

**READING THE *SOWETAN*'S MEDIATION
OF THE PUBLIC'S RESPONSE
TO THE JACOB ZUMA RAPE TRIAL:
A CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS**

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ABSTRACT

Reading the *Sowetan*'s mediation of the public's response to the Jacob Zuma rape trial: A critical discourse analysis

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In this minithesis I conduct a critical discourse analysis to take on a double-pronged task. On the one hand I explore the social phenomenon of the contestation between supporters of then-ANC deputy president Jacob Zuma and supporters of his rape accuser. The trial, which took place in the Johannesburg High Court between mid-February and early May 2006, stirred intense public interest, both locally and internationally. The performance of thousands of Zuma's supporters and a far smaller number of gender rights lobby groups, both of whom kept a presence outside the court building throughout the trial, received similar attention. Second, I examine how the *Sowetan*, a national daily tabloid with a black, middle-class readership, mediated the trial through pictures of the theatre outside the court and letters to the editor.

The study is informed by post-Marxist and cultural studies perspectives, both approaches that are concerned with issues of power, ideology and the circulation of meaning within specific sociocultural contexts. A rudimentary thematic content analysis draws out some of the main themes from the material, while the critical discourse analysis is located within a theoretical framework based on concepts from Laclau & Mouffe's theory of meaning, which assumes a power struggle between contesting positions seeking to invalidate one another and to either challenge or support existing hegemonies. This is further informed by, first, Laclau's theorisation of populism, which assumes that diverse groupings can unite under a demagogue's banner in shared antagonism towards existing power, and second, by concepts from Mamdani's theorisation of power and resistance in colonial and post-colonial Africa, which explicates three overarching ideological discourses of human rights, social justice and traditional ethnic practices. The study, then, explores how these three discourses were operationalised by the localised contestations over the trial.

December 2007

DECLARATION

I declare that *Reading the Sowetan's mediation of the public's response to the Jacob Zuma rape trial: A critical discourse analysis* is my own work, that it has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other university, and that all the sources I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged as complete references.

Alison Stent

December 2007

Signed: _____

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

The scope of the study

The rape trial of then-ANC deputy president Jacob Zuma in the Johannesburg High Court between mid-February and early May 2006 stirred intense public interest and received extensive attention from the news media, even at times making international news. The performance of thousands of Zuma's supporters and a far smaller number of gender rights lobby groups, both of whom kept a presence outside the court building throughout the trial, received similar attention.

The rape complainant, an overnight guest at Zuma's Johannesburg home in November 2005, was an HIV-positive Aids activist half his age, whose father had been Zuma's comrade during South Africa's liberation struggle against apartheid. Zuma at the time was head of the council that advises the government on HIV-Aids policy, a married man and head of a "moral regeneration" programme aimed at promoting safe sexual practice.

Although this combination generated considerable outrage, Zuma's popularity with South Africa's masses appeared not dented but enhanced, to the point where his accuser was symbolically executed by his supporters. In addition the party's youth league and two partners in governance, Cosatu and the SACP, gave him their open and fervent support, even announcing their intention to nominate him as the country's next president.

The *Sowetan*, a national daily tabloid, is one of South Africa's largest black-oriented daily newspapers. This study, a mini-thesis in fulfilment of 35% of a Masters degree, explores the *Sowetan's* mediation of the contestation between Zuma's supporters and those of his rape accuser from a gender and class perspective. Since it is specifically the South African public's response to the trial that is under the microscope, I focus on the *Sowetan's* pictures of the contestation outside the court (particularly those representing body performance and messages on clothes and posters) and letters to its editor about the trial, thus deliberately excluding journalists' news reports and commentary to isolate the

‘voices’ of the citizenry. I first undertake a rudimentary thematic content analysis of this material to gain a ‘broad descriptive sweep’ of it before conducting a critical discourse analysis.

The significance of the study

Democratic South Africa is one of post-colonial Africa’s leading countries politically and economically, and its constitution is recognised as being among the most progressive in the world. Nonetheless, the democracy faces severe challenges, not the least of which is the fact that many of the rights inscribed in the constitution, particularly second generation socio-economic rights, have yet to be felt by the country’s desperately poor and unemployed majority. According to Mamdani (1996) the greatest challenge facing democracy in Africa is a rural-urban divide that has left colonially co-opted and perverted traditional authorities intact in rural areas, a divide between modernity and ‘tradition’ that exists in South Africa no less than its northern neighbours. Gender equality too, while inscribed in the constitution, is far from the quotidian reality of most South Africans, whether employed or unemployed, urban, rural or peri-urban.

Jacob Zuma’s rape trial, I argue in this study, threw these three sets of ‘unfinished business’ – class justice, gender justice and the relationship between tradition and modernity – into sharp relief, often pitting them against one another in different combinations. However, while modernity is often equated with Western discourses such as that of universal and individual human rights (including gender equality), it should never be forgotten that Western societies are themselves rooted in traditions as patriarchal and misogynistic as any customary rural one in Africa¹. Suttner, for example, discussing the trial, speaks of the ‘commonality of patriarchy across cultures’ (2007:9) and notes that Zuma, a Zulu, and the white Afrikaans trial judge (whom Suttner refers to as ‘kindred spirits’ (2007: 12)) both ‘deployed well-worn stereotypes of what one expects a woman to do when she is raped’ (2007:11).

¹ See for example Mmatshilo Motsei’s [The Kanga and the Kangaroo Court](#) (2007).

If the aim of discourse analysis is to ‘map out the processes of a struggle to fix meaning’ (Phillips and Jorgensen 2002: 24-5), ‘the word ‘critical’ signals a focus on the role played by discourse in establishing and maintaining relations of domination’ (Janks 1998:195). It is the work of critical discourse analysis, therefore, to examine how power works through language, or to be more specific, to expose the discursive strategies deployed in attempts to fix meaning, as well as to identify whether they are attempts to challenge or to support existing hegemonies.

This study, then, attempts to throw some light on the unprecedented spectacle outside the courtroom by using critical discourse analysis principles to examine how wider discursive struggles over class, traditionalism/modernity and gender are operationalised in the localised contestation between Zuma’s supporters and those of the rape complainant as they construct antagonistic identities for the two figures. I examine apparent contradictions in Zuma’s diverse support base (such as rights-based, urban organisations espousing a nationalistic ideology, like Cosatu and the SACP, gathering under a banner painted overtly in ethnic, customary colours) in light of Laclau’s (2005) theorisation of populism and link this with a perspective on class issues that is specific to Africa’s struggle to free itself of colonialism, and which identifies a ‘breach’ between the discourses of social justice and human rights (Mamdani 1996: 20-21). Finally, I examine the *Sowetan*’s role in mediating this contestation for its readers.

The context of the study

Political context

When the African National Congress (ANC) came to power in South Africa’s first democratic election in 1994, it pre-empted potential leftist opposition by taking as formal alliance partners the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) and the South African Communist Party (SACP). One of the new government’s first projects was to unify an ethnically, racially and culturally divided country under a nationalistic discourse. Another stated aim was to improve the lives of South Africa’s desperately poor, unemployed majority. By the end of the first decade of democracy, the centre-right, but regionally and ethnically based Inkatha Freedom Party, comprising mainly Zulus in

KwaZulu-Natal, had lost significant support to the ANC and the far right white, such as the Conservative Party, was an insignificant minority. However the ANC's two alliance partners and many of the country's poor had become increasingly disillusioned with the ANC's liberal capitalist economic policies, which had fantastically enriched a new black elite. Dissatisfaction began to crystallise around who would succeed the country's second president, Thabo Mbeki, both as ANC president in 2007 and as the country's president in 2009.

Jacob Zuma, Mbeki's deputy, seemed the obvious choice. However he was dismissed by Mbeki in June 2005 after being charged with fraud and corruption after allegedly accepting a bribe from a bidder in an international arms procurement deal. Zuma's financial advisor, who allegedly brokered the deal, was found guilty for his role in a separate trial. Before Zuma's fraud trial could come to court, two things happened, both around late 2005. First he was charged with rape. Second was what came to be known as 'the hoax e-mail saga'. This was a series of about 100 emails and chatroom transcripts, purported to be correspondence between senior ANC officials, the head of the National Prosecuting Authority and several senior journalists determined to keep Zuma from power. In the correspondence, which was rejected by the presidency as a hoax, Zuma is derogatorily referred to as 'the Zulu boy', a term implying ignorant country bumpkin.

Zuma has alleged since the fraud allegations first emerged that there is a conspiracy to derail his chances of succeeding Mbeki. He has constructed both sets of criminal charges and certain sections of the media as part of this plot, and has threatened to sue various publications, including the *Sowetan*, for their portrayals of him. From a poor, uneducated background himself, Zuma has constructed his identity as a simple rural man with strong customary roots, in stark contrast to the intellectual and well-educated Mbeki who, like his predecessor Nelson Mandela, is a Xhosa, and who is seen as having abandoned the rural poor. The term 'Zulu boy' was appropriated by Zuma's supporters during the rape trial as their rallying cry, an indication of the strong ethnic element in his support base. One aspect of this study examines the *Sowetan's* coverage of this rural, customary discourse.

Media context

The *Sowetan* has a national circulation of about 1.6 million² that targets an English-literate black readership. Yet its history is one that responded to the marginalisation of black readers; it began in 1981 as a free delivery, and under the editorship of academic and anti-apartheid activist Aggrey Klaaste from 1988 to 2002, became well-respected in progressive and academic circles. By the time South African media conglomerate Johnnic Communications (now Avusa) acquired a controlling share in 2004, the *Sowetan* was in competition with the national daily tabloid, *The Sun*, and shares many of the layout features that traditionally set tabloids apart from broadsheets. However its target market is middle class as opposed to *The Sun's* working class one, and the *Sowetan* has retained a fairly strong human rights framework. The news media are argued to play an important role in society both in setting the agenda (not as much for what people should think, as for what they should think about) and for providing the frame through which to view events (see for example Cook et al 1983; McCombs 2001). For this reason, the way the *Sowetan* chose to represent and frame the events surrounding Jacob Zuma's rape trial is considered significant.

Structure of the study

This chapter has outlined the parameter and scope of the study, touching on its aims and methods and briefly sketching the context of the topic. In the following chapter I explain the broad theoretical framework within which the study is located, and discuss the themes that link the aims and methods. Chapter Three discusses the methodological considerations underpinning the thematic content analysis and critical discourse analysis. Chapter Four comprises the analysis itself, and in Chapter Five I sum up the findings and draw some conclusions.

² Interview with *Sowetan* operations manager Yusuf Patel, 13 June 2007; www.biz-community.com/Article/196/90/9116.html, accessed 7 January 2007

CHAPTER TWO: ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

Introduction

In Chapter One it was noted that as a populist figure Zuma has drawn supporters with widely disparate and sometimes conflicting positions. Unified under the rallying cry of ‘100% Zulu boy’, they enacted intense symbolic violence towards the rape complainant outside the courtroom during the trial, while most of the demands articulated on their posters had nothing to do with the trial at all. Gender activists and rape support groups also gathered outside the court to demonstrate in support of the complainant, and a strong police presence was needed to keep physical violence between the two contesting groups to a minimum. These performances were only one measure of the public’s intense sense of involvement in the trial. The polarisation was also evident in numerous radio talk shows and television debates, and there was a proliferation of websites, blogs, letters to the press and even music written expressing both positions.

Although in a sense the public’s involvement was a sideshow to the main drama of Zuma and his accuser’s disclosures inside the court, the contestation between the two positions takes centre stage in this investigation. As mentioned above, Chapter Four focuses on two forms of the public’s response produced in the *Sowetan*: first the formal letters to the editor, the designated site for public expression, and second, photographs of the protests outside the court, where messages are recorded in the form of posters, dress, slogans on clothing and body performances such as burning effigies. In this chapter I outline an analytical framework that may help to ‘plot the course of these struggles to fix meaning’ (Phillips & Jorgensen 2002: 24) as the two positions deploy various strategies to construct their own positions and identities as valid in contrast to the contesting position which is constructed as ‘other’; that is, alien, irrational and invalid.

In the belief that the contesting discourses surrounding the rape trial and the succession race could have profound implications for the quality of South Africa’s democracy, I have chosen to ground this study in a social constructivist approach to representation. To

unpack this a little, if representation is understood as the production of meaning through language (Hall 1997: 28), constructivism's central concept is that language plays an active role in creating and shifting meaning (Hall 1997: 28). By implication then, particular messages and their consequent understandings of the world lead to particular actions, and in this way, language and the construction of knowledge has social consequences. Four theoretical strands within the constructivist approach to representation that are relevant to the investigation are discussed below.

First, Michel Foucault's ideas have been widely deployed in the development of both representation theory and discourse analysis (Phillips & Jorgensen 2002: 12; Hall 1997: 42). His radically historicised notions of power/knowledge, discourse, 'truth' and the subject discussed below have been seminal in the field of critical social theory and have been taken up by many influential analysts, including Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (Phillips & Jorgensen 2002: 12-13), who are discussed in later sections. Foucault's conceptualisations are therefore briefly outlined to form the foundations on which the analytical framework is built. However, while his ideas underpin the analytic approach of Laclau and Mouffe, their departures from Foucault also usefully inform this study, and it is their concepts on which the analysis in Chapter Four is based. In particular I employ their conceptualisation of discourses as struggling for hegemony through the appropriation of nodal points, which in turn organise discourse through chains of equivalence. Third, Laclau's (2005) analysis of populism, which partly informs the protest analysis in Chapter Four, throws light on the disparate and sometimes contradictory collection of groups supporting Zuma. Finally, Mamdani's theorisation of power and resistance in post-colonial Africa provides the necessary framework to contextualise three identified discourses at play in the pro- and anti-Zuma contestation, namely a rights-based discourse, a customary or ethnic one and a third which Mamdani calls 'social justice'. I outline each theory in turn.

Foucault and the social constructivist approach to representation

There are two concepts central to the social constructivist approach to representation: first, as mentioned above, that discourse shapes meaning and second, that meaning (in

forms such as world views, identities and knowledge) is historically contingent (Phillips & Jorgensen 2002:5). In other words, through discourse, we create representations of reality that are never mere reflections of a pre-existing reality but contribute to constructing reality; second, the social worlds so created are historically and culturally specific and shifting.

While Foucault did not set out to develop a theory of representation, his contribution to social constructivism and the current understanding of representation is considered profound (Hall 1997: 42; Phillips & Jorgensen 2002: 12). Preoccupied with the mechanisms of social control exercised by and in modern state institutions³, Foucault radically altered concepts such as discourse, truth, power and subjectivity, not least by his insistence on the historical contingency of knowledge and ‘truth’. In his earlier ‘archaeological’ phase, his aim was to ‘analyse how human beings understand themselves in our culture and how our knowledge about the social, the embodied individual and shared meanings comes to be produced in different periods’ (Hall 1997: 43). What concerned him, according to Hall, was ‘the production of *knowledge* (rather than just meaning) through what he called *discourse* (rather than just language)’ (Hall 1997: 42-3, italics inserted).

Foucault’s conceptualisation of discourse and knowledge

Clearly then, we need to explicate Foucault’s influential conceptualisations of knowledge (as opposed to meaning) and discourse (as opposed to language), which were a radical departure from the semiotic approach to representation, whereby representation relates to the way words function as signs within language (Hall 1997: 42). For Foucault, whose project was to understand relations of power, not relations of meaning, the semiotic approach was restrictive: he was concerned to analyse ‘relations of force, strategic developments and tactics’ (Hall 1997: 43). Semiotics, as the study of signs in communication, could not therefore account for what he termed the ‘intrinsic intelligibility of conflicts’ (Hall 1997: 43). To this end, he expanded the

³ Foucault’s major works focused on madness and medical discourse, discipline and the penal institutions and sexuality.

conceptualisation of discourse from simply a linguistic one that referred to passages of connected writing or speech, to one which included both language and practice, and saw his task as:

A task that consists of not – of no longer – treating discourses as groups of signs (signifying elements referring to contents or representations) but as practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak. (Foucault 1972:49 in Prinsloo 2002: 17)

In other words not only language but the social practices that go with it operate together to shape the ways the world is experienced. Foucault turned his attention to the way that language and ‘practices’ in modern state institutions operated to produce ‘regimes of truth’ (Hall 1997: 49) or the body of knowledge and understanding that existed at the time about a topic. He wanted to explicate ‘how the rules of inclusion and exclusion work that govern which statements are accepted as meaningful and true’ (Phillips & Jorgensen 2002: 12), and, to this end, he described the discursive strategies that he proposed were used to delimit the field of objects, define a legitimate perspective and fix norms for how concepts and theories were elaborated (Foucault 1981). Together, these strategies construct the topic, define and produce the objects of knowledge, govern the way it can and cannot be talked about and regulate conduct in relation to that topic, rendering anyone who tries to speak or act outside these limits unintelligible. Control mechanisms extrinsic to discourse itself include those rituals governing who can speak and when, and taboos on certain topics, attitudes and behaviours, while discourses themselves, Foucault held, also exerted internal controls such as the use of commentary to guide how people think about a topic and rules governing who is qualified to speak on it (Foucault 1981).

Foucault’s conceptualisation of power and truth

It will be clear from the above that for Foucault, there was no ‘truth’ because the imaginable repertoire of concepts and behaviours was constrained differently in different historical eras:

Truth isn’t outside power. ... Truth is a thing of this world; it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it induces regular effects of power. Each society has its regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth; that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true, the mechanisms and

instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned ... the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true. (Foucault 1980: 131 in Hall 1997: 49)

This insistence on the historical discontinuity of knowledge is considered one of Foucault's major contributions to contemporary thinking: he made way for an understanding of the contingent and shifting nature of how discursive formations sustained different 'truth regimes' at different times (Hall 1997: 49; Phillips & Jorgensen 2002: 12). Social theorists like Laclau and Mouffe, for example, embraced this view, as discussed in this chapter.

In his second, or 'genealogical' phase, Foucault turned his attention to the way discourse works to shape its social world, focusing on political power relations and the way discourse was embedded in institutional and material practices (Phillips & Jorgensen 2002: 16). His conceptualisation of power was radical in that he insisted that power is not simply negative, top-down and repressive but productive, and that it cannot be held, only deployed:

What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it does not only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network which runs through the whole social body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is repression (Foucault 1980:119 in Phillips & Jorgensen 2002:13)

Thus power is understood as producing, among other things, discourse and knowledge, and as circulating at every level of social life.

Foucault's conceptualisation of the subject

If constructivism implies a rejection of the autonomous Cartesian subject, (Hall 1992: 282) this similarly applies to Foucault's discursive, historicised subject. For Foucault it is discourses, not the subjects who speak it, that produce knowledge – and in fact subjects themselves are produced within discourse. Subjects may produce texts, but they operate within 'regimes of truth' specific to a culture and era, and are thus 'subjected to' its rules

and conventions. They can relay power/knowledge but not stand outside it (Hall 1997: 55). Foucault's subject is shaped or 'disciplined' from an early age by 'microtechnologies of power' that operate at body level; s/he is inserted into pre-existing discourses at schools, prisons, factories, churches, and arguably families, to be transformed and improved (Prinsloo 2002: 25-7):

In thinking of the mechanisms of power, I am thinking rather of its capillary form of existence, the point where power reaches into the very grain of individuals, touches their bodies and inserts itself into their action and their attitudes, their discourses, learning processes and everyday lives. (Foucault 1980 in Prinsloo 2002: 27)

However, importantly, Foucault was clear that subjects need to *be constituted* as autonomous: "Modern power is tolerable only on condition that it mask a substantial part of itself. Its success is proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms" (Foucault in Prinsloo 2002: 27). Thus power disciplines the body to produce what he called 'docile' or willing subjects; the ANC for example has a powerful disciplining discourse that includes among other mechanisms, a taboo against fostering divisive ethnicism within its ranks.

Laclau and Mouffe's theory of meaning

Operating similarly within a social constructivist position, Laclau and Mouffe's starting point is that discourse shapes meaning, and that meaning can never be ultimately fixed since it is historically contingent. In line with Foucault's theorisation, discourse is understood to comprise both language and social practice. They also subscribe to his conceptualisation of power, understanding it not as something that is held and exercised over others, but as that which produces the social in particular ways at particular times. In other words the social world, including all knowledge, identity formations and social relations are contingent and shifting (Phillips & Jorgensen 2002: 37). The implication is that Laclau and Mouffe's theory is inherently political, not in the narrow sense of party politics but in the sense that forms of social organisation are the outcomes of political processes which have excluded all other forms (Phillips & Jorgensen 2002: 36).

Terms and concepts in Laclau and Mouffe's theory of meaning

Below I outline the terms and concepts in Laclau and Mouffe's theory of how meaning is created and contested. The analogy of a fishing net has been used to explicate their understanding of discourse, with linguistic signs as the knots in the net. Thus each 'knot' derives its meaning from its relation to other knots:

Signs acquire their meanings by being different from each other, but, in ongoing language use, we position the signs in different relations to one another so that they may acquire new meanings... it is through conventions, negotiations and conflicts in social contexts that structures of meaning are fixed and challenged'. (Phillips & Jorgensen 2002: 25)

However, whereas Saussurian structuralism saw the net as fixed and stable, post-structuralists like Laclau and Mouffe hold that its stability is constantly challenged by contesting attempts to fix alternative meanings.

According to Laclau and Mouffe then, a discourse is the structured totality of the net, or in other words 'the fixation of meaning within a particular domain' (Phillips & Jorgensen 2002: 24-6). If signs occur as elements with potential multiple meanings, once deployed within a discourse they become fixed, however temporarily. The social practices that establish, or fix, their relations with other signs are termed articulations. For example, in the context of a developmental psychology discourse the word 'independence' takes on a certain meaning when fixed (articulated) in relation with signs indicating 'milestones' such as walking alone and feeding oneself. However in a post-colonial discourse it would take on a different meaning as a result of articulations with signs such as 'struggle', 'oppression' or 'foreign power'.

The political implications of this are crucial to this study, because specific articulations, by fixing meaning in particular ways, work to either reproduce or challenge existing discourses. If each sign is perpetually potentially polysemous, every social practice or expression is an articulation. However, in addition to this, each articulation also draws on earlier fixations of meaning – that is, even though it is an innovation, it nonetheless draws on wider discourses in which signs have become fixed and naturalised to varying degrees (Phillips & Jorgensen 2002: 29). In the context of this study, then, every letter to the

editor, each T-shirt, handwritten poster or body performance in a protest march is an articulation, an attempt to fix meaning in the given terrain, while at the same time it draws on other pre-existing discourses (for example those of human rights, social justice or ethnic custom). This point underpins the analysis in Chapter Four.

I turn now to the internal functioning of a discourse, or from its anatomy to its physiology, so to speak. According to Laclau and Mouffe, there are certain 'key signifiers' in a discourse that function as an organising principle: 'A 'nodal point' is a privileged sign around which the other signs are ordered; the other signs acquire their meaning from their relationship to the nodal point' (Phillips & Jorgensen 2002: 26). Phillips & Jorgensen use the example of 'body' as a nodal point in a medical discourse; in this study of the contesting positions over the rape trial, the main nodal point, I argue, is 'Zuma'. Phillips & Jorgensen add that 'floating signifiers' are the signs, or elements, that different discourses struggle to invest with meaning in their own particular way:

Nodal points are floating signifiers, but whereas the term 'nodal point' refers to a point of crystallisation within a specific discourse, the term 'floating signifier' belongs to the ongoing struggle between different discourses to fix the meaning of important signs. (Phillips & Jorgensen 2002: 26)

Thus discourses struggle to achieve hegemony, or social consensus, in the Gramscian sense (Simon 1982: 21). In other words, they struggle to appropriate the floating signifiers in the contested terrain between them and turn them into nodal points by investing them with their own meaning. This takes place through the social practices of articulation, which organise signs or moments around nodal points in chains of equivalence (Phillips & Jorgensen 2002: 43). In a patriarchal disc

consensus that has been accepted as ‘truth’ and reveal its contingency, but to examine how hegemonies were put in place:

The aim of analysis is, therefore, not to uncover the objective reality, for example, to find out what groups society ‘really’ consists of, but to explore *how* we create this reality so that it appears objective and natural... the starting point of Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory is that we construct objectivity through the discursive production of meaning. It is that construction process that should be the target of analysis. (Phillips & Jorgensen 2002: 33)

The construction of identity in Laclau and Mouffe’s theory

For Laclau and Mouffe discourses constitute identities. To discuss this concept I return to the issue of articulation, that is, those social practices that link floating signifiers with other signs in a discourse, investing them with meaning through their relation to other signs. This is central to Laclau and Mouffe’s theorisation of the formation of both individual and group identities, thus going right to the heart of this study, which is at once an investigation of the contesting positions over Zuma’s identity, an examination of how Zuma’s support group is constituted and a critical look at the *Sowetan*’s mediation of these.

Like Foucault, Laclau and Mouffe reject the classical Western understanding of the individual as an autonomous subject. For them, both individual and collective identities are organised according to the principles of the discursive processes outlined above. I begin with individual identity. Borrowing and adapting⁴ Althusser’s concept of interpellation, Laclau and Mouffe hold that discourses interpellate individuals in particular ‘subject positions’, (a term which they conflate with that of identity (Phillips & Jorgensen 2002: 43)). In other words, people are placed in certain positions by particular ways of talking: ‘If a child says ‘mum’ and the adult responds, then the adult has become interpellated with a particular identity – a ‘mother’ – to which particular expectations

⁴ Phillips & Jorgensen point out that in Althusser’s theory there is an economic determinism incompatible with discourse theory: Althusser understands the interpellation of subjects as ideological as it hides the true relations between people. To Laclau and Mouffe, there are no ‘true’ social relations determined by the economy (P&J 2002: 41)

about her behaviour are attached. In discourse theoretical terms, the subjects become positions in discourses' (Phillips & Jorgensen 2002: 40).

Thus discourses designate positions for people to occupy as subjects, with a corresponding set of expectations about how to act, what to say and what not to say. Incorporating Jacques Lacan's (1997) theorisation of the subject as 'as a perpetually incomplete structure which constantly strives to become a whole' gave Laclau and Mouffe's subject a 'driving force', as it constantly tries to 'find itself' through investing in different discourses (Phillips & Jorgensen 2002: 42). This is linked with Laclau and Mouffe's second departure from Althusser (see footnote 4 for the first departure). For them, subjects are 'fragmented' or 'decentred'; that is, each individual is interpellated by many discourses – mother, daughter, taxi driver, ANC supporter, part-time student, tenant and dinner guest might be only a few. When these interpellations give conflicting instructions on how to behave, for example in certain interpretations of 'feminist' and 'Christian', the subject is said to be 'overdetermined', or to put it another way, an antagonism is set up: 'A social antagonism occurs when different identities mutually exclude each other ... Thus, antagonisms can be found where discourses collide' (Phillips & Jorgensen 2002: 47-8).

To summarise, meanings and identities are discursively constituted through chains of equivalence that link signs together in opposition to other chains. These define how the subject is, and how it is not. Secondly, identity is always relationally organised, in other words, it is something because it is contrasted with something that it is not. Or to put it another way, 'it is by being represented by a cluster of signs with a nodal point at its centre that one acquires an identity. Identities are accepted, refused and negotiated in discursive processes' (Phillips & Jorgensen 2002: 43).

