up to you actually demand money. They have this air of posterity above them. They wouldn't ask for money. They just stick out their hand and say "money!" I was walking on the road that goes past the journalism department and on past the bakery, and a little black kid came up to me, stuck out his hand and said "money". I said: "Excuse me, what did you say?" and he repeated "money" in Afrikaans and Northern Sotho - he said "geld" and "chelepe". It's like: give me money now, I deserve. And then I get mad. You think: "I'm not giving you a sock, get out of my way". And then on the other hand, there is this old man who walks around and kind of pleadingly asks you - then you feel sorry for the people. So I think it's a spur of the moment thing.

Do you ever feel guilty about beggars in Grahamstown or underprivileged people generally?

Guilty ... it's hard to say. Guilty as in I took something away from them or I owe them something - no. No, not really, not like that. I would feel, as I say, embarrassed, maybe more embarrassed about the fact that I can't really do anything for them. I think poverty is a hell of a problem - if we didn't have poverty in South Africa ... if you could take away poverty, you would take away a lot of other problems. I wouldn't say guilty because ... a lot of white people - you know about so-called "white-guilt" - feel that, because they prospered under the Apartheid system, they really owe the black population something. It's true that it did give whites an unfair advantage, as it were - we all prospered under it, but for me, I look at it as if it were a generational thing: I never voted on

anything on apartheid, my generation never voted on anything, except for the referendum, but personally I didn't vote on that, so I didn't have any hand in it, as it were. I didn't have a choice where I was going to be born into - that's where it happened. If I had maybe been an architect of the system or the ideology or something like that, or if I had personally done something bad to these people, then I might have felt guilty, but I have never personally harmed anybody else, white or black, in my life. I have never even called a black person a "kaffir" to their face. I have never done anything like that, so ... for that reason that doesn't make me feel really guilty.

In your protocol you mentioned that your behaviour would depend on the mood that you were in. Could you elaborate on that.

Perhaps I didn't put that very clearly. I was just trying to explain that, if I am in a bad mood, if I have had a bad day at university or somebody gave me trouble or whatever, just a bad mood, I will be less inclined to feel sorry for somebody - not necessarily beggars or black people or whatever - just anybody who takes me the wrong way while I am in a bad mood. I wouldn't be very friendly towards them. But maybe if I am in an incredibly good mood, the next day you know ... This organization that feeds the little street-children - GADRA - every now and then they ask people not to give them money, but rather to give to the organization so that they can put that money into education and food and clothes and so on. So with that in mind, I try to make a point of it not to give these little kids money, but I have done it - one day I was in a very, very good mood (maybe I had got a good test result or something) and I just ... "money, yes sure", just give him a couple of cents ... It depends on the mood.

You mentioned in your protocol that by giving beggars money, one is reinforcing their idea that begging is a feasible way of life. Does that imply that beggars have a choice in the matter?

I may not have put that very clearly - I was actually in a bad mood when I wrote that. That is actually a good point you make ... If for argument's sake they do have another choice, then what I said would obviously apply ... but, as you say, with South Africa's economic climate the way it is today, the fact of the matter is that most of these people might not have an alternative, so in that respect, that would go along with what you said. But this organization - that is maybe the kind of thing that I wanted to explain - they say "don't give the street-kids money, because it shows them that if they can get money from the students, then they don't have to go to the organization that forces them to go to school before they can get clothes or food or whatever - I don't know how the system works ... You see? But they have to go there so that they can get the stuff from the organization. But if the students were to keep on giving them money, then they wouldn't need to go to the organization for help. You would be shooting those guys down, as it were.

Suppose GADRA did not exist and the reality was that these beggars did not have a choice, would that affect your behaviour ... would you be more inclined to give money?

Well I don't want to come off like a total fascist, but for your research to be valid I suppose one has to be totally honest. To be honest, I don't think I would start giving them money all of a sudden ... to make myself feel better. I think I would maybe, even if it is subconscious, search for a justification not to give them money. But on the other hand, something I also said in my protocol, the couple of rand I can give that person isn't going to improve their lives - I could give them five hundred rand and it is not going to make a difference really, if you think about it - they can go and buy food for five hundred rand (if I had five hundred rand to give them to begin with), but that is not the solution. The solution is much bigger than that: the country's economy as a whole has got to improve. We can keep on pouring two rand, two rand, two rand into the people day by day, but it is not going to do anything. A misconception a lot of black people are under, still, is that if your skin is white, you have money to burn, absolutely, which these days - I'm sorry but that's just not true any more. I don't think it was the rule to begin with - I think there was an elite and the white elite was just larger, proportion-wise, than the black elite. But being a student, I'm not even paying for my own education - I'm studying here on a loan. So, to begin with, I don't have money because I'm white ...

Do you consider yourself a charitable, socially-responsible person?

... It depends on how you define socially-responsible ... I realize there is room for improvement. I'm not saying "hey, there's nothing wrong with me". But I'm not like a criminal or anything like that. I think I'm socially responsible in the way that I have never threatened anybody else in any way; I am a law-abiding citizen; while I worked, I payed taxes, before I came to university; my fiancee and I actually do give money to GADRA ... so ... I don't know, if that is the criteria, then maybe I am socially responsible ... but it is a hard concept to define I think, it depends on what you have to do to be a socially-responsible person.

You mentioned in the protocol that you believe it is "every man for himself". Can you elaborate on that?

(laughs) It is interesting that you bring up that point, because I had a terrible disagreement with one of my sociology lecturers the other day. You probably know the three main perspectives in sociology: functionalism, conflict-Marxist, and interactionist. But anyway, these are just the three main perspectives: the ways the theories are structured and so forth. Functionalism - the theory goes that basically it is survival of the fittest, it is every man for himself, class-stratification is totally justified, people are born with different potentials for social advancement. So it is inevitable that there is a ruling class and a working class. That is the way it is. I was actually inclined to

agree with that, and this person didn't think that was very kosher: she felt it conjured up the image of a fascist ogre, or Hitler kind of scenario ... I just ... the fact of the matter is this: I don't believe ... in fact it is evident: there are not enough natural resources on this planet or in this country for everybody to have an equal share and be prosperous ... I mean everybody can have an equal share but ... It's like the saying goes: "before the Russian Revolution there were the wealthy and the poor, after the Russian Revolution there were just the poor" ... that kind of thing. So I think some people are going to advance further in life than others, maybe not because of some biological advantage but because of the environment they are born in ... and then they are socialized into becoming people that have a standard of education, are go-getters and so forth. I don't think everybody is going to be able to be equal - that is what I mean. It is hard enough these days to fend for yourself, you can only stretch yourself that far without actually destroying yourself. So, ja ... it's every guy for himself.

And yet later on in your protocol you state: "There are some people, both black and white, who feel that the white population, especially the Afrikaners, should be held accountable and indeed recompense black people for the injustice of Apartheid. I feel this might be true to a certain extent." This suggests that you do acknowledge some broader responsibilities.

That responsibility, I would say, lies in more than ... the white section of the population have better educations, they are better qualified - they shouldn't all abandon the country all of a sudden. I mean, they still have a positive role to play, and ... recompensation in that sense that they could actually devote their skills and their technical knowledge, whatever, into maybe helping that section of the population that is not ... that's underprivileged. There is a big difference between doing that and money being extorted from you, saying: "You're white, give me a thousand rand, give me your house and your car because I deserve it, I was underprivileged" and, on the other hand, asking: "Please stay in the country, teach people, help people, establish another university or schools", stuff like that ... I mean in South Africa there are five black chartered accountants, five, in the country at the moment ... and there are hundreds of white ones, so the one section of the population has the potential to help the other ones get on to a certain level. I think that is what we should do. But we shouldn't be threatened and ... given an ultimatum: "Give me your money or you die." That is what I meant, just that we have a positive role to play ... and we should be willing to play it.

Tell me a little about your personal background ... the environment that you grew up in ...

The whole context that I grew up in is very Afrikaans. I have always lived in the countryside. I was born in Klerksdorp, which is a little town in the Western Transvaal. Then I lived practically my whole life in Potchefstroom, which is like ... these days and has always been, Afrikaner consciousness capital ... My father was

a lecturer in the Journalism Department at Potchefstroom University for twelve years ... so I have always grown up in a household where academic values were perpetrated ***(perpetuated)*** ... and then ... ja, my dad worked at the university I mentioned - very nice job he had. I went to a provincial primary school in Potchefstroom. Then we moved when I was in standard four. We moved to Hartbeespoort, which is kind of ... thirty five kilometres out of Pretoria, between Brits and Pretoria. I don't know if you know where that is ... it's kind of between Johannesburg and Pretoria - the Hartbeespoort Dam is there. It is a weekend holiday spot, as it were. Then my dad worked for the Human Sciences Research Council. I went to high school in Hartbeespoort - Hoerskool Hartbeespoort, also an Afrikaans provincial school ... and then, when I was in my matric year, an American exchange student came to high school, and she and I fell in love, and then she went back to the states and I went after her. I stayed there for six months. I came back and I worked for four months - this is actually really interesting - I worked for four months in a steel factory in Pretoria. So when people ... I have always used this to great benefit when I am in an argument with somebody ... and they say: "Ja, you have had a privileged background, white man, you don't know what the working class is all about." I say: "Listen china, I worked with black labourers ... in a steel mill. For four months I worked a twelve hour shift a day - one week day shift, the next week night shift. I was paid five rand seventy an hour. My boss was black so don't tell me what I know and what I don't know. The section manager, the supervisor, he was a black man - he was a Northern Sotho ... I know all about the proletariat and what they go through so just be quiet" (laughs) ... My fiancee was doing her first year in the U.S. still - she was doing summer school to catch up some courses. And then she came over in September of last year, and then we applied to lots of universities - UPE, UCT, Natal and Rhodes, and we ended up coming to Rhodes.

Your English is very good ...

Ja, English was always my best subject at school ... Actually, at school you got quite bored with Afrikaans, quite quickly ... because I mean you've had it forever, feels like forever, from grade one. We just did grammar the whole time - incredibly boring. But English, on the other hand, was quite a new thing. It was interesting and we read a lot of books, once we got the grammar down. As I say, my dad being a very academic man, has always tried to teach us the value of a good education, so I read a lot of books when I was a kid and there was a high value attached to studying and so forth.

I would imagine that, coming from an academic background, the atmosphere would have been fairly intellectual with emphasis on explanation and understanding ...

Ja, the thing is that ... certainly there was an emphasis on understanding things and so forth, but my parents are still very conservative. It has often been said that Afrikaans families are entrenched and the kids are there to be seen

and not heard and that kind of thing, so that academicism ... you still knew your place as a child. You didn't ... the authority structure was very clearly defined for you, let me just say that. You knew where to go and where not to go. So ... of course, now it's different, now I suppose my dad sees me as somebody he can relate to on an equal basis because I'm also at university, I'm also studying in his kind of direction, what he studied ... so I'm getting to know what I am talking about ... but that came with time. I by no means grew up in a very liberal family atmosphere.

Do you debate with your father at all?

Our views are actually quite similar as far as the wide classification of liberalism and conservatism goes - my father is a relatively conservative man. But again, he is one of those academic conservative people, he is kind of pacifist: he'll talk about things, he'll say "This is deplorable", but when it comes to actually doing something about it, you know, he'll never go out and join an organization like the AWB and say "Let's take a gun in hand and go and kick these Marxist pigs out of there" or something like that. It's in a very academic kind of context ... I've told him a lot of times: "It's time we ... we have to start doing something. We have to look to the future and have contingency plans in case so-and-so happens so that we can react in a certain way." And he just says: "Ja, that's fine and so on, but let's just see what happens." I don't know ... I think I am not as naive as my father is.

Getting back to your comments on generational differences ... You mention the "sins of the fathers" in your protocol. Do you think it is a case of a single generation separating those who bear blame from those who do not?

I think it is a generational bracket - people between so and so had maybe a bigger finger in the pie as it were. But - something that I have begun to realize, especially now that I am doing journalism, is people have always been ignorant about the real ideology behind political parties and so on ... You can't directly blame people for apartheid by saying: "You all knew exactly what the ideology was about: hidden curriculum in black schools, purposeful socialization into an inferior class position", you know. That stuff you find out at university. The first time I heard the word "Apartheid" and I'm not lying to you, I swear, was when I was in standard six. Really, that's the truth. I don't think you can just point a finger at people and say: "You were all a bloody bunch of conspirators, you knew exactly ... you all sat at a huge table and said: right, we are going to subjugate the black people and one, two, three, that is how we are going to do it." For instance, let me give you an example: although we are very conservative, my Grandparents still vote National Party, not because they really understand the changes the National Party has undergone, it is just that fifty years ago the National Party did not engender what it stands for now. It was much more conservative, obviously. I think habit comes into it. Ignorance plays a large part. But surely, to come back to your question, the people who knew what it was about, the guys who engineered the whole ideology,

certainly they, if they were here today, would be liable to answer for these things. But they are long dead, so what do we do now?

Interview Two with Subject One

In your protocol and your interview you talked about feeling "embarrassed" at ignoring the appeal of the beggar. It wasn't clear where that feeling of embarrassment came from. Perhaps you could elaborate a little on that.

I mean ... let me just start by saying that is definitely a feeling that I find myself having when I see a person on the street and they beg from me. I feel ... embarrassed, almost like ashamed to a certain extent ... no, maybe ashamed is the wrong word: self-conscious ... in the sense that ... I don't know, I find it hard to explain. I just have a feeling ... but if I think about it I assume it is because that deep inside I know that I am privileged, and that person has nothing. But I also know there is really nothing I can do for them ... for that person. I can give them two rand or five rand every time I walk past them, and even if I do give them five rand every time I walk past them it is really not going to give them a house or give them a job or give them an education or stuff like that. So it makes me feel bad that, maybe in the first place that I have ... maybe that is a natural reaction - if you have something into which to a certain extent you were born you know, maybe you just feel self-conscious about the fact that you have more than this person, who by the luck of the draw it could have been the other way around. There is nothing inherent in yourself that merits you having more than that person - it's just the luck of your, where you, the level of society you were basically born into.

Do you think that perhaps part of your embarrassment stems from having empathy with the beggar, in other words feeling his embarrassment and humiliation as your own?

There must be an element of that because, I don't know so much about embarrassment, but personally it scares the crap out of me when I think, as I just said, I could have been on that level. There is absolutely nothing within myself that mandates me being at the level where I am, other than the fact that I was born into that level of society, and from there on I've worked towards and attained status. But hey, I could have been born ... it could have been me so that is pretty scary, to think ... it could have been me ... if my father loses his job ...

So that crosses your mind in that situation?

Definitely ... wow, you know ... it could so easily be any one of us, given the right circumstances and stuff like that.

You also spoke about how you wished they would "leave you alone" and "disappear". Do you ever feel alienated from beggars in particular or black people in general ... do you sense a barrier between you and them?

It's funny, I had a similar argument with somebody the other day: we were talking in sociology, in one of our tuts. One black guy said: "well, because you are white you don't really understand what the whole Apartheid system, what the effect of it was", and I told the guy: "Ja, you are 100% correct because, unfortunately I can't identify with what you are saying because I did not share that experience. I can read about it and you can tell me about it, but there is really no way that I can really know what you went through because I did not share that experience." And that is the same thing with the beggar ... I don't really know the social context that person comes from. There is no way I can really know because ... I come basically from a different world, you know. I can empathize with them, as I said, and maybe try to understand, but it is still going to be from way over here ... from totally objective.

Intellectual understanding only?

I think it has a definite emotional component: it is an emotional topic, I mean these people dig from dustbins and they have to scrounge to stay alive and stuff like that, but I can't really understand what they are going through because I have never had that experience and I probably never will.

So there is no substitute for personal experience?

... I don't know ... I think no, to a certain extent there isn't, because you can read about it. You can maybe, in certain cases use participant observation, you can go with the people. I mean obviously as a researcher you won't expose yourself to as bad conditions as them: you are not going to go and live like a beggar out on the streets for nine months or whatever. So I think that personal experience is maybe the ultimate ... I can't really understand what that person is going through, so ... in that sense, I guess you are right about a feeling of alienation because that person is so out of my context. I really don't know ... the bottom line is that I don't know how to deal with that person ... when the opportunity comes and presents itself I really have trouble dealing with them because I don't know how.

You mentioned "helplessness" and "frustration" in your interview. Is that paralysis the outcome of that sense of alienation?

You don't know what to do, I mean, as I said, what am I supposed to say to this guy? He has nothing basically

in this world and he comes up to me and expects me to do something for him, but just what the hell am I supposed to do? And that is a feeling of immense frustration. The ideal situation would obviously be if we could get rid of poverty. It is not nice going out in the morning and seeing someone digging in the trash in front of your house for food. It is not nice, and I don't wish it on anybody, but you know, what can I do? And that is immensely frustrating. If I was a billionaire with billions of rand I would build a house for everybody, but in my social ... what can I do? I can do absolutely nothing.

At various points in your interview you made it clear that you did not regard yourself as personally responsible for the plight of beggars or Apartheid. Do you ever feel an element of responsibility despite such rational thinking?

