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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ORANGE

FREE STATE AND THE ROLONG

OF THABA 'NCHU

DURING THE PRESIDENCY OF

J.H. BRAND

1864 - 1888

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN FULFILMENT

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## PREFACE

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
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## INTRODUCTION



SCALE :  
 0 50  
 KILOMETRES.

KEY :



The Roleng Territory.



Boundaries laid down by Major Warden in 1949.

## INTRODUCTION

During the period 1864 to 1888, President J.H. Brand of the Orange Free State Republic had to deal with two Rolong chiefs at Thaba 'Nchu. The first, Chief Moroka II, ruled the Seleka tribe from 1829 to 1880, while his successor Tsipinare, a Tshidi-Rolong, ruled from 1880 to 1884. The majority of the Rolong at Thaba 'Nchu were of the Seleka division, but the minority groups, the Tshidi and Rapulana, also played an important role in the tribe's relations with the Free State.

The Rolong as a whole split up into four main divisions following the Rolong Chief Tau's death in the late 18th Century. The four divisions took their names from Tau's sons, Ratlou, Tshidi, Seleka and Rapulana. Moroka II was the sixth chief of the Seleka branch. His predecessors were: Seleka who ruled ca. 1777 to 1785, Koikoi who ruled ca. 1785 to 1794, followed by Moroka I (1795 to 1800) and Mokgosi (1800 to 1805). Moroka's father, Sefunelo, succeeded Mokgosi in 1805, and steered the tribe through the Difaqane wars until his death in 1829.<sup>1</sup>

The fact that Chief Tsipinare was not directly descended from Seleka in this line, but was a Tshidi-Rolong ruling the Seleka tribe, had momentous consequences for the Rolong of Thaba 'Nchu. There were other divisions within the Thaba 'Nchu society which also had important effects on the history of the Rolong's relationship with the Free State. There were small remnants of other tribes, such as the Hurutshe and the Kwena, who had accepted

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1. Molema, S.M. Chief Moroka, His Life, His Times, His Country and His People P.17

the protection of the Seleka-Rolong and had moved with them to Thaba 'Nchu.

The tribe which had the greatest impact on the relationship between the Rolong and the Free State was, however, the Sotho tribe, living to the south and east of Thaba 'Nchu. Of the Sotho, the Rolong and the Boers, Moshoeshoe's people, the Sotho, were the first to establish themselves in the area between the Orange and the Vaal Rivers. Moroka and his Seleka-Rolong were the second. Moshoeshoe moved his people from Butha Buthe at the head of the Caledon valley to the mountain fortress of Thaba Bosiu in 1824 in order to safeguard himself from Tlokwa attacks. At this time, the Seleka-Rolong, under Sefunelo, had established themselves at Makwassie, north of the Vaal, with the Wesleyan missionaries, Samuel Broadbent and T.L. Hodgson, who had made contact with the tribe in 1823. Like Moshoeshoe, the Rolong were forced to move owing to the turmoils of the Difaqane and took refuge from the Taung, at Platberg on the Vaal River, in 1826. At the same time as Moshoeshoe was extending his power in the Caledon valley by offering his protection to refugee tribesmen and building them into a Sotho nation, segments of various tribes and peoples were gathering at Platberg hoping for the same sort of protection.

By 1833, three years after Moroka became chief, it had become apparent that the area around Platberg could not support this swollen population. The leaders of the various tribes decided to reconnoitre the Modder River and Caledon River areas in an attempt to find suitable sites for resettlement. On 4 May 1833, the Wesleyan missionaries, James Archbell and John Edwards, and, according to Illsley, Chief Moroka, journeyed to the Thaba

area, where they encountered one of Moshoeshoe's vassal chiefs, Moseme of the RaMokhele Taung. According to recent research, it appears that Moseme invited the Rolong to settle at Thaba 'Nchu without consulting Moshoeshoe, in order to enlist their help against the marauding Kora.<sup>2</sup>

In late 1833, the various Platberg peoples journeyed south. The smaller Coloured and Griqua peoples were settled at Mpukani, Merumetsu and Platberg, while approximately 7 000 Rolong settled at Thaba 'Nchu. On 7 December 1833, the Wesleyans attempted to negotiate an agreement with Moshoeshoe which would give the Rolong a definite right to the land around Thaba 'Nchu. Archbell drew up two land transactions, which Moshoeshoe agreed to sign. In the one document, Moshoeshoe agreed to the absolute sale of approximately twenty-five square miles to the Wesleyan Missionary Society for the price of 7 young oxen, one heifer, two sheep and one goat. This was signed by Moshoeshoe, Moseme and the Revs. Archbell, Edwards and Thomas Jenkins. The second document recorded the sale of "all that spacious country designated Thaba 'Nchu ... and also, on the East and North of all those Hills and Dales extending to the Noka ya Tauw/Lion River ...", for the price of nine head of cattle, and seventeen sheep and goats. This was signed by Archbell, Moshoeshoe and Moseme, witnessed by Moroka, Ngakantsie (Moroka's nephew) and Molapo, Moshoeshoe's son.

From the events which followed, it became clear that Moshoeshoe had only intended granting the Rolong the usufruct of the land and regarded the payment of sheep and cattle as the traditional payment of a vassal to his chief. It appears that

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2. Sanders, P. Moshoeshoe. Chief of the Sotho P.63-67

Illsley, W. The Story of Moroka Mission.

in 1833, Moshoeshoe was genuinely ignorant of the European system of alienating land. The missionaries on the other hand were equally unaware of the African system that land was inalienable.<sup>3</sup>

The conflict inherent in the 1833 transactions only became apparent in 1843, by which time the situation in the area west of the Caledon had become further complicated by the influx of large numbers of emigrant Boers, trekking north to escape the jurisdiction of the Cape Colony.

In 1836, Moroka rescued a stranded party of Boers after the Boers successful battle with Mzilikazi's Ndebele at Vechtkop. In their enmity towards Mzilikazi, the Rolong and the Boers found common ground, and established cordial relations. The expansionist Boers, however, soon clashed with the Sotho, who were expanding westwards. In 1843, the Cape Government decided to enter into a treaty with Moshoeshoe to safeguard the Sotho from encroachment. The results of this treaty strengthened the ties between the Rolong and Boers through a common opposition to Moshoeshoe.

Sir George Napier, the Cape Governor, drew up a boundary for the Sotho, which, in addition to the area between the Caledon and Orange Rivers, assigned them a strip of land 25 to 30 miles wide west of the Caledon. The treaty angered the Boers, but it also led to a dispute between Moroka and Moshoeshoe when the latter demanded that Thaba 'Nchu should be included within the Napier line. This sparked off a long and vituperative dispute over land

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3. Venter, I.S.J. Die Ruilkontrakte in 1833-1834 aangegaan tussen Mosjesj en die Wesleyane P.16-33

rights between Moshoeshoe and his Paris Missionaries, and Moroka supported in his claims to independence by the Wesleyans.

Moroka tried to offset Moshoeshoe's claims by appealing to the Governor to sign a treaty with the Rolong. Although he was not successful, it is not surprising that Moroka supported Warden, the second British Resident in the Free State, when he formed an alliance of chiefs opposed to Moshoeshoe in March 1846. In 1849, Moroka assisted Warden in defending Adam Kok against Moshoeshoe and Sekonyela, the Tlokwa chief.<sup>4</sup>

The Rolong chief was rewarded when, in 1849, Warden drew up the boundaries of the Rolong territory, for the Sovereignty Government, along the lines laid down by Archbell in 1833, and recognised Moroka's independence of both the Sotho and the Boers.

Warden drew the Free State-Rolong boundary as follows:

From a beacon on the Modder River 800 yards below the homestead of Paul Smit's farm down Modder River to its junction with Koranna Spruit, thence up Koranna Spruit hill abreast of the rocky hill north of said Spruit, thence up and over said rocky hill to a beacon erected by the British Resident and the Chief Moroka, thence in a straight line to a beacon on a low ridge east of Hans Stein's homestead, thence in a straight line to the S.W. corner beacon of the farm Roelof's Fontein, of Roelof J. van Rooyen.

Moroka's boundary with the Sotho ran along a line from Kaffirskop to a ridge running eastwards to the source of the Makopa River, from there to the junction of the Makopa and Leeuw Rivers. The line then followed the Leeuw River until a point

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4. Venter, I.S.J. Die Sending-stasie Thaba 'Nchu  
1833-1900 P.13

where the line ran northwards to Mekoro, otherwise named Hoepelrok, and from there along the Manganiespruit to Roelofsfontein.<sup>5</sup>

Warden's recognition of Moroka as an independent chief so enraged Moshoeshoe that he attacked Thaba 'Nchu after the British Rolong defeat at Viervoet in 1851, and put the whole tribe to flight.

Despite the Rolong's association with the hated government of the Orange Free State Sovereignty, Moroka's history of opposition to the Sotho made him the natural ally of the Boers when they regained their independence in 1854. Moroka remained on cordial terms with J.P. Hoffman and J.N. Boshoff, the first two Presidents of the Republic, and aided the Free State in the Free State-Sotho war of 1858.

The Free State's failure to subdue the Sotho and the appointment of M.W. Pretorius as President on 8 February 1860 led to a change in Moroka's attitudes. His relations with both the Free State and the Sotho became increasingly equivocal and it was suspected that he was considering switching his alliance to the Sotho. As early as 1861, a Free State burgher expressed the fear that circumstances had changed sufficiently since 1858 to make the possibility of Moroka changing his alliance something that had to be taken into consideration. He wrote to The Friend, "of a sincere friend our bungling government has now made a lukewarm ally, who may soon change into an enemy, and joined to other enemies, a formidable one".<sup>6</sup>

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5. Theal, G.M. Basutoland Records VOL.1.P233  
6. The Friend 8 November 1861

Pretorius's relations with Moroka led to a serious deterioration in trust between the Free State and the Rolong. Pretorius not only cut off Moroka's ammunition supply in an attempt to please Moshoeshoe, but also negotiated an alteration in the Free State-Sotho boundary from Jammerberg Drift to Kaffirskop which had been drawn in 1858 at Mabilela in April 1861, which infuriated Moroka. The Rolong chief complained that the line encroached on his territory at Tochgekregen and at a nearby farm owned by Hans Steijn.<sup>7</sup> Pretorius promised to appoint a commission to investigate the chief's complaint but until 11 May 1862, nothing was done and the grievance rankled.<sup>8</sup> On 13 March 1862, Pretorius, Joseph Allison (Warden's secretary) and Moroka met at Paulsmitsberg to go over the disputed area. When Allison confirmed that Pretorius's line agreed with Warden's description,<sup>9</sup> Moroka protested that Warden had promised to alter the beacons in the area. The chief then attempted to persuade Pretorius to accept certain conditions if he agreed to accept Pretorius's beacons.<sup>10</sup> The Free State Volksraad, however, merely confirmed the Warden line on 4 February 1863, without any concession to Moroka's objections.<sup>11</sup>

The extent to which relations between the Free State and the Rolong had deteriorated by this stage was illustrated during a visit paid by Moroka to Bloemfontein in June 1863. Moroka's purpose was to look for certain horses which he claimed had been stolen from Thaba 'Nchu and taken to Bloemfontein. This from a start upset the Boers, but when Moroka appeared with a large escort, it was feared that his intentions were hostile. That

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7. G.S. 1402 Moroka-Pretorius 15 May 1861  
 8. Theal, G.M. Basutoland Records Vol. 3A P.115  
 9. G.S. 1402 P.175  
 10. G.S. 1402 P.177 ff Moroka-Pretorius 19 June 1863  
 11. V.R.N. 4 February 1863

evening, two burghers were seen pointing a gun through a hole in the building in which Moroka was staying. When Moroka sent two of his sons and a headman, Willem Mokhosi, to complain to the Acting President, they were told to stop or they would be shot, and were driven back into the building. Later the same night, the Fieldcornet of Bloemfontein arrived at the house and told Tsipinare that if it had been in his power, he would have shot all the Rolong.

It appears that the Fieldcornet was aware of another gathering of Rolong at Kafferfontein near Bloemfontein, and feared these were reinforcements for an attack on Bloemfontein. Tsipinare pointed out that the men at Kafferfontein were unarmed and assured the Fieldcornet that the Rolong had only come to look for horses. Moroka, however, was convinced that the Free Staters had attempted to assassinate him, and left Bloemfontein in a hurry.<sup>12</sup>

The State Attorney visited Moroka in an attempt to smooth relations, but was given such a hostile reception that, on his return, he informed the Executive Council that Moroka had declared war.<sup>13</sup> As a result, the Acting President, J.J. Venter, called a public meeting on 1 July to discuss setting up "a volunteer corps of townspeople, to practise gunnery, with a prospect to manning the fort, in case of an attack".<sup>14</sup> The Executive Council, however, came to the conclusion that Moroka was not intent on war. They were correct, as the State Attorney arrived at Thaba 'Nehu shortly after one of Moroka's relatives

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12. G.S. 1402 P.215 Moroka-Allison 19 June 1863  
 13. G.S. 109 P.68-70 Roberts-Govt. Sec. 2 July 1863  
 14. The Friend 10 July 1863

had died. He mistook the tribe's mood for one of hostility to the Free State.<sup>15</sup>

Despite the fact that Moroka had no intention of declaring war on the Free State, Brand, who became President on 2 February 1864, took office at a critical point in the Rolong-Free State relations. Tensions which were inherent in the Rolong's position, sandwiched between two opposing powers, had come to the fore. As early as 1861, Moroka had written to the High Commissioner, P. Wodehouse, stating that he was on good terms with Moshoeshoe.<sup>16</sup> At the beginning of 1864, the possibility of a Rolong-Sotho rapprochement was in the air. Fortunately for Brand, the Seleka-Rolong had a long history of friendship with the Boers and a long history of opposition to the Sotho. It proved easier to remember the friendship with the Boers than to forget and overcome the distrust between Sotho and Rolong.

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15. *ibid.*

16. Theal, G.M. *ibid.* Vol. 3A 27 June 1861

CHAPTER ONE

NEGOTIATIONS TOWARDS A TREATY

## CHAPTER ONE

At the start of Brand's presidency, the Rolong's relationship with the Free State was clouded by past grievances and the deterioration in relations with Pretorius's government. With the threat of renewed war between the Boers and the Sotho, Brand was eager to improve relations with Moroka and to persuade the chief to ally himself with the Free State. The Sotho chief, Moshoeshoe, was, however, aware of the possibilities opened by Moroka's rupture with the Free State and was eager to win the chief over to his side. Brand's negotiations towards a treaty thus met with an equivocal reaction from the Rolong chief, throwing an interesting light on Moroka's position and on the factors determining his relationship with Brand and his eventual alliance with the Free State.

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On 3 February, the day following Brand's appointment as President, the Free State Volksraad directed him to negotiate a treaty with Chief Moroka.<sup>1</sup> J.J. Venter, the Acting President, had suggested the move two days previously, as he thought that the Free State's relations with the chief had improved and that Moroka seemed to desire an alliance with the Free State.<sup>2</sup> Moroka had not, however, forgiven the Free State for the treatment he had received from Pretorius and refused to consider any alliance until two grievances were rectified.

The chief asked for the return of the horses which had been stolen from him the previous year, and demanded the release of one

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1. Theal, G.M. Basutoland Records Vol. 3A P.246  
2. ibid. Vol. 3A P.247

of his subjects who had been unjustly detained in terms of the Free State pass law,<sup>3</sup> Ordinance No. 1 of 1860.<sup>4</sup> Brand investigated the last complaint and found that the Rolong had been imprisoned as he had a gun which was not mentioned in his pass. However, he promised to release the man on receipt of a letter from Moroka.<sup>5</sup> With regard to the horses, Brand stated that they could only be reclaimed through the law courts,<sup>6</sup> as he could not personally intervene unless the case was brought on appeal before the Executive Council.<sup>7</sup>

Moroka refused to take the matter of his horses to court,<sup>8</sup> but agreed to meet Brand after the President had, at his request, secured the release of another pass offender.<sup>9</sup> He agreed to meet Brand on 12 April near the Modder River, where they could discuss anything Brand desired.<sup>10</sup>

Moroka had good reason not to mention the treaty specifically, as he had no intention at this stage of signing any treaty and had other reasons for wishing to see Brand. The first was that the Sotho had just stolen 72 horses from Thaba 'Nchu. He was apprehensive about the situation in Basutoland and desired Brand's intervention. He informed Brand that the peace was only a pretence on the part of the Sotho to give them greater opportunities to steal.<sup>11</sup> From a letter written on 25 May, it appears that Moroka also wished to raise the subject of the horses

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3. G.S. 1402 P.231 Moroka-Brand 1 April 1864  
 4. Ordonnantie - Boek van den Oranje Vrijstaat 1854-1881  
 5. G.S. 1511 P.59 Brand-Moroka 17 May 1864  
 6. G.S. 1511 P.74 Brand-Moroka 28 May 1864  
 7. G.S. 1511 P.100 Brand-Moroka 28 June 1864  
 8. G.S. 1402 P.251 Moroka-Brand 20 May 1864  
 9. G.S. 1402 P.233 Moroka-Brand 4 April 1864  
 10. G.S. 1402 P.239 Moroka-Brand 9 April 1864  
 11. *ibid.*

stolen by the Boers, again.<sup>12</sup> Brand thus found the chief "very amicably disposed" but unwilling to sign a treaty.<sup>13</sup>

Moroka stated that it would have been contrary to tribal custom for him to have made a written agreement and that his word was his bond. As one article in The Friend commented, this was all very well as far as it went, "but we opine that Moroka's reluctance to enter into a treaty may be traced to the shabby treatment he has received at the hands of our government".<sup>14</sup> Moroka explained to J. Burnet, the Civil Commissioner of Aliwal North, that one of his reasons was that "the Free State had attempted to assassinate" him the previous year; but he added that he knew what friendship was, and had proved it many times, but he could not embark on a business of life and death, perhaps against people who were his best friends. His reference was to the Sotho.<sup>15</sup>

The chief was definitely keeping an eye on his relations with Moshoeshoe and had not decided which party he would ally with in any future conflict between the Boers and the Sotho. True he had aided the Boers in the 1858 war, but he had gained little, and his relationship with the Free State had deteriorated. Moshoeshoe had certainly ignored Article XII of the 1858 Peace Treaty, which bound him not to inflict any damage or take any revenge on the Free State's allies in the war on grounds of their aid to the Free State. The Sotho had continued to raid Thaba 'Nchu, but Moshoeshoe constantly put out friendly feelers in an attempt to win the Rolong over to his side. For one thing, the chief still

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12. G.S. 1402 P.247 Moroka-Brand 25 May 1864

13. The Friend 15 April 1864

14. *ibid.*

15. G.S. 1337 Moroka-Brand 21 April 1864

regarded Moroka as his vassal.<sup>16</sup> There is an indication that there was some sort of rapprochement between the chiefs as early as June 1861. In a letter to the High Commissioner, Moroka stated that he was "good friends with Moshesh", but that he knew the Sotho chief did not altogether trust him because of his relationship with the Free State.<sup>17</sup> In fact, Moshoeshoe had made definite overtures to Moroka in 1861, that in case of war with the Free State, he should ally himself with the Sotho.<sup>18</sup>

The Rolong chief realised the difficulties involved in a Sotho alliance quite as much as he appreciated the problems of a Free State alliance. He informed Wodehouse, the High Commissioner, that he could not contemplate an alliance with the Sotho and desired to keep out of the quarrel between the Sotho and the Free State, as their dispute did not immediately concern the Rolong. He stated that he intended sending declarations of neutrality to both Brand and Moshoeshoe, with demands that both parties should refrain from sending armed forces or cattle through his country. The chief described Thaba 'Nchu as being caught "between two fires" and realised that if either party gained his alliance, his people would suffer grievously. Enough damage would be done to Thaba 'Nchu if he remained neutral.<sup>19</sup>

At Moroka's request, Wodehouse wrote to Brand and Moshoeshoe urging them to avoid acts of hostility to one another and, more particularly, to avoid injuring Moroka, who was actuated by friendly feelings towards both parties. He also promised the

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16. See Introduction P.2

17. Theal, G.M. *ibid.* Vol. 2B P.586 27 June 1861

18. G.S. 1337 Moroka-Burnet 21 April 1864

19. Theal, G.M. *ibid.* Vol. 3A P.275  
Moroka-Wodehouse 21 April 1864

Rolong chief to support him with all the influence he possessed.<sup>20</sup> Brand's reply to Wodehouse assured the High Commissioner that Moroka had indicated his inclination "to cultivate friendly feelings with the Free State" and that he had done everything in his power to avoid a war with the Sotho. Brand was certainly not prepared to recognise Moroka as a neutral party and, in fact, the position of the Rolong territory made this almost impossible.<sup>21</sup>

Despite Brand's refusal to regard the Rolong as neutral, Moroka made no attempt to negotiate with Brand. His relations with the Free State, in fact, continued to deteriorate after the Modder River meeting. On 26 April, Brand asked the chief to assist a group of Boers in recovering some stolen cattle. Moroka replied that he would but added, with not a little pique, that he would have Brand know that Africans were not the only thieves in the neighbourhood.<sup>22</sup> On 4 May, he again complained of Boer thefts and brought up another grievance which illustrates the tense relations of the time more clearly. He asked why the Boers farming near his country were leaving their farms and driving their sheep and cattle away, and stated that his people were bringing him reports that the farmers intended to fight him. In one case, a Boer had threatened to fight him for stock he had lost.<sup>23</sup> Brand dismissed these rumours as "silly fabrication" and took the opportunity to urge Moroka once more to enter into an alliance.<sup>24</sup>

The Rolong's relations with the border farmers, however, continued to block Brand's attempts to persuade Moroka. On

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20. *ibid.* P.283 Wodehouse-Moroka 6 May 1864  
 21. *ibid.* P.284 Brand-Wodehouse 20 May 1864  
 22. G.S. 1402 P.241 Moroka-Brand 28 April 1864  
 23. G.S. 1402 P.243 Moroka-Brand 4 May 1864  
 24. G.S. 1511 P.41 Brand-Moroka 7 May 1864

20 May, the President asked for help in tracing eleven horses, whose spoor had been traced to within half an hour of Thaba 'Nchu.<sup>25</sup> Moroka reacted with great indignation to the implication that his people had stolen the horses and stated that he had proof that the horses and several others belonging to their owner, Bezhuidenhout, were in fact in Basutoland. He ended off by stating:

"I want Mr. Bezhuidenhout to pursue this accusation of his against my people - if he cannot do so, he must, to my satisfaction, remove from me this intimation of stealth which he has cast upon me".

The chief also mentioned several old grievances against the Free State. One was the case of a Boer theft from a Rolong named Abraham Letabele, another concerned the horses that had been stolen from him in Bloemfontein, and the other grievance was that Moroka was still dissatisfied with the treatment of a certain pass offender.<sup>26</sup>

The tone of this letter upset Brand, who requested the chief to be more courteous.<sup>27</sup> Moroka did not retract his statements but patched the matter up by stating that he had not meant to grieve Brand. He did, however, show that he was not simply the subservient and grateful ally of the Republic that he is so often made out to be. The true picture is far more subtle.<sup>28</sup>

This haggling over old grievances continued until October 1864. On 25 June, Moroka asked for the return of a Rolong horse which had been identified in Bloemfontein, and complained that his heart was still sore about the others he had lost. The horse

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|-----|-----------|-----------|--------------|-------------|
| 25. | G.S. 1511 | P.68      | Brand-Moroka | 20 May 1864 |
| 26. | G.S. 1402 | P.247-249 | Moroka-Brand | 25 May 1864 |
| 27. | G.S. 1511 | P.74      | Brand-Moroka | 28 May 1864 |
| 28. | G.S. 1402 | P.251     | Moroka-Brand | 30 May 1864 |

had not necessarily been stolen by the Boers, as it was a common Sotho practice to steal Rolong horses and then sell them to the Boers, but this made little difference to the chief.<sup>29</sup> Another grievance Moroka aired in September was that some of his people had been hindered from returning to Thaba 'Nchu after their labour contracts in the Free State had expired. The chief pleaded that he would like the Rolong to have the privilege of going into the Free State and returning when they wished.<sup>30</sup>

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What changed this whole situation and eventually led Moroka to ally himself with the Free State on 27 March 1865 were events connected with Sir Philip Wodehouse's mediation between the Free State and the Sotho over their boundary disputes.

On 3 February 1864, the Free State Volksraad had entrusted Brand with the task of asking Wodehouse to point out the boundary line between the Free State and Basutoland, or cause it to be pointed out, in accordance with Articles One and Two of the 1858 Peace Treaty. Wodehouse had accepted on condition Moshoeshoe accepted, and journeyed to Aliwal North. By the time he arrived at Aliwal North, further correspondence had convinced Wodehouse that the Free State had not given him wide enough powers to make his mediation honest or worthwhile. He had been asked merely to point out the Warden Line, whereas he wanted powers to determine new boundaries where he thought fit. He returned home, but Brand convened an extraordinary meeting of the Volksraad and persuaded the members to grant Wodehouse the powers he required. Wodehouse

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29. G.S. 1402 P.255 Moroka-Brand 25 June 1864  
 30. G.S. 1402 P.261 Moroka-Brand 7 September 1864

was informed of this on 6 May, and returned to the Free State in October. The news that Wodehouse had agreed to mediate made the Sotho renew their claims to the Rolong territory, a matter which had been disputed since the 1833 land transactions. On 20 May, one of Moshoeshoe's sons wrote a letter to The Friend in which he stated "that all the country in which Molitsane, Moroka and many other chiefs live is Moshesh's".<sup>31</sup> The same claim was made by Moshoeshoe himself in a memorandum submitted to Wodehouse, which indicated the land which the chief considered belonged to Basutoland. He included a list of refugee chiefs whose lands had been taken from them by the Boers and who were now living in his country. He listed Moroka as one of them to assert his claim to Thaba 'Nchu and to make it clear that he still considered Moroka to be his vassal.<sup>32</sup>

In accordance with his policy of treating Moroka as a vassal, Moshoeshoe requested Wodehouse in October 1864 to settle his boundary between the Rolong territory and the Free State. Moroka reacted sharply to this, rejected the Sotho chief's request, and stated that he was perfectly satisfied with his Free State boundary. He asked Wodehouse instead "to mediate and settle the line between him and his powerful and encroaching neighbour Moshesh". The High Commissioner refused to mediate between the Rolong and the Sotho and, on 28 October, merely confirmed the Warden Line through the area disputed between the Boers and the Sotho with one exception in that he recognised Biddulph's 1849 alteration in the Warden Line.<sup>33</sup>

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31. The Friend 20 May 1864  
 32. Theal, G.M. *ibid.* Vol. 3A P.303  
 33. *ibid.* P.304  
The Friend 14 October 1864



'Nchu to his negotiations with Brand. Orpen stated that the Rolong had refused to consent to a Free State alliance and wished the chief to ally with Moshoeshoe. A certain Rolong, Makontsi, was the principal opponent of a Free State alliance. He was influenced by the fact that a relative of his had allied himself to the Transvaal Boers, with disastrous results. Presumably, his people had been either forced to pay taxes, supply labour, or had lost their land to the Transvaal. Some of Moroka's sub-chiefs suggested that they sell their land to the Boers and move rather than suffer the consequences of either alliance. Others deserted Moroka and, taking their cattle with them, crossed into Basutoland to join Moshoeshoe.<sup>38</sup>

On 17 November, however, Moroka wrote to Brand assuring him of his continued friendship with the Free State, and that he would soon renew their discussion on the treaty.<sup>39</sup> The reason for this was that the Sotho had again alarmed him. On 12 November, Tshabadira's post was robbed by Sotho, and on the night of 13 November, the cattle from five posts along the Modder River went missing. Moroka held the Sotho responsible and feared the outbreak of war. On 14 November, he wrote to Brand:

"Referring to our recent conversation, and your promise to help me. I would feel obliged if you will give instructions to the Field-Cornets nearest me, Messrs. Steyn and De Wet, that if I should see it necessary, they may have the power to render me assistance. Further, if I should be in great straits, I wish authority to send to Bloemfontein without delay to obtain powder and guns".<sup>40</sup>

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38. Theal, G.M. *ibid.* Vol. 3A P.312  
Orpen-Civil Commissioner of  
Aliwal North 14 November 1864
39. G.S. 1402 P.271 Moroka-Brand 17 November 1864
40. G.S. 1402 P.269 Moroka-Brand 14 November 1864

Two days after this, the cattle were found quietly grazing near the river. The Editor of The Friend supposed they had strayed during a thunderstorm, and stated:

"Our Government will do well to be very careful how it commit itself to a war for the sake of the Barolongs, who will be continually crying out Wolf! Wolf! if they only think they can rely upon our support".<sup>41</sup>

Moroka, however, insisted that the cattle had been stolen, and had been left behind by their captors at the break of day. He appeared to be genuinely alarmed.<sup>42</sup> Brand had promised him aid only if he entered into "an offensive and defensive treaty". This was another reason why Moroka reacted by re-opening negotiations.<sup>43</sup>

A meeting was accordingly arranged, but did not take place owing to confusion over the venue. Brand waited for three hours at Johannes Steijl's farm, while Moroka, the Rev. J. Scott and the Rolong council waited for Brand for the whole day at a nearby farm belonging to Johannes Steijn. The similarity of the two names was the obvious cause of the confusion.<sup>44</sup>

Brand and Moroka did not attempt another meeting until March 1865. It is not clear why there was this long delay. Moroka's desire for an alliance with the Free State increased after November. On 24 November, Brand informed him that he hoped to discuss the proposed treaty soon but could not fix a date for a meeting.<sup>45</sup> As he was anxious to conclude the matter, it is probably best to conclude that Brand was too busy with the Sotho question to meet Moroka.

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41. The Friend 18 November 1864  
 42. G.S. 1402 P.271 Moroka-Brand 17 November 1864  
 43. G.S. 1511 P.182 Brand-Moroka 16 November 1864  
 44. The Friend 25 November 1864  
 45. G.S. 1511 P.200 Brand-Moroka 24 November 1864

After the chief's attempt to meet Brand in November, the Rolong's relationship with the Sotho deteriorated further. On 19 December, Moroka informed Wodehouse that the Sotho had manifested their ill will towards him for a long time but especially since, according to Wodehouse's advice, he had begun preparing to ally himself with the Free State.<sup>46</sup> Two days after he had missed Brand at Johannes Steijn's farm, the chief expressed his anxiety to meet Brand,<sup>47</sup> and on 12 December again indicated that he was anxious to sign a treaty. At this time, the chief was rather concerned that the Free State had lost confidence in him. Brand had sent out several patrols to guard the Free State-Sotho border. The chief, however, thought that the patrols were sent to spy on him. He had also heard accusations that as soon as the commandos had left Bloemfontein, he was going to attack the Free State.<sup>48</sup> Brand reassured the chief of the Free State's continued friendship and expressed hopes that the Sotho situation would soon improve.<sup>49</sup>

Moshoeshoe did not, however, co-operate with Brand's efforts to make the Sotho respect the Warden Line and the Free State-Sotho struggle continued. It was only in March 1865 that Brand was able, once more, to meet Moroka. They met early in the month and Moroka again refused to sign a written alliance and expressed only a verbal wish to remain on friendly terms with the Free State.<sup>50</sup> Events were, however, moving towards a conclusion. It must have appeared to Moroka at this stage that he had little alternative

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46. Theal, G.M. *ibid.* Vol. 3A P.327  
Moroka-Civil Commissioner of  
Aliwal North 19 December 1864
47. G.S. 1402 P.277 Moroka-Brand 25 November 1864
48. G.S. 1402 P.279 Moroka-Brand 12 December 1864
49. G.S. 1511 P.262 Brand-Moroka 24 December 1864
50. The Friend 10 March 1865

but to accede to Brand's demands. Relations with Moshoeshoe seemed irreparable and he would not submit to Moshoeshoe's demands that he should cease to regard himself as independent. Brand went ahead and sent Moroka a draft of the proposed treaty. By 18 March, Moroka had considered this carefully with his council, and he informed Brand that he approved it with the exception of the fourth article. The article provided for the extradition of Free State criminals who fled into the Rolong territory. Moroka wanted the same rights of extradition for Rolong criminals who might flee to the Free State, and hoped Brand would take this into account while drawing up the treaty.<sup>51</sup>

Brand had no objection to granting powers of extradition to Moroka, provided that the laws under which extradition was required were not repugnant to the principles of Christian religion. He then sent Moroka two copies of the treaty and asked him to sign it, and to append the signatures of his councillors and of the missionaries. He also informed Moroka that the treaty would have to be ratified by the Volksraad in terms of Article 37 of the Constitution, which made it competent for the President to make treaties but subjected these to the Volksraad's consent.<sup>52</sup>

The "Tractaat van Alliantie en Bondgenootschap Tusschen het Gouvernement van den Oranje Vrystaat en Moroka Opperhoofd der Barolongs" was then signed in Bloemfontein on 27 March 1865, and was ratified by the Volksraad on 21 February 1866. In the first clause, Brand and Moroka undertook to assist one another in the event of an attack on or an invasion of either of their territories by one or more of the Sotho clans. Clause two

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51. G.S. 1402 P.297 Moroka-Brand 18 March 1865  
 52. G.S. 1512 P.30 Brand-Moroka 24 March 1865

provided that if either party wished to declare war on or to attack one or more of the Sotho clans, they would have to receive the consent of the other party beforehand "om aanspraak te kunnen maken op de hulp en bystand van de andere party". Article three stated that Moroka would be able to purchase firearms and ammunition in the Free State subject to the applicable Free State laws. Any such application would have to be in writing, signed by the chief and sealed with his seal. The application had to give the name of the person who was to receive the weapon. The person would then have to go to Bloemfontein himself with one of the chief's sons. These three clauses were the only clauses dealing specifically with the Sotho threat but for this reason, the whole treaty was kept secret and was not published.

The remaining two clauses attempted to regulate the normal relations between the two territories. Article four provided for mutual extradition along the lines agreed to by Brand and Moroka. In article five, both parties undertook to help the other in tracing the spoor of lost horses, promised to hand stolen horses over to their owners and agreed that thieves should be prosecuted according to law.<sup>53</sup>

On 31 March 1865, The Friend reported:

"Het Opperhoofd Hoofd heeft eindelijk het zoo lang besproken tractaat geteekend, waarbij hij zich onverbrekkelijk met ons heeft verbonden. Zijne bekende gehechtheid aan den Vrijstaat is dus voor goed gewaarborgd en wij wenschen dat hij zich in onze trouw nimmer zal vergissen, maar steeds meer het goede ondervinden, dat uit dit traktaat voor zijn volk kan voortvloeijen bij gelijketrouwbeoening".

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53. G.S. 1337 The Treaty of Alliance March 1865


The English columns also expressed the opinion that, by signing the treaty, Moroka had linked his fortunes inseparably with the Free State.<sup>54</sup> To what extent this was true was to appear in the months that followed. Mutual trust and co-operation were not the only fruits of the treaty and, as will be seen in the following chapter, there were to be many conflicts over the interpretation of the clauses of the Treaty of Alliance.






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54. The Friend 31 March 1865

CHAPTER TWO

THE SOTHO WAR



-  Moroka's Territory.
-  Area gained by the Free State in terms of the Second Convention of Aliwal North, 1869.
-  Area annexed by Fick in October 1865 which did not become Free State territory.
-  Area east of the Warden Line annexed by Wepener.
-  Southern area contested by Moshoeshe.

- \*\*\*\*\* The southern boundary of Basutoland in terms of the 1858 Peace Treaty.
- The Warden Line of 1864.
- + + + + + Boundaries laid down by the Treaty of Thaba Bosiu, 1866.
- ..... Eastern limit of Fick's annexations.

## CHAPTER TWO

In the months after the signature of the Treaty of Alliance and during the Sotho war, Moroka's relationship with the Free State remained pragmatic. The assistance he gave to the Boers was important and varied, but throughout he put the interests of Thaba 'Nchu before those of the Free State. His attitude was largely determined by fear of the Sotho. He was also concerned about the way his troops were treated by the Free Staters and for much of the war, his main concern was to maintain his tribe's strength and cohesion. Brand was initially reluctant to confide in Moroka, and the Boers were wary, throughout the war, of placing too much reliance on the Rolong; but despite friction and disappointments, the Free Staters were genuinely appreciative of the Rolong's contribution. Moroka was, however, disappointed with the results of the war.

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For several months after he signed the Treaty of Alliance in March 1865, Moroka's attitude to the Free State was equivocal as he knew the Sotho feared the Rolong-Free State alliance and were particularly keen to prevent his people from acting as guides to the Boers.<sup>1</sup> Moshoeshe also threatened him shortly after the treaty was signed, that if he did not change his alliance, he would start the war by attacking Thaba 'Nchu; but if he abandoned the Free State, he could count on Sotho help. Moroka informed Brand of this offer, and pleaded for a Boer commando to guard Thaba 'Nchu.<sup>2</sup> As Brand was alarmed by

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1. G.S. 1402 P.303 Moroka-Brand 6 April 1865  
 G.S. 1402 P.305-308 Moroka-Brand 7 April 1865  
 2. G.S. 1402 P.305-308 Moroka-Brand 7 April 1865

Moshoeshoe's overtures, he sent Marthinus Steyn, a member of the Executive Council, to find out exactly what Moroka's response to the offer was.<sup>3</sup> What passed between Steyn and Moroka was unrecorded, but the whole episode made Brand wary of taking the Rolong chief into his confidence. For the next month, he kept Moroka in the dark about his Sotho policy<sup>4</sup> and refused the chief's frequent appeals for ammunition.<sup>5</sup>

By 1 May, Moroka was seriously worried that the Free State had left him in the lurch, and appealed for information.<sup>6</sup> On 9 May, Brand replied that war seemed imminent as his ultimatum to Moshoeshoe for compensation for Lesoana's raids had expired at the beginning of the month.<sup>7</sup> He also informed Moroka that he had stationed Boer commandos at Nooitgedacht and Paul Smitsberg, the northern and southern points of Moroka's western boundary, to protect the Free State from invasion, and suggested that the chief start patrolling his boundaries.<sup>8</sup>

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3. G.S. 1512 P.41 Brand-Moroka 10 April 1865  
 4. G.S. 1402 P.311 Moroka-Brand 1 May 1865  
 5. G.S. 1512 P.45 Brand-Moroka 9 May 1865  
 6. G.S. 1402 P.311 Moroka-Brand 1 May 1865  
 7. Lagden, G. The Basutos P.342-345; P.356  
 Towards the end of November 1864, Lesoana, one of Moshoeshoe's nephews, began raiding the Bethlehem area, destroying houses and capturing livestock. The Free state started patrolling the area and clashed with a raiding party early in December, but Lesoana refused to submit to a fine. On 23 February 1865, Brand demanded that Moshoeshoe remove Lesoana from the border and hand over 70 head of cattle as compensation. He repeated the ultimatum on 28 March and stated that it would expire on 1 May. Moshoeshoe sent a few cattle to Brand on 26 April but Brand refused these and on 9 May a commando set out to punish Lesoana. A battle ensued on 25 May, after which Lesoana took refuge with Molapo, who refused to hand him over. He also raided Natal, killing 5 Transvaal subjects and 3 others. He then headed a large raid in the area below the Drakensburg, the Free State winter grazing area, and captured 1 500 cattle.  
 8. G.S. 1512 P.45 Brand-Moroka 9 May 1865

Brand's action against Lesoana did not result in war, but a new "casus belli" soon appeared. On 6 June, Brand warned Moroka that he had sent an ultimatum to Mopeli, whose Sotho had captured three Free Staters and had maltreated them in Basutoland. The culprits and fifty head of cattle were to be delivered to the Landdrost of Winburg by sunset on 8 June. If the chief did not comply, Brand intended to consider the action as a declaration of war from both Mopeli and Moshoeshoe. He advised Moroka to strengthen his posts but also asked him to send 200 Rolong with arms and provisions to assist the Boer commandos in his vicinity.<sup>9</sup> Moroka refused unless the Free State laagers were brought nearer to Thaba 'Nchu as he felt too exposed to attack.<sup>10</sup>

Perhaps because of this refusal, Brand did not inform the chief when he declared war on the Sotho on 9 June and began operations against Mopeli. As late as 21 June, Moroka had no idea that war had begun, and he suggested that the war be started by an attack from both sides of Thaba 'Nchu so that his town would not be left exposed.<sup>11</sup> When he heard of General Fick's victory over the Sotho at Maboletla, Mopeli's town north of the Caledon, he expressed himself both grieved and disappointed that Brand had not consulted him before declaring war, and complained that the concentration of Boer forces in the north left the Sotho in other areas free to raid the Free State and Thaba 'Nchu with impunity. As a result, he was expecting an attack from Letsie. According to the chief, he was entitled

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9. G.S. 1512 P.45 Brand-Moroka 6 June 1865  
 10. The Friend 16 June 1865  
 11. G.S. 1402 P.321 Moroka-Marais 21 June 1865

in terms of Article Two of the Treaty of Alliance, to expect Brand to have consulted him before declaring war and, in any case, he appeared hurt that Brand had set so little value on his advice.<sup>12</sup>

Despite the fact that he had not consulted Moroka before declaring war, Brand asked the chief on 20 June to assist Fieldcornet de Wet in following up the Boer attack on Mopeli by sending him five or six hundred men.<sup>13</sup> Moroka again refused to co-operate and claimed that in guarding Thaba 'Nchu he was doing enough to protect the Free State and asked for ammunition to do so.<sup>14</sup> Brand did not understand the chief's fear of an attack and assured him that the Boers would assist him immediately if a raid took place.<sup>15</sup> The Government Secretary, J.C.N. Marais, followed up these assurances with a repeated request for six hundred men and emphasised that Brand had already issued orders which relied on Moroka's co-operation and that Brand would be "very much put out" if he failed to comply.<sup>16</sup>

Marais appealed for help again on 28 June as a Sotho commando was sweeping along the Modder River.<sup>17</sup> Raids were in fact occurring in all directions. Thousands of Sotho under Posholi and Moorosi had crossed the Caledon near Wilgeboom Spruit on 20 June and carried out raids into the Free State. Raids also occurred into the Bloemfontein, Winburg and Harrismith districts. As the raids were taking place on all sides of his

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| 12. | G.S. | 1402 | P.323-325 | Moroka-Brand  | 21 June 1865 |
| 13. | G.S. | 1512 | P.72      | Brand-Moroka  | 20 June 1865 |
| 14. | G.S. | 1402 | P.323-325 | Moroka-Brand  | 21 June 1865 |
| 15. | G.S. | 1512 | P.77      | Brand-Moroka  | 23 June 1865 |
| 16. | G.S. | 1634 | P.249     | Marais-Moroka | 24 June 1865 |
| 17. | G.S. | 1634 | P.250     | Marais-Moroka | 28 June 1865 |

territory, it was not surprising that Moroka again refused to help Marais. On 27 June, Masupha's Sotho murdered a group of Bastards at Rietspruit in the Free State. Brand appealed to Moroka to send men to pursue Masupha as he would not be able to do so;<sup>18</sup> but Moroka again refused. He informed Brand that he feared they did not understand one another perfectly and sent one of his sons to Bloemfontein to make it clear that he was not prepared to do more than guard Thaba 'Nchu.<sup>19</sup> After this, Brand changed his tune and on 5 July told Moroka to use the six hundred men to protect Thaba 'Nchu but he hoped that he would send out patrols in different directions to prevent Sotho commandos from entering the Free State.<sup>20</sup> There is no evidence that Moroka was prepared to help the Free State, even in this way.

It was only when all the Free State forces had mustered and were prepared to make a concerted attack on Basutoland<sup>21</sup> that Moroka expressed his willingness to assist the Boers.<sup>22</sup> His delay appears to have been wise. While there was only a small Free State commando in the field, Thaba 'Nchu was vulnerable. The chief was also unwilling to expose his people to uneven odds and an unfair proportion of the war effort. He may have been waiting to see which way the war went before taking the irrevocable step of attacking the Sotho. The evidence certainly suggests that Moroka was exercising a pragmatic wariness, but there is no hint that he ever seriously considered changing his alliance.