We turn now to Laclau and Mouffe's theorisation of collective identity, a discussion which in several fundamental aspects foreshadows Laclau's (2005) analysis of populism, discussed in the section below. Individual identities, as discussed above, are formed through chains of equivalence. Group identities follow a similar 'logic of equivalence', that is, chains of equivalence establish some possibilities of identification while others

are ignored (Phillips & Jorgensen 2002: 44). For example let us take the contentious term 'African'. For some, this term might be reserved for all the dark-skinned peoples on the continent who were once oppressed by European colonialism. For others, it may mean anyone who was born on the continent and who chooses to identify with the term. For still others it could refer to anyone who was born here no matter where they live now. Egypt, on the other hand, considers itself and is internationally accepted as part of the Middle East rather than part of Africa (except when it comes to soccer). The category is further blurred with sub-categories like 'African American', most of whom have never been to Africa and will never even think of coming. Then there are complications like islands: Zanzibar is discursively constituted as 'part of Africa' (and its citizens therefore as Africans) while Madagascar is not. Be that as it may, group identities, like individual ones, are discursively constituted by what they are not; the 'other', or whatever is understood to be excluded from the group. The erstwhile Pan Africanist Congress may have defined 'African' in opposition to 'settler' while the apartheid government set up equally contentious divisions between 'African', 'coloured', 'Indian' and 'white'.

A second discursive strategy deployed by the logic of equivalence is that all differences within the group are ignored. The discursive antithesis to the logic of equivalence, therefore, is the 'logic of difference', where heterogeneities within the group are foregrounded. Christians, for example, are Protestant or Catholic; within the Protestant group are Methodists, Anglicans and Presbyterians, each of these is further divided into charismatic and orthodox and so on. Hence, as Phillips & Jorgensen phrase it, 'different understandings of society divide the social space into different groups ... [and the] understanding of society which prevails, and the group division that this implies, have critical consequences for our actions' (Phillips & Jorgensen 2002: 46).

Thus I propose to analyse the contestations over Zuma's identity by examining how articulations (that is, social practices) reproduce, challenge or transform existing discourses in the field by organising chains of equivalence around nodal points; or in other words, map the process of the struggle to 'hegemonically pin down the meaning of... floating signifier[s]' (Phillips & Jorgensen 2002: 51) and thus (temporarily at least) fix meaning.

Laclau's theory of populism

Laclau's conceptualisation (2005) of populism as a form of discourse is an elaboration of the theory of group identity formation described above. His point of departure is the definition of articulation that he developed with Mouffe (that is, any social practice that organises signs around nodal points in a discourse, be it a verbal, written or enacted expression). Next, he proposes that, since populist discourse can be found in both leftist and rightist political persuasions, populism be analysed not according to its ideological content, but according to the way that content is articulated, i.e. its 'mode' or 'logic' of articulation. The two modes of articulation that he brings into play were also introduced above, namely the paired concepts of 'logic of equivalence' and 'logic of difference', but he now uses them rather differently, as we shall see below. In sum, Laclau detects similarities across the political spectrum in the way the elements of a populist discourse are connected: '[the] articulating form, apart from its contents, produces structuring effects which primarily manifest themselves at the level of the modes of representation (Laclau 2005: 2).

Differential and equivalential modes of articulation

Laclau begins his analysis of populism by making the point that the 'specifically political articulation' of a social identity is defined by its attempt to bridge the gap between 'political will and communitarian space' (2005: 3) (although, as he points out, no such attempt can ultimately succeed). Reiterating his and Mouffe's earlier position that discourses interpellate individuals in particular subject positions or identities, he states:

Individuals are not coherent totalities but merely referential identities which have to be split up into a series of localised subject positions. And the articulation between these positions is a social and not an individual affair. (2005: 3)

As the units or elements that build this social link, he proposes the theoretical category of 'demand' (Laclau 2005: 4). Pointing out that in English the word 'demand' carries both the meaning of a request and its more active sense of imposing or claiming the request, he advances the idea that they correspond to two different modes of articulation. As an example of the first meaning, he offers a scenario where a group of people living in a

certain neighbourhood want a bus route introduced to transport them from their places of residence to the area in which most of them work, a request that is satisfied when they approach the ‘city hall’:

The demand is a punctual demand, closed in itself – it is not the tip of an iceberg or the symbol of a large variety of unformulated social demands... requests of this type, in which demands are punctual or individually satisfied, do not construct any chasm or frontier within the social... Each instance is a part (or a differential point) of a highly institutionalised social immanence. (Laclau 2005: 3)

The social logics operating according to this ‘institutionalised, differential model’ are what Laclau calls the logics of difference: ‘They presuppose that there is no social division and that any legitimate demand can be satisfied in a non-antagonistic, administrative way’ (Laclau 2005: 3).

Turning to the second meaning of ‘demand’, Laclau now has the request of his putative group rejected, as well as a large variety of other requests such as sanitation, housing and schooling, over a period of time. He predicts that the ‘multiple frustration’ will cause a new set of social logics: ‘Some kind of solidarity will arise between them all: all will share the fact that their demands remain unsatisfied. That is, the demands share a negative dimension beyond their positive differential nature’ (Laclau 2005: 5).

As the inverse of the earlier, differential situation, Laclau terms this second mode of articulation the ‘logic of equivalence’:

All the demands, in spite of their differential character, tend to reaggregate themselves forming what we will call an *equivalential chain*. This means that each individual demand is constitutively split: on the one hand it is its own particularised self; on the other it points, through equivalential links, to the totality of the other demands. (2005: 5)

Returning to his earlier image, Laclau describes each of these demands as the tip of one large iceberg, which is the set of a large number of social claims. In other words, what articulates the ‘tips’ or demands is the ‘lack pervading them all’ (2005:6).

He then differentiates between the subjects of the two types of demands, naming the first kind, the ones interpellated by differential logic ‘democratic subjects’. The type of

subject constituted by equivalential logic, on the other hand, will be wider, he points out, because its subjectivity is the result of the ‘equivalential aggregation of a plurality of democratic demands’. These he names ‘popular subjects’. Here Laclau is careful to point out that rather than understanding the two modes of articulation as discrete opposites, they are better seen as occupying extreme ends of a continuum:

[T]he more social demands tend to be differentially absorbed within a successful institutional system, the weaker the equivalential links will be and the more unlikely the constitution of a popular subjectivity; conversely, a situation in which a plurality of unsatisfied demands and an increasing inability of the institutional system to absorb them differentially coexist, creates the conditions leading to a populist rupture. (2005: 5-6)

The anti-institutional nature of populism

A second condition necessary for a ‘populist rupture’, he continues, is the identification of the *source* of the negativity that links the rejected demands, in other words the entity that does the rejecting. In this way, equivalential or popular discourses dichotomise the social space, creating a chasm or ‘internal frontier’: they ‘divide the social into two camps: power and the underdog’ (2005: 6). In other words, importantly, a populist discourse espouses a pre-Foucauldian notion of power, one in which power is top-down, repressive and negative. It discursively totalises the institutional power in its representation of the power: ‘There is no populism without discursive construction of an enemy’ (2005: 7). It is this dichotomisation that ‘subverts the particularistic, differential character of the demands’ (2005: 6) that allowed for a notion of power as flowing and productive and turns them instead into the second, equivalential kind.

It is this frame that enables one to understand two aspects of this study: first, Laclau’s dichotomy, the social chasm between the underdog and the top-down, repressive power of governing institutions corresponds with the proliferation of anti-Mbeki messages outside the courtroom during Zuma’s trial on posters, in songs and in physical performances such as burning pictures of him; and second, Laclau’s understanding of the wide range of subjects drawn together under the banner of anti-institutional feeling that characterises populism makes sense of the odd, often contradictory juxtaposition of groupings that constellated under Zuma’s banner, such as urban, rights-based

organisations like Cosatu and the SACP alongside the ethnic Zulu base of his core support group. In the words of South African political commentator Xolela Mangcu:

What Zuma has done rather remarkably is what [American rightwing politician George] Wallace did so many years ago in constructing a populist front. Zuma has combined various groups that had their own discrete gripes about Mbeki around a frontier against the latter's centralised rule: the Congress of South African Trade Unions, the ANC Youth League, civil society organisations, black professionals and entrepreneurs, opinion makers, former senior government officials and ANC bigwigs. (Business Day 30 September 2006)

In a nutshell, 'the problem of populism is precisely that it embraces a range of diverse and often contradictory political beliefs' (Beasley-Murray 2005: 2). In relation to this study, these include the ANC's leftist alliance partners' desire for less centrism and a more socialist economic policy; the bruised ethnic pride of the Zulu people; the construction of a conspiracy to prevent Zuma's ascendancy to presidency and the genuinely desperate poverty and unemployment among the majority of South Africans, many of whom lack housing, employment, health care, access to schools or even clean water.

Representation in populist discourse

I return to Laclau's exposition. Having made the crucial point that populism is inherently anti-institutional, he turns to the more complex problem of how a populist front can represent itself as a totality when it comprises a set of particularistic demands that are entirely different from each other. Here he returns to four more concepts discussed in the previous section: empty signifiers, floating ones, hegemony and nodal points (although he now refers to the latter as 'central signifiers'):

[T]hat representation [of disparate groupings as a unity] is only possible if a particular demand, without entirely abandoning its own particularity, starts also functioning as a signifier representing the chain as a totality... This process by which a particular demand comes to represent an equivalential chain incommensurable with it is, of course, what we have called *hegemony*. (2005: 7, italics in original)

In other words, one demand takes precedence over all the others in order to symbolise them all. Here Laclau makes another crucial point:

The so-called ‘poverty’ of the populist symbols is the condition of their political efficacy – as their function is to bring to equivalential homogeneity a highly heterogeneous reality, they can only do so on the basis of reducing to a minimum their particularistic content. *At the limit, this process reaches a point where the homogeneizing function is carried out by a pure name: the name of the leader.* (2005: 7, italics inserted)

Within this study, I argue that Zuma becomes this leader. As we shall see in Chapter Four, his supporters wore T-shirts with his face and name emblazoned on them, while their posters articulated demands ranging from the re-democratisation of the ANC, equations between Mbeki’s regime and apartheid, accusations that an anti-Zulu Xhosa cabal was in power and fury at the suggestion that the next state president could be a woman, to open threats of civil war – and all within the context of a rape trial. Thus Zuma’s name became the empty signifier that represented this heterogeneous and sometimes contradictory set of demands.

Laclau offers two alternative scenarios for the de-polarisation of his two camps. As we have seen above, populist logic needs its nodal point to empty itself of content in proportion to the width of its reference; in other words, the more demands in the equivalential chain it represents, the less it can represent its own particularistic demand. Laclau’s first alternative is what he calls a ‘transformist operation’ (2005: 9). In this scenario the equivalential links between demands get broken by satisfying them: ‘This is the road to the decline of the populist form of politics, to the blurring of the internal frontiers and to the transition to a higher level of integration of the institutional system’ (2005: 9).

His second alternative, one that does not involve the dissolution of the frontier, is by now familiar: it involves the re-articulation of the chains of equivalence while retaining the central signifier, or nodal point. In this study, Laclau’s first alternative equates to genuinely improving the lives of the poor and placing some checks on the power of the presidency, while the second involves separating Zuma from the idea of these improvements.

But Laclau reiterates and emphasises his earlier caveat, that the boundary between

equivalential and differential discourses is fluid:

To ask oneself if a movement *is* or *is not* populist is, actually, to start with the wrong question. The question that we should, instead, ask ourselves, is the following: *to what extent* is a movement populist? As we know, this question is identical to this other one: to what extent does the logic of equivalence dominate its discourse? (2005: 12)

This point becomes important in examining the role the *Sowetan* plays in its mediation of the protesters outside court. Answering his own question, Laclau concludes that not only can no political movement be entirely ‘exempt’ from populism because they all, to some extent, interpellate the ‘people’ against an enemy, but that, in fact populism and politics are synonymous:

The degree of ‘populism’, in that sense, will depend on the depth of the chasm separating political alternatives... Populism means putting into question the institutional order by constructing an underdog as an historical agent – i.e. an agent which is an *other* in relation to the way things stand. But this is the same as politics. We only have politics through the gesture which embraces the existing state of affairs as a system and presents an alternative to it. (2005: 14)

In conclusion, he reaffirms his constructivist stance on representation, stating that the ‘people’ is a construct of populist discourse, not a ‘primary datum’, and consequently it is representation that constitutes social reality, not the other way round.

Power and resistance in Africa

Citizen and subject

Crucial to contextualising the study, which examines a power contestation in a South African context, is Mamdani’s (1996) theorisation of the organisation of power in Africa historically, the resilience of this organisation and the consequent forms that resistance takes in post-colonial Africa. In particular, Mamdani explicates the colonial legacy of a ‘citizen-subject’ divide that left many African countries, including South Africa, with an urban-rural schism that has deep implications for democracy in Africa. As Prinsloo phrases it:

Mamdani identifies how subjects in colonial Africa were produced by two conflicting discourses as either ‘citizens’ or ‘subjects’, the former being reserved

for the racially defined colonisers, the latter for the indigenous people. Importantly, the constitution of the indigenous people as ‘subject’ was not effected by direct rule or unmediated centralised despotism but depended on indirect rule, tribal leadership selectively constituted, and the relegation of the peasantry to customary law devolved into the hands of local despots. (2006: 7)

Mamdani has, in other words, identified two discourses operating parallel in what he calls the ‘Janus-faced’ or ‘bifurcated’ colonial state:

Urban power spoke the language of civil society and civil rights, rural power of community and culture. Civil power claimed to protect rights, customary power pledged to enforce tradition. The former was organized on the principle of differentiation to check the concentration of power, the latter around the principle of fusion to ensure a unitary authority. To grasp the relationship between the two, civil power and customary power, and between the language each employed – rights and custom, freedom and tradition – we need to consider them separately while keeping in mind that each signified one face of the same bifurcated state. (1996:18)

Colonisers in cities, then, were citizens, that is, subjects of a discourse of civil rights, freedom and political representation, while rural Africans were subjects in several senses: being Foucault’s willing subjects of a rural customary discourse meant that they were subjected to traditions that had been perverted and despotised, its existing checks and balances removed by the colonial power together with even the appearance of the rule of law, and thus they were subjects in a third sense, Mamdani’s sense.

Human rights, ethnic custom and the struggle for social justice in Africa

But having placed the discourses of modernity and rights in opposition to that of co-opted traditional rural culture, Mamdani identifies a third type of subject:

Between the rights-bearing colons and the subject peasantry was a third group: urban-based natives, mainly middle- and working-class persons, who were exempt from the lash of customary law but not from modern, racially discriminatory civil legislation. Neither subject to custom nor exalted as rights-bearing citizens, they languished in a juridical limbo. (1996: 19)

Thus there was no juridical, that is state-defined, discourse interpellating urban natives; they were the subjects of neither a customary rights nor a civil rights discourse, the two juridical institutions set up by the Janus-faced state. However this is not to say there was

no discourse interpellating them; discourses and the identities, or subjects, they interpellate and produce are not only politically and legally defined. As Laclau and Mouffe point out above, there are multiple discourses constantly interpellating individuals, whose subjectivities are consequently multifarious, or to use discursive terms, identities are decentred or overdetermined. To discover the nature of the main discourse that interpellated urban natives in the absence of a juridical one then, we need to follow Mamdani as he plots a trajectory for the development of African civil society. He does this by identifying four historical ‘moments’ in its relationship with the state, the first being this juridical limbo when ‘the colonial state [w]as the protector of the society of the colons’ (1996: 19). It was with the struggle for independence, Mamdani notes, that an indigenous civil society was born:

The second moment in that development saw a marked shift in the relation between civil society and the state. This was the moment of the anticolonial struggle, for the anticolonial struggle was, at the same time a struggle of embryonic middle and working classes, the native strata in limbo, for entry into civil society. That entry, that expansion of civil society, was the result of an antistate struggle. Its consequence was the creation of an indigenous civil society. (1996: 19-20)

Thus what interpellated urban natives was a struggle discourse, a struggle for social justice. Excluded and ‘othered’ by European despotism, refused the status of subjects of a citizen’s discourse and its concomitant chain of civil and political rights, they demanded entry into its centre. I argue that this struggle discourse, or social justice discourse, corresponds closely to the anatomy and physiology of Laclau’s populism, in that those engaged in the struggle for extra-juridical justice had necessarily to constitute themselves as ‘underdogs’ and the colonial state as the ‘enemy’; *at this point* it was not civil rights that was the enemy but the political dominance that excluded them from it.

Redress and redistribution

To return to Mamdani, his third moment is contextualised by independence and a deracialised state. Here he identifies Africanisation or, a phrase more familiar to South Africans, affirmative action, as the strategy adopted by newly independent and deracialised states in their attempt to deracialise their civil societies:

Independence tended to deracialize the state but not civil society. Instead, historically accumulated privilege, usually racial, was embedded and defended in civil society. Wherever the struggle to deracialize civil society reached meaningful proportions, the independent state played a central role. (1996: 20)

Mamdani makes the important point that such a strategy on the part of the state had the effect of shifting the existing tension between the state and civil society (a crucial ingredient of Laclau's populism dynamic) to tensions within civil society, as colonial beneficiaries, or 'colons', tried to defend their privilege, a point to which I return shortly. He then further analyses this third moment into two sub-moments, namely redress, or the dismantling of privilege, and redistribution, which he starkly rephrases as 'corruption'. The effect of the first, he writes, was to unify the victims of colonial racism. 'Not so the second [sub-moment], which turned around the question of redistribution and divided that same majority along lines that reflected the actual process of redistribution: regional, religious, ethnic, and at times just familial' (1996: 20). We therefore have two sets of tensions: first, 'colons' trying to hold on to the privileges they were used to, and second, a majority of poor people whose deprivations remained in place while a new elite was enriched and empowered through clan links, struggle links, clientelism and prebendalism. Enlarging on the former tension, Mamdani writes:

Racial privilege not only receded into civil society, but defended itself in the language of civil rights, of individual rights and institutional autonomy. To victims of racism the vocabulary of rights rang hollow, a lullaby for perpetuating racial privilege. Their demands were formulated in the language of nationalism and social justice. *The result was a breach between the discourse on rights and the one on justice, with the language of rights appearing as a fig leaf over privilege – power appearing as the guarantor of social justice and redress*". (1996: 20-21, italics inserted)

Thus the language of civil rights became tainted, part of Laclau's 'enemy', while social justice could be won with struggle strategies such as the force of numbers, mob violence and 'making the country ungovernable'. However, I argue that the breach Mamdani speaks of was not a dichotomy between rights and justice but a *trichotomy*; by now both the civil rights discourse and the ethnic discourse of clan loyalty and patronage were working in opposition to – or in Laclau's terms, discursively constituted as the enemy of – the one of social justice, even while the historical tension between the first two

remained in place. In other words, the former victims of racism were now doubly constituted as victims, or Laclau's underdogs; victims first of racism's legacy and second of corrupt redistribution practices.

For Mamdani this failure of redistribution to bring about social justice contextualised the fourth moment, which was characterised by the collapse of the embryonic indigenous civil society⁵ and its absorption into political society: 'It is the time when civil society based social movements became demobilized and political movements statized' (1996: 21), or in other words, leading figures of the organised struggle took government positions. A partial example of this is Cosatu's alliance with the ANC in government, although Cosatu still simultaneously at times mobilises in opposition to the state.

Post-colonial South Africa

However, Mamdani identifies some important differences between South Africa's trajectory and its northern neighbours:

The specificity of the South African experience lies in the strength of its civil society, both white and black ... The strength of urban forces and civil society-based movements in South Africa meant that unlike in most African countries, the center of gravity of popular struggle was in the townships and not against Native Authorities in the countryside. The depth of resistance in South Africa was rooted in urban-based worker and student resistance, not in the peasant revolt in the countryside. Whereas in most African countries the formation of an indigenous civil society was mainly a postindependence affair, following the deracialization of the state, in South Africa it is both cause and consequence of that deracialization. (1996: 29-30)

Thus in South Africa the struggle itself was already partially deracialised; furthermore it was firmly rooted in the urban, rights-based discourse of students and workers.

Consequently it is unsurprising that this civil rights discourse should operate powerfully within the new ANC-led government and its alliance partners, many of whose members were activists in the struggle. It is a government justifiably proud of a constitution that

⁵ Mamdani appears to be using these terms in a Gramscian sense, where political society stands for the *coercive* relations materialised in the various state institutions that bring about 'direct domination' while civil society comprises the 'ensemble of organisms called private ... apparatuses of *hegemony*' such as churches, trade unions, political parties and cultural associations that make up the ruling class (Simon 1982: 68-71, emphasis mine).

has been hailed internationally as one of the most progressive in the world, and of a history of struggling for universal human rights such as privacy, dignity, gender equality and freedom and speech as much as for liberation from the colonial yoke. Nonetheless, racial tension was and is present in South African society, particularly around equitable redistribution of previously racialised resources such as land, education and employment. In addition, like its neighbours, South Africa's wealth has not flowed from its new government to its desperately poor majority, but to a new black elite. There is a third similarity between South Africa and its neighbours, which Mamdani underscores:

It is precisely because black civil society in South Africa is that much stronger and more tenacious than any to the north that it illustrates dramatically the limitations of an exclusively civil society-based perspective as an anchor for a democratic movement: the urban uprising that unfolded in the wake of Durban 1973 and Soweto 1976 lacked a perspective from which to understand and transcend the interethnic and the urban-rural tensions that would mark its way ahead. (1996: 31)

His point is that post-independence Africa, including South Africa, did not fully democratise; power, and crucially, with it wealth, may have partly deracialised but it did not detribalise, in other words it did not dismantle the despotism set up and entrenched in colonially organised rural ethnic territories. Mamdani points out that the states that tried to detribalise did so through centralising power, something Mbeki has been accused of, particularly by Cosatu. Therefore both forms of despotism (centralism and tribalism), in democratic South Africa at least I would argue, jostle one another in the wings, while further north, according to Mamdani, one form of despotism was simply replaced by another. To summarise the argument made above, there is not the Manichean duality of modern and tribal discourses, civil rights and customary ones; rather there are three intertwined discourses: civil or human rights, customary rights and social justice. Clearly the relationships between the three are complexly interwoven. What follows below and in Chapter Four, therefore, is a closer look at the texture and quality of these three discourses, who they interpellated and the way they operated in the public's responses to Zuma's rape trial, both in relation to each other and in relation to power; in other words whether they work to challenge or to reinforce the status quo.

Human rights, ethnic custom and social justice in South Africa

Viewed through Laclau's lens of populism, Mamdani's 'social justice' discourse, then, constitutes its subjects as 'underdogs' and constitutes whatever power is frustrating their demands as 'the enemy'. In his inaugural lecture at the University of Cape Town (1998), Mamdani elaborates on both the breach between civil rights and social justice in a specifically South African context, and on the nature, or quality, of the ethnic and rights discourses. I deal with the latter first.

Taking the citizen-subject framework outlined above as his point of departure, Mamdani shifts focus to a mutually constitutive dichotomy between settler and native identities in the post-colonial state, making the point that the split is a political one as distinct from a cultural one; that is, the two sets of identities are juridical, defined and entrenched by the state as part of the colonial legacy, or to be more specific, a result of the newly deracialised state's failure to dismantle customary power organised into ethnic pockets:

Natives were said to belong, not to any civic space, but to an ethnic space. The native identity was not defined by where he or she was born or lived, but by his or her ancestral area. That area, in turn, was defined ethnically: you belonged to your ethnic area. You were obliged to follow the customs of your ethnic group. Your rights and obligations were defined by your custom, and that custom was enforced as a 'customary' law, by a Native Authority, whose seat was the local state. The local state spoke the language of culture, not rights. (1998: 1)

'Settlers', in contrast, were by definition rootless and homeless, forever wandering; they had citizens' rights but were without the second set of rights afforded to 'natives' via their ethnic, customary identity; one which was intensely geographical but a geography inextricable from history: your 'real' home was the place your ancestors were buried.

The class question

Mamdani underscores this distinction with the important point that it is poor natives who benefit most from their customary subjectivity because through it they have access to land: 'We need to recognize a class question here... The rich could buy land anywhere. So the poor came to have a better sense of ethnic belonging, of who belonged and who didn't, than did the rich' (1998: 1). Thus an ethnic discourse could on the one hand be

partly responsible for continued poverty after independence by enriching and privileging a new elite, and on the other hand, offer protection to the most vulnerable at a local level.

Mamdani makes a second important distinction between customary rights and civic ones:

Civic rights continued to be defined as individual rights in the civil and political sphere. In contrast, customary rights were defined as a group right, one you accessed by virtue of belonging to an ethnic group. The domain of customary rights was not as much civil and political, as it was cultural and economic. (1998: 1)

In short, we have indigenous subjects, many of them still suffering extreme deprivation as a result of colonialism, which had brought with it a European, liberal discourse of human rights. As a group therefore, they have no historical reason to believe that individual, civil rights, accessible only to an already empowered and educated elite through expensive legal processes and structures, could ever equate with social justice, that is, equitable distribution of resources. On the other hand, the democratic, popularly elected governments which replaced the colonial yoke have generally embraced a neoliberal capitalist discourse encompassing individual rights and, to varying extents, eschewed the customary discourse as a colonial tool or, as in South Africa, uncomfortably tried to accommodate it alongside, but subject to, the civil rights discourse while simultaneously apportioning wealth and power among a select cabal.

Enlarging on the political extent to which a hegemonic neoliberal discourse of individual human rights can silence one of social justice, Neocosmos writes:

If rights discourse contributes to the maintenance of privilege for the privileged ... [t]he whole system ... has the effect of excluding the majority from official state politics on the one hand, while making it difficult if not impossible for them to mobilise politically on the other ... It leads to the complete antithesis of an active citizenship which is the necessary basis of democracy. Citizenship is simply reduced to the possession of state documents which entitle the majority to engage in politics at most once every five years or so. (Neocosmos 2004: 223)

Rephrasing this neoliberal domination in economic terms, Neocosmos suggests that capitalism presents a problem specific to Africa, 'where the social grievances which fuelled the national liberation struggle such as access to land, jobs, greater social equality

among classes, races and genders seem incapable of redress'. The free market system and its attendant individualistic liberalism are, he writes, 'incapable of addressing these issues of social justice' (2004: 224).

Neocosmos, intentionally or otherwise, evokes a classic Marxist class antagonism, that is a powerless underclass and a ruling elite determined to hold on to its privilege. Mangcu speaks succinctly to this antagonism in the context of Zuma and his supporters, writing of the temptation to dismiss those with whom we disagree as 'irrational':

It is a seductiveness deeply rooted in pre-existing stereotypes and anxieties about the masses. Over the years we have created a house of cards talking about how wonderfully inclusive our country has become, pretending that all was well with the natives. And now that the natives are restless, we feign indignation and say they have "issues". You bet they have "issues". You and I and the endangered precious minorities are the "issues" ... we monopolise the privileges of freedom, and insult them as stupid when they tell us so ... We have always known that, in the words of political theorist Ernesto Laclau, "there is in any society a reservoir of raw anti-status quo feelings which crystallise in some symbols (read Jacob Zuma)". (Business Day 28 Sep 06)

Mangcu has identified a middle class and elite horror of unruly mobs associated with an underclass whose demands are not met. In an earlier article Mangcu accuses elements of the media, the voice of the privileged, of fanning this antagonism by 'mobilisation of elite bias':

[journalist Achille Mbembe, writing in *City Press* and *Sunday Times*] builds his argument by appealing to the basest of elite stereotypes, which is a picture of marauding gangs driven more by passion than reason. He paints a picture of Zuma the antimodern, anti-Christ, threatening the cosmopolitan embodiment of modernity, Thabo Mbeki. Through this deployment of historical fiction the individuals and organisations that support Zuma are no longer political agents in a political debate but delusional mobs fitting the description of a millenarian, eschatological movement. (Business Day 8 June 06)

In Chapter Four I investigate whether the *Sowetan* appeals to these 'elite stereotypes' and represents Zuma's supporters as unreasoning 'marauding gangs' and 'delusional mobs'.