Well ... in terms of guilt or not ... rather than having a feeling of guilt I would say that I sometimes feel regret that the whole thing happened - that there was a system like that. It was not the first oppressive system, it is not going to be the last I'm sure. I think ... maybe, I don't know, it is probable that if that system never came about we wouldn't have had half the social problems we have now, in my mind anyway. So I think, I feel regretful that it ever came about. I feel sometimes, self-consciousful, bordering on feeling ashamed because I am part of a group that is seen as ... well, widely part of a group, that is seen as having a direct hand in this and brought the whole thing about. So that makes me feel a little ashamed and so on. As I said, personally I have never oppressed anybody else or ever harmed any other person, and I try to be socially responsible in that I don't waste my time at university - I don't waste my father's money, I don't waste the government's money, I don't sit here at university - I don't take up a space. If I don't work at university then I am basically occupying a space that somebody else could use, and I'm not doing that: I'm working at university so in that sense I feel that I am being socially-responsible. I am earning my keep as it were.

Isn't it a paradox that although you do not regard yourself as personally responsible in any way, you nevertheless feel regret or occasional shame because of a group-identity that you did not ask for?

I think, like you said, there is like a rational level of explanation where you can tell yourself: "Hey, there is absolutely no rational reason or explanation for me to feel guilty because I have never done anything in my life to hurt anybody", but I think ... my personal feelings of self-consciousness, shamefulness about the fact that I am a part of this group arises from other people's reactions to a certain extent. I have never personally had somebody explicitly come up to me and say "you damn ... you Afrikaner, you racist pig, Nazi", whatever you know, but I just perceive that other people sometimes think: "Yes, you're Afrikaans - racist come ... "

You said that you would probably not donate money to beggars on street-corners and you gave various reasons: that a few rand would not make a difference, that you would be compromising the effectiveness of GADRA, that you are not wealthy enough to donate to everyone and that class-stratification is inevitable given scarce resources. Do you think there is a danger that you are simply rationalizing away a lack of charity on your part?

Ja ... it makes a lot of sense what you are saying. If I have to be totally honest with myself, ja, I mean probably ... but in the sense that rationalizing the problem is more of a self-defense mechanism. If I were to commit myself emotionally to every tragedy I see happening around me every day in society I would go out of my bloody mind. I mean, if I were to commit myself emotionally to every poor person that comes to my door and says: "Bloke, I have nothing in this world. Please help me." If I were to commit myself to every stray dog - I'm not comparing the two, I'm just saying - or every hungry child I see on television ... I don't know if you could do it but I would actually go nuts thinking that the world is such a cruel place, and here I sit in a relative position of privilege while there are millions of people out there suffering or basically being in a living hell. So I think for me personally rationalizing the problem - saying this and this and that - I'm trying to distance myself from real emotional involvement with those things.

Do you ever feel a tension between being self-focused and being other-focused ... between feeling sympathy or empathy for the beggar and at the same time being aware of those emotions and attempting to hold them back in order to deal with the situation?

Well, if I understand your question correctly, I do try to ... in a situation like that, I would try to focus away from that person ... really not look, because if you look that is the first step towards getting involved. If you take the time and you look then you are going to start thinking, and if you start thinking about it you will probably become more involved and then you will commit yourself maybe to really trying. I know it sounds cold-hearted that you don't want to commit yourself to trying to help that person, but ... so you just like try to distance yourself naturally and maybe ... I don't think at that moment I specifically focus on my own feelings and on myself - I just try to keep like a blank emotional state as it were and just quickly rush by ... not to get hooked by the situation as it were.

Is there anything you would like to add before we conclude the interview?

No, I mean I've tried to be honest because I've really thought about the problem by myself - if there's one thing I want to accomplish in my life it is that I don't want to do anything without thinking about it because ... I don't want to be stupid, I don't want to be labelled as a stupid person, so before I do something I always try to think "why am I doing this and why am I thinking this way?" So that is the way I reason it out for myself. What it

seems to me ... I don't know how that guy can handle it because he has already emotionally committed himself to these people - taken a portion of his life and committed it to these people - it's just like a drop in the bucket. He's not really accomplishing anything and I can't see how he could stay sane dealing with that.

Did you see Schindler's List?

Ja, that was a good movie. At the end when the guy says that the Nazi pin he has is worth 30 Franc and that is like ten more lives and he has an emotional breakdown at the end - I thought that was very realistic. Can you imagine thinking ... and then you are going to keep on resenting yourself: "hell, did I do enough, did I do enough, couldn't I have done more, maybe I should have done whatever."

A bottomless pit?

... that sucks you down. Then you are committed, then there is no way you can get out of it without tremendous guilt or totally resenting yourself. But at least, I think maybe ... I don't know, maybe these people survive that commitment by reaffirming to themselves "I'm doing the right thing, I'm doing the right thing", so they kind of have this moral support ... back-rest you can lean against. But still, wow, I think there must be self-resentment anyway because you are going to keep on thinking "have I done enough?"

Appendix Five: Classified and Transformed Natural Meaning Units

Reading for Affect: Subject One

Protocol

1. If I am to be honest with myself, I would have trouble motivating my feelings.

The subject has difficulty motivating (explaining or justifying) his feelings.

2. If I walk by, as often happens in Grahamstown with the street-children, I usually experience a kind of embarrassment ...

The subject experiences embarrassment if he does not give to street children.

3. ... as well as a certain amount of hostility - you just want them to leave you alone, to disappear.

The subject experiences hostility towards street children. He wishes they would cease making demands upon him.

4. It is hard to say why I feel like that.

The subject has difficulty explaining these feelings.

5. I am sure that my behaviour in such a situation would depend largely on the mood I am in at that particular moment in time.

Mood exerts a major influence on his behaviour.

6. As an Afrikaner, I do not feel responsible at all for the situation in which some black people find themselves in (poverty, unemployment etc.).

The subject does not feel responsible for the plight of black people. He rejects the idea that blame might

arise out of his identity as an Afrikaner.

7. There are some people (both black and white) who feel that the white population (especially the Afrikaner) should be held accountable, and indeed recompense, the blacks for the injustice of Apartheid. I feel that this might be true to a certain extent ...

The subject partially acknowledges the accountability of the white population, especially the Afrikaner, and the need to recompense black people.

8. ... but I do not believe that the children should pay for the sins of the fathers.

The subject does not believe himself responsible for injustices perpetrated by the previous generation.

9. Not all whites were responsible for Apartheid and not all whites are racists.

Responsibility is not universally conferred upon white people because not all white people were to blame for Apartheid.

10. Therefore, as a person who has never committed a racist act against anybody, I do not feel responsible for the plight of the old beggar.

The subject does not feel responsible for the beggar because he has never committed a racist act.

<u>Interview One</u>

11. If I am to be honest with myself, sometimes I do **(feel sympathy)**, especially when I see a very old person. This one guy comes to mind ...

The subject sometimes feels sympathy, particularly if the beggar is old.

12. Then I feel sorry but then I think: "What can I do?"

The subject feels sympathy but also powerlessness.

13. So I would say that empathy is also a feeling that comes up.

The subject feels empathy.

14. It's like: give me money now, I deserve. And then I get mad.

When money is demanded of the subject, as if the beggar has a right to it, the subject feels anger.

15. ... on the other hand, there is this old man who walks around and kind of pleadingly asks you - then you feel sorry ...

Sympathy is evoked by an old man who pleads for money.

16. ... it's a spur of the moment thing.

The subject acts on the spur of the moment.

17. Guilty ... it's hard to say.

The subject has difficulty deciding whether he feels guilty or not.

18. Guilty as in I took something away from them or I owe them something - no. No, not really, not like that.

The subject does not feel personal guilt - guilt arising out of a personal debt.

19. I would feel, as I say, embarrassed, maybe more embarrassed about the fact that I can't really do anything for them.

The subject feels embarrassed, perhaps embarrassed because of his inability to assist.

20. I didn't have any hand in it, as it were.

The subject was not responsible for Apartheid in any way.

21. If I had maybe been an architect of the system or the ideology or something like that, or if I had personally done something bad to these people, then I might have felt guilty ...

The subject would feel guilty had he been directly involved in propagating the Apartheid system, or had he personally infringed the rights of those who were its victims.

22. ... but I have never personally harmed anybody else, white or black, in my life. I have never even called a black person a "kaffir" to their face. I have never done anything like that, so ... for that reason that doesn't make me feel really guilty.

The subject does not feel guilty because he has never personally harmed or publicly insulted anyone.

23. ... if I am in a bad mood, if I have had a bad day at university or somebody gave me trouble or whatever, just a bad mood, I will be less inclined to feel sorry for somebody ...

When the subject is in a bad mood, he is less inclined to feel sympathy for others.

24. ... - not necessarily beggars or black people or whatever - just anybody who takes me the wrong way while I am in a bad mood. I wouldn't be very friendly towards them.

While in a bad mood, the subject is inclined to react in unfriendly way to people, particularly people who are experienced as intrusive.

25. But maybe if I am in an incredibly good mood, the next day you know ... one day I was in a very, very good mood (maybe I had got a good test result or something) and I just ... "money, yes sure", just give him a couple of cents ... It depends on the mood.

The subject is more inclined to give money when in a good mood.

26. To be honest, I don't think I would start giving them money all of a sudden ... to make myself feel better. **(This in answer to a question about how he would react if there was no local community feeding project)**

The subject acknowledges that he feels better after giving but nevertheless predicts that he would not assist in such a situation.

27. ... we have a positive role to play ... and we should be willing to play it.

The privileged white minority have an obligation to the underprivileged and should be willing to honour this.

Interview Two

28. I mean ... let me just start by saying that is definitely a feeling that I find myself having when I see a person on the street and they beg from me. I feel ... embarrassed ...

When the subject sees a person begging on the street he feels embarrassed.

29. ... almost like ashamed to a certain extent ...

He almost feels ashamed.

30. ... no, maybe ashamed is the wrong word: self-conscious ... in the sense that ... I don't know, I find it hard to explain.

The subject is uncertain if shame best describes his feelings.

He feels self-conscious but finds this feeling difficult to articulate.

31. I just have a feeling ... but if I think about it I assume it is because that deep inside I know that I am privileged, and that person has nothing.

The subject considers that this feeling stems from an awareness of the wealth and status differential between himself and the beggar.

32. So it makes me feel bad that, maybe in the first place that I have ... maybe that is a natural reaction - if you have something into which to a certain extent you were born you know, maybe you just feel self-conscious about the fact that you have more than this person, who by the luck of the draw it could have been the other way around.

The subject is self-conscious because he has done nothing to deserve his privileged position ie., the beggar has as much right to his privileges as he himself does.

33. I don't know so much about embarrassment, but personally it scares the crap out of me when I think, as I just said, I could have been on that level.

The subject is less certain that he feels embarrassment than that he is scared to think that he could easily have been born into the same socio-economic class as the beggar (this realization makes him anxious; perhaps he becomes aware of the contingency of his own existence).

34. But hey, I could have been born ... it could have been me so that is pretty scary, to think ... it could have been me ...

It is scary to think that it could have been him begging on the street (but for the circumstances).

35. I can't identify with what you are saying because I did not share that experience **(in reply to a remembered assertion by a black man that the subject could not understand the effect of Apartheid upon black people).**

The subject cannot identify with the experience of black people because he did not share that experience (this suggests that there are limits to his empathy).

36. I can empathize with them, as I said, and maybe try to understand, but it is still going to be from way over here ... from totally objective ...

The subject claims he can empathize, but that this is from a detached, objective perspective (perhaps consisting of mostly cognitive role-taking).

37. ... it has a definite emotional component **(the perspective he takes)**: it is an emotional topic, I mean these people dig from dustbins and they have to scrounge to stay alive and stuff like that ...

There is an emotional component inherent in his attitude (this may reflect a degree of empathy).

The subject experiences painful emotions (personal distress) when he considers the lifestyles of beggars (perhaps this is the course his empathy takes).

38. I guess you are right about a feeling of alienation because that person is so out of my context.

The subject acknowledges that he feels alienated because the beggar occupies a very different context to

himself.

39. I really don't know ... the bottom line is that I don't know how to deal with that person ... when the opportunity comes and presents itself I really have trouble dealing with them because I don't know how.

The subject does not know how to deal with the beggar when the opportunity to help arises (this suggests frustration at being unable to help, and perhaps also at being unable to extricate himself from the situation).

40. He has nothing basically in this world and he comes up to me and expects me to do something for him, but just what the hell am I supposed to do. And that is a feeling of immense frustration.

The subject feels immense frustration at not knowing how to respond to the beggar's appeal for help (he is paralysed by the magnitude of the beggar's needs, and perhaps aware of his inability to escape the situation).

41. It is not nice going out in the morning and seeing someone digging in the trash in front of your house for food. It is not nice, and I don't wish it on anybody.

The subject experiences personal distress at the sight of a beggar scrounging for food (the source of this may be an empathic connection with the beggar ie., the subject empathically recognizes the beggar's lifestyle as unpleasant).

42. ... but you know, what can I do? ... And that is immensely frustrating. If I was a billionaire with billions of rand I would build a house for everybody but in my social ... what can I do? I can do absolutely nothing.

The subject is frustrated that he can do nothing (to assist).

This frustration stems from his own lack of economic power that prohibits him from assisting impoverished people in a significant way.

43. ... rather than having a feeling of guilt I would say that I sometimes feel regret that the whole thing happened - that there was a system like that.

The subject denies that he feels guilt, but acknowledges that he regrets the system of Apartheid.

44. I feel regretful that it ever came about.

He regrets that the system ever came about.

45. I feel sometimes, self-consciousful ...

The subject is occasionally self-conscious.

46. ... bordering on feeling ashamed because I am part of a group that is seen as ... well, widely part of a group, that is seen as having a direct hand in this and brought the whole thing about.

This self-consciousness borders on shame and stems from his identification with a group that is widely regarded as having brought Apartheid about (his feelings are partly conditioned by the perceptions of others).

47. So that makes me feel a little ashamed and so on.

The subject feels a little ashamed because of this group-membership.

48. I'm working at university so in that sense I feel that I am being socially-responsible.

The subject feels that he is being socially-responsible because he is working at university.

49. ... my personal feelings of self-consciousness, shamefulness about the fact that I am a part of this group arises from other people's reactions to a certain extent.

His feelings of self-consciousness and shamefulness (at being an Afrikaner) arise out of the reactions of others (this supports #46. His self-identity is therefore partly constructed by others ie., the value he places upon being an Afrikaner).

50. ... rationalizing the problem is more of a self-defense mechanism. If I were to commit myself emotionally to every tragedy I see happening around me every day in society I would go out of my bloody mind.

The subject recognizes that emotional commitment to every tragedy he encounters would threaten his psychological health (through excessive personal distress).

He perceives a need to defend himself against this potential emotion.

51. I would actually go nuts thinking that the world is such a cruel place, and here I sit in a relative position of privilege while there are millions of people out there suffering or basically being in a living hell.

A personal distress reaction would be exacerbated by the realization that the world is intrinsically cruel and that the subject is fortunate to occupy a privileged position while others suffer.

52. So I think for me personally rationalizing the problem - saying this and this and that - I'm trying to distance myself from real emotional involvement with those things.

The subject attempts to distance himself from emotional involvement, recognizing that such involvement carries a personal cost.

53. I don't think at that moment I specifically focus on my own feelings and on myself - I just try to keep like a blank emotional state as it were and just quickly rush by ... not to get hooked by the situation as it were.

Confronted by a beggar, the subject does not specifically focus on his feelings or himself (he attempts to depersonalize himself).

He attempts to keep a blank emotional state ie., not to focus on any emotions at all.

54. I think I can't personally afford to get emotionally involved with everything you see in the world, because for some people it is a hard world.

The subject anticipates a high personal cost to himself if he becomes emotionally involved with every instance of worldly suffering he encounters.

55. I don't know of you have been watching CNN and the whole tragedy in Rwanda - all those people are getting cholera and they are dying. I tell you I couldn't do what those health workers are doing - I would absolutely go crazy.

The subject could not commit himself to relief-work on a large scale without "going crazy" ie., extreme distress/psychic pain.

56. I saw this white guy, he was from the Netherlands or France or somewhere and he was a doctor. He was standing up to his armpits in dead people and he was trying to save ... when he is busy here saving someone, right

next to that person is somebody else just died. It just seems to me ... I don't know how that guy can handle it because he has already emotionally committed himself to these people - taken a portion of his life and committed it to these people - it's just like a drop in the bucket - he's not really accomplishing anything and I can't see how he could stay sane dealing with that.

The subject would experience extreme distress at the negligible effect his emotional commitment would have.

57. ... you are going to keep on resenting yourself: "hell, did I do enough, did I do enough, couldn't I have done more, maybe I should have done whatever."

Having committed himself emotionally, the subject would experience self-resentment arising out of uncertainty over whether he had assisted sufficiently (interestingly, this cognition does not arise until there is emotional commitment on his part).

58. Then you are committed, then there is no way you can get out of it without tremendous guilt or totally resenting yourself.

Having committed himself emotionally, the subject would be unable to withdraw this commitment without tremendous guilt or self-resentment.

59. ... maybe these people survive that commitment by reaffirming to themselves "I'm doing the right thing, I'm doing the right thing", so they kind of have this moral support ... back-rest you can lean against.

The subject acknowledges the possibility that he could sustain emotional commitment by reaffirming to himself the positive moral quality of his actions (this might make it possible to continue despite personal distress and in the absence of meaningful results).

60. But still, wow, I think there must be self-resentment anyway because you are going to keep on thinking "have I done enough?"

The subject nevertheless anticipates that one would feel self-resentment because of the cognition that one had not done enough to assist.

Reading for Cognition: Subject One

Protocol

1. If I am to be honest with myself, I would have trouble motivating my feelings.

The subject has difficulty motivating (perhaps justifying or explaining) his feelings.