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| 18. | G.S. | 1512 | P.83  | Brand-Moroka  | 1 July 1865  |
| 19. | G.S. | 1402 | P.329 | Moroka-Brand  | 3 July 1865  |
| 20. | G.S. | 1634 | P.250 | Marais-Moroka | 5 July 1865  |
| 21. | G.S. | 1512 | P.91  | Brand-Moroka  | 7 July 1865  |
| 22. | G.S. | 1402 | P.331 | Moroka-Brand  | 10 July 1865 |

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In July, the Free State launched a two pronged attack on Basutoland which was designed to converge on Thaba Bosiu. Commandant Louw Wepener entered Basutoland from the Koesberg area while Fick commanded the attack from the north. Moroka kept a close watch on the progress of both commandos and after Wepener's success at Vechkop on 14 July, he decided it was at last safe to enter the war. He called his people together and asked for volunteers. Out of approximately 1000 he chose 400 who set out to join General Fick's commando on 18 or 19 July, with sixty Bastards and twenty seven wagons filled with provisions. Most, if not all, were mounted and a fair number must have been armed as their departure left Moroka short of ammunition.<sup>23</sup> The general command of the force was given to Moroka's adopted son, Tsipinare, but the men were organised into divisions, each with its own name and under the command of a sub-chief.<sup>24</sup>

The assistance the Rolong gave during the war took several forms. They participated in active fighting; played an important role as guides, spies and stockherds; and provided escorts for small groups of Boers on their way to join the various commandos. They also performed invaluable service by forwarding post for Brand, particularly when the President did not know where his commandos were. Tsipinare's troops were not, however, always in the field. Moroka characteristically recalled them when he felt Thaba 'Nchu was threatened. He also refused to carry posts or provide escorts whenever he felt the situation was too dangerous.

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23. G.S. 1402 P.333 Moroka-Brand 22 July 1865  
Commando reports as published in The Friend

24. G.S. 1404; G.S. 1405

The Rolong were involved in several skirmishes and attacked a Sotho village on their way to join Fick's commando. This seemed to many Free Staters to indicate that they were in earnest.<sup>25</sup> Before they joined Fick, the General had crossed the Caledon and proclaimed the area to the north and the west of the river to be Free State territory. He had then crossed the Phutiatsana to attack Masupha's stronghold on Berea mountain. The Rolong arrived shortly after the sack of Berea and were reported to have laughed heartily at the Sotho rout.<sup>26</sup> The combined force then moved towards Thaba Bosiu. The Free Staters were not very impressed with the Rolong's contribution on the journey. A partisan account, for instance, described how the Rolong stayed lazily in camp during a cattle raiding expedition, leaving the burghers to capture and manage approximately 1 200 head of cattle, 1 000 sheep and a few hundred horses. There is also a suggestion that the Boers were wary of the Rolong's fidelity. The same account of the raid stated that during an encounter with the Sotho, the Rolong took care to shoot from such a distance that they could not possibly have hit the Sotho.<sup>27</sup> There are other indications that the Rolong were not wholeheartedly against the Sotho. There were two recorded instances when the Rolong refused to carry post for the Boers without real reason.<sup>28</sup> After one of these refusals, William Reed, an emissary from Aliwal North to Moshoeshoe, came to the conclusion that the Free State should not trust the Rolong as they were possibly more friendly to Moshoeshoe.<sup>29</sup> To what extent the Free State troops distrusted the Rolong is not clear

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25. The Friend 21 July 1865

26. The Friend 2 August 1865

27. The Friend 25 August 1865

28. G.S. 1402 P.335 Moroka-Brand 27 July 1865

29. Theal, G.M. Basutoland Records Vol. 3B P.481 ff

but they were also unimpressed with their part in the siege of Thaba Bosiu.

On 3 August, Commandant Wepener joined Fick's commando at Thaba Bosiu. On 31 July, Wepener had defeated Letsie at his town Matsieng and annexed the area he had overrun. The whole country west of a line running from Bamboesplaats on the eastern side of Pamponspruit to Thaba Telle, a mountain three miles east of Matsieng, and from there directly north to the Caledon, was now to be Free State territory. According to Theal, the addition of Wepener's men brought the numbers of the combined force to 2 100 burghers, 500 Rolong, and a mixture of 400 Fingoes, Tlokwa and Monageng.<sup>30</sup> On 8 August, they attempted to take the mountain and failed, but on 15 August the attack was renewed.

The men mustered for the attack at sunrise. 600 who could not be mounted remained in the camp while the rest, including the Rolong, advanced. The Rolong and the Bloemfontein Fingoes were placed under the command of Captain Webster, and took up position on a hill opposite the mission station. The plan was that, while one group of Free Staters was to occupy the ravines and keep up a steady covering fire, Wepener and his men would attempt to scale the mountain. In the meantime, the Rolong were to attack the mission station, which they did despite heavy fire from the Sotho in the building. They took the station and also repulsed another party of Sotho which attacked them from the rear. Wepener almost reached the summit but by that time had only about 100 men with him and needed reinforcements. Only a few Rolong volunteered

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30. Theal, G.M. Fragment of Basuto History P.62

but they arrived too late to help. Wepener was shot dead and Commandant Wessels was badly wounded. As a result, the Boers panicked and fled down the mountain with the Sotho in pursuit. This in turn made the Rolong abandon the mission station. The Friend reported that Webster tried repeatedly to persuade the Rolong to move forward to support the Boers, but in vain. The article concluded that the Rolong had not distinguished themselves at all. The Rolong did not suffer any fatalities, but five men were wounded by bullets and assegais.<sup>31</sup>

After this second attempt had failed, Fick changed his plans and decided to invest the mountain, and starve the Sotho into submission by sending out patrols to capture stock and to destroy cornfields. The main Free State force remained dispiritedly encamped before Thaba Bosiu, weakened daily by desertions, until 25 September. The Rolong's main contribution during the month's siege was to provide herdsmen for the livestock captured by the various commandos. On 17 August, a quantity of approximately 6 000 cattle, 12 000 sheep, and 250 horses was placed in the care of about 200 Rolong herders. They were instructed to drive the herd to the Modder River area where Fieldcornet de Wet would divide the stock into smaller groups. They had great difficulty keeping the stock together as the whole herd in motion, with 90 wagons, covered some three miles in length. Once de Wet had divided them up, they were to graze the animals near the river. Even this proved difficult and the problems were exacerbated by unsympathetic treatment from the Boers.<sup>32</sup>

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31. Grobbelaar, J.J.G. Die Vrystaatse Republiek en die Basuto Vraagstuk P.137 ff  
The Friend 18 August 1865
32. The Friend 25 August 1865

On 1 September, Brand wrote to Moroka complaining that some of the herders had absconded with stolen cattle and asked that the culprits be sent to Bloemfontein for trial.<sup>33</sup> Later in the month, all the chief herdsmen left the cattle and returned to Thaba 'Nchu. Tshabadira Moroka, one of the chief's sons, asked Brand to protect the Rolong herders from the Boers, who were constantly threatening to shoot them if stock strayed onto their farms or if cattle were lost. He complained that there were no kraals in which to keep the cattle and the September rains were making their task impossible.<sup>34</sup> Brand realised that the situation had got out of control and ordered de Wet to move the cattle and to take the responsibility away from the Rolong.<sup>35</sup>

This was not the first occasion that friction appeared between the allies over captured stock. Shortly after the Rolong had joined Fick, a quarrel broke out between the General and Tsipinare over the distribution of booty. On 28 July, Moroka informed Brand that his people could not understand why they were not allowed to keep any cattle they captured. Tsipinare and Tshabadira complained that while the Boers and the English kept theirs, those they captured were confiscated to pay the government's war expenses.<sup>36</sup> Brand defended Fick's action with reference to the Commando Law of 1 March 1865. Article 21 stated that all volunteers who were not Free State burghers would enjoy the same privileges as burghers while on commando. Article 28 provided that all booty would be pooled. Part would be sold to pay the government's war expenses, part would be paid out as compensation, and then the rest would be divided fairly

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|-----|-----------|-------|-------------------|--------------|------|
| 33. | G.S. 1512 | P.134 | Brand-Moroka      | 1 September  | 1865 |
| 34. | G.S. 1402 | P.353 | Tshabadira-Marais | 23 September | 1865 |
| 35. | G.S. 1634 | P.262 | Marais-Moroka     | 28 September | 1865 |
| 36. | G.S. 1402 | P.337 | Moroka-Brand      | 29 July      | 1865 |

between those on commando. Brand pointed out that the Rolong could not expect the same amount as the Boers who had been in the field for almost three months. Tylden throws a slightly different light on Fick's conduct, by pointing out that the General was accused, though perhaps unfairly, of helping himself to captured stock.<sup>37</sup> Brand assured Moroka that once Moshoeshoe was defeated, there would be enough booty for all, and in the meantime he hoped that the Rolong troops would obey the officer commanding the Free State force.<sup>38</sup>

The Rolong, however, continued to complain of unjust treatment. Tsipinare accused the Boers of stealing his horses and then alleging that he had stolen them in the first place. On 12 August, Moroka had appealed to Brand to see that his people's rights were respected<sup>39</sup> and apparently Brand had some success as Moroka thanked him for his help.<sup>40</sup> Nevertheless, minor friction continued throughout the war over the distribution of captured cattle and the treatment of herdsmen.

While Thaba Bosiu was being invested, the Rolong who were not appointed as herders, participated in several raids and clashed with the Sotho at least once. On one expedition, the Boers and Rolong separated. The Boers returned the next day with cattle, horses and about 1 500 sheep, but as there was no sign of the Rolong, a party set out to look for them. The Rolong eventually returned with 505 head of cattle. One of their number and 16 Sotho had been killed and two Rolong wounded in a skirmish.<sup>41</sup>

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37. Tylden, G. The Rise of the Basuto P.93

38. G.S. 1512 P.111 Brand-Moroka 29 July 1865  
The Friend 6 May 1865

39. G.S. 1402 P.339 Moroka-Brand 12 August 1865

40. G.S. 1402 P.345 Moroka-Brand 15 August 1865

41. The Friend 6 September 1865; 8 September 1865

The Friend reported another clash between the Sotho and the Rolong which occurred some time around 10 September. A body of Sotho attacked the Rolong camp and stole 69 horses. The Rolong promptly fled to Commandant Roos's camp nearby and left the Boers to repulse the Sotho.<sup>42</sup> It appears that the Rolong returned to Thaba 'Nchu after this attack.

\* \* \* \* \*

The Free State war council decided to raise the siege of Thaba Bosiu on 25 September. The force then split up. A commando under Pieter Wessels was to scour the country along the Orange River; General Fick was to march north to attack Molapo, and Commandant Roos was to remain in the Korannaberg area. There is no mention of the Rolong accompanying any of these groups. They were involved in a successful skirmish in the Korannaberg area on 24 September but they were in the area to collect corn. Moroka was with them and it appears that the expedition set out from Thaba 'Nchu.<sup>43</sup> Early in October, a group of Rolong clashed with Sotho near Mekoatling but the Rolong were again in the area to collect corn and do not seem to have been attached to Roos.<sup>44</sup>

If Moroka did recall his troops in mid-September, he had ample cause. The Free State offensive was proving ineffective and the concentration of forces at Thaba Bosiu left the Sotho in other areas free to raid with impunity. The Rolong territory was attacked shortly before the siege was raised and the Sotho carried off cattle from one of the posts.<sup>45</sup> The disruptive effects of the war were also affecting Thaba 'Nchu. As early as

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42. The Friend 6 October 1865

43. The Friend 25 September 1865; 29 September 1865

44. The Friend 18 October 1865

45. G.S. 1402 P.351 Tshabadira-Marais 22 September 1865

23 August, Moroka complained that his people were starving.<sup>46</sup> The Rolong had never cultivated enough land to be self-sufficient and had always relied on imported corn from Basutoland.<sup>47</sup> This trade was disrupted by the war and Moroka was forced to make raids into Basutoland to collect corn although Brand advised him not to, because of the danger of ambushes. The Boers were, however, soon raiding for corn themselves.<sup>48</sup>

By October, Moroka's main concern was that his people were leaving Thaba 'Nchu. The Minutes of the Wesleyan Bechuana District meeting for 1866 stated that many had scattered among the farmers and elsewhere in search of subsistence and reported a net decrease in their numbers of 108.<sup>49</sup> Others were leaving out of fear for the Sotho or to safeguard their cattle from Sotho raids. On 10 October, Moroka issued a proclamation authorising any landdrost to imprison Rolong found in the Free State without a pass from himself.<sup>50</sup> This was, in fact, the Free State pass law, but it was the first time that the chief had pressed for its enforcement himself. He was soon complaining that the Free State had not heeded his plea although Brand had promised to co-operate.<sup>51</sup> The efflux continued throughout the war.

In October, the Free State decided to raise new commandos to aid the war effort. These were to be made up of volunteers who would not be paid but would be allowed to keep all the stock they captured. It was generally hoped that the Rolong would

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46. G.S. 1402 P.347 Moroka-Brand 23 August 1865  
 47. Minutes of the Wesleyan Bechuana District 1880 P.103  
 48. G.S. 1512 P.132 Brand-Moroka  
 49. Minutes of the Bechuana District 1866 P.278  
 50. The Friend 20 October 1865  
 51. G.S. 1512 P.169 Brand-Moroka 13 October 1865

support the commandos, but an article in The Friend which threw an interesting light on the Free State's attitude to its allies, stated that they would have to be supported and led by a considerable body of white men. It was obvious that the Boers did not have a high opinion of the Rolong as warriors, but they did hope that they would be useful as guides and in driving cattle out of the kloofs and strongholds in the Basutoland mountains.<sup>52</sup> On 13 October, however, Moroka reported that he was expecting an attack and the threat appears to have made him change his mind. Webster did not think his fears justified, but Brand asked de Wet to assist Moroka if need be and told the chief to let Commandant Roos have all the information he could gather. He also gave Moroka detailed information about Free State operations and stated that if he co-operated, the enemy would be harassed from all sides and Thaba 'Nchu would be safe.<sup>53</sup> Brand's efforts to convince the chief that he could spare his men, however, failed.

One reason for this was that Thaba 'Nchu was continually troubled by Sotho thieves early in November. On 7 November, Moroka informed Marais that he was gathering all his cattle together and that he was going to form a strong laager in front of Thaba 'Nchu on the eastern side of the town. He intended summoning all the women and children to the town for their protection. From the laager he planned to send out patrols to intercept any stray Sotho and to meet the enemy if an attack was made on the town.<sup>54</sup> When, on the following day, he received

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52. The Friend 18 October 1865

53. G.S. 1512 P.169 Brand-Moroka 13 October 1865  
The Friend 20 October 1865

54. G.S. 1402 P.349 Moroka-Marais 7 November 1865

letter from Marais asking him to assist Webster and de Wet in scouring the Jammerberg area, he was unsympathetic. He replied that he felt something had to be done about the situation but his spies had told him that the Sotho were gathering in the mountains and he felt open to attack. He also felt that de Wet's 200 Boers were quite insufficient to cope with the numerous Sotho near Jammerbergdrift and would not expose his men to such odds. He stated that if de Wet mustered 500 or more, he would consider helping him.<sup>55</sup>

Again the chief had reason to be wary. In mid-November, the war was, to all intents and purposes, at a standstill. The Free State forces were riddled with dissatisfaction and a general trek home was expected. A correspondent of The Friend stated on 11 November that if this occurred without peace being made, the Rolong would be at the mercy of the Sotho.<sup>56</sup> Moroka was aware of the danger and began building entrenchments and fortifications.<sup>57</sup> He also asked the Boers stationed at Klipplaatfontein to move their laager nearer to Thaba 'Nchu, but their commander decided that this would leave too great a gap in the Free State boundary defences.<sup>58</sup> Marais tried on 14 November to convince Moroka that any assistance he gave to Webster and de Wet would act as protection to Thaba 'Nchu but, by this stage, the chief was aware that the Sotho were encamped in force near Platberg, and he refused to move. He was also worried about a message from Moshoeshoe which he received through Mr. Baker, the Wesleyan missionary at Platberg. He reported this message as

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55. G.S. 1402 P.365 Moroka-Marais 8 November 1865

56. The Friend 1 December 1865

57. The Friend 29 November 1865

58. The Friend 24 November 1865

follows:

"Although I have been fighting against him (Moshoeshoe) so long he is still friendly; but I must cease fighting or in the end it will be worse for me".<sup>59</sup>

On the day before he wrote this, Webster arrived at Thaba 'Nchu hoping to be joined by several hundred Rolong. Moroka had just received a message from Roos asking for help. He gave Webster 150 Rolong to help Roos ward off the Sotho attack but when he returned, Moroka refused to help him further because of the weakness of his own position and fear of Moshoeshoe.<sup>60</sup>

The chief only sent his troops back into the field when the Free State began inflicting significant defeats on the Sotho. On 22 November, he received an encouraging report from Brand, who informed him that he had ordered de Wet to return to Paul Smitsberg and that Roos was on his way to attack Molapo. Both were to move back to Platberg and deal with the Sotho there as soon as possible. He also stated that Mocrosi had already been defeated and that the Smithfield commando was on its way to attack Posholi. New levies were taken to the field and he was confident that the Free State would soon be in a strong position but he urged Moroka to send patrols to assist de Wet and Roos.<sup>61</sup> Early in December, Marais reported that the Free State commando was preparing for a final and general attack and asked if 500 Rolong would join the Boers at Platberg and help to clear the area.<sup>62</sup> Brand suggested that after this they should move in the direction of Modderpoort.<sup>63</sup>

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59. G.S. 1402 P.367 Moroka-Marais 14 November 1865  
 60. The Friend 17 November 1865  
 61. G.S. 1512 P.207 Brand-Moroka 22 November 1865  
 62. G.S. 1634 P.276 Marais-Moroka 5 December 1865  
     G.S. 1634 P.278 Marais-Moroka 8 December 1865  
 63. G.S. 1512 P.231 Brand-Moroka 9 December 1865

When Moroka heard that the Boers had successfully attacked Platberg, he agreed to assist them. On 13 December, The Friend reported that he had once more "plucked up courage" and had sent 600 men to join the commando. The force was placed under Commandant Wessels who was busy patrolling the Korannaberg area on his way to join the main commando at Platberg. By the time they joined the commando, it had left Platberg and was moving towards the Caledon. The Rolong were involved in a disastrous clash with the Sotho at Putsianidrift on the Caledon on 22 December. After this defeat, the Boers began steadily trekking home and, by the end of the month, there were only 300 burghers left in the great commando.<sup>64</sup> Moroka's fears returned. On 29 December, he wrote to Brand as follows:

"I fear they will go and leave me alone to hold the lion by the ears, which I am not able to do. Should it be so, I shall come to you to ask for a place for our wives and children. If the Boers leave the Basutos unconquered, Thaba 'Nchu will be exposed to their rage and power, and what shall I do? I cannot stay. Where shall I fly? I must seek refuge in the Free State".<sup>65</sup>

Moroka was thus considerably alarmed when a Sotho commando started moving towards Thaba 'Nchu early in January 1866.<sup>66</sup> The Sotho were actually on their way to attack the Smithfield laager and as soon as Moroka realised this, he let Brand know.<sup>67</sup> His thoughts were, however, once more focused on the needs of his own territory.

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64. The Friend 13 December 1865; 29 December 1865;  
5 January 1866

65. G.S. 1402 P.377 Moroka-Brand 29 December 1865

66. G.S. 1403 P.383 Moroka-Marais 4 January 1866

67. G.S. 1403 P.385 Moroka-Brand 5 January 1866

The exodus from Thaba 'Nchu increased throughout November and December. By January, it was a serious threat to the strength and cohesion of the tribe. In December, the chief wrote frequently to Brand asking that runaways be captured and imprisoned. He regarded the runaways as "rebels" and followed up as many individual cases as he could. Brand co-operated in some cases, but Moroka's proclamation remained a dead letter as the Free Staters were only too willing to receive the Rolong as labourers.<sup>68</sup> On 14 December, Moroka applied for a special pass to enable his son, Richard, to search for and apprehend runaways in the Free State.<sup>69</sup> Brand was most alarmed when Richard started roaming the Free State with armed parties. Several farmers complained about Richard, presumably as he was trespassing and seizing their labourers. Brand renewed his instructions to the landdrosts to enforce the pass law but told Moroka that the matter could only be dealt with effectively at Thaba 'Nchu and that it was up to the chief to see that his people did not leave in the first place. On 16 January, he informed the chief that he would not tolerate Richard's activities. If he wished any Rolong to be apprehended, he would have to send a headman to the nearest landdrost, who would investigate the case and imprison them if warranted. Moroka was to have no jurisdiction over those imprisoned.<sup>70</sup> Brand's stipulations could only have increased the chief's difficulties and with his strength depleted, he felt his weakness acutely.

Despite the plight of Thaba 'Nchu, most of the Rolong who

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68. G.S. 1402 Letters dated 7 November 1865; 14 December 1865; 21 December 1865  
 69. G.S. 1402 P.371 Moroka-Brand 14 December 1865  
 70. G.S. 1512 P.207-209 Brand-Moroka 22 November 1865  
 G.S. 1512 P.242 Brand-Moroka 30 December 1865  
 G.S. 1512 P.250 Brand-Moroka 16 January 1866

joined the Boers in December remained in the field. In January, Wessels was in command of the Free State force and kept 400 Rolong with him. By 19 January, he was moving a commando of approximately 900 men to Platberg where the Sotho had re-established themselves.<sup>71</sup> Early in February, 100 Rolong were sent with 300 burghers to patrol the Korannaberg area. Shortly after this patrol set out, a small Rolong village about three miles from Thaba 'Nchu town was attacked by a Sotho commando. They stole cattle and shot the headman. After this, Moroka took two steps to strengthen his position. He resumed sending out patrols around the territory,<sup>72</sup> and invited a group of Bastards, who had formerly lived at Platberg, to settle at Thaba 'Nchu.<sup>73</sup> They had been forced to join the Sotho in the war but in January had intimated their willingness to join the Free State.<sup>74</sup> The Free State offered them land but later accepted Moroka's invitation. Brand also allowed Baker, the missionary at Platberg, to station himself at Thaba 'Nchu as the Volksraad had ordered all missionaries in Basutoland west of the Caledon to leave their stations.<sup>75</sup> Moroka was eager for reinforcements, particularly as Moshoeshoe had contacted him again early in February, ostensibly to ask his advice.<sup>76</sup>

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The Volksraad's February session led to a complete alteration of the war situation. The members expressed their

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71. The Friend 5 January 1866; 19 January 1866  
 72. The Friend 16 February 1866  
 73. The Friend 23 February 1866  
 74. The Friend 12 January 1866  
 75. G.S. 1403 P.395 Scott-Brand 18 January 1866  
 76. The Friend 9 February 1866

determination to continue the war and Brand's patriotic speeches inspired the Boers with a new determination.<sup>77</sup> On 5 February, the Raad ratified Fick and Wepener's annexations, and on 22 February refused Wodehouse's offer to mediate towards peace. New forces began systematically destroying Sotho villages and crops.<sup>78</sup> The Volksraad also ratified Brand's treaty with Moroka, expressed appreciation of the Rolong's help and hoped this would continue. Moroka, however, continued to be cautious.<sup>79</sup>

He supported the new offensive by allowing the Platberg Bastards to join Wessels and by allowing his other troops to remain in the field, but he refused to send more men.<sup>80</sup> On 10 March, Brand asked him to send spies to the Korannaberg and also a commando to help clear the area.<sup>81</sup> There is no evidence that Moroka co-operated and, as Platberg and the Korannaberg were again teeming with Sotho, it was unlikely that he did. His continued caution was also illustrated by the fact that on 30 March, he refused to carry post for Brand as a previous escort had been ambushed and killed.<sup>82</sup>

The renewed Free State effort forced Moshoeshoe to sue for peace and on 3 April, the Treaty of Thaba Bosiu was signed. Tsipinare's signature was affixed to the document. In it, Moshoeshoe bound himself not to molest the Rolong in any way on the grounds of their participation in the war. At first, Moroka

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77. Lagden, G. History of the Basuto Vol. 2 P.390  
 78. Thompson, L.M. Survival in Two Worlds P.286  
 79. V.R.N. 21 February 1866; 22 February 1866  
 80. G.S. 1403 P.401 Moroka-Brand 9 March 1866  
 81. G.S. 1512 P.277 Brand-Moroka 10 March 1866  
 82. G.S. 1403 P.405 Moroka-van Soelen 30 March 1866  
 G.S. 1403 P.407 Barker-Brand 16 April 1866

seems to have been reasonably optimistic about the peace settlement.<sup>83</sup> On 18 April, he instructed George Mitchell, the Anglican missionary at Thaba 'Nchu, to tell Brand how thankful he was to see his people return in good spirits and with victory on their side. He also confidently sent Tsipinare to Bloemfontein to collect the Rolong's share of the cattle and horses paid by Moshoeshoe in terms of the treaty. He wished for a reward for his participation and wanted to cover his war expenses.<sup>84</sup> He was greatly disappointed when Brand stated that not even the Free Staters could expect a share in the cattle as the government had incurred such heavy debts. All Brand would give Moroka was a few horses which had been left at Thaba 'Nchu by Lewis Wessels and fifty head of cattle.<sup>85</sup>

Brand did, however, bring the question of what compensation should be given to the Rolong before the Volksraad. He asked whether the chief should be given more cattle or whether he should, in addition, be given a piece of land.<sup>86</sup> Moroka was not given more cattle and on 9 May, simply divided those he had. The Friend reported that a crowd of about 1 000 Rolong gathered to receive their share. This turned out to be 5 or 8 head to each sub-chief however many men were in his division. Despite the fact that there were not enough to go round, the Rolong were in a cheerful mood and gave a deafening cheer in honour of their chief.<sup>87</sup>

Moroka petitioned the Raad for land on 12 May. At the suggestion of H.A.L. Hamelberg, the Raad decided to shelve the

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83. The Friend 13 April 1866

84. G.S. 1403 P.411 Mitchell-Brand 18 April 1866

85. G.S. 1512 P.324 Brand-Moroka 21 April 1866

86. V.R.N. 7 May 1866; 9 May 1866

87. The Friend 18 May 1866

petition until land allocation in the conquered territory was settled.<sup>88</sup> On 11 June, a commission was appointed to decide what was to be done with the ceded land and, again at Hamelberg's suggestion, Moroka's application was referred to it for favourable consideration. Ten members registered their opposition to this and supported a motion by G.J. du Toit, member for Vet River and Chairman of the Raad, refusing the request on the grounds that Moroka had gained enough from the war. Du Toit added that the chief had been supplied with all his ammunition by the Free State and should be grateful that he was now safe from Sotho raids and was in safe and lawful possession of his territory.<sup>89</sup>

Moroka laid another petition before the Raad requesting permission for his people to hunt in the Free State as they had no food.<sup>90</sup> Unfortunately, by this time, Brand had already received complaints of damage caused by Rolong hunting parties. In order to stop them, he had asked Moroka to re-issue his October proclamation in more general terms to make it clear that the pass law was still in force and ordered all fieldcornets and commandants to keep a look out for hunters.<sup>91</sup> The Volksraad decided that any concession to Moroka might be misused but left the matter to Brand's discretion.<sup>92</sup> Brand recommended that Moroka encourage his people to work in the Free State to earn money or that, if he knew any farmers who were willing to allow the Rolong to hunt on their farms, he could apply for permission to do so, but only parties of three or four men would be

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88. V.R.N. 17 May 1866

89. V.R.N. 13 June 1866

90. G.S. 1403 P.417 Moroka-Brand 14 May 1866

91. G.S. 1512 P.331 Brand-Moroka 1 May 1866

G.S. 1512 P.335-336 Brand-Moroka 18 May 1866

92. V.R.N. 17 May 1866

permitted.<sup>93</sup> The chief refused to grant wholesale passes to his people<sup>94</sup> and to Brand's great indignation, a party of 500 Rolong with large numbers of cattle, horses and wagons entered the Free State on 30 May, with 3 000 cattle, horses and wagons, on a massive hunting expedition between the Vet and Modder Rivers. Moroka denied any knowledge of the event but even if he had tried to enforce Brand's regulations, it was clear that the rank and file would not abide by them.<sup>95</sup>

The chief was disappointed at the Free State's unwillingness to help his people who were suffering want owing to their participation in the war. He had expected a far greater share in the war booty and a greater show of appreciation from the Free State. There is no doubt, though, that the Free State had borne the brunt of the war effort and would have defeated the Sotho without Moroka's help. The amount of actual fighting the Rolong had done was limited. In fact, their main contribution was that they had not joined the Sotho rather than any assistance given to the commandos. The Rolong's reward was that they retained their land and their possessions. The Free State was not prepared to halve the Sotho cattle as if the Rolong had borne half the war effort.

Moroka did, however, gain two things from his participation. On 20 August 1866, the Free State confirmed his sovereign right to his land as an independent chief. This was extremely important as the boundaries laid down by the Treaty of Thaba Bosiu left Thaba 'Nchu entirely surrounded by the Free State.

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|-----|-----------|-----------|--------------|--------------|
| 93. | G.S. 1512 | P.355-356 | Brand-Moroka | 18 May 1866  |
| 94. | G.S. 1403 | P.423     | Moroka-Brand | 24 June 1866 |
| 95. | G.S. 1512 | P.369     | Brand-Moroka | 3 June 1866  |
|     | G.S. 1403 | P.421     | Moroka-Brand | 4 June 1866  |

There is no doubt that the Free State's willingness to allow him this position was related to his loyalty in the war. The way the Free State sought to confirm his independence was, however, strange. One of the original land documents signed by Moshoeshoe in 1833 was registered as Act No. 2005 in the Free State's Deeds Office. The document was signed by Moshoeshoe and Mosemi on the one hand, and Archbell, Edwards and Jenkins on the other. What the government thought it was doing registering a document which, in fact, states that the Rolong territory was owned by the Wesleyan Missionary Society, is a mystery.<sup>96</sup> The Deeds Office either overlooked or did not realise that the document gave the land to the missionaries for the use of the Rolong. Whatever the case, the Free State thought that by registering the document they were acknowledging Moroka's independence. There is no suggestion that by registering the chief's right to the land, the Free State was claiming the Rolong as subjects. By registering the transaction, the Free State was also making it quite clear that it would not support Sotho claims to the territory. In mid-1866, the question as to whether the Free State would grant more land to the Rolong was still being debated, but in 1869, Moroka eventually received 2 000 morgen of land as a reward for his assistance in the war.<sup>97</sup>

Another important result of Moroka's loyalty was that the Free State ratified the Treaty of Alliance. This served until his death to regulate his relations with Brand and to act as a brake against encroachments on his sovereignty. Moroka was

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96. Thaba 'Nchu Land Document Act No. 2005

97. See Chapter Three P.78

disappointed that he had not gained more from the war and his disappointment grew as the Sotho threat continued but he had gained the most important reward. His rights as an independent chief were respected and this attitude was consciously traced by the Free Staters to his loyalty in the Sotho war, despite the fact that Moroka had shown great presence of mind in often putting his own interests before those of the Free State.


CHAPTER THREE

THABA 'NCHU BECOMES  
AN ENCLAVE

MAP NO. III.

SOURCE : 2/308 (Reduced)

SCALE : Miles.



BOVENSTAANDE SCHETS VERTOOND DE GRENS LYN TUSSEN DER ORANJE VRIJSTAAT EN DE GRONDGEBIED VAN HET OPPERHOOFD MOROKA VOLGENS EEN OVEREENKOMST GESLOTEN TUSSENEN ZHED. STAATS PRESIDENT EN HET OPPERHOOFD MOROKA OP DEN 15de APRIL 1869.

## CHAPTER THREE

The relationship between the Free State and the Rolong changed subtly during the period between the signature of the Treaty of Thaba Bosiu on 3 April 1866, and the ratification of the Second Convention of Aliwal North on 24 December 1869. Two factors contributed to this change. The first was that both the Treaty and the Convention left Thaba 'Nchu entirely surrounded by Free State territory. The second was that the Convention removed the Sotho threat. The change was, to some extent, counteracted by the fact that both the Treaty and Wodehouse's annexation of Basutoland failed to secure peace with the Sotho. For this reason, the relationship between the Free State and the Rolong, during this period, appeared to be similar to their relationship during the second Sotho war. The ratification of the Convention, however, left the Free State and the Rolong on their own to sort out the implications of a new situation.

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The Treaty of Thaba Bosiu affected the Rolong in two ways. It was too severe to ensure peace, and the Rolong continued to be threatened by the Sotho despite the fact that Thaba 'Nchu was now surrounded by Free State territory. Thaba 'Nchu's new position as a black enclave within the Free State not only failed to protect the Rolong from the Sotho, but also exposed them to a new threat posed by land-hungry whites. This new threat indicated that the Free Staters attitude to the Rolong was changing but the failure of the peace settlement disguised this to some extent as the need for a common alliance continued.

By May, the Rolong realised that the Sotho had no intention of observing the terms of the Treaty.<sup>1</sup> The Treaty had laid down the boundary between the Free State and Basutoland as follows:

From Bamboesplaats near Pampoenspruit, with a straight line to about three miles to the east of Letsie's new Town; thence with a straight line northwards to the Caledon River, up along the Caledon to the Putisani to its source, and thence along the Drakensburg to the Natal British boundary.

Theoretically, Moroka's position after the Treaty should have protected him from Sotho raids, but the Free State was unable to occupy the land east of the Rolong territory. In the Treaty, Moshoeshoe had promised to recall his people from the areas supposedly conquered by the Free State, and to remain neutral if the Free State took up arms to remove those who disobeyed.<sup>2</sup> The Sotho in the ceded area did not, however, move and in order to gain time to reap their crops, Mopeli, Letsie, Sekhonyana<sup>3</sup> and Moletsane asked to be received as Free State subjects. For various reasons, the Volksraad refused these first requests but allowed the chiefs to remain on their land until the crops had been reaped. From the Free State point of view, this was a mistake as it encouraged the Sotho to think the land was still theirs. They began cultivating more land than they ever had before. The Volksraad's decision was also unfortunate for the Rolong, as it enabled the Sotho to wreak their revenge from secure bases in the ceded territory.

In August, Letsie repudiated the Treaty of Thaba Bosiu

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1. The Friend 18 May 1866
  2. Theal, G.M. Basutoland Records Vol. 3B P.650
  3. Moshoeshoe's brother. He was also called Nehemiah.

altogether<sup>4</sup> and the Sotho began a series of attacks on the Rolong. There was a fairly widespread feeling in the Free State that Moroka would decide to leave Thaba 'Nchu as a result, and speculators began to think of the opportunity of acquiring Rolong land. An article in The Friend on 24 August stated:

"De Barolongs gevoelen zich niet op hun gemak om in zulke korte nabijheid te zijn by hun naturellen vijand de Basutos".

The author speculated that as a result of this insecurity and the fact that large numbers were leaving Thaba 'Nchu, the Rolong territory would soon pass into European hands. As the author expressed this:

"De Barolongs, zoo men weet, zijn voor maanden herwaats in grooten gatale aan het trekken geweest, zoodat het dien tengevolge niet onmogelyk is, dat dit grondgebied vroeger of later in handen van eene blanke bevolking zal komen".

The first move from the Free State to secure the territory for whites occurred in mid-August. A private deputation from Smithfield went to Thaba 'Nchu with proposals to buy the territory. The Friend stated that their aim was "om een nieuwen Vrijstaat of model Republiek aan onze grenzen te vestigen". As Moroka was on a visit to the Kwena chief, Sechele, the deputation had to await his return, but The Friend reported that it was understood that a company had been formed to buy the Rolong territory at whatever cost.<sup>5</sup>

In September, hopes that Moroka would sell his land were encouraged by rumours that the chief had asked Brand if he could

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4. Sanders, P. Moshoeshoe Chief of the Sotho P.297  
5. The Friend 24 August 1866

move to the Korannaberg mountains. The Friend suggested that if this request was granted, the whole tribe would move there and articles on 14 and 21 September implied that the move would be permanent.<sup>6</sup> What foundation there was for these speculations is not known. There was no mention of the matter in Moroka's correspondence and he certainly did not receive the Korannaberg. These mountains would have given the Rolong a stronghold which they lacked in Thaba 'Nchu mountain, but it is probable that, if Moroka did make this request, he was envisaging the area as an extension and not as an alternative to Thaba 'Nchu.

No more was heard of these speculations until Wodehouse annexed Basutoland but they were highly significant. The reason why the discussions fell into the background was that the Free State could not afford to alienate the Rolong in view of the deteriorating Sotho situation. The Rolong also seemed to have shelved discussions as to whether they should all move and logically concentrated on defending what they had in face of the renewed Sotho threat.

For the rest of the year, the Rolong had to face Sotho raids and thefts without Moroka's leadership, as he was still in the north. His stepson, Tsipinare, however, acted in the chief's place and carried out the same sort of pragmatic policy as his father. He had much the same attitude to the Free State and the Sotho as his father had had prior to the outbreak of war in 1865. He severely disapproved of Brand's policy of allowing the Sotho to remain in the ceded area and as the Free State took no steps to control the situation, he opened direct negotiations with

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6. The Friend 14 September 1866; 21 September 1866

Moshoeshoe. At the same time, he pressed Brand to take vigorous action against the Sotho, though he inadvertently helped to frustrate Brand's attempts to occupy the conquered land.

The first reports of clashes between the Rolong and the Sotho were received in Bloemfontein on 9 August. Moroka's house was burnt down and the spoor of stolen cattle and horses was traced to Moletsane's town. William Mokhosi, one of Moroka's councillors, also warned Brand on 9 August that Letsie was building a wall around Qeme which was now in the ceded territory, and that Moshoeshoe was refortifying Thaba Bosiu.<sup>7</sup> Tension mounted in the following fortnight and on 24 August, a serious raid occurred. The Sotho attacked five cattle posts and carried off all the stock.<sup>8</sup> After this, Sotho raids appear to have been almost continuous. On 13 October, Tsipinare wrote to Moshoeshoe protesting that the situation appeared tantamount to war, as stock was being stolen daily. He stated that when Moroka left on his visit to Sechele, the chief had asked Moshoeshoe to "look after" Thaba 'Nchu, and asked what the Sotho chief was doing about the request.<sup>9</sup> In what sense Moroka meant Moshoeshoe to "look after" Thaba 'Nchu is not clear. In view of the hostility between the Rolong and the Sotho in this period, it is possible that Moroka's request was an anxious plea rather than an indication of a rapprochement.

Moroka's request is, nevertheless, interesting. His attitude to the Sotho had always been equivocal and it would not

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7. G.S. 1403 P.431 Mokhosi-Brand 9 August 1866  
The Friend 24 August 1866  
 8. G.S. 1403 P.437 Tsipinare-Brand 25 August 1866  
 9. G.S. 1403 P.449 Tsipinare-Moshoeshoe 13 October 1866

be at all surprising if the Free Staters failure to subdue the Sotho had made the chief think once more of the necessity of friendship with the Sotho. His alliance with the Free State had been opposed by a section of his people<sup>10</sup> and even during the war, there were occasions when the Rolong were suspected of being more sympathetic towards the Sotho than the Boers.<sup>11</sup> It is also interesting that in the period prior to Wodehouse's annexation, the Anglican missionary at Thaba 'Nchu wrote that the Sotho were "kept from" the Rolong by Moroka's alliance with the Free State.<sup>12</sup> This rather indicates that he did not consider a rapprochement as impossible. An awareness of this undercurrent is important if the complexity of the situation is to be understood.

Tsipinare also asked Moshoeshoe to see that all Sotho travelling through Thaba 'Nchu were provided with a proper pass and understood that they could only travel along the road and could only trade during the day. He hoped this would reduce thefts.<sup>13</sup> It is notable, however, that he allowed the Sotho to resume trading with his people, who were still desperately in need of food. Some form of normal contact with the Sotho had, therefore, been resumed.

The Free State's failure to occupy the conquered territory was the main cause of these continuous thefts. More and more Sotho crossed the boundaries of the Treaty of Thaba Bosiu and returned to their former homes. One of the difficulties facing

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10. Theal, G.M. Basutoland Records Vol. 3A  
Orpen-Burnet 14 November 1864  
Orpen-Burnet 25 November 1864

11. See Chapter Two P.36

12. Private paper printed by W. Crisp 24 February 1868  
Diocesan Archives, Bloemfontein

13. G.S. 1403 P.449 Tsipinare-Moshoeshoe 13 October 1866

the Free State was that the eastern boundary of the Rolong territory had to be surveyed before farms could be sold. A quarrel with Tsipinare hindered the survey and thus his behaviour was partly responsible for the delay in occupation and the resultant Sotho threats.

After the treaty was signed, Brand asked Moroka to point out his eastern boundary. Early in September, Tsipinare, Samuel Moroka and George Moroka, other sons of the chief, met Stegman, the Surveyor General of the Free State, for this purpose. According to Tsipinare, the party started at Leeuw River but only got as far as Mekoro, where Stegman asked to be shown the beacon. He was told that a beacon had never been necessary. As he thought he was being deceived, the Surveyor called Tsipinare a "humbug" and rode off in great indignation. Tsipinare was most upset<sup>14</sup> but a report in The Friend indicates that, as far as Stegman was concerned, this dispute at Mekoro was merely the last straw. A dispute had arisen prior to this at Menschvretersberg where Tsipinare had indicated a line which would have included about thirty Free State farms in the Rolong territory.<sup>15</sup>

How long this dispute delayed the survey of Free State farms is not clear but on 10 September, the Government Secretary wrote to Tsipinare regretting that he was hindering the inspection of farms. Brand sent Stegman a copy of Warden's description of the boundary with instructions that he keep as strictly as possible to it and leave any difficulties to be settled later.<sup>16</sup>

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14. G.S. 1403 P.439 Tsipinare-Brand 8 September 1866  
 15. The Friend 14 September 1866  
 16. G.S. 1634 P.317 Marais-Tsipinare 10 September 1866

In his complaint to Brand, Tsipinare did not mention his claims to the Menschvretersberg area, probably as they had no foundation; but the Free State claims to land around Mekoro unsettled the Rolong. By 20 October, Stegman had placed his beacons in this area, and Tsipinare complained bitterly against encroachment.<sup>17</sup> Marais, the Government Secretary, assured him that Stegman had adhered to the Warden Line but promised to look into the matter as the government had no desire to curtail the Rolong's rights.<sup>18</sup> He asked Joseph Allison to investigate, as he had accompanied Warden, and his arbitration in earlier disputes had won him the confidence of the Rolong.<sup>19</sup> The matter had to await Moroka's return,<sup>20</sup> but on 3 January 1867, Moroka went to Bloemfontein and arranged that Brand and Allison would meet him at Thaba 'Nchu on 12 February to settle the dispute.<sup>21</sup> Allison, however, fell ill and the meeting was postponed.<sup>22</sup> Moroka was very worried,<sup>23</sup> but as Brand decided that the settlement would have to wait until peace was established, the question was shelved, and only settled in 1869.<sup>24</sup>

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Despite the boundary dispute with the Rolong, the survey of farms in the conquered territory was completed by 15 January, and a few burghers attempted to occupy their land.<sup>25</sup> During the subsequent conflict with the Sotho, Moroka's policy differed from

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|-----|-------------------|-------|------------------|-------------|------|
| 17. | G.S. 1403         | P.451 | Tsipinare-Brand  | 20 October  | 1866 |
| 18. | G.S. 1634         | P.325 | Marais-Tsipinare | 23 October  | 1866 |
| 19. | G.S. 1634         | P.327 | Marais-Tsipinare | 5 December  | 1866 |
| 20. | G.S. 1403         | P.455 | Tsipinare-Brand  | 7 December  | 1866 |
| 21. | <u>The Friend</u> |       | 11 January       | 1867        |      |
|     | G.S. 1512         | P.441 | Brand-Moroka     | 30 January  | 1867 |
| 22. | G.S. 1634         | P.342 | Marais-Moroka    | 11 February | 1867 |
| 23. | G.S. 1403         | P.465 | Moroka-Brand     | 11 February | 1867 |
| 24. | G.S. 1513         | P.234 | Brand-Moroka     | 18 March    | 1868 |
| 25. | Sanders, P.       | ibid. | P.298            |             |      |

his conduct in previous campaigns, but was ruled by the same caution and self-interest. He did not actively aid the Free State as he had done in the Second Sotho War, but nevertheless kept in touch with Brand. He may have been attempting to establish a position of neutrality but, if anything, his loyalties were still with the Free State. It is notable that by May 1867, Moroka was reasonably sure that the Free State would subdue the Sotho. He continually pressed Brand to take active steps against the Sotho<sup>26</sup> and was very disappointed that the Free State had not cleared the ceded area. The situation in the ceded territory was such that, until late September 1867, he certainly had every reason to concentrate his forces at Thaba 'Nchu.