Mamdani warns post-apartheid South Africans of the ‘limits to which the non-racial language of rights can be effective... once it has become illegitimate in the eyes of the native majority’:

In native ears, rights-talk increasingly sounded like a defense of settler privilege, and justice a language to articulate native grievance. Part of the lesson of the Uganda Asian experience is that the denial of justice bred a wave of popular discontent, a wave a demagogue rode to power. The story of Idi Amin Dada has been racialized and told over and over again, as that of an anthropological oddity. To be meaningful, it needs to be retold as the story of an unaddressed social grievance that could be harvested by a demagogue. (2005: 8)

Idi Amin, in other words, capitalised on the existing conditions which in Laclau’s terms are necessary for a ‘populist rupture’ – a history of long-frustrated social demands. Laclau has made it clear that a populist discourse expediently deploys whatever other discourses are resonant in the society at the time, including those of the apparently oppositional civil and customary rights, in any combination that makes utopian promises of equitable redistribution seem possible. In this study, we will see in Chapter Four how Zuma supporters call on their constitutional rights in the same breath as invoking their ancestors through traditional rites such as burning *impepho* (incense), how posters inscribed with democratic slogans were juxtaposed with those threatening civil war, how rights-based organisations like Cosatu could condone threats to the life of a woman who challenged a politically and tribally powerful male and how a government proud of its citizens’ right to free speech allowed public protest to become hate speech and incitement to violence. Here is a deeper layer of explanation for the disparity of the groupings unified by their support for Zuma: a Zulu yet high in the structures of a party that has yielded two Xhosa presidents; rich, powerful and urbane yet from a poor, rural and ethnic background, he was constructed as Mbeki’s Other, everything Mbeki is not, and therefore on him was pinned the hope of providing what Mbeki had not – social justice.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have constructed a framework for a critical discourse analysis of some of the South African public’s responses to Zuma’s rape trial as represented by the *Sowetan*.

Grounded in Foucault's conceptualisation of power as circulating at all levels of society, I have outlined the post-structuralist discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe in which interpellation of subjects by discourses that contest for hegemony are key concepts for the understanding of identity construction. This theory contextualises a discussion of populism that functions discursively to construct power along pre-Foucauldian and Marxist lines, or in other words as repressive and concentrated in the state, and as something that needs to be wrested from the state through a popular rupture (Simon 1982: 72). These concepts are then placed in a post-colonial African context with Mamdani's path-breaking identification of civil rights, customary and social justice discourses.

In a survey of post-Marxist work in South Africa, Bertoldi and Van Zyl, discussing Laclau and Mouffe's discourse theory, write: 'post-Marxists aim to identify different discursive conditions for the emergence of collective action. They ask how political identities are constituted, and how relations of oppression are constituted out of relations of subordination' (1998: 36). Bertoldi and Van Zyl add that attempts to apply the work of Laclau and Mouffe to the South African situation have provided 'few, if any, interesting or new insights' (1998: 44).

In a similar survey of post-colonial academia in South Africa, Leroke notes that among the concerns of post-colonialist scholarship are representation, Marxist critique, the power/knowledge relationship and, like post-Marxists, identity formation. However, it is distinguished by its 'fascination with the other' in identity formation; in fact 'It can be said to be the study of otherness' (1998:58-61). I hope, therefore, to make a small contribution to South African post-Marxist and post-colonial research by analysing the articulatory social practices that took place around Zuma's rape trial as the two contesting positions, pro- and anti-Zuma, deployed three discourses of civil rights, ethnic tradition and social justice in their attempts to invalidate and 'Other' one another, vying to invest various nodal points with their own chains of equivalence, variously forming alliances and setting up antagonisms in different combinations.

CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY

Introduction

Certain events occur in social and political worlds that serve as catalysts, bringing to the fore discourses and undercurrents that may otherwise have remained dormant. The Zuma trial and its unprecedented contestation between his supporters and those of the rape complainant outside the courtroom is one such event, and so to examine media texts related to it is in effect both a socio-cultural critique and a form of media analysis.

This study focuses on pictures of protests outside the courtroom and letters to the editor, thus deliberately excluding the news reports and commentary by professional journalists. The rationale behind this focus is to try to isolate the ‘voices’ of the public included in the pages of the *Sowetan*. It also allows for a clearer analysis of how the *Sowetan* has framed these contestations. The analysis takes on a double-pronged task. On the one hand it explores how seemingly contradictory discourses such as ethnic traditionalism, social justice and human rights were operationalised and articulated within the contestations that took place in the public domain. On the other hand, it examines the *Sowetan*’s role in mediating class, tradition/modernity and gender issues for its readers. Thus it is a socio-cultural critique anchored to an analysis of a selected set of texts.

Research question

The research question that drives the study is: ‘How are the ‘voices’ of citizens responding to the Zuma rape trial constructed and mediated in the *Sowetan*?’. To explore this question, I first use thematic content analysis to extract broad themes running through the material (the newspaper’s pictures of the protests outside the courtroom and letters to its editor concerning the trial) before conducting a critical discourse analysis. The study is located within a theoretical framework that identifies three wider discourses of traditional ethnicity, human rights and social justice as informing both the localised contestation between Zuma’s supporters and those of his rape accuser, and the *Sowetan*’s mediation of it.

Content analysis is generally seen as a quantitative method stemming from a positivist, scientific tradition of research although its offspring, thematic content analysis, while yet remaining true to its roots, has a more subjective, interpretive dimension as I explain later in this chapter. It is a form of qualitative content analysis, which has been developed in the past few decades in disciplines such as psychology and anthropology specifically for its ability to explore meanings underlying messages in large aggregates of text (Zhang 2006: 1). Critical discourse analysis, on the other hand, is a qualitative method situated firmly within a critical research paradigm, which has an overtly emancipatory agenda (Smaling 1994: 235; Huckin 1995: 1⁶, Deacon et al. 1999: 13; Morgan 2002: 3). Below I outline some of the theoretical considerations arising from my choice of such a hybrid research design.

Methodological considerations

Three broad paradigms (or in other words, a ‘constellation of beliefs, norms and values that guide scientific research’ (Smaling: 1994: 234)), or frameworks for thinking about human behaviour, are loosely discernible in social science enquiry, namely an empirical, an interpretive and a critical one, and although they are separated by significant philosophical (epistemological, ontological and axiological) differences, this need not imply that they are incompatible (Smaling 1994: 233-237). In fact the lines between them, both epistemologically and methodologically, have become increasingly blurred (Bryman 1984: 75-90; Hardy & Bryman 2004: 547-565; Deacon et al. 1999: 114-5).

Moreover, while quantitative (counting, statistical) research methods were once linked exclusively with the empirical, positivist, scientific paradigm and qualitative methods with the interpretive (while critical researchers used both (Smaling 1994: 241; Deacon et al. 1999: 11)), there is a growing acceptance that research designs that simply apply the most appropriate method for a specific purpose can often bring the strengths of each approach to bear. Pool, for example, asserts: ‘it should not be assumed that qualitative methods are insightful, and quantitative ones merely mechanical methods for checking

⁶ As this is a paper in an unpaginated on-line journal, I use page numbers as established on a downloaded copy.

hypotheses. The relationship is a circular one; each provides new insights on which the other can feed' (1959:192, quoted in Holsti: 1969: 12). Forty years later, Deacon et al. echo this point: 'The use of more than one analytical method has the advantage that the weaknesses of any single method, qualitative or quantitative, are balanced by the strengths of other methods' (1999: 114). Hansen et al. are more specific about these strengths and weaknesses, stating that the weakness of 'positivist' methods like content analysis is their lack of theory while they can bring a 'methodological rigour' otherwise lacking to more qualitative approaches (1998: 91).

Deacon et al. make a useful distinction when they state that what separates interpretive research from positivism is not whether figures are referred to but how they are used: 'Positivists look to statistics to answer research questions. Interpretive researchers see them as a source of questions, a springboard for further investigation and analysis' (1999: 9) and Smaling asserts that choice of method is seldom paradigmatic, that is influenced by a researcher's preferred views of humanity and ideologies alone. Methods are also chosen for pragmatic reasons, including the question of how best to answer the research question (1994: 245). It is these considerations that led to a research design that straddles all three paradigms. Thematic content analysis was seen as the best way of gaining a broad overview of the material and extracting some major themes, because its aim, in Deacon et al.'s words, is to 'produce a 'big picture' by delineating trends and patterns over large aggregates of texts (1999: 117).

Critical discourse analysis has a completely different aim. As implied by the phrase 'emancipatory agenda' used above, its users do not strive, as positivist researchers do, for 'objectivity' through rigorous counts, or for reliability and validity through documenting reproducible experiments. Rather, in Huckin's words, it is a 'highly context-sensitive, democratic approach which takes an ethical stance on social issues with the aim of improving society' (1995:1). There is no pretension to objectivity, then; it is research with an agenda. Huckin explicates this 'ethical stance' as one that:

Draws attention to power imbalances, social inequities, non-democratic practices, and other injustices in hopes of spurring readers to corrective action. This is why

the term critical is used: critical discourse analysis not only describes unfair social/political practices but is explicitly critical of them. (1995: 2)

This study, then, first uses thematic content analysis in order to gain a ‘common-sense, descriptive sweep of content’ (Wilbraham 1995: 2) before turning to a method that, through close textual and semiotic analysis, may help to explicate some of the power imbalances that became apparent during the South African public’s contestations over Jacob Zuma’s rape trial. Below, I discuss first how I conducted the thematic content analysis and second, how I went about the critical discourse analysis.

Methods

Thematic content analysis

Zhang (2006: 1) offers two definitions of qualitative content analysis, namely: ‘[a] research method for the subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns’ (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005:1278) and second, ‘An approach of empirical, methodological[ly] controlled analysis of texts within their context of communication, following content analytic rules and step by step models, without rash quantification’ (Mayring, 2000:5).

The definitions, Zhang points out, emphasise that the method allows researchers to interpret social reality in a ‘subjective but scientific manner ... qualitative content analysis goes beyond merely counting words or extracting objective content from texts to examine themes and patterns that appear or are latent in the manifest content’ (2006: 1).

Similarly, Bryman notes that qualitative content analysis ‘comprises a searching-out of underlying themes in the materials being analyzed’ (2004: 392 in Kohlbacher 2005: 9).

He defines qualitative content analysis as:

An approach to documents that emphasizes the role of the investigator in the construction of the meaning of and in texts. There is an emphasis on allowing categories to emerge out of data and on recognizing the significance for understanding the meaning of the context in which an item being analyzed (and the categories derived from it) appeared. (2004: 542 in Kohlbacher 2005: 9)

What the three definitions have in common is an emphasis on subjective interpretation and an emphasis on seeing the material in its context, both departures from classical content analysis so fundamental that they push thematic content analysis out of the positivist paradigm and into the interpretivist one.

However, the step-by-step scientific rigour of the method is also emphasised, and concomitantly the literature abounds with 'recipes' for conducting a thematic content analysis. Hansen et al. (1998: 98-99) for example, outlines a series of rather inscrutable steps: 1) define the research problem; 2) select media and sample; 3) define analytical categories; 4) construct coding schedule; 5) pilot coding schedule and check reliability; 6) prepare data and analyse. Zhang (2000: 2-5), while skipping Hansen et al.'s first stage and advising a little more comprehensively on the final stages, presents a basically similar schema: 1) Arrange the data; 2) Decide unit of analysis; 3) Develop categories and coding scheme; 4) Test coding on sample; 5) Code all text; 6) Assess coding consistency; 7) Draw conclusions; 8) Report.

Mayring's (2000:12) formula for the crucial 'development of categories and coding' stage is more helpful: 1) Inductive category development; 2) Summarising; 3) Context analysis; 4) Deductive category application. Enlarging on inductive category development, he advises the researcher to be guided by both the theory and the research question, and to develop the first tentative categories deductively before revising them in 'feedback loops' (that presumably correspond with Hansen et al.'s stage 5 and Zhang's stage 4) and that eventually lead to reducing them to main categories. His 'deductive category application' stage is where category definitions and coding rules for inclusion and exclusion are explicated, preferably with examples.

Mayring offers sound advice in another area: while his concern is with preserving the positivist strengths of content analysis such as its replicability (and thus reliability) he also emphasises that the method is flexible and adaptable, and advises that the researcher be guided in this respect primarily by the research question and the nature of the material (2000: 13). Having stated my research question above as well as my aim in conducting

the thematic content analysis then, I therefore structure my discussion according to the following: 1) Sampling and data collection (what Hansen et al. calls ‘media selection and sample’ and Zhang terms ‘arranging data’); 2) category development; and briefly, 3) reliability issues.

- Sampling and data collection

I focus on the *Sowetan*’s coverage of the trial, partly because it is one of only two national daily newspapers in South Africa with an English-literate black target readership, and partly because it is based in Johannesburg, where the trial took place. As mentioned in Chapter One, the *Sowetan* currently has a relatively large average daily readership of 1.6 million. In spite of its tabloid format, it has a history of human rights activism and a middleclass target readership, as opposed to its rival national daily tabloid, *The Sun*’s working class one.

I established the research material through a search of the *Sowetan*’s electronic archives, which as a Johnnic staff member I have access to through the company database. Using the keywords *Zuma* and *rape*, the electronic search yielded about 400 items between 1 January and 21 June 2006 including photographs, cartoons, news, analysis, editorial comment and letters from the public. Considering the scope of this study⁷, it seemed that the sample would be more than adequate, since the keywords would ensure a reasonable level of representivity and the date parameters spanned the crucial period of the study, that is, the full duration of the trial (February 13 to May 8 2006) plus six weeks before and after.

Having narrowed my focus to the public’s response to the trial as discussed above, I then constructed two tables, one of all the pictures of protests outside the court (25 items) and one of all the letters concerning the trial (50 items). I used identifiers such as date, page, headline (or caption and tagline for the pictures). I summarized the main points in the letters, and entered denotative descriptions of pictures. Both tables were marked for direction (pro- or anti-Zuma letters, or in the case of the pictures, representations of pro-

⁷ This mini-thesis fulfills 35% of the Masters degree’s requirements

or anti-Zuma demonstrators). These tables are submitted as Appendices 1 and 2 respectively.

- Category development

Each letter and each picture was treated as a unit of analysis. Immersing myself first in the letters, I began by identifying the issues and concerns that seemed to recur most frequently. These were Mayring's 'first tentative categories', derived directly from the material, or what Piantanida et al. refer to as 'first tier' or substantive codes 'still closely tied to the idiosyncrasies of the situation' (2004:339). As most theorists agree, thematic content analysis has 'fuzzier boundaries' than classical content analysis because each protocol (in this case, letter) can carry many themes (Zhang: 3; Wilbraham: 1). This was indeed the case, as can be seen from the difference between the 'issue' and 'letter' totals in the table below. At one stage, a summarised table of these looked like this:

Issue	ProZuma: 16 letters	AntiZuma: 34 letters	TOTAL LETTERS: 50
Let judge decide	12	9	21
Liberation struggle (social justice)	7	7	14
Succession	4	13	17
Protesters' behaviour	6	16	22
JZ Bad Example			
• During trial		13	
• On night of incident		16	29
Patriarchal position	7		7
Women rights position		16	16
Complainant	5	11	16
Role of media	5	3	8
TOTAL ISSUES: 150	46 issues	104 issues	

Table 1: First tier categories summary: issues in letters to the editor

I emphasise that this was only one stage of the categorising process, which stretched over more than a year; there are many versions of this table. Having coded the letters, the next stage was looking for relationships between issues and trying to see what the pro-Zuma letters had in common as opposed to what the anti-Zuma letters had in common, as well

what the two groups had in common. In other words there was a process of collapsing issues and concerns into broader and broader categories that eventually became four overarching themes, namely gender, succession, supporters' behaviour and the role of the media (See Appendix 4 and Chart 1 in Chapter Four). This process of clustering substantive codes based on related characteristics, described by Piantanida et al. as a 'recursive spiraling between iterative and conceptual interpretation' (2004: 340) is what eventually leads to Mayring's 'main categories'. It is both a humbling and a frustrating process if one has any illusions that positivist 'objectivity' is possible. Be that as it may, these were my final categories:

Theme	Pro-Zuma	Anti-Zuma	TOTAL THEMES:
Gender	9	19	28
Supporters	4	14	18
Succession	3	10	13
Media	5	3	8
THEME TOTAL:			67
<i>Media-Gender</i>	<i>1</i>		<i>1</i>
<i>Media-Succession</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>3</i>
<i>Succession-Gender</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>
<i>Supporters-Gender</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>9</i>
<i>Supporters-Media</i>	<i>1</i>		<i>1</i>

Table 2: Second tier categories summary: themes in letters to the editor

As some letters addressed more than one theme, the second half of the table (in italics) shows letters with mixed themes. Thus for example the twelve instances where gender is discussed together with another theme (one media, two succession, nine supporters) are part of the theme total of twenty-eight for gender in the top half of the table. (As noted above and in Chapter Four, the total refers to themes, while the letter total is 50.) Chart 1 in Chapter Four is therefore sourced only from the top half of this table, although in the critical discourse analysis I look carefully at the way the themes interact with each other.

Another way I tried looking at the material was chronologically, to see if these themes developed and changed over time, and whether letters responded to the news events recorded by the pictures (see Appendix 3 and Chart 2 in Chapter Four). They did, but nonetheless I decided to structure the critical discourse analysis in Chapter Four according to the four themes rather than adopt a chronological approach. The rationale was that, although the public did respond to the events as they unfolded, those responses must necessarily have been informed by values and subjectivities that relate to wider ideological discourses such as the ones of social justice, human rights and ethnic tradition as argued in Chapter Two. These inform the critical discourse analysis of the localised contestation and the strategies deployed by the two camps in their discursive struggle for hegemony.

So far I have discussed the thematic content analysis largely in relation to the letters, and how the identification of the four themes that structure the analysis in Chapter Four is arrived at. Working with the pictures, I used the database less and engaged more with hard copies of the pages. This was because a far more semiotic approach was required; although in one sense I analyse pictures as entities in their own right I also place them in the context of the page in order to see more holistically what messages the *Sowetan* presented. Here I still engaged in constant classification and comparison to allow themes like ‘order/disorder’, ‘diversity in the groupings’ and ‘women displaying ethnic performance’ to emerge, and these also structure a part of Chapter Four.

One major limitation of the semiotic aspect of the analysis is that my copies of the pages were black and white, thus excluding the powerful element of colour. However, analysis of such complexities would have extended this study way beyond its required and hence limited scope.

- Reliability and validity

I must point out that no detailed coding schedule is presented here, because the bulk of the concluding and reporting work (Zhang’s stages 7 and 8) are done through critical discourse analysis, discussed below. However the consistency of the decisions made in

assigning themes to letters (or letters to themes) will hopefully be clear from examining Appendix 2, the table of summarised letters. All the pages with pictures analysed are appended, as well as one letters page which is discussed in terms of page design.

Critical discourse analysis

Critical discourse analysis is a contemporary approach to the study of language and discourses in social institutions. Drawing on poststructuralist discourse theory and critical linguistics, it focuses on how social relations, identity, knowledge and power are constructed through written and spoken texts. (Luke 1997: 50)

The above definition of critical discourse analysis echoes Huckin's assertion referred to earlier in the chapter that critical discourse analysis is concerned primarily with analysing texts of various sorts to expose the dynamics of power relations in the social world. In my analysis, I draw mainly on Laclau & Mouffe (1985) for a theory of discourse. However, as Phillips and Jorgensen point out, because Laclau and Mouffe's aim was theory development, their discourse theory is 'short on specific methodological guidelines and illustrative examples' (2002: 8) and does not include many 'practical tools for textually oriented discourse analysis'. As a result, they advise, 'it can be fruitful to supplement their theory with methods from other approaches to discourse analysis' (2002: 24). Huckin, too, notes that critical discourse analysts differ among themselves in the kinds of tools they employ: '[They] do not all focus on exactly the same kinds of text features ... there is no standardized form of critical discourse analysis methodology' (1995: 5). Having outlined the concepts he uses to teach critical discourse analysis to second-language English students, he cautions:

It is important to emphasize that the concepts just described are meant to be used *selectively*, not exhaustively. Critical discourse analysis is an *approach*, a way of looking at texts, not a rigorously systematic method of analysis ... a critical discourse analyst should use his or her best judgment as to which concepts are most appropriate to an insightful understanding of the text at hand. (2002: 12, emphasis in original)

I therefore synthesised the method I use to conduct the analysis in Chapter Four; one that encompasses my theoretical framework, which is located within the body of post-Marxist and post-colonial African literature, thereby indicating that the study is underpinned by

questions of identity construction, class, gender and other power relations. The three keystones of this framework are, first, concepts from Laclau & Mouffe's (1985) theory of meaning, which assumes a power struggle between contesting discourses seeking to invalidate one another and to either challenge or support existing hegemonies in the way they construct identities through organising chains of meaning around nodal points; second, Laclau's (2005) theorisation of populism, which assumes that diverse groupings can unite under a demagogue's banner and dichotomise the social space in shared antagonism towards existing power, and third, concepts from Mamdani's (1996; 1998) theorisation of power and resistance in Africa, which explicates three overarching ideological discourses of social justice, human rights and traditional ethnic practices.

Huckin⁸ (1995; 2002) advocates four levels, or layers, of increasingly 'microscopic' examination, beginning with the social context, then approaching the text as a whole before examining it sentence by sentence and finally at phrase and word level. At each stage certain concepts, or analytical tools, come into play. The social context layer, or 'higher level' of analysis, involves discursive processes and broader, more general concepts than those used in close textual examination. At the 'whole text' level he examines issues around genre, framing (including visual aids), foregrounding, omission and presupposition. At sentence level he looks at how strategies like transitivity, topicalisation, insinuation, presupposition and deletion work to foreground or background agency (who exerts power). At word and phrase level he examines issues of connotation, register and modality. Below I discuss how certain aspects of these first two levels inform the study, while the second two levels of close textual examination are the subject of Chapter Four.

- Social context level

In Chapter Two I identified three discourses at play in the *Sowetan's* representation of the public's responses to Zuma's rape trial, one extra-judicial and two juridical. These are,

⁸ In introducing these levels Huckin acknowledges Fairclough's (1992) three-dimensional model for conducting a critical discourse analysis, which similarly places the text (first dimension) in the context of its discursive practices of production and interpretation (second dimension) and these in turn in the wide socio-political context of the third dimension.

first, the discourse of struggle for social justice which, with its historical links to African struggles against colonial and apartheid governments, is extra-judicial. According to Laclau's criteria it would rate high on a populist scale since it interpellates as its subjects a frustrated underclass with a range of diverse demands linked only by their subjects' antagonistic relationship with the political power.

Second, we have two juridical or state-defined discourses, although both have extra-judicial undercurrents. First is a neoliberal, individualistic human rights discourse associated on the one hand, paradoxically again with the South African liberation movement (paradoxical since it is (now) juridical, institutionalised, and thus intrinsically inimical to the extra-judicial one described above). The struggle movement placed a range of juridical rights, including gender rights, at the centre of its struggle for justice, and consequently this discourse is strongly linked with the current government, which wrote and enshrined the constitution. Yet on the other hand, according to Mamdani and Neocosmos, the human rights discourse is tainted with retention of privilege, because its individualistic nature links it to the Western legal system which offers little recourse for class- or gender-based historical injustices, or to the poor and ill-educated (Mamdani 1996: 20-21; Neocosmos 2004: 223-4, See Chapter Two).

The second juridical discourse is a customary/traditional/ ethnic discourse, validated by the state and the constitution. It is associated with, on the one hand, patronage and clan loyalties that created a new, post-liberation privileged class and on the other hand, paradoxically can provide security for the poor and vulnerable. Thus while both the juridical discourses can be constituted as institutional, in other words inimical to the 'underdog' subjects of Laclau's populist social justice discourse, they can also both at times be appropriated as the protector of the 'underdog'.

In Chapter Four, I examine how these three discourses were inscribed in various combinations in line with contesting interests. This entails using Laclau & Mouffe's concepts to analyse the articulatory social practices that took place around Zuma's rape trial as the two contesting positions, pro- and anti-Zuma, deployed the three discourses of

social justice, civil rights and ethnic tradition in different combinations to invest various ‘nodal points’ with their own chains of equivalence, in their attempts to invalidate and ‘other’ one another.

- Whole text level

Huckin notes that texts ‘manifest a characteristic set of formal features serving a characteristic purpose’ according to their genre, or ‘text type’ (1995: 6). The texts I consider are letters to the *Sowetan* on the one hand and on the other, the newspaper’s visual representations of the protests outside the court during Zuma’s rape trial, as they record the way people made messages including posters, T-shirts, dress and body performances.

As a genre, letters to the editor are, I argue, part of a neo-liberal, human rights-based discourse that constructs the media as a fourth estate, as a Habermasian public sphere that functions, in the words of James Curran, as a ‘space between government and society in which private individuals exercise ... informal control [over the state] through the pressure of public opinion’ (1997: 122). Thus the leader page, where letters are published, is a forum for reasoned debate, for arguing points and listening to others, even conflicting ones, in the best liberal fashion. As well argued elsewhere (see for example Schudson 2000: 194, and proponents of the political economy school such as Herman & Chomsky 1988), such a view of the press presupposes an informed and literate aggregate of citizens, a public secure in its individual civil rights such as freedom of speech, whose opinions carry weight with the state; in short, a wealthy middle class.

The language of protest as a genre, on the other hand, is always already at odds with the system; by its very nature it speaks from a place of marginalisation to a perceived injustice dished out from an inimical, repressive, top-down power. This is the discourse of Mamdani’s social justice and of Laclau’s populism, where every mass-based public protest is to some degree a ‘populist rupture’ in which ‘underdogs’ demand social justice from a reluctant or ineffectual political dominance. In this study, the genre is presented photographically and the pictures are then anchored by the *Sowetan* through captions.

The protesters are frequently clearly aware of the camera, and consciously enact scenarios before it in order to ensure their statements, whether articulated on posters, in dress, ritual or action, are disseminated via the lens to TV and newspaper audiences. Thus the theatre outside the courtroom becomes a platform for both sets of protesters to articulate their disparate voices and 'demands' in various combinations under the nodal point, or catalyst, of Zuma as his identity, and concomitantly that of his complainant, is contested.

I deal with issues of framing (including visual cues such as page design), foregrounding, omission and presupposition extensively in Chapter Four and Five, and therefore will not enlarge on them here.

CHAPTER FOUR: ANALYSIS

Introduction

In this chapter I begin with an overview of the material based on a rudimentary thematic content analysis. This discussion allows the emergence of four themes. As explained in Chapter Three, I structure the critical discourse analysis that follows according to these themes rather than adopt a chronological approach. This is because, although the public did respond to events as they unfolded, these responses must necessarily have been informed by an existing set of values and subjectivities that have been constructed, as argued in Chapter Two, by prevailing (and contesting) discourses such as the ones of social justice, human rights and ethnic tradition.

What follows then, is a brief chronological overview of the material to show how the themes emerged. To conduct the close critical reading, I then take each theme by turn, discussing first pictures, then anti-Zuma letters and finally pro-Zuma letters in terms of the themes. In conclusion, I draw together the threads that have emerged to look at how the two contesting positions have formed equivalential chains of meaning around the identities of Zuma and his complainant.

Thematic content analysis: Overview of letters and pictures

Of the 50 letters concerning Zuma's rape trial published in the *Sowetan* between January and June 2006, thirty five, or 70 percent, express positions that are critical of him while only fifteen are supportive of him. On the other hand, in the *Sowetan's* visual portrayals of the two sets of opposing supporters outside court, the numerical domination is in the other camp, the pro-Zuma position. Of the 25 pictures, 21 of them, or a full 84 percent, are representations of Zuma's supporters and only four are of the anti-rape and HIV-Aids activists. This may be our first indication of a class division in the public's response to Zuma's rape trial, an observation we will test and monitor throughout this study.