2. It is hard to say why I feel like that.

The subject has difficulty understanding his feelings. The reasons for his feelings are not transparent to him.

3. I have some difficulty justifying my behaviour.

The subject has difficulty justifying his behaviour.

4. Usually I do not give beggars any money, because I do not think that it serves any purpose and it does not accomplish anything.

The subject does not think that donating money accomplishes any practical purpose.

5. And I do not have the money to throw away.

The subject implies that he cannot afford to give money away frivolously.
Giving money to beggars is regarded as a waste.

6. By giving beggars money, you are only reinforcing their idea that begging is a feasible way of life.

By donating, the subject is perpetuating the problem by reinforcing the perception that begging is feasible.

7. The one or two rand that you can give them is certainly not going to change their lives and rescue them from poverty ...

The small amounts that he can afford cannot bring about meaningful long-term changes.

8. ... the socio-economic problems of South Africa require much more than any single individual can give.

Isolated individual action cannot ameliorate South Africa's socio-economic problems.

9. I am a realist.

The subject regards himself as a realist.

10. I fervently believe that in this life it is "every man for himself", you have to look after yourself because nobody else will.

The subject believes that self-interest is essential to his well-being, given that other people are not inclined to look after his interests.

11. If I were to give money to every homeless beggar that approaches me, I would only destroy myself in the end.

Donating money to every homeless beggar, would bankrupt the subject, hence the consistent policy of not donating.

12. As an Afrikaner, I do not feel responsible at all for the situation in which some black people find themselves in (poverty, unemployment etc.).

The subject does not feel responsible for the plight of poor blacks and denies that such responsibility might arise out of his group-identity.

13. There are some people (both black and white) who feel that the white population (especially the Afrikaner) should be held accountable, and indeed recompense, the blacks for the injustice of Apartheid. I feel that this might be true to a certain extent ...

The subject acknowledges some responsibility on the part of the white (especially Afrikaner) population to recompense black people for injustices committed on behalf of the white population.

14. ... but I do not believe that the children should pay for the sins of the fathers.

The subject and his generation are not responsible for injustices committed by others (the previous generation) and are not obligated to recompense those who they have not personally harmed.

15. Not all whites were responsible for Apartheid ...

Blame is not conferred by group-identity.

16. ... and not all whites are racists.

Not all whites are racist.

17. Therefore, as a person who have never committed a racist act against anybody, I do not feel responsible for the plight of the old beggar.

Since the subject has never behaved in a racist manner, he is not responsible for the beggar.

Past racist acts would confer a generalized responsibility for beggars (or those who are less fortunate).

<u>Interview One</u>

18. This one guy comes to mind - this old beggar that is sometimes in town. He walks with a cane. He looks as if he could have been somebody's grandfather - little white beard, old fifties kind of hat and jacket. It just makes me think sometimes: where does that guy come from, what kind of a life did he have before he fell on hard times (maybe he was that way for his whole life).

When the subject considers a familiar old beggar he attempts to take the perspective of that person, contemplating that person's origins and life-story. (The subject is perhaps able to draw upon his own sympathetic life experience, perhaps his experience of his own grandfather, in this endeavour)

19. Then I feel sorry but then I think: "There are hundreds, if not thousands of people like him in South Africa today. What can I do?"

A realization of powerlessness results from the thought that there are too many needy people for the subject to assist.

20. ... a lot of white people - you know about so-called "white-guilt" - feel that, because they prospered under the Apartheid system, they really owe the black population something. It's true that it did give whites an unfair advantage, as it were - we all prospered under it ...

The subject acknowledges that white people (himself included) did benefit unfairly from Apartheid and that this represents a reason to feel guilty and indebted.

21. ... but for me, I look at it as if it were a generational thing: I never voted on anything on apartheid, my generation never voted on anything, except for the referendum, but personally I didn't vote on that, so I didn't have any hand in it, as it were.

The subject denies this argument (see #20) on the grounds that he has not personally supported apartheid in any way. His generation had no direct hand in Apartheid. He is therefore not responsible.

22. I didn't have a choice where I was going to be born into ...

The subject is not responsible for Apartheid because he was powerless in regard to his birth into a privileged class.

23. If I had maybe been an architect of the system or the ideology or something like that, or if I had personally done something bad to these people, then I might have felt guilty ...

Since the subject has never acted in a substantive way to support the system, or implicitly supported it through his interpersonal relations, he is not guilty and feelings of guilt are inappropriate.

24. ... but I have never personally harmed anybody else, white or black, in my life. I have never even called a black person a "kaffir" to their face. I have never done anything like that, so ... for that reason that doesn't make me feel really guilty.

In his interpersonal relations he has never harmed anyone, or employed racial slurs. The subject is therefore not guilty.

25. This organization that feeds the little street-children - GADRA - every now and then they ask people not to

give them money, but rather to give to the organization so that they can put that money into education and food and clothes and so on. So with that in mind, I try to make a point of it not to give these little kids money ...

The subject attempts not to give because that money can be put to better use by the local welfare organization.

26. ... but I have done it ...

The subject has given money in spite of this rationalization.

27. ... if the students were to keep on giving them money, then they wouldn't need to go to the organization for help. You would be shooting those guys down, as it were.

Donating to beggars is problematic because of an unintended consequence of giving, namely, that beggars need not seek proper help from the local welfare organization.

28. I think I would maybe, even if it is subconscious, search for a justification not to give them money.

Even if no local organization existed (and the above argument did not apply ie., #27), the subject considers that he would probably still search for a justification not to donate money, even if this was a subconscious process.

29. ... the couple of rand I can give that person isn't going to improve their lives.

No practical or meaningful function is served by his small donations, hence donating is irrational.

30. The solution is much bigger than that: the country's economy as a whole has got to improve.

The solution is macro-economic and requires more than isolated individual action.

31. A misconception a lot of black people are under, still, is that if your skin is white, you have money to burn.

The subject is cognizant of the perception that white people are automatically wealthy.
He considers this perception to be untrue.

32. I'm not even paying for my own education - I'm studying here on a loan. So, to begin with, I don't have money because I'm white ...

The subject is not wealthy, therefore the aforementioned perception is erroneous.

33. I think I'm socially responsible in the way that I have never threatened anybody else in any way; I am a law-abiding citizen; while I worked, I payed taxes, before I came to university; my fiancee and I actually do give money to GADRA ...

The subject considers himself to be social responsible in the sense that he has never threatened anyone, obeys the law, pays taxes and donates to formal charities.

34. ... it is a hard concept **(social responsibility)** to define.

The subject has difficulty defining social responsibility.

35. Functionalism, the theory goes that basically it is survival of the fittest, it is every man for himself, class-stratification is totally justified, people are born with different potentials for social advancement. So it is inevitable that there is a ruling class and a working class. That is the way it is. I was actually inclined to agree with that.

The subject is inclined to agree with the theory of functionalism: competition is inevitable, acting in a self-interested way is therefore natural and since people have different potentials, class stratification is justified.

36. ... there are not enough natural resources on this planet or in this country for everybody to have an equal share and be prosperous.

There are insufficient resources for everyone to prosper equally. Poverty is therefore inevitable.

37. ... some people are going to advance further in life than others, maybe not because of some biological advantage but because of the environment they are born in ... and then they are socialized into becoming people that have a standard of education, are go-getters and so forth.

It is inevitable that some people will advance further than others, not necessarily because of a biological advantage, but because they are born into different environments and then socialized differently.

This is inevitable in a society (presumably because it is "functional").

38. I don't think everybody is going to be able to be equal - that is what I mean.

Material equality is therefore an impossible goal.

39. It is hard enough these days to fend for yourself, you can only stretch yourself that far without actually destroying yourself. So, ja ... it's every guy for himself ...

It is difficult to ensure one's own well-being.

Helping others carries a cost to oneself.

40. ... they shouldn't all abandon the country all of a sudden. I mean, they still have a positive role to play ...

White people should not abandon the country. They are obligated to make a positive contribution.

41. ... recompensation in that sense that they could actually devote their skills and their technical knowledge, whatever, into maybe helping that section of the population that is not ... that's underprivileged.

The white population have a responsibility to utilize their skills and knowledge to help the underprivileged population.

42. There is a big difference between doing that and money being extorted from you, saying: "You're white, give me a thousand rand, give me your house and your car because I deserve it, I was underprivileged"

This obligation differs from an obligation to transfer money or other assets to the underprivileged simply because one is white. The latter variety of obligation is unfair and amounts to extortion.

43. ... we shouldn't be threatened and ... given an ultimatum: "Give me your money or you die."

It is unfair to threaten white people in order to obtain their money.

The argument that all whites are responsible for Apartheid and therefore obligated to donate money is fallacious, and amounts to moral and emotional extortion.

44. That is what I meant, just that we have a positive role to play ... and we should be willing to play it.

White people are obligated to help and should acknowledge this.

45. ... when I am in an argument with somebody ... and they say: "Ja, you have had a privileged background, white man, you don't know what the working class is all about." I say: "Listen china, I worked with black labourers ... in a steel mill ... I know all about the proletariat and what they go through so just be quiet"

When in arguments the subject employs his past experience to refute the contention that he cannot empathize with the working-class.

46. ... so I have always grown up in a household where academic values were perpetrated **(perpetuated)**.

The subject acknowledges the academic values that he has been taught.

47. I read a lot of books when I was a kid and there was a high value attached to studying and so forth.

The subject attaches a high value to reading and studying.

48. ... my parents are still very conservative.

The subject regards himself as more liberal than his parents.

49. ... the authority structure was very clearly defined for you.

As a child, the subject was aware of his position relative to familial authority.

50. ... people have always been ignorant about the real ideology behind political parties and so on ... You can't directly blame people for apartheid.

People are not directly responsible for Apartheid because they were not aware of the reality: they were ignorant and were being manipulated.

51. I think habit comes into it. Ignorance plays a large part.

People supported Apartheid because of ignorance and voted out of habit (rather than expressing an informed decision).

52. ... the people who knew what it was about, the guys who engineered the whole ideology, certainly they, if they were here today, would be liable to answer for these things.

The people who deliberately engineered Apartheid are responsible for it.

53. But they are long dead, so what do we do now?

The subject is unsure of how to ameliorate the damage of Apartheid given that those who are responsible for it are dead.

Interview Two

54. I find it hard to explain.

The subject finds his emotions hard to explain.

55. I just have a feeling ... but if I think about it I assume it is because that deep inside I know that I am privileged, and that person has nothing.

The subject assumes that his feelings (embarrassment and self-consciousness) arise out of the knowledge that he is privileged whereas the beggar is not.

56. But I also know there is really nothing I can do for them ... for that person. I can give them two rand or five rand every time I walk past them, and even if I do give them five rand every time I walk past them it is really not going to give them a house or give them a job or give them an education or stuff like that.

The subject believes that he cannot assist beggars: the money he can afford to donate will not uplift them in any substantive way.

He considers that housing, employment and education are meaningful goals for social upliftment.

57. So it makes me feel bad that, maybe in the first place that I have ... maybe that is a natural reaction - if you have something into which to a certain extent you were born you know, maybe you just feel self-conscious about the fact that you have more than this person, who by the luck of the draw it could have been the other way around.

The subject acknowledges that his position of privilege is fortunate and arbitrary ie., the beggar could just as well have been born with his status (there is an assumption here that being born into a social class inescapably conditions one's future material well-being).

This is the source of his self-consciousness (possibly guilt).

58. There is nothing that merits, inherent in yourself, that merits you having more than that person - it's just the luck of your, where you, the level of society you were basically born into.

The subject considers that there is nothing inherent within him that merits his privileged position: it is the outcome of an arbitrary process beyond his control.

59. ... I was born into that level of society, and from there on I've worked towards and attained status.

Following his birth into a privileged class, the subject has worked to deserve and increase this status ie., by his intrinsic actions.

60. But hey, I could have been born ... it could have been me so that is pretty scary, to think ... it could have been me ... if my father loses his job ...

The subject acknowledges that he could have been born into the social position of the beggar. This frightens him.

He acknowledges that he is still dependent on socio-economic forces for his well-being: he would experience a drop in his standard of living if his father is retrenched.

61. One black guy said: "well, because you are white you don't really understand what the whole Apartheid system, what the effect of it was", and I told the guy: "Ja, you are 100% correct because, unfortunately I can't identify with what you are saying because I did not share that experience.

The subject cannot identify with the experience of black people under the Apartheid system because he did not share this experience.

62. I can read about it and you can tell me about it, but there is really no way that I can really know what you went through because I did not share that experience.

The subject can read about that experience and listen to it being related, but can never achieve complete knowledge because he did not experience it first-hand.

63. And that is the same thing with **(the beggar)** ... I don't really know the social context that person comes from.

The experience of the beggar is similarly opaque (perhaps because he is black). The subject does not know the social context of that person's life.

64. There is no way I can really know because ... I come basically from a different world, you know.

The subject considers that he cannot know the social context/experience of the beggar's life because the subject comes from a different world (this implies that his experience is shaped by the political structures/boundaries of class and race).

65. I can empathize with them, as I said, and maybe try to understand, but it is still going to be from way over here ... from totally objective ...

Although the subject can empathize and make the attempt to understand the experience of the beggar, this is from a detached position (his ability to empathize is compromised).

66. I can't really understand what they are going through because I have never had that experience and I probably never will.

The subject cannot fully understand (empathize with) the experience of beggars because he has never had that experience himself.

It is unlikely (given his privileged status) that he will ever share their experience.

67. I think no, to a certain extent there isn't **(a substitute for personal experience)** ...

There is no complete substitute for personal experience.

68. ... because you can read about it. You can maybe, in certain cases use participant observation, you can go with the people.

One can read about the experiences of others or engage in participant observation (in an effort to understand their experience).

69. I mean obviously as a researcher you won't expose yourself to as bad conditions as them: you are not going to go and live like a beggar out on the streets for nine months or whatever. So I think that personal experience is maybe the ultimate ...

As a researcher one will not expose oneself to the same poor conditions for the same period of time (as beggars must). This limits one's understanding.

70. I can't really understand what that person is going through, so ... in that sense, I guess you are right about a feeling of alienation because that person is so out of my context.

The subject does feel alienated because he cannot fully understand the other's experience: the beggar inhabits a different context to the subject.

71. I really don't know ... the bottom line is that I don't know how to deal with that person ... when the opportunity comes and presents itself I really have trouble dealing with them because I don't know how.

The subject does not know how to deal with the beggar when the opportunity to assist presents itself (perhaps because he has no "common ground" with the beggar).

72. What am I supposed to say to this guy? He has nothing basically in this world and he comes up to me and expects me to do something for him, but just what the hell am I supposed to do?

The subject does not know what to say or do in a situation where a beggar expects the subject to help him.

The beggar's living conditions are so poor and so far removed from those of the subject, that the subject does not know where to start the process of upliftment.

73. The ideal situation would obviously be if we could get rid of poverty.

The subject acknowledges that poverty is the main source of the beggar's problems. Poverty should be removed.

74. If I was a billionaire with billions of rand I would build a house for everybody but in my social ... what can I do? I can do absolutely nothing.

The subject would provide homes for everyone if he was capable of doing so (if he could afford it).

- **His social and financial position limits the extent to which he can help the poverty-stricken. He considers himself powerless to assist.**

75. It was not the first oppressive system, it is not going to be the last I'm sure.

Apartheid was an oppressive system. Other similar systems have existed before and will exist again. Such systems are inevitable (because of human nature).

76. I think ... maybe, I don't know, it is probable that if that system never came about we wouldn't have had half the social problems we have now, in my mind anyway.

Apartheid is the cause of most of the social problems that are experienced in the present.

77. I am part of a group that is seen as ... well, widely part of a group, that is seen as having a direct hand in this and brought the whole thing about.

The subject regards himself as being part of a group (the Afrikaner) that is perceived as creating and perpetuating the system of Apartheid.

78. ... personally I have never oppressed anybody else or ever harmed any other person ...

The subject has never oppressed or harmed anyone in his life.

79. ... and I try to be socially responsible in that I don't waste my time at university - I don't waste my father's money ...

The subject works hard to justify the money his father spends on his education.

He considers this to be socially-responsible.

80. ... I don't waste the government's money ...

The subject works hard in order to justify the state subsidies that make his university education possible.

81. I don't sit here at university - I don't take up a space. If I don't work at university then I am basically occupying a space that somebody else could use, and I'm not doing that. I'm working at university so in that sense I feel that I am being socially-responsible. I am earning my keep as it were.

The subject does not sit idle at university: he works hard in order to justify his privileged position ie., in order to deserve his status as a university student.

He is aware that others would wish to enter university and feels obligated to them to make the most of his opportunity (he is aware that he is fortunate to be in the position he is).

82. I think, like you said, there is like a rational level of explanation where you can tell yourself: "hey, there is absolutely no rational reason or explanation for me to feel guilty because I have never done anything in my life to hurt anybody" ...

The subject acknowledges that there is a rational level of thought (an explanatory level) that appears to render a situation completely intelligible (this level is verbal and consists of communications and arguments by the subject to himself).

According to this level, feelings of guilt are irrational because they are not personally deserved.

83. ... but I think ... my personal feelings of self-consciousness, shamefulness about the fact that I am a part of this group arises from other people's reactions to a certain extent. I have never personally had somebody explicitly come up to me and say "you damn ... you Afrikaner, you racist pig, nazi", whatever you know, but I just perceive that other people sometimes think: "Yes, you're Afrikaans - racist come ... ".

Despite rational argumentation, the subject feels self-conscious and shameful, feelings which he attributes to the reactions of others.