The Free State farmers were forced by Sotho hostility to abandon their farms in the conquered territory. Although Moshoeshoe made a last minute attempt to negotiate a new settlement in February, Brand re-affirmed his intention of clearing the area by force.<sup>27</sup> On 19 February, he wrote to Moroka asking to meet him to discuss the situation. He must have been thinking of formulating a common policy but it seems he also hoped Moroka would be able to give him information about the movements and intentions of the Sotho.<sup>28</sup> During the last week in February, Moroka paid a three day visit to Bloemfontein but there was no record of a meeting with Brand.<sup>29</sup> It was probably during this visit that the chief asked for permission to send his women, children and cattle to the Free State when the commandos entered the ceded territory. Brand set aside a farm, Nieuwejaarsfontein, which was not far from the Rolong territory,

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26. G.S. 1403 P.487 Moroka-Brand 13 May 1867  
 27. Sanders, P. *ibid.* P.298  
 28. G.S. 1512 P.449 Brand-Moroka 19 February 1867  
 29. The Friend 1 March 1867

for this purpose. Moroka, however, never took up the offer. He also asked Moroka for permission to station guards at Daggafontein and for help in patrolling the area. Daggafontein was a large farm in the south western area of the Rolong territory and by placing guards in the vicinity, Brand hoped to prevent the Sotho raiding the Free State from that point.<sup>30</sup> The chief refused to co-operate by patrolling the area as the guards in fact camped quite far from Daggafontein and he wished for a guard near the town of Thaba 'Nehu.<sup>31</sup>

On 12 March, two Free State commandos with a total of approximately 400 men, entered the ceded area. Chief Commandant J.I.J. Fick was to clear the area north of the Caledon, while Chief Commandant J.G. Pansegrouw was to scour the area between the Caledon and Orange. As Mokhosi had warned Brand, the Sotho had fortified their mountain strongholds.<sup>32</sup> They avoided direct clashes with the commandos and concentrated their strength around four mountains. These were Moshoeshoe's Thaba Bosiu, Posholi's Mathebe, Makoai's Mabolaka, and Qeme, Letsie's stronghold.<sup>33</sup> This was important as all of them except Thaba Bosiu were in the ceded territory. The commandos concentrated their efforts on destroying whatever crops the Sotho had failed to reap. This led to renewed requests from Letsie, Mopeli and Moletsane to be taken as Free State subjects. As the Free State could not dislodge them, the Volksraad acquiesced on 10 May.<sup>34</sup> On 22 May, Letsie was given a reserve between the Caledon and the Orange,

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30. G.S. 1512 P.458-459 Brand-Moroka 9 March 1867  
 31. G.S. 1403 P.473 Moroka-Brand 10 March 1867  
 32. G.S. 1403 P.431 Mokhosi-Brand 9 August 1866  
 33. For the names of these mountains, Peter Sanders' orthography is followed.  
 34. V.R.N. 10 May 1867

and on 1 June, Mopeli was given permission to return to his former area in Witziesshoek. Both were to be subject to the control of a Free State commandant. Moletsane was allowed to remain where he was, but was informed that he would be required to move to a reserve in the Winburg area.

The only part Moroka took in the campaign was to forward two pieces of information to Brand. The one warned that Sekhonyana intended intercepting the Free State posts.<sup>35</sup> The other warned that Fick was heading for an ambush.<sup>36</sup> The chief, however, constantly sent spies into Basutoland and their reports convinced him that the Free State's decision of 10 May was a grave mistake.<sup>37</sup> He told Brand so and specifically warned him that he was being deceived by Molapo, who was gradually sending men to help the Sotho resistance.<sup>38</sup> On 13 May, he informed Brand that he did not think the Sotho had the power to hold out against the Free State.<sup>39</sup> This was perhaps an attempt to persuade Brand to resume the campaign. He was certainly eager that he should, as shortly after this, Thaba 'Nchu suffered another raid.<sup>40</sup>

The chief was, therefore, pleased when Brand altered his policy towards the end of June. He again made no attempt to assist the Free State. His policy was the same as it had been in 1865. The Free State campaign had not been successful and he kept his troops at home.

During the renewed Free State campaign, he nevertheless

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| 35. | G.S. | 1403 | P.477 | Moroka-Brand | 3 April | 1867 |
| 36. | G.S. | 1403 | P.481 | Moroka-Brand | 4 May   | 1867 |
| 37. | G.S. | 1403 | P.489 | Moroka-Brand | 12 July | 1867 |
| 38. | G.S. | 1403 | P.481 | Moroka-Brand | 4 May   | 1867 |
| 39. | G.S. | 1403 | P.485 | Moroka-Brand | 13 May  | 1867 |
| 40. | G.S. | 1403 | P.487 | Moroka-Brand | 17 May  | 1867 |

kept in touch with Brand and there was some amount of co-operation between the two. Brand gave the chief some ammunition<sup>41</sup> and on another occasion the chief lent some to a Free State fieldcornet.<sup>42</sup> Moroka's spies were also active and on at least one occasion, he warned Brand that the Sotho were planning raids on the Free State.<sup>43</sup> In mid-August, he received a party of Sotho as his subjects but as they helped him recover stolen cattle and were useful as spies, this in no way indicated a rapprochement with Moshoeshoe.<sup>44</sup> There is no doubt that he wished the burghers every success.

Brand changed his policy largely as a result of the murder of two burghers, Bush and Jacobus Krynaauw, who were both killed in the ceded territory. On 26 June, Brand demanded the extradition of Bush's murderers, but received the following reply from Moshoeshoe:

"I do not understand what you mean when you speak of Basutoland as if it were Orange Free State ground ... I must beg of you to let the Boers know that they must remain where they are, in the Free State, there is no other way to keep the peace".<sup>45</sup>

This was the last straw as far as Brand was concerned. On 16 July, he called his burghers to make a final, full scale effort to clear the ceded area and to compel Moshoeshoe to observe the Treaty of Thaba Bosiu. On 19 July, he proclaimed Martial Law and

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41. G.S. 1513 P.132 Brand-Moroka 22 November 1867  
 42. G.S. 1403 P.513 Moroka-Brand 24 December 1867  
 43. Theal, G.M. Basutoland Records Vol. 3B P.837  
 Theal dates the letter at 20 December, the original in the G.S. 1403 papers is dated 30 December  
 44. G.S. 1403 P.499 Moroka-Brand 19 August 1867  
 G.S. 1403 P.501 Moroka-Brand 9 September 1867  
 45. Grobbelaar, J.J.G. Die Vrystaatse Republiek en die Basuto Vraagstuk A.Y.B. 1939 II P.163

on 5 August, two strong commandos entered the ceded area. J.G. Pansegrouw was sent south with a force of approximately 500 burghers and 100 Mfengu, while Commandant G.F. Joubert went north with roughly the same number.<sup>46</sup>

The Free State forces achieved little of note during August and early September. The Sotho had already gathered their harvest, so the commandos concentrated on capturing cattle and destroying food stocks, but their attempts to drive the Sotho from the hills were ineffectual. The force was too small to cover the vast area and the Sotho managed to put large areas of land under cultivation. As they desperately needed help, the Boers became most disgruntled that Moroka was doing nothing to help them.<sup>47</sup> The situation seemed to indicate that a stalemate had been reached. On 17 September, Wodehouse again offered to mediate. Brand refused the offer but on 17 September, Wodehouse again wrote to the Secretary of State for the Colonies pressing for British annexation of Basutoland.<sup>48</sup>

On the night of 24 September, the Free State secured its first notable success. Makoai's mountain was taken by Pansegrouw.<sup>49</sup> By the end of December, the Free State forces were showing every sign that they would be successful in subduing the Sotho and Wodehouse became more and more alarmed. On 13 January 1868, however, he received a despatch from Buckingham, the new Secretary of State for the Colonies, informing him that he could annex Basutoland provided it was annexed to the Colony

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46. Sanders, P. *ibid.* P.299

47. G.S. 1403 P.519 Moroka-Brand 21 January 1867

48. Theal, G.M. Fragment of Basuto History P.119  
Sanders, P. *ibid.* P.300

49. G.S. 1513 P.98 Brand-Moroka 8 October 1867

of Natal. Wodehouse immediately informed Brand of his new powers and again offered to mediate. Brand rejected the offer on 31 January, stating that the "object of the war was nearly accomplished" and that "the arms of the republic were: under God's blessing everywhere successful".<sup>50</sup>

On 27 or 28 January, Posholi's mountain Mathebe, fell to the Free State. Posholi was killed and to many Sotho his death signalled their defeat. Shortly before this, Moroka, for the first time, indicated his willingness to join the Free State offensive. He gave the rather feeble excuse that the Free State had not told him where the commandos were and, therefore, he had been unable to send his men previously.<sup>51</sup> There is no evidence that he did send any men. On 31 January, he informed Brand that he was expecting a Sotho raid on Thaba 'Nchu. This is presumably the reason why he kept his men at home.<sup>52</sup>

The Free State continued, however, to be successful without Moroka's help. On 22 February, Letsie's Qeme fell, and large numbers of cattle, horses and sheep were captured. The commandos also began destroying the Sotho's new crops. This situation led Wodehouse to prohibit the sale of ammunition to the Free State on 10 March, and to annex Basutoland on 12 March.<sup>53</sup>

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Wodehouse's annexation of Basutoland did not secure peace with the Sotho and, as his proclamation did not lay down any boundaries, the situation in the ceded territory remained

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50. Theal, G.M. Fragment of Basuto History P.124  
 51. G.S. 1403 P.519 Moroka-Brand 21 January 1868  
 52. Theal, G.M. Basutoland Records Vol. 3B P.855  
 Moroka-Brand 21 January 1868  
 53. Sanders, P. *ibid.* P.301

anomalous. In an attempt to control the situation, Wodehouse appointed Sir Walter Currie as his agent for Basutoland on 14 August, and sent him with a few Frontier Armed and Mounted Police to Basutoland. The Free State forces, however, refused to retreat from the ceded territory although the campaign was halted. Wodehouse encouraged the Sotho to remain in the ceded area and, although Currie ordered them not to attack the Free Staters, clashes occurred. There was, however, no prohibition on attacking the Rolong and the Sotho continued to threaten and harass them.<sup>54</sup>

At first, the annexation seemed to make little difference to Moroka's position but it did have important consequences. Indirect pressure was again exerted on Moroka to leave the Free State area. Owing to this and the continued Sotho hostility, Moroka decided to appeal for British protection. The chief may have been thinking of approaching Wodehouse even before the annexation. As soon as he knew that Wodehouse had the power to annex Basutoland, Moroka kept a close watch on his activities.<sup>55</sup> On 3 March, Brand informed him that Wodehouse was due to visit Basutoland at the end of March or early April.<sup>56</sup> The chief immediately asked for transfer of land which had been promised to him as a reward for his participation in the Second Sotho War. He was probably anxious that if Wodehouse annexed Basutoland with the boundaries as they had been prior to the Treaty of Thaba Bosiu, this would preclude the possibility of his acquiring land in the ceded territory. He was also anxious to have his boundary

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54. Sanders, P. *ibid.* P.301 ff

55. G.S. 1403 P.523 Moroka-Brand 21 February 1868

56. G.S. 1513 P.207 Brand-Moroka 3 March 1868

dispute settled before Wodehouse arrived.<sup>57</sup> Brand, however, stated that his boundaries could only be settled after peace had been established.<sup>58</sup>

On 24 March, twelve days after the annexation, the Rev. James Scott, the Wesleyan missionary at Thaba 'Nchu, wrote to the Civil Commissioner of Aliwal North stating that Moroka wished to be taken under British protection. The letter reads as follows:

"... I beg that if possible you will endeavour to get Moroke's (sic) wishes conveyed to His Excellency. Moroke is rather in a delicate position, being in treaty with the Free State, Govt., and being uncertain what the Free State line will be he cannot see his way clear to any decided course of action. For the benefit of the people, and for the ... prosecution of our work I wish we could have British protection thrown over us".<sup>59</sup>

From this letter, it seems as though this request for British protection came from Scott rather than Moroka. The letter was signed by Scott, whereas Moroka usually signed the letters the missionaries wrote for him. Moroka did, however, take the matter up himself later.

He sent his sons to meet Wodehouse at Aliwal North in April. An article in the Dutch newspaper, De Tijd, stated that Wodehouse had invited Moroka to speak to him about the possibility of his becoming a British subject. On 17 April, The Friend refuted this with the special scorn it reserved for anything written in De Tijd. According to The Friend, Moroka had spoken to the High Commissioner of his own accord and had received the same reply as

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57. G.S. 1403 P.525 Moroka-Brand 10 March 1868  
 58. G.S. 1513 P.324 Brand-Moroka 18 March 1868  
 59. G.S. 1403 P.533 Scott-Burnet 24 March 1868

was given to the Free State deputation, that Wodehouse had "no instructions at present to make them subjects of the Queen of England or to do anything on their behalf".<sup>60</sup>

During this period The Friend was strongly annexationist, supporting those in the Free State who wished Britain to resume control over the Republic. The paper also advocated British annexation of the Rolong territory. The editors hoped that Moroka could be persuaded to sell his land to the British<sup>61</sup> but thought that even British protection over the Rolong was preferable to the current situation.<sup>62</sup> Thus even among the Free Staters who supported the extension of British influence at Thaba 'Nchu, there was an element of hostility to the Rolong. Scott's letter indicates that Moroka was worried about his relationship with the Free State. The same impression is conveyed in the article in The Friend on 17 April. This stated that Moroka "has long felt that he is situated in a very difficult and ticklish position with the Boers on the one side, and the Basutos on the other".<sup>63</sup> The Anglican missionary at Thaba 'Nchu discussed this same problem in a letter written early in 1868. Referring to Moroka, Crisp wrote:

"He has two very difficult neighbours to deal with. The Basutos on one side, ... and it is generally thought the Free State would not need much provocation to annex his territory to their country. The Barolongs are accused of annoying the border farmers by frequent petty thefts; and the country around Thaba 'Nchu is certainly superior to most of the Free State".<sup>64</sup>

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60. The Friend 17 April 1868  
 61. The Friend 4 February 1869  
 62. The Friend 11 February 1869  
 63. The Friend 17 April 1868  
 64. Crisp, W. 24 February 1868  
 This letter is enclosed in Crisp's Log Book

As in 1864, Moroka felt caught "between two fires"<sup>65</sup> but added to this was a new realisation that many Free Staters wanted his land. It may have crossed the chief's mind that if they could take land away from the Sotho, they might one day take his.

Wodehouse's refusal to accept Moroka's plea for British protection left the chief in an awkward position, but his more immediate problem was not the Free State threat, but the fact that the Sotho threat was becoming serious. Early in September, Moroka received reports that Masupha and Moletsane's sons were planning a massive raid on Thaba 'Nchu.<sup>66</sup> The raid did not occur in September, but another wave of rumours led the chief to warn Brand on 6 October that the attack seemed imminent.<sup>67</sup>

On 19 October, the raid occurred. According to Moroka, the Sotho carried off 3 000 head of cattle and 9 000 sheep.<sup>68</sup> A letter received by The Friend estimated that 400 Sotho had stolen 1 500 cattle and 500 sheep.<sup>69</sup> Brand reported to Wodehouse that 300 head had been taken.<sup>70</sup> Whatever the amount, the Rolong suffered badly and three men were killed. George Moroka managed to recapture some of the sheep, but Moroka was at his wits end as to what to do. Brand promised to write to Wodehouse on his behalf but told the chief that he would now have to address his complaints to the High Commissioner, and advised him to keep a strong patrol on his border.<sup>71</sup> Moroka promised to write to

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65. Theal, G.M. Basutoland Records Vol. 3A. P.275  
Moroka-High Commissioner 21 April 1864
66. The Friend 14 August 1868  
G.S. 1403 P.551 Moroka-Brand 9 September 1868
67. G.S. 1403 P.553 Moroka-Brand 6 October 1868
68. G.S. 1403 P.569 Moroka-Brand 20 October 1868
69. The Friend 30 October 1868
70. G.S. 1513 P.375 Brand-Wodehouse 30 October 1868
71. G.S. 1513 P.371-372 Brand-Moroka 23 October 1868

Wodehouse but appealed for Free State aid as Sotho raids continued on a large scale.<sup>72</sup> The President replied that he was taking action. New wards had been laid out in the ceded territory and he had called up reinforcements to force the Sotho "to respect private property". He told Moroka that Fieldcornet Enslin had cleared the Menschvretersberg area of Sotho.<sup>73</sup> He also wrote to Wodehouse about Moroka's losses and asked that measures should be taken to prevent the Sotho from crossing the line laid down in the Thaba Bosiu Treaty.<sup>74</sup>

On 3 November, Moroka appealed again for assistance and referred to the Treaty of Alliance to support his plea. He had heard that the Sotho intended burning his town to the ground.<sup>75</sup> Crisp dismissed this threat as an attempt to frighten the Rolong.<sup>76</sup> The Friend also decided that the threat was not serious.<sup>77</sup> Brand, however, decided to co-operate with Moroka and told the chief that he would receive assistance from Fieldcornet Diedericks and Fieldcornet Schalkwyk of Wepener if he contacted them. The Government Secretary, F.K. Höhne, sent instructions to the two fieldcornets and to Commandant Wessels to collect as many men as possible to go to Moroka's assistance.<sup>78</sup>

Nothing happened, but Höhne kept in close contact. Höhne reported rumours of an attack on 18 November<sup>79</sup> but the raid only took place on 16 January 1869. Thaba 'Nchu was not burnt but Höhne wrote expressing his regret that Moroka had suffered further

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| 72. | G.S. 1403         | P.555           | Moroka-Brand    | 26 October  | 1868 |
| 73. | G.S. 1513         | P.374           | Brand-Moroka    | 29 October  | 1868 |
| 74. | G.S. 1513         | P.375           | Brand-Wodehouse | 30 October  | 1868 |
| 75. | G.S. 1403         | P.559           | Moroka-Brand    | 3 November  | 1868 |
| 76. | Crisp, W.         | <u>Log Book</u> | Crisp-Fannie    | 31 October  | 1868 |
| 77. | <u>The Friend</u> | 13 November     | 1868            |             |      |
| 78. | G.S. 1636         | P.10            | Höhne-Moroka    | 3 November  | 1868 |
| 79. | G.S. 1636         | P.13            | Höhne-Moroka    | 18 November | 1868 |

losses. The raid had happened too quickly for the Free State to lend aid. Höhne also informed Moroka that, as the Free State deputation to England had failed, the Free State had appointed a commission to negotiate with Wodehouse and he hoped that through these negotiations "matters would be adjusted".<sup>80</sup>

Early in February, Wodehouse met the Free State Commission at Aliwal North in an attempt to reach a settlement and to determine the Free State-Basutoland boundary. Moroka brought up his claims for compensation at the conference unsuccessfully, but as far as the Rolong were concerned, the conference was more important for the numerous suggestions that were made to Wodehouse that they should be removed from Thaba 'Nchu. On 4 February, The Friend stated:

"We would humbly suggest to Sir P. Wodehouse the propriety and advisability of purchasing (sic) out old MOKOKO, and thus getting rid of his whole tribe for good and all. The Barolong have, it is true, but a small strip of territory; but still it is good. Divided into farms, and sold with British titles, it would realise a handsome sum".

The article continued:

"Moroka and his tribe cannot ... remain in the position they are now in, surrounded by Free State subjects. He cannot but prove a source of future difficulty and trouble. ... Moroko's tribe must sooner or later sell out and join the remainder of the tribe beyond the Vaal".<sup>81</sup>

On 11 February, The Friend stated that Moroka would certainly agree either to annexation or to selling his land to the British

80. G.S. 1636 P.14 Höhne-Moroka 18 January 1869

81. The Friend 4 February 1869

and it was understood that he preferred the latter option. The article stated:

"He does not feel at all secure in his present position; neither is he, nor can he be, secure. His country must and will be absorbed and that at no distant day".<sup>82</sup>

Wodehouse was not interested in annexing the Rolong territory<sup>83</sup> but the settlement at Aliwal North on 12 February reinforced the arguments that Moroka would be forced to move. As the Convention gave the land north of the Caledon to the Free State and fixed the south western boundary of Basutoland along a line drawn from Kornetspruit to Jammerbergdrift, Thaba 'Nchu continued to be surrounded by Free State territory.

On 15 May, Brand wrote to Moroka about rumours that he intended selling his country. He wrote:

"... we have now a good neighbour in you, and we should be very sorry to lose you, but at the same time if you should wish to sell, it would make very little difference to you, if you sold to us instead of to anyone else - whilst it would be a serious thing to our Govt. - if you sold to anyone else but our Govt."<sup>84</sup>

Moroka replied on 29 May 1869 that, at present, he had no intention of disposing of his land.<sup>85</sup> It is doubtful whether Moroka ever seriously considered leaving Thaba 'Nchu but he must have been encouraged by the Free State's amicable settlement of their boundary dispute on 15 April 1869.

82. The Friend 11 February 1869

83. Wodehouse again turned down the Rolong request for annexation at the Jackmansdrift Conference on 27 February  
The Friend 4 March 1869

84. G.S. 1514 P.43 Brand-Moroka 15 May 1869

85. G.S. 1403 P.599 Moroka-Brand 29 May 1869

After the Convention was signed, Free State farmers began occupying their land to the east of the Rolong territory. This necessitated a settlement of the Rolong's boundaries, particularly as several farmers began building in the disputed area around Mekoro. Brand informed Moroka that he had taken care that no farmer would encroach on Moroka's line but the chief was convinced that the buildings were on his land.<sup>86</sup> Brand arranged to go over the line with Moroka, Allison and Stegman on 5 April 1869.<sup>87</sup> The next ten days were spent going over the boundary and settling disputes. On 15 April, the Warden Line was agreed to with two modifications.<sup>88</sup> They first settled the old dispute, which had arisen in 1861 over the boundary at the farm Tochgekregen near Paul Smitsberg. Moroka was promised 60 morgen of land elsewhere. The second modification was made "ter vereffening van het verskil omtrent het naaste punt van Manganespruit aan de Mekoro of Hoepelrok". Brand rejected the Rolong claims in this area as well but the Free State promised to transfer about 1 860 morgen elsewhere to the Rolong in full and free ownership. The agreement was signed by Moroka, Tsipinare, Tshabadira and George Moroka and six Rolong councillors. Stegman promised to draw up a chart of the boundaries and to forward Moroka a copy.<sup>89</sup> The agreement was ratified by the Volksraad on 11 May. Stegman also surveyed the 2 000 morgen allocated to Moroka and on 15 May, Brand forwarded the title deeds of two farms. The one of 2 000 morgen was called Bushmanshoek, and the other of 1 740 morgen was

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86. G.S. 1403 P.589 Moroka-Brand 17 March 1869  
 G.S. 1403 P.593 Moroka-Brand 25 April 1869  
 87. G.S. 1514 P.29 Brand-Moroka 19 March 1869  
 88. G.S. 1514 P.34 Brand-Moroka 30 March 1869  
 G.S. 1403 P.591 Moroka-Brand 31 March 1869  
The Friend 15 April 1869; 22 April 1869  
 89. The Friend 29 April 1869

appropriately called Overeenkomst. Both were on the south eastern boundary of the Rolong territory in the area which had formerly been the ceded territory.<sup>90</sup>

The care taken over the boundary definitions together with Moroka's statement to Brand that at present he had no intention of selling his land, indicates that even if Moroka was thinking of leaving, he was far from having made up his mind. His position after the Convention was, however, uneasy. The settlement of the Sotho question by the ratification of the Convention removed the *raison d'etre* of the Free State-Rolong alliance. The Rev. Crisp realised this when he wrote that "during the Basuto war the Boers were too glad of the Barolong as allies and were rascally friendly, but now they need them no longer the case is different". He saw that the only way the Rolong could live in peace after the Convention settlement was to move, although he expected this only to happen in a year or two. He had no doubt that Moroka was making up his mind to move.<sup>91</sup>

There was a growing pressure on Moroka from Free Staters and from his own people to move. The reason why he did not can only be explained by his relationship with Brand. Brand had no doubt about the necessity of honouring his alliance with Moroka and of regulating his relationship with the chief according to the terms of their Treaty of Alliance. As this became clear, Moroka began opposing all those in his country who were intent on leaving.<sup>92</sup>

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90. V.R.N. 11 May 1869  
G.S. 1514 P.43 Brand-Moroka 15 May 1869  
See Map

91. Crisp, W. Log Book Crisp-his father 23 April 1870

92. See Chapter Four

The resolutions of the two heads of state explains why the Treaty of Alliance continued to guide their relationship despite the fact that this relationship had changed.<sup>93</sup>

The change really began when the Free State annexed land to the east of Thaba 'Nchu and pointed to the possible absorption of Thaba 'Nchu in the future. The Free State could not, however, abandon the Treaty of Alliance with the Rolong while the Sotho threat continued. Soon after the Treaty of Thaba Bosiu, Moroka realised that Thaba 'Nchu's position as an enclave within the Free State was a mixed blessing. This appears to have been one of his reasons for applying for British annexation. Wodehouse's refusal and the Convention settlement left Moroka and the Free State on their own to sort out the implications of a new situation. The Rolong remained independent but many saw the writing on the wall although it took longer for the Free State to absorb Thaba 'Nchu than they imagined.

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93. See Chapter Five

CHAPTER FOUR

DISAFFECTION AND DISPERSION

## CHAPTER FOUR

There were two sources of disaffection in the Rolong territory during the 1870's. One was the succession dispute, which will be considered later.<sup>1</sup> The other was the desire of large numbers of Rolong to trek north of the Vaal. As Moroka's opposition to this became clear, disaffection erupted into a rebellion specifically directed against the chief's rule. The rebellion was fomented by one of Moroka's enemies, a Rapulana chief, Matlabe, who had left Thaba 'Nchu in 1841.<sup>2</sup> Matlabe's activities kept the Rolong on the verge of civil war throughout the 1870's. Much against its will, the Free State government became increasingly involved in Moroka's domestic difficulties, and Matlabe's agitations contributed directly to a general deterioration in relations between the Rolong and the Free State in the 1870's.

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Matlabe's hostility to Moroka had a long history, but in the 1870's his opposition to the Seleka chief was closely tied up with the Diamond Field's disputes. Matlabe had long been an ally of the South African Republic and he supported President Pretorius's claims in opposition to Moroka's. This in itself was only important in that it fanned the quarrel between the two chiefs, but the clash between the Transvaal and Moroka was to have serious repercussions for both chiefs.

The Rolong first clashed with the Transvaal in 1868 when, on

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1. See Chapters Six and Seven  
2. See Appendix B for tribal divisions

29 April, President Pretorius issued a proclamation annexing the diamond fields north of the Vaal. Montshica, Chief of the Tshidi-Rolong, protested that the area west of the Harts River belonged to his people and that the area between the Vaal and the Harts up to Schoonspruit was Moroka's, by virtue of his chieftainship over the Seleka-Rolong. Pretorius ignored this protest and, despite opposition from the peoples living in the area, Transvaal land committees continued to survey farms to the west of the Schoonspruit. It was, however, impossible for the Transvaal to occupy the area effectively, so Pretorius decided to negotiate with the chiefs at the Nooitgedacht Conference in August 1870.<sup>3</sup> A commission from the South African Republic therefore went to Nooitgedacht, where the Free State and the Griquas had met to discuss their claims to the whole diamond area. It was agreed that the Free State had no claim to the lands claimed by Waterboer between the Harts and the Vaal Rivers. Brand therefore decided to support Moroka's claims against those of both Waterboer, the Griqua Chief, and the Transvaal.<sup>4</sup>

Moroka represented his claims personally at Nooitgedacht. He made it clear that he claimed the area between the Harts and the Vaal right from their confluence up to a line drawn from the source of the Harts to the Schoonspruit, and along the Schoonspruit to the Vaal. He based his claim on the fact that he had inherited the land from his grandfather, Tau. He disregarded the presence of the Thlaping in the southern region of the area as they had been conquered and subordinated by Tau. Despite the

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3. Agar-Hamilton, J.A.I. The Road to the North P.54  
 4. Theal, G.M. History of South Africa 1854-1872 P.327  
 G.S. 1392 P.80  
 G.S. 1514 P.92 Brand-Moroka 22 September 1870  
 G.S. 1514 P.117 Brand-Moroka 13 October 1870

fact that after Tau's death the Thlaping had reasserted their independence, the Thlaping chiefs, Mankoroane and Jantje Mothibi, supported Moroka's claims at Nooitgedacht.<sup>5</sup>

As there was no agreement between the conflicting parties, Pretorius arranged a meeting between himself and Montshioa on the Molopo River on 15 November 1870. The President hoped that an appeal to Montshioa, whom he regarded as the paramount chief of all the Rolong, would solve the problem of Moroka's opposition at Nooitgedacht as Montshioa had not been present at this meeting. The Tshidi chief, however, firmly supported the claim Moroka had made at Nooitgedacht and explained that the heads of the Ratlou, Tshidi, Seleka and Rapulana clans were all sovereign in their own areas, whatever their seniority.<sup>6</sup> The matter was eventually referred to Lieutenant-Governor R.W. Keate's arbitration at the Bloemhof court in 1871. During the Bloemhof sitting, Pretorius tried to persuade Moroka and Montshioa to accept his protection and promised that if they did they could be certain of receiving their land. He sent Matlabe to negotiate with the chiefs but without success.<sup>7</sup> At both the Molopo meeting and the Bloemhof arbitration, the whole history of the Transvaal claims to the area and Matlabe's involvement in the history came to light. The whole matter puts Matlabe's conduct in the 1870's into perspective.

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Matlabe and his Rapulana-Rolong joined Moroka's Seleka-Rolong at Thaba 'Nchu in 1835. His contact with the Voortrekkers who later settled in the Transvaal began in 1837 when Moroka sent him

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5. G.S. 1392 P.80  
Theal, G.M. History of South Africa Since 1795 Vol. I P.471  
6. G.S. 1392 P.84  
7. Bloemhof Blue Book P.340

to assist Hendrick Potgieter in his first expedition against the Ndebele.<sup>8</sup>

Matlabe had already had a long history of conflict with the Ndebele and had also quarrelled seriously with Moroka. During the Difaqane wars, Matlabe allied himself with the Taung chief, Moletsane, to oppose Mzilikazi's Ndebele. The two chiefs made a surprise attack on the Ndebele, but were put to flight. Fortunately for Matlabe and Moletsane, a party of emigrant Boers repulsed the Ndebele, who were pursuing them hotly. After this, however, the two chiefs quarrelled. Moletsane attacked Matlabe, killed many of his people and drove him back north of the Vaal. Matlabe then entered into a compact with the Ndebele, and Moletsane was attacked and defeated. The chief was, however, frightened by the Ndebele's success and once more allied with Moletsane to fight the Ndebele. Both were put to flight and both clans fled south. Matlabe reached Thaba 'Nchu in 1835. He allied himself with the Boers in 1837 to fight an old enemy.

Before he left to fight Mzilikazi in 1837, Matlabe quarrelled seriously with Moroka over the Seleka chief's attitude to Moletsane. Matlabe still hated the Taung chief for killing so many of his people and when Moletsane appeared in the Thaba 'Nchu area, he wanted to take advantage of his weakness to vanquish him completely. Moroka, who was the senior Rolong chief, however, refused to allow this with what Molema calls "the elevated argument that an opponent must not be crushed when he is down". Stow states that Matlabe "being an imperious man, parted in anger, and taking the remnant of his clan with him, once more retraced

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8. Bloemhof Blue Book P.137, P.140  
 Molema, S.M. Chief Moroka, His Life, His Times, His Country and His People P.43, P.50

steps and crossed the Vaal, where he and his branch of the Rolong have since remained". From Molema's book and the evidence given at Bloemhof, it is clear that Matlabe only finally left Thaba 'Nchu in 1841 and that he did not take all his people with him.<sup>9</sup>

It is important that prior to joining Potgieter, Matlabe had quarrelled with Moroka as his relations with Potgieter anything but pleased Moroka and it appears that he used his relationship with Potgieter to try and weaken Moroka's rule at Thaba 'Nchu. The first expedition against Mzilikazi aroused bitter jealousy between the chiefs. All those who had accompanied the Boers were given cattle, but Matlabe was the only one whom they allowed to keep the cattle.<sup>10</sup> He had been of particular use to Potgieter as a guide as he knew the area from his former conflicts and alliance with the Ndebele.<sup>11</sup> The other chiefs were accused of stealing their cattle, much to Moroka's fury and resentment.<sup>12</sup>

Matlabe did not accompany Potgieter's second expedition against the Ndebele but sent his brother, Mongala.<sup>13</sup> After this expedition Potgieter settled in the Potchefstroom area where he was visited by Matlabe, who was on a hunting trip, in 1839. Potgieter told him that if all the Rolong moved north of the Vaal, he would give them land, in the area conquered from Mzilikazi. They

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9. Molema, S.M. ibid. P.43  
 Stow, G.W. The Native Races of South Africa P.516 ff  
 Schüller, G.M.K. Die Barolong van Thaba 'Nchu, Oranje Vrijstaat; 'n Studie van Kultuurverandering P.25, P.41
10. Bloemhof Blue Book P.264
11. Molema, S.M. ibid. P.42  
 Stow, G.W. ibid. P.516 ff
12. Agar-Hamilton, J.A.I. ibid. P.76, P.16  
Bloemhof Blue Book P.140, P.265
13. Molema, S.M. ibid. P.54  
Bloemhof Blue Book P.137

signed a treaty which stated that the Schoonspruit would be the eastern boundary of the Rolong territory. It appears that from the start, Matlabe was prepared to recognise Potgieter's sovereignty over this area and the whole territory east of the Harts and, at Bloemhof, he gave evidence to this effect for reasons which will be explained later. His preparedness to accept land from Potgieter in 1839 seems to have been a result of his desire to establish his independence from Moroka and to build up his own strength again in an area safe from attacks by other tribes.

Potgieter gave Matlabe a letter inviting Moroka to move his people north of the Vaal. A great council was convened at Thaba 'Nchu to discuss the matter. Mongala, who gave evidence at Bloemhof, recorded that the general feeling was that they should move. It appears that Moroka was not averse to letting Gontse, the Ratlou chief, and Tawana, the Tshidi chief, go, but himself decided to remain. Both Gontse and Tawana had accompanied him to Thaba 'Nchu.<sup>14</sup> In 1841, Matlabe, Gontse and Tawana left Thaba 'Nchu.<sup>15</sup> Matlabe was given land on the Mooi River, curiously enough east of the boundary he had drawn up in 1839, and consented to the others remaining there with him for a while. Gontse and Tawana left after about seven years as they refused to submit to Potgieter's demands that they supply labour and pay taxes.<sup>16</sup> Matlabe was, however, content to remain as a Transvaal subject. By 1870, he had been taught that his occupation of his land depended entirely on Transvaal goodwill. Stephanus Schoeman had expelled him from the area, but President Pretorius had

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14. Bloemhof Blue Book P.141, P.249, P.250, P.263, P.264

15. Molema, S.M. ibid. P.61

16. Bloemhof Blue Book P.107, P.141, P.144, P.363  
 Agar-Hamilton, J.A.I. ibid. P.17

allowed him to return to the land Potgieter had given him.<sup>17</sup>

Moroka could not use Potgieter's treaty with Matlabe in support of his claims to the land west of the Schoonspruit as both Matlabe and the South African Republic denied that Potgieter had given the Rolong sovereignty over the area.<sup>18</sup> In fact, Moroka repudiated the treaty from the first. He argued that Mzilikazi had never even entered the area west of the Schoonspruit and therefore Potgieter not only had no claim to the area but was not in a position to give it away. According to him, Mzilikazi had not overrun the area and it remained the Seleka-Rolong's inheritance.<sup>19</sup>

Matlabe had left some of his people behind at Thaba 'Nchu and after he settled near Mooi River, he accompanied Potgieter on a journey to Thaba 'Nchu to persuade them to join him. How Moroka received him on this occasion is not known, but in the 1870's, Matlabe made repeated accusations that his people were kept at Thaba 'Nchu by force. Mongala was one of the Rapulana who remained behind but he gave no evidence at Bloemhof that he was forced to do so.<sup>20</sup> It would, however, have been in character if Moroka had at least encouraged the Rapulana to stay. In 1872, Matlabe came again to Thaba 'Nchu to fetch his people.<sup>21</sup> Approximately thirty years had passed. The early dispute had had a long time to rankle and this time an open clash occurred. Molema describes Matlabe as an "irascible, volatile, moody individual, independent in thought, agile and vivacious in

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17. Bloemhof Blue Book P.263, P.264

Agar-Hamilton, J.A.I. *ibid.* P.180

18. Bloemhof Blue Book P.264, P.340

19. Bloemhof Blue Book P.138

20. Bloemhof Blue Book P.263

21. G.S. 1403 P.659 Moroka-Brand 28 February 1872

movement, acrimonious in speech, and quick at coming to a decision".<sup>22</sup> By 1872, Matlabe was an elderly man, but his temperament made him a dangerous enemy.

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After hearing all the evidence at Bloemhof, Keate made his award. This was published on 17 October 1871. Keate accepted the northern and north eastern line claimed by David Arnot for Nicholas Waterboer. The line as far as Boetsap had been agreed on between Waterboer and Mahura in 1842. Keate accepted Arnot's extension of this line from a point north of Boetsap to Platberg on Vaal.<sup>23</sup> Moroka was therefore not successful in his claims to the area from the confluence of the Vaal and Harts to the Boetsap-Platberg line. Keate did not accept his claims to the land as far east as Schoonspruit either, but he gave the Rolong and Thlaping the area between Waterboer's boundary and "a line sweeping round from the source of the Molopo, past the source of the Hart to Makwassie Spruit and down the Makwassie Spruit to the Vaal".<sup>24</sup> As Mothibi and Montshioa had agreed to his claims between the Vaal and the Harts, the area bounded by the Boetsap-Platberg line, the Vaal River up to the Makwassie and the Makwassie up to the source of the Harts, was now Moroka's in theory, if not in practice.

After the Keate award, Matlabe was to have a greater opportunity of creating trouble at Thaba 'Nchu than he had before. Keate's award gave the Rolong an area which was theoretically free from Transvaal claims to suzerainty. Those who had previously

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22. Molema, S.M. *ibid.* P.42

23. Theal, G.M. History of South Africa 1854-1872 P.389

24. Theal, G.M. *ibid.* P.364

refused to move as they did not want to place themselves under Boer control might now respond to his promptings that they should trek from Thaba 'Nchu.

Matlabe journeyed to Thaba 'Nchu in February 1872.<sup>25</sup> Moroka reported to Brand in April that he was unsettling the minds of his people and going among them creating disaffection. He was wanting to draw many of the people away from Thaba 'Nchu to the interior against his wish. He also informed Brand that if Matlabe persisted in his activities, he would have "to use measures to quell the insurrection".<sup>26</sup> It is obvious that in just over a month, Matlabe had succeeded in gaining a good deal of support.

It is important that one of the first things Matlabe did on arriving at Thaba 'Nchu was to contact Brand.<sup>27</sup> He was well aware that the success of his movement depended on Free State support. For one thing, Moroka was an ally of the Free State, but more important was the fact that all Africans travelling through the Free State had to be supplied with passes. As Moroka refused to grant these, he hoped to be able to obtain them from Brand. Moroka, however, heard of his intentions and wrote to Brand warning him not to believe anything Matlabe said as he was only intent on causing trouble.<sup>28</sup> Höhne replied that Brand would hear Matlabe's case but would not grant him a pass until he had conferred with Moroka about the matter.<sup>29</sup> When Matlabe arrived in Bloemfontein, Brand informed him that he would have to

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25. G.S. 1403 P.659 Moroka-Brand 28 February 1872  
 26. G.S. 1403 P.663 Moroka-Brand 10 April 1872  
 27. G.S. 1403 P.661 Moroka-Brand 22 March 1872  
 28. G.S. 1403 P.661 Moroka-Brand 22 March 1872  
 29. G.S. 1634 P.571 Höhne-Moroka 23 March 1872

have a pass from Moroka before he could cross the Free State. He then wrote to Moroka and told him that the passes should contain all the particulars of his followers, the number of wagons and stock that Matlabe's people took with them.<sup>30</sup> This illustrates that, from the start, Brand saw no reason why the people should not leave. Matlabe had been accompanied on his visit by Samuel Motuba, one of his brothers,<sup>31</sup> a man named Andries, who was in all possibility Matlabe's son,<sup>32</sup> and a man named April, about whom nothing else is known, though it is probable that he was also a Rapulana-Rolong.<sup>33</sup>

Matlabe was undeterred by Brand's insistence that he would have to obtain a pass from Moroka. In July, he and his supporters sent an advertisement to The Friend. This read:

"De ondergeteekende, Barolong Kapiteins, die maken hiermede aan alle hunne onderdanen bekend, dat elk een die van meening is om met hunner trek te gaan naar de oud Barolong stad bekend als LOFLAKANI, gelegen aan de over zyde van de Hartsrivier, moet klaar zyn zoodra de kafferkoorn die nu te velden staat ingeooft is".

This was signed by "Matlaba, Mongala, Motuba, Picho, Mothopi, Kegakiloe, Mokhosi, Makhora Moipolai" and "Mogathoe", who styled themselves as "Kapiteins van de BaRapulana".<sup>34</sup> Apart from Mongala and Motuba, Matlabe's brothers, nothing is known about the others, except that they all belonged to the Rapulana clan.

Moroka sent a letter to The Friend protesting against him. He stated that the movement was in direct opposition to his orders

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30. G.S. 1634 P.573 Hühne-Moroka 23 April 1872

31. Molema, S.M. *ibid.* P.54

32. Agar-Hamilton, J.A.I. P.183, P.185

33. G.S. 1634 P.573 Hühne-Moroka 23 April 1872

34. The Friend 4 July 1872

and that in "the present state of affairs, it would be damaging to the interests of the Barolong to allow any of our people to remove to that territory, and would possible compromise me as the chief of the tribe".<sup>35</sup> It is interesting that the land to which the Rapulana wished to move was actually north of that claimed by Moroka but was in the area awarded to the Rolong generally. The distinction between moving to Moroka's land or north of it does not seem to have been clearly made either by the 'rebels' or by Moroka, nor does the desire to move north of the Vaal seem to have been restricted to the Rapulana.

Moroka wrote to Brand that he was waiting until the land north of the Vaal was "clear" and the line was properly defined before taking steps towards filling up the country to which Matlabe wished to move.<sup>36</sup> It is clear that in the first half of 1872, Moroka was not opposed to letting these people go once the land was safe for them to move there. Part of the problem in that area was that the Transvaal farmers remained in occupation of parts of it. As Theal states, there was "only one way in which the boundary laid down by Mr. Keate could be maintained, and that was by Great Britain assuming direct control in the territory west of it and keeping a strong military or police force there". The South African Republic, for instance, refused to give up its claims to the village of Bloemhof and continued to station a landdrost there. In the parts where farmers were not living, different native "clans quarrelled with each other, and European vagabonds of almost every nationality went among them fomenting jealousy and strife".<sup>37</sup> An editorial in The Friend

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35. The Friend 4 July 1872

36. G.S. 1403 P.663 Moroka-Brand 10 April 1872

37. Theal, G.M. *ibid.* P.370

advised the Rolong to re-occupy their lands beyond the Vaal, but suggested that they seek British protection first, "otherwise their powerful neighbours - the Transvaal Boers - will assuredly 'chaw them up'".<sup>38</sup> Seen in this light, Moroka's actions in 1872 appear to have been wise.