There are no pictures in January. Of the 50 letters, a mere four were written in January

when the selection of the judge was being decided. The split between the contesting pro- and anti-Zuma positions is equal, with two expressing a patriarchal position with regard to women and two criticising Zuma's behaviour. Between 14 and 16 February, the *Sowetan* covered both the preliminary hearing in news stories as well as the scenes outside court through the medium of photographs. Of the six pictures of scenes outside court, only one is of anti-rape activists, while the five of Zuma supporters show them in huge, unruly numbers, often clashing physically with police. Following immediately (17-22 Feb), there is a flurry of ten letters in only six days, and they are concerned exclusively with the behaviour of Zuma's supporters outside the court. Nine condemn it and one defends the stance of Cosatu and the Youth League, two of the groups supporting Zuma.

While the March pictures (thirteen) and letters (fifteen in all) are spread more evenly throughout the month, the distribution between the contesting camps is still skewed, with only two of the thirteen pictures portraying his critics outside court, but about 75 percent of the letters (eleven of the fifteen) critical of Zuma. The pictures of Zuma's supporters continue to show high-energy turmoil while in the letters, his detractors continue to express outrage at these crowd scenes, especially near the beginning of the month. Once the complainant begins leading evidence from 6 to 17 March, however, gender-sensitive criticism of Zuma's behaviour on the night of the encounter becomes a new and powerful theme, running through no less than eight of the eleven letters. An interesting opposition arises between the two camps in their attitude to the trial's outcome on the letters page, with pro-Zuma letters echoing a theme of 'innocent until proved guilty' and 'let the court decide', (though the irony of this stance becomes clear as the chapter unfolds) while the anti-Zuma letters state the view that the outcome of the trial is immaterial as Zuma has already demonstrated he is not presidential material, and express consternation at the way the legal process is playing out from a gender equality perspective.

Zuma's evidence, heard between 3 and 7 April, provided his detailed version of the sexual encounter and his subsequent, now notorious, shower. Yet curiously, although Zuma's extraordinary testimony elicited world-wide press coverage, relatively few


pictures and letters were printed in April – a mere two pictures, both of Zuma supporters, and five letters. Four letters are deeply critical of his sexual conduct and/or adamant that he cannot be president because of it, and one is from a supporter on what becomes a favourite topic of the Zuma camp, namely criticism of the media.

The case was adjourned on 18 April, and then in May another flurry of letters (fifteen) appear, all in the week following the judgment on May 8. What is interesting about these is that almost half, that is, seven of the fifteen, are from Zuma's supporters, the only time supporting letters come anywhere near the anti-Zuma letters numerically. In fact the seven also make up almost half the fifteen Zuma-supporting letters over the six-month period of the study. Many of these May letters carry a notably misogynistic theme, together with expressed satisfaction that 'justice has been done'. There are only four pictures in May, three portraying Zuma supporters and one, anti-rape activists. There are no June pictures and only one letter; this expresses support for Mbeki in the succession race.

In sum, numerically, both letters and pictures peak in March, and letters again in May, corresponding in the first case to both the theatre outside the courtroom and the complainant's testimony, and in the second to the verdict (see Chart 1 below). What is interesting about this chart is the similarity in the trajectories of pictures of Zuma supporters and letters that are critical of him/them, peaking, as noted, in March. This correspondence is explored extensively during the course of this analysis.


Second, four overlapping major themes emerge from the discussion above, each acting as a bone of contention, or nodal point, around which the contesting meanings of the two camps coalesce to construct opposing identities for Zuma and the complainant, who was code-named Kwezi to protect her identity. These four themes can be summed up as follows: the behaviour of the two opposing groups of supporters outside court; gender equality; the presidential succession race; and finally, the role of the media (Chart 2).

Chart 1: Chronological overview of data



Source: Own data (Appendices 1, 2 & 4)

Chart 2: Themes



Source: Own data (Appendices 2 & 4)

It must be emphasised that the graph in Chart 2 above does not indicate the total number of letters but *the number of times a theme appeared* in the group of 50 letters; for example a letter may have been coded for both ‘gender’ and ‘supporters’ and therefore would have been counted twice. No letter was coded for more than two categories.

Theme 1: Representations of protests outside court

Representations of the supporters in the pictures

An examination of how the protesters were visually represented yields three interesting tendencies. First, the *Sowetan* tends to represent the two contesting groups of protesters in terms of order and disorder; Zuma’s supporters tend to appear as wild, out of control and constantly clashing physically with police and/or anti-rape activists, while the dominant representation of the complainant’s supporters shows them as reasonable, orderly and self-controlled, although this, importantly, was not always the case in real life, as we shall see.

A second pattern in the pictures is, in line with Laclau’s populism, the remarkable diversity of the groupings that support Zuma’s cause. They range from Zulu ethnic subjects to western, urban Christian churches, civil society rights groups, various anti-Mbeki lobbies and the unemployed masses as well as a wealthy elite with access to political power, legal representation and the latest technology. Finally, the overwhelming number of women playing active, vigorous roles and enacting ethnic performances while men are largely passive and in the background is noteworthy. I use these observations to structure the discussion below.

a) Order and disorder in the pictures

As touched on above, most of the pictures taken outside the courtroom depict Zuma’s supporters in huge numbers, waving hand-scrawled, mis-spelt placards or engaging vigorously with riot police. The far fewer images of the anti-rape activists, in contrast, are of much smaller groups, posters neatly and professionally printed, usually in orderly, static photographs. In this way the *Sowetan*’s overall representation of the contesting

groups creates the impression of order versus disorder: the anti-rape activists are already well-behaved, in fact personifying the middle-class, literate target market of the *Sowetan*, the ordered citizenry, while Zuma's supporters are disorderly and the police, often foregrounded in the pictures, have to enforce order on them.

- 'Accuser now the accused' (Appendix 5)

The opposition of order and disorder can be illustrated with reference to a double-page spread (29 Mar: 6-7). Here the large, bold, reverse upper case headline on the left page forms the focal point: 'Accuser now the accused'. The headline anchors the meanings of the disparate images below it and to the right, and directs the reader's reading of the collage. On the facing (right hand) page, two pictures are placed next to each other to form a stark contrast. On the right, forming the page lead (or focal point), a neat line of gender activists, all women, stand stock-still about three deep behind a restraining tape, holding posters against their chests or over their heads. The orderliness is not signified only by this stillness, but also in the uniformity of the posters, which are all the same size, and all professionally printed in the same upper-case font. They read: 'Defending women rights'; 'Innocent until found otherwise'⁹; 'Don't distort our rights'; and 'Stop abusing our rights'. Such orderliness is further emphasised by their reflection in a puddle in the foreground, so still that the reversed lettering of the posters is undisturbed.

To the picture's left, in stark contrast, the customary is flagged. A woman in ethnic clothing, turban and beads with her face painted in white ethnic patterns is foregrounded. Her right arm thrusts vigorously towards the camera so that her pointing finger looms into the top left corner and her mouth is open in a shout. She is being physically restrained by a policeman wearing a public-order bib, profiled face impassive, eyes shaded by his cap. Both are looking away from the camera. A high-energy jumble of riot police and posters can be seen in the background. The tagline (a word or two in upper case preceding the caption, and separated from it by a colon) is 'Overheated' and the caption tells us: 'A Jacob Zuma supporter is restrained by police after clashing with sympathisers of the rape complainant'. If the gender activists are represented as ordered,

⁹ Fascinating – for all the world as though it is the complainant who is on trial.

this woman is constructed in binary opposition – she is portrayed as disorderly and needing constraining. However, another connotation must be pointed out: the picture strongly evokes the social justice discourse of the ANC’s struggle days, when police were the enemy, brutally repressing public protests, or Laclau’s ‘populist ruptures’, over long-ignored demands.

By placing these two pictures alongside each other, then, the *Sowetan* signifies/articulates a contrast between order and disorder. The gender activists are represented as self-controlled and law-abiding; personifications of the reasonable, neo-liberal human rights discourse, literate and ordered in their literacies, in fact the face of the *Sowetan*’s target readership. Zuma’s supporters, in binary opposition, are constructed as uncontrollable, chaotic and lawless – and these elements are conflated with tribalistic, primitive elements alien to a suburban, middle-class citizenry.

- ‘Sex bill gets its day today’ (Appendix 6)

In contrast to the picture above, one picture portrays gender activists being reasonably active and dynamic (3 May: 4). In it, three women are foregrounded. Their right arms are raised to the same height and their body stances, open mouths and facial expressions make it clear they are singing a rhythmical, energetic song, perhaps toyi-toying, but nonetheless in control and conscious, their facial expressions open to the viewer. The woman in the centre wears an ‘HIV positive’ T-shirt and the woman on the left, one that reads ‘Solidarity with ♀’. This woman also has a striped kanga wrapped around her waist, a sign of solidarity with the complainant, who was accused of trying to seduce Zuma by wearing one on the night of their sexual encounter. To the right of the picture is a headline: ‘Sex Bill gets its day today’. The subhead is ‘Zuma’s trial could have been different’. A pullquote (a sentence or two lifted out of the text and reproduced in large, bold print to capture the essence of the story) placed in the centre of the two-column story reads: ‘The complainant shouldn’t carry the burden of proof’.

The *Sowetan*, then, has chosen to frame and contextualise the picture – and the rape trial – within the broader context of the disgracefully slow revision of the Sexual Offences

Bill, which, had it been passed before the trial, may have stopped Zuma's legal defence team from discrediting the complainant (and thus the state's case) in order to secure Zuma's acquittal. In this way page design has been used to highlight a particular irony and gender-specific injustice inherent in the trial, and in any adversarial (as opposed to inquisitorial) legal system more generally. Importantly, this seems to provide an explanation for – in other words make reasonable and human – the protest in the picture.

- 'Zuma's Folly' (Appendix 7)

This pattern of representing order and disorder as binary opposites associated with gender lobby groups and Zuma supporters respectively is again apparent on a page published four days earlier (10 Mar: 19), an opinion piece rather than news (its text-heavy nature thus already excluding less literate readers), headlined 'Zuma's Folly'. Other than this large, reverse-caps headline, the picture, placed top right on a right-hand page and framed by text left and below, is the focal point. In it, three posters, hand-scrawled and suggestive of semi-literacy as a result of the immature, unformed script, are foregrounded while the faces of the youths holding them and those of the youths crowded behind them are obscured by hats, the hard shadows of midday sun or the posters themselves. What is interesting is the worm's eye view (low angle shot) chosen by the photographer, which, unlike the frontal stance in the picture discussed above, gives extra prominence to the figures in the foreground and causes them to loom, while the awkward perspective of the buildings in the background indicates the barrel effect of an ultra-wide angle lens. The general impression, then, is of a faceless, dark and rather menacing crowd – in short, Mangcu's 'delusional mob' (see Chapter Two), a picture that succeeds in alienating the viewer from the subjects. The picture's tagline is 'Chanting hate', and the caption, unusually, is overt commentary from the *Sowetan*: 'Claiming to know for sure what the court has yet to learn, Jacob Zuma's supporters demonstrate outside the Joburg high court'. Thus the *Sowetan* has directed the reader to feel critical of Zuma's faceless supporters, constructed here as engaging in hate speech and, in spite of their social status, pre-empting a judge's decision while they are scarcely literate, as their script connotes. However, a closer look reveals that this protest is actually just as static and orderly as the gender activists in 'Accuser now the accused', discussed above; the youths are, in fact,

simply standing still and peacefully holding up their posters.

b) Diverse groupings in the pictures

According to Laclau, the dynamics of populism work to unify disparate and heterogeneous demands and groupings, both by their opposition to the status quo and by the emergence of an ‘empty signifier,’ such as a hero’s name (in this study Zuma or Kwezi), which loses its own specificity as it stands in for the other specific demands. So far, among Zuma’s supporters we have encountered Zulu ethnic women subjects, and poor, barely literate young men subjects in the pictures. In addition, we know that Zuma is supported by the ANC’s Youth League as well as its alliance partners, Cosatu and the SA Communist Party, whose struggle history, nationalist ideology and urban base, one would think, would have caused them to shun the ethnic customary discourse based in rural KwaZulu-Natal. However, Zuma’s supporters hail from many other spaces, equally divergent and sometimes equally contradictory. I touch on only a few of these in the section below.

- ‘Strong Stand’ (Appendix 8)

In this picture (14 Feb: 5) Golden Miles Bhudu, self-appointed life president of the Prisoners’ Organisation for Human Rights (SAPOHR), stands in orange prison garb, chains wrapped around his body, holding a badly hand-scrawled poster that reads: ‘Jacob Zuma was raped’. Thus while his poster misappropriates the human rights discourse to construct Zuma as, presumably, the victim of violations of dignity and privacy, Bhudu’s body performance and dress express other grievances with the political order, such as rape in prisons. Bhudu, then, has seized on Zuma’s case as a platform and used it to air his own cause. I point to only two more pages, both published on the same day, the day of the rape trial verdict, to give a sense of the diversity of Zuma’s appeal.

- ‘Fund Fun’ (Appendix 9)

In this picture-story feature (8 May: 4), the picture shows a huge crowd seated on a grandstand. Two women are foregrounded, standing, arms raised in ‘struggle salute’ fists and faces animated and smiling. They are wearing ‘100% Zuluboy’ T-shirts and tribal

beads. One woman shades her head with cloth printed with the ANC logo. The picture's accompanying story, headlined 'Pre-trial jive', details a huge fundraising concert of mainly *maskandi* (a commercialised Zulu ethnic music genre) held in his honour the day before his verdict, of which his dancing and singing were the highlight, particularly his signature tune, *Awuleth 'umshini wami* (Bring me my machine gun), for a cheering crowd of over ten thousand. We are also told that praise singers compared Zuma to Mandela. The picture's caption, which reads: 'Jacob Zuma's supporters paid R25 each to attend a concert in the Jabulani amphitheatre in Soweto yesterday', flags the low ticket price as an indication of the underclass status of his support base. The picture is interesting not only for the blend of Zulu ethnic chic and ANC struggle history discourses, but in light of the picture discussed below.

- 'Weeping' (Appendix 10)

Page seven of the same issue has a similar picture-story feature as its lead, the two forming the beginning and end respectively of a four-page news feature dedicated entirely to speculation about the verdict. The story, headlined 'Zuma sobs', details a Christian prayer meeting held in support of Zuma in Durban on the Saturday, the day before the *maskandi* festival in Johannesburg. The subhead, alongside it and placed above a close-up picture of a pensive Zuma pushing his spectacles up his nose, presumably wiping a tear away, is: 'Prayer meeting touches a raw nerve'. According to the story he 'broke down' sobbing, moving most of the congregation to sympathetic tears as well. Juxtaposed with the 'Pre-trial jive' feature, this story is another indication of Zuma's ability to play to seemingly contradictory audiences – from an urban, Western, Christian church in KwaZulu-Natal where he wept on one day, to a huge, upbeat festival of ethnic dancing, singing and drumming in Soweto less than twenty-four hours later. In contrast, Kwezi's supporters, while made up of a number of gender lobby organisations, are visually represented as a reasonably homogenous group.

c) Foregrounding of women and customary performance (Appendices 11 and 12)

Already in several of the pictures discussed above we have seen how customary or traditional iconography performed by women is foregrounded in the *Sowetan's* visual

mediation of the court protests. It is a recurrent theme. In one picture a woman in customary regalia is burning a pair of panties with a rapturous expression on her traditionally painted face (4 Apr: 4); in another a woman in a ‘Friends of JZ’ T-shirt – but again with tribal beads – kneels chanting before some smoking *impephu* (incense for purification and connecting with the ancestors in a customary ritual) with a young man at her side whose head is bowed and hands are clasped as though in prayer (16 Mar: 6). In each of these pictures, the faces are obscured or turned away from the camera, or eyes are closed, ‘othering’ customary subjects and alienating the viewer from their rituals.

In contrast, there are no pictures of the complainant’s supporters enacting customary performance or dress; as noted in the discussion of ‘Sex Bill gets its day’ the *Sowetan* generally frames and contextualises their performance to construct it as rational and orderly. What makes the *Sowetan*’s (and those of the media in general) representation of the two opposing camps in such binary oppositions as order and disorder, civilised and primitive, so fascinating is an observation from a journalist colleague who happened to be walking past the court during the trial. He saw a large unruly crowd, chanting, yelling and toyi-toying – and burning a picture of Jacob Zuma¹⁰. I am unaware of any such representations in the press, and the *Sowetan* certainly makes no mention of any such incident, while on the other hand stories, pictures and commentary on Zuma’s supporters burning effigies and pictures of the complainant and Mbeki were prominently featured. We have no way of knowing whether this was only one isolated incident or not, or whether any such incidents were recorded on film or not, or third, whether such putative pictures were rejected in the *Sowetan*’s production processes or not. Nonetheless, the fact that it happened at least once and was not recorded by the media, however ‘innocent’ the omission, is crucial to our understanding of how the two sets of supporters were represented¹¹. I return to this important point in Chapter Five.

¹⁰ Interview with photographer Bazil Raubach, August 2007

¹¹ To quote Berelson: ‘There is considerable opening for the collection of selective evidence ... for overlooking the non-dramatic and focusing upon a few cases which may be quite untypical of the total output ... there is a place for impressionistic observation, depending on the nature of the problem and the content to be analysed (1952: 119).

Representations of the supporters in the letters

The ‘real time’ clash between anti- and pro-Zuma protesters outside court is carried through in the letters, with an overwhelming number criticising Zuma’s supporters on grounds ranging from intimidation to political insurrection. The supporters, in turn, attack gender activists, the media and human rights activists, mostly for violating rights such as freedom of expression. The underlying similarity, then, is the writers’ preoccupation with human rights, a theme already hinted at in many of the posters described above. This observation applies just as much to Zuma’s supporters as his detractors; in fact it appears in no fewer than twenty of the fifty letters, ten from each camp.

- Anti-Zuma letters

The criticism levelled against Zuma’s supporters, abundant in February and March as noted above, constructs them much as the *Sowetan*’s pictures do: as an out-of-control, ‘delusional mob’ who ‘insult[...] all rape victims and their families’ (17 Feb: 16) and manipulate the judicial process: ‘The same people who supported the principle of innocent until proven guilty are seen hurling insults and throwing stones ... we do not yet know who is wrong here ... everyone else should stand on the sidelines and wait for the outcome ... and the worst thing is to pick and choose presiding judges for the trial’ (17 Feb: 16). Again they are accused of pre-empting the judge’s decision: ‘People like [ANCYL leader] Fikile Mbalula ... dancing in the streets proclaiming the former deputy president innocent, even before the case has begun ... proclaiming the alleged victim to be a liar and this even before a court of law makes a finding’ (20 Feb: 12). The support by Cosatu and the ANCYL for Zuma is constructed as ‘misleading and dangerous’ and they are cautioned against being ‘used as political pawns’ (17 Feb: 16), a reference to the succession race.

Zuma is censured for both his personal conduct and that of his supporters. He, ‘the alleged rapist’ (we are reminded), is seemingly callous for he is reprimanded for ‘dancing and enjoying himself while the alleged victim has to cover her head to protect her identity’ (17 Feb: 16). Then he is sharply criticised as a weak leader for his ‘seeming lack of control’ over his supporters when they destroy ‘Mbeki’ T-shirts, ‘sing insulting songs

about the judiciary’ and ‘intimidate the complainant’ (20 Feb: 12).

Zuma is also frequently criticised for appropriating his liberation credentials – in other words a social justice discourse – to serve his own purpose, in particular, for his use of the above-mentioned liberation struggle song *Awuleth ’umshini wami*, which became his signature tune during the course of this trial. In at least two letters, the song is seen as a sinister threat to democracy: ‘Zuma and his supporters [should] stop intimidating the judges, the complainant, her supporters and the nation as a whole and ... desist from making threats of civil war if the judgment ... does not favour them (22 Feb: 12) and: ‘Is he strategically passing a subtle message to his followers to get their machine guns and prepare for war?’ (17 Feb: 16). The same letter accuses ANCYL president Mbalula of ‘behaving like a freedom fighter campaigning an unjust cause’. This places the social justice discourse in opposition to the rights discourse, which is linked with democracy. In another reference to the liberation struggle (this time linking social justice *with* human rights), a woman writes: ‘As a black woman who contributed to the struggle ... it is understandable why the current generation of the ANCYL would find this disturbing exhibitionism acceptable but it is difficult to see how Zuma could let it pass ... having served under Oliver Tambo’s leadership, he cannot be blind to the frightening effect of what is happening outside court’ (10 Mar: 18).

The criticism of his supporters is frequently extended to concerns about gender justice, a theme we explore more fully in the section below. Often, Kwezi seems to personify a universal rape complainant, as when one woman asks: ‘What message will his supporters’ ugly intimidation send to the nation? Are they saying that any woman who dares to speak out against abuse will be intimidated? ... I have yet to hear or see Zuma or his lawyers condemn his supporters’ actions’ (10 Mar: 18).

We have seen how the two discourses of social justice and human rights often merge in these letters; a significant number of them (five) express the view that Zuma and his supporters discredit the liberation struggle by their behaviour or, to put this in the terms of the analytical framework, they draw on a social justice discourse whose value system

is extra-judicial (and thus independent of current political institutions) for their critique. In line with this, as touched on elsewhere, many letters criticising Zuma are unconvinced that the complainant is getting or will get fair treatment from the legal system, a point I discuss further in Chapter Five.

Yet, as we shall see below, both camps draw on the human rights discourse to invalidate each other's position and place each other's behaviour beyond the bounds of decency: they accuse each other of pre-empting the court's decision and ignoring the 'innocent until proved guilty' dictum (correctly so, they both do this), of trying to intimidate a range of parties and of violating a range of constitutional rights. In fact, as noted above, this strategy is deployed in no fewer than twenty of the fifty letters, ten from each camp. It is worth pointing out that Zuma's detractors do it more often near the beginning of the trial while his supporters use it more and more confidently as the trial progresses.

- Pro-Zuma letters

Even if Zuma's supporters wrote fewer letters to the *Sowetan* they are proportionately just as vocal in condemning the anti-rape activists that support the complainant outside the court. The activists are constructed as being hostile to men: 'Are South African women's organisations callous? ... The latest victim of their bitter war against males ...' (5 Jan: 12) and of violating Zuma's right to a fair trial: 'What does Powa's¹² presence say about the rights of a person who is innocent until proven guilty?' (15 Mar: 14). However, ironically, Zuma's (and their own) behaviour is simultaneously defended under the right to freedom of expression while the women's groups are accused of being undemocratic and intimidatory: 'Zuma's critics are hypocritical ... Let our people express their feelings and let the court process the case ... this is a democracy and people must not be intimidated by contempt of court claims' (22 Feb: 12).

After the trial the complainant's supporters are constructed within stereotypical patriarchal frames as shameful, noisy, irrational and in need of discipline from an adult:

¹² One of the most vocal and visible groups supporting the complainant outside the court is called Powa, an acronym for People Opposing Women Abuse.

‘Organisations that supported Zuma’s accuser should feel ashamed of themselves. It seems they only make a lot of noise and don’t educate women about abuse’ (11 May: 12) and ‘All the pressure groups labelled Zuma a rapist before the trial even started ... but justice has finally been done (10 May: 14). Thus the ‘demands’ (in Laclau’s terms) of women’s organisations to recognise the crisis of rape and the injustices inherent in the systems that deal with both victims and perpetrators is constituted as ‘other’ and their demands are dismissed as a ‘war’ against men. Already, then, a gender theme is emerging. I examine this in more detail in the next section.

To sum up the findings in this section, the two camps accuse each other of undermining democracy, jeopardising the fairness of the trial and violating each other’s constitutional rights, in the process exposing and further polarising gender divisions. Meanwhile I have pointed to a class dimension in the *Sowetan*’s visual mediations that on the one hand echoes the criticism of Zuma’s supporters on the letters pages, and on the other hand, tend to construct Zuma’s supporters as an irrational, savage mob, placing gender activists in binary opposition as well-behaved, law-abiding, rational, middleclass citizens.

Theme 2: Representations of gender justice

In the pictures, Zuma’s supporters tend to obfuscate and silence any question of gender injustice under their overriding construction of a conspiracy to discredit Zuma and thus prevent him from taking over the presidency from Mbeki. In contrast, gender power relations are a central concern in the letters. The dominant theme from his critics is that the behaviour of both Zuma and his supporters in this regard disqualifies him as a presidential candidate whether he is convicted of the rape or not. Letters from the pro-Zuma camp in this regard reveal a deeply patriarchal and often misogynistic stance.

Gender justice in the pictures

- ‘Zuma’s Folly’ (Appendix 7)

I demonstrate how Zuma’s supporters swamp gender issues with the succession question by returning to the picture of three youths holding up posters discussed above in the section on the protesters, *Zuma’s Folly*. The central poster, the focal point of the image,

asks: ‘How much did they pay you *nondidwa*’. There is no question mark at the end, turning the question into a statement of fact, an accusation that ‘Nondidwa’ (isiXhosa for slut/whore) was paid. The existence of an anti-Zuma lobby ‘they’ is taken as certainty and all possibility of there actually having been a rape is swept aside, rendered unthinkable, out of the question, through the construction of the rape complainant as a tramp, a liar and a tool of conspirators who would pay a woman to invent the accusation. The poster concomitantly declares its belief in Zuma’s innocence.

The poster to the right of this reads: ‘Zuma for president 2009 if Madiba did it why not JZ’. With these words Zuma as a potential leader (president) is elevated to Nelson Mandela’s iconic status of both hero and martyr in the struggle for liberation; the present government is conflated with the brutal, oppressive apartheid regime which subverted the legal system to silence those who worked for social justice, thus symbolically linking Zuma’s rape trial with the Rivonia trial. This functions to highlight Zuma’s liberation struggle credentials, to discredit the current legal system and construct it as the enemy of both social justice and human rights, and finally, to once again proclaim Zuma’s innocence, no matter what the trial’s outcome.

To the left, the third poster reads: ‘The leadership of this country especially the presidency is not a certain tribe thing. Zuma for president 2009’. This poster alludes to an ethnic contestation between Zulu and Xhosa people, introducing an element of ethnic tension present in Zuma’s supporters’ conspiracy theory and their construction of a Xhosa cabal intent on keeping a Zulu from becoming president.

Together, the three posters present a classic picture of Laclau’s populism at work: power is constructed as top-down and repressive, working to frustrate the legitimate demands of the powerless, while the demands themselves, homogenised to their limit through chains of equivalence, are represented by the empty signifier of their leader and hero’s name, Zuma. With this focus on the succession, the fact that this is a rape trial is dismissed and invalidated as a ploy and the complainant is rendered bad, mad, outside reason, a perjuring tool of the sinister power. Importantly, with the social space so dichotomised,

leaving room for only two camps (the inimical power and the underdog) gender justice demands, personified by the complainant, have been linked with the repressive power through this same equivalential logic.

- ‘Campaign trail’ (Appendix 13)

Another poster stands out when considering the tangled threads of gender and succession: unusually for Zuma’s supporters it is professionally printed and equally unusually, it is held by a man. It reads: ‘Cosatu says Phumzile won’t be president’ (22 May: 13). The poster is a direct response to Thabo Mbeki’s announcement that he thought South Africa was ready for a woman president (the announcement was reported in the *Sowetan* (8 May: 4) headlined ‘Mbeki’s timing raises gender issue for Cosatu’). The poster refers to Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, who not only replaced Zuma as the country’s deputy president when he was fired by Mbeki after the rape accusation, but is married to former Scorpion head Bulelani Ngcuka, who led the fraud investigation of Zuma and his financial adviser Shabir Shaik, and who called the country’s newspaper editors together to tell them there was a *prima facie* case against Zuma but that charges would not be laid. It is thus an oblique restatement of the conspiracy theory, as Mbeki never named a particular woman in his announcement. Like the three posters in ‘Zuma’s Folly’, this poster obscures its patriarchal resistance to female leadership behind an adamant statement of resistance to Mbeki’s perceived attempt to name his successor, a point I pick up again in the following section discussing the letters.