These reactions are not explicit but the subject nevertheless infers that others think of him as a racist.

He attributes their perceptions to his status as an Afrikaner.

84. ... rationalizing the problem is more of a self-defense mechanism. If I were to commit myself emotionally to every tragedy I see happening around me every day in society I would go out of my bloody mind.

The subject considers that rationalizing the problem (presenting reasons why he cannot donate money) is a self-defense mechanism to avoid emotional commitment to the needy.

The extent of need is so great that the subject is unable to commit himself unequivocally without "going out of his mind" (excessive personal distress).

85. I would actually go nuts thinking that the world is such a cruel place ...

Faced with the pain and need of others, the subject would conclude that the world is intrinsically cruel.

This realization would drive him insane (the irony is that the subject already does acknowledge that the world is cruel, although this knowledge is divorced from the corresponding emotion. This suggests that it is really the emotion that makes the difference which agrees with #84).

86. ... and here I sit in a relative position of privilege while there are millions of people out there suffering or basically being in a living hell.

The knowledge that he is privileged while millions of other people are less fortunate, would exacerbate the subject's personal distress (again, this knowledge already exists but is not based upon emotional experience).

87. So I think for me, personally, rationalizing the problem - saying this and this and that - I'm trying to distance myself from real emotional involvement with those things.

Rationalizing the problem is an attempt to avoid emotional involvement in the suffering and needs of others.

88. ... in a situation like that, I would try to focus away from that person ... really not look, because if you look that is the first step towards getting involved. If you take the time and you look then you are going to start thinking, and if you start thinking about it you will probably become more involved and then you will commit yourself maybe to really trying.

The subject does not look at beggars because he anticipates that this will lead to emotional involvement on his part by provoking him to think about the plight of the beggar (cognitive role-taking may lead to empathy, sympathy and ultimately personal involvement on his part).

89. I know it sounds cold-hearted that you don't want to commit yourself to trying to help that person, but ... so you just like try to distance yourself naturally ...

The subject attempts to distance himself from the beggar because he does not want to commit himself emotionally to that person.

He acknowledges that this sounds cold-hearted.

90. I don't want to do anything without thinking about it because ...

The subject does not want to act without thinking.

91. I don't want to be stupid ...

The subject does not want to be stupid (uncritical, unaware of his motivation).

92. I don't want to be labelled as a stupid person ...

The subject does not want to be perceived as a stupid person.

93. .. so before I do something I always try to think "why am I doing this and why am I thinking this way?" So that is the way I reason it out for myself.

The subject always tries to understand the motivation for his actions and thoughts, before he embarks on a course of action. This entails a process of reason.

94. I think I can't personally afford to get emotionally involved with everything I see in the world, because for some people it is a hard world.

The personal cost to himself (personal distress) prohibits the subject becoming emotionally involved.

The subject understands that there is much suffering in the world and anticipates that emotional realization of that suffering would be unpleasant.

95. ... it's just like a drop in the bucket - he's **(the health worker in Rwanda)** not really accomplishing anything and I can't see how he could stay sane dealing with that.

Helping others may not contribute significantly to the mass upliftment of the needy.

This would drive the subject insane if placed in the same position as a relief worker.

96. ... maybe these people survive that commitment by reaffirming to themselves "I'm doing the right thing, I'm doing the right thing", so they kind of have this moral support ... back-rest you can lean against.

The subject acknowledges that moral certitude ie., the belief that one is doing the right thing (and repeating this belief to oneself) may make it possible to endure personal distress.

Reading for Behaviour: Subject One

Protocol

1. If I walk by, as often happens in Grahamstown with the street-children ...

The subject often walks by street-children.

2. I do not think I would give the beggar money in the hypothetical situation described, even though I have small change in my pocket.

Despite the fact that the subject is in a position to donate money, he thinks that he would not do so.

3. Usually I do not give beggars any money

Usually the subject does not give the beggars money.

Interview One

4. It's like: give me money now, I deserve. And then I get mad. You think: "I'm not giving you a sock, get out of my way".

When beggars approach the subject as if they are entitled to his money, he responds angrily and does not

give them money.

5. And then on the other hand, there is this old man who walks around and kind of pleadingly asks you - then you feel sorry for the people.

When a familiar old man requests money pleadingly, sympathy is evoked and presumably the subject is more inclined to donate.

6. So I think it's a spur of the moment thing.

The subject's behaviour is dependent on momentary factors.

7. ... if I am in a bad mood, if I have had a bad day at university or somebody gave me trouble or whatever, just a bad mood, I will be less inclined to feel sorry for somebody - not necessarily beggars or black people or whatever - just anybody who takes me the wrong way while I am in a bad mood. I wouldn't be very friendly towards them.

When the subject is in a bad mood (which may be provoked by an unpleasant event/s), he is less inclined to feel sympathy and hence to behave favourably towards any other person, particularly anyone who exacerbates the bad mood by making an unfair demand upon the subject, or by being intrusive.

8. But maybe if I am in an incredibly good mood, the next day you know ... I have done it - one day I was in a very, very good mood (maybe I had got a good test result or something) and I just ... "money, yes sure", just give him a couple of cents ...

A good mood increases the probability of the subject donating money.

9. It depends on the mood.

The subject's behaviour depends on his mood.

10. I don't think I would start giving them money all of a sudden **(if GADRA did not exist)** ... to make myself feel better.

In the absence of a local welfare organization (hence: in the absence of an alternative for the beggar) the

subject does not think that he would donate money.

11. ... my fiancee and I actually do give money to GADRA ...

The subject and his fiancee do contribute money to the local welfare organization.

Interview Two

12. If I was a billionaire with billions of rand I would build a house for everybody ...

If the subject was in a financial position to do so, he would build a house for every homeless person.

13. ... personally I have never oppressed anybody else or ever harmed any other person ...

The subject has never oppressed or harmed anyone.

14. I'm working at university so in that sense I feel that I am being socially-responsible.

The subject works hard at university.

15. ... in a situation like that, I would try to focus just away from that person ...

In a situation where he is confronted by the appeal of the beggar, he attempts to ignore that person (to focus elsewhere).

16. I just try to keep like a blank emotional state as it were and just quickly rush by ... not to get hooked by the situation as it were.

The subject quickly rushes by, attempting to keep a blank emotional state.

17. I tell you I couldn't do what those health workers are doing ...

The subject would be unable to do relief-care work on a mass scale.

Appendix Six: Part Profiles for Subject One

Profile for Affect: Subject One

The subject has difficulty explaining or justifying his feelings. He contends that he acts on the spur of the moment.

When the subject sees a person begging on the street he feels embarrassed. This may be exacerbated if he does not donate to the beggar. He contends that this embarrassment might be because of an awareness of his inability to assist.

The subject is occasionally self-conscious (an elaboration upon the embarrassed feeling referred to above). He finds this feeling difficult to articulate. The subject considers that this feeling stems from an awareness of the wealth and status differential between himself and the beggar. Specifically, the subject is self-conscious because he has done nothing to deserve this privileged position ie., the beggar has as much right to his privileges as he himself does.

This self-consciousness borders on shame and stems from his identification with a group that is widely regarded as having brought Apartheid about (his feelings are partly conditioned by the perceptions of others). His feelings of self-consciousness and shamefulness (at being an Afrikaner) arise out of the reactions of others. His self-identity is therefore partly constructed by others ie., the value he places upon being an Afrikaner is partly determined by others' perceptions of this category. The subject is nevertheless uncertain if shame best describes his feelings.

The subject is more certain of a feeling of anxiousness when he thinks that he could easily have been born into the same socio-economic class as the beggar (realizing the contingency of his own existence makes him anxious). He finds it scary to think that it could have been him begging on the street (but for the circumstances).

Apart from embarrassment and shame, the subject experiences hostility towards street children. He wishes they were not there. When money is demanded of the subject in a way that implies the beggar has a right to it, the subject feels anger. The subject acknowledges that he feels alienated because the beggar occupies a very different context to himself (which makes empathy difficult).

The subject nevertheless claims that he can empathize, but that this is from a detached, objective perspective (a kind of cognitive role-taking). He does acknowledge an emotional component to his attitude (which may reflect a degree of empathic feeling) but concedes that this is restricted because he cannot identify with the experience of black people having not shared that experience himself ie., poverty and oppression. There are therefore limits to his empathic ability.

The subject sometimes feels sympathy, however, particularly if the beggar is old. Sympathy is evoked by an old man who pleads for money.

Even where the subject feels sympathy, a feeling of powerlessness may accompany it. The subject feels immense frustration at not knowing how to respond to the beggar's appeal for help (he is paralysed by the magnitude of the beggar's needs and/or by an inability to escape the situation). The subject is frustrated that he can do nothing to assist. He claims that this stems from his own lack of economic power that prohibits him from assisting impoverished people in a significant way.

Related to this feeling of frustration are painful emotions (personal distress) when the subject considers the lifestyles of beggars (this is a possible course his empathy takes). The subject experiences personal distress at the sight of a beggar scrounging for food (the source of this may be an empathic connection with the beggar ie., he empathically recognizes the beggar's lifestyle as unpleasant). The subject further recognizes that emotional commitment to every tragedy he encounters would threaten his psychological health (through excessive personal distress). He anticipates a high personal cost to himself if he becomes emotionally involved with every instance of worldly suffering he encounters. The subject could not commit himself to relief-work on a large scale without "going crazy" ie., extreme distress/psychic pain. He would experience extreme distress at the negligible effect his emotional commitment would have. Having committed himself emotionally, the subject imagines he would experience self-resentment arising out of uncertainty over whether he had assisted sufficiently (interestingly, this cognition does not arise until there is an imagined emotional commitment). Having committed himself emotionally, the subject would be unable to withdraw this commitment without tremendous guilt or self-resentment.

This type of personal distress reaction would be exacerbated by the realization that the world is intrinsically cruel and that the subject is fortunate to occupy a privileged position while others suffer. Although this is suggestive of a sense of guilt, the subject has difficulty deciding whether he feels guilty or not.

The subject claims he does not feel responsible for the plight of black people. He rejects the idea that blame might arise out of his identity as an Afrikaner. The subject does not believe himself responsible for injustices perpetrated by the previous generation: not all white people were to blame for Apartheid. He claims he does not feel responsible for the beggar because the subject has never committed a racist act; he has never personally harmed anyone. He denies responsibility for Apartheid in any way. He concedes that he would feel guilty had he been directly involved in propagating the Apartheid system, or had he personally infringed the rights of those who were its victims.

The subject therefore denies that he feels personal guilt - guilt arising out of a personal debt. He nevertheless acknowledges that he regrets the system of Apartheid. He regrets that the system ever came about. Moreover, he partially acknowledges the accountability of the white population, especially the Afrikaner, and the need to recompense black people. The privileged white minority have an obligation to the underprivileged and should be willing to honour this. He implies that he feels a sense of obligation by the claim that he is being socially-responsible because he is working hard at university. In addition, he acknowledges also that he feels better after giving (which suggests guilt feelings) but predicts that despite this he would not assist in such a situation.

Mood exerts a major influence on behaviour (mood may enhance or restrict his initial emotions). When the subject is in a bad mood, he is less inclined to feel sympathy for others and will be inclined to react in an unfriendly way to people, particularly people who are experienced as intrusive (his feeling of hostility and alienation may be enhanced). The subject is more inclined to give money when in a good mood.

He perceives a need to defend himself against the possibility of personal distress and associated guilt (emotions he is aware of in potential). The subject attempts to distance himself from emotional involvement, recognizing that such involvement carries a personal cost. Confronted by a beggar, the subject does not specifically focus on his feelings or himself (he attempts to depersonalize himself). He attempts to keep a blank emotional state ie., not to focus on any emotions at all.

The subject acknowledges the possibility that he could sustain emotional commitment by reaffirming to himself the positive moral quality of his actions (this might make it possible to continue despite personal distress and in the absence of meaningful results). The subject nevertheless anticipates that he would feel self-resentment because of the cognition that he had not done enough to assist.

Profile for Cognition: Subject One

The subject has difficulty understanding his feelings. He finds his emotions hard to explain. The reasons for his feelings are not transparent to him. Hence, he has difficulty justifying his feelings and behaviour (although at first glance he is successful at doing so).

The difficulty he experiences understanding his motivation is problematic given the academic values that he has been taught and internalized. The subject attaches a high value to reading and studying. He does not want to act without thinking. The subject does not want to be uncritical or unaware of his motivation. Moreover, he does not want to be perceived as being so. The subject always tries to understand the motivation for his actions and thoughts, before he embarks on a course of action. This involves a process of reason.

This is evident in his response to the hypothetical moral dilemma. The subject defends the fact that he usually does not donate to beggars. He argues on various grounds that he is not responsible for their plight:-

He does not feel responsible for the plight of poor blacks and denies that such responsibility might arise out of his group-identity. Blame is not conferred by group-identity. Not all whites are racist.

The subject and his generation are not responsible for injustices committed by others (the previous generation) and are not obligated to recompense those who they have not personally harmed. His generation had no hand in Apartheid. He is therefore not responsible. Moreover, even the older generation cannot be held directly responsible because they were not aware of the reality of Apartheid: they were ignorant. People supported Apartheid because of ignorance and voted out of habit (rather than expressing an informed decision). Only those people who deliberately engineered Apartheid are truly responsible for it.

The subject denies the argument that because he prospered under Apartheid he owes a debt to those who suffered. He contends that he has not personally supported Apartheid in any way. Similarly, he was powerless in regard to his birth into a privileged class. Since the subject has never acted in a substantive way to support the system, or implicitly supported it through his interpersonal relations, he is not guilty and feelings of guilt are inappropriate.

Past racist acts would confer a generalized responsibility for beggars (those who are less fortunate) but since the subject has never behaved in a racist manner, he is not responsible for the beggar. In his interpersonal relations he has never harmed anyone, or employed racial slurs. He has never oppressed or harmed anyone in his life. The subject therefore regards himself as not guilty.

Having denied responsibility for the beggar, the subject defends the opposing principle, namely, acting in a self-interested fashion. He contends that self-interest is essential to his well-being, given that other people are not inclined to look after his interests. It is difficult to ensure one's own well-being because other people do not have one's own private interests at heart.

The subject is inclined to agree with the theory of Functionalism: competition is inevitable, acting in a self-interested way is therefore natural and since people have different potentials, class stratification is justified. Given that there are insufficient resources for everyone to prosper equally, poverty is inevitable. Similarly, it is inevitable that some people will advance further than others, not necessarily because of a biological advantage, but because they are born into different environments and then socialized differently. This is inevitable in a society (presumably because it is "functional"). Material equality is therefore an impossible goal. Moreover, although Apartheid was an oppressive system, other similar systems have existed before and will exist again. Such systems are inevitable (presumably because of human nature).

Having denied any positive responsibility on his part for the beggar and defended the principle of acting in a self-interested fashion, the subject employs further (utilitarian) arguments to justify the fact that he usually does not give to beggars. These arguments also take various forms:-

He does not think that donating money accomplishes any practical purpose. The small amounts that he can afford cannot bring about meaningful long-term changes. Giving money to beggars is therefore a waste. Isolated individual action cannot ameliorate South Africa's socio-economic problems. No practical or meaningful function is served by his small donations, hence such donation is irrational. The solution is macro-economic and requires more than isolated individual action. The subject believes that he cannot assist beggars: the money he can afford to donate will not uplift them in any substantive way. The subject regards himself as a realist. His social and financial position limits the extent to which he can help the poverty-stricken. A realization of powerlessness results from the thought that there are too many needy people for the subject to assist.

Helping others carries a cost to oneself which may be prohibitive. The subject cannot afford to give money away frivolously. Donating money to every homeless beggar, would bankrupt the subject, hence the consistent

policy of not donating.

By donating, the subject is perpetuating the problem by reinforcing the perception that begging is feasible. The subject attempts not to give because that money can be put to better use by the local welfare organization. Donating to beggars is also problematic because of an unintended consequence of giving, namely that beggars need not seek proper help from the local welfare organization. The subject does concede, however, that even if no local organization existed (and the previous argument did not apply), he would probably still search for a justification not to donate money, even if this was a subconscious process.

The subject subsequently combines the argument that he cannot assist meaningfully with the argument that the personal cost to himself is prohibitive. He contends that helping others may not contribute significantly to the mass upliftment of the needy and that this would drive the subject insane if placed in the same position as a relief worker. This insight, together with the earlier admission that he would probably not assist even if no local welfare organization existed, suggests that the underlying reason for his apparent lack of charity is the attempt to avoid any emotional distress that might ensue if he commits himself to helping others.

The subject subsequently admits as much: he acknowledges that there is a rational level of thought (an explanatory level) that appears to render a situation completely intelligible and is valid on its own terms (this level is verbal and consists of communications and arguments made by the subject to himself and summarized above). According to this level feelings of responsibility and guilt are irrational because they are not personally deserved. Despite this cognition, such feelings still arise.

In similar vein, the subject regards himself as being part of a group (the Afrikaner) that is perceived as creating and perpetuating the system of Apartheid. Despite rational argumentation, the subject concedes that he feels self-conscious and shameful. He attributes these feelings to the reactions of others. These reactions are not explicit but the subject nevertheless infers that others think of him as a racist. He attributes their perception to his status as an Afrikaner.

The subject is thereby led to the conclusion that rationalizing the problem (presenting reasons why he cannot donate money) may be a self-defense mechanism to avoid emotional commitment to the needy (and perhaps his feelings in general). It is an attempt to avoid emotional involvement in the suffering and needs of others.