There is probably another reason why Moroka was averse to his people leaving Thaba 'Nchu, and this accords well with the policy he had pursued in the 1860's. The moment people in the Free State heard that there was a strong movement among his people wishing to leave, they began speculating about buying his land.<sup>39</sup> Moroka's opposition to the movement was almost certainly also an attempt to preserve the strength of his position at Thaba 'Nchu and his position as chief. In an attempt to analyse Moroka's position and his policy, The Friend pointed out how anxious Moroka had been to get his claims north of the Vaal recognised, and stated that although it had never been "positively asserted" that Moroka was intending to move there, the fact that Thaba 'Nchu was surrounded by Free State territory made this probable. The article pointed out that the land had become extremely valuable, and that the Rolong could dispose of their country for about thirty thousand pounds sterling but could probably obtain even more. The article also throws another light on the way the Free Staters regarded Thaba 'Nchu in the 1870's. It stated:

"The Barolong are, it is true, living at peace and free from molestation at the hands of the Free State Government, but no independent native tribe can long so remain hemmed in by white settlements. All history teaches us this fact ..."<sup>40</sup>

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38. The Friend 4 July 1872

39. The Friend 4 July 1872

G.S. 1403 P.687 Moroka-W.W. Collins 20 December 1872

40. The Friend 4 July 1872

The stress on the 'Free State Government' is also interesting as Matlabe's movement received a great deal of encouragement from the Free State farmers, particularly those who farmed near Thaba 'Nchu. One of the methods by which Moroka's subjects escaped from Thaba 'Nchu in the 1870's was by receiving passes to go and work in the Free State and then after remaining a while with a farmer would obtain a pass from his employer to trek north of the Vaal. Others would simply move over onto the bordering farms and would receive passes from the exasperated farmers.<sup>41</sup> There were certainly hopes among the Free State farmers that this movement would enable them to obtain land in Thaba 'Nchu. After Matlabe's visit to Bloemfontein, Moroka was continually pestered by groups of farmers coming to ask if they could purchase farms in his country. He wrote to W.W. Collins, who was Chairman of the Commission Administering the Government during Brand's illness, that:

"Lest anything should have been done by Matlabe and his party to lead people in the Free State to suppose that my country is to be disposed of, I would humbly beg that you would insert in the Government Gazette a Notice stating this it is not (sic) my intention to dispose of my country on any account whatever, and that no person be deceived by any report to the contrary".<sup>42</sup>

This was done, and The Friend reported Moroka's statement on 9 January 1873. The wording of the report shows the value attached by the farmers to the land at Thaba 'Nchu. It stated that it was not Moroka's intention to dispose of his "fat acres".<sup>43</sup>

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41. G.S. 817 P.20 Moroka-Brand 12 January 1872  
 42. G.S. 1403 P.687 Moroka-Collins 20 December 1872  
 43. The Friend 9 January 1873

Despite the desire among Free Staters to take possession of Moroka's land, the government of the Free State decided it would have to co-operate with Moroka against Matlabe. After Matlabe had placed his notice in The Friend, Moroka wrote to Brand asking him to issue special instructions to all fieldcornets along the roads to Winburg and Kroonstad that they should use force to stop any Rolong travelling without passes.<sup>44</sup> Brand co-operated and orders were sent to all Free State fieldcornets to apprehend any of Moroka's people travelling through the State without passes.<sup>45</sup> Late in August 1872, Moroka heard that Matlabe and "his malcontents" were preparing to leave. He immediately informed Brand of this so that he could warn all the fieldcornets to frustrate Matlabe's attempts to leave.<sup>46</sup> Höhne replied that he had given orders to J. Steijl of Korannaspruit and to Commandant Wessels to prevent Matlabe from moving.<sup>47</sup>

Moroka had no police force to prevent his people leaving himself and the Free State's action meant that dissidents had to continue to direct their appeals to the Free State government, which became more and more irritated at its involvement in this dispute. Opinions that it was time some sort of orderly government was established at Thaba 'Nchu to prevent such unrest were also to grow stronger. Discontent in the Rolong territory with Moroka's government was one cause of unrest and in desiring changes in the Rolong government, the Rolong dissidents and the Free State government were at one. In December 1872, Höhne informed Moroka that the government recognised that Matlabe and

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44. G.S. 1403 P.671 Moroka-Brand 2 July 1872  
 45. G.S. 1634 P.594 Höhne-Moroka 25 July 1872  
 46. G.S. 1403 P.677 Moroka-Brand 29 August 1872  
 47. G.S. 1634 P.598 Höhne-Moroka 31 August 1872

his brothers had very strong reasons for wishing to remove but that the government had, after "mature consideration", decided to support Moroka in view of the friendly relations that had always existed with him. Höhne also stated that one of the reasons why Matlabe's people wished to move was that Moroka "would not allow them to disperse over the land but kept them crumpled up at Thaba 'Nchu".<sup>48</sup> He suggested that, without the slightest intention of wishing to interfere with Moroka's government, he should make some concessions to the malcontents.<sup>49</sup> This statement is significant. Taken together with other moves from the Free State government to reform the Rolong government in other ways, this shows how the existence of a separate government at Thaba 'Nchu was, even in the 1870's, coming to be seen as a hindrance to the peace and order of the whole Free State.<sup>50</sup>

There were other reasons for discontent in the Rolong territory in 1872, which explain why the desire to move was not restricted to the Rapulana. One must have been the succession dispute. Although there is no evidence for this, it is highly probable that Matlabe found supporters in those opposed to Moroka's rule. Among other complaints voiced against the Rolong government was one voiced by the Wesleyan missionaries in 1872 that "many of the principal men of the tribe upon whom the affairs of government, and the temporal wellbeing of the people depend" had become alcoholics. It is interesting that the Wesleyans thought this so serious that they recorded if the evil was not

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48. This concentration of settlement was, in fact, characteristic of the Tswana and all those tribes who lived in what Sansom terms the "western ecological zone".

Hammond-Tooke, W.D. ed. The Bantu Speaking Peoples of South Africa Ch. 5

Basil Sansom Traditional Economic Systems

49. G.S. 1403 P.624 Höhne-Moroka 13 December 1872

50. See Chapter Five

checked, they feared that the tribe would disperse.<sup>51</sup> Although the problem of the introduction of liquor was as serious among the ordinary people, there could perhaps have been discontent among the rank and file over the conduct of their government. Another factor which could have caused distress was that the crops failed in 1872, and the Wesleyans recorded that there was increased poverty to contend with.<sup>52</sup>

Despite the fact that the Free State economy expanded in the 1870's, agricultural and economic distress continued to trouble the Rolong. Despite the fact that money became more plentiful<sup>53</sup> among the Rolong, inflation hit them hard. Two things contributed to the increase in the amount of money flowing into Thaba 'Nchu in the 1870's. Every year, the people's sheep flocks increased and more wool was produced and sold. The Diamond Fields provided an increasing market for produce and although the Rolong exported little, this did have the effect of raising their wages from the Free State farmers.<sup>54</sup> The discovery of diamonds also, however, contributed to inflation. In 1873, for instance, the Anglican missionaries reported that the price of everything had doubled within a year.<sup>55</sup> The nature of the settlement at Thaba 'Nchu also made it extremely vulnerable to crop failure. In 1878, Anthony Trollope, the British novelist, recorded on a visit to Thaba 'Nchu that:

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- 51. Minutes of the Bechuana District Meeting 1872 P.515-517
  - 52. Minutes of the Bechuana District Meeting 1872 P.515
  - 53. Minutes of the Bechuana District Meeting 1871 P.448
  - 54. The Quarterly Paper of the Orange Free State Mission  
January 1874 P.20
  - 55. The Quarterly Paper of the Orange Free State Mission  
April 1873

"... it seems to me that so large a number of people living on such an extent of land, which of course is not closely cultivated, may be subject at any time to famine".<sup>56</sup>

The failure of the harvest in 1872 and inflation in 1873 must have aided Matlabe's cause.

Agitation subsided a little in 1873,<sup>57</sup> but Matlabe sought a new ally to further his cause. In May 1873, the government of the Orange Free State received a letter from President T.F. Burgers saying that he would permit Matlabe and his people to proceed to the Transvaal, and requesting the Free State government to let him pass through their state.<sup>58</sup> Hühne accordingly wrote to Moroka to ask him whether he still refused to let Matlabe go.<sup>59</sup> Moroka replied that he hoped the government would adhere to its promise not to let Matlabe leave. He also stated:

"We do not know Matlabi (sic) as a chief, and he has no people at Thaba 'Nchu. We object in toto to his coming into our country for purposes of agitation".<sup>60</sup>

This is interesting as Moroka's actions make it clear that he regarded the Rapulana at Thaba 'Nchu as his subjects. Whether or not Moroka recognised Matlabe's right as chief of the Rapulana he did regard himself as having rights of seniority over Matlabe.<sup>61</sup> Molema states that Moroka had initially liked Matlabe very much and suggests that this was because of all the Rolong chiefs he was the only one who was his traditional junior.<sup>62</sup> It may be that Moroka thought that Matlabe had forfeited his authority over his

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56. Trollope, A. South Africa P.422  
 57. Minutes of the Bechuana District Meeting 1873 P.553  
 58. G.S. 1635 P.18 Hühne-Moroka 19 May 1873  
 59. G.S. 1635 P.18 Hühne-Moroka 19 May 1873  
 60. G.S. 1403 P.705 Moroka-Hühne 21 May 1873  
 61. Bloemhof Blue Book P.198  
 Molema, S.M. ibid. P.42  
 62. Molema, S.M. ibid. P.42

people by leaving them in 1841. Another matter which may have bearing on this is that Matlabe himself stated at Bloemhof that Moroka had not appointed him as chief. The fact that Moroka referred to the Rapulana at Thaba 'Nchu as his subjects makes it extremely difficult to determine how much, if any, support the Rapulana gained from other sections of the population. The number of Rapulana at Thaba 'Nchu is not known. Matlabe recorded at Bloemhof that his people north of the Vaal lived in sixteen "scherms". He did not know exactly how many people he had with him there, but stated that the largest "scherm" contained nineteen men.<sup>63</sup> He did not, therefore, have a very large number of people north of the Vaal. It is probable, however, that if the disturbances had been restricted to the Rapulana, Moroka would have let them go, as he later let the Kwena go. It is interesting that the Wesleyans who recorded their alarm at the political agitation annually, never recorded that it was a movement of the Rapulana against the government; but they may have been ignorant of the distinction between a Rapulana and a Seleka-Rolong.

Another problem is Moroka's assertion that the unrest was imposed upon the others by Matlabe.<sup>64</sup> In view of the seriousness of the unrest, this is unlikely and it is worth noting that Mongala, one of the Rapulana chieftains who had stayed at Thaba 'Nchu, recorded at Bloemhof that he was "good friends" with Matlabe.<sup>65</sup>

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63. Bloemhof Blue Book P.264

64. G.S. 1403 P.705 Moroka-Höhne 21 May 1873

65. Bloemhof Blue Book P.141 Matlabe was Mongala's eldest brother. He was also one of Moroka's councillors.  
Bloemhof Blue Book P.140

The fact that the Free State continued to support Moroka by refusing to grant Matlabe a pass despite Burgers' intervention, led to an open clash between Matlabe's supporters and Moroka's supporters in February 1874. It is interesting that a farmer in the Ladybrand District reported that Moroka and a younger brother of his were fighting for the chieftainship,<sup>66</sup> as it is clear from Moroka's letters that the dispute was with Matlabe.<sup>67</sup> In a letter to Sir Henry Barkly, the chief of the Tshidi-Rolong, Montshioa, had also referred to Matlabe as the "younger brother" of Moroka.<sup>68</sup> As Matlabe's father was the chief Makxowe<sup>69</sup> and Moroka's father was Sefunelo and there is no evidence that they had the same mother, this can only be explained by what Molema has to say on the subject of the relationship between the two. Molema states that they "were more closely related between themselves than they were to the other chiefs, being descended from a common great-great-grandmother, and maternal relationship, no matter how distant, is a very potent factor among the Batswana, and especially the Barolong".<sup>70</sup> It is clear that even if Matlabe had been making a bid for the chieftainship in 1875, this dispute is not to be confused with the disputes over the succession which were taking place at the same time.

In March, Moroka sent one of his sons to tell Brand the particulars of what had happened and to ask for Brand's advice as to what he should do about it.<sup>71</sup> Brand's reply is not recorded but it is interesting that the farmer from Ladybrand who reported

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66. The Friend 5 March 1874

67. G.S. 1403 P.721 Moroka-Brand 9 March 1874

68. Bloemhof Blue Book P.167

69. Agar-Hamilton, J.A.I. *ibid.* Genealogical Table

70. Molema, S.M. *ibid.* P.42

71. G.S. 1403 P.721 Moroka-Brand 9 March 1874

the outbreak of fighting thought that the government should take up arms to support its ally, Moroka. He stated:

"I feel convinced that the party which now stands up against Moroka would very soon abandon hostilities were the Free State to espouse the lawful rights of the old chief ..."<sup>72</sup>

There is no indication that Moroka did ask for such assistance but the comment is significant as Brand was later accused of letting things get out of control by his lenient policy towards rebels against the Rolong government. This was only one reaction to Moroka's trouble and perhaps an uncommon one. The other was that the Free State should establish some form of government at Thaba 'Nchu.<sup>73</sup>

This clash in February may not have been the only outbreak of violence during 1874. The Wesleyan missionaries recorded that "one or two collisions" had taken place and some blood had been shed during the year. The minutes of their District Meetings are exasperatingly short and uninformative; but they recorded at the end of 1874 that several families had left Thaba 'Nchu owing to the political discontent, that they had lost several members, and that their work had been seriously affected. They also recorded that:

"Those who have not left, share that feeling so largely that they are disposed to remove unless some improvement takes place".<sup>74</sup>

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72. The Friend 5 March 1874  
 73. The Friend 16 May 1878  
The Friend 12 September 1874  
 74. Minutes of the Bechuana District Meeting 1874 P.581

The missionaries do not mention Matlabe once in their Minutes, Notices or Reports nor do they throw any light on the nature of the "political agitation" which might add to an understanding of it.

Matlabe managed to move back north of the Vaal during 1874, but most of the Rapulana remained behind still unable to get Moroka's permission to leave. He did not return to his old lands in the Transvaal but President Burgers evicted Molema, Montshioa's brother, from Polfontein in order to give the land to Matlabe. His reason appears to have been that Matlabe's land in the Potchefstroom district was desired for white settlement.<sup>75</sup>

In March 1875, Moroka informed Brand that he had decided to let Matlabe's brother, Motuba, remove north of the Vaal but complained that Motuba had refused to move immediately. Instead he had started journeying to and from Polfontein, which he thought was going to lead to trouble.<sup>76</sup> President Burgers was in Bloemfontein at this time and Moroka asked Brand to find out if any "connection" had been entered into between Motuba and the Transvaal government. He also sent Tsipinare to Bloemfontein in the hope that he would be able to speak to Burgers.<sup>77</sup> Brand introduced Tsipinare to Burgers and later reported to Moroka that "no agreement whatever" existed between Burgers and Matlabe and that he advised Moroka to let Matlabe go and to call him to trial if he misbehaved.<sup>78</sup> It appears that Brand was confusing Matlabe with Motuba, which is not surprising considering the variety of spellings used by the writer of Moroka's letters. On 8 March

75. Agar-Hamilton, J.A.I. *ibid.* P.121, P.159, P.174, P.180, P.184

76. G.S. 1403 P.755 Moroka-Brand 1 March 1875

77. *ibid.*

78. G.S. 1516 P.93 Brand-Moroka 4 March 1875

Brand again advised Moroka to let all the discontented people in his territory leave. The reason for this is that he had received a letter from Matlabe from Polfontein. Höhne replied to this letter and told Matlabe that he could not give passes to his followers to join him unless Moroka agreed but if this consent was obtained there would be no objection to him or any of his people passing through the Free State.<sup>80</sup> This time Moroka took Brand's advice and he let Motuba leave. He took thirty wagons with him, "his people", and all his stock.<sup>81</sup> In May 1876, the Free State government received a very confused letter from Motuba who was then at Polfontein.<sup>82</sup> Not even Höhne could make complete sense<sup>83</sup> of it but Motuba was asking Brand to speak to Moroka about the people he had left behind. Moroka's reaction to this is not known, but when on 4 January 1878 Brand received another letter from Motuba stating that he was coming to Thaba 'Nchu to fetch "his trek",<sup>84</sup> Moroka reacted strongly. He stated to Brand:

"When Motuba removed from this he took with him all his belongings leaving nothing behind. We must therefore most decidedly object to his visiting Thaba (sic) with any such pretext. As it can but produce one result, that of causing dissatisfaction and disorder among our people".

He continued that this would only lead to a repetition of the "illegal proceedings" adopted previously by Matlabe and Motuba "which kept the whole country in a state of constant agitation for many months at times threatening to bring on a civil war".<sup>85</sup>

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| 79. | G.S. 1635 | P.84  | Höhne-Moroka  | 8 March    | 1875 |
| 80. | G.S. 1635 | P.84  | Höhne-Matlabe | 8 March    | 1875 |
| 81. | G.S. 1403 | P.761 | Moroka-Brand  | 16 March   | 1875 |
| 82. | G.S. 817  | P.3   | Motuba-Brand  | 28 April   | 1876 |
| 83. | G.S. 1636 | P.32  | Höhne-Moroka  | 11 May     | 1876 |
| 84. | G.S. 1635 | P.213 | Brand-Moroka  | 4 January  | 1878 |
|     | G.S. 1516 | P.317 | Brand-Moroka  | 4 January  | 1878 |
| 85. | G.S. 817  | P.20  | Moroka-Brand  | 12 January | 1878 |

During the period following Motuba's departure in 1875, and his attempts in 1878 to fetch "his trek", the movement to trek north of the Vaal seems to have partially subsided; but another movement almost certainly related to it occurred. In 1872, Matlabe had complained that Moroka insisted on keeping the people at Thaba 'Nchu town.<sup>86</sup> In 1876, a marked movement of decentralisation took place. The Wesleyan missionaries recorded that many people who had for years resided at Thaba 'Nchu town were now moving into the country and large villages were being formed in many places along the border. One result of this was that conflict with the border farmers increased, the other was that Moroka's control over his people was weakened.

The main reason for this was economic although the many complaints about Moroka's arbitrariness indicate this as a probable cause as well. In 1876, the Wesleyans reported that the market value of grain had depreciated.<sup>87</sup> In 1877 there was a partial failure of crops,<sup>88</sup> followed by severe drought in the following two years. The people were compelled to import large amounts from Basutoland and another movement of decentralisation occurred.<sup>89</sup> The change in population distribution became so marked that in 1880 the Wesleyans were forced to form seven circuits to evangelise the Rolong.<sup>90</sup> Perhaps for the first time, now that the Sotho threat had been removed, the Rolong had in the 1870's a chance to adapt to a different ecological environment, but the suddenness of the movement links it with the opposition to Moroka's government.

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86. G.S. 1634 P.624 Hühne-Moroka 13 December 1872

87. Minutes of the Bechuana District Meeting 1876 P.637

88. *ibid.* 1877 P.15

89. *ibid.* 1878 P.44; 1879 P.75

90. *ibid.* 1880

A link between this movement and the movement to cross the Vaal is to be found in a complaint made by Moroka to Brand in January 1878. He wrote:

"Many of our people are from time to time in the habit of crossing the border into the Free State - taking with them quantities of stock - without having provided themselves with the necessary pass. No action whatever has been taken by the farmers to prevent this. As a consequence some of the Barolong have settled down on Free State farms; and other after staying some time with the farmers, obtain passes from the said farmers to go over the Vaal River".<sup>91</sup>

This is probably the reason why Moroka refused to give passes to his people to stay in the Free State for any length of time. In May 1878, a complaint was recorded in The Friend that Moroka was refusing to grant passes to people who wished to be away from Thaba 'Nchu for more than six days.<sup>92</sup> Moroka's complaint in January indicates that not all the people wishing to leave Thaba 'Nchu wished to trek north of the Vaal. If this report in The Friend is true, it is not surprising that people were seeking to escape from Moroka's control. The Wesleyans remarked on the arbitrariness of Moroka's rule in 1877 and 1878,<sup>93</sup> and it is notable that after Moroka's death, Brand suggested to Tsipinare that he give the people a say in the government.<sup>94</sup> The writer of the article in The Friend wrote that Moroka's action:

"seems to be the most unreasonable and unfair exercise of the arbitrary power which the chief claims to possess".

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91. G.S. 817 P.20 Moroka-Brand 12 January 1878  
 92. The Friend 16 May 1878  
 93. Minutes of the Bechuana District Meeting 1877 P.15; 1878 P.45  
 94. G.S. 1517 P.195-196 Brand-Tsipinare 30 May 1880 cross ref.  
 G.S. 1517 P.227 Brand-Tsipinare 2 August 1880 cross ref.

The question that followed is extremely important as it is not the only statement of its kind recorded in the press at this time, and reflects the increasing exasperation of people in the Free State to Moroka's rule. The writer asked:

"Would it not be allowable for the Government of the Orange Free State to enquire into such acts of oppression on the part of a neighbouring power, and if necessary recommend moderation, or remove the authority of the power which thus gives such instances of imbecility and inability in managing its own affairs?"<sup>95</sup>

By 1878, Brand was also becoming exasperated with Moroka's refusal to let his people move and by requests from the discontented that he intervene on their behalf. When Moroka asked Brand to interfere, Brand wrote to Moroka strongly advising him to let all malcontents leave. He stated that in all countries, especially in England, no opposition was given to people wishing to leave and that Moroka would be far better off without unwilling subjects.<sup>96</sup> Moroka must have sensed that Brand was taking a stronger line, as he assured him that he had no objection to his people leaving the country voluntarily and that no obstacles were placed in the way of individuals who applied for passes.<sup>97</sup>

In April, Brand received another petition from one of Moroka's subjects asking him to persuade Moroka to let him leave Thaba 'Nchu. The plea came from Letlojana,<sup>98</sup> the old chief of the Molotswana section of the Kwena tribe who had been living with Moroka ever since he placed himself under the protection of the

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95. The Friend 16 May 1878  
 96. G.S. 1635 P.213 Brand-Moroka 4 January 1878  
 97. G.S. 817 P.20 Moroka-Brand 12 January 1878  
 98. G.S. 1517 Brand-Moroka 25 April 1878

Seleka-Rolong in 1823.<sup>99</sup> Brand advised Moroka to let the Kwena go.<sup>100</sup> Letlojana and his son, Petrus Malefo, left for the Transvaal during 1878 but it appears that they did not take all their people with them. These people had formerly lived at Platberg on the Schoonspruit and at Laapfontein, but as these areas had been divided into European farms, they scattered among the farmers in the Potchefstroom district. In November, they were settled by the Rev. Timothy Creswell, who had formerly been a Wesleyan missionary at Thaba 'Nchu and was now stationed at Potchefstroom, on a farm called Uitkyk near Ventersdorp.<sup>101</sup> The Minutes of the Bechuana District Meeting for 1878 record that this was a small settlement.<sup>102</sup> Letlojana died soon after this, but his son Malefo soon took steps to persuade those he had left at Thaba 'Nchu to join him. Creswell accordingly wrote to Brand about this matter.

Moroka told Brand that he had no objection to individuals applying for passes but he would not countenance any attempt from Malefo to interfere in his country, as this would only "give encouragement to all discontented parties who have left us to keep up a constant agitation ... and would lead to general dissatisfaction". Brand informed Creswell of this,<sup>103</sup> but when he received more pleas asking for his interference, wrote to Moroka:

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99. Molema, S.M.      ibid. P.16  
       Schüller, G.M.K.   ibid. P.53
100. G.S. 1517      Brand-Moroka    25 April    1878
101. Molema, S.M.      P.140, P.141
102. Bechuana District Minutes 1878
103. G.S. 817    P.38   Moroka-Brand    10 December 1878  
       G.S. 1517   P.57   Brand-Creswell   14 December 1878

"I do not know why I should receive letters about people residing in your territory ... Although it is no concern of mine I think you would be doing well to let them go if they wish".<sup>104</sup>

Moroka accordingly called all the Kwena together and asked them whether they wished to remove. According to Moroka, they disavowed "having taken any action at all in reference to removing".<sup>105</sup> The indications are that strong ties continued to bind this group of Kwena to the Rolong at Thaba 'Nchu. Tsipinare married Petrus Malefo's daughter, Losabana, and Tsipinare's son, Tawana, married Malefo's youngest daughter, Sesadi.<sup>106</sup>

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By 1879, two sectors of Moroka's people had removed north of the Vaal. The fact that both the Kwena and the Rapulana settled in the Transvaal and not in the area awarded to them by Keate is not really surprising in view of the fact that the Transvaal was in virtual occupation of most of the land east of the Harts River. In 1879, Matlabe died at Polfontein. The importance of his agitation among the Rolong was that it had resulted in encouraging the dispersion of the tribe. The dispersion of the Rolong of Thaba 'Nchu had already begun during the 1865 war. Many left Thaba 'Nchu during the war and in the following years, for economic reasons and out of opposition to Moroka's rule. This continued in the 1870's but after the Keate award, attention was attracted to the north as an alternative to dispersion among the Free State farmers. Here

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
104. G.S. 1517 P.65 Brand-Moroka 7 January 1879

105. G.S. 817 P.40 Moroka-Brand 13 January 1879

106. Molema, S.M. *ibid.* P.16

again, dispersion was encouraged by drought and Moroka's restrictions on the movement of his people; but Matlabe's animosity and revengeful temperament cannot be discounted. Another factor was Matlabe's desire to boost his own position in the Transvaal particularly after 1874 when his possession of Polfontein was contested by the Tshidi-Rolong.

The agitation in the Rolong territory and the exodus of people aroused the attention of the Free State farmers who saw Moroka's removal as inevitable. There is some evidence that they encouraged Matlabe's movement, either by giving his followers passes or by accepting Rolong as labourers. To many, Moroka's inability to suppress the movement himself, drew attention to the backwardness of Moroka's government and indicated the need for some sort of Free State control in the area. Brand's involvement in Moroka's dispute with his subjects also pointed to the same need. In many ways, Brand was seen already to be the arbiter of events at Thaba 'Nchu. Even Brand showed signs of wishing to reform the Rolong government. What kept him back was his relationship with Moroka and his continued refusal to abandon his treaty obligations. He did, however, make many attempts to exert an indirect influence on the Rolong government in the 1870's, although this was scarcely noticeable in his involvement in Matlabe's agitation. The Free State's involvement in the dispute did, however, contribute to the general deterioration in relations with the Rolong which was so noticeable in other spheres in the 1870's.



References :

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Oxford Atlas






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Key :

-  Area claimed by Arnot for Waterboer.
-  Area claimed by the Free State.
-  Eastern boundary claimed by Moroka at Bloemhof.
-  Keate Award Line. 1871.
-  Moysey's Line. 1881.

CHAPTER FIVE

PROBLEM ISSUES

## CHAPTER FIVE

The movement of dispersion and the unrest in the Rolong territory were not the only factors which made Thaba 'Nchu an irritant to the Free State government and farmers in the 1870's. The deteriorating relationship between the allies was also affected by the Free State labour shortage, boundary disputes and problems of jurisdiction. On many issues, both Moroka and Brand saw the need for common legislation. As the Free State sought to impose its pattern of legislation on the Rolong, the existence of a separate government at Thaba 'Nchu came to be seen in the Free State as an anachronism. Throughout the 1870's, the Free State government sought to impose greater controls on the African peoples living within the State's boundaries, and the State's relationship with the Rolong became increasingly affected by this trend towards harnessing the African peoples, to serve the needs of the country.

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Throughout the 1870's, the main factor in the Free State's policy towards Africans was the ever increasing demand from the farmers for African labour. After the close of the Sotho wars, the Free State began to revive economically, and the farmers turned their attention to building up agriculture and expanding their stock farming. The labour problem was particularly acute in the newly acquired agricultural districts in the eastern Free State, and it was here too that the problem of squatting became serious. After the Convention of Aliwal North, large numbers of Sotho simply crossed into the Free State and established themselves in unauthorised squatter settlements on whatever open

ground they could find.<sup>1</sup> Many of the Sotho must have been returning to their former homes.

To the farmers, the existence of these "plakkerplase", as they were called, was intimately connected with their labour shortage, as hundreds of Africans were spending their days in idleness. They also objected that the existence of the squatter settlements encouraged vagrancy and stocktheft, were havens for thieves and troublemakers, and were a general threat to their security. Another complaint was that labourers already in contract were encouraged to desert their masters to become idle squatters.

In the 1870 Volksraad session, memorials were received from many farmers, advocating the disruption of "plakkerplase" and enforced distribution of those unemployed among the farmers. The Volksraad decided that a stricter enforcement of Ordinance 1 of 1860 was required. The Ordinance had been passed to prevent just such evils as vagrancy, stocktheft and the formation of squatter camps, and allowed the principle of forced contracting. A fieldcornet could, at his discretion, force a vagrant to contract himself to a farmer, but only for a couple of months.<sup>2</sup>

In 1871, it was decided to tighten the tax laws. A new hut tax of ten shillings was levied on all Africans who did not hire

1. Van Aswegen, H.J. Die Verhouding Tussen Blank en nie Blank in die Oranje Vrystaat 1854-1902  
A.Y.B. 1971 I P.257  
Van Aswegen's chapters on the labour question in the Free State are so comprehensive that extensive reliance has been placed on his work in the first pages of this Chapter
2. Van Aswegen, H.J. *ibid.* P.261, P.268  
The Friend 9 March 1876  
V.R. 196 P.74-77, P.92-104

themselves to a farmer for at least six months of the year. This replaced the more lenient tax on heads of families contained in Ordinance 7 of 1866.<sup>3</sup> The most important measure designed to control squatting came in 1872. A resolution was passed providing that no farmer could keep more than five families on his farm without paying one pound for every hut possessed by any additional labourers. If the land was not occupied by a white farmer, only two families were exempt from the hut tax. This was incorporated into Ordinance 2 of 1871.<sup>4</sup> The problems, however, increased. In 1878, Ordinance 15 of 1878 levied a poll tax of ten shillings on all male Africans between the ages of 18 and 70, irrespective of whether they paid the hut tax or not.<sup>5</sup> The idea was to force the Africans to work in order to obtain the money. Ordinance 7 of 1881, although outside the period of discussion, was the culmination of the efforts to control the African peoples. The main provisions were the same as those in the amended Ordinance 2 of 1871, but the farmer now had to apply for any labour he wanted in addition to the permitted number of families and had to submit lists of his employees to the fieldcornet of the district.<sup>6</sup>

The interest of all these moves to disrupt squatter settlements and to harness all Africans to the farmers needs, lies in the fact that the complaints made by farmers about the Rolong at Thaba 'Nchu, indicates that they regarded Thaba 'Nchu in much the same way as they regarded "plakkerplase". As Moroka began clamping down on restrictions on the movement of his people

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3. Van Aswegen, H.J. *ibid.* P.262  
 4. Van Aswegen, H.J. *ibid.* P.265  
 5. Van Aswegen, H.J. *ibid.* P.270  
 6. Van Aswegen, H.J. *ibid.* P.272-274

to obstruct those wishing to move north of the Vaal, the farmers began to urge for Free State control over Thaba 'Nchu to ensure an adequate supply of labour.

In the first few years of the decade, there were, however, suprisingly few recorded cases of conflict with Moroka over labour. The supply of labour from the Rolong seems to have been largely seasonal. Since 1864, Moroka had obtained standardised pass forms from the Free State and it is notable that his demands for a resupply of forms often coincided with the Free State's harvest or shearing seasons. In October 1872, he explicitly stated to F.K. Hühne, the Government Secretary, that he needed passes as many of his people wanted to assist the farmers in the shearing.<sup>7</sup>

The supply of labour from Thaba 'Nchu was not only seasonal. There is evidence that many Rolong contracted themselves for longer periods, although there is no evidence of contracts lasting for more than a year. In all these cases, Moroka kept a close watch on his subjects and, in several cases, ensured that his people returned to Thaba 'Nchu when their contracts expired. As always, the chief was particularly concerned to maintain his strength at Thaba 'Nchu and to preserve his authority over his tribe.

Evidence that Moroka was willing to allow his people to furnish a fairly constant supply of labour for the farmers is illustrated by a letter he wrote to Brand in February 1874. The chief complained that his people were being forced to buy new

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7. G.S. 1403 P.681 Moroka-Hühne 21 October 1872  
 G.S. 1403 P.711 Cameron-Hühne 25 November 1873  
The Friend 16 May 1878

passes on entering the Free State, whereas previously the Free State authorities had merely countersigned his passes. He warned that this might prevent many from going to work in the Free State at all.<sup>8</sup> Brand explained that the officials were acting in accordance with a regulation passed by the Volksraad on 12 May 1873. This empowered all Landdrosts, Justices of the Peace, Fieldcornets and Assistant Fieldcornets to issue passes and required that a sixpenny stamp be affixed to them. Moroka may well have feared that they would grant passes for longer periods than he wished.<sup>9</sup> On several occasions, Moroka interfered to ensure that his people returned home when their contracts expired. In 1873, he sent one of his men to fetch ten people who had been working at the Diamond Fields for some time.<sup>10</sup> Shortly after this, he sent another four men to fetch twenty-six people from another area as he knew their contracts had expired.<sup>11</sup>

In 1874, Moroka clashed with a farmer who wished to extend a labour contract, whereas the chief insisted that his subject return home.<sup>12</sup> In June 1875, a similar case occurred, but the farmer refused to let his servant go. Moroka reacted strongly to this, and warned Brand that "if an impression gained ground among his people that the farmers could act in this way, it would effectively stop them from going into the Free State to take service with the farmers".<sup>13</sup> It was clear that Moroka would stop his people from leaving Thaba 'Nchu if this became common.

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| 8.  | G.S. 1403 |       | Moroka-Brand | 4 February 1874 |
| 9.  | G.S. 1514 | P.403 | Brand-Moroka | 5 February 1874 |
| 10. | G.S. 1403 | P.707 | Moroka-Höhne | 7 October 1873  |
| 11. | G.S. 1403 | P.709 | Moroka-Höhne | mid-1873        |
| 12. | G.S. 1514 | P.428 | Brand-Moroka | 13 April 1874   |
| 13. | G.S. 1403 | P.765 | Moroka-Brand | 4 June 1875     |

It became increasingly difficult for the chief to control the employment of his people by the farmers. The movement of decentralisation in the Rolong territory, in particular, increased his problems. Not all the Rolong who slipped over the boundaries in the second half of the decade trekked north of the Vaal; many settled in the Free State. Moroka's reaction to this was to clamp down on his pass regulations. In May 1878, a protest was recorded in The Friend that the chief was only allowing his people to leave Thaba 'Nchu for six day periods. The farmer who wrote the article felt strongly enough about this to suggest that the Free State assume control over Thaba 'Nchu. The farmers' answer was to help the Rolong circumvent the chief's regulations.<sup>14</sup>

Although the farmers came to resent Moroka's restrictions on his people, there were more complaints concerned with vagrancy and stocktheft than about the inadequate labour supply from Thaba 'Nchu. These complaints also indicate that the farmers thought of Thaba 'Nchu as a "plakkerplaas". During 1870, complaints were made about Rolong stealing cattle as they journeyed to Basutoland and Bethany.<sup>15</sup> Complaints were also made that Thlaping travelling to and from Thaba 'Nchu were also responsible for stockthefts. The Thlaping were accustomed to sending their horses to Thaba 'Nchu every summer as they could not stand the heat north of the Vaal. Every time this occurred, there were loud complaints from the Free Staters.<sup>16</sup> As with the "plakkerplase", the farmers complained that even if they retrieved

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14. The Friend 16 May 1878  
 15. G.S. 1403 P.621 Moroka-Brand 4 January 1870  
 G.S. 1613 P.473 Höhne-Brand 24 March 1871  
 G.S. 1636 P.20 Höhne-Moroka 25 February 1870  
 16. G.S. 1636 P.21 Höhne-Moroka 10 March 1870  
The Friend 17 September 1874

their stock, the thieves could remain unpunished by seeking refuge at Thaba 'Nchu.<sup>17</sup>

As far as the Rolong were concerned, the problem of vagrancy was clearly tied to their relationship with other African groups. An incident occurred in 1874 which indicated that the Rolong's relationship with other tribes, particularly with the Sotho, could pose a threat to the peace of the Free State in another way. In February, Moroka informed Fieldcornet A.P.J. Diedericks that he was expecting Masupha to attack Thaba Patsoa on his eastern boundary, where the majority of his Sotho subjects lived. It appears that Masupha wanted to punish those Sotho who had deserted the tribe in the war. Diedericks had heard similar rumours from other sources and warned the Landdrost of Ladybrand to be alert. Nothing came of the rumour and it was the only one of its kind in the decade; but it nevertheless indicated a possible source of trouble if the Rolong remained independent.<sup>18</sup>

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The first attempts made by the Free State government to extend its control, in a limited way, into the Rolong territory arose out of the problems experienced by farmers living on the boundaries of Thaba 'Nchu. The main causes of conflict were irregularities over impounding stock and the difficulty of assessing damages caused by cattle straying over the borders.<sup>19</sup> Complaints were made that stock was either not impounded at Thaba 'Nchu,<sup>20</sup> or sold without sufficient advertisement,<sup>21</sup> and that the

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|-----|-------------------|-------|-----------------------------------|------------------|
| 17. | G.S. 1636         | P.20  | Höhne-Moroka                      | 25 February 1870 |
| 18. | G.S. 763          | P.18  | Moroka-Diedericks                 | 17 February 1874 |
|     | G.S. 763          | P.19  | Diedericks-Landdrost of Ladybrand | 17 February 1874 |
| 19. | G.S. 1634         | P.576 | Brand-Moroka                      | 29 April 1872    |
| 20. | <u>The Friend</u> |       | 17 September                      | 1874             |
| 21. | <u>The Friend</u> |       | 9 May                             | 1874             |

pound fees were exorbitant. In February, Höhne reported complaints to Moroka and asked for a copy of the Thaba 'Nchu pound regulations. He also sent Moroka a copy of the Free State regulations so that he might see what was considered reasonable.<sup>22</sup>

As complaints continued, Brand sent Fieldcornet A.P.J. Diedericks to Thaba 'Nchu in 1872 to attempt to come to some agreement with the chief. Moroka agreed to negotiate but insisted on first convening his council. Diedericks suggested to Brand that a member of the Executive Council be sent to Thaba 'Nchu on the date scheduled for the council meeting "te zien op dat wij beter onze zaken kunnen regelen ...", and to sign a provisional "conventie" with the chief.<sup>23</sup> Brand accordingly sent Höhne and M.T. Steyn to Thaba 'Nchu at the end of April 1872 to negotiate with Moroka on any matter raised.<sup>24</sup> This was the first occasion after the negotiation of the Treaty of Alliance in 1865 that members of the Free State government were sent to negotiate with Moroka with a view to imposing regulations on the Rolong.

There were hopes in the Free State that Steyn and Höhne would offer to buy the Rolong territory and thus get rid of the Rolong's irritating presence. An article in The Friend referring to the meeting with Moroka stated:

"Eenigen zijn van oordeel dat Moroko (sic) van zijn land ten behoeven van dit Gouvernement voor een kleinigheid afstand zal doen; wetende dat hy nu door de laatste beslissing van den heer Keate een uitgebreide stuk grond bezijde de Vaal heeft".<sup>25</sup>

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| 22. | G.S. 1636         | P.20  | Höhne-Moroka     | 21 February | 1870 |
| 23. | G.S. 1403         | P.665 | Diedericks-Brand | 22 April    | 1872 |
| 24. | G.S. 1634         | P.576 | Brand-Moroka     | 29 April    | 1872 |
| 25. | <u>The Friend</u> | 9 May |                  |             | 1872 |

It appears that no agreement was reached with Moroka at the meeting. The chief went to Bloemfontein early in May and drew up a set of Pound Regulations with Höhne there. On 15 May, Höhne asked Moroka to sign a copy of this so it could be published in the Government Gazette.<sup>26</sup> Moroka, however, refused to sign the document as his council thought certain modifications were necessary. He promised to send Höhne an amended copy as soon as possible.<sup>27</sup>

The matter was only re-opened by Brand in December 1874 owing to a complaint made by W.W. Collins that one of his horses had been sold at the Thaba 'Nchu pound before he had had the opportunity to reclaim it. Brand sent Moroka a copy of the Free State Ordinance No. 5 of 1873 and asked him to enforce the clauses concerning times of publication.<sup>28</sup> Moroka explained that he had not published his ordinance as he had been waiting to see if his modifications worked, but claimed that he was observing the main particulars of the Free State ordinance. In this case, the practice had not been the same, but he promised to find and return Collins' horse, and to ensure sufficient publication was given in future.<sup>29</sup> Perhaps one reason for the irregularities at Thaba 'Nchu was that the revenue from pound fees and pound sales must have been one of the few sources of income available to the Rolong government.

Although no definite agreement was reached over impoundage, the Free State seems to have secured its object as complaints

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| 26. | G.S. 1634 | P.578 | Höhne-Moroka              | 15 May     | 1874 |
|     | G.S. 1516 |       | Brand-Moroka              | 3 December | 1874 |
| 27. | G.S. 1403 | P.669 | Moroka-Höhne              | 20 June    | 1872 |
| 28. | G.S. 1516 |       | Brand-Moroka              | 3 December | 1874 |
|     | O.R. 104  | P.147 | <u>Government Gazette</u> | 2 June     | 1873 |
| 29. | G.S. 1403 | P.769 | Moroka-Brand              | 6 January  | 1875 |

from the farmers decreased. There were other difficulties, however, which pointed to the need for common legislation in the Free State and Thaba 'Nchu. Demands by both Free State and Rolong farmers for compensation for damages also involved problems of diplomacy and jurisdiction. By 1876, there was so much illfeeling among the Free State farmers about Moroka's demands for compensation for any damage done by strayed cattle or other stock, that a group of farmers petitioned the Volksraad to take active measures to find a solution. One of the problems, according to the farmers, was that the Rolong cultivated their lands so close to the borders and to the sides of the roads that it was difficult to prevent cattle trespassing. Hühne tried to persuade the chief to leave an area of uncultivated land along the roads and boundaries.<sup>30</sup> The problem was not as simple as that. In several instances, one involving Gert Pretorius, the Rolong authorities forcibly extracted payment for damages from farmers. In one case, Moroka stated that this was done to see that the farmer appeared in the Rolong Courts to answer charges made against him.<sup>31</sup> Whatever the details of each case, no Free Stater was prepared to submit to having fines forcibly taken from him nor was he prepared to stand trial in a Rolong Court. After the case involving Gert Pretorius in 1875, Brand sent two members of the Executive Council, J.J. Venter and J.J.P. Prinsloo, to investigate.<sup>32</sup>

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| 30. | G.S. 1635 | P.139 | Hühne-Moroka                                   | 5 July       | 1876 |
| 31. | G.S. 1403 | P.701 | Moroka-Commission of Administration            | 21 May       | 1873 |
| 32. | G.S. 1516 | P.140 | Brand-Moroka                                   | 7 September  | 1875 |
|     | G.S. 1403 | P.775 | Moroka-Brand                                   | 11 September | 1875 |
|     | G.S. 1403 | P.779 | <u>Minutes of Meeting of Executive Council</u> |              |      |
|     |           |       | <u>Members</u>                                 | 22 September | 1875 |

On two other occasions, clashes over compensation involved boundary disputes. On the one occasion, Brand had again to send members of his Executive Council to sort out the dispute.<sup>33</sup> It was becoming clear that some other means of solving disputes would have to be found. On the other occasion, the Free State trader involved had handed the whole matter over to his lawyers and Moroka was faced with a letter from Attorney C.C. Mathey informing him that he was to be sued for three hundred and twenty pounds. The chief objected that the trader was not seeking redress "in a manner consistent with the diplomatic relations existing between the Orange Free State and the Barolong chief and people". He also stated that:

"Hitherto all misunderstandings between the Border farmers and ourselves have been brought to the notice of your Honor directly and hence our relations with your Government have been of the most satisfactory character".<sup>34</sup>

Clearly Moroka wished for no alterations in the manner disputes were settled but another clash with Gert Pretorius in 1878 indicated that no satisfactory settlement to these problems could be reached unless the Rolong submitted to Free State jurisdiction.<sup>35</sup>

The need for common legislation for both countries was not only felt in the Free State. Moroka himself felt the need on a couple of issues. In 1879, the chief complained that it was the Free Staters rather than the Rolong who were responsible for damages caused by Free State stock straying onto cultivated lands.