Gender justice in the letters

- Anti-Zuma letters

Zuma is frequently othered for patriarchal and abusive behaviour, and condemned as a hypocrite and for setting a poor example to his followers, particularly in the context of his leadership position in the HIV/Aids pandemic at the time. The sexual encounter is not framed as rape but its gendered dimensions are foregrounded as immorality: ‘A man of Jacob Zuma’s stature ... especially when the complainant happens to be the daughter of a friend of his, an Aids activist and half the man’s age. Not so long ago Zuma led our moral regeneration campaign, so quite apart from whether or not it was rape, what was the man

thinking? (15 Mar: 14). As a ‘public figure ... adultery sets a bad example to the youth’ (13 Mar: 12); ‘He should not have slept with that woman without using a condom ... he gave a speech in 2004 about how we should all be responsible about HIV-Aids’ (14 Mar: 12) and ‘At his age, in his position, his behaviour is disgusting’ (10 Apr: 12).

Considering the nature of the accusation it is unsurprising that much of the criticism levelled against Zuma in the letters relates to the inequality of gendered relations, both during the actual trial and outside. In other words, the responses are often located firmly within a social justice discourse, expressing anger at what anti-rape activists identify as social myths that naturalise violence against women even within a neo-liberal, Western human rights discourse, such as that what a woman wears and her previous sexual history have relevance for subsequent sexual violence: ‘I would not be surprised if the rate at which rape victims report their violations drops dramatically. Who wants her past sexual activities to be publicised and scrutinised? ... wearing a miniskirt will now be used against a woman who is raped’ (22 Mar: 12). The way the trial was conducted and the chances of justice for women from the legal system became a matter of critical concern for some writers: ‘How do you successfully interrogate someone about a sexual incident that happened when she was only five? ... The woman will be interrogated by the defence lawyer until Zuma wins the case, but I still think he was evil to her’ (15 Mar: 14) and ‘He [Zuma] failed to show support for female emancipation when he allowed his lawyers to try to discredit the alleged victim’s previous abuse’ (31 Mar: 18).

Thus for Zuma’s critics, the trial helped to crystallise and publicise perceptions of the failure of the rights discourse and its legal system to defend the vulnerable; importantly, the letter writers have deployed a social justice discourse to construct women as outside of the protection of the rights discourse – in short, as Laclau’s ‘underdog’, a strategy in collision with the one described above, where gender equality is linked with ruling hegemonies. But in addition, Zuma is criticised for placing social justice in opposition to gender justice when he conflates the African liberation struggle with his present troubles: ‘His insensitivity in singing *Awuleth’umshini wam* at a rape trial, with all its phallic symbolism for me as a black woman is mind blowing’ (17 Feb: 16).

- Pro-Zuma letters

When it comes to gender relations a set of responses recurs in Zuma's supporters that is deeply conservative of traditional patriarchy, in effect a backlash against any strides made in relation to juridical gender equality under Mbeki. The attacks incorporate those in the ANC who have been supportive of shifting gender inequalities, men are constructed as Laclaudian 'underdogs' and the present leadership is constructed as the enemy – once again, as in the mass protests, subsuming gender justice under the succession race. In a particularly bitter letter one man uses both the customary and the social justice discourses to construct men as 'underdogs' in Thabo Mbeki's reign: 'He has given women and children more choice than men ... there are many divorces because of equality ... During apartheid the black man was not free. Under Mbeki's regime the black man is in a worse position' (5 Jan: 12). In another letter, attacking gender activists for 'try[ing] to convince us that the complainant was raped', the human rights discourse is deployed to construct Zuma as a victim and a martyr, just as Golden Miles Bhudu did in his poster: 'Why is the abuse of Zuma's dignity being ignored? The claim by the woman has also revealed his sexual escapades, which are a private matter ... Having sex without a condom is not a crime' (31 Mar: 18). Considering that Zuma's sexual history was never probed and the complainant's was, this concern with the man's right to privacy is somewhat ironic.

After the judgment, the human rights discourse is again misappropriated to express outrage that traditional patriarchy has been challenged. 'It is sad to see that many African women do not understand what rape and abuse is ... do human rights only refer to women? What about poor men who are emotionally abused every day? Everything that a man does nowadays is wrong' (11 May: 12). Then, convicted criminals are exonerated and future violence against women is condoned on the grounds that the convicts are victims of women: 'I can imagine thousands of men who are serving sentences for rape and abuse, which they did not commit. What would happen when they come out of jail? They will be angry ... women who falsely accuse men should be jailed for perjury ... Women must realise that we are raising a generation that has fathers who have been

jailed for nothing ... Zuma's win was not only for him, but for all men' (12 May: 18). The political pain evident in this letter indicates that once again the social justice discourse linked to the struggle history has tangled with customary values built into the patriarchal system.

Thus for his supporters Zuma's trial provides a virtual meeting point, or nodal point, where dissatisfaction with challenges to conservative and traditional patriarchy are articulated in chains of meaning with a misappropriated human rights discourse, working to construct women first as misguided for not knowing whether they have been raped or not, and then sinister, accusing perjurers who have robbed thousands of children of their male role models. Concomitantly Zuma, constructed as a martyr and a victim, personifies the victimhood of all men, and his acquittal symbolically vindicates the construction of women (and Mbeki for supporting their demand for equality) as the inimical other.

Theme 3: Representations of the succession race

As we have seen, Zuma's supporters are vociferous about his succession to the presidency in their mass protests outside court. This makes it all the more curious then, that they are all but silent on the issue in their letters. In fact, only three of the sixteen letters concerning the succession race come from the pro-Zuma camp – and all three make the point that the presidency is not up for discussion, using two discursive strategies, which I discuss shortly. In contrast, the remaining thirteen letters are adamant that Zuma cannot be president after what the trial has revealed of his personal life, no matter what the trial's outcome. No pictures of gender activists outside court make any reference to the succession debate.

Succession in the pictures

- 'Viva JZ' (Appendix 14)

In the preceding sections I have already shown how Zuma's supporters submerge the gender justice protest to focus adamantly on the succession race in their posters, while the *Sowetan* constructs their protests as irrational and alien to its urban, middleclass readers through conflating the disorderly with ethnic performance. These points having been

made, I turn to only one more picture (7 April: 6), which both underlines these two points and unpacks the conspiracy theory mentioned above. In it there is once again a woman in customary regalia and face paint, signifying that she is, in the Foucauldian sense, a willing ethnic subject. She holds up and points to a battered piece of packing-box cardboard covered closely with hand-printed script, so crudely written as to be barely legible. Her eyes are closed and the paint renders her face mask-like, impenetrable, and thus impossible to identify with. The poster reads:

‘1. Where is Chris Hani? Assassinated before he succeeded Mandela. 2. Where is Ramaphosa? Forced to jet out of xx to consider business. 3. Where is Mathews Phosa? Stepped out of the race to follow business. 4. Where is Tokyo? Pushed to follow business. Next to poor comrade Zuma - they regard as illiteracy and pushed to courts because you wouldn’t accommodate business but president – they decided to take you to court for nothing. Viva JZ viva!’

The poster’s litany of struggle heroes, here constructed as having been in one way or another ‘pushed out’ of line for the presidency, sets Zuma up as the next target to be demolished, this time through the courts, presumably so that the unnamed ‘they’ (Mbeki) can stay in power. This reasonably sophisticated political account, so out of congruity with its tattered format and ethnically decked out proponent, succinctly summarises the conspiracy theory that contextualised the rape trial and constructed the rape complainant as a political pawn, while the dress performance again reminds us of the ethnic tensions alleged to be present in the succession race.

Succession in the letters

Zuma’s detractors’ theme that his behaviour precludes him from becoming president is constant throughout the trial, evoking Habermas’ ‘public sphere’ where the press functions as a ‘space between government and society in which private individuals exercise ... informal control [over the state] through the pressure of public opinion’ (Curran 1997: 122). His supporters, however, without ever saying why they think Zuma should be president, are inscrutable on the succession issue and launch vitriolic personal attacks on anyone who criticises him.

- Anti-Zuma letters

Zuma is scorned as a hypocrite who is untrustworthy, lacks integrity and dignity, has shamed the country and no longer deserves to be a leader because of his sexual irresponsibility: ‘Zuma’s ambition of becoming president in 2009 is a pipe dream ... the outcome of his two trials is immaterial ... Msholozzi has dug his own grave and we must wait by it to make sure he sleeps in it’ (17 Mar: 16) and, published on the same page: ‘even if he is acquitted he can never be entrusted with the leadership of South Africa ... we need a person who commands respect and has integrity’ (17 Mar: 16).

The conspiracy theory is scoffed at and invalidated, and Zuma is constructed as a buffoon: ‘If there were a conspiracy... then his alleged detractors seem to know him well ... once the right environment was set up he would do the rest himself’ (5 Apr: 12) and ‘If indeed he is being politically victimised and crucified, then the conspirators ... are damn good ... this might be his end masterminded by himself’ (6 Apr: 12). Several letters from erstwhile supporters express how he has disappointed them: ‘He has passed from the political elite to being an ordinary, shameful individual airing his dirty laundry ... this marks his end in political power (6 Apr: 12).

After his shower revelation, reported on April 6, this theme intensifies: ‘I am ashamed of his controversial views ... he misled us because we did not know his beliefs ... he is guilty of not practising what he preached ... Zuma has let the country down, irrespective of whether he is guilty of rape’ (10 Apr: 12) and on the same page: ‘Did he think about the pain and humiliation to people who respect him?’ (10 Apr: 12). After the judgement: ‘Jacob Zuma must just resign from politics because he has lost his dignity, if he ever had any. Sleeping with an HIV-positive person without protection does not say much about the morals of the person who is supposed to be the father of the nation’ (10 May: 14).

- Pro-Zuma letters

As mentioned above, there are two discursive strategies at play in the three pro-Zuma letters that mention the presidency. One is to discredit his critics, and the second is to silence the debate by rendering it ‘out of place’. Two letters respond to doubts about

Zuma's capacity to lead the country expressed in the *Sowetan*, singling out its freelance columnist Justice Malala, an outspoken critic, for personal attacks before deferring to party structures to invalidate any debate on who should succeed President Mbeki: 'Justice Malala's column on Monday has become an irritating mantra. The man has been so consumed by ANC deputy president Jacob Zuma's case that he has been unable to write about anything else ... The ANC has its own policies and the machinery of succession is in place' (23 Mar: 12) and again: 'If the views of your columnist Justice Malala ... are to be believed the [ANC] would have been history by now ... Fortunately the ANC is blessed with tried and tested procedures and structures. It will ... deliver the correct candidates to lead the organisation and the country' (6 Apr: 12).

Thus the ANC is constructed as having processes that protect itself from poor judgement, and the journalist's commentary is othered, delegitimised and placed outside its inscrutable fortress. (I return to the Zuma camp's treatment of the journalist below in discussing the role of the media.)

The third letter, while also deferring to party structures, is openly patriarchal, providing a patronising view of women as lacking and needing protection like children: 'I was flabbergasted when President Thabo Mbeki told the nation that South Africa was ready for a woman president. Decisions in the ANC are not taken by individuals. They are debated within all structures of the party ... women were previously disadvantaged and they need empowerment in terms of skills so that when they are in power they are not placed in jeopardy' (12 May: 18). Women are thus constituted as incapable and vulnerable, although to what danger we are not told, and although black men have a similar history of disadvantage and disempowerment.

What is interesting about these three letters is that they all try to invalidate individual opinions with reference to a collective identity; it is the party structures that decide, not individuals like Mbeki or Malala. The discourse of individual, universal human rights (such as freedom of expression) is thus disallowed, rendered illicit, impertinent and worthless, thus invalidating any debate on the country's next president. Mamdani (1998:

1, see Chapter Two) points out that this distinction between individual and group rights corresponds to the chasm between civil rights and customary or ethnic ones. In the above letters, however, we see that this customary (patriarchal) discourse has fused with the social justice one that calls on the ANC's 'tried and tested' liberation struggle history for authority.

Yet the rights discourse is also deployed to construct all criticism as 'out of place'. Malala, it is proposed (23 Mar: 12), also has no legal right to voice an opinion while the trial is in progress (although, as we saw in the section discussing pro-Zuma letters on the protests outside court, Zuma's supporters demand the right to freedom of expression for themselves): 'Maybe he needs to be advised that the rape case is under the authority of the judge and is sub judice'. Only certain groups, then, may legitimately express only certain opinions.

Theme 4: Role of the media

There are no pictures that refer to the role of the media. However, as we saw above and will see again in the section below, Zuma's supporters construct the media as part of the conspiracy against him. Five of the eight letters discussing this theme are from Zuma's supporters.

- Anti-Zuma letters

Two letters critical of Zuma in January respond to an article written by Zuma himself that was published in the *Sowetan* (19 Jan: 15) in which he cites 'six lessons' that South Africa as a 'young democracy' should note. One of these two letters (23 Jan: 12) criticises Zuma for 'lashing out at the media' in his article. It deploys a liberal, civil rights-based discourse that encompasses a view of the media as the fourth estate and argues that the media have a 'moral responsibility' to 'report whatever is relevant and important', as citizens 'deserve to know everything, especially about a person who might be our next president'.

The second letter, published on the same page, expresses support for Zuma's 'legitimate fight' but is critical of the 'amateurish' use made of the electronic medium by some of his supporters: 'Worryingly he [Zuma] is silent on the insults [to Thabo Mbeki] that are flying around on the Friends of Jacob Zuma website ... the continuation of these insults only helps to undermine his noble cause'. While the scope of this paper does not extend to discussing the role of the electronic media, it is interesting that a medium at present accessible to only the wealthy elite in South Africa was chosen by Zuma's supporters, in light of the simple, rural, man-of-the-people identity he has constructed¹³ (for example, note the reference to 'the masses' in the last letter in the section below).

- Pro-Zuma letters

The commentator most discussed by *Sowetan* readers is, as we saw above, its freelance columnist Justice Malala. Several letters construct Malala's critiques as spiteful, ignorant, manipulative and deleterious: 'Malala caricatures items to spread dirt on the character of Zuma ... blaming the ANCYL for supporting Zuma instead of his accuser by virtue of her being in an age group of the constituency it represents equals blackmail. It fits a pattern of intolerance and an arrogant assumption ... Put simply, Malala has the wrong end of the stick' (23 Mar: 12). After the trial is over, Malala's critique is delegitimised through the same strategy of ascribing mischievous motives to him when he is accused of 'waging a systematic campaign to write off leaders such as Zuma and Motlanthe' and of 'sucking opinions from the thumb': 'Those who think like Malala are up to mischief. They want to impose the candidates they prefer on the party' (6 Apr: 12). Malala, then, is part of the 'conspiracy'.

Other letters also appear to frame any criticism of Zuma or his supporters as part of the conspiracy. In contrast to praising the media for its fourth estate role, one letter (31 Mar: 18) constructs the media as 'irresponsible' for allowing 'pressure groups' and 'gender

¹³ In Raymond Suttner's words: 'I saw him respond to his dismissal as Deputy President through demagogic interventions, depicting himself – with SACP and Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) complicity – as a people's leader, with some ambiguity that suggested he would be sympathetic to socialism. I knew that such imagery contradicted his own record not only in government, but since 1990, (when he abandoned his membership of the SACP of which he had been a Central Committee member). (2007: 4)


activists' the space to 'ensure that the accuser's version is accepted without question' and 'analysts [the space to] convict Zuma in the court of public opinion'. In another (22 Feb: 12), internationally renowned human rights advocate George Bizos is attacked for criticising the theatre outside the courtroom. The writer states: 'In any conflict, hypocrites hide behind claims of objectivity while taking sides. This is what many commentators have done. They have lambasted the masses for doing what they believe is right'. The media, human rights lawyers and gender lobby groups are thus discursively linked through Laclau's equivalential logic; they are thrown together into the 'enemy' camp and constructed as allies, or even co-conspirators, in a campaign to punish Zuma and his 'underdog' masses who know what is right. I discuss these two letters in more detail in Chapter Five.

To sum up the tangled threads of the above two themes, the letters page is embraced by the anti-Zuma camp as a 'public forum' to debate the presidency but utterly rejected by his supporters in favour of protest media such as posters and T-shirts.

Conclusion


We have seen in this chapter how the Jacob Zuma rape trial became, in Laclau's sense, a nodal point for two populist fronts outside the court, each with a set of unaddressed social grievances or 'demands'. Below I have represented graphically how these two antagonistic chains of meaning invested Zuma and the complainant with oppositional identities. On the one hand, a number of gender lobby groups used the trial as a platform to air 'demands' (or equivalentially linked chains of significance) such as patriarchal domination, gender-based violence, HIV-Aids and gender injustices inherent in the legal system. Gathering under the banner of 'Kwezi', they constructed her as the 'underdog' victim of all of these (and thus she personified all victims of sexual assault) as well as being the personal victim of Zuma:

Chart 3: Anti-Zuma position's chains of meaning



Meanwhile a more disparate set of groups gathered in huge numbers, with concerns ranging from prisoners' and workers' rights to ethnic pride; from poverty and unemployment to disgruntlement with Mbeki's leadership style, none of which had anything to do with rape *per se*. These groupings coalesced under Zuma's banner, constructing him as a personal victim of the complainant and the wider victim of a conspiracy to displace him:

Chart 4: Pro-Zuma position's chains of meaning



Thus, although the two, each with their hero/victims personifying a different kind of underdog, were at one in the sense that their sets of grievances were both with established political systems, or top-down repressive power, they also constructed each other as the enemy. For the gender activists, Zuma personified patriarchal domination rooted partly in ethnic cultural traditions, while for the Zuma camp the complainant came to personify the hated Mbeki regime, not only because for them she represented a deep-seated plot that encompassed this trial, his fraud investigation and the 'e-mail hoax saga', but also because, as we saw in the section discussing Zuma's supporters' letters on gender, she personified the threat posed to established male dominance by gender equality, which Mbeki supported.

The theatre outside court, then, closely resembled Laclau's 'populist rupture', including frequent clashes between the groups or with police, and 'demands' expressed through other body performances such as burning effigies of the constructed enemies. In Mamdani's terms this is the language of social justice, whereby in Africa's history, independence was won with the force of numbers. On this front, then, gender justice appears to have lost the battle; it was swamped and almost silenced by the sheer force of numbers that framed the trial within succession and conspiracy narratives.

However, the collision between the discourses was examined on a second front: in the 'public forum' of letters to the editor the polarised positions waged the same war to try and fix meanings in particular ways and thus exclude all other meaning potentials. The *impasse* can be summed up in terms of the four themes as follows: (1) Because of the *gender*-related behaviour of Zuma and his *supporters* he can never *succeed* Mbeki as president and we have the right to express this view through any *medium*. (2) There is nothing wrong with *our behaviour* or Zuma's and any demand through any *medium* for *gender* equality is part of the plot to prevent his *succession*. In line with the reasoned, neoliberal, human rights-based nature of this platform the physical violence was absent; a second difference between the two platforms is that the force of numbers went the other way. However, it remains to be seen whether gender justice emerged – or will ever emerge – the winner.

In Chapter Five I scrutinise three more letters in order to unpack the class and gender faultlines along which the camps appear to have split, and to probe one more instance of the *Sowetan's* active mediation in these divisions.

CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION

Introduction

In the introduction to this study I stated that the aim of the project was to examine the *Sowetan's* mediation of the contesting 'voices' of citizens as they responded to the Jacob Zuma rape trial. To carry out this study I proposed to conduct a critical discourse analysis, focusing on protests outside the courtroom and letters to the editor. The analysis, guided by a thematic content analysis of the material, thus took on a double-pronged task. On the one hand I proposed to explore how seemingly contradictory discourses such as ethnic traditionalism, social justice and human rights were operationalised and articulated within two sets of responses, those pro- and those anti-Zuma. On the other hand, I wanted to examine the *Sowetan's* role in mediating these responses for its readers. To this end – or these ends – I chose an eclectic approach which encompassed and knitted together several theories of power and meaning.

In Chapter Two I outlined these various theories to create a framework of analytical tools based on Laclau and Mouffe's (1985) theory of meaning (with emphasis on their conceptualisation of discourses as struggling for hegemony through the appropriation of nodal points, which in turn organise discourse through chains of equivalence). This set up the critical discourse analysis of the contesting pro- and anti-Zuma positions as creating antagonistic chains of meaning around the identities of Zuma and his complainant. Laclau's (2005) analysis of populism, which flows from Laclau and Mouffe's theory, also informed the analysis in Chapter Four, while it was from Mamdani's theorisation of power and resistance in post-colonial Africa that I drew out the three above-mentioned discourses of ethnic traditionalism, social justice and human rights and identified them as being at play in the pro- and anti-Zuma contestation. Mamdani's 'social justice' discourse, which is rooted in Africa's struggle for independence and liberation, I argued, is linked with Laclau's populism through its extra-judicial status. Finally, I located this study within a growing body of post-Marxist and post-colonial African literature for the focus on identity construction and 'othering' that they share.

In Chapter Three I discussed the methods I used to conduct Chapter Four's analysis, and some of their epistemological implications. In Chapter Four I conducted a thematic content analysis, which enabled the extraction of several major and overlapping themes running through the material. I then conducted the critical discourse analysis according to the methods described in Chapter Three, structuring the discussion according to the themes that had emerged. I worked from the premise that letters to the editor would fall largely within a neoliberal human rights discourse associated with a literate and privileged middle class, while the protests outside court would speak the language of marginalised groupings whose demands were not being met by an inimical institutional system – in short, who operated within Mamdani's discourse of social justice, which I expected to conform with Laclau's theorised dynamics of populism.

In the course of the analysis, the *Sowetan* appeared to be located firmly within the human rights discourse, with its visual mediation of the mass-based protests outside court reflecting the same elitist horror of mob violence – or populist ruptures from a frustrated underclass – that was expressed by an overwhelming number of its letter-writers. I concluded the chapter with a graphical representation of how, according to Laclau and Mouffe's (1985) theory of meaning, the two contesting positions, pro- and anti-Zuma, might have constructed conflicting identities of 'underdog' and 'enemy' for Zuma and his accuser in terms of Laclau's populist dynamics, deploying discourses of ethnicism, human rights and social justice to other and invalidate each other's positions as they did so.

In this final chapter, I examine the emergent class and gender divisions hinted at above, as articulated in several letters published in the *Sowetan*. In conclusion, I scrutinise the *Sowetan*'s role in these divisions.

The class faultline

Two letters to the editor were briefly touched on near the end of Chapter Four in discussing pro-Zuma letters to the editor on the subject of the media's role in the trial.

These letters (31 Mar: 18 and 22 Feb: 12) showed that Zuma's supporters linked the media, human rights lawyers and gender lobby groups as allies, or even co-conspirators, in a campaign against Zuma. I return now to examine this construction in more detail.

As mentioned in Chapter Four, the letter of (22 Feb: 12) attacks, along with gender activists and the media, the 'respected advocate George Bizos'. Bizos was criticised for commenting that Zuma's supporters' behaviour 'borders on contempt of court' and 'undermines the administration of justice'. 'This is a democracy and people must not be intimidated by contempt of court claims,' the writer argues. 'Bizos and company do not speak up when those outside the court support alleged rape victims'.

Thus Bizos, once a liberation struggle hero for human rights work such as the part he played in the Rivonia trial defence team, is now othered by that same struggle (social justice) discourse; he is constructed as deploying the human rights discourse to defend a top-down and elitist institution and frustrate the legitimate demands of the marginalised and oppressed. In short, he has joined the enemy camp.

In Laclau and Mouffe's theory, identities, whether individual or collective, are formed through chains of equivalence that establish some possibilities of identification while others are ignored. This logic of equivalence, or equivalential mode of articulation as they also call it, is a two-pronged discursive strategy which works first to constitute a group by its 'other', that is, by what it is not, Us and Them; and second, to ignore all differences within the group. This is the strategy at work in the letter above: the 'other' group has been homogenised: human rights lawyers, gender activists and the media are all constituted as one on account of their critical stance of Zuma and/or his supporters. Laclau's mechanism of populist discourse is also at work, since the writer has given the 'other' group the power and thus constituted his (the writer is a male) group as the underdog: 'Bizos and others have information that those gathering outside court do not have'. This construction of the human rights discourse as inimical and 'other' also echoes Mamdani's identification of a 'breach between the discourse on rights and the one

on justice, with the language of rights appearing as a fig leaf over privilege' (see Chapter Two).

Another letter from a Zuma supporter casts a fascinating light on the class dynamics at play here. It is, in fact, worth quoting in full. Headlined 'Hypocrites see only one side of the Zuma coin', it reads:

Some commentators are apparently perplexed by the support Jacob Zuma continues to get, especially among women.
 Gender activists and some women's organisations have argued that the support undermines the struggle against women and child abuse.
 Women supporting Zuma may look ordinary and might not work in plush offices like our sophisticated critics, but they surely have a bigger picture of what's happening in court.
 The advantage activists have is easier access to the media, as opposed to 'street columns' used by Zuma's supporters outside court.
 The two sides speak to two different audiences and past each other.
 Fortunately though, the matter is now before the courts and justice will prevail.
 Some argue that Zuma supporters are intimidating the accuser and probably the judge but what about articles dedicated to vilifying Zuma? Don't these intimidate Zuma and the judge? What does Powa's presence say about the rights of a person who is innocent until proven guilty? Only hypocrites see one side of the coin. (15 Mar: 14)

The (male) writer points bluntly to a gulf between classes that, in his eyes, leaves women 'haves' and 'have nots' with no common bond; they are 'two different audiences'. He constitutes gender activism as the exclusive domain of 'sophisticated' people in 'plush offices'; women who support Zuma, in binary opposition, are common folk and 'look ordinary'. In addition, while these activists have 'easier access to the media' (presumably due to higher literacy levels) through their social location they are unable to access the 'bigger picture' that can be gained from the 'street columns' outside the court. The media, then, is constructed as part of this 'other' that is not 'ordinary' or everyday; part of a privileged elite speaking to a 'different audience'; both Zuma's critics and the media are othered and excluded by a disdainful inscrutability that constructs them as not worth engaging with, and simultaneously as privileged objects of resentful envy.

The writer, however, has constituted himself with the authority of an insider, someone who can articulate the world through the eyes of the misunderstood masses, including women. Yet at the same time, like the writer of the letter about Bizos, he ‘underdogs’ the masses (the social justice discourse), placing the power to define the terms of the contestation squarely in the hands of the educated middle class: ‘Some argue that Zuma supporters are intimidating the accuser and probably the judge, but what about articles dedicated to vilifying Zuma? Don’t these intimidate Zuma and the judge?’

The primary dividing line that separates Zuma’s supporters from his detractors, this writer implies, is that of class – and as we have seen in Chapter Four, the *Sowetan* at least in part subscribes to this view, with its overt and covert othering of Zuma’s underclass and ethnic supporters in its visual mediations. But were this to be the true dividing line, and were the writer’s homogenisation of the ‘enemy’ to be accurate, that would mean that the *Sowetan* concomitantly supports the demands of Kwezi’s supporters for gender justice on all its fronts. I return to this observation shortly in order to test it.

The gender faultline

To return briefly to the letter, we note that the argument of gender activists, (that is, that women’s support for Zuma undermines fighting gender abuse), is noted but not taken up. With this strategy, just as we saw in the discussion of the ‘Zuma’s Folly’ posters in Chapter Four, the discourse of gender justice is simultaneously trivialised in the face of some unspecified ‘bigger picture’ hinted at, and rendered unreasonable, inappropriate, unthinkable. The implication is that were the deluded gender activists to grasp the ‘bigger picture’ (presumably the plot to prevent Zuma, champion of the masses, from gaining political control) they too would no longer bother with fighting women and child abuse.