The extent of need is so great that the subject anticipates that he would be unable to commit himself unequivocally without "going out of his mind" (excessive personal distress). Faced with the pain and need of others, the subject would conclude that the world is intrinsically cruel. This realization would drive him insane (the irony is that the subject already does acknowledge that the world is cruel, although this knowledge is divorced from the corresponding emotion). This suggests that it is really the emotion that makes the difference ie., the subject understands that there is much suffering in the world but anticipates that emotional realization of that suffering would be unpleasant. The knowledge that he is privileged while millions of other people are less fortunate, would exacerbate the subject's personal distress (again, this knowledge already exists but is not based upon emotional

experience). The anticipated personal cost to himself therefore prohibits the subject becoming emotionally involved. He does acknowledge, however, that moral certitude ie., the belief that one is doing the right thing (and repeating this belief to oneself) may make it possible to endure personal distress, although this remains hypothetical in his case.

The subject does not look at beggars because he anticipates that this will lead to emotional involvement on his part by provoking him to think about the plight of the beggar (cognitive role-taking may lead to empathy, sympathy and ultimately personal involvement on his part). The subject attempts to distance himself from the beggar because he does not want to commit himself emotionally to that person. He acknowledges that this sounds cold-hearted.

The realization that his arguments may be a type of defense against his feelings, opens the door for further concessions. The subject concedes that he does feel embarrassment and self-consciousness and suggests that these emotions may arise out of the knowledge that he is privileged whereas the beggar is not. The subject further acknowledges that his position of privilege is fortunate and arbitrary ie., the beggar could just as well have been born with his status (there is an assumption here that being born into a social class inescapably conditions one's future material well-being) and there is nothing inherent within him that merits his privileged position: it is the outcome of an arbitrary process beyond his control. The knowledge that he does not deserve his status then becomes a spur to social responsibility (which is to employ the theory of Functionalism for the opposite argument as before). Furthermore, he acknowledges that he is still dependent on socio-economic forces for his well-being: he would experience a drop in his standard of living if his father is retrenched. All these acknowledgements serve to contradict his earlier contention that there is nothing unethical about selfishness. The result is not a reversal of his earlier arguments, merely an acknowledgement of reasons and feelings that mitigate against a completely selfish response. The fact that the subject has given money in spite of all his rationalizations suggests for instance that he does feel some sense of obligation.

Hence the subject concedes that following his birth into a privileged class, he has worked to deserve and increase this status ie., by his own intrinsic actions. The subject also acknowledges some responsibility on the part of the white (especially Afrikaner) population to recompense black people for injustices committed on behalf of the white population. The subject acknowledges that white people (himself included) did benefit unfairly from Apartheid and that this represents a reason to feel guilty and indebted. The subject is cognizant of the perception that white people are automatically wealthy. This wealth is a consequence of apartheid, is not deserved and it is therefore rightful that white people make donations. The subject is not wealthy, however, therefore the aforementioned perception is erroneous where he is concerned (this again demonstrates the tension between a self- and other-oriented response). White people should not abandon the country. They are obligated to make a positive contribution. The white population have a responsibility to utilize their skills and knowledge to help the underprivileged population. White people are obligated to help and should acknowledge this.

The tension in his cognition is further demonstrated by his assertion that the above obligations differ from an obligation to transfer money or other assets to the underprivileged. The latter variety of obligation is unfair and amounts to extortion. It is unfair to threaten white people in order to obtain their money. The argument that all whites are responsible for Apartheid and therefore obligated to donate money remains untrue and amounts to moral and emotional extortion.

The same tension is probably reflected by the self-confessed difficulty the subject has in defining social responsibility (he is perhaps unsure of his own obligations). The subject is unsure of how to ameliorate the damage of Apartheid given that those who are responsible for it are dead. The subject considers himself to be social responsible in the sense that he has never threatened anyone, obeys the law, pays taxes and donates to formal charities. He works hard to justify the money his father spends on his education and the state subsidies that make his university education possible. The subject does not sit idle at university: he works hard in order to justify his privileged position ie., in order to deserve his status as a university student. He is aware that others would wish to enter university and feels obligated to them to make the most of his opportunity (he is aware that he is fortunate to be in the position he is). This he considers to be socially-responsible but is clearly unsure where to draw the line.

Beyond an intellectual recognition of obligation (that may give rise to self-conscious feelings of responsibility), the subject claims that he can empathize with the needy. When he considers a familiar old beggar he attempts to take the perspective of that person, contemplating that person's origins and life-story. He is able to draw upon his own sympathetic life experience (perhaps his experience of his own grandfather) in this endeavour. When in arguments, however, the same claim may be employed defensively: the subject employs his past working experience to refute the contention that he cannot empathize with the working-class (this is also a rebuttal to the imagined argument that he is cold-hearted because he does not donate to beggars). He also regards himself as liberal, or at least more liberal than his parents.

There are clearly limits to his empathy. The subject concedes he cannot identify with the experience of black people under the Apartheid system because he did not share that experience. The subject can read about that experience and listen to it being related, but can never achieve complete knowledge because he did not experience it first-hand. The experience of the beggar is similarly opaque (perhaps because he is black). The subject does not know the social context of that person's life. The subject considers that he cannot know the social context and experience of the beggar's life because the subject comes from a different world (his experience is shaped by the political structures/boundaries of class and race). He imagines it is unlikely (given his privileged status) that he will ever share their experience. The subject proposes that there is no complete substitute for personal experience. One can only read about the experiences of others or engage in participant observation (in an effort to understand their experience). Even as a researcher, however, one will not expose oneself to the same poor conditions for the same period of time (as beggars must). This inevitably limits one's understanding.

Hence, although the subject can empathize and make the attempt to understand the experience of the

beggar, this is from a detached position (his ability to empathize is compromised). The subject cannot fully understand (empathize with) the experience of beggars because he has never had that experience himself.

This leaves the subject feeling alienated because he cannot fully understand the other's experience: the beggar inhabits a different context to the subject.

A concurrent feeling of powerlessness may also arise: because he has no "common ground" with the beggar, the subject does not know how to deal with the beggar when the opportunity to assist presents itself. The subject does not know what to say or do in a situation where a beggar expects the subject to help him. The beggar's living conditions are so poor and so far removed from those of the subject, that the subject does not know where to start the process of upliftment.

Hence the subject finds himself in the position where he understands the problems and the solutions, but is paralysed in terms of assisting. Apartheid is perceived as the cause of most of the social problems that are experienced in the present. The subject acknowledges that poverty is the main source of the beggar's problems. Poverty should be removed. Similarly, housing, employment and education are recognized as meaningful goals for social upliftment. The subject would provide homes for everyone if he could afford it. This is a source of frustration.

Profile for Behaviour: Subject One

Usually the subject does not give the beggars money, even when he is in a position to do so. In the absence of a local welfare organization (hence: in the absence of an alternative source of assistance for the beggar) the subject anticipates that he would still not donate money.

The subject therefore often walks by street-children. In a situation where he is confronted by the appeal of the beggar, he attempts to ignore that person (to focus elsewhere). He quickly rushes by, attempting to keep a blank emotional state. The fact that the subject mentioned that he would be unable to do relief-care work on a mass scale suggests that this may be a defensive posture.

The subject claims that he acts on the spur of the moment. His mood, however transient, will exert an influence on his behaviour. When the subject is in a bad mood (which may be provoked by an unpleasant event/s), he is less inclined to feel sympathy and hence to behave favourably towards any other person, particularly anyone who exacerbates the bad mood by making an unfair demand upon the subject or by being intrusive. When beggars approach the subject as if they are entitled to his money, he responds angrily and does not give them money. A good mood increases the probability of the subject donating money.

When a familiar old man requests money pleadingly, sympathy is evoked and presumably the subject is more inclined to donate.

If the subject was in a financial or social position to do so, he would build a house for every homeless

person. In the absence of such influence the subject and his fiancee do contribute money to the local welfare organization, he works hard at university and claims to have never oppressed or harmed anyone.

Appendix Seven: Profiles for Subjects

General Profile for Subject One

age: 20
sex: male
home language: Afrikaans
degree: B.A.

The subject has difficulty understanding his feelings. He finds his emotions hard to explain. The reasons for his feelings are not transparent to him. Hence, he has difficulty justifying his feelings and behaviour.

He contends that he acts on the spur of the moment. His mood, however transient, exerts a major influence on behaviour. When the subject is in a bad mood (which may be provoked by an unpleasant event/s), he is less inclined to feel sympathy for others and will be more inclined to react in unfriendly way to people, particularly people who make unfair demands upon him or are experienced as intrusive. The subject is correspondingly more inclined to give money when in a good mood.

The difficulty he experiences in understanding his motivation is problematic given the academic values that he has been taught and internalized. The subject does not want to act without thinking. He does not want to be uncritical or unaware of his motivation. Moreover, he does not want to be perceived as being so. The subject always tries to understand the motivation for his actions and thoughts, before he embarks on a course of action. This requires a process of reason.

When the subject sees a person begging on the street he feels embarrassed. This may be exacerbated if he does not donate to the beggar.The subject is occasionally self-conscious (an elaboration upon the embarrassed feeling referred to above) but finds this feeling difficult to articulate. This self-consciousness borders on shame and stems from his identification with a group that is widely regarded as having brought Apartheid about (his feelings are partly conditioned by the perceptions of others).

Although this is suggestive of a sense of guilt, the subject has difficulty deciding whether he feels guilty or not. He claims he does not feel responsible for the plight of black people and rejects the idea that blame might arise out of his identity as an Afrikaner (although he acknowledges this identity and corresponding feelings of shame). He strenuously denies, however, that he feels any personal guilt ie., guilt arising out of a personal debt that he has incurred. When money is demanded of the subject in a way that implies the beggar has a right to it, the subject feels anger.

He employs various arguments to support his contention that he is not obligated to assist the poverty-stricken:-

He and his generation are not responsible for injustices committed by others (the previous generation) and are not obligated to recompense those who they have not personally harmed. His generation had no hand in Apartheid. He is therefore not responsible. Moreover, even the older generation cannot be held directly responsible because they were not aware of the reality of Apartheid: they were ignorant. People supported Apartheid because of ignorance and voted out of habit (rather than expressing an informed decision). Only those people who deliberately engineered Apartheid are truly responsible for it.

The subject denies the argument that because he prospered under Apartheid he owes a debt to those who suffered. He contends that he has not personally supported Apartheid in any way. Similarly, he was powerless in regard to his birth into a privileged class. Since the subject has never acted in a substantive way to support the system, or implicitly supported it through his interpersonal relations, he is not guilty and feelings of guilt are inappropriate (which does not imply that he does not feel such feelings).

Past racist acts would confer a generalized responsibility for beggars (those who are less fortunate) but since the subject has never behaved in a racist manner, has never harmed anyone or employed racial slurs, he is not responsible for the beggar.

Having denied responsibility for the beggar, the subject defends the opposing principle, namely: acting in a self-interested fashion. He contends that self-interest is essential to his well-being, given that other people are not inclined to look after his interests.

He is inclined to agree with the theory of Functionalism: competition is inevitable, acting in a self-interested way is therefore natural and since people have different potentials, class stratification is justified. Given that there are insufficient resources for everyone to prosper equally, poverty is inevitable. Similarly, it is inevitable that some people will advance further than others, not necessarily because of a biological advantage, but because they are born into different environments and then socialized differently. This is inevitable in a society (presumably because it is "functional"). Material equality is therefore an impossible goal. Although Apartheid was an oppressive system, other similar systems have existed before and will exist again. Such systems are inevitable (presumably because of human nature).

The subject is left with the dilemma of how his shameful feelings originate. He attributes his feelings of self-consciousness and shamefulness (at being an Afrikaner) to the reactions of others (thereby acknowledging that his self-identity is partly constructed by others ie., the value he places upon being an Afrikaner is partly determined by others' perceptions of this category). The reactions of others may not be explicit but the subject nevertheless infers that others think of him as a racist. He attributes this perception to his status as an Afrikaner, a group that is perceived as creating and perpetuating the system of Apartheid.

He acknowledges that there is a rational level of thought (an explanatory level) that appears to render a situation completely intelligible and is valid on its own terms (this level is verbal and consists of communications and arguments made by the subject to himself). According to this level feelings of responsibility and guilt are

irrational because they are not personally deserved. Despite rational argumentation, however, such feelings still persist.

The subject therefore experiences a contradiction between feelings of shame that he cannot resist and which he attributes to his unasked-for group identity, and the conscious belief that such feelings are irrational and undeserved.

Despite the argument that he and his generation are not responsible for Apartheid and his subsequent defence of self-interest, he does acknowledges the partial accountability of the white population, especially the Afrikaner, and the need to recompense black people. Part of his feeling of feeling of indebtedness is therefore warranted.

The privileged white minority have an obligation to the underprivileged and should be willing to honour this. The subject acknowledges that white people (himself included) did benefit unfairly from Apartheid and that this represents a reason to feel guilty and indebted. The subject is cognizant of the perception that white people are automatically wealthy. This wealth is a consequence of apartheid, is not deserved and it is therefore rightful that white people make donations. White people should not abandon the country. They are obligated to make a positive contribution. The white population have a responsibility to utilize their skills and knowledge to help the underprivileged population.

It is clear that he feels bound by this obligation, hence the claim that he is being socially-responsible because he is working hard at university. For the same reason he concedes that following his birth into a privileged class, he has worked to deserve and increase this status ie., by his own intrinsic actions.

Despite acknowledging a feeling of obligation, the subject concedes that he does not usually give the beggars money, even when he is in a position to do so. He employs a variety of (utilitarian) arguments to justify this fact. These arguments take various forms:-

He does not think that donating money accomplishes any practical purpose. The small amounts that he can afford cannot bring about meaningful long-term changes. The solution is macro-economic and requires more than isolated individual action. The subject regards himself as a realist. His social and financial position limits the extent to which he can help the poverty-stricken.

Helping others carries a cost to oneself which may be prohibitive. The subject cannot afford to give money away frivolously. Donating money to every homeless beggar, would bankrupt the subject, hence the consistent policy of not donating.

By donating, the subject is perpetuating the problem by reinforcing the perception that begging is feasible. The subject attempts not to give because that money can be put to better use by the local welfare organization. Donating to beggars is also problematic because of an unintended consequence of giving, namely that beggars need not seek proper help from the local welfare organization.

The subject denies that he is selfish and rebuts the hypothetical argument that he is cold-hearted: he

employs his past working experience to refute the contention that he cannot empathize with the working-class. He also claims that he is a liberal.

There is clearly a second tension operating here: between a self-focused response that he attempts to defend, and an other-focused response that his feelings of obligation demand.

Beyond an intellectual recognition of obligation (that may give rise to self-conscious feelings of responsibility), the subject acknowledges an emotional component to his attitude. He claims that he can also empathize with the needy. The subject sometimes feels sympathy for instance, particularly if the beggar is old. When he considers a familiar old beggar he attempts to take the perspective of that person, contemplating that person's origins and life-story. He is able to draw upon his own sympathetic life experience (perhaps his experience of his own grandfather) in this endeavour. Under such circumstances, however, the subject will be more inclined to donate.

There are clearly limits to his empathy. The subject cannot identify with the experience of black people under the Apartheid system because he did not share that experience.

The experience of the beggar is similarly opaque (perhaps because he is black). The subject does not know the social context of that person's life. The subject considers that he cannot know the social context and experience of the beggar's life because the subject comes from a different world (his experience is shaped by the political structures and boundaries of class and race). He imagines it is unlikely (given his privileged status) that he will ever share their experience. The subject proposes that there is no complete substitute for personal experience. This inevitably limits his understanding.

Hence, although the subject can empathize and make the attempt to understand the experience of the beggar, this is usually from a detached position (a kind of cognitive role-taking).

This leaves the subject feeling alienated because he cannot fully understand the other's experience: the beggar inhabits a different context to the subject.

A concurrent feeling of powerlessness may also arise: because he has no "common ground" with the beggar, the subject does not know how to deal with the beggar when the opportunity to assist presents itself. The subject does not know what to say or do in a situation where a beggar expects the subject to help him. The beggar's living conditions are so poor and so far removed from those of the subject, that the subject does not know where to start the process of upliftment. The subject feels immense frustration at not knowing how to respond to the beggar's appeal for help. Even where the subject feels sympathy, this feeling of powerlessness may accompany it.

Hence the subject finds himself in the position where he understands the problems and the solutions (on an abstract level), but is paralysed in terms of assisting.

Related to this feeling of frustration are painful emotions (personal distress) when the subject considers the lifestyles of beggars. The subject experiences personal distress at the sight of a beggar scrounging for food (given his alienation, this is a possible course his empathy takes).

The subject recognizes that emotional commitment to every tragedy he encounters would threaten his psychological health (through excessive personal distress). The subject anticipates a high personal cost to himself if he becomes emotionally involved with every instance of worldly suffering he encounters.

He combines the earlier argument that he cannot assist meaningfully with the argument that the personal cost to himself is prohibitive. He contends that he would experience extreme distress at the negligible effect his emotional commitment would have. This would be exacerbated by the realization that the world is an intrinsically cruel place (the irony is that the subject already does acknowledge that the world is cruel, although this knowledge is divorced from the corresponding emotion). The knowledge that he is privileged while millions of other people are less fortunate, would further exacerbate the subject's personal distress (again, this knowledge already exists but is not based upon emotional experience).

Having committed himself emotionally, the subject imagines he would then experience self-resentment arising out of uncertainty over whether he had assisted sufficiently (interestingly, this cognition does not arise until there is emotional commitment).