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| 33. | G.S. 1403 | P.797     | Moroka-Brand | 30 January | 1877 |
|     | G.S. 1635 | P.160     | Höhne-Moroka | 1 February | 1877 |
| 34. | G.S. 1403 | P.741     | Moroka-Brand | 2 October  | 1874 |
| 35. | G.S. 1516 | P.335-336 | Brand-Moroka | 6 March    | 1878 |

He stated that many farmers willfully outspanned on private property and ruined gardens while travelling through his country, and he had "resolved to make an ordinance" to deal with the problem.<sup>36</sup> Brand promptly asked to advance information on any proposed regulations and, to ensure that Moroka would know which would be acceptable to the Free State, quoted the Free State Ordinance No. 3 of 1873 in detail.<sup>37</sup>

The Free State government's concern that any ordinance passed by Moroka should conform to its requirements was another way in which the Free State sought to extend its control over the Rolong in the seventies. The fact that Moroka began legislating in ordinance form in the seventies in itself illustrates the awkwardness of his position. He promulgated two ordinances; Ordinance No. 1 of 1875 and Ordinance No. 2 of 1875. On both occasions, the chief was forced to make sure the terms were acceptable to the Free State government as both involved Free State subjects. He began thinking of drafting the first ordinance to deal with the sale of liquor, by Free State vendors in his country, in 1873. The second dealt with government licences for all persons trading in the Rolong territory. Although Moroka initiated these ordinances, they were, in fact, drawn up by the Free State government and took effect only after publication in the Free State Government Gazette. This illustrates that, to a large extent, Moroka's government had become an anachronism.<sup>38</sup>

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36. G.S. 817 P.48 Moroka-Brand 30 October 1879  
 37. G.S. 1517 P.140 Brand-Moroka 5 November 1879  
 38. The Friend 1 July 1875  
 G.S. 1403 P.695 Moroka-Höhne February 1873

There was one other matter about which the Free State would have liked Moroka to legislate. The Free State began steps to eradicate the weed *Xanthium Spinosum*, which damaged wool, in 1870. These measures were useless, particularly in areas around Thaba 'Nchu, unless steps were taken to destroy the weed at Thaba 'Nchu as well. Brand's correspondence with Moroka was studded with pleas that the Free State ordinance dealing with the problem be enforced in the chief's country. Although Moroka took steps to control the growth of *Xanthium Spinosum* at odd intervals, complaints from farmers continued. As in the other case, the Free State government wanted to extend its laws over the Thaba 'Nchu area.<sup>39</sup>

The fact that Free State law was not enforceable at Thaba 'Nchu and that the Free State law courts had no jurisdiction in the Rolong territory worried Brand for two other reasons. Criminals could escape justice by fleeing to the Rolong territory and Free State jurisdiction over white residents at Thaba 'Nchu was uncertain. The Treaty of Alliance of 1865 had provided for mutual extradition of criminals fleeing over the Rolong border, but it had become increasingly apparent that extradition was entirely dependent on Moroka's will. For its part, the Free State was becoming increasingly reluctant to leave any matter involving the prosecution of justice in Moroka's hands.

In the last three years of the decade, complaints by Moroka that his judicial prerogatives were being ignored were fairly frequent. In 1878, he objected to a Free State summons to try a

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39. G.S. 1634 P.647 Hühne-Moroka 30 January 1873 ) are two  
G.S. 1517 P.65 Brand-Moroka 7 January 1879 ) examples

man whom he had already tried for a murder committed within the Rolong boundaries. He wrote as follows to Brand:

"I am at a loss to understand upon what principle the matter is taken up by the Free State law courts, lying as it does beyond the bounds of their jurisdiction".<sup>40</sup>

The wording of the letter suggests that it was, as usual with most of Moroka's letters, written by a missionary. It is almost certain that the missionaries guided Moroka in standing up to his rights as an independent chief. Their influence may also explain Moroka's increasing reluctance to hand his subjects over to trial in the Free State. Brand was forced to admit that the Free State had no jurisdiction in this case.<sup>41</sup>

The strength of the Rolong opposition to the trend towards trying all cases in the Free State is perhaps best illustrated by a letter written by Tsipinare to Brand, objecting to a particular trial in Bloemfontein. The letter stated:

"The whole affair comes under our jurisdiction - both cattle and people are from Thaba 'Nchu - and our object was to have the thieves and cattle sent here in order that the matter might be investigated in our own court of justice. By consenting to the investigation of the matter in Bloemfontein we would endanger the principle of our indisputed right secured to us by our Extradition treaty".<sup>42</sup>

In 1878, Brand attempted to negotiate a new extradition treaty with the Rolong which would bring the requirements in line

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| 40. | G.S. 817  | P.23  | Moroka-Brand    | 5 February  | 1878 |
|     | G.S. 817  | P.12  | Moroka-Truter   | 26 March    | 1877 |
|     | G.S. 1636 | P.34  | Höhne-Moroka    | 12 April    | 1877 |
| 41. | G.S. 1516 | P.333 | Brand-Moroka    | 27 February | 1878 |
| 42. | G.S. 817  | P.61  | Tsipinare-Brand | 1 April     | 1880 |

with the State's diplomatic relations with other countries. The difference between these other extradition treaties and the terms of the 1865 Treaty of Alliance was that, while the Treaty of Alliance provided for extradition from the Free State in all cases, the other treaties made it competent for the Free State Supreme Court to refuse applications for extradition.<sup>43</sup> Brand wrote to Moroka, as follows, on 30 July 1878:

"As circumstances have very much changed since our treaty of 1865, which was never published, as it was not advisable to make public the clauses about the Basutu's, I would like to suggest to you, whether it would not be preferable to make a new treaty, more suited to the altered circumstances of the times, and more in accordance with the treaties of friendship and extradition such as we have entered into with the United States, the Cape Colony and Natal".<sup>44</sup>

In August, Moroka replied that he would consider this, but the matter went no further.<sup>45</sup> Although the Rolong did not enter into a new treaty, Brand began requiring that extradition should take place on the same terms as with other countries. This meant that he required Moroka to send far more detailed affidavits with his requests for extradition,<sup>46</sup> and began to insist on his right to assess whether requests should be complied with.<sup>47</sup>

One of the reasons for Brand's increasing reluctance to hand over criminals for trial in the Rolong territory may have been

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43. O.R. 41 P.264-265 Ordinance No. 1 of 1876  
Extradition Treaty with the Cape Colony 5 February 1876
44. G.S. 1517 P.27 Brand-Moroka 30 July 1878
45. G.S. 817 P.36 Moroka-Brand 20 August 1878
46. G.S. 1635 P.261 Brand-Moroka 14 January 1879  
G.S. 1517 P.92 Brand-Moroka 6 March 1879
47. G.S. 1517 Brand-Moroka 10 April 1879

that Moroka's reputation for impartiality had been severely damaged in 1877 when he arrested and imprisoned a Free State African for twenty two days without hearing the evidence against him. The matter probably only received attention as the man's detention inconvenienced his master;<sup>48</sup> but if this is coupled with the Rolong's reputation for charging exorbitant fees and fines, it appears that the Free State had a low opinion of the way law was administered in the Rolong territory.

It was owing to this that Brand became concerned over the position of white residents at Thaba 'Nchu and refused to allow Free State subjects to be tried by Moroka. In 1877, a European trader who lived at Thaba 'Nchu appealed to the Free State government against Moroka, who wished to try him. Hühne replied:

"Morocco (sic) being an independent chief governs his people in his own way and administers justice according to his own laws, and any person taking up residence in his country, must submit to his Government, which cannot be interfered with unless it is clearly shown that all the courts of the country having been appealed to, the same justice usually administered to his own subject has not been accorded to the foreigner".<sup>49</sup>

Perhaps the trader was not a Free Stater, but this statement was important as, in 1876, there were already as many as 100 Europeans living permanently at Thaba 'Nchu town.<sup>50</sup> Most of them were traders, but many must have been Free Staters. It was only in 1879 that Brand found the loophole which he wanted to prove

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48. G.S. 1635 P.175 Hühne-Moroka 9 May 1877  
 49. G.S. 1635 P.166 Hühne-Baine 14 March 1877  
 G.S. 1635 P.167 Hühne-Moroka 15 March 1877  
 50. Quarterly Paper of the Bloemfontein Mission  
 October 1876

that the Free State had jurisdiction over its subjects, even if they lived at Thaba 'Nchu or committed crimes in the Rolong territory. In 1879, Moroka applied for the extradition of a Free State subject who had committed a crime in his territory and then fled to the Free State. The man may have been European but this is not certain. Initially Brand agreed,<sup>51</sup> but after consultation with the Free State Attorney General, he revised his opinion. On 24 May 1879, he wrote to Moroka saying that he had only agreed due to his ignorance of the existence of Ordinance No. 9 of 1865.<sup>52</sup> This gave the Free State law courts jurisdiction over any Free State subjects who committed crimes in any countries adjacent to the State that were not within the jurisdiction of the Cape Colony or Natal.<sup>53</sup> He, therefore, stated that the man's trial should take place in the Free State and refused the extradition. The concern which prompted Brand to consult the Attorney General is another example of the uneasiness which the existence of a separate jurisdiction at Thaba 'Nchu caused him.

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On almost every problem issue in the 1870's, Moroka was forced to adopt measures which conformed to the Free State's requirements; but tensions remained to trouble relations throughout the decade. These tensions, the need felt at Thaba 'Nchu and Bloemfontein for common legislation on various issues, the anomalous judicial situation and Thaba 'Nchu's resemblance to a "plakkerplaas", all pointed towards the need for the

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51. G.S. 1635 P.261 Brand-Moroka 14 January 1879  
 52. G.S. 1517 P.110 Brand-Moroka 24 May 1879  
 53. O.R. 41 P.127 Ordinance No. 9 of 1865

extension of Free State control over Thaba 'Nchu, and the process began in the 1870's. Despite these tensions, Matlabe's agitations, and a general deterioration in relations between the Free State farmers and the Rolong, Brand's relationship with Moroka remained fairly cordial. A statement made by Brand to the 1878 Volksraad is indicative of the extent to which cordial relations persisted despite problems and an undercurrent of Free State hostility. He commented on a visit paid to him by Moroka by saying:

"Het bezoek onlangs door het Opperhoofd Moroka aan mij gebracht, zal zeker veel bijdragen, om de goede verstandhouding, die er gelukkig bij voortdurend tusschen ons blijf bestaan, te versterken".<sup>54</sup>

CHAPTER SIX

THE EFFECTS OF DENOMINATIONAL RIVALRY

## CHAPTER SIX

When Moroka died on 8 April, the Rolong were divided as to whether they should accept Tsipinare or Samuel Lehulere Moroka as his successor. Rivalry between the two men had troubled the tribe since 1864 and was another cause of unrest during the seventies. The dispute only crystallised in 1880, which makes the year the natural focus of any discussion of the dispute. Samuel's claims in 1880 were supported by the Anglican missionaries as he was an Anglican, while Tsipinare's claim was supported by the Wesleyans. The Friend of 5 August 1880 remarked on this division as follows:

"It has been ... stated ... that the dispute at Thaba 'Nchu is a denominational one, that it is simply a feud between the Methodist Christians and those in communion with the Church of England, and that it is largely the creation of the clergymen in charge of the latter".<sup>1</sup>

Subsequently, historians have postulated much the same conclusion. G.M. Theal, S.M. Molema and W.G.A. Mears have all implied that the political division at Thaba 'Nchu corresponded with the division between Anglicans and Wesleyans. The question as to whether they are correct is important as the focus on the religious division seems to have halted any further investigation into what actually caused the civil war which broke out over the succession dispute.

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Any analysis of the effects of denominational rivalry on society at Thaba 'Nchu must begin with a discussion of Samuel's

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1. The Friend 5 August 1880

aims in introducing an Anglican mission into a previously exclusively Wesleyan sphere of influence. All sources agree that his aims were political and that he intended to use the Anglican mission to bolster his own position in the tribe. Molema states:

"The community at Thaba Ncho (sic) had been necessarily exclusively Wesleyan from its Maquassi and Platberg/Vaal days, and as their religious denomination, so their tribal politics. They had nearly all recognised Tsipinare as the successor to the chieftainship until Samuel introduced a division into their denominational and political outlook, and obtained a considerable following as Tsipinare's rival".<sup>2</sup>

Molema probably obtained his information from Theal, as he does not appear to have used many, if any, archival sources in writing his book. Theal stated that when Samuel returned from England he

"commenced efforts to supplant Tsepinare (sic) the recognised heir to the rulership of the clan. He succeeded in obtaining a number of adherents, and henceforth the Barolong clan ... was divided into two factions, quarrelling about a form of Christianity and a choice of a future ruler".<sup>3</sup>

The implication of this statement is that the political and religious divisions corresponded. Molema certainly seems to have interpreted Theal in this way.

In a section entitled "Division and Disaster", Mears quotes Molema on the introduction of the Anglican mission and stated:

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2. Molema, S.M. Chief Moroka P.129  
 3. Theal, G.M. History of South Africa from 1795 to 1872  
 Vol. IV P.282

"This situation destroyed the unity of the Barolong at a time when only unity carefully preserved could have saved their land and independence from the covetous Orange Free State Republic".<sup>4</sup>

Again the rivalry of Anglican and Wesleyan was seen to be a major cause of the outbreak over the succession in 1880.

The thesis of this chapter and the next is that, while there were strong links between the political opposition to Moroka and Tsipinare, and the Anglican church, religion had very little to do with the political situation except that Samuel thought his links with the Church of England would enable him to gain the support of the British government. In 1880 there was no sign of a dispute over which form of Christianity the tribe was to follow, nor was there a "fued between the Methodist Christians and those in communion with the Church of England".

Samuel's early connections with the Anglicans seem to have convinced him that there was a strong connection between that Church and the British government. Moroka sent Samuel to Zonnebloem College in Cape Town where he came under the influence of Sir George Grey. He became a frequent visitor at the High Commissioner's home and was sent by Grey to further his education at the Anglican college of St. Augustine's in Canterbury.<sup>5</sup> While at St. Augustine's, Samuel formed a close relationship with an ordinand, George Mitchell, and persuaded him to accompany him on his return to South Africa in 1864. Mitchell then became a deacon in the Diocese of the Orange Free State Mission. It was

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4. Mears, W.G.A. Wesleyan Barolong Mission in Trans-Orangia 1821-1884 P.33-34

5. Molema, S.M. ibid. P.113

Rees, W. & L. Life and Times of Sir George Grey P.313

Samuel's influence that led Mitchell to start the Church of England mission at Thaba 'Nchu in May 1865.<sup>6</sup> He convinced Mitchell that he was heir to the chieftaincy and even Mitchell's colleagues who joined him later seem to have been singularly unaware that there was any doubt about the matter.<sup>7</sup>

The Thaba 'Nchu mission was not, however, entirely Samuel's idea. Edward Twells arrived as the first Bishop of Bloemfontein in 1863 and immediately began plans to start an Anglican mission at Thaba 'Nchu.<sup>8</sup> Moroka supported the plan,<sup>9</sup> and seems to have had no suspicions about Samuel's relationship with Mitchell. Like Samuel, Moroka appears to have thought that an Anglican missionary would act as a link with the British government. His hostile relations with both the Free State and the Sotho, at the time, should be borne in mind.<sup>10</sup> The Paris Missionary Society in Basutoland was well aware that the Africans would associate the Anglican church with British power, and this was one of the reasons they objected to Twells' plans for Basutoland. They stated that they could not compete with a church that had "the prerogative of representing in many respects the government which holds in its hand the territorial destinies of South Africa".<sup>11</sup>

During the 1860's, there was no dramatic division of the tribe on religious lines, nor was there any dramatic identification between political opposition and Anglicanism. Despite the fact

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6. Barrow, J.W. A Brief History of the Bloemfontein Mission South Africa, from its Commencement to 1876  
P.7
7. Crisp, W. Log Book Crisp-his mother 13 August 1868
8. Orange Free State and Basuto Mission Occasional Paper No. 1 P.28
9. The Friend 19 May 1865
10. See Introduction
11. Paris Missionary Society-Twells 29 November 1864  
Diocesan Archives

that Moroka's connections were Wesleyan, he actively encouraged the Anglican missionaries. There is evidence that Moroka never intended Samuel to be chief<sup>12</sup> and if he sensed that the Anglican church was becoming a club for all those supporting Samuel, he would not have been as enthusiastic as he was. He sent several of his younger sons to be taught by Mitchell and when the missionary left in 1867, took steps to obtain another missionary. The fact that Mitchell was recalled to Bloemfontein because the Thaba 'Nchu mission had simply not flourished and there was more pressing work to do elsewhere is also important.<sup>13</sup> As Mitchell had made scarcely any converts by 1867, the impression given by Theal, Molema and Mears that there was a rapid split appears to be erroneous.

After Mitchell's departure, Moroka sent several messages to Canon H.F. Beckett, the Superior of the St. Augustine Missionary Brotherhood at Springfield, asking him to send men to teach his people. Beckett had come to South Africa in 1867 with the intention of setting up a mission to the Sotho on a farm called Modderpoort, but owing to the Sotho war settled at Springfield for the time being. Beckett paid the chief a visit and took several services at Thaba 'Nchu. In 1868, at Moroka's request, the whole Brotherhood moved to Thaba 'Nchu. There was now a large number of High Church Anglican monks living at Thaba 'Nchu teaching the Rolong Gregorian chants with Moroka's blessing. In 1869, they moved to Modderpoort leaving William Crisp and a little later, Mitchell, in charge of the mission.<sup>14</sup> Moroka gave Crisp

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12. See Chapter Seven

13. Quarterly Paper of the Orange Free State Mission  
May 1868 P.4

14. Quarterly Paper of the Orange Free State Mission  
30 January 1871 P.13-14

further proof of his goodwill towards the mission by making a speech at the church telling the people to give money towards the mission,<sup>15</sup> and by giving the Anglicans more land in November 1869.<sup>16</sup> Despite the fact that Moroka was aware of the rivalry and distrust between the Anglican and Wesleyan missionaries, he had certainly not been forced to take sides in a denominational division in his tribe by 1870. In fact, by the end of 1870, the Anglicans had only made 35 converts, 16 of whom were baptised in December 1870.<sup>17</sup> Both the Wesleyan and Anglican missions began expanding rapidly after 1870, and the religious division became more important. To some extent, it was no accident that the Anglican mission expanded at a time when opposition to Moroka was expressing itself in many different ways.

Converts were made into churches deeply suspicious of one another; but how much the hostility between the missionaries affected the Rolong themselves is uncertain. The Paris Missionary Society in Basutoland were quite sure that any denominational clash would affect the Africans. They informed Twells that if he started missions in areas where a more protestant religion was practiced, his stress on Anglo-Catholic religious practices would cause "families to be divided and agitated by differences, not to say rivalries of discipline and worship".<sup>18</sup> There is some evidence that denominational differences did cause this sort of difficulty. Tshabadira Moroka, for instance, was most upset when his son, Michael, came

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15. Crisp, W. Log Book Crisp-his father 23 July 1869  
 16. Crisp, W. ibid. Crisp-Mr. and Mrs. Potts 7 November 1869  
 17. Quarterly Paper of the Orange Free State Mission  
 June 1871 P.13-14  
 18. Paris Missionary Society-Twells 29 November 1864  
 Diocesan Archives

under Mitchell's influence and tried to wean the boy from Anglicanism by sending him to Lovedale. Tshabadira was one of the sons whom Moroka had sent to Salem for his education. His motives may, however, had been political, as his son later supported Samuel.<sup>19</sup> Whatever the social impact of religious division was, Moroka kept himself aloof from the conflict. In 1874, he talked to Froude about the mission rivalry. Froude reported Moroka's conversation as follows:

"My sons," he says, "want me to be baptised. I say to them, Christians here," pointing to the Wesleyan Station, "and Christians there," pointing to the Anglican monks. "Christians there won't speak to Christians here. When one of them has converted the other it will be time to come to me".<sup>20</sup>

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The hostility of the missionaries had been evident from the first. When the Wesleyans heard of Twells' intentions of starting a mission, the Superintendent of the Wesleyan Bechuana District, Richard Giddy, protested in the strongest terms.<sup>21</sup> Twells, however, had little faith in the efficacy of Methodism or of other protestant religions. For instance, he informed the Paris Missionary Society that the reason why they had not been more successful was that they did not practice the "religious ceremonies" of the Church of England.<sup>22</sup> The Bishop assured the Wesleyans that there was ample room for independent missionary work at Thaba 'Nchu. On the face of it, this appeared true. In 1864, the Wesleyans had 372 members and 116

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19. Molema, S.M. *ibid.* P.113  
 20. Froude, J.A. Short Studies on Great Subjects Vol. III  
 21. Giddy-Twells 28 December 1864 Diocesan Archives  
 Giddy-Twells 17 March 1865 Diocesan Archives  
 22. Paris Missionary Society-Twells 29 November 1864  
 Diocesan Archives

on trial, out of a total population of roughly 12 000.<sup>25</sup> The Anglicans, however, built their church within a couple of hundred yards of the Wesleyan chapel and made no effort to evangelise a different section of the tribe.

The Wesleyans were acutely conscious of rivalry. In 1866, they regretted that the Anglicans had opened up a "rival" school<sup>24</sup> and in 1875 stated that their position had become very difficult owing to the "presence of a large staff of ritualistic clergy ... who instead of going out to labour among the heathen, rather endeavour to decoy away the best of our people". They also accused the Anglicans of gaining converts through the "liberal distribution of presents". James Scott added in a letter - "the teaching of the priests of that Church is such that we hesitate to leave the people to its influence".<sup>25</sup> The Wesleyans regarded the Anglican priests as bigots, although the Anglicans insisted that they kept on "friendly terms" with the Wesleyans.<sup>26</sup>

There was another source of the Anglican-Wesleyan conflict which seems to have influenced Moroka in his decision to allow an Anglican mission. Giddy warned Twells before the mission was established that the Wesleyan Missionary Society held the title deed for all the land at Thaba 'Nchu.<sup>27</sup> Twells informed Moroka of this claim in September 1865 and stated:

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23. Quarterly Paper of the Orange Free State Mission  
June 1871 P.15
24. Minutes of the Bechuana District Meeting 1866 P.280
25. ibid. 1875 P.601
26. Crisp, W. Log Book Crisp-his father 1 July 1868  
The Quarterly Paper of the Orange Free State Mission  
June 1871 P.15  
ibid. October 1871 P.9
27. Giddy-Twells 28 December 1864 Diocesan Archives

"If I believed this claim to be true ... I would not allow Mr. Mitchell to remain one day longer on ground belonging to men who impudently set themselves to oppose the spread of the Gospel among the Heathen, and who receive not the ministers of Christ. I believe their claim to be a false one. I look to you as Chief of the Country".

In addition, he asserted that, as Moroka's right to the land had been recognised by both the British and the Free State governments in treaties with him, his rights should also be recognised by all people living in his country. He asked the chief to give him a document indicating his grant of land to the Anglican mission, so that "we may have something to bear witness against those who deny your authority".<sup>28</sup>

There is evidence that the Wesleyans continued to consider themselves as the rightful owners of Thaba 'Nchu. Moroka may, thus, have had good reason for welcoming Twells' support, although he himself does not seem to have clashed with the Wesleyans on this issue. In 1882, an interesting document was drawn up by the Notary Public in Grahamstown. It concerned the indenture drawn up between Moshoeshoe, Moseme and the Revs. Archbell, Edwards and Jenkins. In 1882, Edwards was the only one of these three missionaries who was still alive. The document stated that Moshoeshoe had sold the land to the missionaries and apparently the Wesleyans thought, in 1882, that Edwards had a claim to the whole of the Rolong territory. In the document drawn up in 1882, Edwards transferred any rights he had to this land to Barton in his capacity as General Superintendent of the Wesleyan Society in

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28. Twells-Moroka 21 September 1865 Diocesan Archives

South African, and to his successors.<sup>29</sup> This is almost incredible as even the Wesleyans knew that if they desired more land for missionary purposes, they had to apply to the Rolong chief. Their claims must have received a final blow when the Free State annexed Thaba 'Nchu in 1884, and only allocated the Wesleyans the land on which their mission was built and two farms, Rietpoort and The Willows, which had been granted to them.<sup>30</sup>

The conflict between the two Missionary Societies may have owed something to the fact that they supported rival candidates to the succession. Until about 1878, the Wesleyans seemed to have been quite unconcerned about Samuel's claims, but the Anglicans knew as early as 1868 that Samuel and Tsipinare were rivals. In 1868, Crisp stated that Tsipinare's "influence" would possibly override Samuel's "right" to the chieftaincy when Moroka died.<sup>31</sup> At the arbitration court in 1880, John Cameron, who had links with the Wesleyans, reported a conversation he had had with Samuel a few years before Moroka's death. Brand took down this evidence as follows:

"Samuel zeide jy weet dat ik Moroka's zoon ben en julle hangt Sepinare aan ik zal julle het zwaar maken na Moroka's dood".

Cameron then urged Samuel to bring his grievances to Moroka's attention so that the matter could be rectified.<sup>32</sup> This must have warned the Wesleyans of impending trouble. Sometime during the seventies, Moroka told Mitchell that Samuel was not his son at all, and he therefore had no claim to the chieftaincy.

29. Document obtained from the Warden of Thaba 'Nchu Methodist Mission

30. Title Deed of Wesleyan ground drawn up by the Orange Free State Deeds Office 16 August 1885

31. Crisp, W. Log Book Crisp-his mother 13 August 1868

32. G.S. 1404 P.77

C. Harmon, a Wesleyan missionary, stated that he had been told this years before 1880 by John Cameron and the Rev. J.T. Daniel, another Wesleyan missionary.<sup>33</sup> Richard Moroka, a Wesleyan, described a meeting between Mitchell and Moroka, to Brand. Brand took down his evidence as follows:

"Mr. Mitchell ziede aan Moroka ik verneem dat ... Mettau en Samuel uwe erfgenamen zyn. Moroka zeide ik geloof niet dat jy kunst zweren dat Samuel myn kind is ... Moroka zeide hy is niet myn kind. Mr. Mitchell zeide wie is dan die erfgenaam. Moroka zeide eerst Sepinare ..." <sup>34</sup>

If Moroka and the Wesleyans had been unaware of Samuel's pretensions before this, they could not have been unaware of it afterwards. The succession dispute does not, however, seem to have been a great issue between the missionaries until 1880. The Wesleyans, for instance, never mentioned the succession dispute explicitly in their Minutes until after the 1880 rebellion. Despite this, the clear cut hostility between the Anglican and Wesleyan missionaries on religious grounds and over the ownership of the Rolong's land has made it convenient for historians to take the links between the Anglicans and the opposition political movement as proof that the political and religious divisions corresponded.

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As the Anglican mission expanded in the 1870's, its influence spread among many of Samuel's supporters and the opponents of Moroka and Tsipinare. Although the mission did not become so closely associated with sedition that it forfeited Moroka's support completely, there is one indication that Moroka's attitude

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33. G.S. 817 Harmon-Brand 1 June 1880

34. G.S. 1404 P.54

to the Anglicans, particularly to Mitchell, changed owing to their support of Samuel. In 1878, Mitchell recorded that he had been considering plans for having his church properly ceiled, and was proposing to appeal to the Anglican people for the necessary funds. He wrote that, "all of a sudden the Chief of the country forestalled me, and compelled - literally compelled - them one and all to contribute very heavily towards the cost of the restoration of the Wesleyan Chapel". Moroka's action could possibly have been a result of his conversation with Mitchell over Samuel's claims to the chieftaincy.<sup>35</sup>

The chief's clash with Mitchell may also have been a result of the fact that the Anglicans were at least connected with another of his opponents, Moroka's uncle Bogatchou. It is notable that on one occasion, Bogatchou and Samuel were suspected of plotting Moroka's death, but it is not known when this occurred.<sup>36</sup> In 1870, the Rev. William Crisp accompanied Bogatchou and a group of Rolong, on a journey to the north of the Vaal, so that he could learn their customs and to recover his health. In May 1871, Crisp wrote in a letter to his father:

"You know Bogacho (sic) - the man I travelled up country with last year. I am still travelling with him ... He says when I go to pay you a visit he shall sell some of his cattle and come with me - that he may see you and the queen".<sup>37</sup>

Like Samuel, Bogatchou appeared to associate the Anglican church with British power. In January 1871, the Anglicans were mooting

35. Quarterly Paper of the Bloemfontein Mission  
October 1878 P.19  
The Minutes of the Bechuana District 1877 state that the Rolong contributed £1 150 to the building of the Wesleyan Chapel
36. G.S. 1405 8 June 1880 Ngakantsi's evidence
37. Crisp, W. Log Book Crisp-his father 21 May 1871

plans to build near Bogatchou's kraal in Thaba 'Nchu town.<sup>38</sup> In 1875, they reported that there was a village behind the church where there were many Christians and their number was increasing steadily. It is possible that this was either Bogatchou's kraal or the village of another of Samuel's allies, Lebetta.<sup>39</sup>

It is not known whether Lebetta was an opponent of Moroka's rule, but it would not be surprising if it was proved that he was. He appears to have been a chief or headman of the Hurutshe tribe,<sup>40</sup> and may have been affected by the resurgence of tribe divisions in the seventies. So many of the tribes which had joined the Seleka-Rolong in the Difaqane wars attempted to break away during this period and it is not impossible that the Hurutshe were among those whom Moroka attempted to keep at Thaba 'Nchu by force.<sup>41</sup> In any event, Lebetta was one of Samuel's foremost supporters in 1880. In August 1874, the Rev. W.H.R. Bevan, an Anglican missionary, wrote a letter saying that Mitchell had been preaching a "good deal" in Lebetta's village, and was gaining influence there. As a result, Lebetta sent one of his sons to the Anglican school.<sup>42</sup> There are no other established links between the Anglicans and Samuel's supporters.

In the period between 1870 and 1876, the number of converts in the Anglican Church increased from 35 to roughly 500.<sup>43</sup> The Wesleyan mission also expanded rapidly. In 1873, for instance,

38. Quarterly Paper of the Orange Free State Mission  
October 1871 P.10

39. Quarterly Paper of the Orange Free State Mission  
October 1875 P.26

40. De Express 2 September 1880

41. See Chapter Four

42. Quarterly Paper of the Orange Free State Mission  
April 1875 P.8

43. Quarterly Paper of the Orange Free State Mission  
October 1875 P.24

the missionaries recorded an addition of 170 members to the society,<sup>44</sup> and in 1878, wrote that they had 423 full members and 109 of trial, in the outstations alone. Most of these stations had only been started after the decentralisation of movement of 1876.<sup>45</sup> In 1878, the Anglicans held their first vestry meeting and elected Samuel Moroka as their first church warden.<sup>46</sup>

Despite the fact that Samuel was a leader in the Anglican church and there were definite links between the church and several of his supporters, the political alignment in 1880 and the following years had very little to do with the religious division. After Brand's arbitration in 1880, Tsipinare banished Samuel from the country and forced many of his supporters to flee. This exodus affected both missions and the numbers of those who left give some indication of who Samuel's supporters were. The mission records, however, can only give a general impression of this situation. The problem is that not all those who left were necessarily Samuel's supporters, as some left for fear the Samuel would return to attack them. Nevertheless, there are some interesting statistics.

In January 1881, Crisp recorded that, on looking through his communicants roll, he could distinguish the names of fifty-five people who had left the country out of a total of a hundred and sixty-three.<sup>47</sup> These were probably Samuel's supporters. Those who remained showed no hostility to Tsipinare and were certainly not active partisans of Samuel's party. There was thus a

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44. Minutes of the Bechuana District Meeting 1873 P.553

45. ibid. 1878 P.44

46. Miscellaneous Volume Minutes of the 1878 Vestry Meeting  
Diocesan Archives

47. Quarterly Paper of the Bloemfontein Mission  
January 1881 P.26

political division among the Anglicans. In 1880, the Wesleyans recorded that five of their native agents and fifteen class leaders had supported Samuel and that half of their numbers were "misled" by his party. 140 members, including 8 class leaders, left the country with Samuel's supporters. Another 75 had also left, but whether they were Samuel's supporters is not clear.<sup>48</sup> In 1881, there was another revealing entry in the Wesleyan Minutes. This stated that of the number who remained in the country, 129 were not attending classes. The report stated: "These are resident in the country but are sympathisers with the pretender and disaffected to the government and take this way of showing their dislike to the rule of Tsipinare".<sup>49</sup> Tsipinare never became a Christian but as with Moroka, his relationship with the Wesleyans was close. One of his wives was baptised by the Wesleyans in October 1881 and was, according to the Minutes, "a very earnest Christian".<sup>50</sup> To boycott the Wesleyans was, therefore, one way of expressing opposition to Tsipinare.

The fact that the Rev. George Mitchell was so closely associated with Samuel's rebellion in 1880 was the main reason why many contemporaries saw the clash as denominational. In an article attacking Mitchell, De Express stated on 17 June 1880:

"We have nothing to add here, as to our regret at the role played by Mr. Mitchell ... without which, there is not the slightest doubt, the whole matter would never have occurred".<sup>51</sup>

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48. Minutes of the Bechuana District Meeting 1880 P.102

49. ibid. 1881 P.129

50. ibid. 1881 P.130

51. De Express 17 June 1880 The Friend supported Mitchell while De Express did everything it could to besmirch his name

Unrest would almost certainly have broken out regardless of Mitchell's role, but Mitchell's support undoubtedly made the outbreak more serious, as his presence encouraged the Africans to think they would get British support against Tsipinare.

Mitchell strongly supported Samuel's claim in 1880 despite the fact that he had been told by Moroka that Samuel was not his son. On 11 May 1880, he informed Brand that Samuel was the "legal and only heir of the late Moroka, his father".<sup>52</sup> Shortly after this, Tsipinare complained that Mitchell was prompting agitation.<sup>53</sup> He wrote to Brand in June as follows:

"Samuel has hordes flocking to his standard, as, the Revd. G. Mitchell represents himself as belonging to the British State Church, and, therefore, in a position to get that mighty 'British' aid for the furtherance of Samuel's cause - further he 'Samuel' does not neglect to intimidate the Barolong, by alluding to the punishments he will inflict on those who do not side with him, as he will have the most powerful (sic) aid, namely that of the British government".

Tsipinare also pointed out that Samuel was supported by a group of Sotho from British Basutoland and told Brand that "they fully calculate on Mr. Mitchell's influence with the British Government bearing them out, in their present unwarranted actions".<sup>54</sup>

From Samuel's subsequent conduct, it was clear that he genuinely thought British aid was a possibility, and that he was not referring to British aid merely to frighten the people.<sup>55</sup> What Mitchell had said to make Samuel believe this is not known,

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52. G.S. 817 P.68 Mitchell-Brand 11 May 1880  
 53. G.S. 817 P.70 Tsipinare-Brand 29 May 1880  
 54. G.S. 817 P.74 Tsipinare-Brand 1 June 1880  
 55. See Chapter Eight P.172

nor is it clear that Mitchell did believe the British would support Samuel. Mitchell, himself, denied that he had done anything to encourage Samuel to violence and after investigation by his church authorities, his conduct was supported. Tsipinare however, saw Mitchell's presence as a threat. On 31 May 1880, he ordered the missionary to leave Thaba 'Nchu within 48 hours.<sup>56</sup> Twice before this he had appealed to the Anglican Bishop, Allan Webb, to recall Mitchell himself, and to send another man in his place.<sup>57</sup> He explained to Webb that his action had nothing to do with hostility to the Anglican church as a whole, but was directed at Mitchell personally and that he wished for a missionary to replace him. Webb sent William Crisp back to Thaba 'Nchu.<sup>58</sup> While Tsipinare welcomed Crisp back, he made him sign a declaration of submission to his authority on 13 September 1880. This stated that the office bearers of the Anglican church and mission at Thaba 'Nchu acknowledged themselves bound by Brand's arbitration in favour of Tsipinare, recognised Tsipinare to be the Chief of the Rolong, and undertook to "render him due obedience according to law, and to support his government".<sup>59</sup>

Crisp signed the declaration, but on the same day, Archdeacon Groghan of Bloemfontein wrote to Tsipinare saying that by signing the document, the Anglican church was not acquiescing in his treatment of Mitchell.<sup>60</sup> Tsipinare's conduct indicates

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56. Quarterly Paper of the Bloemfontein Mission  
January 1881 P.25

57. G.S. 152 P.200-209 6 September 1880

58. Quarterly Paper of the Bloemfontein Mission  
January 1881 P.24

59. Diocesan Archives Miscellaneous Volume entitled  
Confirmation Candidates 13 September 1880

60. *ibid.* Groghan-Tsipinare 13 September 1880

that he was apprehensive that another Anglican would take up Mitchell's role. The fact that he allowed the mission to continue, however, shows that the Anglican mission had not become so associated with sedition that it forfeited his support. As will be shown in the following chapter, Tsipinare knew full well that the opposition to his rule had little to do with religion. So long as it was made clear that the Anglicans had no influence with the British government, he had little to fear from the missions. He continued to support the Anglican mission. In November 1881, he promised to give Webb more land in freehold title for the mission.<sup>61</sup> In 1882, he gave £50 towards Crisp's plan to build a boarding school and, in good seasons, the Anglican missionaries received a collection of corn from the tribe at Tsipinare's orders.<sup>62</sup> In 1883, he gave another 2 512 acres to the Anglicans.<sup>63</sup> On one occasion, Tsipinare stated that he had promised the Bishop, during Moroka's lifetime, that he would do what he could towards the support of the Anglicans.<sup>64</sup> At no stage did he have any clear cut animosity towards the Anglicans, despite the missionaries support for Samuel and their connections with Bogatchou and Lebetta.

Bishop Webb wrote to Brand on 5 August 1880 after a visit from Samuel. He stated that Samuel was accompanied by "prominent Wesleyans and others who are not members of the Anglican Church and that the remonstrance raised is most certainly not on religious grounds but from national Barolong

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61. Quarterly Paper of the Bloemfontein Mission  
 July 1881 P.148    January 1882 P.35  
 62. *ibid.* April 1882 P.96  
 63. *ibid.* July 1883 P.144  
 64. *ibid.* July 1881 P.148

feeling".<sup>65</sup> Samuel certainly used the Anglican church, but it was the political and not the religious division which was the important division at Thaba 'Nchu in the seventies and in 1880. As will be seen in the next chapter, there was also far more to the dispute than the dispute between Samuel and Tsipinare over precedence.

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65. G.S. 152 P.118 Webb-Brand 5 August 1880

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE SUCCESSION DISPUTE AND  
BRAND'S ARBITRATION

## CHAPTER SEVEN

As outlined in Chapter Six, at the time of Chief Moroka's death on 8 April 1880, there were two main contestants for the succession - Samuel Lehulere Moroka and Tsipinare. Their dispute not only plunged the Rolong territory into chaos but also threatened to involve the Sotho, the Free State, and even tribes north of the Vaal into a general war. As the settlement of the dispute was essential for the peace of the Free State, Brand persuaded both parties to submit first to his mediation and then to his arbitration. At both courts, he was faced with a mass of conflicting claims based on evidence drawn from the whole history of the tribe. An analysis of this evidence not only explains why Brand decided the arbitration in favour of Tsipinare, but also why a large portion of the tribe found his decision unacceptable. The outbreak of violence at Thaba 'Nchu and Brand's failure to quell unrest were also important as they led to renewed demands from Free Staters for an extension of Free State control over the Rolong.

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Unrest began shortly after Moroka's death. The late chief's youngest brother, Molale, summoned a meeting of all councillors to decide on the succession.<sup>1</sup> The night before the meeting, Bogatchou, Samuel's main supporter, warned one of the councillors, Willem Mokhosi, that he did not think it right for Tsipinare to remain in power, as he was not one of Moroka's sons.<sup>2</sup> Bogatchou and Samuel were both at the council meeting on 13 April, and all sources agree that they made no protest when the council

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1. De Express 17 June 1880  
2. G.S. 1404 P.123

proclaimed Tsipinare to be Chief of the Rolong.<sup>3</sup> Immediately after the meeting, however, Samuel told Tsipinare that he would not be happy until an assembly of the whole tribe was called. Tsipinare replied that there was no time for an assembly as he was busy tying up Moroka's business and first had to make it known that he was Moroka's successor. After this, he promised to call a meeting. As Samuel wanted an assembly to reject Tsipinare's claim, he was not satisfied.<sup>4</sup> Another report stated that Tsipinare threatened the people that if they did not accept him as chief, "he would ruin their country".<sup>5</sup>

Samuel took it into his own hands to inform Letsie, the Sotho chief; Moshote, the Ratlou chief; and Motuba, the Rapulana chief, of Moroka's death.<sup>6</sup> When, on 11 May, Tsipinare sent Brand a letter informing Brand that he had assumed the chieftaincy,<sup>7</sup> Samuel wrote to Brand appealing for aid.<sup>8</sup> When Tsipinare removed his letter from the post, he asked the Rev. George Mitchell, the Anglican missionary, to write on his behalf and immediately left for Bloemfontein.

Mitchell explained to Brand that trouble was brewing as Tsipinare refused to call an assembly of the people to decide on the succession, and as Samuel was the legal heir, he refused to let Tsipinare simply assume the government. He warned that Samuel was planning to call an assembly himself.<sup>9</sup> Brand was undeterred by this and by Samuel's visit. On 13 May, he wrote

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3. G.S. 817 P.67 Tsipinare-Brand 11 May 1880  
De Express 17 June 1880
4. G.S. 1405
5. G.S. 817 P.68 Mitchell-Brand 11 May 1880
6. Govt. Courant 19 December 1883
7. G.S. 817 P.67 Tsipinare-Brand 11 May 1880
8. G.S. 817 P.66 Samuel-Brand 11 May 1880
9. G.S. 817 P.68 Mitchell-Brand 11 May 1880

to Tsipinare congratulating him on his succession.<sup>10</sup> He had two reasons for this. One was that Tsipinare had ruled the Rolong as regent during the last five years of Moroka's life. The other was that Moroka had told him that Tsipinare was his successor.<sup>11</sup> Brand informed Mitchell that he would not correspond with anyone who was not the "de facto" ruler of the country, and that he could not interfere in the internal affairs of the Rolong "where there are no overwhelming political reasons that would make this necessary ...".<sup>12</sup>

On 27 May, Samuel wrote again to Brand, informing him that he was calling an assembly. He rightly claimed that according to Rolong custom, the people had a right to nominate the successor of any chief and this could not simply be done by the chief's councillors.<sup>13</sup> On 29 May, Tsipinare told Brand that he intended suppressing the agitations prompted by Mitchell and Samuel by resorting to force.<sup>14</sup> It was obvious that Tsipinare could not rely on the tribe to support him.

Brand advised him rather to call the assembly himself. He also told him to introduce drastic reforms into his government by giving the people a say in the government, by reforming taxation, and by removing any restrictions preventing people from leaving the territory if they wished.<sup>15</sup> Brand astutely realised that much of the opposition to Tsipinare was a result of his previous rule as regent. Tsipinare admitted as much. He told Brand Samuel had none of Moroka's headmen or councillors with him, but

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|-----|-----------|-----------|-----------------|-------------|
| 10. | G.S. 1517 | P.195     | Brand-Tsipinare | 13 May 1880 |
| 11. | G.S. 1517 | P.195-196 | Brand-Tsipinare | 30 May 1880 |
| 12. | G.S. 1635 | P.334     | Brand-Mitchell  | 20 May 1880 |
| 13. | G.S. 817  | P.69      | Samuel-Brand    | 27 May 1880 |
| 14. | G.S. 817  | P.70      | Tsipinare-Brand | 29 May 1880 |
| 15. | G.S. 1517 | P.195-196 | Brand-Tsipinare | 1880        |

that his supporters were drawn from those whom Moroka had had to keep down by force. Their bitterness towards him was explained by the fact that he had had to carry out Moroka's policies.<sup>16</sup> There is evidence that Tsipinare later took steps to implement Brand's advice but, at the time, Samuel's threat was too pressing.<sup>17</sup>

Brand also warned Tsipinare that the Treaty of Alliance with the Free State had ceased on Moroka's death. He could not therefore rely on Free State assistance. He warned Tsipinare only to act in self-defence, and to take great care to protect the white inhabitants of Thaba 'Nchu.<sup>18</sup> Despite this warning Tsipinare's forces fired into the crowd when Samuel attempted to hold a meeting in the chief's "kgotla" on 31 May. C. Harmon, a Wesleyan missionary, assured Brand that Tsipinare's men had only fired over the people's heads and that nobody was killed.<sup>19</sup> Tsipinare stated that Samuel's followers had opened fire on his people first and that two men were killed and one wounded.<sup>20</sup> Samuel, on the other hand, stated that his people had gone unarmed, and that Tsipinare's forces had wounded four people, one of whom was likely to die. He warned Brand that he would arm his people and assemble them again the next day.<sup>21</sup>

Tsipinare appealed for Free State aid with the plausible argument that a force of white people would easily suppress the rebellion, whereas his forces would only cause more bloodshed.