Up until now I have restricted my discussion of the *Sowetan*’s visual mediations to pictures. I turn now to an examination of its stance on gender justice demands by returning to one more letter to the editor and placing it in its own ‘bigger picture’, that is, the context of the page (Appendix 15). The letter was touched on briefly in Chapter Four. I reproduce it here in full. Headlined ‘Rape is about rape’, it reads:

In the wake of the Jacob Zuma rape trial, I would not be surprised if the rate at which rape victims report their violations drops dramatically. Who wants her past sexual activities to be publicised and scrutinised? Why is a rape charge not treated only as such? *I bet my last cent that wearing a miniskirt will now be used against a woman who is raped.* My concern is what message is being sent to young minds. (22 Mar: 12, italics inserted)

The letter is a ‘filler’, the least significant item on the page, relegated to the smallest bottom left corner of the letters space. In the inmost left column is the editorial. In this issue, the editor has pronounced on two issues, the first taking up two thirds of the column. The second, with the subhead ‘Vanity of flesh’, ironically, is placed alongside the letter ‘Rape is about rape’ – and equally ironically, is also concerned about what message is being sent to young minds. It reads:

One never knows whether to laugh or cry when it comes to singer Kelly Khumalo, the self proclaimed 21-year-old virgin.
 It is admirable for any young woman to abstain from indulging in matters of the flesh until she finds the right partner, but the way Kelly carries on seems to send mixed messages.
 Dressing scantily and performing sexually charged dances, as Kelly does, hardly encourages morality.
 But if Kelly is a virgin we must applaud her, especially given the scourge of Aids that has taken its toll on our young people.
 The only problem, perhaps, is that so many people don’t believe she is still a virgin. Pity that her raunchy actions so contradict her assertions.

Thus, with pompous pronouncements that link dress to morality (whatever that is), relegate dancing to ‘carrying on’ (whatever that is) and imply both that Khumalo is probably lying about her virgin status (and that if she is one, that would make her ‘moral’ – and more desirable) this editorial functions to invalidate and trivialise a fundamental gender justice demand in the letter adjacent to it – and this, in the middle of the ruling party deputy president’s rape trial in which the dress of the woman complainant was presented – and accepted – as crucial evidence of his innocence. In a final (unintended) irony, the cartoon at the top of the page, a comment on international politics, makes reference to Human Rights Day, celebrated the day before this issue.

The *Sowetan* has thus ‘mainstreamed’ and endorsed views on gender that cut across ethnicity, race, class, modernity and tradition: from Zuma’s Zulu cultural traditions to his white Afrikaans judge’s, from the poor and dispossessed who burn pictures of Mbeki in frustration to the *Sowetan*’s comfortable, elite readership. Gender rights, concomitantly, are marginalised, even silenced. The *Sowetan* may pay lip service to them when they seem to reflect its readers’ values and views – as long as, in other words, they are neat and orderly (not wild and savage, burning effigies and tangling with police, as we saw in Chapter Four; not spontaneous and high-spirited, exulting in their sexuality like Kelly Khumalo). In fact, as long as they don’t challenge the systemic (patriarchal) power structure running through all the above societal divisions. My point is that whether or not Kwezi is a rape victim, and whether or not Zuma is a conspiracy victim, the real victim of this contestation between the two positions has been gender justice – and the *Sowetan* is shown here to have been complicit in this.

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APPENDIX 1: Table of pictures

DATE	PAGE	TAGLINE	CAPTION	DESCRIPTION	POSTER/T-SHIRT /PERFORMANCE
14-Feb	5	Strong stand:	Miles Bhudu, life president of the Prisoners' Organisation for Human Rights, stages a picket during the Zuma rape trial.	A full-length cutout picture of Golden Miles Bhudu, life president of the Prisoners' Organisation for Human Rights, in chains and prison garb, dominates a colour box with a thick black frame at the top of the page. Bhudu is placed centre, dividing the box, a story on either side. He stands with feet planted apart, holding a badly written, hand-scrawled poster balanced against his shoulder, with the poster protruding into the text of the story to the left. In his other hand are gathered the chains around his body.	poster - JZ was raped - so say SAPOHR
14-Feb	5	Trial turmoil	Police hold back onlookers yesterday during the rape trial of embattled ANC deputy president Jacob Zuma	Above right of 'Strong stand' is a small horizontal picture, 'Trial turmoil'. Blurred with action, a line of police officers is shown from behind in full riot gear battling to control the crowd. The story to Bhudu's left is headlined 'Recusal worries black lawyers', with the 2-column text framing a thumbnail of Bernard Ngoepe, the judge who recused himself. Below right is the story 'Protesters clash at Zuma trial'.	
16-Feb	28	Stand back:	A policeman battles to control the crowd outside the high court yesterday.	A crush of people bearing down on the riot cop	
16-Feb	28	Huge support:	Thousands of people braved the rain outside the Jhb high court yesterday to show support for ANC deputy president Jacob Zuma, who is being tried for rape.	Pritchard Street is packed tightly with people.	
16-Feb	28	Women's solidarity:	Activists against the abuse of women demonstrate outside the high court.	Hands holding up a professionally printed poster; bgd a few faces and two obscured posters also being held up	poster - rape is always a crime

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DATE	PAGE	TAGLINE	CAPTION	DESCRIPTION	POSTER/T-SHIRT /PERFORMANCE
7-Mar	4	Backlash:	Members of women's groups shout anti-Jacob Zuma slogans and demonstrate outside the Jhb high court yesterday	A woman is in the foreground with the arm raised and finger pointing above her head. Next to her another woman gestures. Other women are in the background, some holding posters.	T-shirts - HIV positive & solidarity with women. Parts of the words 'criminal', system and rape can be discerned on one poster. The other 2 are illegible
9-Mar	4	Watchful eye:	An armed member of a special task force monitors the crowd at the trial of Jacob Zuma, who is the accused in a rape trial being tried in the Jhb high court	A blond youth in military gear with machine gun in foreground; bgd is a mix of military & crowd	
9-Mar	4	Defiant:	A woman shows her support for former deputy president Jacob Zuma outside the Jhb high court	An enormous woman raises her fist and places her other hand across her breast. In the background other women are raising fists and shouting	Performance: struggle fist
8-Mar	6	Faithful:	Jacob Zuma's supporters pray for him outside the Jhb high court during lunchtime break yesterday	Three-col pic of three women in foreground standing together, all wearing JZ Tshirts, eyes closed and passionate looks on their faces. Many faces behind them.	T-shirt - Zuma
10-Mar	19	Chanting hate:	Claiming to know for sure what the court has yet to learn, Jacob Zuma's supporters demonstrate outside the Jhb high court.	Three youths stand in front of the courtroom holding posters	Posters say: 1) How much did they pay you Nondidwa 2) Zuma for president 2009 - If Madiba did it why not JZ. 3) The leadership of this country especially the presidency is not a certain tribe thing Zuma for president 2009
14-Mar	6	Aikhona:	Jacob Zuma supporters outside the Jhb HC where the former deputy president is appearing on rape charges	Two women pointing at the camera and yelling are in the foreground. Men further back are silent.	
15-Mar	4	Toyi toyi:	Jacob Zuma's supporters at the Jhb HC yesterday during his trial for rape	Young men toyi-toyiing with court building in background	Struggle dance
16-Mar	6	Purification:	ANC supporters of Jacob Zuma sing freedom songs and burn impepho, an African herb used in cleansing ceremonies.	People kneel in front of a smoking bundle, box of matches on the ground next to it. Two people are foregrounded: R, a woman who seems to be chanting, wearing a Friends of Jacob Zuma T-shirt, jeans and traditional beads, baseball cap with peak backwards; next to her is a young man with head bowed and hands clasped as though praying	Tshirt - support FoJZT. Performance: ritual cleansing/ call to ancestors

APPENDIX 1: Table of pictures

DATE	PAGE	TAGLINE	CAPTION	DESCRIPTION	POSTER/T-SHIRT /PERFORMANCE
29-Mar	6&7	Overheated:	A Jacob Zuma supporter is restrained by police after clashing with sympathisers of the rape complainant	A gesticulating woman in tribal gear is held by two riot policemen with impassive faces. Her arm is raised and her finger points at the camera	Customary dress
29-Mar	6&7	High spirits:	Jacob Zuma supporters show their support for the former deputy president outside the Jhb HC where he is appearing on a rape charge.	A large crowd is dancing in the street, with buildings in the background. A woman in tribal headgear is foregrounded in profile, one leg in a high kick. Above is huge two-stack reverse caps headline	Zuma T-shirts
29-Mar	6&7	Placard protest:	Members of women's rights groups have attended every day of the trial.	A line of women standing behind restraining tape with professionally printed posters reflected in water	Posters: 1) Innocent until found otherwise 2) Defending women rights 3) Don't distort our rights 4) Stop abusing our rights.
30-Mar	4	Rumbunctious:	Once again Zuma's supporters clashed with the police outside the Jhb HC yesterday	A man is shouting and gesticulating with a riot policeman on either side of him. One of the officers pushes or hits him on the back with his baton	
30-Mar	4	True believers:	Jacob Zuma's supporters clad in T-shirts proclaiming 'Jacob Zuma 100% Zuluboy'.	Large crowd of shouting gesticulating youths behind a strained tape, Zuma's face prominent on T-shirts	T-shirts - zulu boy
4-Apr	4	Take that:	Supporters of rape accused Jacob Zuma burn a pair of panties outside the Jhb HC yesterday.	A woman in tribal gear, closely surrounded by a crowd, holds up a piece of underwear. The pic is taken from below and at an angle, making the people and buildings in the background loom. The fire is not visible in the picture - only the cap tells us she is burning the item. The page is dominated by a large reverse caps headline, 'She was ready for sex' and the pic is framed by two stories, one of his version of the night and the other alluding to the conspiracy	Performance: burning panties

APPENDIX 1: Table of pictures

DATE	PAGE	TAGLINE	CAPTION	DESCRIPTION	POSTER/T-SHIRT /PERFORMANCE
7-Apr	6	Viva JZ:	Zuma supporters outside the Jhb HC where Jacob Zuma's trial continues.	Two women hold up a large, shabby, creased piece of cardboard with closely written, koki-penned text printed in a semi-literate hand. The woman on the right, pointing to the text, is in tribal gear, the one on the left in urban jeans and T-shirt.	Poster says: 1. Where is Chris Hani? Assassinated before he succeeded Mandela. 2. Where is Ramaphosa? Forced to jet out of xx to consider business. 3. Where is Matthews Phosa? Stepped out of the race to follow business. 4. Where is Tokyo? Pushed to follow business. Next to poor comrade Zuma - they regard as illiteracy and pushed to courts because you wouldn't accommodate business but president - they decided to take you to court for nothing. Viva JZ viva!
3-May	4	Defiance:	Women from anti-rape groups demonstrate outside the Jhb HC as the state and the defence in the Jacob Zuma rape trial resume their closing arguments.	Women yelling and thrusting their arms forward. One is in a kanga.	T-shirts - HIV+, solidarity with women
8-May	3	Clear messages:	Supporters of former SA deputy president Jacob Zuma demonstrate outside the Jhb HC, pending today's outcome of his trial for rape.	Yelling crowd in Zuma T-shirts are holding three posters above their heads. Left of the pic is large reverse caps headline: 'Innocent'.	Posters: 1) Come 2007 conference of the ANC, and Mbeki out... 2) Whether the next president is a man or woman that debate is imeterial. It raises by stupid people. 3) Back to basics building democratic ANC
8-May	6	Faithful:	Jacob Zuma supporters in full song outside the Jhb HC.	Mainly women w 100% Zuluboy Tshirts on, yelling, fists raised	Tshirts - Zuma
22-May	13	Campaign trail:	Other candidates duck out of sight as Zuma heads out to canvas votes	Foregrounded in the centre is a professionally printed poster with the Cosatu logo. It is held by a man who may be yelling. He is standing still and only his head and shoulders are visible above the poster. He is neatly dressed with a good haircut. Around and behind many people are milling. Two Cosatu T-shirts are visible. One person has an Aids arm-band on.	Cosatu says Phumzile won't be president

APPENDIX 2: Table of letters

DATE	PAGE	HEADLINE	DETAIL	THEME	PRO/ ANTI
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05-Jan	12	Still no freedom for black men	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mbeki wrecking families by giving women equality • Govt doesn't recognise customs • It's worse now than under apartheid" 	GENDER	P
10-May	14	Women's groups not interested in facts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Disturbing Powa statement that acquittal blow to reducing rape stats – shd he be found guilty just to reduce the stats? • They jumped to conclusions – guilty b4 the trial started • Now justice is done 	GENDER	P
10-May	14	Fight for rights must be equal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Innocent till proved guilty • Stand for equal rights but mean women's rights • A man can be the victim of the allegations 	GENDER	P
11-May	12	Educate women about abuse	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Happy justice prevailed • Sad so many African women don't know what rape & abuse is anything passes cos law on their side • Hr only women's rights? • Poor men emotionally abused every day • Nowadays everything men do is wrong • JZ humiliated, what will happen to her? 	GENDER	P
12-May	18	Zuma victory is a win for all men	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Thousands of men sentenced for rape & abuse they didn't commit • They'll be angry when they come out • Must take law seriously when it says innocent till proved guilty • Women who falsely accuse shd be jailed for perjury • We are raising a generation whose fathers were jailed for nothing 	GENDER	P
16-May	12	Crime of rape is misunderstood	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • One in 9 convictions – can't blame legal system • Became apparent that most don't understand what rape is – thus many false allegations • Govt must educate about what rape is • Zuma rights to dignity & reputation seriously violated 	GENDER	P
15-May	12	Zuma must lead fight for moral regeneration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Charge doesn't mean guilty • Stigma of rape makes people think guilty • JZ apology shd be accepted – he learnt his lesson • Many people in parliament can't go public about what they've done • He's the one to lead HIV fight and MRC cos of what he's gone thru 	MEDIA	P

APPENDIX 2: Table of letters

DATE	PAGE	HEADLINE	DETAIL	THEME	PRO/ ANTI
31-Mar	18	Media playing a dangerous game with public	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> "• Gender activists enjoy space in media trying to convince us JZ guilty • Do they think we should just accept what she says? • Media irresponsible to allow this • Why is abuse of JZ being ignored? • His private life revealed • Sex without a condom not a crime " 	MEDIA-GENDER	P
06-Apr	12	Malala making mischief in ANC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> "• Malala waging campaign to write off leaders like JZ and Motlanthe • ANC got own structures that will deliver correct candidate " 	MEDIA-SUCCESSION	P
23-Mar	12	Malala, get off Zuma's back	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> "• Malala caricatures JZ, spreads dirt, says he's unfit • ANC has own machinery • Conspiracy to emasculate • Intolerance & arrogance • To say YL should support her cos she's young & he's old is blackmail • Wait for court decision " 	MEDIA-SUCCESSION	P
12-May	18	Mbeki must consult instead of giving his opinion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> "• Flabbergasted re woman president – got to be debated in ANC structures • Shdnt exaggerate gender equality – women PDI, still need skills " 	SUCCESSION-GENDER	P
22-Feb	12	Zuma's critics are hypocrites	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> "• Bizos says FoJZ in contempt of court cos undermining admin of justice • But they believe innocent until proven otherwise – why doesn't Bizos crit Powa? • People must express themselves in a democracy • Commentators pretend objectivity but lambast the masses " 	SUPPORTERS	P
21-Feb	10	People who give Zuma support are not fools	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> "• Cosatu & YL are anti-rape but possible that complainants can lie • Would support anybody whose rights were being violated • 'our people will never again be black-mailed by a false moral stance' " 	SUPPORTERS	P
05-Jan	12	Don't judge, let courts decide	Powa waging 'bitter war against males' Emotion-based assumptions b4 court decision	SUPPORTERS-GENDER	P

APPENDIX 2: Table of letters

DATE	PAGE	HEADLINE	DETAIL	THEME	PRO/ ANTI
15-Mar	14	Hypocrites see only one side of the Zuma coin	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Commentators perplexed at support from women; Powa says it undermines women's struggle • But FoJZ women have a bigger picture • Powa has access to media, FoJZ to 'street columns' • The two sides can't hear each other • Court will bring justice • Some say FoJZ intimidating judge & complainant but aren't Powa/media intimid judge & Zuma? • What does Powa say about innocent till proven guilty? 	SUPPORTERS-MEDIA	P
14-Mar	12	Zuma ignores own advice	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • JZ should be blamed for risking HIV and not walking his talk 	GENDER	A
15-Mar	14	This is too embarrassing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MRC leader – even if not rape what was he thinking, ½ his age and HIV+ • Court has not and will not be fair to her 	GENDER	A
22-Mar	12	Rape is about rape	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sure rape reports dropping – sex past scrutinised • Miniskirt now an excuse • What message to youth 	GENDER	A
31-Mar	18	Knockout blow for Zuma	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • He doesn't care what trial has done to him, party or country • Judgement question – HIV+ • Morals question – MRC • Dnt support women allowing lawyers to discredit her • Shd have seen it wd raise questions about MK camps • Blasphemous JC pedestal • Lied about relationship with her 	GENDER	A
10-Apr	12	Guilty or not, the Zuma issue is about being a good role model	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Selfish sexual needs • Battle against Aids • Pain & humiliation of those who respect him • He says culturally wrong to discuss sex w daughter but then she has to defend him in court • Leading youth astray – shower, risk for few mins of pleasure that shd get from wives • Apologise, be good role model 	GENDER	A
10-Apr	12	Msholozhi has let South Africa down terribly	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ashamed of JZ – views contrary to leadership & world • Shower; short skirt; leaving her aroused = rape charge • Uncontrollable sex urge? • Dnt practice what he preached in NAC – respect women, use restraint • Let country down even if not guilty 	GENDER	A

APPENDIX 2: Table of letters

DATE	PAGE	HEADLINE	DETAIL	THEME	PRO/ ANTI
08-May	12	Zuma's troubles caused by lack of education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • He achieved what others cdnt even without ed • But if had school, wdnt have said that stuff in the rape trial • Would have understood Shaik misleading him • Would have understood Aids & kept away from temptation • Would have outgrown narrow rural and tribal male chauvinism • Brave son of soil, took more risks for MK than intellectuals • But even warriors need ed to face personal challenges 	GENDER	A
10-May	14	We do not take rape seriously	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Woman has to flee her home • Message she shd keep her mouth shut? • FoJZ makes it look like SA doesn't take rape seriously • Married man, political leader – irresponsible • What chance for youth with that eg? 	GENDER	A
12-May	18	Every rape must be reported	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Despite judgement gender work must go on against ridiculous and old-fashioned notions • Women must report rape – not be put off • Right to dignity in constitution 	GENDER	A
11-May	12	Walking the rape tightrope	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rape & false allegations both evil – we have to walk the tightrope • Judiciary must mediate • Must fight for HR – rape terrible, men must fight it, protect & respect women • But some women use hatred of rape to destroy men with false allegations, this violates men's rights 	GENDER	A
23-Jan	12	Let the media do their job properly	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • JZ crits NPA but no-one is above the law • He crits media but they have a 'moral responsibility' to inform us 	MEDIA	A
10-May	14	Morality key to judgment of office seekers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • If morality were law JZ would have been guilty & sent to jail – as wd others • But no-one could cast the first stone • Our hypocritical moralists don't lead the public castigation of JZ 	MEDIA	A
23-Jan	12	Zuma must stop insults directed at Pres Mbeki	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Don't agree w scorpions BUT • JZ must denounce Mbeki insults on FoJZ website • They undermine his 'legitimate fight' and 'noble cause' 	SUCCESSION	A

APPENDIX 2: Table of letters

DATE	PAGE	HEADLINE	DETAIL	THEME	PRO/ ANTI
17-Mar	16	Immorality and the presidency are not exactly bedfellows	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MRC leader dug his own grave - 'to want him for president is catastrophic' • Can't understand FojZ supporting candidate who show such poor judgement • Married man, should lead by eg esp with HIV crisis • Outcome of trial immaterial – he's dishonest and chooses bad company • SA can't sacrifice its gains for him, we must wait by grave to ensure he stays in it 	SUCCESSION	A
17-Mar	16	Zuma can never lead the country	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Even if acquitted on both charges can't lead country • Image dented, should leave public life • Mbeki's successor must command international respect • 'Those who subscribe to violence... warlord mentalities must be condemned regardless of struggle credentials' • Deafening silence from black intellectuals – consumed by profit, forgotten the poor 	SUCCESSION	A
31-Mar	18	Crisis threat in position for president	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mbeki shd consider 3rd term – one candidate has issues, other possibilities have not had leadership tested 	SUCCESSION	A
05-Apr	12	Zuma would be a gamble	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • If there was a conspiracy then the detractors know him well – give him the setup, he'll do the rest himself • Rape immaterial – married, slept w HIV+ • Sign of other blunders? 	SUCCESSION	A
06-Apr	12	Political power lost as Zuma washes dirty linen in public	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Passed from political elite to shamed & ordinary – end of political power • If it's a conspiracy they're damn good – but he might have masterminded it himself • Ruling won't matter, he can't be respected after this 	SUCCESSION	A
10-May	14	Zuma has no dignity and must quit politics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Speech after acquittal disturbing – bragged about getting away with it • Lost dignity, shd resign • HIV+, can't lead the nation 	SUCCESSION	A
05-Jun	12	Thabo Mbeki is an exceptionally good president	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mbeki great president • Vavi and Fikile Mbalula think JZ their meal ticket • Mbalula not doing his job, maybe too busy supporting comrade standing trial 	SUCCESSION	A
15-May	12	Adultery a bad example to set	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public figures shd try to practice the vows they made when got married 	SUCCESSION-GENDER	A
22-Mar	12	Malala punting Mbeki for another term is disturbing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Agree with Malala JZ & FojZ conduct bad • But Mbeki not the only candidate – ANC has lots of talent at the top • Disturbing thought of 3rd term – must set eg for Africa 	MEDIA-SUCCESSION	A

APPENDIX 2: Table of letters


DATE	PAGE	HEADLINE	DETAIL	THEME	PRO/ ANTI
17-Feb	16	Singing of struggle song is sinister	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • JZ support in rape trial 'misleading and dangerous' • ANCYL & SACP 'shocking' & 'hypocritical' • Disappointed in Fikile Mbalula for 'behaving like a freedom fighter campaigning an unjust cause' • Cosatu agitating the poor - workers don't understand govt empowerment policies – Cosatu job to teach them • Umshini wam JZ message to prepare for war? 	SUPPORTERS	A
20-Feb	12	Zuma has lost control of his supporters	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ANC member – JZ and Mbalula must stop supporters: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Destroying Mbeki Tshirts o FoJZ songs insulting judiciary o Intimidating complainant o undermining judiciary 	SUPPORTERS	A
22-Feb	12	JZ supporters' behaviour appalling	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ACDP joins CGE, HRC & Powa concerns about FoJZ behaviour • ANC should condemn it and tell JZ not to sing mshini wam • Also disallow posters inciting violence • JZ et al must stop intimidating judiciary, complainant, her supporters & whole nation • & stop threatening civil war 	SUPPORTERS	A
14-Mar	12	Christians sinking in immoral cess-pool	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Leader of MRC accused of rape & corruption • Followers cause chaos outside court & no action taken • Meant to be an African leader but laughing stock 	SUPPORTERS	A
12-May	18	Zuma's free so let us leave Kwezi and her family alone	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Respect judge decision but poor Kwezi in exile • Msholozhi tell followers to leave her in peace 	SUPPORTERS	A
17-Feb	16	Give Zuma's accuser the chance to present her case	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Who gave supporters right to hurl stones & insults? • Accused 'dancing & enjoying himself' accuser has to cover her head – is it a shame to seek justice? • Supporters shouldn't tarnish her image – makes JZ seem disrespectful & insensitive • Worst thing to pick & choose judge • Innocent till proved guilty – wait for outcome 	SUPPORTERS-GENDER	A

APPENDIX 2: Table of letters


DATE	PAGE	HEADLINE	DETAIL	THEME	PRO/ ANTI
17-Feb	16	JZ backers are insulting all abused women	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Don't want next generation to learn this • Innocent till proven guilty but 'spare a thought for the victim' • Cosatu & YL insulting rape victims & families • Shdn't be keeping workers from work & children from school 'immoral propaganda body' – collect money for an alleged rapist • Think about abused women and 'come to your senses and don't be used as political pawns' 	SUPPORTERS-GENDER	A
17-Feb	16	SA women should be deeply concerned	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Women should be dismayed by 'spectre' outside court • Insensitivity of phallic mshini wam 'mind-blowing' • Hope judiciary not intimidated 	SUPPORTERS-GENDER	A
20-Feb	12	Sheer hypocrisy prevails at the former deputy president's trial	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mbalula prancing in the street proclaiming his innocence b4 trial even begun, some women old enuf 2b her mother • Same pl accuse media, judiciary & others of finding him guilty of corruption • Threatening victim, accusing her of being used by conspirators thus calling her a liar b4 court judgement • What hapnd to Msholozis' MRC? 	SUPPORTERS-GENDER	A
20-Feb	12	Rape trial is a shameful display for SA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SA humiliated b4 world intimidating victim • No chance women can be protected? 	SUPPORTERS-GENDER	A
10-Mar	18	Zuma must condemn ugly behaviour of his supporters	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • JZ, who led the MRC, must condemn ugly scenes outside court – women also contributed to liberation • Message – women who speak out get targeted • Govt promoting women's lib but who would seek justice after seeing this • Can see why YL finds it acceptable, they grew up while women were fair game but not Zuma, he served under Tambo 	SUPPORTERS-GENDER	A
13-Mar	12	Rape trials and abuse prove women's struggle is not over	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Women's struggle far from over, - politics, bz, poverty, abuse • JZ bad eg for youth - adultery • Why WL silent • Women supporting Zuma disgraceful message 	SUPPORTERS-GENDER	A
29-Mar	16	Jacob Zuma's supporters must stop treating him like God	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • JZ not god – all humans fall short • Shortcomings publicised cos public figure • Support 4 rape accused demoralised SA – condone it depending on who did it? • See JZ thru her eyes – HIV+ 	SUPPORTERS-GENDER	A

APPENDIX 3: Chronology charts

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
PRO-ZUMA LETTERS	2	1	4	1	7	0
ANTI-ZUMA LETTERS	2	9	11	4	8	1




	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
PRO-ZUMA PIX	0	5	11	2	3	0
ANTI-ZUMA PIX	0	1	2	0	1	0




APPENDIX 3: Chronology charts

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
LETTERS	4	10	15	5	15	1
PIX	0	6	13	2	4	0




APPENDIX 4: Chronology and theme overviews

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
ANTI-ZUMA LETTERS	2	9	11	4	8	1
PRO-ZUMA LETTERS	2	1	4	1	7	0
ANTI-ZUMA PICTURES	0	1	2	0	1	0
PRO-ZUMA PICTURES	0	5	11	2	3	0



APPENDIX 4: Chronology and theme overviews

THEME	ANTI-ZUMA	PRO-ZUMA	THEME TOTAL
Gender	19	9	28
Supporters	14	4	18
Succession	10	3	13
Media	3	5	8
Total			67
Media-gender		1	
Media-succession	1	2	
Succession-gender	1	1	
Supporters-gender	8	1	
Supporters-media		1	



ACCUSER NOW THE ACCUSED

State derides Zuma's conspiracy theory

The woman who said Jacob Zuma raped her was accused of being a liar in the Johannesburg high court yesterday.