Furthermore, he anticipates that he would be unable to withdraw this commitment without tremendous guilt or self-resentment.

He therefore perceives a need to defend himself against the possibility of personal distress and associated guilt (emotions he is aware of in potential) and attempts to distance himself from emotional involvement, recognizing that such involvement carries a personal cost.

Confronted by a beggar, the subject does not specifically focus on his feelings or himself but attempts to keep a blank emotional state ie., not to focus on any emotions at all. He does not even look at the beggar because he anticipates that this will lead to emotional involvement on his part by provoking him to think about the plight of the beggar (cognitive role-taking may lead to empathy, sympathy and ultimately personal involvement on his part). He acknowledges that this sounds cold-hearted.

The anticipated personal cost to himself therefore prohibits the subject becoming emotionally involved. He does acknowledge, however, that moral certitude ie., the belief that one is doing the right thing (and repeating this belief to oneself) may make it possible to endure personal distress. He nevertheless anticipates that he would feel self-resentment because of the cognition that he had not done enough to assist.

This insight, together with an earlier admission that he would probably not assist even if no local welfare organization existed, suggests that the underlying reason for his apparent lack of charity is the attempt to avoid any emotional distress that might ensue if he commits himself to helping others.

For the same reason the subject may even feel hostile towards street children. He wishes they were not there (since they are a source of personal distress).

The subject is led to the conclusion that rationalizing the problem (presenting reasons why he cannot donate money) may be a self-defense mechanism to avoid emotional commitment to the needy. It is an attempt to avoid

emotional involvement in the suffering and needs of others.

The realization that his arguments may be a type of defense against his feelings, opens the door for further concessions. The subject concedes that he does feel embarrassment and self-consciousness and suggests that these emotions may arise out of the knowledge that he is privileged whereas the beggar is not. In other words, such feelings may not be forced upon him unfairly by his group-identity, but may be the outcome of his own moral reasoning.

He considers that his feelings of self-consciousness stem from an awareness of the wealth and status differential between himself and the beggar. Specifically: the subject is self-conscious and shameful because he has done nothing to deserve this privileged position ie., the beggar has as much right to his privileges as he himself does. He acknowledges that his position of privilege is fortunate and arbitrary ie., the beggar could just as well have been born with his status (there is an assumption here that being born into a social class inescapably conditions one's future material well-being) and there is nothing inherent within him that merits his privileged position: it is the outcome of an arbitrary process beyond his control. Furthermore, he acknowledges that he is still dependent on socio-economic forces for his well-being: he would experience a drop in his standard of living if his father is retrenched.

He feels anxious when he thinks that he could easily have been born into the same socio-economic class as the beggar (realizing the contingency of his own existence makes him anxious). The knowledge that he does not deserve his status then becomes a spur to social responsibility (which is to employ the theory of Functionalism for the opposite argument as before).

All these acknowledgements serve to qualify his earlier contention that there is nothing unethical about selfishness. The result is not a reversal of his earlier arguments, merely an acknowledgement of reasons and feelings that mitigate against a completely selfish response. A selfish response can be seen as a simplification on the subject's part, or as an attempt to deny the existence of competing feelings.

The tension between a self-oriented and other-oriented response is reflected by the self-confessed difficulty the subject has in defining social responsibility. He acknowledges that white people have an obligation to uplift those who have suffered under Apartheid, but asserts that this does not translate into an obligation to transfer money or other assets to the underprivileged. This would be unfair and amounts to extortion. It is unfair to threaten white people in order to obtain their money. The argument that all whites are responsible for Apartheid and therefore obligated to donate money is untrue and amounts to moral and emotional extortion. The subject admits that he is unsure of how to ameliorate the damage of Apartheid given that those who are responsible for it are dead.

For his own part, the subject considers himself to be social responsible in the sense that he has never threatened anyone, obeys the law, pays taxes and donates to formal charities. He works hard to justify the money his father spends on his education and the state subsidies that make his university education possible. The subject does not sit idle at university: he works hard in order to justify his privileged position ie., in order to deserve his

status as a university student. He is aware that others would wish to enter university and feels obligated to them to make the most of his opportunity (he is aware that he is fortunate to be in the position he is). This he considers to be socially-responsible but is nevertheless unsure where to draw the line.

Addendum

The subject agreed that the above profile was fair reflection of his response to the dilemma. He expressed some concern that he may have seemed cold-hearted during the interviews but was reassured by the insight that this might be a defensive posture intended to deflect feelings of personal distress.

General Profile for Subject Two

age: 22
sex: male
home language: English
degree: B.Theology

Upon noticing the beggar, the subject first becomes aware of his own fortunate position relative to the beggar.

He is aware that his relatively higher status and affluence is not intrinsically deserved. Lower classes are equally not deserving of their correspondingly less affluent state. He regards gratitude as an appropriate response for those who are fortunate and is offended by a lack of appreciation of such good fortune on the part of the wealthy. This implies that he feels an obligation to demonstrate his gratitude, perhaps through socially-responsible behaviour.

The subject does indeed acknowledge some responsibility to uplift others on his part. He denies that this stems from an awareness of having benefitted under Apartheid. The subject claims he was not old enough to adopt an ethical or practical stance against Apartheid and was therefore not responsible for the system. The subject recognizes that class differences have arisen by right of birth rather than authentic entitlement. He therefore regards himself as not responsible for the privileged position he occupies. He denies that he feels guilt or shame because of his group-identity. There is even a suggestion of anger at the contention that the subject may have an obligation stemming from the fact that he has benefitted from his status as a white-person.

Now he is old enough to express a free choice and take autonomous action. His feelings of obligation are understood in terms of a positive ethical injunction that constitutes part of his identity as a Christian. He regards himself as called upon to love everyone, including those of lower classes, those in need, and those who are suffering. Loving people implies treating them justly. Love requires personal sacrifice: attention, empathy and time.

The subject feels sympathy arising out of the fact that the beggar is compelled to beg (by socio-historical circumstances that are out of his control). This claim for compassion may be borne out by his involvement in a church feeding-scheme to assist street-children. The scheme affords the subject the opportunity to gain insight into the lives of the street-children. Based on insight obtained, assistance is made available by the subject.

Mood exerts a major influence on behaviour and is described in terms of an affective state. The causes of a bad mood may be unclear to the subject. A bad mood leads to irritability but despite this the subject would still feel empathy and this would result in helping behaviour. His compassion would override any bad mood so that he would do or say something to assist the beggar.

The subject nevertheless experiences the situation (where he is confronted by the appeal of the beggar) as ambiguous. Under certain circumstances he would be less likely to donate. His feelings of obligation and sympathy may be mitigated by various factors. His sympathy may be tempered by the realization that many beggars are deserving of such sympathy. He admits that he feels less sympathy for beggars because of the frequency of his encounters with them.

Sympathy may be further mitigated by suspicion of the beggar's motives. Such suspicion arises out of his belief that many beggars use the money selfishly or wastefully. Some beggars eschew authentic productive work in favour of laziness and practised fraud. Hence the subject has reason to be suspicious of the beggar's motives ie., his/her need may not be genuine. When confronted by the beggar, the subject would therefore initially think not to give money to beggars.

The subject would therefore have to ascertain whether the beggar was genuine before assisting him. He would be more inclined to assist when the appeal is seen to be genuine ie., where he is certain that the money will be used for food. If the beggar smells of alcohol then the appeal would be taken as misleading (presumably because the beggar has no intention of buying food for his family), and the subject would not donate money to him. When the beggar expresses a willingness to work, the subject will donate (this would be taken as evidence of the beggar's sincerity).

If the subject does have money but there is some doubt regarding the genuineness of the beggar's need (ie., the situation remains ambiguous), the subject would possibly buy food on behalf of the beggar (to ensure that the money will not be misused).

The subject also has difficulty deciding whether the professed need of beggars is urgent or not. The absence of real need would be illustrated by the subsequent purchase of alcohol. Smoking would also be taken as evidence that the beggar's need is not dire. Wasteful non-essential expenditure implies that the beggar's need is not great. Where this is the case the subject does not feel obligated to assist.

A further source of ambiguity is the recognition that although dishonesty and fraud cannot be excused, such behaviour is nevertheless a consequence of poverty. In a similar vein the subject recognizes that alcohol might represent an escape for the beggar (a tension between blame and sympathy is apparent).

If the beggar's need is not urgent or if the subject believes that a donation would be used irresponsibly by the beggar, he will be unlikely to donate money. He nevertheless recognizes that other beggars are in genuine need. The greatest need (and perhaps the most authentic) is that of the street-children (presumably because they are too young to uplift themselves). He feels a particular obligation towards street-children.

He considers that he can usually judge (by observation) whether a beggar is being truthful or not and how great the beggar's need is. A demonstration of good faith on the part of the beggar will allay the subject's suspicions. He will be beneficent towards beggars whose need is genuine and who are willing to work in exchange for food/money. Under these circumstances the subject will consider the beggar to be deserving.

Even if the subject decides that the beggar is both genuine and in real need, he would be unsure of the best (most ethical or practical) way to assist. He recognizes that any donation he might make could exacerbate the problem (if the beggar uses his money to buy alcohol). He further recognizes that differing social conditions exert different (moral) demands upon him: different dilemmas may arise out of different geographic locations. The subject is aware of the existence of a local welfare organization that requests that people do not give to beggars.

Personal sacrifice is only required where this is possible, however, and would only include material possessions where one has more than is necessary. There are occasions where the subject is not capable of donating money: often the subject does not have available money to donate to beggars. Under such circumstances he would direct the beggar to nearby soup kitchens. This applies both to "genuine" beggars and to those whom he suspects of some deception.

Addendum

The subject was satisfied that the above profile accurately reflected his response to the dilemma.

General Profile for Subject Three

age: 23
sex: female
home language: English
degree: B.A.(Hons)

Sorrow would be the subject's immediate response. It is likely that this feeling refers partly to sympathy and partly to a personal distress reaction. Although feeling sorrow, she maintains that she would not necessarily donate to the beggar.

Feelings of sorrow and helplessness would arise from a process of role-taking. The subject takes the

cognitive perspective of the beggar and imagines that in his position she would feel a blow to her ability to fend for a family as the beggar is expected to do. This suggests an imagined blow to her self-esteem (which is a self-focused personal distress reaction). She becomes aware of his helplessness and inability to provide: he and his family are starving and there is no option available to him other than begging. She considers that such suffering and consequent dependency on others is tragic.

The source of this suffering and dependency is unclear to the subject, although by acknowledging that provision for a family is a social expectation placed upon fathers, she implies that social forces are at least partly responsible. She also refers to a process of social-construction that sets her apart from the beggar (in terms of status/welfare) and acknowledges that ideological factors are part of this process of social-construction.

Suffering and dependency are nevertheless the result of circumstances over which one has no control. She acknowledges that she could be in the same situation were circumstances different. She considers herself differentiated from the beggar by historical and environmental factors beyond her control. She contends that her birth into an upper-class is a random event and considers herself lucky in this respect. For the same reason, beggars have no other option than to beg. This helplessness (and the fact that they are starving) is a source of sorrow to her.

There is a clear tension in her thinking between the view that the distribution of wealth is arbitrary and the view that social forces determine such differences. These positions hold out differing implications for social action.

Irrespective of whether she donates to beggars or not, the subject claims a general sense of social responsibility. She claims to feel an obligation to assist. This sense of obligation to others is said to stem from patriotic feelings towards her adopted country: she even became a South African citizen in order to express her political opinion.

Furthermore, she claims that her patriotic adoption of South Africa facilitates an empathic feeling towards her fellow citizens. The subject maintains that she generally feels sympathy for beggars.

Guilt feelings may arise if she does not honour her felt obligation. If she has already donated that day, she will be likely to ignore an appeal ie., she would be unlikely to donate again but would still feel guilty walking past the beggar. The rationalization that she had already donated that day would decrease these guilt feelings. This implies that an original reason to donate might be to diminish self-oriented guilt feelings (which in turn suggests generalized guilt feelings). In any event guilt does arise out of a refusal to give money on the grounds that she has already given earlier that day. The claim that she would not have extra money to spare because of having donated earlier would appear to be a rationalization she might employ in that situation.

The subject concedes that she feels guilty (in a generalized sense) because she is not doing enough to honour her felt obligation. She feels an obligation to be more proactive. She does not feel, however, that these general guilt-feelings stem from her group-membership. Irrespective of the beggar's colour, she would feel guilty. Her guilt arises out of her generalized relation to beggars: she feels guilty about their plight.

From this it is clear that her feelings of obligation and resultant guilt do not arise purely out of patriotism:

guilt arises out of a felt obligation to prevent people from begging on the street. This obligation may stem from the cognition that she should be capable of assisting (presumably given her higher status and relative affluence).

Despite the admission that she feels a general obligation towards beggars, the subject maintains that she is not personally responsible for their plight. It would therefore appear that her feeling of obligation stems from the perceived status differential between herself and them, a differential that she has done nothing to deserve.

The subject acknowledges that a process of role-taking (leading to renewed awareness of this differential) may not occur. It might be that she is self-focused and hence unlikely to donate money because she does not attend to the beggar. Preoccupation with her own activities would decrease the likelihood of the subject making donations. When the subject is confronted by beggars she is often focused on her own immediate goals and aware of her own time-constraints. Preoccupation with a particular goal excludes lengthy consideration of their apparent needs. She acknowledges that exclusive goal-directed behaviour is a mind-set (in the same way as being other-oriented is a mind-set).

She claims she may be irritated because she has insufficient time to assist the beggar, although it is likely that her irritation may stem from the emotional demands of the situation and that being self-focused is a way of avoiding these demands. The dubious claim that she does not have enough time to stop and look in her purse would tend to support this.

Her (defensive) assertion that she does not formulate an intention to donate to beggars in advance of confronting them, and does not proactively seek them out, might be taken to imply that she is often self-focused.

When the subject does not ignore the beggar, she does not automatically assist but will assess the integrity of his appeal. If he is drunk, the subject would suspect that her money would be used to purchase more liquor and will be less inclined to donate. She nevertheless acknowledges that drunkenness is a deleterious way of coping (which is to take cognizance of broader social forces and illustrates a tension between blame and sympathy).

Similarly, her sorrow may tempered by the perception that she is possibly being used ie., the apparent suffering of beggars is a sham and begging is a form of organized crime. Any sympathy she might feel would be mitigated by a suspicion that the beggar was misleading her. The subject would even become cross if the beggar appeared fit enough to attempt to find work. Under such circumstances she is unlikely to donate.

If the beggar is old and infirm, however, the subject would be more inclined to donate (since such a person is presumably not capable of being self-sufficient). Potentially productive persons are correspondingly less worthy of charity because they have the option of work available to them. Hence, young and healthy people should find productive work, particularly if they are supporting a family. Evidence of an attempt to earn money despite difficult circumstances (rather than depend on charity) is laudable.

There is a clear tension here between a belief in individual responsibility and an awareness of social determinism: beggars have a personal responsibility to be productive but old beggars are excluded from taking responsibility for their condition. By only highlighting age and infirmity as limitations to one's potential

productivity the subject departs from her earlier reference to the social-construction of class differences.

Apart from all other considerations, the subject's recent experience (prior to the appeal) may condition her mood which will in turn condition her emotional and behavioural response. If the subject has had good fortune (and is in a good mood), she is more inclined to donate, and thereby share her good fortune with the beggar. The converse is true if she has had poor fortune. Mood would therefore appear to partially condition whether she is self- or other-focused.

Addendum

The subject agreed that the above profile was a good reflection of her response. She expressed some concern regarding the interpretation given to her self-focused state. She maintained that there are occasions where she is self-focused purely as a function of the task she is engaged in (rather than to avoid psychic distress). She conceded that at other times the "defensive" interpretation was accurate. She was particularly in agreement with the insight that her moral thinking is characterized by tension.

General Profile for Subject Four

age: 18
sex: male
home language: Zulu
degree: B. Com.

The subject's response to the dilemma is initially determined by his feelings. His overall feeling towards the beggar differs from his immediate feeling-reaction. The subject's immediate feeling is mediated largely by his mood.

If the subject is feeling light-hearted and joyful, he will feel moved to donate money to the beggar (a positive response is more reflexive). When the subject is in a good mood he is more himself (authentic). Hence, the subject is able to react authentically to people when he is in a good mood. He is able to respond positively and authentically to others.

When the subject is in a bad mood, however (as a result of unusual circumstances), something blocks the authentic (other-directed) flow of his thoughts and emotions. He becomes self-focused and will protect this condition by ignoring an appeal from another. If the subject is self-focused, he is unable to respond positively and authentically to others.

The subject regards the moral dilemma as complex and confesses that occasionally he cannot understand/give reasons for his actions. Initially, he is merely guided by his feelings. The subject experiences the

situation as opaque.

This seeming lack of intelligibility, coupled with the realization that other people are suffering, may give rise to feelings of anger and frustration.

Alternatively, the subject is frustrated at the abstract historical/temporal circumstances that have embroiled him in the situation and forced him to respond to it.

His feelings of frustration may also be due to the disturbance to his status quo, embodied by the demand suddenly made upon him. Until the subject changes his immediate feelings the beggar is experienced as a personal demand or burden. He may even feel anger upon seeing the man. This anger is generalized and not directed at anyone. Such anger may in turn arise out of frustration the subject feels at the situation he finds himself in.