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| 16. | G.S. 817 P.74                 | Tsipinare-Brand | 1 June 1880 |
| 17. | G.S. 817 P.78                 | Harmon-Brand    | 1 June 1880 |
|     | See Chapter Nine              |                 |             |
| 18. | G.S. 1517 P.195-196           | Brand-Tsipinare | 30 May 1880 |
| 19. | G.S. 817 P.78                 | Harmon-Brand    | 1 June 1880 |
|     | <u>De Express</u> 3 June 1880 |                 |             |
| 20. | G.S. 817 P.73                 | Tsipinare-Brand | 31 May 1880 |
| 21. | G.S. 817 P.71                 | Samuel-Brand    | 31 May 1880 |

Brand immediately summoned his Executive Council and sent 200 burghers to the Rolong borders.<sup>22</sup> The newspapers gave the number at 600.<sup>23</sup> Brand was seriously alarmed. On 1 June, he warned Samuel not to call another meeting, stating "the Free State cannot stand by quietly and see all the mischief that must result if you go and shoot and kill each other ...".<sup>24</sup>

Brand was not, however, prepared to do more than safeguard the Free State's boundaries at this stage. He brought the matter to the Volksraad's attention on 1 June. The Minutes recorded: "ZHEd. meent dat onze Staat natuurlijk geen hulp kan verleenen aan deze native ...". Only one member stated that Tsipinare should be assisted, but it appears that he was merely thinking that the Free State should send a mediator. One member gave a graphic description of the situation by saying "wanneer midden in ons huis een vuur brandt, wij verplicht zijn daartegen maatregelen te nemen". One after another, the members stated that the best thing to do was to leave the matter entirely in Brand's hands, but they showed their concern by passing a motion authorising Brand to take strong action, if needed, despite fears that this would antagonise opinion in the Cape.<sup>25</sup>

Brand sent the Sheriff of Bloemfontein, N.C.P. Raaff, to Thaba 'Nchu with offers of Free State mediation. He found the Rolong divided into two armed camps, but they promised not to fight until they had seen Brand.<sup>26</sup> Tsipinare accepted the offer

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22. V.R.N. 1 June 1880 P.243  
 23. De Express 3 June 1880  
The Friend 3 June 1880  
 24. G.S. 1517 P.199 Brand-Samuel 1 June 1880  
 25. V.R.N. 1 June 1880 P.243-245  
 26. V.R.N. 2 June 1880 P.253  
 G.S. 1517 P.197 Brand-Tsipinare 31 May 1880  
 Brand-Samuel 31 May 1880

of mediation immediately; Samuel only after consultation with Mitchell. The Friend stated that Samuel would have preferred to have the country divided between the rivals and to have a European Resident who would see that both kept within their limits.<sup>27</sup> Brand then sent M. Steyn and C. van der Wath, members of the Executive Council, to obtain written confirmation that both parties would submit to his decisions. They were also told to inform the Rolong that if hostilities broke out, the Free State would take steps to prevent a war.<sup>28</sup>

By this stage, it was clear that Samuel had a large proportion, if not a majority, of the people on his side. The alarming thing was that so many of these were not Rolong at all. Tsipinare stated that among Samuel's followers was Monyake, Moletsane's son, who lived at Thaba 'Nchu and had always given trouble, and a group of Sotho from British Basutoland.<sup>29</sup> De Express stated that Samuel was supported by all the Sotho in the Rolong territory.<sup>30</sup> The question as to how much support Samuel had from the Sotho at Thaba 'Nchu or in Basutoland was important to the Free State even at this stage. Trouble had been brewing in Basutoland since the Sprigg ministry extended the Cape Peace Preservation Act to include Basutoland in 1878. As Masupha, Lerothodi and most other chiefs, except Johnathan Molapo, made it clear that they would not submit to Sprigg's proclamation, the possibility of war was of vital interest to the Free State. Civil war seemed probable and if hostilities did break out, there was no knowing that Samuel's Sotho would not become embroiled or

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27. The Friend 5 August 1880

28. V.R.N. 2 June 1880 P.253

29. G.S. 817 P.74 Tsipinare-Brand 1 June 1880

30. De Express 3 June 1880

that they would not be supported by Sotho from Basutoland, many of whom sympathised with Samuel.<sup>31</sup>

Samuel also had the support of the Kwena, who had given Moroka so much trouble in the seventies. Samuel, in fact, told Brand that the initial cause of the whole disturbance was that Tsipinare had collected an armed force to drive the Kwena out of the country without even giving them time to prepare for the journey. He declared that his party was determined to see that they were at least given the opportunity to reap their crops and to prepare themselves properly for their departure.<sup>32</sup> It is not known exactly what gave rise to Tsipinare's disagreement with these people, but it is probable that the Kwena had remained a source of disaffection after 1878 and had suffered from Tsipinare's enforcement of Moroka's repressive policies.

Tsipinare's position in Moroka's government also explains Samuel's links with the Rapulana. Bogatchou, in fact, travelled to Polfontein to bring Matlabe's successor, Motuba, to Thaba 'Nchu to support Samuel's case. Motuba both gave evidence on Samuel's behalf and brought several of his tribe with him. In his evidence, Motuba implied that it was Tsipinare who had forced him to leave the country.<sup>33</sup>

Bogatchou was another of Samuel's supporters who had been opposed to Moroka. Molema calls him a "regular Casca". The fact that his father had on one occasion left Sefunelo, Moroka's father, in an unsuccessful attempt to found his own clan, may

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31. Lagden, G. The Basutos, the Mountaineers and their Country Vol. 2 P.510-511  
 32. G.S. 817 P.76 Samuel-Brand 1 June 1880  
 33. G.S. 1404 P.5-6

indicate a possible source of Bogatchou's opposition.<sup>34</sup> Tsipinare stated that Moroka regarded Bogatchou as a rebel because he had left the country after the battle of Viervoet. Joseph Ngakantsi, one of Moroka's councillors, testified that Bogatchou and Samuel were suspected of having made a plot to kill Moroka.<sup>35</sup> Tsipinare had been so closely associated with Moroka's government that it was natural that Bogatchou opposed his rule as well.

Tsipinare certainly inherited opposition directed against Moroka's policies, but by the time Brand went to Thaba 'Nchu as mediator on 8 June 1880, it was clear that the main bone of contention was that he was a Tshidi-Rolong, and therefore had no right to rule over the Seleka clan. Tsipinare's father was, in fact, Montshioa's younger brother, Tlala.<sup>36</sup> Tlala was killed in the Difaqane wars and Moroka married his widow, Nkhabele, at Oud Platberg in 1831. According to Molema, Nkhabele's son, Tsipinare, was seven years old at this stage.<sup>37</sup>

For some reason, Moroka always referred to Tlala as his elder brother and stated that Tlala would have had precedence over him to the chieftaincy. Several of Moroka's councillors gave evidence before Brand to this effect. Moroka definitely referred to Tsipinare as his elder brother's son.<sup>38</sup> Tlala's father was, however, Tawana, and Moroka's father was Sefunelo. What precisely the relationship between the two was is, therefore, unclear.

34. Molema, S.M. *ibid.* P.151

35. G.S. 1405 8 June 1880

36. See Appendix A

37. Molema, S.M. *ibid.* P.34  
G.S. 1404 P.11

38. G.S. 1405  
G.S. 1404 P.122

On 3 June 1880, De Express stated:

"Sipinare (sic) is de zoon van Tlala, den ouden broeder van Moroka. Tlala was opperhoofd der Barolongs, het was slechts na zyn dood dat Moroka opperhoofd werd ... Hoewel nu het hoofd zynde, vergat hy noch nooit de rechten die Sipinare in de eerste plaats op het volk had ...".<sup>39</sup>

Whether De Express had any authority, other than what was being said at Thaba 'Nchu, for this statement is not known. It is notable that the press in the Free State at this time was partisan and little care was taken to substantiate information. De Express ardently supported Tsipinare, while The Friend did all it could to further Samuel's cause.

Whatever the truth of the matter, the fact that Moroka regarded Tsipinare as his elder brother's son was important. It was Rolong custom that if a man adopted his elder brother's son and brought him up, it meant that he intended him to take precedence over his own children when he died.<sup>40</sup> Tsipinare claimed that this was Moroka's intention when he adopted him and also stated that his father, Tlala, was indeed Moroka's elder brother.<sup>41</sup> He added that Moroka had proclaimed him as his heir in an assembly of the people before the Sotho war. He probably meant the second Sotho war.<sup>42</sup>

In view of Tsipinare's claim to be the son of Moroka's elder brother and therefore the heir, William Crisp, the Anglican missionary's, comments on the succession dispute in 1868 are interesting. Crisp stated that it was thought that Tsipinare's

39. De Express 3 June 1880

40. This is substantiated in G.S. 1404 and G.S. 1405 and by Schapera, I. Tribal legislation Among the Tswana

41. G.S. 1404 P.133

42. G.S. 1405

"influence" would override Samuel's "right" to the chieftaincy when Moroka died. He then stated that recently there had been a great disturbance as a man arrived claiming to be Tsipinare's elder brother, "with a long romantic account of having been a slave to another tribe - escaped from them - lived many years in Natal and recently discovered his identity. Poor Sepina's (sic) nose was sadly put out of joint but ... nothing was to be done but grin and bear it and acknowledge him as "Moroka's eldest son". Molema states that Tsipinare did have an elder brother, Setlogelo, but he had been captured by the Ndebele and no more was heard of him. The man who arrived in 1868 must, however, have been a fraud, as there is no other reference to him anywhere.<sup>43</sup>

Samuel based his claim on the statement that he was the eldest surviving son of Moroka's great wife. This would have given him a clear right if he could prove it, and prove that Tsipinare was not Moroka's nephew. In support of his claim, Samuel stated that Moroka's great wife, Matau, had borne him six children. Three were daughters - Senaye, Mpobe and Tsae. The others were sons - Sefunelo, Tsabaliza and then himself.<sup>44</sup> Tsipinare, however, opened his evidence at the mediation by stating that Samuel was the illegitimate son of a Koranna named Nxai. His mother, Matau, had had other children by Nxai as well.<sup>45</sup> As stated in Chapter Six, Moroka himself told Mitchell that Samuel was not his son.<sup>46</sup> Richard Moroka gave evidence of another occasion when the chief stated that Samuel was

43. Crisp, W. Log Book Crisp-his mother 13 August 1868  
Molema, S.M. ibid. P.34

44. See Appendix D

45. The Friend 10 June 1880  
Molema, S.M. ibid. P.154 Molema calls the man Xgai

46. cf Chapter Six P.141

illegitimate.<sup>47</sup> He also named one of his sons "Morwagabuse" which, according to Molema, means "a Bushman (or Korana) shall not reign". Molema also states that "it was said" that this was "a veiled indication of his intentions as to Samuel". He refers his readers to the picture he included of Samuel and says "judge for yourself". Molema describes him as "tall and stately, of light complexion, finely chiselled features and superior appearance", but in character "irascible, implacable and obstinate". The picture of Samuel certainly suggests that he was not a pure Rolong.<sup>48</sup>

Most of the people who gave evidence before Brand in 1880 stated that Samuel was Moroka's son, but even Samuel's supporters were confused as to whether Moroka and Matau were separated when he was conceived. A lot of time was spent debating the question. The evidence that Moroka had divorced Matau some time before this was the most convincing. Samuel's evidence, however, presented Brand with another problem. If he accepted Samuel's case that he was Moroka's eldest son, did this give him precedence over Tsipinare? Samuel answered this by affirming that his elder brother, Sefunelo, had been accorded this precedence despite the fact that Tsipinare may have been older than Sefunelo. Other witnesses supported this by saying that it was only when Sefunelo died shortly before the Sotho war that Moroka transferred powers

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47. G.S. 1404 P.54

48. Molema, S.M. *ibid.* P.152, P.164

H.J. van Aswegen in Die Verhouding Tussen Blank en Nie-Blank in die Oranje Vrystaat 1854-1902

G.M.K. Schüller in De Barolong van Thaba 'Nchu Oranje Vrystaat; 'n Studie van Kultuurverandering

W.E.A. Mears in Wesleyan Barolong Mission in Trans Orangia 1821-1884

and

I.S.J. Venter in Die Sendingstasie Thaba 'Nchu 1833-1900  
all simply accepted that Samuel was Moroka's son.

which had formerly been Sefunelo's to Tsipinare.<sup>49</sup> Samuel explained that he had not been given the powers as he was still a minor. He stated the same thing to explain why Moroka appointed Tsipinare and not himself as regent on 6 March 1875. In a document witnessed by John Cameron, a resident at Thaba 'Nchu, Moroka gave Tsipinare specific rights to control land distribution and gave him a general power of attorney. Samuel's signature was the first on a list of councillors who testified that this had their consent. Samuel could not have been a minor as, in 1875, he was thirty eight years old. Moroka reaffirmed Tsipinare's power of attorney in a proclamation dated 29 August 1878. If Moroka did intend Tsipinare to be his heir, his action in delegating power to him was in accord with Rolong custom. He had himself exercised his father's rule several years before Sefunelo died in 1829.<sup>50</sup>

To Samuel, the fact that Sefunelo had been accorded preference over Tsipinare, proved that the succession belonged to Matau's children. As the other son, Tsabaliza, had died when a small boy, he was the heir. The trouble with this interpretation was that by strict laws of succession, Sefunelo's grandson, Tshabadira, would have been entitled to the chieftainship. Molema stated that he was, but we have only Molema's statement to suppose that Tshabadira was born before 1880. He could only have been born after 1879 and thus, even if he was born before Moroka's death, would have been too small to contest Samuel's evidence given to Brand, which suggests that he may not have been born.

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49. G.S. 1404 P.11-12  
 50. G.S. 1404 P. 9-10  
 G.S. 1405

The confusion lies in the fact that Molema states that "about 1872", Moroka gave a ceremonial feast and formally indicated Mothloare, Sefunelo's son, as his successor. He then states that Mothloare died about two years after this, and only then was Tsipinare nominated.<sup>51</sup> Mothloare was only brought to Thaba 'Nchu in 1877 although he had possibly visited his grandfather before. The fact that Molema puts his death around 1874, however, makes it difficult to assess what reliance can be placed on his other statements. In 1877, Tsipinare fetched Mothloare from his mother, who was a daughter of Chief Sechele of the Kwena.<sup>52</sup> On 20 February 1879, The Friend recorded that Moroka's grandson and "heir" Mothloare had died.<sup>53</sup>

Richard Moroka stated in his evidence that Moroka had intended Mothloare to be his successor only after Tsipinare. Richard was, however, strongly opposed to Samuel's case, and may have said this to invalidate Samuel's claim.<sup>54</sup> If it had been accepted that Mothloare had been given precedence over Tsipinare, this would undoubtedly have strengthened Samuel's case.

Tsipinare, however, threw a spoke in any efforts to prove this, by claiming that Mothloare was his son.<sup>55</sup> Anthony Trollope's book, South Africa, throws some light on this claim. Trollope visited Thaba 'Nchu in 1878 and had some extremely interesting things to say about the succession dispute. He feared the problem of the succession would be hard to solve when Moroka died. He stated that "the son who was the undoubted heir

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51. Molema, S.M. *ibid.* P.151-152  
The Friend 20 February 1879  
 52. G.S. 817 P.15 Moroka-Brand 3 May 1877  
 53. The Friend 20 February 1879  
 54. G.S. 1404 P.54  
 55. G.S. 1404 P.13

died before his great wife had had a child".

"She then went away, back to the Bechuanas from whom she had come, and among whom she was a very royal Princess, and there married Prince Sapena (sic). This marriage was blessed with a son. But by Bechuana law also, ... the son of the wife of the heir become the heir even though he be born of another father".

Trollope added that this boy had been sent for and had arrived at Thaba 'Nchu shortly before his arrival. From this, it appears that Tsipinare had married the widow of Moroka's eldest son, Sefunelo, and had raised seed to Sefunelo. His son, Mothloare, was therefore regarded as Sefunelo's son.

Trollope continued that Tsipinare "had been living some time with the Barolongs, having had some difficulties among the Bechuanas, with the Royal Princess his wife". From other evidence, it is certain that Tsipinare's wife was Sechele's daughter. His quarrel with her may well explain Moroka's difficulties with the Kwena and why Tsipinare wished to expel them from Thaba 'Nchu in 1880.

Trollope concluded his discussion by saying that there were fears that when Moroka died, there would be a contest between Tsipinare and his own son for the succession. Then with prescience added:

"Should the contest amount to a war the Free State will probably find it expedient to settle the question by annexing the country".<sup>56</sup>

It is very interesting that Trollope did not see the succession problem in terms of a contest between Tsipinare and

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56. Trollope, A. South Africa P.418

Samuel. Had Mothloare been alive in 1880, there might have been a third claimant. There were veiled accusations at the arbitration that Tsipinare had murdered his son. As Mothloare died in 1879, these accusations may well have referred to Mothloare. It was not known what Samuel's attitude to Mothloare was, but as he had led the Anglican missionaries to believe he was the rightful heir in the 1860's, it appears that he had not been prepared to recognise Mothloare's claim.

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Brand was faced with most of this confusing and, at times, contradictory evidence when he attempted to mediate between Samuel and Tsipinare on 8 June. It soon became clear that no agreement would be reached and, on 9 June, he pressed both parties to submit to arbitration. Samuel stated he would only do so if Motuba, Moshote, David Massouw, Masupha and Letsie were called in as arbitrators.<sup>57</sup>

Brand and Tsipinare would not accept Samuel's suggestion, but the evidence given to Brand at the mediation court throws additional light on why these chiefs supported Samuel. The fact that Tsipinare was a Tshidi-Rolong was important to the Rolong chiefs Motuba and Moshote who were struggling, with the aid of the Transvaal, to oust the Tshidi-Rolong from lands held by their chief Montshioa. The conflict had begun in 1874 when Motuba's brother, Matlabe, ousted Montshioa's relative Molema from Polfontein. War was to break out shortly between Motuba, Moshote and Montshioa. Tsipinare's relationship to the chief

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57. De Express 17 June 1880  
David Massouw, Chief of the Kora at Mamusa

could only have strengthened their hatred for him.<sup>58</sup>

As Brand and Tsipinare would not accept any of these chiefs as mediators, Samuel agreed on 10 June to submit to Brand's arbitration. The President promised to return to Thaba 'Nchu on 8 July to continue hearing evidence. He also disbanded his force on the Rolong borders.<sup>59</sup>

The arbitration court sat on 8, 9, 12, 13, 14 and 15 July. On 17 July, Brand gave his verdict in favour of Tsipinare. He declared:

"dat de gezegde Sepinare Moroka is en behoort te zyn het opperhoofd over het volk van der grondgebied waar over het opperhoofd Moroka voor zyne dood te Thaba 'Nchu heeft geregeerd".<sup>60</sup>

The Friend stated that Brand "acknowledged Samuel as a son of Moroka who was not (sic) the chief of the Barolong people".<sup>61</sup> Brand, in fact, decided that Samuel was not Moroka's son.<sup>62</sup> The Friend, in its usual partisan way, had twisted the truth. Brand must also have been influenced by the fact that Tsipinare had been "de facto" ruler of the country for years, that shortly before the chief's death he had told him that Tsipinare was his successor, that he was supported by all the white inhabitants of Thaba 'Nchu, and by most of the leading men in the tribe. In a letter to the British government in 1883, Samuel alleged that Tsipinare had bribed Brand into making his decision by giving him Moroka's money

58. See Chapter Four

Molema, S.M. Montshiwa, Barolong Chief and Patriot (1814-1896) P.75 Ch. 10 P.98-154

59. G.S. 1404

G.S. 1517 P.205 Brand-Landdrost of Ladybrand 10 June 1880

60. G.S. 1404

61. The Friend 29 July 1880

62. G.S. 1519 P.87 Brand-Moshoete

14 February 1882

and by alleging that Samuel would hand over Thaba 'Nchu to the British. This can simply be discounted.<sup>63</sup>

It was clear, however, from the outbreak of violence on 31 May and from the evidence given at the mediation and arbitration courts that Tsipinare's right to rule was not accepted by a large portion of the tribe. Many believed that Samuel was Moroka's son and as Sefunelo and Mothloare were both dead, his right to the succession seemed indisputable. On the other hand, they knew Tsipinare was a Tshidi-Rolong and, even if he did have the right to rule, this was not clear to the people. Added to those who were genuine as to Samuel's claim, there were all those who simply opposed Tsipinare as they had previously clashed with him. Brand's decision in favour of Tsipinare did nothing to alter this situation. The chief's opponents resolved to oust him by violence. In this, they had the sympathy of the chiefs of the Ratlou and Rapulana-Rolong and of a section of the Sotho in Basutoland.<sup>64</sup>

Many people in the Free State realised that Brand's arbitration would achieve nothing. On 3 June 1880, De Express wrote:

"Er is geen twyful aan of de passieve houding tot nog toe door dit Gouvernement tegenover de Barolongs aangenomen, moet veranderen, en dat een Vrystaatsche Magistraat in die toekomst onze belangen zoowel als die der Barolongs zelve te Thaba 'Nchu zal moeten verteegenwoordigen".<sup>65</sup>

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63. Govt. Courant 19 December 1883

64. See Chapter Eight

65. De Express 3 June 1880

On 15 July, in an article on the arbitration, The Friend stated:

"We think so too. But how about the thin end of the wedge? What is sauce for the goose, is sauce for the gander!"<sup>66</sup>

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66. The Friend 15 July 1880

CHAPTER EIGHT

CIVIL WAR AND ANNEXATION

## CHAPTER EIGHT

Brand's decision to award the Rolong chieftaincy to Tsipinare failed to end the dispute over the succession. Continued unrest broke out into armed clashes between Tsipinare's police and Samuel's followers on 27 and 28 August 1880. The Samuelites were forced to flee to the Free State from where they continued their agitations and sought aid to oust Tsipinare. They not only carried out their plans to invade Thaba 'Nchu and to kill the chief, under the very noses of the Free State authorities, but by constantly attacking Tsipinare's government, caused a serious split between Brand and the Rolong chief. The fact that they gained the support of several Free State farmers, of the Ratlou and Rapulana chiefs, of the Kora of Mamusa, and of Moletsane, Masupha and Letsie, indicated that the dispute could have had wide repercussions which would seriously have affected the peace of the Free State. The collapse of government at Thaba 'Nchu and fear that the conflict would spread were the two main reasons why Brand annexed Thaba 'Nchu after Samuel's successful raid in July 1884.

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When he heard that Brand had decided his arbitration in favour of Tsipinare, Samuel accused him of ignoring the evidence of the Rolong and decided to leave Thaba 'Nchu rather than to submit to Tsipinare.<sup>1</sup> As his people were too poor to buy wagons, he asked Brand for authority to grant passes to his followers to enable them to work in the Free State until they had enough money.<sup>2</sup> Without waiting for a reply, he began encouraging the Rolong to

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1. G.S. 817 P.89 Tsipinare-Brand 20 July 1880  
 2. G.S. 817 P.88 Samuel-Brand 19 July 1880

leave Thaba 'Nchu. According to Tsipinare, he pressurised and intimidated some 200 people into leaving within the three weeks following the arbitration.<sup>3</sup>

Brand advised Samuel not to move,<sup>4</sup> but persuaded Tsipinare to issue free passes to the rebels for one month and asked the chief to allow Samuel and Bogatchou to sell their farms.<sup>5</sup> Brand's advice and willingness to help him, encouraged Samuel to think that he might yet win his case against Tsipinare. An article in The Friend and a meeting with the Anglican bishop, Bishop Webb, seem to have had the same effect on the rebel. On 22 July, an article in The Friend stated that Samuel would be extremely foolish to leave Thaba 'Nchu, and that if his people were a majority, their influence would eventually overcome opposition.<sup>6</sup> Bishop Webb also advised Samuel to remain at Thaba 'Nchu to "await the course of events".<sup>7</sup>

By early August, Samuel had decided to remain at Thaba 'Nchu to do everything possible to disrupt Tsipinare's rule. He apparently believed that the Free State would eventually prefer his rule to chaos under Tsipinare. He now took steps to prevent anyone from leaving the territory and established his own government at Bogatchou's kraal. From there he sent out armed parties to help people resist summonses to Tsipinare's court and to cause general agitation. In fomenting general discontent, he was assisted by Motuba and his Rapulana-Rolong, who ignored a

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|----|-------------------|-----------|-----------------|--------------|------|
| 3. | G.S. 817          | P.131 ff  | Tsipinare-Brand | 16 September | 1880 |
| 4. | G.S. 817          | P.95      | Tsipinare-Brand | 20 July      | 1880 |
| 5. | G.S. 1517         | P.209-210 | Tsipinare-Brand | 19 July      | 1880 |
| 6. | <u>The Friend</u> | 22 July   |                 | 1880         |      |
| 7. | <u>The Friend</u> | 5 August  |                 | 1880         |      |

demand from Brand that they leave the territory.<sup>8</sup>

Samuel also caused alarm by claiming that the British government had promised to support him. This was completely untrue. On 30 July 1880, Samuel wrote to the High Commissioner, Sir Bartle Frere, asking for British interference in his favour. Shortly after this, he met Sir Gordon Sprigg in Bloemfontein and appealed for aid. The Prime Minister of the Cape rejected his plea,<sup>9</sup> and after some delay, Frere asked Brand to inform Samuel that he would have to recognise Tsipinare as chief.<sup>10</sup> Despite this, Samuel continued to intimidate the Rolong with threats of punishment by the British for those who failed to support him.<sup>11</sup>

At this stage, Samuel seems to have had no clear purpose besides attempting to oust Tsipinare and to swell his own following. Until 21 August, Tsipinare refrained from action as Brand had warned him not to use force and had made it clear that the Free State would not assist him against Samuel. The President thought that the only way for Tsipinare to deal with the discontented was to introduce European reforms into his government. He advised the chief to give the people a voice in the administration and to grant every Rolong "a plot of ground in full property upon payment of a small annual quitrent".<sup>12</sup> Brand clearly thought that there were grievances which Tsipinare could meet, and that the agitations were not simply over the succession.

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| 8.  | G.S. 817          | P.89        | Tsipinare-Brand | 20 July      | 1880 |
|     | G.S. 817          | P.98        | Tsipinare-Brand | 13 August    | 1880 |
|     | <u>De Express</u> | 2 September | 1880            |              |      |
|     | G.S. 817          | P.131 ff    | Tsipinare-Brand | 16 September | 1880 |
| 9.  | G.S. 817          | P.131 ff    | Tsipinare-Brand | 16 September | 1880 |
| 10. | G.S. 1517         |             | Frere-Brand     |              |      |
| 11. | G.S. 817          | P.131 ff    | Tsipinare-Brand | 16 September | 1880 |
| 12. | G.S. 1517         | P.118       | Brand-Tsipinare | 2 August     | 1880 |

On 5 August, Bishop Webb informed Brand that one of Samuel's objections was that he believed that Tsipinare was planning to sell the Rolong territory.<sup>13</sup> The background to this allegation was not Brand's advice, but a proclamation issued by Tsipinare on 19 July and published by The Friend on 29 July 1880. The proclamation warned any outsider against purchasing any land or land rights in the Rolong territory as the land was not alienable without Tsipinare's knowledge or consent.<sup>14</sup> The warning was the chief's answer to Brand's request that he allow Samuel and Bogatchou to sell their farms. He refused the request and through the proclamation sought to prevent any Free Stater from entering into clandestine sales with the rebels.<sup>15</sup> There was, however, an implication that he did have the right to alienate land in Tsipinare's proclamation, and Samuel seized on this to create general alarm.

In August, Tsipinare began planning his reaction to Samuel. By 12 August, he had organised a strong police force, which included a number of white mercenaries, one of whom, Thomas McDonald, was made Chief of Police.<sup>16</sup> Samuel grew increasingly apprehensive about this and on 16 August met Tsipinare at the great "kgotla" and gave a public demonstration of reconciliation with the chief.<sup>17</sup> On 19 August, a declaration dated 17 August, signed by Samuel and witnessed by Tsipinare's councillors and headmen, appeared in De Express.<sup>18</sup> In this, Samuel confessed his fault in attempting to obtain the chieftaincy, acknowledged Tsipinare as his lawful chief and promised to obey him.

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| 13. | G.S. 152          | P.118 Webb-Brand     | 5 August 1880  |
| 14. | <u>The Friend</u> | 29 July 1880         |                |
| 15. | G.S. 17           | P.89 Tsipinare-Brand | 20 July 1880   |
| 16. | <u>De Express</u> | 12 August 1880       |                |
| 17. | <u>The Friend</u> | 9 September 1880     |                |
|     | G.S. 817          | P.109 Samuel-Brand   | 23 August 1880 |
| 18. | <u>De Express</u> | 19 August 1880       |                |

After the meeting of reconciliation, Tsipinare took active steps to end the rebellion, and to improve his relations with the Free State. On 18 August, he informed Brand that he had appointed C.C. Mathey, a lawyer, as his representative in Bloemfontein and asked Brand to recognise him as such. The chief's probable reasons for this move were that he thought the rebels were misrepresenting his government and creating a false impression in the Free State, and that he hoped, through Mathey, to persuade Brand to change his attitude to the rebels. The chief strongly believed that Brand's failure to help him and his sympathy for the rebels was encouraging opposition to his government. Brand, however, refused to recognise Mathey and told Tsipinare that his move was both unnecessary and undesirable.<sup>19</sup>

On 21 August, Tsipinare banished twelve leading rebels, excluding Samuel. Whether Samuel had been sincere in his reconciliation is not known, but this order sent him again into rebellion. He ordered the prohibited men to remain at Thaba 'Nchu and decided to make a renewed attempt to assassinate Tsipinare. On 26 August, The Friend published a notice from Samuel withdrawing his submission to Tsipinare's authority.<sup>20</sup> In a later edition, Samuel explained that on the day after the reconciliation meeting, he had been handed a piece of paper which he was not allowed to read. He signed it, as he was assured it was merely a statement on reconciliation.<sup>21</sup>

As the ringleaders made no move to leave Thaba 'Nchu, Tsipinare ordered them, on 23 August, to leave within three

19. G.S. 817 P.101 Tsipinare-Brand 18 August 1880

20. The Friend 26 August 1880

21. The Friend 9 September 1880

days.<sup>22</sup> According to a Thaba 'Nchu correspondent, the rebels sent their children into the country in preparation for a three-pronged attack on Thaba 'Nchu. They ordered their followers to spare no-one, particularly the whites, who were to be killed and their shops looted.<sup>23</sup> Samuel had a deep grudge against the European residents of Thaba 'Nchu, as the majority supported Tsipinare and the European evidence at the arbitration had been against his case.<sup>24</sup> De Express confirmed that preparations were being made for an attack and added that orders had been issued by Samuel to "the Bahurutse and Legoya at Lebetha's and Mogena to be in readiness".<sup>25</sup>

On 24 August, Tsipinare warned Brand that he intended to use force if the ringleaders did not comply with his demand, as he could no longer bear with the "systematic opposition and organised defiance of the malcontent".<sup>26</sup> On 27 August, he sent McDonald and his police to arrest four of the ringleaders who were known to be at a certain funeral. In the afternoon, about ten policemen set out to arrest another three men at Lebeta's kraal. As they explained their mission to a few people near the kraal, about fifty to sixty armed rebels took up shooting positions behind walls. Although the police assured them that they had not come to fight, the rebels opened fire on them. In about half an hour, the police had dispersed the rebels, leaving five dead. In a hostile attack on Tsipinare, The Friend stated that the chief's police had simply opened fire on the kraal.<sup>27</sup> Not only was this untrue, but Tsipinare had ample reason to act harshly as he had

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22. G.S. 817 P.106 Tsipinare's Report August 1880  
 23. De Express 2 September 1880  
 24. G.S. 817 P.89 Tsipinare-Brand 20 July 1880  
 25. De Express 2 September 1880  
 26. G.S. 817 P.102 Tsipinare-Brand 24 August 1880  
 27. The Friend 2 September 1880

seen armed parties moving towards Thaba 'Nchu town.<sup>28</sup>

Despite the chief's action against the rebels, large groups of rebels, some mounted, some on foot, moved into Bogatchou's kraal in Thaba 'Nchu town during the night of 27 August. The following morning, Tsipinare ordered the police to proceed to the kraal. McDonald reported that the force consisted of twelve white policemen, another eight European residents of Thaba 'Nchu, who were commanded by Tsipinare himself, and a few Rolong. They found between three or four hundred rebels, entrenched behind loop-holed walls. They assured the rebels that they did not wish to fight, but wished to arrest certain men. The rebels again opened fire. Once fighting had begun, the police were joined by the main body of Tsipinare's troops. Initially they met with fierce resistance but, after approximately an hour, the rebels fled and dispersed in all directions into the country. Ten rebels were killed and an uncertain number wounded.<sup>29</sup>

On Sunday 29 August, Tsipinare sent messages throughout the country, inviting all who had fled to return in peace to their homes. By 31 August, more than 200 men had voluntarily surrendered, and Tsipinare was optimistic over the prospect of peace.<sup>30</sup> Many Rolong, however, fled with their stock into the Free State. Samuel and Bogatchou both fled to Bloemfontein. Tsipinare confiscated their goods, and banned them and another ten men from returning to Thaba 'Nchu. Samuel explained to Brand that he had fled because the President had warned him not to fight.<sup>31</sup> Samuel's arrival in Bloemfontein and the news of the

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28. G.S. 817 P.106 Tsipinare's Report August 1880

29. De Express 2 September 1880

30. G.S. 817 P.103 Tsipinare-Brand 31 August 1880

31. G.S. 817 P.111 Samuel-Brand 31 August 1880

clash at Thaba 'Nchu caused great alarm in the Free State. A letter in De Express laid the blame for the whole affair on the fact that Brand had persistently refused to act decisively. It read:

"We all feel sure that if His Honor had from the first been determined in refusing to countenance Samuel and his followers, we would not have had any trouble since the award was given. We all know His Honor the President acted for the best, but he is mistaken in the people he has to deal with".<sup>32</sup>

Brand genuinely thought that the only way for Tsipinare to overcome the discontent in his territory was for him to pursue a policy of moderation, conciliation and reform. He refused to condemn Samuel and urged Tsipinare to meet the people's grievances and give them a say in the government. He was, however, mistaken in his judgement of the rebels, as they were intent on nothing less than ousting Tsipinare. The problem as to whether Samuel was sincere at the reconciliation meeting on 16 August and whether a settlement would have been reached if Tsipinare had not acted against Samuel's allies, remains; but it fits in better with Samuel's character to see the reconciliation meeting as a mere foil on Samuel's part to blind Tsipinare from uncovering his final plans to end the chief's rule. Brand wanted to avoid violence, but the only way conflict might have been avoided was for Brand to have made it quite clear that the Free State would assist Tsipinare in any conflict with the rebels.

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From 28 August 1880, the Free State became increasingly involved in the clash between Tsipinare and Samuel owing to the

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32. De Express 2 September 1880

presence of large numbers of refugees in the Free State who continued to incite unrest at Thaba 'Nchu.<sup>33</sup> Despite warnings from Tsipinare that the rebels in the Free State were continuing to plot his downfall, Brand continued to condemn Tsipinare's policy towards the rebels. The truth of the matter is that all Brand's investigations into the rebels conduct failed to uncover any plot. As a result, he believed the rebels accusations against Tsipinare and refused to act on the strength of information given to him by the Rolong chief. There is no indication that Brand fostered the rebels, hoping for a conflict which would enable him to annex Thaba 'Nchu with impunity. There was too much to risk in such a policy with the threat of Sotho involvement and the outbreak of a general war. All the evidence points to the fact that Brand was genuinely misguided in his dealings with Samuel and was mistaken in the people he had to deal with.

Brand strongly condemned Tsipinare's use of violence on 28 August,<sup>34</sup> granted Samuel and Bogatchou asylum in Bloemfontein, and refused to order the rebels who had settled on the Free State side of the Rolong border to return to Thaba 'Nchu.<sup>35</sup> He clashed with Tsipinare when he pressed the chief to restore the goods he had confiscated, believed all Samuel and Bogatchou's extravagant claims to property at Thaba 'Nchu,<sup>36</sup> and queried the chief's treatment of the prisoners he had taken, as Samuel claimed they were being maltreated.

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| 33. | G.S. 817  | P.103     | Tsipinare-Brand                               | 31 August    | 1880 |
| 34. | G.S. 1517 | P.235-237 | Brand-Tsipinare                               | 2 September  | 1880 |
| 35. | G.S. 152  | P.210     | Superintendent of the Waaihoek Location-Brand | 7 September  | 1880 |
| 36. | G.S. 1517 | P.242     | Brand-Tsipinare                               | 8 September  | 1880 |
| 37. | G.S. 817  | P.117     | Tsipinare-Brand                               | 10 September | 1880 |

On 8 September, Brand ordered the Fieldcornet of Bloemfontein to find out how many Rolong were squatting on the border and what possessions they had with them.<sup>38</sup> Despite the fact that on 10 September, Tsipinare again issued a general amnesty to all except the twelve outlaws,<sup>39</sup> Brand still refused to enforce the pass law on the refugees. On 14 September, Tsipinare again asked Brand to move the fugitives from the border and stated that he would even allow them to remain elsewhere in the Free State if necessary. He complained that the fugitives were committing acts of violence and theft in his territory, that a party had crossed the Modder River and burnt two villages, and that others were crossing the river daily to graze their stock in the Rolong territory, guarded by armed groups. He warned Brand that he could send out patrols to control the situation but doubted that this was the best course of action.<sup>40</sup> Brand promised to send Truter, the Landdrost of Bloemfontein, to the border to warn the fugitives not to steal or cause trouble, but again advised Tsipinare to follow a policy of patience and moderation.<sup>41</sup>

On about 16 September, another wave of Rolong fled into the Free State. Tsipinare explained that Samuel had sent messages into his territory stating that he was expecting the Free State government to interfere on his behalf and the people had fled in fear. Some may, however, have been more of Samuel's followers who wished to join up with the rebels in the Free State. Tsipinare blamed Brand strongly for mishandling the situation.<sup>42</sup> His relations with the Free State also deteriorated at this time

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38. G.S. 1517 P.242 Brand-Tsipinare 8 September 1880  
 39. De Express 16 September 1880  
 40. G.S. 817 P.119 Tsipinare-Brand 14 September 1880  
 41. G.S. 1517 P.248 Brand-Tsipinare 15 September 1880  
 42. G.S. 817 P.131 ff Tsipinare-Brand 16 September 1880

owing to an increase in clashes between Rolong and Free State farmers over straying stock and the usual border difficulties. This was hardly surprising in view of the unsettled border situation; but the farmers complaints against Tsipinare added to Brand's strained relations with the chief.<sup>43</sup>

On 20 September, Brand sent Truter, Samuel and Bogatchou to explain to the Rolong refugees that they would either have to return to Thaba 'Nchu or move further into the Free State. Truter issued passes, eighty to Rolong wishing to move north of the Vaal, but most of the squatters complained that their families and wagons were still at Thaba 'Nchu. Brand therefore appealed to Tsipinare to allow them to collect their property and families.<sup>44</sup> Truter's visit does not seem to have achieved much, as the border situation remained unsettled. On 22 September, Tsipinare reported that another group had crossed over into the Free State after hearing rumours that Samuel was on his way back from the Diamond Fields with a commando and that another was moving towards Thaba 'Nchu from Ladybrand.<sup>45</sup>

Despite the evidence that Samuel was continuing to foment unrest, Brand allowed Samuel to remain in the Free State. Samuel asked to be allowed to stay on the farm Springfield, presumably the farm situated between Bloemfontein and Thaba 'Nchu. Wisely, Brand told him to move at least eight hours from Bloemfontein. The rebel settled on a farm near Bultfontein owned by Edward Cox.<sup>46</sup>

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43. G.S. 1517 P.249 Brand-Tsipinare 15 September 1880  
 44. G.S. 1517 P.255-257 Brand-Tsipinare 20 September 1880  
 G.S. 153 P.25 Truter-Brand 21 September 1880  
 45. G.S. 817 P.145 ff Tsipinare-Brand 22 September 1880  
 46. Govt. Courant 19 September 1883

From September 1880 until mid 1881, little was heard of Samuel's movements although in January 1881, another group of Rolong fled into the Free State owing to rumours that Tsipinare had shot a few Rolong and was planning to attack a certain village which was not named.<sup>47</sup> Whether this was simply another scare prompted by Samuel, or whether the chief was taking action against Samuel's followers who had remained at Thaba 'Nchu, is not known. In March 1881, Samuel re-established contact with Brand, and again challenged Tsipinare's right to the chieftaincy. He also complained that his people were starving and that Tsipinare was driving the wives of his supporters out of Thaba 'Nchu.<sup>48</sup> By June, Free Staters were beginning to fear that Samuel was again planning to oust Tsipinare. De Express called on the Rolong chief to place his country under Free State protection rather than risk renewed civil war, and added that rumours were current that Samuel was being supported by all those whom "the promise of a slice of land could induce to folly and crime".<sup>49</sup>

Tsipinare had reason to fear attack. Samuel's followers roamed his borders, apparently tolerated by the Free State farmers, stealing on a large scale, and circulating alarming rumours. He had evidence that Samuel had sent messengers to Letsie and Masupha asking for assistance against him.<sup>50</sup> In June, the chief heard that small groups of Rolong were leaving Bultfontein to join Bogatchou on an expedition to help Matlabe fight Montshioa, and that they were then coming to attack Thaba 'Nchu.<sup>51</sup> He informed

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| 47. | G.S. 817          | P.160    | Tsipinare-Brand    | 9 January | 1881 |
| 48. | G.S. 817          | P.170    | Samuel-Brand       | 27 March  | 1881 |
| 49. | <u>De Express</u> | 2 June   | 1881               |           |      |
| 50. | G.S. 817          | P.179 ff | Tsipinare-Brand    | 30 April  | 1881 |
| 51. | G.S. 817          | P.185    | Tsipinare-Blignaut | 14 June   | 1881 |
|     | G.S. 817          | P.187    | Deposition         | 14 June   | 1881 |

Blignaut, the Government Secretary, that he had proof that horses stolen from his territory were being taken to Samuel at Bultfontein. The chief was particularly upset that negotiations which had begun in May 1881 over an extradition treaty, had broken down and he was powerless to pursue thieves.<sup>52</sup> Brand investigated the situation at Bultfontein and found that the rumours were false. This encouraged him to believe that Tsipinare's other fears were groundless.<sup>53</sup> Brand also investigated the rumours of contact between Samuel and the Sotho but was persuaded that there was no evidence.<sup>54</sup> Despite the fact that Tsipinare insisted that Samuel's messengers had been seen by his men and forwarded a letter from Samuel, which he had intercepted asking Letsie for aid, Brand took no action.<sup>55</sup>

There was evidence that some of Samuel's followers who had remained at Thaba 'Nchu attempted to cross over into the Free State in the second half of 1881.<sup>56</sup> In November, large numbers of refugees who had formerly been scattered throughout the Free State,<sup>57</sup> returned to the Rolong border, and from November onwards, the situation along the Free State-Rolong border deteriorated sharply. The Free State farmers complained bitterly over Tsipinare's pound duties, compensation fees, the growth of *Xanthium Spinosum* in the Rolong territory, and that Tsipinare was contributing to their labour shortage by refusing to issue passes. Their main complaint, however, was that Tsipinare was filling

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| 52. | G.S. 817  | P.191    | Tsipinare-Blignaut | 21 June      | 1881 |
|     | G.S. 817  | P.195    | Tsipinare-Blignaut | 23 July      | 1881 |
| 53. | G.S. 1638 | P.2      | Blignaut-Tsipinare | 22 July      | 1881 |
| 54. | G.S. 818  | P.3-9    | Tsipinare-Brand    | 16 January   | 1882 |
| 55. | G.S. 817  | P.206 ff | Cameron-Blignaut   | 23 September | 1881 |
| 56. | G.S. 817  | P.189    | Bornman-Brand      | 14 June      | 1881 |
| 57. | G.S. 817  | P.219    | Tsipinare-Brand    | 21 November  | 1881 |

Thaba 'Nchu with Sotho refugees and was placing the worst of these along the borders.<sup>58</sup> Even De Express, which usually supported the chief, objected that he had allowed as many as 400 to 500 Sotho families to move into the territory.<sup>59</sup> Tsipinare denied this, but there is evidence that he was accepting loyal Sotho. The Wesleyan missionaries reported in 1881 that "a very large population of loyal Basuto" were moving from Basutoland to Thaba Patsoa, one of their circuits in the Rolong territory on the eastern border.<sup>60</sup> The farmers blamed their border difficulties on these Sotho, not on the presence of Samuel's followers.