"The complainant is in certain respects a liar," Judge J Kras, the former deputy president's lawyer, told the court.

In a bid to have her case discharged by Judge Willem van der Merwe, Kras said the state had not proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant had been raped.

The HIV-positive woman alleged Zuma raped her at his home in Johannesburg last November last year. But Zuma said they had consensual sex.

Kras said the complainant had lied to the court about her relationship and that she had had sex with Zuma by engaging in a




WOMEN'S RIGHTS: Jacob Zuma supporters show their support for the former deputy president outside the Johannesburg high court where he is appearing on a rape charge.



DISBELIEVING: Kras J Kras, Jacob Zuma's lawyer

WOMEN'S RIGHTS: Jacob Zuma supporters show their support for the former deputy president outside the Johannesburg high court where he is appearing on a rape charge.

Ministers not off the hook yet



Waghid Michael

The DA has failed to get its bid to have parliament's powerful financial watchdog committee join an investigation into the alleged non-disclosure of their financial interests by cabinet ministers, deputy ministers and top public servants.

Instead, the members of the watchdog committee, the standing committee on public accounts (Scopa), yesterday agreed that parliament's multi-party joint committee on ethics and members' interests would pursue the matter.

The proposal by the DA's Eddie Mbebe that Scopa join the investigation was shot down by the other political parties in parliament yesterday.

Vicent Smith of the ANC said that the investigation, which was prompted by a report earlier this year by Mbeke Fikile, the anti-bribery unit, would not be within Scopa's jurisdiction.

Smith said that the ethics committee was responsible for ensuring that politicians adhered to parliament's rules of conduct.

The code requires ministers, deputy ministers and members of parliament to declare and register their business interests, gifts and sponsorships, and returns also not declared from their parliamentary activities.

Smith said Scopa had an "intensive task", which included reviewing more than 200 annual reports of companies, and could not be drawn into doing more work.

Fikile, who attended yesterday's meeting of Scopa, did not comment on recent criticisms of his report but said Scopa had to make a presentation to the ethics com-



DEFENDING: Vicent Smith of the ANC, above, and Eddie Mbeke of the DA.



DEFENDING: Eddie Mbeke of the DA, above, and Eddie Mbeke of the DA.

mittee on April 2.

Fikile said other bodies that would be drawn into the ethics committee's investigation, into undisclosed interests included the Public Service Commission (PSC) and the Companies and Intellectual Property Registration Office (CIPRO).

The PSC is expected to produce a report for the ethics committee that will recommend action of the prescribers for the disclosure of financial interests by public servants.

Fikile said that a number of public servants were not adhering to parliament's rules on disclosure.

It is expected that the PSC will also set out procedural reforms for the disclosure of financial interests by departmental heads of provincial governments.

Representatives of Scopa are likely to be called before the ethics committee. The office has been criticised for not keeping up-to-date records of company registrations and board memberships.

The government recently said that it accepted the explanations of ministers and deputy ministers about the alleged non-disclosure of their business interests.

But ministers will still have to explain themselves to both of parliament's oversight committees - and to the public.



OVERHEATED: A Jacob Zuma supporter is restrained by police after clashing with competitors of the rape complainant.



PLACARD PROTEST: Members of women's rights groups have attended every day of the trial.

The doctor who examined the complainant after the alleged rape said she told him that she had washed, showered and bathed, Kras told the court.

But the complainant had testified that she had taken a shower.

The complainant said she had told the doctor of "a dripping pain" in her vagina but the doctor said she had made no mention of this.

Kras asked why the complainant did not say in her statement to the police that Zuma had held her hands down during the alleged rape, as she had testified in court.

"One would think it would be very important to put this in the statement to support the rape

allegation," Kras said.

The complainant told the police that she went to work after the alleged rape. But she had testified that she had sent several SMSes after the alleged rape, he said.

Kras questioned why the complainant had not left Zuma's house after the alleged rape or locked the door to her room. Kras said she must have felt she was in no danger.

He said Zuma would have run a greater risk of contracting HIV during a rape than while having consensual sex.

HIV infection is more likely to be contracted during violent sex.

ON DUTY: Bodyguards are on the alert as Zuma's car leaves the Johannesburg high court.

Attorney Broadbent, for the state, said that if the rape allegation against Jacob Zuma were part of a political conspiracy that conspiracy was poorly planned.

"One would have expected her [the complainant] to storm out of the house and lay this complaint with blood flowing all over her face and several lesions and a horrible story to tell."

"She did not even have a real injury," Broadbent told the court.

Zuma's legal team had not introduced political conspiracy as a fact but had merely raised the subject and then "kept their options open", Broadbent said.

Zuma was dismissed as deputy president last year when corruption charges were brought against him.

The rape charge followed.

Zuma and his supporters have claimed that the trial and rape charges against him are part of a political conspiracy to stop him becoming president of South Africa.

Broadbent was opening a defence application for Zuma's discharge under section 134 of the Criminal Procedure Act.

The trial continues today. - Sapa

NGOs suspected they would lose

Mary Pappas

Two days after their application to give evidence as "witnesses of the court" in the Jacob Zuma rape trial was rejected, the NGOs at the centre of the matter had their effort was not wasted.

The Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, the Tembisa Legal Studies and the Johannesburg Legal Advocacy Centre wanted to present evidence on the effects of rape and repeated abuse.

In his dismissal, Judge Van der Merwe said he could not see how the applicants could help him.

Leon Gerloff, director of the Johannesburg Legal Advocacy Centre, said they were disappointed, but had known "right from the beginning that it was going to be difficult".

"We managed to raise important issues and made the judge aware that there are some other things to look at. In that sense, it wasn't a waste of time," she said.

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 Email address: support@avbob.co.za
 Address: Surplus Business Unit
 Old Mutual Actuarial & Consulting
 P O Box 1214
 CAPE TOWN
 8001

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DEFIANCE: Women from anti-rape groups demonstrate outside the Johannesburg high court as the state and the defence in the Jacob Zuma rape trial resume their closing arguments. PHOTO: LEN KUMALO

SEX BILL GETS ITS DAY TODAY

Zuma's trial could have been different

Waghied Misbach

If the long-awaited draft Sexual Offences Bill that comes before the cabinet today had already been passed the completion of the Zuma rape trial would have been totally different.

Inadequacies in sexual offences law has come under increasing scrutiny by civil society groups, because of the high rate of HIV-Aids, rape and child abuse.

The draft comes at the end of an eight-year battle to pass the bill into law, Johnny De Lange, the deputy minister of justice and constitutional development, told parliament yesterday during a briefing to the national council of province's (NCOP) select committee on security and constitutional affairs.

Lisa Vollen of the Tshwane Legal Advocacy Centre said yesterday she welcomed the fact that the bill was now before the cabinet, because it could "hopefully" mean that its passing would be speeded up.

"The complainant shouldn't carry the burden of proof, as it was in the Zuma case. There also need to be clear criteria spelt out, under which questions about a complainant's sexual history may

be allowed in a court case."

Responding to questions from Soetens after the briefing, De Lange said he was confident the law will be approved by the cabinet, then passed through to relevant parliamentary committees for further discussion and public input.

It will then have to go to the national assembly for approval, pass through the NCOP, and then to the president to be signed into law.

De Lange would not provide any details of changes to the law made by the justice department and ministry, or the time frame attached to its approval. Once the cabinet approves it, drafts will be available to the public for their input.

Samantha Waterhouse of Resources Aimed at the Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect also welcomed the fact that the bill would soon be on the cabinet's agenda.

Her organisation wants to ensure there is a broader definition of rape in future law. Presently oral and anal violations are considered under the less serious charge of indecent assault.

She said the law should also tighten up policy on treatment of victims of violence and rape by the police, courts and health clinics.

'The complainant shouldn't carry the burden of proof'

Minister accuses media of fabricating judges' fears

The fears reportedly expressed by judges about pending changes to the court system might have been fabricated by the media, Johnny de Lange, the deputy justice minister, said yesterday.

"I must be honest, I don't trust the media. I don't know if a real judge went to them and complained," he told the parliamentary security and constitutional affairs select committee.

"These people that are anonymous and hide behind secrecy, I really do not know who they are. I cannot tell you if they're real, and I definitely cannot tell you if their arguments are valid," De Lange said.

No judges ever "raised those things in public", the deputy minister told the committee.

"We read a lot of articles about judges who are unhappy about something, but it is anonymous. You don't know, I don't know."

"I know the vast majority of [media] articles are never checked up on. Our comments are never asked on these," De Lange said.

He then proceeded to outline issues about which he said judges had expressed concern.

One involved responsibility for



MEDIA Basher: Johnny de Lange, the deputy minister of justice

court resources, which De Lange said "have in this country always been the preserve of the executive".

Judicial functions, he said, were "the preserve of the judiciary" and resources of the courts were "the preserve of the executive".

The executive, not the judiciary, was responsible for accounting to the citizenry, he said. - Sapa



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ZUMA'S FOLLY

His supporters' screams of rage could prove his downfall, writes **Nthabisang Moreosele**

You are damned by the company you keep.

The Jacob Zuma rape trial raises concerns about how the South African public views rape and other violence against women.

When the former deputy president was charged, various political entities entered the debate and claimed he had been framed.

Prominent and ordinary members of the public rushed to embrace Zuma and offer him unqualified support.

It was said that his accuser was a tool of a faction that did not want Zuma to be the next president.

Screaming women in tribal dress have burnt pictures of the alleged victim. They have branded her immoral.

These strident calls have not been silenced. What has been suppressed is the right to sympathy and dignity of the alleged rape victim.

She has been vilified as a schemer and as a shameless and money-grubbing opportunist.

Women's-rights activists say victims of abuse are often abused several times over - when they are raped, when they report the case and are examined by a doctor to establish if physical evidence exists and when they testify in court.

But the alleged victim in the Zuma case is apparently going to endure the pain five or more times over.

Apart from a few brave activists and family members, few people have publicly or privately given her support during the trial.

The noise from the pro-Zuma faction has drowned any sane response from those who are not Zuma allies.

The trial is likely to trivialise the seriousness of violence and the abuse of women in this country.



CHANTING HATE: Claiming to know for sure what the court has yet to learn, Jacob Zuma's supporters demonstrate outside the Joburg high court.

PHOTO: SANA

The claim that the charge is a political tool being used to discredit Zuma suggests that the complainant is a liar and that women often fabricate assault charges.

Rape seldom occurs in front of witnesses but, whatever the outcome of this trial, the excuses have already been made and are being thrust down our throats daily.

This is no longer a criminal case, it has become a trial of strength between political factions.

Again the alleged victim will be the loser, as will all women in

this country, including those disgusting protesters.

The friends of Zuma, and his family, have a right to protect his name, but their actions are in danger of negating the strides we have made since 1994 in the fight against child abuse and woman abuse.

Their fight to clear Zuma seriously impinges on the rights of the victim to dignity and privacy.

The justice system has made great progress in recognising and prosecuting sexual crimes in the past 100 years.

Rape is acknowledged to be a violent crime that has control

and power aspects. It is a scourge in our country.

The posters depicting the accuser as a loose, immoral woman will set us back years. It is not only immoral women who are raped.

The stereotypes of yesteryear have made such a strong comeback, before and during this trial, that one wonders what the many campaigns against violence have achieved.

The actions of many of the Zuma supporters will deter abused women from coming forward to name those who brutalised them.

Zuma should be careful of his supporters. They have already tarnished his image by their antics.

As the former leader of the moral regeneration campaign he cannot afford the daily TV screenings of the vulgar, profanity-screaming crowds that have turned his trial into a mockery of justice.

Those images will linger long after this ordeal is over. They will cripple his political ambitions.

Zuma should tell his unswerving supporters to stay at home while he gets on with the business at hand.

Giving cash to smaller parties would be truly democratic

The local-government elections are over and have generally been declared free and fair.

From the results one can see the victorious parties that gained political clout from the poll are the ANC, the DA and the Independent Democrats.

Unfortunately this cannot be said about some of the smaller parties, such as the PAC, Azapo and others. An overall report indicates that these parties received 8,10 percent of the votes compared with 8,22 percent in 2000.

They all blame a lack of resources for their dismal performance in the elections.

The law in this country allows the Independent Electoral Commission to fund parties that have representation in parliament. The funding is proportional to the number of seats

a party has in the national assembly. The ANC, as the majority party, gets the biggest chunk of the fund.

Given their low number of seats, both the PAC and Azapo received minimal support from the commission. And given their small support base, the two parties obtained little support from their members. But the situation was exacerbated because they were unable to attract large contributions from wealthy donors.

Just before the elections Azapo president Mostbudi Mangena announced that his party would be unable to contest all the municipal areas because they faced huge financial constraints.

All the smaller parties found that they could not run effective



Ido Lekota

political
NOTEBOOK

election campaigns to garner support from the electorate.

Consequently, they did not attract many votes and as a result have fewer seats. Their proportional funding, based on the number of seats they held, then gives rather literal meaning to the term a vicious cycle.

But apparently all is not lost. According to ANC insiders there are discussions among the political parties concerning the future funding of election campaigns.

The proposal is that the gov-

ernment should give money to all registered parties contesting an election, even those outside the national assembly that hold no seats.

The logic here is that such a move would level the playing field and smaller parties with no financial muscle could then afford to run a sound election campaign.

Such funding would, to an extent, reduce political parties' dependence on wealthy individuals and interest groups, who often try to use their financial support to influence politics.

The proposal is a move in the right direction and many permutations could be considered. For example, there could be a basic amount given to all parties and the remainder could be divided according to the size of the party. This would encour-

age parties to go on recruitment drives.

Another possibility could be a basic grant given to parties, which are then expected to match any further amount with money collected through their own fund-raising initiatives.

The commission would still serve as a monitoring agency, ensuring the effective use of taxpayers' money by the political parties.

The issue about public funding accountability and the possibility that some taxpayers might be unhappy about their money being used to finance organisation they do not support is a real herring.

If these taxpayers are true democrats they should be willing to defend the right of all parties to express their political views.

Recusal worries black lawyers

Wagheed Misbach

Judge Bernard Ngoepe's decision to recuse himself from the Jacob Zuma rape trial might have been to protect the integrity of the judiciary - but it could set a dangerous precedent.

This is the view of Muzi Msimang, president of the Black Lawyers Association.

Msimang said yesterday that the association's position was that the independence of the judiciary was "sacrosanct".

"That includes resisting pressure from all quarters, including the government," Msimang said.

He said he did not know the grounds for the judge's decision but that a judge would recuse himself if there was a "perception that his impartiality might be compromised".

He said Ngoepe might well have acted to protect the judiciary.

"But I must sound a warning," Msimang said. "I hope [Ngoepe's decision] does not create a dangerous precedent that will allow any prosecution to ask for this sort of thing."

"What if a white man does not want to appear before a black judge, or the other way around?"

Zuma's legal team brought the application for Ngoepe's recusal on the grounds of the judge's involvement in granting search warrants in Zuma's separate corruption trial to be held in Durban in June.

Ngoepe told the court he was stepping aside, but not for the reasons put forward by Zuma's defence.

"The protection of the credibility of the judiciary weighs heavily with me," the judge said.

Sheila Cameron, justice spokesman for the Democratic Alliance, welcomed the judge's decision.

"I know the judge very well," she said.

"He is a wise and strong leader and would never cave in under pressure."



RECUSED: Judge Bernard Ngoepe



TRIAL TURMOIL: Police hold back onlookers yesterday during the rape trial of embattled ANC deputy president Jacob Zuma.

Protesters clash at Zuma trial

Anti-rape groups and supporters of Jacob Zuma exchanged insults outside the Johannesburg high court yesterday as lawyers inside asked the trial judge to recuse himself.

A small group of anti-rape protesters chanted in Zulu, "Why are you playing around with your pants? Now you have caused a problem."

A pro-Zuma supporter, bearing a traditional shield and three sticks, pointed at them and shouted "Look at these bitches".

STRONG STAND: Miles Bhude, life president of the Prisoners' Organisation for Human Rights, stages a picket during the Zuma rape trial. PHOTOS: PAJ BERGHO

About 30 people, mostly women, held placards reading "Rape is always a crime", "Solidarity with women who speak out" and "Silence does not equal consent".

The protesters included members of People Opposed to Women Abuse (Powa), the Gender Aids Forum, the Forum for the Empowerment of Women, a black lesbian group, and the Positive Women's Network.

Carrie Shelver, Powa's public awareness manager, said her group was demonstrating in support of survivors of sexual violence, and of the complainant in the Zuma rape case. She is a 31-year-old HIV-Aids activist whom Zuma allegedly raped last year in his Forest Town, Johannesburg home.

"Survivors get very little support in South Africa," Shelver said - Sapa

cyan magenta black • Sowetan • 14 February 2006 • Page 5

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How can we help you?



FUND FUN: Jacob Zuma's supporters paid R25 each to attend a concert in the Jabulani amphitheatre in Soweto yesterday.

PHOTO: ANTONIO MICHAEL

PRE-TRIAL JIVE

Thousands of fans dance to JZ's tune at fund-raising concert

Khanyisile Nkosi and Ida Lekota

Rape-accused Jacob Zuma, 61, yesterday danced up a storm at the Jabulani amphitheatre in Soweto, Johannesburg.

And thousands of supporters cheered him at the fund-raising concert in his honour.

The former deputy president performed his signature song *Acafish' Umshini amini* on the eve of the expected judgment in his rape trial.

Zuma was accompanied by family members, including *umshosha* from his Ntshalalala clan.

The amphitheatre has the capacity to accommodate about 7 000 people, but conservative

estimates indicated there were about 10 000 supporters there. Thousands more were outside the venue.

The Johannesburg high court is expected to deliver its judgment today on allegations that the ANC deputy president raped a 31-year-old HIV-positive family friend on November 2 last year.

The judgment will be broadcast live on e.tv and SABC television as well as on radio stations, including 702.

Judging by the mood at the well-attended concert, which was organised by the popular maskandi group, *Izingane Zuma*, Zuma's support is far from waning. Each person paid R25 to attend the concert.

The maskandi group said the concert was held to raise funds for Zuma's other court case, a corruption trial involving convicted Durban businessman Schabir Shaik. It is expected to begin in July.

Zuma's arrival at the concert was spectacular.

There were loud cheers, jubilant salutation and whistling as an *imbongi* sang Zuma's praises as he approached the stage.

The *imbongi* described Zuma as an "anointed leader who, like Nelson Mandela, triumphed over those who tried to silence him".

Before his performance Zuma thanked the crowd for their support. He said they made him feel "human".


He said he would not comment on his rape trial because it would amount to contempt of court.

Zuma led the amphitheatre in song and mesmerised with his moves when he danced across the stage and urged the crowd to join in. The venue reverberated with song and dance.

The artists who performed at the concert included 14 other maskandi and *imbongi* groups. One of them, Shree Nontekhala, won a Sama award at the weekend.

Gospel artist Audile Zuma entertained as did Bongani Zuma, Mazamhane and Makhosonke Zuma.

The partying went on late into the night.



CRITICISED: President Thabo Mbeki says he supports a woman president.

Mbeki's timing raises gender issue for Cosatu

Cosatu in KwaZulu-Natal says questions have been raised about the timing of President Thabo Mbeki's statement that the next president of the country should be a woman, SABC news reported yesterday.

Mbeki said on Friday that he saw no reason why the next president of the country could not be a woman.

"I have been criticised about this," Mbeki told hundreds of women in Phuthaditjhaba in the Free State.

"But as far as I am concerned the next president of South Africa should be a woman."

Zet Laziqho, Cosatu's provincial secretary, said the statement came at a time when everyone was awaiting the verdict in Jacob Zuma's rape trial.

Laziqho said women should not be used for what he called selfish political agendas hidden in campaigns for women empowerment.

He said that it should be asked what made Mbeki so confident that the next president would be a woman.

Meanwhile, the office of the Gauteng provincial police commissioner said yesterday that a number of systems were in place to ensure that safety and security prevailed during the judgment in the Zuma trial today.

"We will do whatever is necessary to safeguard and protect the lives and property of our citizens," the office said. — Sapa

Exile for Zuma's accuser, nothing for others

Waghied Misbach

Women's groups have welcomed security measures for Jacob Zuma's rape accuser to be relocated overseas, but have raised concerns about the safety of thousands of South African women who are not adequately protected by the criminal justice system.

This response from activists campaigning against women and child abuse comes in the wake of reports that Zuma's rape complainant will be moved because of fear for her life in South Africa.

Yesterday's report in *Soewetan's* sister newspaper, the *Sunday Times*, quoted senior figures within the security establishment

confirming that the complainant will be whisked out of the country for her own safety.

The report said a high-level security assessment had been made by officials from the police, intelligence agencies and witness protection programme in February. The report indicated that she has not been held in the National Prosecuting Authority's witness protection programme, but has been under close police guard.

The Witness Protection Act allows for aftercare after a trial based on a security assessment. The assessment showed there was an immediate threat to the woman's life. She was not safe in South Africa and would have to be

relocated outside of the country. She would not be moved to an African country because her safety might be compromised by

'For her personal safety it is a good thing, but it is a sad indictment of the system'

poor security and bribery.

The conclusions were reached after her picture was burnt outside the Johannesburg high court and her home in KwaMashu was

broken into twice.

"For her personal safety it is a good thing, but it is a sad indictment of the system. It reflects that the criminal justice system can't protect complainants," said Samantha Waterhouse from Resources Aimed at the Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect.

"Many people I work with drop cases because they are told by police that they can't be protected."

Waterhouse also slammed Zuma for not coming out "much more strongly" against the behaviour of his supporters outside the court.

Lisa Vetten from the Tshwaraning Legal Advocacy Centre agreed that the move was

good for the complainant, but she echoed the same concerns.

"It's a good thing because the case has taken a terrible toll on her," Vetten said.

"But on the other hand I am totally horrified that this should happen in a country with our constitution, where the rights of people are upheld to lay charges."

Vetten said this was a serious indictment on the security agencies which cannot protect the safety of rape survivors.

Though many complainants do tell the police about harassment, often the courts do not revoke bail for the accused, said Vetten.

ZUMA SOBS

Prayer meeting touches a raw nerve

Mary Papayya and Canaan Mdlotshe

Jacob Zuma took one look at his friends, family and supporters and wept.

Far from being the usually jovial, firing and confident man, Zuma shed tears on Saturday.

The country's former deputy president wept during a prayer meeting at eThekweni Community Church in Durban. The meeting was a show of support for Zuma, who faces judgment today in his rape trial.

Zuma has admitted he did not use a condom, but has insisted the sex was consensual.

For nearly a month the country has been gripped by the intriguing details emanating from the rape case. There was the baby oil massage and then the shower afterwards, the latter said to have been to minimise the risk of contracting HIV.

Kemp J Kemp, Zuma's lawyer, said his client did the sensible thing when he took the shower.

But on the eve of the judgment Zuma, for the first time since the trial started, broke down and cried. Many of those

who attended the prayer meeting were moved to tears when Zuma broke down.

At previous meetings the ANC deputy president had put on a brave face, often dancing and singing, but on Saturday tears were streaming down his face.

"We pray the sun won't go down on us on Monday [today] as this country is sitting on a time bomb that might explode the moment the judge passes his verdict," said Bheki Cele, MEC for community safety and liaison in KwaZulu-Natal, who attended the weekend prayer meeting.

Judge Willem van der Merwe began delivering his judgment this morning.

Police said they had already made contingency plans to deal with any possible unlawful behaviour in the vicinity of the court.

The Sunday Times yesterday reported that the woman who accused Zuma of rape might be taken out of the country as a safety measure.

Even if Zuma is found not guilty, his troubles will be far from over. In a few months, Zuma will be in court again fac-

ing serious corruption charges related to his dealings with convicted fraudster Schabir Shaik.

Unfazed, Durban businessman Shaik, a confidant and former financial adviser of Zuma, yesterday spoke out for the first time on the rape allegations.

Shaik, who himself was found guilty of fraud and corruption, said he is confident that Zuma will be a free man today.


Shaik said the rape trial was a sinister plot against Zuma. The fact that "a few good men have kept silent on this and many other issues" shows that there is "a plot" and "there are detractors against him".

Shaik said the support shown by Zuma supporters both inside and outside the court was symptomatic of people speaking out against oppression.

"If this oppression continues unabated it will lead to anarchy," Shaik said.

Zuma faces corruption charges later this year related to dealings he had with Shaik after Durban Judge Hilary Squires found that Shaik had a "generally corrupt relationship" with Zuma.

● See pages 12 and 13.



WEeping: Jacob Zuma

What people on the street say:

Ntwaagae Seleka, Duda Susani and Sae Masuku

While fans of ANC deputy president Jacob Zuma celebrated with him in Soweto yesterday, other citizens had a lot to say about the verdict to be delivered in his rape trial in the Johannesburg high court today.

A snap survey by Sowetan on the streets of Johannesburg and Durban yesterday solicited mixed reactions, with those in Durban unanimously saying that he is innocent.

● **Riaz Saboya, 30**, a mechanic from Florida, Johannesburg.
Verdict: Guilty
Reason: The facts in court

show he raped her.

Is he fit to be president?
No, he has brought shame to the country. But he has contributed so much to the freedom of this country that the least that can be done is to give him a ministerial post such as minister without portfolio.

● **Garry Morton, 28**, a mechanic from Bosmont, Johannesburg.
Verdict: Not guilty

Reason: The complainant has accused several men of rape before and the way she was dressed in Zuma's house.

Is he fit to be president?
No, the accusations against him has diminished his image.
● **Anna Mary Diederiks, 41**, from



Witpoortje, Johannesburg.
Verdict: Guilty
Reason: The woman had a strong case against him.

Is he fit to be president?
No, he is not worthy. What kind of a leader violates women?

● **Charl Esktoen, 28**, a technician from Krugersdorp.
Verdict: Guilty

Reason: He knew about her HIV status but still went ahead,

because he is cruel, without using a condom.

Is he fit to be president?
No, we don't want an alleged rapist to rule this country. If he becomes president he will do whatever he wants with women.

● **Ross Hatting, 53**, unemployed, from Florida in Roodoepoort.
Verdict: Guilty

Reason: He definitely forced himself on her. If they had con-

ensual sex they would have used condoms.

Is he fit to be president?
No, he is scandalous and has a negative stigma of crime.

● **Albert de Waal, 29**, technician from Bosmont, Johannesburg.
Verdict: Not guilty

Reason: She came to his house with a plan to drag his image through the mud. She has done it with others.

Is he fit to be a leader?
No, because his image has been tarnished and it will be worse with the fraud case.

● **Kgolo Tema**, an events organiser from Durban.
Verdict: Not guilty

Reason: Judging by the evidence I don't think he raped that woman.

Is he fit to be a leader?
No, it will create problems for the country.

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CENTURION 012 882 1187	DURBAN 031 237 8284	ELDRING 011 827 8274	JOHANNESBURG 011 822 2792
WEDDARD 011 215 8375		BRANKFAN 082 762 8149	BONSBURG 011 490 2655
KIMBERLY 082 802 7612		SPRINGS 011 811 2362	BEPOFOVEN 011 490 2655
		ADRIKON PARK 012 229 8623	BERTRAM 011 818 1282
		SEABRISTON 011 872 1807	

Appendix 10

'SHE WAS READY FOR SEX'

Zuma provides steamy version of night in bed

Khanyisile Nkosi and Kingdom Mabuza

ANC deputy president Jacob Zuma told the Johannesburg high court yesterday that he knew the risks involved when he had unprotected sex with an HIV-positive woman.

Taking the witness stand in a bid to prove his innocence after being accused of raping the 31-year-old woman, Zuma said he knew that his chances of contracting the deadly disease were negligible because of his knowledge of HIV-Aids.

Zuma told the court that he had acquired a "better knowledge and understanding" of HIV issues while he was chairman of the Aids Council, a position he held during his reign as deputy president of the country.