Initially, he may regret his own participation in the situation and question whether he could have avoided the situation (this is an acknowledgement that he finds the situation is unintelligible ie., it merely "exists", and that the only solution is to attempt to avoid the situation). He may react by berating himself for not avoiding the situation ie., for not taking responsibility for events.

The helplessness and personal distress he feels when confronted with particular instances of poverty are unpleasant and result in the impulse to withdraw from the situation.

Since his self-focused feeling is the outcome of a sour mood, which in turn may be related to helplessness and personal distress, there is a danger that the situation will aggravate this self-focused state and a cycle will ensue. The subject is nevertheless able to overcome this initial aversive "blocked" reaction although he has difficulty understanding how. This is made possible through a generalized sense of responsibility (conscience) and a facility for empathy. These two factors would appear to be interrelated.

Despite the claim that he prefers to be guided by feelings, the subject values being told the reasons for the beggar's need. The subject donates to the beggar because the beggar has explained his need and the need appears authentic. Indeed, he is able to be more compassionate where he is aware of the reasons for an appeal. The appeal has more worth if it is substantiated with reasons. Without an explanation the subject is less likely to assist.

In addition to valuing being told reasons to donate, the subject does employ some cognitive perspective-taking: he is able to distance himself from the situation (take the perspective of a fictitious other) and consider his position relative to that of the beggar. The subject gives because of an awareness of his fortunate position relative to that of the beggar (this does require a level of awareness of the beggar's position). He perceives himself as having everything he needs while the beggar is deprived of basic needs. The beggar is seen as having a relatively greater need than the subject does. The subject is aware that his money has more value to the beggar than it does to himself.

Moreover, the subject acknowledges that his position of privilege is not due to any action on his part but is the outcome of an essentially arbitrary historical process. He acknowledges that he has not done anything to deserve his privileged life. His privileged state has been gifted to him. He has benefited in many ways.

The subject contends that if one is aware that one's own good fortune is the result of arbitrary good luck,

then one will in turn be more giving (presumably because one can recognize that poverty is similarly arbitrary and not deserved). The phrase "not by accident" would appear to contradict this. It may be that either the subject's expression is clumsy or that he does indeed acknowledge some deeper reason or causative factor that renders the distribution of wealth explicable. The subject acknowledges that he (and his family/class) have not necessarily worked for their privileges. If this is openly acknowledged then privileged people will be more giving. A beggar has equal status (as a human being) to anyone else around campus. Hence, the subject regards poverty as unjust and believes the conditions of poverty should be alleviated. Certain beggars/people who are poverty stricken nevertheless deserve their poor status because they have brought it upon themselves by their own actions. The subject has difficulty deciding whether someone deserves their poor status or not. He acknowledges the possibility that the beggar is lying. The subject is, however, certain of his own privileged status. He regards himself as fortunate and this may be reason enough to be generous.

This process of reasoning gives rise to an ethical sense that makes it impossible to ignore the beggar (the subject feels ethically-bound not to ignore the beggar). The subject's conscience is aroused and would then compel him to donate.

The subject experiences conscience as either a bad or a good feeling. In the context of the dilemma (being confronted by a beggar) conscience is predominantly a feeling. There are occasions, such as when the subject is praying, that conscience is experienced as a still, small voice which may express an injunction against a particular course of action. On an occasion where he overrode this injunction (with the voice of self-interest) the subject subsequently regretted doing so when as a result he did indeed infract a social rule.

In either modality (as a feeling or as a voice) the subject's conscience would cause him to feel guilt feelings if he does not assist the beggar. The subject would perceive of himself as having acted inauthentically by ignoring someone else's need, particularly if he has been approached by that person. Guilt would arise out of an awareness of a discrepancy between his actions and his convictions/beliefs. Consequently, the subject usually feels guilty if he does not overcome the blockage (the self-focused mood referred to earlier).

The subject would berate himself for not helping. He would regard himself as class-conscious and conceited (this implies he would take the perspective of an imaginary bystander). This negative self-evaluation may then feed back into his bad mood.

Where the subject is in a bad mood, his conscience would therefore drive him to make a conscious attempt to change his immediate negative feelings toward the beggar.

The subject's guilt feelings do compel him to donate but he does not regard guilt as the most ethical reason to donate. He does not think that guilt should motivate action: helping because of a bad feeling is less ethical than helping because of compassion/empathy. The subject thinks that giving out of a positive feeling is more ethical than giving out of a desire to remove a negative feeling.

The subject prefers not to intellectualize (which gives rise to conscience and thence to guilt) but rather to

be guided by feelings of empathy. Empathy may also result in a felt obligation to give ie., the subject may be moved to donate by a felt compassion for those whom he empathizes with. The subject claims to feel empathy for beggars he encounters rather than merely understanding their perspective/situation in a cognitive way (although it is clear that cognitive role-taking may be the source of conscience).

Whereas the subject finds no joy in giving because of a self-focused state, he does experience a joy (self-reward) in giving out of an empathic sense. The subject feels that if he gives to someone he is appreciating (acknowledging, esteeming) them. Having given to someone, the subject feels as if he has pleased that person. The subject feels as if he has added something (a dimension) to that person's life: by giving he has blessed that person. For this reason the subject enjoys speaking to people and finding out the root of their problems (presumably this facilitates further empathy and caring behaviour).

The subject also believes that in giving you receive, although he rejects the idea that he gives only to receive rewards (giving is not a form of trade/reciprocity: by giving you are behaving morally and that this is an intrinsic reward unto itself). Equally, selfishness is unethical and no rewards may be expected.

Empathy nevertheless carries the danger of further personal distress. The subject empathizes with his friends when they experience problems but this can be frustrating (either because the burden is too great or because certain problems cannot be solved by the subject).

Giving out of compassion in this way is closer to an expression of free will. In the same vein, the subject values the freedom of choice to commit oneself to religion or not. Faith born of free choice is authentic and dynamic. Legislating in the place of choice is sad because religious belief should spring spontaneously from within. Similarly, ritualistic belief departs from the ideal of a freely chosen belief. Being motivated by something external (such as guilt) is like someone else commanding you. This is an unauthentic basis for motivation since the primary agent is not oneself.

Authentic personal change can likewise only be brought about through inner renewal, rather than external, political change. The subject believes that his own moral development has been in the nature of an inner unfolding brought about by a personal relationship to God.

The subject values communication and regards talking to someone as a form of giving. Giving does not necessarily imply a material donation. Indeed, more can be gained through communication than by material charity. Both he himself and the beggar can benefit by talking to each other. By talking to the beggar, the subject can gain greater insight into that person's problems. The beggar will appreciate authentic personal communication more than an impersonal material donation.

He therefore prefers talking with rather than giving money to beggars and will occasionally go out of his way to converse with the beggar and inquire after his/her life-circumstances. In this way he might learn how to assist more properly (this does not imply that he will then assist in ways that attempt to solve the root problems identified). He anticipates that he will instruct and speak to people in his future (professional) life.

Communication should nevertheless be authentic. The subject cannot escape the situation because he would be required to lie in order to do so, which would be unauthentic and hence unethical. The subject acknowledges that his beliefs and attitudes may not be those of other people ie., some people may condone lying in certain situations. As far as he is concerned, however, there is never a need for lies. Lying is unethical and a form of cowardice. Lying may be one way to escape from an uncomfortable situation, but is nevertheless unnecessary. Honesty is a more ethical way to do so.

Material donations are also important although a material donation is only a short-term solution: the real problems are those which underlie and produce the material conditions of life. The subject is occasionally aware that his money donation is almost insignificant because it will not have any long-term effects. Long term solutions are better, particularly educational programmes (communication) that enable people to help themselves.

One therefore has to be aware of the full nature of the problem so that immediate gratification of the needs of people might be deferred where longer-term benefits are likely to accrue.

The subject questions the value of material things given that life is short and "you can't take it with you". He equates materialism with selfishness and contends that helping others is a more valuable goal. The subject is critical of people who only want to earn money for themselves.

Hence, he intends to live an other-focused life. He concedes that one does need personal satisfaction (from receiving money as a reward) and enjoyment but that he intends using money to benefit other people. In this respect he is influenced by the belief that what you give you receive (this may be an ethical injunction).

Addendum

Unfortunately, the subject could not be contacted in order to evaluate his profile.

General Profile for Subject Five

age: 22
sex: female
home language: English
degree: B.A.(Hons)

When the subject is confronted by moral issues, emotions always result. Her response to the appeal is largely driven by her emotions.

At the point where she decides whether or not to respond to the appeal, intellect (moral reasoning) does not play a role. At this point it is too late for her to reason about the situation: her emotions already dictate a

course of action. She asserts that action is usually guided by her mood.

The subject would possibly think about the appeal (ie., assess the situation and consider her ethical obligation) before the moment she has to make a final decision. At the moment she makes the decision, however, emotions hold sway and the subject acts without an intellectual understanding of why she does so.

She may use intellect as a way of making subsequent sense of her emotions, rather than employing intellect to determine her response. She describes intellect as a "band-aid" (this may imply that her emotions are experienced as unpleasant and that she uses intellect to deny the validity of these unpleasant emotions, such as guilt).

In response to the hypothetical dilemma, the first emotion she feels is frustration. She is tired and frustrated ("gat-vol") of this typical South African situation. This reaction would appear to comprise both a self-oriented response (the appeal is an intrusion) and an other-oriented response (the discrimination is unfair). Firstly, the subject acknowledges this "gat-vol" feeling as a mood that stems from an awareness of the public/political sphere. This mood can intrude upon her private life. This feeling of being intruded upon is unpleasant. This intrusion is felt to be more acute (and hence more unpleasant) during the present period of socio-political change in South Africa. She perceives this intrusion as typically South African since it arises out of a cultural preoccupation with politics. She is tired of being inconvenienced by South African socio-political issues. Race has always been a prominent issue in South Africa and the subject has grown up to be sensitized to this issue (to her perceived detriment). The subject wishes that the boundaries between people (gender, racial, religious) would cease to be important and that discrimination would consequently fall away. She is burdened by such boundaries such that when she is with a black person, she is conscious of their colour. She is tired of having to deal with the South African race-issue and wishes it was irrelevant.

The subject does tire of personal appeals, but only because they are saddening and emotionally taxing. Nevertheless, she does not reject the premise upon which such appeals are based ie., street-children have the right to make demands upon her. Her "gat-vol" feeling is usually a response to abstract political demands made upon her, rather than concrete confrontation and personal experience with the situation. The "gat-vol" feeling is a type of distress that she is not prepared to tolerate. She rejects the premise upon which such abstract demands are based. Such "goings-on" do not have a moral claim on her. The subject regards the appeal as an intrusion or demand. She feels irritated by the appeal because it requires sacrifice on her part.

She regards her irritation as irrational, however, since her sympathy lies with the employees (this suggests that sympathy is the "rational" and therefore morally defensible feeling).

Her frustration stems secondly from an awareness of the unfairness of the situation and of her own inability to change the situation. The subject is aware of the great extent of unfairness that exists. The inherent potential of people is overlooked in favour of race. The subject does not want to be perceived as being merely politically-correct. She contends that her stance is authentic because the situation is inherently unjust: the inherent potential of people is being overlooked and race is being employed as a criterion for reward/advancement. It is unfair if

factors other than actual ability and inherent potential are taken as important. Race is an unfair criterion of worth.

Moreover, she can do nothing about it. Hence she feels frustrated (a feeling she also attributes to the employees) and angry. She feels frustrated because she would not discriminate if placed in a management position. She is frustrated because she is not management ie., not in the position they are in (there is the suggestion here that the subject feels powerless to change management's views short of actually becoming them, which is of course impossible. This would suggest that the subject feels there is some sort of unbridgeable moral chasm between her and the management). She feels a sense of hopelessness at the unsurpassable difference in attitudes and values between her and the management. She feels frustrated because instances of discrimination are persisting.

Her "gat-vol" feeling is further exacerbated because the subject cannot understand what might motivate such discrimination. If the victims of discrimination are black then the subject experiences disbelief because discrimination contravenes prevailing social norms. Specifically: it is antithetical to the present period of social change.

The subject also considers the management to have completely different values and attitudes to herself. This renders their racist behaviour unintelligible. The subject cannot believe that people would possess such different views (to herself). Most people have much more liberal views (are unprejudiced) which is appropriate given the current period of South African history and prevailing norms.

She suggests that the views of management are the outcome of their being brought up in a period where different values and norms prevailed. Perhaps the management are still clinging to such old and inappropriate values.

In any event, it is impossible to engage management in meaningful dialogue (because their frame of reference is so different ie., there is no common ground). It is therefore impossible to change their views. This exacerbates her feelings of frustration.

Anger may also arise (at the senselessness of management for continuing to discriminate).

The realization that the situation is unfair is accompanied by cognitive role-taking on the subject's part: she takes the perspective of the employees and is thereby aware of their frustration and perceived powerlessness (this may be an authentic empathic reaction or a partial projection based on her preconception that management will not change). She imagines that they may have worked really hard in order to achieve an education and a measure of success (this renders discrimination particularly unfair).

A feeling of depression may arise out of these feelings of frustration. She feels sad because discrimination is unjust and change is unlikely. If the victims are black, the subject would be deeply saddened given the unintelligible contradiction between the racist actions of management and prevailing social norms (of change, equality and fairness).

If discrimination is against whites, the subject would be depressed because of the possibility that she herself would fall victim to discrimination in the workplace. Her peak, however, feeling will be anger, perhaps out of a

sense of group-identity and personal threat but also out of the perception that discrimination has persisted (despite social change) and has merely taken a full circle.

The subject also feels sympathy for those who are being discriminated against, whatever their colour. She has little sympathy for businesses. She feels greater sympathy for street-children and out of this comes a greater sense of moral obligation (a feeling of obligation arises because one feels sympathy). It is clear that the subject experiences a conflict between sympathy for the employees (other-oriented) and irritation at the intrusive nature of the appeal (self-oriented).

All these emotions (frustration, anger, sadness, sympathy) would nevertheless be insufficient to motivate the subject to support the appeal if she really wanted to buy the products. The subject admits that she would probably place her needs and desires above those of others. The subject would never frustrate the rights of underprivileged people but equally would not expend effort in an attempt to uphold them.

The subject experiences conflicting feelings when she has to weigh up her personal interest versus social responsibility. The subject is unsure of whether to donate (to street-children) or not. She attempts to be guided by her emotions but since these conflict she becomes less sure of which course to take. The subject acknowledges a psychic conflict between two sides: a moral, other-oriented side and a self-oriented side.

The subject doubts that she would support the newspaper appeal if her desire for the product was great. If the subject has sufficient desire for the product she will ignore the appeal, pushing other emotions aside (such as sympathy for the victims of discrimination) and ignoring other ethical factors and issues associated with the product (although she might be aware of such issues). She acknowledges that this desire is stronger than the other emotions and will determine her behaviour. She acknowledges that this desire is greed (ie., it is self-focused). Her basic instinct is therefore to buy the product. Her self-interested side therefore usually wins out and the subject identifies with this side.

She nevertheless defends any lack of charity on her part. She contends that people have the right to make appeals to others but must not expect to receive full support (perhaps the subject is implying that people have a similar right to ignore an appeal ie., the subject is not morally bound to respond positively. The expectation that everyone will respond positively is therefore unrealistic and unfair to the subject). Furthermore, not everyone will support such an appeal (this carries the implicit argument that the subject is vindicated in ignoring the appeal because other people will also choose this course of non-action).

She distinguishes between areas where help is required or not required (perhaps the criterion is the severity of the discrimination or a personal sense of moral obligation). The victims of discrimination at work do not require her assistance in order to improve their situation (perhaps the subject is implying that such people are more empowered or that they are guaranteed a certain level of support irrespective of her response).

The cost of responding to every appeal is argued to be prohibitive (in order to be consistent it is therefore more ethical to respond negatively to every appeal). The subject does not believe that her occasional donations to

street-children assist them in any meaningful way.

She questions why she should not continue to act in her own interest. She implies that there is no valid reason not to act out of self-interest. The product (that the appeal would have her boycott) is there to be bought (it is therefore natural that she should buy the product without consideration of other factors. The purchase of the product is a value-free decision ie., ethical factors are irrelevant. The meaning/significance of the product is immediately given in its status as a commodity).

Despite these arguments, she concedes that the underlying reason for her behaviour is self-interest. The primary conflict is therefore between her selfish desire for the product and other-oriented emotions such as sympathy and/or a sense of moral obligation.

This conflict is echoed by dynamics within her family. When the subject is confronted by the appeal she imagines how the issue would provoke intellectual dissent within her family. The questions asked during the interview provoke the same thought, namely that there will be arguments within her family. There would be disagreement over how to respond to the appeal and this would result in tension. The subject attributes her own inner conflict to the conflicting viewpoints in her family. These constellate into opposing "voices". The subject is "touchy" about moral dilemmas because she anticipates conflict and tension (both within herself and within her family). Her father is regarded as rational and logical to the extent that this may be intimidating, whereas she regards her mother as emotional and irrational.

Her behaviour is, however, not necessarily always self-interested. She might respond differently if she had some concrete experience of the issue or personal investment in the appeal. The newspaper appeal is undifferentiated from a host of other appeals, and as such does not engage her sufficiently. She does not feel a sense of obligation to support an abstract appeal, although she cannot say why. She would be more likely to assist if she personally knew the victims, if she had physically witnessed the discrimination, or if the discrimination affected her directly in some way. The subject is very sensitive to the dilemma of street-children for instance.

She acknowledges that she would feel more sympathetic towards black people she knows personally. She anticipates that if the appeal was more personal, she might have a correspondingly greater sense of obligation (perhaps this is why the street-children dilemma is that much more sensitive).