Many Free Staters feared that Tsipinare's acceptance of Sotho refugees would extend the conflict in Basutoland into the Free State. This fear was heightened by an incident which occurred at Allandale in the Free State on 31 December 1881, when a group of approximately 100 to 200 Rolong and allegedly Sotho, gathered at a canteen and attacked a Free State burgher.<sup>61</sup> A burgher from Winburg reported that this was merely one of seven or eight similar incidents which had occurred in December.<sup>62</sup> Brand took a very serious view of the incident,<sup>63</sup> but Tsipinare blamed the whole affair on the farmers who were not enforcing the pass laws against Samuel's followers. He told Brand:

"I have expected nothing less than serious riots, and all manner of lawless violence, as the outcome of the toleration displayed by the inhabitants of the Free State to Samuel Lefulere, and his adherents ..."

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58. G.S. 1638 P.41 Blignaut-Tsipinare 7 November 1881  
De Express 22 December 1881; 29 December 1881  
 G.S. 1519 P.88-89 Brand-Tsipinare 21 February 1882
59. De Express 9 February 1882
60. Minutes of the Bechuana District 1881 P.132
61. De Express 26 January 1882
62. G.S. 818 2 January 1882
63. G.S. 1519 P.76-77 Brand-Tsipinare 9 January 1882

He also asked for permission to buy £450 worth of rifles and ammunition.<sup>64</sup>

Tsipinare had definite evidence that several Free State farmers were inciting Samuel's followers to cause trouble. They not only allowed the rebels to congregate on their farms but, according to the chief, were assisting them to steal stock from his country and were sharing in the booty. As far as Tsipinare was concerned, the major source of trouble was the Free State's refusal to sign an extradition treaty with him. He could not pursue thieves and complained that the Free State farmers obstructed any attempts to trace stock.<sup>65</sup>

Despite further evidence that a group of border farmers were intent on fanning the dispute between Tsipinare and the rebels, Brand failed to investigate Tsipinare's charges. In January 1882, Gert Pretorius of Langverwacht, with whom Tsipinare had previously had several arguments, clashed with the chief over compensation for damages caused by his stock.<sup>66</sup> Pretorius and his family owned several farms along the Rolong boundary, among them Zamenkomst and Sannahspost, and appears to have been a leading figure in the farming community. As far as he was concerned, this was the last straw, and several farmers bound themselves into a sort of league aimed at ousting Tsipinare and at forcing the Free State government to annex Thaba 'Nchu. In a letter to De Express, one of Pretorius's allies stated that annexation was the only solution to their problems. As the government refused to assist them, they intended to set about the matter:

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64. G.S. 818 P.16-17 Tsipinare-Brand 19 January 1882  
 65. G.S. 818 P. 3- 9 Tsipinare-Brand 10 January 1882  
 66. G.S. 1638 P.63-65 Blignaut-Tsipinare 11 January 1882

door Samuel en Sipinare onderhands te helpen en hen tegen alkander op te hitsen en dan tusschen beide te stappen en te zeggen "dit is anarchie, wij kunnen zulke dingen niet verdragen op onze grenze te midden van ons volk", en daarna het land te annexeren.<sup>67</sup>

Another letter, perhaps also from Pretorius's friends, warned that the Sotho were planning to ask permission to cross the Free State "ten einde Sipinare te noodzaken zijn kapiteinschap aan Samuel, wien het, volgens hen, rechtmatig toekomt, af te staan".<sup>68</sup>

Brand sent M.T. Steyn and Blignaut to investigate the grievances of the border farmers and to tell Tsipinare that he seriously disapproved of his attitude to the rebels, but he did not investigate the charges and evidence that the farmers were stirring up trouble. De Express reported that Steyn and Blignaut had found the farmers complaints to be "pretty groundless" and stated that the complaints, and Brand's attitude, could be "ascribed to a continued and active, though secret, agitation of Samuel's agency, to cause if possible, a rupture between Tsipinare and our government".<sup>69</sup> Tsipinare also wrote to Brand accusing him of being blind to the true state of affairs.<sup>70</sup>

During 1882 and 1883, there were further developments in Samuel's plans to oust Tsipinare but, until June 1883, the impetus of the rebel movement subsided. Sometime in 1882, Samuel decided to submit his case to the Free State Volksraad before resorting for force. The situation along the Rolong border quietened and Tsipinare's relationship with Brand improved

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67. De Express 9 January 1882

68. De Express 19 January 1882

69. G.S. 818 P.26-34 Commission's Report 4 February 1882

De Express 9 February 1882; 2 March 1882

70. G.S. 818 P.35-36 Tsipinare-Brand 6 February 1882

sufficiently for the Volksraad to authorise Brand in May to conclude an extradition treaty with Tsipinare in accordance with Ordinance No. 9 of 1856. Negotiations began, but the treaty was only signed on 14 December 1882, and was only ratified by the Volksraad on 13 June 1883.<sup>71</sup>

Samuel failed to take the opportunity of submitting his case to the 1882 Volksraad, but began to prepare his case in September 1882. On 23 September, he went to Bloemfontein and conferred a general power of attorney on J.J. de Villiers, a Bloemfontein lawyer, and seven rebels made declarations supporting Samuel's case before the Justice of the Peace.<sup>72</sup> Samuel and Bogatchou then visited the Rolong on the Free State-Thaba 'Nchu border, and once more Tsipinare suffered heavy thefts.<sup>73</sup> In January 1883, a Samuelite thief who worked for Gert Pretorius on his farm Fairplay, testified that Samuel had ordered all his followers to steal as much as possible from Tsipinare in preparation for an attack on Thaba 'Nchu. They were to hide their booty with friends in the Free State or Basutoland.<sup>74</sup> Brand refused to believe this, as he was confident that any plan to attack Thaba 'Nchu would come to the attention of the Free State authorities.<sup>75</sup>

In April 1883, De Express warned that Samuel was "organizing, finally, for purposes of war, and that under our very noses". In April, Samuel was arrested on charges of forging passes using de Villiers' name, but was not convicted. De Express also

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| 71. | G.S. 1638 | P.104     | Blignaut-Tsipinare | 5 April                      | 1882 |
|     | V.R.N. 1  |           |                    | May 1882; 7 June 1882; 1883  |      |
| 72. | V.R. 256  | P.118     |                    | 23 September 1882; P.123-133 |      |
|     | G.S. 818  | P.77      | Samuel-Brand       | 23 September                 | 1882 |
| 73. | G.S. 818  | P.78-81   | Tsipinare-Brand    | 26 September                 | 1882 |
|     | G.S. 818  | P.102-104 | Tsipinare-Brand    | 25 September                 | 1882 |
| 74. | G.S. 818  | P.102-104 | Tsipinare-Brand    | 29 January                   | 1883 |
| 75. | G.S. 1519 | P.180     | Brand-Tsipinare    | 30 January                   | 1883 |

complained that one of Samuel's leaders, William Zeekoe, was forming a centre of agitation in Bloemfontein.<sup>76</sup> Also in April, Samuel's lawyer asked for permission to copy Brand's notes at the arbitration in order to prepare Samuel's case, but Brand refused to allow him to see them.<sup>77</sup> On 24 April, Moshote sent Samuel a letter, a translation of which began "Ik heb geen tyd daarheen te gaan", which suggests the possibility that Samuel had asked the chief for military aid.<sup>78</sup>

A feeling of uncertainty spread among Tsipinare's people and the chief requested that Brand investigate Samuel's activities.<sup>79</sup> Brand again replied that he could not believe the rumours that Samuel was preparing an attack, as it was impossible that the rebel could think of moving through the Free State with armed men. He advised Tsipinare as follows:

"Wees grootmoedig tracht diegenen die vroeger tegen  
U waren met liefde en edelmoedigheid te winnen".<sup>80</sup>

Brand's advice was misguided. Tsipinare knew well that the time for such platitudes was past.

In May, Samuel's case came before the Volksraad and was dismissed.<sup>81</sup> Instead, the Volksraad ratified the Rolong extradition treaty and empowered Brand to sign a treaty of friendship with Tsipinare. The Raad was, however, faced with a memorial from approximately 180 Free State burghers, among them Pretorius, complaining about the situation at Thaba 'Nchu and the influx of Sotho refugees in the Rolong territory.<sup>82</sup>

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|-----|-------------------|-----------|----------------------|------------|------|
| 76. | <u>De Express</u> | 26 April  | 1883                 |            |      |
| 77. | V.R. 256          | P.137     | Blignaut-de Villiers | 10 April   | 1883 |
| 78. | V.R. 256          | P.135     | Moshote-Samuel       | 24 April   | 1883 |
| 79. | G.S. 818          | P.127-130 | Tsipinare-Brand      | 3 May      | 1883 |
| 80. | G.S. 1519         | P.216     | Brand-Tsipinare      | 9 May      | 1883 |
| 81. | V.R. 256          | P.111-116 | Samuel's Memorial    | 21 May     | 1883 |
|     | G.S. 1519         | P.308-311 | Brand-Smyth          | 5 December | 1883 |
| 82. | V.R. 256          | P.153-158 | Memorial             |            |      |

The situation in Basutoland and along the Sotho-Free State border was so unstable at this time that the farmers had every cause for concern. Following the outbreak of war between Jonathan Molapo and the rebels, Joel Molapo and Masupha, in December 1882, the eastern Free State was flooded with Sotho refugees. Despite Brand's protests to Orpen and then Blyth, the Government Agents in Basutoland, and to the Cape Government, by April 1883 thousands of Sotho had crossed with their stock into the Free State and fighting between the opposing groups was endemic.<sup>83</sup>

Brand sent M.F. Steyn and C. van der Wath, a member of the Executive Council, to discuss the grievances in the memorial with Tsipinare, who denied that he was filling his territory with Sotho and accused Pretorius of wishing to invade his territory to obtain land. Steyn and van der Wath sent for Pretorius, whose grievances were found to be without substance.<sup>84</sup> After this meeting, Tsipinare appointed J.A. Cameron, a resident of Thaba 'Nchu, as his magistrate to "facilitate the dispatch of business between myself and subjects and the residents of the Orange Free State", in the hopes that the step would improve his relations with the border farmers.<sup>85</sup> Brand welcomed the step and even promised to write to the chief about a treaty of alliance.<sup>86</sup>

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Although it appeared that his relations with the Free State had temporarily improved, the fact that the Volksraad had dismissed Samuel's case meant that Tsipinare expected trouble.

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83. Lagden, G. The Basutos P.539

84. G.S. 818 P.146-153 12 June 1883; 15 June 1883

85. G.S. 818 P.160-161 Tsipinare-Brand 13 July 1883

86. G.S. 1519 P.242-243 Brand-Tsipinare 19 July 1883

On 14 July, Samuel asked to be permitted to return with his followers to Thaba 'Nchu, as he now accepted that he had lost his case.<sup>87</sup> Tsipinare refused, and explained to Brand that Samuel had been advised by several Free State farmers to take this course rather than risk an armed invasion. Once at Thaba 'Nchu, he knew Samuel would cause trouble which would lead to Free State annexation. He also warned Brand that he had official information from several Sotho chiefs that Samuel was intriguing with them to overthrow him.<sup>88</sup> Brand ignored these warnings and instead pressed Tsipinare at least to allow Bogatchou and Samuel to sell their farms.<sup>89</sup>

True to his promise, however, Brand negotiated a Treaty of Friendship and Alliance with Tsipinare. The treaty was signed on 8 August by Brand, M.T. Steyn, C. van der Wath, J.J. Venter and Thomas F. Brand on the one hand, and Tsipinare, John Cameron, Jacob Ngakantsie, J.D. Goronyane and Stefanus Makoloi on the other. The treaty was to last for five years after ratification by the Free State Volksraad, and contained six articles. Four were of particular importance to Tsipinare in view of the threat presented by Samuel. Article three stated that no African living in the Rolong territory would be allowed to enter the Free State without a pass, and vice versa. Article five bound both parties to come to each others aid in the event of an invasion of or attack on either territory. Article six enabled Tsipinare to buy ammunition in Bloemfontein on the same terms formerly accorded to Moroka. Article one stated that there would be lasting peace and friendship between the burghers of the Free State and the Rolong

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87. G.S. 818 P.165-166 Samuel-Tsipinare 14 July 1883  
 88. G.S. 818 P.162-164 Tsipinare-Brand 18 July 1883  
 89. G.S. 1519 P.244 Brand-Tsipinare 20 July 1883

of Thaba 'Nchu. Article two stated that there would be free and private trade between the white inhabitants of both states, subject to the rules and regulations of both countries. Article four promised mutual co-operation in following spoor of stolen stock and in apprehending thieves. The treaty was thus on much the same lines as Moroka's Treaty of Alliance of 1865. Brand and Tsipinare signed as heads of independent states. As before, the Boers could not acquire land at Thaba 'Nchu unless by a personal favour of the chief.<sup>90</sup>

Early in September, Brand received a report that seventy mounted and armed Rolong were holding themselves in readiness to invade Thaba 'Nchu. Although he told Tsipinare

"het is aller onwaarschijnlijkst, dat myne burgers zouden toelaten dat een getal kleurlingen gewapend door den Vrystaat trokken"

he did investigate. The man he sent saw Samuel and Bogatchou near the farm they were reported to be on, but when the owner of the farm expressed his amazement to hear the report, decided that the report was unfounded. The conclusion Brand came to was that Tsipinare should regard all such rumours as highly improbable.<sup>91</sup>

Both Tsipinare and Cameron continued sending reports to Brand supporting their fear that Samuel was preparing an invasion. One of these stated that both Goapele and Job Moreobule were on Pretorius's farm. Other ringleaders were seen at Sannahspost, another of Pretorius's farms on the west of the Rolong territory. On 9 September, there was a large gathering of Samuel's followers at Zamenkomst and Tsipinare heard that they were busy buying

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90. Gouvts. Courant No. 399 12 September 1883

91. G.S. 1519 P.271-273 Brand-Tsipinare 4 September 1883

horses, guns and assegais. Cameron accordingly requested to buy 30 rifles, and employed Pieter Raaff, the son of an old inhabitant of Thaba 'Nchu, as commander of Tsipinare's forces.<sup>92</sup>

On 13 September, Brand decided at last to act, and sent M.T. Steyn along the border to see how many of Samuel's followers were squatting on the Free State farms. Steyn reported that he could find only a few rebels, but that several trustworthy people had confirmed that an invasion seemed probable and that many farmers appeared to sympathise with Samuel.<sup>93</sup> Brand also sent C. van der Wath to tour the farms along the Modder River in the direction of De Wetsdorp. Van der Wath reported that he had met two groups of Samuelites at Springfield who were moving towards one of Pretorius's farms, probably Sannahspost. He met another twelve groups whom he did not think intended causing trouble, but wished to return to Thaba 'Nchu to sow their crops. All of them stated that they no longer supported Samuel as he had lost his case.<sup>94</sup> Brand also sent Fieldcornet Prinsloo to make the terms of his Treaty of Friendship and Alliance with Tsipinare, known to Samuel, who told Prinsloo that he had not heard of the treaty before. J.J. Venter also went in the direction of Rooiwalsleegte, making the terms of the treaty known wherever he went. The Landdrost of Ladybrand did likewise in the vicinity of Hoepelrok. Brand also sent Captain Albrecht and his artillery to the border to see that the pass law was enforced but, as Tsipinare told Brand, all the Samuelites were in fact supplied with passes illegally obtained.<sup>95</sup> These measures unfortunately convinced Brand that the situation was now under control.

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|-----|-----------|-----------|-----------------------|-------------------|
| 92. | G.S. 818  | P.182-184 | Tsipinare-Brand       | 10 September 1883 |
| 93. | G.S. 818  | P.198     | Steyn-Brand           | 18 September 1883 |
| 94. | G.S. 818  | P.206     | Van der Wath-Blignaut | 20 September 1883 |
| 95. | G.S. 1519 | P.280     | Brand-Tsipinare       | 25 September 1883 |

As far as Tsipinare was concerned, Brand's measures had achieved little. On 14 September, the chief forwarded a report from a fieldcornet that he had encountered several groups of Kora, from David Massouw of Mamusa, who were journeying to join Samuel's men.<sup>96</sup> On the same day, Fieldcornet Diedericks of Haltwistle reported that Gert Pretorius was rounding up volunteers to assist the invasion. These were all to assemble at Langverwacht. Diedericks sent a list of 38 names signed on one of the lists which were circulating to enlist volunteers. Pretorius's name was first on the list. The list also indicated that Goapele and Moreobule were involved.<sup>97</sup> Brand still thought an invasion was impossible as nobody could be so stupid, but he did send the Landdrost of Ladybrand to inform Pretorius of the Free State's alliance with Tsipinare. The Landdrost reported that he had seen some of Samuel's followers but they were unarmed and he was sure they intended submitting to Tsipinare individually and would do no harm.<sup>98</sup>

Samuel did not act in September as he still hoped to enlist the aid of the Sotho and the British. In October 1883, he entered Basutoland to see Letsie. Diedericks was informed that once fighting began at Thaba 'Nchu, Joel, Letsie and other Sotho chiefs intended to come to Samuel's assistance. As a result, Blignaut asked the Governor's Agent at Maseru and the Landdrost of Ladybrand to keep a watchful eye on the Sotho. The Governor's Agent ordered Samuel to return to the Free State but instead,

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|-----|----------|-------|--------------------|-------------------|
| 96. | G.S. 818 | P.190 | Tsipinare-Brand    | 14 September 1883 |
| 97. | G.S. 818 | P.200 | Diedericks-Brand   | 14 September 1883 |
|     | G.S. 819 | P.24  | List of Volunteers |                   |
| 98. | G.S. 818 | P.194 | Brand-Tsipinare    | 15 September 1883 |
|     | G.S. 818 | P.203 | Landdrost-Blignaut | 18 September 1883 |

Samuel went to Cape Town.<sup>99</sup> While in the Cape, he wrote two letters asking for British assistance and British protection for his people. He claimed that the Free Staters were enslaving his people, that they were intent on taking his land at Thaba 'Nchu, and that he had the support of Moshote, Motuba, Letsie, Moletsane, Masupha and Massouw. He also stated that his main reason for fleeing to the Cape was that a contingent of Europeans from Wepener, commanded by Raaff, had gone to assist Tsipinare and had sworn to kill Samuel. Undoubtedly, Raaff's appointment to lead Tsipinare's forces had scared the rebel and had made him think that outside help would be necessary. The Acting High Commissioner, L. Smyth, however, merely sent Samuel's letters back to Brand.<sup>100</sup>

Samuel then decided to go to England himself.<sup>101</sup> His departure for England convinced Brand that any danger was now over and he pressed Tsipinare to issue a general amnesty to all the rebels. The Volksraad also ratified the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance. Despite this, rumours of an invasion continued and Tsipinare's insistence forced Brand to investigate a report that a party of white farmers had planned to assassinate the chief and had promised a reward of £500 to anyone who succeeded. Whatever investigations were made failed to uncover the plot.<sup>102</sup>

In June 1884, Samuel was seen back in the Free State in the vicinity of Vlakfontein and Kruidfontein.<sup>103</sup> On 8 July,

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|------|------------------------|-------|------------------------------|-------------|------|
| 99.  | G.S. 818               | P.223 | Tsipinare-Blignaut           | 12 October  | 1883 |
|      | G.S. 1638              | P.284 | Blignaut-Tsipinare           | 17 October  | 1883 |
| 100. | <u>Gouvts. Courant</u> |       |                              | 19 December | 1883 |
| 101. | G.S. 1519              | P.12  | Declaration of N.J. Papenfus | 18 February | 1884 |
| 102. | G.S. 1634              | P.314 | Blignaut-Tsipinare           | 28 February | 1884 |
|      | G.S. 819               | P.15  | Tsipinare-Brand              | 25 February | 1884 |
| 103. | <u>The Friend</u>      |       |                              | 14 August   | 1884 |

Tsipinare made a final plea for help.<sup>104</sup> On the morning of 10 July while it was still dark, Samuel's followers invaded Thaba 'Nchu, set fire to Tsipinare's house, and shot the chief and his servant Lang Jan. More than half the town was burnt down during the raid. How many rebels there were is not clear, as there were so many conflicting stories and rumours. The most reliable source estimated the number at 400, while another stated that there were 2 000 rebels.

Samuel was assisted by eleven Free State farmers, but they appear to have had nothing to do with the actual murder of the chief. Gert Pretorius, B.C. Pretorius, C.T. Pretorius, S.J. Pretorius, P.E.J. Vorster, P.W. Ferreira, T.P. Ferreira, F.J. Ferreira, C.D. van der Linde, L.J. Swart and a man named Lourens gathered together at Langverwacht on 9 July. Job Moreobule, who was staying on the farm, then briefed Samuel's followers. The ammunition store at Ladybrand was then robbed. The whites part in the attack seems to have been completely self-interested. They planned to steal as much property as possible. Lourens testified later that they had taken approximately 1 000 sheep, 184 head of cattle, and twenty horses, and that Pretorius planned to send these to Barend Letsie for safekeeping until the matter had blown over. They also broke into an African store, stole merchandise and approximately £500 in cash.

Their main purpose was, however, to acquire land. Samuel had promised several of them 3 000 morgen each, and Pretorius had promised all volunteers 500 to 1 500 morgen each. As far as Pretorius was concerned, the factor of personal hatred of Tsipinare was also important. It was notable that B.C. Pretorius

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104. G.S. 819 P.39 Tsipinare-Brand 8 July 1884

C.J. Pretorius, L.J. Swart and P.E.J. Vorster were related to him. The other men may also have been connected with Pretorius personally, as it was stated that he had enlisted some of his tenants.<sup>105</sup>

It was widely claimed that Samuel had also been assisted by the Sotho. Whether there were any Sotho from Basutoland is not known, but many Sotho were holding themselves in readiness on the Sotho border to help Samuel, who had established himself in Tsipinare's kraal, if necessary. Several telegrams, a couple from Fieldcornet Diedericks, reached Brand on 12 July warning him that Barend Letsie was holding his Sotho at Dou Dou's drift on the Caledon. Brand called up approximately 1 000 burghers to the Free State-Basutoland border and arrived at Thaba 'Nchu on 12 July, empowered by his Executive Council to deal with the situation at his discretion. On arrival, he annexed the Rolong territory. There is no doubt that his main reason for this was fear that the Sotho would become involved in the conflict.<sup>106</sup>

Many Free Staters blamed the whole outbreak on Brand. It was widely stated in The Friend that neither Samuel nor Pretorius were as culpable in Tsipinare's murder as the Free State government, which had failed to deal with the rebellion beforehand.<sup>107</sup> Brand had had three whole years to deal with the problem and had plenty of evidence about Samuel's and Pretorius's plans. Largely due to his own integrity, his love of justice

105. The Friend 17 July 1884, 31 July 1884; 14 August 1884; 28 August 1884; 18 September 1884; 25 September 1884  
De Express 27 November 1884  
Minutes of the Bechuana District 1884 P.30
106. G.S. 1406 11 July 1884; 12 July 1884  
The Friend 5 February 1885
107. The Friend 31 July 1884

and magnanimity, Brand had pursued a mistaken policy from the first. His mistaken trust in the rebels and in the border farmers also led him to misjudge the seriousness of the situation.

There was, however, another aspect of the whole problem of the rebellion against Tsipinare. The Friend hinted at this in an article on 17 July 1884. It stated, with reference to Tsipinare:

"There is no doubt that the attempt to govern his people on enlightened principles was one of the causes of his downfall. The system was too costly".<sup>108</sup>

During his brief reign, Tsipinare had attempted to revolutionise the whole Rolong administration. He reformed the system of land tenure and, in so doing, placed a heavy financial burden on the people. The chief employed a Free State land surveyor, E. Bourdillon, to do a complete survey of his territory. The cost of this, and of their new titles, had to be borne by the people. Tsipinare's appointment of white officials, Raaff and Cameron, who were supposed to receive salaries of £2 000 per annum, also meant that taxation increased.<sup>109</sup> Tsipinare also had to borrow money and was seriously in debt by the time he died. All this must have contributed to the hostility against him and to Samuel's success. Some observers commented that not a single shot was fired in Tsipinare's defence. The main reason for this was, however, not the chief's unpopularity, but the fact that Tsipinare kept all the arms and ammunition himself and that the

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108. The Friend 17 July 1884

109. Minutes of the Bechuana District 1882 P.162

town was virtually deserted as the people were at their country homes attending to their crops.<sup>110</sup>

There were two other matters which may have caused dissidents to join Samuel. Tsipinare was undoubtedly allowing loyal Sotho to settle at Thaba 'Nchu and was also planning to dispense with Rolong customary law. According to the missionaries, he was fully contemplating introducing a modified form of the Free State law into his territory and was planning to introduce a system of government similar to that in the Free State.<sup>111</sup>

Whether or not the chief's revolutionary plans to administer and govern his people along lines copied from the Free State helped Samuel, must remain an hypothesis. Many of his reforms were prompted by Brand or advice from the Free State newspapers. In taking the initiative to implement reforms himself, Tsipinare was probably trying his utmost to forestall annexation, and improve his relationship with the Free State. The chaos Samuel's invasion caused ruined all his plans. Brand's misguided policy towards the rebels and the aid of several Free State farmers allowed the invasion to take place. Samuel's raid into Thaba 'Nchu, the threat of war between Samuel's supporters and those loyal to the dead chief, and fear of Sotho involvement were the main reasons why Brand felt he had to take the step of annexing Thaba 'Nchu.

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110. V.R. 273 P.35


111. G.S. 1409

See Chapter Nine P.221

CHAPTER NINE

THE MOROKA DISTRICT  
1884-1888

MAP NO. V. GENERAL PLAN OF THE SURVEY OF THE ROLONG TERRITORY  
CONDUCTED FOR CHIEF TSIPINARE.



Source : Free State Archives Depot.

Scale : No scale on original - map scale is 1 : 5 of original.

Key :

Numbers 1 to 142 were surveyed by E. Bourdillon.

Unnumbered farms e.g. 'Moroyana' were left unsurveyed.

'Gladstone' and 'Salisbury' were subdivisions of farms 11 and 95 made after Free State annexation.

The farms granted to Moroka in terms of Ordinance No. 6 of 1866 were not included in Bourdillon's 'General Plan' and were not included in the Moroka District.

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| 2. Mooifontein        | 49. Sebata         | 96. Kleingeluk         |
| 3. Bultfontein        | 50. Lesaka         | 97. England            |
| 4. Grysfontein        | 51. Bonolo         | 98. Commissiehoek      |
| 5. Ramoporama         | 52. Tabele         | 99. Makopa             |
| 6. Kopieskraal        | 53. Sercalo        | 100. Leeuwdraai        |
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| 20. Palmietfontein    | 67. Schurvekop     | 114. Chubani           |
| 21. Parana            | 68. Palmietspruit  | 115. Roodebult         |
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## CHAPTER NINE

On 11 September 1884, the Free State Volksraad approved Brand's annexation of the Rolong territory and on 16 September the area was proclaimed as the Moroka District by Ordinance 40 of 1884. Free State rule was disastrous for the Rolong. In the four years which followed the annexation, the Free State appropriated almost two-thirds of the Rolong's land, disrupted their system of government, humiliated their leaders, and increased their poverty. The Free State also failed to protect the Rolong from continuous threats from the Sotho, and continued disturbance fomented by Samuel Lefulere. Thousands left the district. In 1888, those who remained were scattered on the few farms still owned by Africans, or were housed in a government location. The Free State gained land, revenue and labour from their legislation, but the annexation also brought its problems. Brand was frequently at odds with his Volksraad on the Rolong question, and the problems caused by Samuel's liaison with the Sotho chiefs and Sotho claims to the district seriously affected the whole state.

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Brand's initial problem after the annexation was that Samuel refused to surrender and the Free State dared not attack him for fear of Sotho intervention, as Barend Letsie continued to hold a commando on the banks of the Caledon to assist Samuel if necessary.<sup>1</sup> The Sotho were infuriated by the Free State annexation of land which they considered to be theirs, although

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1. De Express 17 July 1884  
G.S. 1406 12 July 1884

it had been given to the Rolong to use.<sup>2</sup> The restlessness in Basutoland increased when Brand sent over 1 000 Free Staters to guard the Sotho border, and it was rumoured that Masupha was preparing for war.<sup>3</sup> Despite the fact that on 13 July Fieldcornet Diedericks obtained two hostages from Barend as an assurance of peace,<sup>4</sup> Brand was convinced that his action had forestalled a Sotho raid and that the situation remained dangerous. On 15 July, he informed Clarke that the Commissioner's efforts to control the situation were totally inadequate.<sup>5</sup>

Brand left Thaba 'Nchu on 14 July to consult his Executive Council as to how he should proceed and to collect Free State reinforcements. He appointed C. van der Wath, a former member of the Executive Council, as Special Commissioner for Thaba 'Nchu and gave him the powers of landdrost.<sup>6</sup> He also took the precaution of placing guards between Bultfontein and Brandfort to prevent any more of Samuel's followers from moving to join him before returning with a warrant for Samuel's arrest.<sup>7</sup> As the Free State forces had been joined by 300 of Tsipinare's men, there was a considerable feeling of anti-climax when Samuel's lawyer persuaded him to surrender on 17 July. His people were disarmed and their horses were confiscated. They were then given passes to return from where they had come.<sup>8</sup> Pretorius and his accomplices were captured and imprisoned at Ladybrand. Samuel and several of his followers were taken to Bloemfontein despite

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|----|-------------------|--------------------------|--------------|---------------|
| 2. | G.S. 1519         | P.462                    | Brand-Clarke | 5 August 1884 |
| 3. | V.R.N. 11         | September 1884           | P.810        |               |
|    | <u>De Express</u> | 31 July 1884;            | 17 July 1884 |               |
| 4. | G.S. 1406         | Barend Letsie-Diedericks | 13 July      | 1884          |
|    | G.S. 1406         | Diedericks-Brand         | 13 July      | 1884          |
| 5. | G.S. 1519         | P.431-432                | Brand-Clarke | 15 July 1884  |
| 6. | V.R.N. 11         | September 1884           | P.809        |               |
| 7. | <u>De Express</u> | 21 August                | 1884         |               |
| 8. | <u>De Express</u> | 24 July                  | 1884         |               |
|    | V.R.N. 11         | September 1884           | P.809        |               |

fears that his followers at Waaihoek, Kaffirfontein and other areas surrounding the town, would react.<sup>9</sup> Brand informed Clarke of the surrender but was still disturbed by the restless state of Basutoland. He met Clarke at Platberg on 21 July and at Wepener on 28 July and, after this, the situation eased slightly. Clarke managed to persuade Brand that the alarm was partly due to the presence of Free State troops on the border and when Clarke gained assurances from the Sotho chiefs that they did not want war, he disbanded his troops except for guards at Ladybrand and Thaba 'Nchu.<sup>10</sup>

On 29 July, Brand was able to turn his attention to the question of land rights at Thaba 'Nchu. At the time of the annexation, Brand had promised the Rolong that land would be set aside for all those who had not been implicated in Tsipinare's murder. He also assured them that all land rights which had been given by Tsipinare or Moroka to whites and blacks would be respected and they would be allowed to retain possession of these lands. From the beginning, there was no question of simply proclaiming the area a Rolong reserve.<sup>11</sup> On 29 July, he embodied these promises in a proclamation. This differed slightly from his previous statements as it stated that the people would either be left where they were or would be moved to locations.<sup>12</sup> On 4 August, he appointed a three-man commission to investigate all claims to land. The Commissioners were J.A. Prinsloo, the Commandant of Bloemfontein, C. Voigt, a Bloemfontein attorney, and E. Bourdillon, the Government Surveyor who had surveyed the

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9. De Express 14 August 1884  
 10. G.S. 1519 P.439 Brand-Clarke 17 July 1884  
 G.S. 1519 P.457 Brand-Clarke 31 July 1884  
 V.R.N. 11 September 1884 P.809-810  
 11. V.R.N. 11 September 1884  
 12. Govt. Courant 20 July 1884 No. 323 1884

territory. They were to report on all claims with reference to ten points. They had to note the basis on which the claim was made and from whom any land grant had been obtained, the situation of the land, the extent of cultivation, the number of buildings, the claimant's name, race, his length of occupation on the land and the amounts he had paid in taxes or other fees. The Rolong were informed that the Commission would start hearing evidence on 11 August at Thaba 'Nchu and that all claims were to be made within a fortnight.<sup>13</sup>

To the Free State, this sort of commission was a necessity. The government had no intention of appointing another chief or of recognising any authority held by sub-chiefs or headmen.<sup>14</sup> There was thus no tribal authority to distribute land or settle disputes. Brand also considered that the introduction of perpetual quitrent tenure was essential for progress and stability.<sup>15</sup> The Rolong were, however, alarmed. Richard Moroka and Robert Tawana Moroka, Tsipinare's son and heir, called a public meeting to request Brand to proclaim the area as a reserve and to protest that they needed more than a fortnight to present their claims. In a letter to Brand, they stressed the confusion into which the people had been thrown and doubted whether they would be calm enough to represent their claims effectively. They also expressed their dismay at several hostile expressions of public opinion in the Free State which had recommended that they be expelled from the territory. They objected, in particular, to a report of a meeting held by J.G. Fraser with his Bloemfontein constituents.

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13. Govt. Courant 6 August 1884 P.342 No. 328 1884

14. V.R. 271

15. G.S. 1517 P.227 Brand-Tsipinare 2 August 1880

Fraser had suggested that the whole of the eastern side of the territory should be occupied by white farmers to protect the Free State from a Sotho invasion.<sup>16</sup> Brand referred these objections to Prinsloo, the Chairman of the Commission, but Prinsloo thought that a fortnight would be sufficient and began hearing evidence on 11 August.

The Prinsloo Commission's report was laid before the Volksraad on 11 September. Brand informed the Raad that from the evidence given before the Commission, it seemed that almost the whole Rolong territory had been given out by Tsipinare, although all land documents and titles had been burnt at the time of the chief's death. The Commission's minutes stated quite clearly that these documents had existed. In a letter to Brand, Prinsloo had explained that after 1876, Moroka began to copy the Free State system of land tenure and began to issue certificates to individuals giving them ownership of farms on conditions of service and inalienability during his life. Tsipinare had extended these conditions to cover his lifetime as well.<sup>17</sup>

The minutes of the Commission were handed to a committee of the Volksraad for study. This second commission, consisting of J.A. Venter, J.G. Siebert, J.G. de Waal, M. Prinsloo and D.B. van der Haer, considered the minutes from a completely different standpoint.<sup>18</sup> They reported to the Raad that they could not recommend any of the claims "omdat zy na nauwkeurig onderzoek heeft bevonden dat zoodanige personen hunne regten op die

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16. V.R. 273 P.220 Richard-Brand 8 August 1884

17. V.R. 273 P.224-227 Commission-Brand 16 August 1884

18. The Commission will hereafter be termed the Siebert Commission for clarity, and also because Siebert was the driving force behind it.

gronden niet hadden bewysen".<sup>19</sup> They dismissed the claim that the Rolong had possessed land certificates as a lie.<sup>20</sup> Their report was submitted to the Raad on 17 September, together with a list of farms they recommended should be granted to claimants. Out of a total of 152 farms in the district, they were prepared to give twenty-five to individual African claimants, six to Tsipinare's estate, and nine to white applicants. The remaining land was to fall to the Free State government.

The Commissioners' explained their allocation by stating that although Moroka and Tsipinare had beaconed off ground for various sub-chiefs and the people in their charge, the ground could not be considered to be the property of the sub-chiefs. They also stated that, although they did not know what right the chiefs had to grant ownership of land, nine certificates had been granted to whites. They thought that although these could not be considered to give the whites legal title, they should be granted the farms in view of Brand's proclamation. As far as the Rolong were concerned, they decided that only the families, councillors and sub-chieftains of Moroka and Tsipinare should be given land, as compensation for the loss of the positions they had formerly enjoyed.

The report listed certain conditions under which loan farm tenure would be granted for the forty farms. It is clear that the Commission wanted the Rolong to pay for the expense of their civil war, which was estimated at £3 000.<sup>21</sup> Titles were to be redeemed within six months of the issue of the grant. In addition to the usual stamp duty, the grantees were to pay 1%

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19. V.R. 271 P.187

20. V.R.N. 18 September 1884 P.881

21. De Express 18 February 1886

of the value of the fixed property calculated at 10 shillings sterling per morgen. If the money was not paid, an extension of three months would be granted, after which the farms would be forfeited to the Free State government. The Commission had not bothered to find out whether the Rolong could pay this amount. Most could not. They had already paid Tsipinare twice for the titles and had borne the full cost of Bourdillon's survey. In addition, they had been heavily taxed by Tsipinare and had suffered economically owing to Samuel's agitations.<sup>22</sup> Totally unaware of the poverty of the people, the Commission also decided that grantees would have to pay the Free State "recognitie" while the other Africans would be subject to a hut tax of ten shillings.

Another important recommendation in the report was that African grantees would only be allowed to sell their farms to whites, and would be subject to the requirements of Ordinance No. 5 of 1876. Article four of this Ordinance was particularly important as it stated that any "kleurling" owning property in the Free State would not be allowed to retain more than five heads of families on his farm. This corresponded to legislation for whites to avoid the growth of "plakkerplase"; but there was no provision that the African could seek permission to retain more labour if he paid a fee. This had a twofold object of crushing the power of the sub-chiefs and of supplying labour. It is noteworthy that, although the Commission sought to justify its distribution in terms of African custom, it turned a blind eye to the customary right of the people to remain on the land of their sub-chiefs. They also stated that Moroka could not have granted

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22. G.S. 820 P.117-120 Richard-Brand 3 August 1885  
Minutes of the Bechuana District Meeting 1882 P.162  
Minutes of the Bechuana District Meeting 1886 P.294

farms to individuals as the land was, by custom, inalienable, and yet were quite willing to allow the sale of the farms to whites. It was quite clear that the Commissioners were only prepared to consider customary rights when it suited them.

All the Rolong who were not granted farms were to be moved to five government locations. These were to be the town of Thaba 'Nchu and four others of 8 000 morgen each. The sites were to be chosen by the Executive Council but were to be as far as possible from the Basutoland border. Fear of the Sotho was also expressed in another recommendation that any grantee could exchange his farm for one further removed from Basutoland. Farms not granted to claimants and not reserved for locations were to fall to the government and were to be sold as soon as possible at an upset price of twelve shillings and sixpence per morgen. Credit would be given for ten years. The only other important provision in the Siebert Report was that it was decided to grant the mission societies the land they claimed, once it had been ascertained that these were not large enough to become "plakkerplase".<sup>23</sup>

Siebert claimed that these suggestions would give general satisfaction to all in the Moroka District.<sup>24</sup> He could not have been more wrong. The Rolong were profoundly shocked and distressed. Van der Wath reported that the people were so "terneergeslagen" that they felt they would rather remove to Basutoland than accept this settlement. They stated that they could not possibly live on the amount of land set aside. 81 263 morgen had been granted to individuals and only 24 000 had been

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23. V.R. 271 P.185-193 The Commission's Report

24. V.R.N. P.873 17 September 1884

set aside for the rest of the population, in addition to Thaba 'Nchu town. The grantees objected to being given title under the conditions of Ordinance 5 of 1876, as they felt the people in general had as much right to the land as they did. They informed van der Wath that they would feel obliged to refuse the land and leave the country. The Landdrost was extremely worried about the spirit in the district and suggested that if it did not improve, Brand would have to visit Thaba 'Nchu.<sup>25</sup> The Rolong were also most distressed that their land had not been made inalienable. At the opening of the Raad's session, Richard Moroka had petitioned the Raad to continue the restriction, as the chiefs were convinced that if the Rolong were allowed to sell, "pressure will be brought to bear upon them from without, and the country will soon pass out of their hands".<sup>26</sup> The Rolong were also alarmed at a proposal from Brand that Siebert should replace van der Wath as Landdrost.<sup>27</sup> Their reaction made Brand think again particularly in view of the Rolongs confidence in van der Wath.

The Siebert Report needs more explanation than the Commissioners gave the Raad. Only an analysis of the Prinsloo Commission's minutes, in the light of the Siebert Report's recommendations, show what criteria really lay behind the Report. It was not simply a question of granting the claims of the senior men of the tribe. Not even the twenty-five grantees received all the land they claimed. Robert Moroka, for instance, was only granted Papfontein, although he claimed Mooifontein, Bultfontein, Gruisfontein, Rapuiskop, Lovedale and Tweespruit as well, and

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25. G.S. 819 P.122 van der Wath-Govt. Secretary  
22 September 1885  
26. V.R. 273 P.212-215 Richard-Brand 11 September 1885  
27. G.S. 819 P.134 van der Wath-Govt. Secretary  
22 September 1885

based all his claims on the same evidence. In doing this, the Commission was guided by a recommendation of the Prinsloo Commission. In a letter to Brand, Prinsloo stated that, in addition to granting certain farms to his sub-chiefs, Tsipinare had given them the oversight of surrounding areas which could not be considered their property.<sup>28</sup> This was used by the Siebert Commission to justify the grant of only one farm to each claimant despite the fact that many of the farms could not be described as "surrounding areas". The farm granted was not necessarily the biggest, and those granted varied in size from 484 morgen to 6 000 morgen.

The Commission did not even give all the sub-chiefs land. David Goronyane, Moroka's uncle, and Stefanus Setlogelo, Moroka's nephew, were not to be granted any land at all, much to the indignation of the tribe. This points to another criterion of the Commission. In every case, the deciding factor was Bourdillons's evidence. African claims were only accepted if Bourdillon stated that he had surveyed the farm for the applicant although, if this was the case for several farms, only one was granted. If Bourdillon did not know the name of the person for whom the land had been surveyed, the claim was completely disregarded, even if all the principal men of the tribe pointed to the man's indisputable right to it. The best example involved Stefanus Setlogelo, who claimed Menschvretersberg, Lokoale, Somerset and Mount Pleasant. He had been given the land in 1880 when Tsipinare took it from the rebel Monyake, Moletsane's son. Bourdillon did not know for whom he had surveyed the land, and the claim was thus disregarded. The Rolong asked why they were

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28. V.R. 273 P.224-227 Prinsloo-Brand 16 August 1884

accused of wholesale perjury, as their evidence had meant nothing.<sup>29</sup> Siebert explained this disregard for their evidence when he informed the Raad of

"de tegenstrijdigheden daarin voorkomende, en hoe weinig waarde daaraan kan worden gehecht; uit alles blijkt dat er nimmer eigendomsrechten zijn verleend".<sup>30</sup>

Bourdillon's evidence was also decisive with regard to all European claims where land certificates were not produced. Of the ten surveyed farms about which Bourdillon could not testify, the Raad granted four to Tsipinare's relations and headmen.

Bourdillon may also have influenced the Commission on the question of inalienability. In a paper entitled The Native Tenure of Land in the Annexed Barolong Territory which he wrote on 16 September, Bourdillon pointed out that, although Tsipinare had changed the basis of land ownership (a point the Commission ignored), he had retained the law of inalienability. This did not only apply to the sale of land to those outside the tribe, but meant that land could not even be sold by one member of the tribe to another. It could only revert to the chief or pass to the family of the original holder as hereditary property. He added that the Free State government now stood in the position of the chief and it would be "consistent with all Barolong custom" if the land could only revert to the government or remain in the holder's family.<sup>31</sup> The paper is included in the Volksraad appendices and may have been used as an apology for not allowing sales between the Africans. On the other hand, the Commissioners may simply have decided that the Rolong would have to submit to

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29. V.R. 274 P.192-195 Richard-Brand 22 September 1884

V.R. 272 P.133 Claim of Stefanus Setlogelo

30. V.R.N. 18 September 1884 P.881

31. V.R. 273 P.85-87

Ordinance No. 5 of 1876, as Article Six prohibited them from buying land.<sup>32</sup> The argument that the government stood in the chief's shoes was, however, widely used to justify all appropriations of land.