He said the fact that he slept with an HIV-positive person without using a condom did not mean that he was infected with the disease.

"I had knowledge that chances of a male person contracting the disease from a [HIV] positive female person were slim," said Zuma.

He said he was also aware that women were at greater risk of contracting HIV when having unprotected sex with a man who was infected.

Asked by his defence lawyer, Advocate Kemp J Kemp, if the complainant had any reason to think she was at risk of being re-infected with HIV or contracting any sexually transmitted disease from him, Zuma said he had no reason to believe she was at risk.

Zuma, 63, has pleaded not guilty to a charge of raping the woman at his home in Forest Town, Johannesburg, on November 2. He said that he had consensual sex with the complainant.

Zuma said the woman had arrived at his home that day, saying she had something to tell him. They agreed to discuss the matter that night after he finished working.

He said that when he finished his work he went to the guest bedroom where the woman was sleeping.



TAKE THAT: Supporters of rape accused Jacob Zuma burn a pair of panties outside the Johannesburg high court yesterday.

PHOTOS: MOHAU MOFOKENG

"She was lying on her stomach sucking her thumb. She was asleep. I woke her up and asked her if she still wanted to speak to me," said Zuma. "She said 'yes'. I then said she can come to my bedroom.



"As I was preparing the bed she walked in and sat on the bed. I then gave her a chance to tell me what she had been longing to discuss with me, but she said she was cold and asked if she could get underneath the duvet covers. I said 'yes'," said Zuma.

He said he then started asking himself questions about her intentions because she was dressed only in a kanga.

"I took off my clothes and put on my short pyjamas. I expected her to object to my undressing in front of her, but she did not," Zuma said.

He said the woman com-

plained that her body felt tired and asked for a massage.

"I told her that I did not have massage oils but only had baby oil. She said it was fine," said Zuma.

He said when he returned with the baby oil, he found the woman lying on her stomach.

"She loosened the kanga from the front so that I could lower it.

"As I did that I noticed that she was not wearing her panties. I realised that she was up to something.

"I started massaging her back. When I finished she asked me to massage her legs. I massaged one leg and then moved to the other," said Zuma.

He said she did not object to the massage, even when his hands reached her private parts.

When he finished, the complainant asked for the front part of her body to be massaged, Zuma said.

He said when the complainant turned to face upwards, her naked body was exposed.

"I massaged

her. When I was finished she thanked me. I then took the baby oil back to the bathroom, washed my hands and returned to the bedroom.

"When I got underneath the duvet covers, she put her arm around me. I realised that she wanted something and also started touching her. I took off my pyjamas.

"She put her leg on me. We started touching and kissing. When I touched her private parts I realised she was ready. I [got] on top of her and she opened her thighs."

Zuma said he hesitated when he realised that neither of them had a condom, but said that they did have sex.

Zuma said that during the sex, he told the complainant she was a "real woman".

"When I asked her if I should ejaculate inside of her, she did not respond, she just smiled."

Zuma said he showered afterwards. When he returned to his room the woman had gone back to the guest bedroom.

The trial continues.



DEFENCE: Kemp J Kemp

Disgraced, anxious and angry

Kingdom Mabuza and Khanyisile Nkosi

ANC deputy president Jacob Zuma told the Johannesburg high court yesterday that the former National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) boss Balelani Ngcuka was one of the ANC members who did not want him to become president of the organisation.

"I do not wish to reveal much, but I will mention what is not a secret anymore.

"When Mr Ngcuka was investigating a case of corruption, he reached a certain point and called some newspaper editors to a secret meeting and asked for their support to fight me.

"He even said he will not take me to court, but will leave me to the world," said Zuma.

He said Intelligence Minister Ronnie Kasrils also appeared to be opposed to him.

"His actions of late show he is after something," Zuma said.

Kasrils, who has been accused of orchestrating the move to purge Billy Masetlha, the former head of intelligence and alleged Zuma sympathiser, has been identified as one of the people the 31-year-old complainant contacted after the alleged rape in November.

"When a person is accused of rape it has an effect. That is the reason I volunteered to step down on some of my duties as an ANC leader," Zuma said.

He said it was the media and his supporters that had spoken about him as being the next president of the ANC.

Zuma also admitted he was close to the complainant's father while in exile. He said he was shocked when a rape charge was laid because he had been under the impression that the intercourse had been consensual.

Zuma told Judge Willem van der Merwe that he did not mention sex in the statement handed to police investigators because the matter was "already all over the newspapers".

Vivian Mooki

Two alleged masterminds of counterfeit Tsotsi and Mama Jack DVDs cut sad frames at Johannesburg's specialised commercial crimes court yesterday.

Sipho Sangweni, 29, from Soweto, and Glynis Lincoln, 31, of Auckland Park, are alleged to have defrauded the two local movies of a total of R11.7 million.

They allegedly mass produced the DVDs and sold them for a profit.

Arrested on Friday, they have

Fake 'Tsotsi' DVD suspects in court

been charged with fraud, theft, corruption and contravening the Electronic Communications Act, the Copyright Act and the Counterfeit Act.

They applied for bail yesterday and magistrate Jerry Jansen van Vuuren released them on R20 000 and R20 000 bail respectively.

Lawyers for Sangweni, a tech-

nician at Panasonic and Lincoln, a facility co-ordinator at a Johannesburg film laboratory in Lyndhurst, said their clients intended to plead not guilty and that Lincoln, a former employer of the SABC, denied the allegations made against her.

The case was postponed to June 21.

Their arrest and subsequent court appearance has delighted James Lemmon, the chief executive of the Southern African Federation Against Copyright Theft.

He said their arrests, if the two were found guilty, would reduce the number of fake DVDs appearing in the country.

"The two suspects were

involved in the editing process of Tsotsi and Mama Jack respectively. They apparently took copies of the final versions of both movies and distributed them," Lemmon said.

"All the fake DVDs sold in every corner of our cities were allegedly produced by these two."

Lemmon said fake movie DVDs and game CDs were costing the country more than R400 million a year.

Last year Safact confiscated more than 1.1 million fake copies of several films nationwide.

ZUMA RAPE TRIAL

LINES ON FIRE

Calls galore before and after 'attack'

Kingdom Mabuza and Khanyisile Nkosi

Former deputy president Jacob Zuma received 54 SMS messages from the complainant in his rape trial before the alleged rape, the Johannesburg high court heard yesterday.

And Zuma made nine phone calls in one day to the woman after she had accused him of raping her.

Jan le Roux, a phone analyst, told the court that Zuma made the calls from his cellphone.

Le Roux did not reveal the contents of the calls. The court ruled that Zuma and the complainant's phone numbers should not be published or broadcast by the media.

Zuma, 61, has denied raping the 31-year-old daughter of a late friend at his home in Forest Town, Johannesburg, home on November 2. He claims they had consensual sex.

In a presentation shown in court, KwaZulu-Natal MEC for finance Zweli Mkhize featured prominently in more than 20 phone calls and SMSes - excluding the nine calls made by Zuma to the complainant - after the alleged rape.

The calls that Mkhize made projected him as a mediator between the alleged victim's family and Zuma.

The presentation showed that Mkhize called Zuma, the alleged victim, her mother, former journalist Ranjeri Murrumy and lawyer Yusuf Docrat, whom he allegedly engaged to discourage the complainant from proceeding with the case.

Mkhize called the alleged victim 18 times. Zuma also made calls to the mother of the alleged victim, the court heard.

Docrat confirmed in court that Mkhize had asked him to offer legal advice to the alleged victim and her family.



PURIFICATION: ANC supporters of Jacob Zuma sing freedom songs and burn 'impopho', an African herb used in cleansing ceremonies. PHOTO: MBLIZEN ZULU

Rape accuser's photo e-mailed

Kingdom Mabuza

The identity of the alleged victim in the rape case involving Jacob Zuma is circulating among e-mail users.

Sowetan received an e-mail with the alleged victim's picture posted in as an attachment.

The court ruled that the woman's identity should not be published or exposed for security reasons.

The image is similar to the one the crowd burnt outside the court last week, referring to the woman as "a bitch".

Kaizer Mohan, spokesman for the Friends of Jacob Zuma, distanced Zuma supporters from the incident and said the people who distributed the picture had been paid by Zuma's enemies.

Zizi Kodwa, the ANC Youth League's spokesman, said he was shocked. "We hope the culprits will be found," he said.

Sally de Beer, national spokesman for the police, said was unaware of the e-mail. She referred Sowetan to the Gauteng police spokesman Mary Martins-Engelbrecht, who would not comment.

Top cop messed up procedures at Zuma's home

Khanyisile Nkosi and Kingdom Mabuza

Police commissioner Norman Taioe did not follow standard police procedures when he asked Jacob Zuma to point out the scene of the alleged crime.

The shortcomings emerged in Taioe's testimony in Zuma's rape case in the Johannesburg high court.

Taioe's was responding to questions from Zuma's lawyer, Advocate Kemp J Kemp. He asked the top cop about his failure to warn Zuma about his rights before the former deputy president pointed out the alleged crime scene at his home in Johannesburg on November 13.

Taioe said he did not do that because Zuma and his lawyer, Michael Hulley, were cooperative. He also admitted that he did not

complete the standard form the police use to take statements, confessions and pointouts.

Taioe is the seventh witness to take the stand in the Zuma trial being heard in the Johannesburg high court.

Zuma, 61, pleaded not guilty to the charge of rape, saying that the 31-year-old complainant, the daughter of a late friend, had had consensual sex with him.

Taioe said his visit to Zuma's home was a follow up to a



meeting they had in Nkandla, KwaZulu-Natal, the previous week. He said it was agreed that the next meeting at Zuma's home in Johannesburg would be to "familiarise ourselves with the alleged crime scene".

"Was that the only purpose?" asked Kemp.

"Also to take photos of the scene," Taioe answered.

He said the reason for taking pictures was to gauge the distance from Zuma's bedroom to the guest room the complainant

had said was the crime scene.

Taioe said they had also agreed at the meeting in Nkandla to take DNA samples from the accused, but the police did not do the tests that day.

"I told him [Hulley] that it [the visit] was a follow up to the one in Nkandla," he said.

Taioe said he asked Zuma to show the police the alleged crime scene when they arrived at the house. He said Zuma showed them the guest room, his bedroom and the rest of the house.

Taioe, who said he is in the pro-Zuma camp, denied that he had deliberately tried to trap the accused by asking him to point out the alleged crime scene.

When asked if he had recorded the accused's responses, Taioe said he had not because he thought it was unnecessary. The trial continues.

Alliance of DA and small parties takes Cape Town

By Sowetan Reporters

In a day of shocks and high drama, the DA's Helen Zille was voted in as the new mayor of Cape Town.

She beat the ANC's candidate, Nomandla Mfeketo.

Zille received 106 votes against Mfeketo's 103.

Zille's victory was a clear indication that the DA has managed to woo the smaller parties away from the alliance between Patricia De Lille's Independent Democrats (ID) and the ANC.

The DA and the rest of the smaller parties together had 106 votes, which means that one per-

son from the ANC or the ID also voted for Zille.

The ANC and the ID also lost out when the position of speaker went to the Freedom Front Plus and deputy mayor's post went to the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP).

Zille said afterwards that the

alliance meant that a multiparty executive committee would be formed with representative from all the smaller parties.

Faoline Cupida, the ACDP's leader in the Western Cape, said her party had been unable to accept the ANC's insistence that Mfeketo become mayor "because

there were instances of corruption in the city under Mfeketo".

The ANC congratulated Zille on her election and thanked those who supported Mfeketo. The party also committed itself to working "to unite the people of Cape Town to promote effective local government".

STRIDENT HUSH



Sad day for ANC as pool of potential candidates dwindles

It is nice to see the ANC is finally shaking off its long slumber and joining the rest of the country.

After all, why has it taken the party so long to realise that there is a vigorous and vibrant election campaign under way to install its new president?

Last week Jacob Zuma, the ANC deputy president, was photographed holding babies – the classic campaign politician's stunt – and listening to elders in his home town.

The next day he was speaking at a rally where he again alleged that he had been vilified by the media. He has also given media interviews and has spoken at other meetings since his acquittal on rape charges.

In all of these appearances, Zuma said if the people called on him to lead the country he would do so.

If Jacob Zuma is not on the campaign trail then I clearly do not know politics. After all, he is unlikely to be traversing the country for fun.

So it was nice to see that the clever policy architects at the ANC saw fit to put pen to paper and release a document that will try to put some meat on the debate – or lack thereof – on who succeeds President Thabo Mbeki as leader of the party and, possibly, of the country.

According to our sister newspaper the Sunday Times, the ANC will officially release a policy document on succession that will lead to debates on whether Mbeki should be retained as party president or if someone else should succeed him.

The party elects a new leader and a national executive committee next December. But some formations within the party are already calling for the party congress to be brought forward to December this year

so that a new leader and clear power broker can emerge and stop the in-fighting that has bedevilled the ANC.

Those who hold this view do not believe that Mbeki has enough power and authority, at the moment, to bring order to the ANC.

The ANC document states that the party has two choices.

It says the first would be to elect the experienced Mbeki to continue as party president.

If this were to happen the question of who becomes the president of the country if the ANC wins the 2009 national elections remains open.

The ANC's deputy president – whoever that would be post-conference – or someone else, could then become president in 2009.

This option, the document points out, is dangerous in that it could lead to intense lobbying by those who want to be appointed by the ANC as its presidential candidate.

"It would not allow Mbeki the time and space to gradually bow out while also assisting the new ANC president to establish an appropriate profile before the election campaign," the Sunday Times said.

"If this option [choosing Mbeki to continue as ANC president] is adopted, then the ANC will need very clearly and very firmly, possibly as a resolution of national conference, to assert that the ANC is not considering amending the constitution to provide for a third term.

"While unconventional and not provided for in the ANC constitution and processes, the NEC may wish earlier than the list processes to designate the ANC deputy president [or whoever else] as the movement's candidate in the 2009 elections and ask branches to endorse it."



CAMPAIGN TRAIL: Other candidates duck out of sight as Zuma heads out to canvass votes.

The document says that electing a new ANC president – as opposed to continuing with Mbeki – would convey the sense of a new beginning.

The opening of a debate on ANC succession is welcome.

Mbeki himself told the Gordon Institute of Business Science this week that ordinary South Africans should speak about the succession.

"What do our people say? Where do they see South Africa in future? We look and see all these reports, these ups and downs, the fights ... all these things happening in the ANC ...

"Some people want to hang on to the presidency and others want to take over. We see all of that," he said.

It is my view that the ANC document is likely to be consigned to history even before the ANC conference next December.

This is simply because the idea of a president who is junior

to Mbeki as ANC president will not fly.

Even if this proposal were entertained for longer than three seconds in the ANC, the truth is that anyone who enters the Union Buildings after an ANC victory in 2009 will stop taking Mbeki's calls.

Every leader needs to put a stamp on his party and his own presidency.

Mbeki has put his own particular signature on the ANC and the country.

He has grabbed certain opportunities and has squandered many others. There are no second chances or power grabs behind the back door.

The ANC needs a new leader to mold it back into a coherent machine that fulfills its historic promise to eradicate poverty and bring true liberty to the people of South Africa.

Thabo Mbeki has had his chance and has made a mag-

nificent contribution. It is time for him to go. But who will be the new leader?

Jacob Zuma, seeing as he is already drumming up support across the length and breadth of the country, believes that he can be that new leader. Many others agree that he can do it.

If that is the case then let him take his chances at the national conference in December.

But where are the others? Does the ANC have only two leaders capable of leading? Does the ANC only have two leaders with the hunger to lead it?

It is a sad day when one of the greatest parties on the continent – and in the world – can muster only a single, scandal-ridden candidate to take over its leadership.

It is a sad day when we boast of a democracy but all the revolutionary voices we used to hear in the 1980s and early 1990s have gone so quiet. What are these leaders afraid of?

Humane to alleviate winter of discontent



BRRR: A cold front passes over Gauteng driving these children to a brazier in Canadganda informal settlement in Nancefield, Soweto. PHOTO: MIBUZINI ZULU

This truly is the winter of our discontent. Across the country we sit in front of heaters, braziers, fireplaces and all sorts of contraptions to keep ourselves warm.

We are wrapped up in jerseys and scarves and massive jackets in an attempt to keep out the chill.

But this is a relentless winter. It is cold to the bone, so cold that one feels the life go out of one's fingers and toes after just a few minutes outside.

In Johannesburg this week-end, I watched in horror as rain came down, meaning it was going to get colder. There were reports that Durban and Pietermaritzburg were lashed by hailstones the size of golf balls. In the Free State, Limpopo and the Drakensberg mountains heavy

snow arrived with a vengeance. More snow is expected in the Eastern Cape and parts of KwaZulu-Natal.

And things are going to get worse, say weather forecasters.

Some of us are lucky enough to have something to protect ourselves from the elements. We live in houses and have enough of a wardrobe to dress warmly.

But spare a thought for the homeless this winter. Spare a thought for those who are, through no fault of their own, driven to find themselves on the city streets and in alleyways – at a time when the elements can easily kill them.

This weekend I nearly wept when I saw a young man parking cars wearing only sandals. It was deathly cold.

What can we do?

There are charities that give soap, clothes, shoes and blankets to the destitute. Some also give shelter. We should, all of us who have a little something to give, try to give something to help lessen the terrible conditions that our compatriots find themselves in. It is a terrible pity that in this day that we still have people facing death from cold. But that is just the way it is.

As individuals, though, we can help. We do not have to wait for the government. We can give a little here, we can help a relative who is destitute there, we can take a homeless child in before he disappears into the streets. Whatever it is you can do, as an individual, please do it.

We owe it to ourselves and to our own humanity.

INTUITION ON TRIAL

The woman who has accused Jacob Zuma of rape had ulterior motives when she arrived at his home in Johannesburg last November, his daughter told the Johannesburg high court yesterday.

"She was either trying to seduce my father or get money from him," said Duduzile Zuma, 23.

She did not want the woman to spend the night at her father's house because she had an uneasy feeling about her, Zuma said.

"Something about her just wasn't sitting right with me."

She told the court that she was protective of her father.

Zuma said she arrived at her father's house on the evening of November 2, the night of the alleged rape, and was irritated when she saw the complainant in the house.

"I thought she was there to sponge off my dad. I just had that feeling when my dad introduced her as a comrade's child ... and they always need help."

The well-spoken Zuma said it

Zuma's daughter testifies rape accuser made her 'uneasy'

was "women's intuition" that made her immediately feel suspicious and irritated by the woman's presence at her father's home in Forest Town that evening.

State prosecutor Herman Broodryk broke the tension by remarking in a booming voice "that [women's intuition] is a very dark and dangerous area for a man".

Zuma said they made small talk while preparing the evening meal of samp and beans.

She felt that the woman had hinted about needing money to go to Swaziland to visit a relative who had been bitten by a snake.

Zuma had told the court earlier that she became annoyed when the complainant turned down the offer of a lift home, and when she said that she always travelled with a tooth brush and a pair of panties.

When the complainant came



VIVA Z: Zuma supporters outside the Johannesburg high court where Jacob Zuma's trial continues.

PHOTO: PETER HOGGARI

to Zuma's room to borrow the book *The Princess* she asked to talk to Zuma's father.

Zuma then took her to the study where her father was working and left her there when

her father took a call on his cellphone.

"I left her there ... thinking about what she was trying to do."

"The way she was dressed [in a kanga] I thought she was definitely trying to entice my dad to sleep with her," she said.

The short skirt that Jacob Zuma claims was used to entice him was mentioned again yesterday, but in his daughter's version it appeared to be a part of the complainant's work attire.

Duduzile Zuma said she had intended to keep an eye on the woman and later lay in her bed waiting to hear the woman's footsteps going from her father's study back to the guest room.

But she fell asleep and was woken the next morning by the sound of the front door opening. She assumed it was the complainant leaving.

Jacob Zuma denies the charge of rape but says that he and the complainant had consensual sex. - Sapa

ELECTING MEMBERS FOR THE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE OF THE NZHELELE CATCHMENT WATER USER ASSOCIATION (WUA)

The Nzhelele Catchment WUA will proceed with the process of electing members for its Management Committee. According to Chapter 8 of the National Water Act, No. 36 of 1998, a WUA is established to manage, use, control, conserve, develop and protect water resources. It is through this management committee that the WUA will be able to implement these functions. The WUA subscribes to the requirement set out in Section 2 of the National Water Act, No. 36 of 1998, in respect of ensuring appropriate community, racial and gender representation within the Management Committee.

Only members of the Nzhelele Catchment WUA are invited to participate in this election.

Election Details:

- Date** : 28 April 2006
- Time** : 08h00 to 1600
- Venues** : Rabali Showground
Dopeni Agriculture Office
Vhutshimavu Pack House

For further information, contact Matildah Mmola on
Tel. (015) 290 1249 • Fax (015) 295 3249 or
e-mail: molam@dwaf.gov.za



water & forestry
Department
Water Affairs and Forestry
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

E-mail case heads to court

The Pretoria regional court has dismissed an application to throw out the case against an information technology executive at the centre of an alleged hoax e-mail conspiracy in the ANC.

Muziwendoda Sikhona Kunene's defence representatives had asked that the case be set aside because of high court action over his arrest on a search-and-seizure warrant rather than an arrest warrant.

But prosecutor Matric Laphondo produced documents showing that though a high court application had been made, it was removed from the roll last December.

Magistrate Lesetja Mphahle found that the prosecution had acted within its rights in arresting Kunene and that there was no pending high court matter preventing the case from going ahead.

The matter was postponed to May 10 for further investigation.

Kunene was arrested in December for allegedly distributing hoax e-mails implicating senior members of the ANC in a conspiracy against the party's deputy president, Jacob Zuma, and against the party's secretary-general,



LAWFUL ARREST: Muziwendoda Sikhona Kunene

Kgalema Motlanthe.

He is accused of contravening the Intelligence Services Oversight Act by not providing information about the e-mails to the inspector-general of intelligence, Zola Ngeakani.

The saga resulted in President Thabo Mbeki's dismissing Billy Masetlha, the national intelligence agency's director-general. - Sapa

UKWAZI SCHOOL OF NURSING: PRETORIA MISSED OUR JANUARY 2006 INTAKE?

Students can now register daily at the school between the hours of 08h00 and 16h00 for our next CARE WORKER course commencing 15 May 2006.

The School is situated at 3rd Floor,
South Wing, MBA Building, 527 Church Street,
Arcadia, Pretoria

For further information contact us on
(012) 341 8703 or 341 8705 or 341 5573
(fax) (012) 341 5579 or write to us at PO Box 29582,
Sunyani 0132.

uKwazi
SCHOOL OF NURSING
YOUR HEALTH CARE EDUCATORS

Sowetan

says

Charnel house of misery

Service delivery has always been the mantra of the ANC and other parties hoping to woo the voting public to cast votes their way.

Hardly a week after the electorate reaffirmed this mandate and delivered a resounding victory to the ANC, Monday's edition of *Sowetan* reported a heart-wrenching story of a hospital in the Free State that has come to characterise the poor state of too many of the country's healthcare institutions.

Bongani Hospital in Welkom is a place of death, rather than one of healing.

And compounding the air of doom and gloom at the hospital is the sight of corpses being wheeled openly through public corridors used by other patients and visitors.

The hospital's saga reads like a tale of horrors from the pen of Stephen King.

Sally, this is no fiction. Bongani Hospital is a life-and-death saga involving real people in a country whose constitution guarantees access to decent healthcare to all.

Even the hospital's doctors, in whose hands lie the fate of the sickly and the infirm, are said to be grieved with the administrative bankruptcy of the institution and the lack of basic amenities.

Naturally this calls for the provincial health authorities to act speedily to redress this unacceptable situation.

Vanity of flesh

One never knows whether to laugh or cry when it comes to singer Kelly Khumalo, the self-proclaimed 21-year-old virgin.


It is admirable for any young woman to abstain from indulging in matters of the flesh until she finds the right partner, but the way Kelly carries on seems to send mixed messages.

Dressing scantily and performing sexually charged dances, as Kelly does, hardly encourages morality.

But if Kelly is a virgin we must applaud her, especially given the scourge of Aids that has taken its toll on our young people.

The only problem, perhaps, is that so many people don't believe she is still a virgin. Why that her raunchy actions so contradict her assertions.

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Sharpeville was start of sanctions against apartheid

It is time we provide the genuine history about what happened in Sharpeville on March 21 in 1960.

The real heroes and martyrs who led the struggle have not received their due praise in the country's history books. I am against the monopolisation of the struggle by one political party.

We should not accept propaganda about that historic day.

We know a programme of action was launched by Africans against the illegitimate system and how the ensuing massacre played an important role in introducing sanctions against apartheid South Africa.

On another issue, why should the colonial name of South Africa still be in use?

In Africa we have Zambia and Nigeria, so why not Azania for South Africa?

Izwe lethu mofrika.
Vincent Mabokela
Johannesburg

Rape is about rape

In the wake of the Jacob Zuma rape trial, I would not be surprised if the rate at which rape victims report their violations drops dramatically.

Who wants her past sexual activities to be publicised and scrutinised? Why is a rape charge not treated only as such?

I bet my last cent that wearing a miniskirt will now be used against a woman who is raped.

My concern is what message is being sent to young minds.
Venus Diale, Pretoria



HAVE YOUR SAY

Malala punting Mbeki for another term is disturbing

I have great respect for Justice Malala's journalistic abilities and always look forward to reading his articles.

I agree with him about former deputy president Jacob Zuma and his conduct, including his inability to rein in his supporters.

What I strongly disagree with, though, is his assertion that "the only candidate left for the presidency of the ANC next year is Thabo Mbeki, and he will listen if the people want him back".

The ANC has an abundance of talent, from the top four - Kgalema Motlanle, Sankie

Mthembu-Mahanyele, Mosisa Lekota, Phumle Mlambo-Ngcuka - through to Cyril Ramaphosa, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Trevor Manuel.

It is disturbing that Malala advocates a third term for Mbeki. We must set an example rather than follow the trend of African presidents who change their constitutions for an extra term.

I hope the article was only meant to stimulate debate or does Malala harbour political ambitions and is silently campaigning to be remembered when the time comes.

Mbuyi Hina, Witwatersrand Park

Bra E deserves to be honoured

A report in *Sowetan* on Monday that Sandile Arena in Pretoria will be renamed after your late entertainment editor must get the thumbs up.

People will be happy with such a move.

Bra E deserves this honour. He was a great journalist who helped to build the entertainment industry in South Africa. His legacy must live on.

Elliot Makhaya was exemplary and a role model to many of us.

I will rally behind this move to honour him.

The committee must speed up the process, for wisdom has been drawn from this man.

Socialites must also be honoured.

Makhaya's people will remember him forever.

I believe that people in the area will appreciate the arena being named after Makhaya.

Parapara Makhabela
Sandileville

Kids' tongues in twist over languages in Limpopo

I find it disturbing that the MEC for education in Limpopo has decided to introduce compulsory mother-tongue education in black schools.

Firstly, Aaron Mokoaleli's kids are all studying at multiracial schools.

Secondly, he did not consult with all stakeholders to

determine if they buy in to his initiative.

Thirdly, Mokoaleli did not scrupulously evaluate if this initiative will disadvantage our children. It was just an emotional decision to prove a point.

If he wants to enrich his CV at the expense of our kids, he should make sure that his

children are also affected.

How on earth is teaching courses such as nursing, engineering, medicine and others going to be feasible?

Maybe Mokoaleli can tell me what schizophrenia is in pure Northern Sotho?

Stop confusing our kids, please.
Khongolani Maluleka, Matrusalele

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Pseudonyms may be used but all letters must include the writer's full name, address and telephone numbers. The editor reserves the right to edit letters.