In a similar vein the subject is better able to empathise with black people who are discriminated against at work despite all their efforts to achieve a good education (as a student she finds this easier to relate to). An enhanced ability to empathize heightens the subject's awareness of the unfairness of the situation and her associated feelings of obligation.

She would also respond differently if people she knew and respected supported the appeal. Her conscience would be aroused. She would feel challenged by them. Her conscience would override her initial (self-focused) reaction not to support the appeal although the subject would resist such a change (hence the need for them to "get through".

She would be more willing to assist if people she respected presented her with reasons to assist. In order for others to affect her behaviour they would have to present her with *cogent* reasons (this implies that the subject would attempt to reject such arguments and would succeed in doing so unless they consisted of powerful reasons to assist).

Irrespective of how the appeal is conveyed or the attitudes of her peers, the subject feels a general sense of obligation toward black people. Related to this feeling of obligation, the subject feels generalized guilt feelings (towards black people). Assisting street-children makes the subject feel better (reduces her guilt, results in self-rewards).

The subject does not feel that her guilt-feelings are justified. She denies that she is personally responsible (for Apartheid or discrimination). The subject rejects the idea that she is bound by a general moral obligation to uplift all black people. This is not her role. She asserts that lifting up black people is not necessary (in order to lead a moral life). Generalized guilt feelings are therefore inappropriate.

It is therefore unfair that she should feel guilty. She is angry at the fact that she feels guilt since she has done nothing to deserve such feelings. She feels anger that these unwanted and undeserved guilt-feelings are thrust upon her. She wishes she did not feel guilty.

She nevertheless regards her race as collectively responsible for such injustices and acknowledges the possibility that her guilt feelings arise from her "white" group identity ie., her race-membership. She does acknowledge an internalized group identity. It is something given to her that she inadvertently feels. The subject accepts this identity on its own terms: she withholds any ethical judgement (the implication may be that this sense of identity is so fundamental that ethical judgement is precluded). The subject feels ashamed of white people who discriminate.

She is nevertheless not conscious of this process (and therefore certain that this is the origin of such feelings). She is hesitant to *consciously* acknowledge a global "white" identity. The term "white" is held to describe a large group (of disparate segments). There are elements of the "white" group that the subject would not identify with at all (it is unclear whether she would identify with the "white" management, although it is clear that she regards their values as vastly different to hers). The subject therefore acknowledges the possibility that her feelings of responsibility may be the *unconscious* outcome of a "white group-identity" which leads her to feel responsible for the actions of a "white" management in spite of a conscious awareness that she possesses different values to them.

She maintains that if she was to openly acknowledge a *broad* "white" identity, then she would be obliged to feel responsible for the actions of people who would behave in ways different to her (this would include the management). There is a paradox here in that the subject has already acknowledged feelings of generalized responsibility. It is likely that she is again denying the appropriateness of her feelings of obligation.

She equates self-sacrifice and helping with doing the "right thing" and is aware of her Christian values,

which also contradicts the claim that she is not under an obligation to assist in some way.

The subject experiences specific guilt feelings as a consequence of choosing in favour of self-interest. These guilt feelings arise as a result of intellectual reflection: the subsequent moral "weighing up" of her behaviour. Guilt feelings are exacerbated by awareness of her own privileged status and relatively profligate lifestyle. This may be exacerbated by the media which emphasises the underprivileged status and suffering of black people. She feels guilty about her selfishness but understands this selfishness to be constituted through an awareness of failing to live up to her acknowledged wider obligation (which may flow from her group-identity). A sense of being selfish and a sense of wider obligation are therefore co-constituted.

In regard to the dilemma, the subject contradicts her statement that she feels a generalized sense of obligation: besides not regarding herself as obligated to support the appeal, she claims she does not *feel* morally obligated to respond positively to the appeal. Again, she may be confusing felt feelings of obligation with the ethical validity thereof.

Addendum

The subject agreed with the profile set out above. She clarified that she does indeed feel guilt and a sense of obligation although she still maintained that these feelings are inappropriate. She also confirmed the existence of competing moral voices and a corresponding dynamic within her family.

General Profile for Subject Six

age: 25
sex: male
home language: Xhosa
degree: B.Com.

The subject will analyze the situation before he reacts or states his views. Before deciding on a course of action, he contends one should assess the situation thoroughly, the goal being to determine whether there is valid proof that the company (in the dilemma) discriminates. If the appeal is valid ie., if it is supported by evidence, it should be supported. Before taking action one should devote time to rational consideration of the situation.

Rational consideration is particularly important where one is individually affected by a situation or proposed course of action. One should consider the costs and consequences to oneself of a particular course of action. Reasoning is necessary where action has consequences for oneself. He will therefore abstain from immediate involvement in favour of careful consideration of the situation.

The subject acknowledges that he is sensitive to racial issues such as discrimination and that this sensitivity predisposes him to react emotionally when he hears about discrimination. He nevertheless maintains that it is inappropriate to act without thinking: this is where many problems are started. One should over-ride one's emotions (which might dictate an unwise course of action) by consciously thinking about the situation. Action should not be impulsive. It is easy to be impulsive and make impulsive demands for support but supporting every appeal because of a lack of due consideration is not desirable (it devalues resistance and/or may carry a personal cost). Feelings should be conditioned by analysis of each situation on its own merits, rather than be generalized or instinctive.

He has difficulty over-riding this initial emotional response, however, particularly where other people have already mandated a course of action (this serves to acknowledge a group-dynamic that may favour an emotional response).

The subject is also conscious of the danger that he might allow himself to be used to further the (selfish) goals of others (he is conscious of the possibility of being manipulated). He contends that people are occasionally used by others to support goals which do not reflect the aspirations of the entire community. People fail to recognize that they are being used because they act impulsively and without due consideration.

A process of reason is necessary to ensure that he is never manipulated by other people for their own benefit. One should therefore not idealize people but should try to develop one's own opinions and values. The subject does not support any particular person. He mixes with everybody (associates with anyone; gives everyone a chance).

The subject will therefore analyze an appeal for possible hidden agendas. He contends that few journalists are truly neutral and few newspapers are unbiased. He asserts that this is a widespread view (and this justifies suspicion on his part). The subject would examine the political position and values of the newspaper (in order to assess the validity of the article). The subject would assess the newspaper based on its historical bias (he therefore takes the socio-historical context into account). He would also look at the source of the article. He would question whether there has been a thorough and impartial investigation. He would suspect that the source/s may be biased and motivated out of greed or malice.

Having thereby ruled out the possibility that he might be manipulated, he will then look at the at the reason for the discrimination. This is the most important factor to consider. The intention of a person or policy and the context of their action must therefore be examined. In the present case (see dilemma 2), there may be various reasons for discrimination (some of them more defensible than others). The degree of iniquity must be assessed by examining the reasons for the discrimination. This then dictates the form and extent of resistance.

If the subject determines that the reason for discrimination is unprincipled (unjust), he will feel sympathy for the victims and will attempt to assist them. If the discrimination has no good reason (as in the case of simple racism) he will support the boycott immediately. Under such circumstances he will do anything within his power to resist and change such policies. He subsequently states, however, that he will have sympathy for the victims

whatever the reason for the discrimination ie., even if it is affirmative action, which suggests a tension in his thinking about the matter.

Discrimination may be a result of affirmative action which is a good cause because it addresses past injustices. Since affirmative action aims to redress the imbalance of the past it is defensible and represents a just reason to discriminate. People who are excluded from work because of a programme that employs a majority of one race group should understand the historical context of such programme ie., that there are past imbalances that must be redressed (this line of reasoning would appear to mitigate against any criticism of the programme on the subject's part, although it does not go as far as to imply outright support for such a programme). Affirmative action is therefore less iniquitous than plain discrimination.

The subject would nevertheless delay final judgement on a policy of affirmative action until he had determined how such a programme is structured. Specifically: is it run along racist lines? He maintains that colour is not an ethical criterion for affirmative action. Affirmative action should be based upon whether one is underprivileged or not. This criterion cuts across racial boundaries since a lot of people from a variety of racial groups are underprivileged (and therefore entitled to restitution and preferential treatment). All people who are underprivileged should be promoted.

There is a therefore a clear tension in the subject's thinking regarding affirmative action. On the one hand he defends affirmative action (taking the context and intention into account) while on the other hand he maintains that any kind of discrimination is totally unethical ie., that there is no good enough reason to justify discrimination. He criticizes affirmative action along these lines ie., affirmative action is basically unethical because it translates into unequal opportunities for different races. Racial discrimination in particular is not supposed to happen (the subject invokes a form of natural law). It is insupportable no matter what group practice it or who the victims are and irrespective of the existence of legislation supporting it. Discrimination based on race is wrong. Affirmative action is therefore discriminatory and should be resisted, although not by an outright product boycott (the subject swings back to a more contextual view). This implies that affirmative action is less reprehensible than other forms of discrimination. Resistance to such discrimination need not be as harsh. He will resist plain (racist) discrimination with greater effort than affirmative action which is supported by well-intentioned argument. The subject would fight against the discriminatory policies and against the management who support such discriminatory policies.

The same tension is evident in the subject's attitudes to management. If management discriminates based on race, then they are racist ie., the subject implies that racism may be inferred from the actions of management. Irrespective of the source, management are responsible for the policies they implement. Such policies depend for their success on the support of management and therefore such support may be inferred from the operation of the policy. By their actions, management inevitably prove whether they support the policies or not. Management should therefore be publicly exposed as racists.

The subject also exhibits a quite different line of thinking: he acknowledges that it is possible that

management are not responsible for the policies they implement. Shareholders or holding companies may force policies upon management. One should therefore not have a general attitude towards management (because situations and responsibilities vary). The subject would look for the source of such policies and then support management to resist such policies where this is warranted.

The subject finally steps out of this debate by concluding that most discrimination is performed privately by management and is not the result of official policies. The absence of a clear policy of discrimination would not necessarily lead the subject to the conclusion that there was no discrimination happening. Management usually have personal reasons to discriminate such as the wish to facilitate better communication by employing people who speak the same language as themselves. The same tension between belief in individual responsibility and a more contextual understanding is again evident here.

Having decided that this particular form of discrimination is unjust, the subject will then feel morally obligated to respond to the appeal positively. He claims that this capacity to have a sense of moral obligation depends upon one's emotional-faculty and also upon how one was brought up. He elaborates on each of these two themes.

The cognition that discrimination is unethical rests on the subject's belief in the equality of all human beings. He assumes that this is universally recognized because this is how children are brought up. Racial discrimination is therefore inhuman because it violates this basic value (of equality). The subject regards this as an injunction. A moral sense therefore depends on the internalization of the value that people are equal and not alien to oneself. This attitude makes social action possible.

The subject will also feel sadness and sympathy for the victims of discrimination. This sadness arises out of the recognition that discrimination is an infraction of the universal value (which he was presumably taught) that all people are equal and deserve equal treatment. This value applies to everyone, regardless of colour and hence he will feel sad no matter what colour the victims of the discrimination are. Violating this value is inhuman and therefore unsupportable. He asserts that his sense of moral obligation depends upon an intrinsic feeling that something is wrong (which implies that a feeling of sadness demonstrates that one has indeed internalized the value that all people are equal ie., a feeling is the outcome of this process).

Moreover, he contends that racial discrimination is morally bad for the human race (there are harmful consequences that affect us all). If one does not resist discrimination it may take on a different form because the capacity for discrimination will have gone unchallenged (which is an argument for resistance ie., anyone may be victimized by discrimination).

Racist attitudes of this sort are nevertheless difficult to change (particularly if management are aware they are doing wrong). Management policies may be difficult to change because of the perception on the part of management that such policies are functional. Management may also invoke their status and authority to ignore appeals from others.

External pressure can be brought upon management if the company is large enough (presumably because the costs of a boycott would be correspondingly higher and/or the support of more senior management could be obtained). In the case of a large company the subject maintains there will be managers who will listen to reason (it is unclear whether the subject is referring to managers with a more developed moral sensibility or merely those realists who will recognize a threat to profitability). He nevertheless predicts that it will be difficult to facilitate change in a single company (because of insufficient possibilities for leverage).

Legislation may be necessary (an external force) to bring about a change in behaviour. In this vein, the subject would also examine the legal context of the discrimination. If the government has legislation permitting racial discrimination, the subject would address all his effort towards changing such legislation. He asserts that the state has an obligation to create legislation prohibiting racial discrimination. Companies may claim that their discrimination is legal if such legislation does not exist.

Whatever form it takes, resistance to discrimination should be structured. It is appropriate to apply pressure commensurate with the degree of iniquity inherent in the discrimination. One's response should therefore be structured and planned and should include a sequence of steps that are not as severe as a boycott. In this way, one stays current on the matter and any further decisions that are taken are informed by the historical process that has already occurred. Such a process is not impulsive and peer-driven.

Since affirmative action is not as unethical as naked racism, less serious measures are required. He would nevertheless regard such a policy as unfair and would support a campaign to make the company aware that it is discriminating unjustly (and hence to change the policy). In the case of affirmative action, the appropriate first step would therefore be to make management aware that affirmative action results in racial discrimination which is unjust (this presumes that management shares the subject's value system). At this stage the subject would not support an appeal for a boycott. If management do not change their policies despite having being made aware of the unethical aspect of affirmative action, more severe action such as a product boycott should be undertaken. In the case of affirmative action therefore, the subject would only support the appeal after the failure of initial softer measures.

Moreover, one can only resist discrimination by action that is within one's power and within the constraints of the law (to go beyond this is unethical). He would never act illegally. His action would be constrained by the law and by his own capacities: he would picket the company, boycott products or attempt to persuade the suppliers to boycott the company, but would never attempt to destroy property. The subject would attempt to increase the self-awareness of those practising discrimination and to isolate them, but would feel ethically bound not to go beyond this. The furthest the subject would go in resisting discrimination, is to boycott the product of a company. In South Africa, consumer boycotts are part-and-parcel of politics and are condoned.

The subject would also donate as much money as he could afford. He would attempt to support a worthy appeal financially (to the extent that he could afford to do so).

Irrespective of any legal obligation or whatever pressure might be brought to bear upon offenders, the

obligation not to discriminate is a moral one ie., people must ultimately be self-motivated to not discriminate. Individuals have a personal moral obligation to not discriminate. Such an obligation should stem from the recognition of the rights of other human beings. Ultimately, external factors such as state legislation or economic pressure cannot prevent discrimination.

It is perhaps for this reason that the subject feels frustration at the impossible task of changing racist attitudes. He is frustrated at the fact that people will continue to discriminate unfairly despite any persuasive attempts he might make to change their behaviour. He feels alienated from management (an unbridgeable moral chasm separates him from them). The subject believes that management know that their actions are unethical (he cannot imagine that they do not share the basic value that people are equal). This he finds particularly frustrating because even the knowledge that they are behaving immorally is insufficient to change the actions of management.

This frustration at an imagined inability to change the views of management will give rise to intense feelings of anger and hostility towards them.

The subject nevertheless believes that people are possible of change ie., they can come to recognise a sense of moral obligation. Through his experience the subject has come to the surprising realization that other people are the same as himself ie., they are not dissimilar in nature and behave in similar ways. His perceptions changed when he commenced his work experience (this implies that prior to this experience he did not see people as inherently similar/equal: perhaps he regarded himself as occupying an inferior status).

He now sees racism as a quality that is not generic to a particular race. If a person is brought up to perceive himself as superior because of his race, he may not regard the victims of discrimination as his concern. If a person is brought up to respect others (as equals), however, that person will feel morally obliged to support an appeal in the interests of others, irrespective of race of the victim/s (presumably such a person would not discriminate either). People therefore behave according to the same principles but differ in this respect according to how they have been brought up.

Racism also stems from a feeling (perhaps the outcome of values one has internalized) and does not imply that the racist is a bad person (since feelings are inadvertent).

Hence, the subject is willing to converse with anyone (since nobody is intrinsically bad). He attempts to understand everybody (ie., how they have arrived at the positions they hold). This helps render the situation intelligible and therefore manageable.

Given that the situation is intelligible it is possible to make people aware that they are discriminating. The subject even assumes that management already know that their actions are unethical ie., they share his values.

Despite the view that one's moral self is the outcome of how one was reared and a manifestation of resulting feelings, the subject also refers to a process of self-construction. In his experience of the possible relations between himself and others, he has realized that it is important to establish one's own goals, values and self-identity. This happens through experiences where one's previous expectations and beliefs are challenged by events.

One has to be self-confident and secure with who one is in relation to others (perhaps the subject is referring to the importance of self-esteem in a country where people have been denigrated because of their colour), and where one is going (all this provides a basis for authentic social action). Indeed, the subject may be implying an equation between self-identity and social action when he refers to "my own line".

The subject has employed reason to establish an authentic self-identity rather than allowed his identity to be dictated by external factors such as politics.

The subject does not judge people according to his own value system (there is the suggestion that an immediate affective response would be on the basis of his own values and that this would be misguided). He keeps a distance (perhaps born out of his understanding that people are driven by feelings that are rooted in their upbringing). Hence, the subject does not object to any person as long as they are open to dialogue (and therefore possible of changing) and do not fight (he may object to their behaviour).

Addendum

The subject was in agreement with the above profile, particularly regarding the ambiguities inherent in his views on affirmative action and the management of the company. He maintained that it is difficult to formulate views easily where such matters are concerned. He conceded again that his feelings are very powerful where racist actions are occurring.