The Volksraad's reaction to the Siebert Report was generally favourable. Many were, however, concerned that the interests of white residents at Thaba 'Nchu and of the whites in the Free State had received insufficient attention. Suggestions were made that all whites in the district should receive the land they occupied and that a further 30 000 morgen should be set aside for sale to whites.<sup>33</sup> A minority were concerned that if the Report was accepted, the Rolong would be exploited and Brand's proclamation would not be fulfilled. The Chairman queried the fact that the land could be alienated and suggested that if there were no restrictions on sale, the government should be given first option of purchase to protect the Rolong from speculators.<sup>34</sup> Two members, D.J. de Villiers and C.C. Mathey, firmly challenged the Commission's allegation that the Africans had not received land certificates.<sup>35</sup> Seven members, including J.C. de Waal,<sup>36</sup> one of the Commissioners, and Brand, decided that the matter had best be handed to a court. De Waal felt that more claims could be proved, while Brand stated that the Commissioners were themselves not clear as to what rights the applicants had to the land. He told the Raad that he believed that many could bring further evidence to prove their claims. He also gave an interpretation of his proclamation which made two members exclaim that if they

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32. V.R.N. 1876 Appendices

33. V.R.N. 18 September 1884 P.880, P.883

34. V.R.N. 18 September 1884 P.875

35. V.R.N. 18 September 1884 P.873, P.876, P.890

36. V.R.N. 18 September 1884 P.884, P.885, P.877

had understood this, they would never have supported it and that if it were taken as the basis of a settlement, all applications would be approved.<sup>37</sup>

There were two other points of interest in the debate. Many were concerned that if Ordinance No. 5 of 1876 was applied, the government would have to find homes for those who were displaced. In this case, the question of land overrode their dislike of "plakkerplase" as it was to do in the final settlement. The Ordinance could, however, only be changed by another ordinance so the point was accepted. The Raad was also concerned about the recommended locations. Even the Siebert Commission admitted that the recommendation was made on a conservative estimate of the population. Despite this, suggestions to increase the size were conservative. The most generous motion would only have set aside 8 000 morgen more.<sup>38</sup> It was decided to leave the matter with the Executive Council for investigation. The recommendations on taxation and the sale of government farms were postponed; but the Executive Council was charged with the issue of titles for the forty farms<sup>39</sup> and the basic thesis of the Report was accepted.

Although the Siebert Report was not a final settlement of the land question, its importance lies in the fact that so many of its recommendations were eventually accepted although its premises were proved to be incorrect. It was also important as it irreparably shook the Rolong's trust in the Free State government and engendered feelings of bitterness and despair. It is also striking that in 1888 the position of the Rolong was very similar

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37. V.R.N. 18 September 1885 P.887

38. V.R.N. 18 September 1884 P.897-898

39. V.R.N. 17 September 1884 P.874-875

to what it would have been if the Report had been accepted. Brand's refusal to implement the recommendations did not stall disaster for long.

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The Volksraad session took place against a background of continued Sotho unrest. Letsie had written a letter to Sir Hercules Robinson, the High Commissioner, protesting against the Free State annexation of Sotho territory. The letter was probably written in August. He explained that as Tsipinare was dead, the land belonged to him, as his father Moshoeshoe had given the land to Moroka.<sup>40</sup> On 11 September, De Express reported that Sotho living in the Rolong territory and along the Basutoland border were returning to Basutoland at the orders of their chiefs.<sup>41</sup> Theiving increased along the border and it was feared that the Sotho were importing arms through Natal.<sup>42</sup> On 12 September, the Landdrost of Ladybrand received a letter from Masupha which thoroughly alarmed the farmers in the district, who warned Brand that they were expecting an attack.<sup>43</sup> Also in September, Brand warned Clarke that the Sotho were intending to hold a 'pitso' to discuss what they would do about the Free State annexation, and that the Sotho newspaper, Leselimyana ea Lesuto, confirmed that there was a movement afoot to persuade the Sotho chiefs to fight for the Rolong territory.<sup>44</sup> Despite the fact that Robinson dismissed Letsie's claim to the area on the grounds of the Aliwal North Convention of 1869,<sup>45</sup> Brand was informed that the pitso was held at the end of September and that the Sotho had

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40. De Express 18 September 1884  
 41. De Express 11 September 1884  
 42. G.S. 1519 P.486-487 Brand-Clarke 17 September 1884  
 43. G.S. 1519 P.484-485 Brand-Clarke 17 September 1884  
 44. G.S. 1519 P.486-487 Brand-Clarke 17 September 1884  
 45. De Express 18 September 1884

decided to await the result of Samuel's trial. If the territory was not then given back to the Rolong, Letsie was prepared to fight for it.<sup>46</sup> Even if Brand's information was a rumour, it indicated the general mood in Basutoland.

Tension mounted in the following months. Brand was informed that Samuel's supporters were planning to rescue him from prison with Sotho assistance. As the Sotho were rumoured to be manufacturing weapons and keeping their horses in readiness for war, Brand ordered all the border landdrosts and fieldcornets to see that the Free State burghers were armed. In addition to believing that an attack was imminent, the Free Staters had no faith whatsoever in Clarke's ability to influence the Sotho.<sup>47</sup> Reports also reached Brand that Samuel's followers were again congregating on the borders of Thaba 'Nchu. The Landdrost placed guards at various places and ordered more ammunition.<sup>48</sup>

Samuel, Bogatchou and four other rebels, Botsielo, Moreobule, Ranoha and Molekantsi, were tried in Bloemfontein on 11 November. They were defended by Attorney Fischer and by Samuel's lawyer, J.J. de Villiers. Fischer opened the proceedings by questioning the court's jurisdiction on the grounds that Samuel was not an inhabitant or citizen of the State and was thus not subject to Free State law. He quoted legal authorities to support his contention that nobody could be regarded as an inhabitant of a state unless he was a resident or had expressed an intention of becoming a resident. No refugee who had always intended to return to another state could be considered in these terms.

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46. G.S. 1519 P.522 Brand-Clarke 29 October 1884  
 47. G.S. 1519 P.516 Brand-Clarke 23 October 1884  
De Express 30 October 1884  
 48. G.S. 1612 P.88 Blignaut-Landdrost of  
 Thaba 'Nchu 23 October 1884  
 G.S. 819 P.163 L.T.N.-Brand 24 October 1884

Samuel's proper residence was Thaba 'Nchu which, at the time of the crime, was not Free State territory. The court accepted that it had no jurisdiction, and much to the consternation of Samuel's Rolong opponents and many Free Staters, Samuel was released. It was generally feared that he would now consider himself above the law.<sup>49</sup>

Richard Moroka complained bitterly of the failure of the Free State to administer justice. He moaned that his people were now the laughing stock of the rebels who were still in the district, and that since the verdict their conduct had become insufferable. They were already talking of bringing Samuel back to Thaba 'Nchu. Richard pleaded that Brand should expel these people from the district, and pointed out that Brand's proclamation had made them expect that Samuel's followers would not be allowed to remain in their country. He listed 29 men whom he wished to see expelled and also informed Brand that five of Samuel's leaders had moved to Basutoland.<sup>50</sup> The following day, Brand banned Samuel, Bogatchou, Molekantsi, Seitlamo, Karl Mothibi, Lebetta, Motlagomang, Botsielo, Moreobule and Molimi from the Free State.<sup>51</sup> Samuel was soon known to be in Basutoland, where Letsie allowed him to live at Korokoro and later Sekanameng.<sup>52</sup> Rumours of a Sotho attack once more disturbed the Rolong, and tension between the two factions in the district continued. Towards the end of December, Richard stated that the rebels in the district were moving to Basutoland.<sup>53</sup>

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49. De Express 13 November 1884

50. G.S. 819 P.185 Richard-Brand 17 November 1884

51. Govt. Courant 19 November 1884

52. G.S. 1519 P.562 Brand-Clarke 15 January 1885

Molema, S.M. Moroka, His Life, His Times P.161

53. G.S. 819 P.201 Landdrost T.N.-Brand 29 December 1884

Iagden stated that the cause of the restlessness and alarm in Basutoland towards the end of the year was that the rebel Sotho chiefs believed that Sir Charles Warren, then in Bechuanaland, would come to Basutoland to capture them.<sup>54</sup> The Free Staters, however, believed that Barend Letsie, Masupha and Lerothodi were drilling their men as they believed that Warren was going to assist them fight the Free State.<sup>55</sup> The Free State may well have misinterpreted the position and overestimated the threat from the Sotho to their own state; but it was the rumours that were believed in the Free State and the Moroka District which affected the relationship between the burghers and the Rolong. Blignaut, the Government Secretary, told the burghers of Ladybrand and Wepener to be on their guard but told Richard Moroka not to believe the stories about Warren, as the British government had consistently refused to help Samuel.<sup>56</sup> Whatever part Samuel had in stirring up the Sotho, it is certain that he was trying to capitalise on the situation.

Towards the end of December and early 1885, Samuel was again in contact with certain chiefs in the north. On 31 December, Moshoete issued a statement from Kunwana supporting Samuel's claim to the chieftaincy at Thaba 'Nchu and stating that the Rolong had never accepted Tsipinare. As proof, he claimed that there were many refugees in the country. The Friend published the statement and stated that they "were given to understand" that Botlasitse, the Thlaping chief, Motuba, Massouw and Letsie had signed similar documents.<sup>57</sup> In January 1885, Samuel himself

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54. Iagden, G. The Basutos Vol. 2 P.570

55. De Express 22 January 1885

56. G.S. 1612 P.57 Blignaut-Landdrost of  
Thaba 'Nchu 1 April 1885

57. The Friend 18 June 1885

issued a statement protesting against the Free State annexation and stating that he would "continue to hold" himself and his people "entitled to recover such lands and possessions at any future time in such way or ways as to me may seem fitting". He also warned the Rolong that he would not recognise any Free State titles or grants of land and that he would have all those who accepted such grants "thrust out from such unlawful possession as soon as may be".<sup>58</sup> Bogatchou was reported to be in the Moroka District in January. This caused such panic that there was a rush on the pass office for passes to trek north of the Vaal or into Nomansland.<sup>59</sup> Brand himself wrote to Clarke over the continued rumours of a Sotho invasion and that Samuel was planning to assassinate all sub-ordinate chiefs who had been loyal to Tsipinare.<sup>60</sup> Pretorius, who had been acquitted, was also thought to be again assisting Samuel.<sup>61</sup> The District was again thrown into panic in March, when the Landdrost of Ladybrand was informed that Letsie, Masupha and Samuel were to attack Thaba 'Nchu within five days. Diedericks commandeered a force to guard Thaba Patsoa and the new Landdrost of Thaba 'Nchu, J.M. de Wet, mustered 100 men.<sup>62</sup> The attack did not take place, but Samuel's followers were again seen trekking to Basutoland or settling around the district borders, and it was reported that tension was far more acute than when Tsipinare was murdered.<sup>63</sup>

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58. The Friend 18 June 1885  
 59. G.S. 820 P.3 L.T.N.-Govt. Sec. 12 January 1885  
 60. G.S. 1579 P.562 Brand-Clarke 15 January 1885  
The Friend 15 January 1885  
 61. The Friend 15 January 1885  
 G.S. 820 P.14 L.T.N.-Govt. Sec. 2 February 1885  
 62. De Express 16 July 1885  
 G.S. 820 P.35 de Wet-Govt. Sec. 23 March 1885  
 G.S. 1612 P.55 Blignaut-de Wet 24 March 1885  
 63. De Express 2 April 1885

In May 1885, the Volksraad met to reconsider the settlement of land claims in the district. Brand opened the session by stating that the Executive Council had not implemented the Siebert Commission's Report, as they could not agree with its recommendations. They had studied the minutes of the Prinsloo Commission and had decided that, with few exceptions, the applications had been amply substantiated and fell within the terms of his guarantee. He assured the Raad that the Council was fully aware that such rights had been granted when the proclamation was drawn up, and suggested that the minutes be submitted to a Judge of the Supreme Court, who would be appointed by himself. If the Judge could not accept a claim on the strength of the minutes, Brand stated that he would be required to hear further evidence from the Rolong. In saying this, Brand went a long way to meet the desires of the Rolong against the wishes of the 1884 Volksraad. He also informed the Raad that he had asked J. Cameron, Tsipinare's magistrate, to conduct a census of the District and that this had revealed that more land was needed than was recommended by the Siebert Commission. He had decided to leave the Rolong where they were. Brand also recommended that a poll tax rather than a hut tax should be levied on the people.<sup>64</sup>

The force of Brand's statements left the Raad with little alternative but to agree to submit the question of land rights to a Judge, particularly as there was a consensus that the members of the Raad were not competent to weigh up the evidence themselves. On 20 May, Brand appointed Judge Gregorowski to settle the claims and to report whether the Africans living on the farms granted to

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64. V.R.N. 5 May 1885 P.20-21

individuals had the right to remain there, as the Siebert Commission had decided they did not. On 20 June, Gregorowski submitted two reports to the Volksraad. The first, Report A,<sup>65</sup> was written on 25 May, and the second, Report B,<sup>66</sup> on 16 June, after he had heard further evidence on a number of claims. The Reports differed widely; but Gregorowski explained that he had submitted both, so that the Raad could see why he had changed his mind. Both Reports were important with regard to the Raad's final decision.

In Report A, the Judge stated that after the Sotho war, Moroka began to give out land to individuals and that this was a clear departure from primitive custom. He was certain that the Africans had been granted land certificates and that these were the same as those granted to whites. He was also certain that, although the certificates were the same, the sub-chiefs did not have as uncircumscribed an ownership as the whites, because they did not have the power to drive the people from their farms. If the Free State permitted this, it would do the Rolong a grave injustice. He added that the people had formerly rendered the sub-chiefs certain services such as helping with sowing and cultivation. He suggested that the services be converted to a money payment, and that regulations should be drawn up to determine the relationship between owners and tenants. To further safeguard the people's rights, he stated that the owners should not be permitted to sell their farms without the permission of the Executive Council, and on condition that the tenants' rights were not affected. Gregorowski decided that 61 claims were fully

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65. G.S. 1410 Report A

66. G.S. 1410 Report B

substantiated by the Prinsloo Commission's minutes, and began hearing additional evidence on the other claims on 2 June.

The additional evidence made him decide that his observations contained in Report A "omtrent de rechten van het Barolong volk in het algemeen op de gronden niet juist was". He now believed that in the last years of Moroka's rule, but mainly during Tsipinare's rule, the basis of land ownership in the territory had been dramatically changed "door de invoering van persoonlyke eigendoms rechten in grond, die vroeger niet bestonden". He now realised that Tsipinare's purpose in having the survey carried out was that he wanted to introduce European land tenure, except that the land was to remain inalienable. He pointed out that Tsipinare had wished to carry out his whole government on the same lines as the Free State government and had even taken steps to draw up a constitution and to introduce Free State law into his country with slight modifications. Gregorowski continued that Tsipinare's people were a mixture of all sorts of nations and suggested that the chief was hoping to attach the sub-chiefs more firmly to his rule by granting them individual title and a fixed interest in the country. The Judge now attached a different importance to the fact that the Africans possessed the same certificates as whites. He had acquired one of these from C. Newberry, a white farmer, who was given it by Tsipinare as security for a loan. Newberry's certificate was to the farm Naneng, which was divided by Bourdillon into Egypte and Eden. John Cameron and J. Daniel, a Wesleyan missionary, confirmed that Tsipinare had given his sub-chiefs absolute ownership to their farms. Both had heard Tsipinare saying to the people on the farms that the owners had a right to drive them off the farms if


they wished, but that he promised to give them land if they did. Gregorowski accepted that the owners were to have full rights to the land but suggested that the Free State allow the people to remain on the farms. He assured the government that it was unlikely that the owners would expel them as this was contrary to custom.







At the end of this Report B, Gregorowski listed 95 farms to be given to Africans on individual title, 14 farms to be given to whites, and 3 to mission societies. This left forty farms for the government, including the town of Thaba 'Nchu. The Volksraad did not debate the principles behind this allocation, but a commission consisting of D.B. van der Haer, J.A. Venter and M. Prinsloo was appointed to draw up regulations governing the issue of titles and to recommend how the government land should be used.<sup>67</sup> As all three had sat on the Siebert Commission, it is not surprising that they accepted that Commission's recommendations on the release of titles, but they did review the question of inalienability which had received a lot of attention from Gregorowski. They stated that no African would be allowed to sell his farm for five years, after which the land could be sold to whites, although the government would have first option. They also stated that no African would be allowed to hire out his land for periods exceeding six months, and permission would first have to be obtained from the Executive Council. Paragraph 5 of their report dealt with the problem posed by Gregorowski's second report, by stipulating that all African farm owners would be obliged to retain the locations on their farms unless the government decided otherwise.

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67. V.R.N. 20 June 1885 P.454

MAP NO. VI. LAND DISTRIBUTION IN THE MOROKA DISTRICT AFTER THE VOLKSRAAD SETTLEMENTS OF 1885 AND 1886.



-  African locations.
-  Government farms which were not reserved for locations.
-  Farms granted to European farmers.
-  Farms granted to African claimants.
-  Land granted to the Anglican Church.
-  Land granted to the Wesleyan Missionary Society.

The Commissioners also decided that, of the government farms, seven plus the town of Thaba 'Nchu should be set aside for African locations. The seven farms, Morago, Kgalala, Bofulo, Roodebult, Kgamo, Tala and Seliba, totalled 17 687 morgen. As Thaba 'Nchu town was about 8 042 morgen, the area for locations totalled just over 25 000, the smallest area yet recommended for locations. The remaining government farms were not to be sold, but could be hired to whites for periods of five years.<sup>68</sup>

The point which occasioned most discussion in the Volksraad was the requirement that the land be inalienable for 5 years. Opinions differed widely, but eventually it was decided to extend the period to cover fifteen years. An important exception was made with regard to Tsipinare's estate, where Brand was authorised to allow sales to cover the chief's private debts.<sup>69</sup> The discussions on the locations also showed a divergence of opinion but the Commission's suggestion was accepted.<sup>70</sup> On 1 July 1885, a Government Notice dated 30 June was published in the Government Gazette listing the farms allocated by Gregorowski. This included a list of stands to be granted to individuals in Thaba 'Nchu town. Ten were granted to Africans, six to Europeans and five to the churches. Another notable feature of the list was that Gregorowski did not hesitate to grant more than one farm to an individual if the evidence supported the claim.<sup>71</sup>

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While the Volksraad was deciding on the various claims, both Samuel's followers and the loyal Rolong were leaving the Moroka

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68. V.R. 285 P.25-28  
 69. V.R.N. 23 June 1885 P.475  
 V.R.N. 23 June 1885 P.467  
 70. V.R.N. 23 June 1885  
 71. Govt. Courant 1 July 1885

District in a steady stream as a result of Samuel's threats.<sup>72</sup> The Landdrost reported that most were moving to the Transvaal or Basutoland, but others were settling in the Kroonstad and Winburg Districts. Hundreds more were to leave because of the Volksraad settlement. On 3 August, the Rolong sent a deputation to Brand complaining that the settlement "would entail misery and ruin upon a large portion of the people" and force them to flee to Basutoland. They complained particularly of the heavy servitudes attached to the grants and the fact that the people were to be expelled from some of the best farms in the country. These farms were those claimed by Joseph Masisi - Mokopo, Commissiehoek and England, and those claimed by Stephanus Koko Moroka - Leeuwdraai and Patchoana, plus a few others. The Rolong objected that, by contrast, the locations were bleak, barren and mostly occupied by Samuel's followers. They were also indignant that the claims of Oud Goronyane and Stefanus Setlogelo had once more been set aside.<sup>73</sup>

Brand was sufficiently moved to withdraw the five farms claimed by Masisi, Koko and Setlogelo from a list of government farms which had been published for hire.<sup>74</sup> He also supported petitions which satisfied Goronyane and Setlogelo. He did not, at this stage, alter the requirement that all Rolong on government farms were to remove to the locations by 20 August. The reluctance of the people to move prompted John Cameron to ask Brand on 19 August whether the Rolong could not hire the government farms themselves, or whether they could not be permitted to remain on the farms even if they were hired to

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72. G.S. 820 P.78 de Wet-Govt. Sec. 29 June 1885  
 73. G.S. 820 P.117-120 Richard-Brand 3 August 1885  
 74. Govt. Courant 12 August 1885

whites.<sup>75</sup> This was not allowed.

On 22 August, de Wet reported that not one of the people who were meant to move to the locations had done so. Some had dispersed into the Free State, others to Basutoland. The rest remained on the farms and stated that they were still looking for wagons and places to live.<sup>76</sup> The Wesleyan Missionary Minutes confirm that hundreds left for Basutoland and the Free State rather than move to the locations.<sup>77</sup> Fourteen of the government farms were hired to whites on 1 September 1885,<sup>85</sup> but Brand decided not to make the people move and halted the hire of farms so that he would have land for an alternative location.<sup>79</sup>

For those who remained, the Sotho and Samuel still appeared as a threat to their security. On 16 July, De Express published a letter written by Letsie to Colonel Clarke denying rumours that he intended placing Samuel on the throne at Thaba 'Nchu; but he pleaded that Clarke would "intercede for Samuel to the Governor, and that the Governor may intercede for him to the President that he may be allowed to return to Thaba 'Nchu". Clarke referred the letter to Sir Hercules Robinson, the High Commissioner, who merely passed it on to Brand.<sup>80</sup> After this, rumours of a Sotho attack lessened noticeably although the Rolong continued to be nervous at times. Robinson's repeated refusal to aid Samuel and his contempt for Sotho claims to Thaba 'Nchu seems to have finally convinced the Sotho that their case was hopeless.

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75. G.S. 820 P.127 J.A. Cameron-Blignaut 19 August 1885  
 76. G.S. 820 P.132 de Wet-Govt. Sec. 22 August 1885  
 77. Wesleyan Bechuana District Meeting 1885 P.263  
 78. Govt. Courant 19 August 1885  
 79. V.R.N. 3 May 1886 P.13  
 80. De Express 16 July 1885

In the latter part of 1885 and the years which followed, the main problems of the Rolong were occasioned by Free State rule and the lapse of tribal government, rather than by Samuel and the Sotho. At the opening of the May 1886 session, Brand brought several of the problems which had arisen to date before the Volksraad. He made several suggestions as to how the Rolong's plight could be alleviated, but his main ideas were rejected. He informed the Raad as to his decision about the locations and suggested that the seven farms were better suited for development by whites who could build dams and irrigate them properly. He suggested that Commissiehoek, Mokopo, England, Leeuwdraai and Patchoana should instead be made the location. The farms totalled 14 974 morgen but were all in the neighbourhood of Thaba Patsoa.<sup>81</sup> The Raad reacted very strongly against this, as the farms were too near Basutoland and they wished to see the area settled by whites. A commission of three members, two of whom had sat on the Siebert Commission, was appointed to see if another solution could be found. They reported on 17 May that the original suggestion should not be altered and that the people living on the farms suggested by Brand should be ordered to move as soon as their harvest was reaped.<sup>82</sup> The Raad supported the report and charged the Executive Council with its implementation.<sup>83</sup> The farms around Thaba Patsoa were among 15 advertised for hire on 16 July for a period of ten years.

The Executive Council gave the Rolong until 6 July to move, but on 7 June de Wet warned Brand that "het volk heeft bezwaar om daarheen te gaan", and the people would rather move to Basutoland.

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81. V.R.N. 6 May 1886 P.61  
 82. V.R. 289 P.93  
 83. V.R.N. 24 May 1886 P.268

Masisi warned that his people would cause a lot of trouble if they went to Basutoland.<sup>84</sup> Brand brought the matter before the Executive Council again on 15 June, with a petition from the people living at England and Commissiehoek that 1 000 morgen of the land should be set aside for them, and pleading that they should not be forced to move to the locations. Brand asked the Raad to grant the request but they refused.<sup>85</sup> Exactly when the Rolong were forced to move is not clear, but the last government farms were hired on 16 July 1886. The amount of disturbance must have been very great. The Wesleyans reported at the end of 1886 that thousands had been evicted from their homes. Some had gone to Basutoland and to the Free State, others had scattered, seeking refuge on the farms held by African grantees. The people were greatly impoverished by the loss of their houses and gardens, although some took their houses with them.<sup>86</sup> The exodus continued in the early months of 1887. By April 1887, there were only 160 families living in the government locations<sup>87</sup> and Thaba 'Nchu town was virtually depopulated. The main movement from the town had occurred well before the settlement as there was no inducement for the people to keep houses there when there was no chief on the station. Formerly, it had been the custom that any Rolong of means had kept a house in town as well as in the country.<sup>88</sup> The Wesleyans were forced to reorganise their whole circuit system to meet the different distribution of the people<sup>89</sup> and in 1887, the Anglicans closed

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84. G.S. 821 P.110 de Wet-Govt. Sec. 7 June 1886

85. V.R.N. 15 June 1886 P.519-520

86. Bechuana District Minutes 1886 P.294

87. G.S. 822 P.51 de Wet-Govt. Sec. 23 April 1887

88. Bechuana District Minutes 1885 P.263; 1886 P.294

V.R. 273 P.85-87

89. Bechuana District Minutes 1891 P.360

their school in the town and started diverting income to Basutoland and Phokwane where some of their congregation had moved.<sup>90</sup>

During the May 1886 session, Brand also brought some of the difficulties facing the African grantees to the Raad's attention. He stated that, of the 95 farms granted to Africans, 74 titles had been redeemed but he believed that the others did not have the means to pay. The Raad agreed with Brand to grant the people an extension rather than confiscate their land.<sup>91</sup> Of those who had paid, many were forced to hire their farms to whites to obtain the money. The government was very strict that no white could hire a farm for more than six months at a time but many Africans hired their farms continuously to different people until such time as they were allowed to sell the farms. An additional reason why many hired their farms was that they did not have the means to run them themselves.<sup>92</sup> The Wesleyan Reports confirm the many complaints of economic distress. In 1885, they stated that many were starving as a result of drought and more than 6 000 head of cattle had died. Some had then to sell their remaining cattle to redeem their titles and pay the Free State tax, leaving them with none to work their farms.<sup>93</sup>

The African grantees had another problem. Now that their traditional authority as chiefs or headmen had lapsed, their relationship with the tenants was undefined and on many farms friction arose. Tenants kept more stock than the owners, expected the owners to carry out all improvements at their own

90. Quarterly Paper of the Free State Mission  
15 July 1887 P.295

91. V.R.N. 3 May 1886 P.13

92. G.S. 1411, G.S. 820; G.S. 821; G.S. 822 and G.S. 823

93. Bechuana District Minutes 1885 P.263

expense, and some even expected the owners to pay their taxes.<sup>94</sup> In his first report and a subsequent letter to Brand, Gregorowski had outlined a possible solution to the problem. He suggested that the tenant pay rent and a fee for grazing and should be limited in his possession of livestock. The Landdrost should be empowered to remove tenants if valid charges were made against them, and that the tenants should lose their rights if they failed to pay their dues or left the country for more than twelve months, and were not working for a Free State burgher.<sup>95</sup>

Any such regulations were quite contrary to the wishes of the Rolong, who feared that they would force the tenants to move. Despite their confidence in their ability to make their own arrangements,<sup>96</sup> so many quarrels broke out that de Wet appealed in October 1885<sup>97</sup> and again in December 1886 that regulations should be drawn up. The government only took action in August 1887, quite possibly because Brand wished to respect the Rolong's wishes. In August 1887, de Wet, van der Wath and Gregorowski met to draw up the required regulations. These were published in the Government Gazette on 2 September. They were along the lines suggested by Gregorowski, but were more detailed and comprehensive. All possible sources of conflict were catered for, but the regulations laid a heavy money load on the tenants. Article Nine, however, stated that the regulations would only be enforced if no other agreement between tenant and owner existed. These agreements were to have legal force where evidence proved they existed.<sup>98</sup> The Rolong complained bitterly<sup>99</sup> over some of the provisions but

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94. G.S. 821 P.193 de Wet-Govt. Sec. 18 December 1886  
 95. G.S. 1410  
 96. G.S. 1410 Daniel-Brand 14 September 1885  
 97. G.S. 820 P.177 de Wet-Govt. Sec. 19 October 1885  
 98. Govt. Courant 2 September 1887  
 99. G.S. 1612 P.157 Bignaut-de Wet 18 October 1887

de Wet dismissed these as "not serious".<sup>100</sup>

By September 1887, many of the grantees had already left the district, others did not wait to see what benefits the regulations would bring them. Although the Rolong had petitioned that their land be made inalienable, from the moment the Volksraad settled the question of individual claims, the restriction came under pressure from grantees wishing to leave the district.<sup>101</sup> The 1886 Volksraad refused to lift the 15 year restriction on sales, despite support from some members. The first real difficulties occurred over the question of insolvent deceased estates, but again the Raad refused despite the precedent of Tsipinare's estate.<sup>102</sup> In 1887, however, the Raad was faced with a petition from Richard Moroka to be allowed to sell his farms and leave the state. As Richard had persistently refused to release his titles and had headed every movement of opposition to the government, the Raad decided to allow him to do so, provided he released his titles and left enough land for any of his tenants who wished to remain.<sup>103</sup> The Raad then dismissed two other requests from Edward Mokosi and Michael Moroka, but on 25 May, Stephanus Mey was given permission to sell Israelspoort.<sup>104</sup> From then on, the principle that a farm could be sold if there was a guarantee that all the people on the farm would leave the district, or that the owner would leave sufficient land for his people, was accepted. The government diligently checked that the tenants rights were not affected, but most left the district with their chiefs or headmen.<sup>105</sup> By the

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100. G.S. 823 P.60-61 de Wet-Blignaut 20 October 1887

101. V.R.N. 7 May 1886 P.76

102. V.R.N. 7 May 1886 P.84

103. V.R.N. 10 May 1887 P.107, P.110, P.112

104. V.R.N. 11 May 1887 P.124, P.126; 25 May 1887 P.247

105. G.S. 822; G.S. 1612; G.S. 823

end of June 1887, Richard and Michael had emigrated with most of their people to Bechuanaland where they bought farms near Setlogele in the vicinity of Mafeking. Robert Moroka, Tsipinare's heir, soon followed them, but returned after the Anglo-Boer war.<sup>106</sup> In the months between May 1887 and 14 July 1888, 27 farms were sold by African grantees. Not all the sales were completed by 14 July, but all the conditions had been fulfilled. Their main reasons for leaving were their dislike of Free State rule, their inability to farm successfully, and the attraction of high prices offered for their farms. Prices ranging from £300 to £1 500 were paid, and offered the people a chance of starting a new life.<sup>107</sup>

The exodus continued after Brand's death on 14 July 1888. Molema states that approximately 10 000 people left the Moroka District as a result of the Free State's land settlement. They scattered widely, but many went to Bechuanaland and to the locations in other parts of the Free State.<sup>108</sup> Samuel Lefulere and his followers joined those who had moved to Bechuanaland in the 1880's after being expelled from Basutoland. He joined many who had fled from him. The first four years of Free State rule were traumatic years for the Rolong and many felt betrayed by their old "bondgenoot". Much, however, had been done against Brand's will and, on his death, a letter signed by Robert Moroka and thirteen others stated "De Barolong native gevoelt den slag diep want hum oprechte vriend is weggenomen ...".<sup>109</sup>



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106. Molema, S.M. Chief Moroka ... P.168, P.178

107. G.S. 823; G.S. 822

108. Molema, S.M. Chief Moroka ... P.170

109. G.S. 824 P.69 Robert-Govt. Sec. 16 July 1885



African Locations.

Government farms not reserved for locations.

Farms sold between May 1887 and July 1888 by African grantees.

Farms which had been hired out by African grantees but had not been sold by July 1888.

Farms owned by Europeans.

Farms owned by Africans and had not been hired out or sold.

Government farms granted to Oud Geronysse and Ou Nool during their life times.

Church lands.

## CONCLUSION

## CONCLUSION

Throughout the twenty-four years of Brand's presidency, the relations between the Free State and the Rolong were essentially pragmatic. Both parties put their own interests first and acted accordingly. There were times when their tradition of friendship, feelings of mutual indebtedness and the awareness of treaty obligations influenced their relationship, but both parties were prepared to ignore these if their own interests would be served.

Moroka's reaction to Brand's negotiations towards a treaty was equivocal for several reasons. He had many grievances against the Free State, his people were divided as to whether they should ally with Brand or Moshoeshoe, he was fearful of the consequences of a Free State alliance and was considering the possibility of friendship with the Sotho. As the Free State-Sotho conflict did not immediately concern him and his relations with both parties were far from cordial, he resolved to remain neutral, if possible, with moral backing from the British. His position sandwiched between the Republic and Basutoland made this impossible; but for over a year, the chief managed to keep his options open. The manifestation of Sotho hostility at the time of Wodehouse's boundary negotiations, however, scared the chief, who became eager for an alliance with the Free State despite opposition from a sector of his tribe.

The chief continued to show the pragmatic nature of his attitude to the Free State by refusing to participate in the war until he was reasonably convinced that the Sotho would be

defeated. Even after the Rolong contingent had joined the Boers, Moroka remained preoccupied with the defence and strength of his own position, and whenever he felt that Thaba 'Nchu was threatened by Free State inactivity, withdrew his forces from the field. After the Treaty of Thaba Bosiu, Moroka constantly urged Brand to take active measures to expel the Sotho from the conquered territory but refused to risk sending out his own troops. Despite his inactivity and the fact that the Treaty of Thaba Bosiu left Thaba 'Nchu surrounded by Free State territory, the relations between the allies remained basically the same, in view of the continued Sotho threat, until 1869.

After 1866, however, opinions were expressed in the Free State that an independent African state within the State's boundaries could not be tolerated for long, and hopes were raised that, as large numbers were leaving Thaba 'Nchu, Moroka would be induced to move or to sell his land. This change in the Free State's attitude to the Rolong became increasingly apparent after the establishment of peace with the Sotho in 1869, as the Rolong's support was no longer needed. Although the government's policy remained unchanged, Moroka was sufficiently alarmed by opinions expressed in the Free State to appeal for British protection.

Relations between the Free State and the Rolong deteriorated steadily throughout the following decade. The Free State farmers, particularly those farming along the Rolong boundaries, became increasingly exasperated by conflicts over compensation, impoundage, boundaries and jurisdiction. The

difficulties of having a separate government at Thaba 'Nchu worried the Free State government, which gradually sought to influence the pattern of legislation in the Rolong territory. Division and disaffection within the Rolong tribe also contributed to this deterioration in relations. Matlabe's agitations placed a tension on Free State-Rolong relations, particularly as Brand disapproved of Moroka's attempts to deal with disaffection by repression. In his attempts to keep his people at Thaba 'Nchu, Moroka also further alienated the Free State farmers, who were sufficiently anxious for Rolong labour to appeal for Free State annexation of Thaba 'Nchu.

The rivalry between Samuel Lefulere and Tsipinare for the Rolong succession had a further adverse effect on Free State-Rolong relations. Neither had the full support of the tribe. As Moroka rejected Samuel's claim and Tsipinare exercised "de facto" power from 1875 onwards, there was a tendency for Moroka's opponents to ally with Samuel, who led his supporters to believe that the Sotho rebels and the British government would assist him in ousting Tsipinare. The outbreak of violence between Samuel and Tsipinare after Moroka's death in 1880 made the chief's death a crisis in Rolong-Free State relations.

Although Brand decided his arbitration in favour of Tsipinare, he impressed on him the need for urgent reforms in government and for a lenient policy towards Samuel's followers, as the only means by which stability could be restored. When further violence erupted and hundreds of Samuel's supporters fled into the Free State, Brand decided that he could not renew

the Treaty of Alliance, which had lapsed on Moroka's death. He continued to show his disapproval of Tsipinare's government by granting asylum to Samuel and by constantly refusing to believe reports that Samuel was seeking aid north of the Vaal, in the Free State and in Basutoland for an invasion of Thaba 'Nchu.

Brand's relations with Tsipinare improved sufficiently for him to conclude a five year treaty of friendship with the chief in 1883; but Tsipinare's relations with the border farmers continued to deteriorate. The farmers were particularly alarmed when Tsipinare began accepting large numbers of Sotho loyals into the territory and several farmers pledged their support for Samuel's invasion and cried for Free State annexation.

After Tsipinare's murder on 10 July 1884, Brand annexed the Rolong territory. He had long been aware of the anomaly of having a separate government at Thaba 'Nchu, and was backed by a Volksraad which believed that the existence of an independent black territory within their country's borders was contrary to the interests of the Free State. These were not, however, Brand's main motives for annexing Thaba 'Nchu. He was genuinely alarmed at the possibility of Letsie, Masupha, and Moletsane coming to Samuel's aid against Tsipinare's followers and the resultant outbreak of a general war. The situation was explosive, and Brand saw the annexation as the best and perhaps the only means of restoring order.

The tragedy lay in the fact that the Free State did not proclaim the Moroka District as a Rolong reserve. Instead, the

Free State appropriated approximately 65% of the Rolong's land and set aside only 6% of this for reserves for the dispossessed. The land settlement resulted in a massive exodus from the territory and left those who remained scattered and leaderless.

Thus ended twenty-four years during which the relationship between the Free State and the Rolong was initially determined by the needs and policies of both parties; but became increasingly influenced by conflict within the Rolong tribe and by the growth of Free State power. The fact that after 1869, the Free State had the means to enforce its wishes on the Rolong became the most important aspect of the relationship. With the aid of the missionaries, both Moroka and Tsipinare defended their independence to the best of their ability, but the tide of Free State nationalism was against them. In the end, Thaba 'Nchu was annexed to safeguard the interests of the Free State and the Rolong were, in a large measure, harnessed to serve the needs of the Boer Republic.

## APPENDICES

## APPENDIX A

Tractaat van Alliantie en Bondgenootschap tusschen het Gouvernement van den Oranje Vrystaat en Moroka opperhoofd der Barolongs.

Johannes Henricus Brand in zyne betrekking als President van den Oranje Vrystaat en als zoodanig handelende voor het gezegde Gouvernement en het opperhoofd der Barolongs Moroka sluiten het volgende verbond met elkander:

1. Zy verbinden zich om elkander gedurende het bestaan van dit tractaat over en weder ter hulp te komen indien een vyandige aanval op, of inval in den Oranje Vrystaat of het grondgebied der Barolongs door een of meer der Basuto stammen mogt gemaakt worden.
2. Indien het Gouvernement van den Oranje Vrystaat of Moroka opperhoofd der Barolongs zich genoodzaakt mogt gevoelen om ter handhaving van zyne nationale eer of regten een oorlog te verklaren aan, of een aanval te maken op een of meer der Basuto stammen, dan zal de aanvallende of oorlog verklarende party, de toestemming der andere party daartoe moeten verkrygen om aanspraak te kunnen maken op de hulp en bystand van de andere party.
3. Het Gouvernement van den Oranje Vrystaat zal aan Moroka het opperhoofd der Barolongs vergunnen om in den Oranje Vrystaat krygsbehoefden en ammunitie te koopen, volgens de in den Oranje Vrystaat bestaande wetten, oor het gebruik der Barolongs, mits daartoe schriftelyk aanzoek gedaan worde by den President van den Oranje Vrystaat door het opperhoofd Moroka; zoodanig aanzoek zal door Moroka geteekend en met zyn zegel voorzien zyn en tevens melden de hoeveelheid van de gevraagde geweren en kruid, alsmede de namen der personen, voorwie dezelve gevraagd worden. De Barolongs, die van zoodanige krygsbehoefden en ammunitie voorzien willen worden, zullen in persoon te Bloemfontein het verlangde komen koopen en van een der zonen van Moroka vergezeld moeten zyn.

4. Het opperhoofd Moroka verbindt zich om alle personen, die wegens begane misdade of eenige overtreding der wet uit den Oranje Vrystaat naar het grondgebied der Barolongs gevlugt zyn of zich aldaar ophouden op schriftelyk aanzoek van een der Landdrosten van den Oranje Vrystaat uit te leveren aan den door den Landdrost daartoe afgevaardigden persoon. En het Gouvernement van den Oranje Vrystaat verbindt zich om misdadieggers, die wegens overtreding van de wetten der Barolongs naar den Oranje Vrystaat gevlugt zyn en zich daar ophouden op een schriftelyk aanzoek door Moroka geteekend en met zyn zegel voorzien aan een door hem daartoe afgevaardigden persoon uit te leveren, mits zoodanige wet niet in stryd zijn met de Christelyke godsdienst.

5. Het opperhoofd der Barolongs en het Gouvernement van den Oranje Vrystaat verbinden zich onderling om elkander over en weder behulpzaam te zyn in het opsporen van vee of paarden, waarvan de sporen uit den Oranje Vrystaat of het grondgebied der Barolongs door het grondgebied van de Barolongs of van den Oranje Vrystaat leiden, en om zoodanige paarden of vee, wanneer dezelve gevonden worden, na behoorlyk bewys overeenkomstig de wet, aan de eigenaren af te leveren en indien dezelve mogten blyken gestolen te zyn, de dieve volgens de wet te doen vervolgen.

Dit tractaat is overeenkomstig art 37 van de Constitutie van den Oranje Vrystaat onderhevig aan de toestemming van den Hoog Edelen Volksraad van den Oranje Vrystaat

Aldus gedaan en geteekend te Thaba Nchu op Maandag den 27 Maart 1865.

|                             |                  |           |
|-----------------------------|------------------|-----------|
| James Scott - Witness       | Moroke Chief     | his mark. |
| Timothy Cresswell - Witness | Sebecoe          | his mark. |
|                             | Motuba           | his mark. |
|                             | Isaac Mooi       | his mark. |
|                             | David Goronyane  | his mark. |
|                             | Christian Gabule | his mark. |
|                             | Bogacu           | his mark. |
|                             | Mokhosi          | his mark. |

en te Bloemfontein op Woensdag den 29 Maart in het jaar onze  
Heeren Een duizend Acht Honderd en Vyf en zestig.

J.H. Brand Staatspresident van den Oranje Vrystaat  
geteerkend in onze tegenwoordigheid

J.C. Nielen Marais Gouvts Sec.

Signature of the Landdrost van Bloemfontein

H.A.L. Hamelberg Lid van den Volksraad

## APPENDIX B

Table of Rolong Chiefs Attested by Moshoele on  
7 December 1882 and by Motuba on 9 December 1882

Morolong  
Noto  
Morare  
Mabe  
Molotoe  
Mabeoe  
Mokhopa  
Masepe  
Thibele  
Tau

Tau had four sons who divided the Barolong Kingdom

| (1)                                      | (2)       | (3)      | (4)                    |
|--|-----------|----------|------------------------|
| Ratlou                                   | Ratshili  | Seleka   | Rapulana               |
| Seitshiro                                | Tshili    | Koikoi   | Moelkane               |
| Mokoto                                   | Thutloe   | Moroke   | Makhoe                 |
| Gantse                                   | Taoane    | Sehunelo | Matlabe                |
| Moshoele<br>(alive 1882)<br>in Khuncoane | Montshioa | Moroka   | Motuba<br>(alive 1882) |

Remarks: Taoane had two sons

| (1)                                    | (2)   |
|--|---|
| Montshioa<br>(alive 1882)<br>in Molopo | Tlala, the Father of<br>Sepinare<br>(alive 1882 in Thaba 'Nchu)<br>Tlala (dead) |

Moroka had two sons in his great house

| (1)                                       | (2)                                |
|---|------------------------------------|
| Sehunelo (dead)                           | Samuel or Lehulere<br>(alive 1882) |
| Motlhoare (dead)<br>(died 1879 in Maseru) | Heir of the Seal in<br>Thaba 'Nchu |

## APPENDIX C

Photograph of  
Samuel Lehulere Moroka



Samuel Lehulere Moroka

List of Moroka's sons as compiled  
by S.M. Molema P.202

- |                     |                            |
|---------------------|----------------------------|
| Moroka II<br>d 1880 | 1. Tau                     |
|                     | 2. Sefunelo                |
|                     | 3. Samuel Lehulere         |
|                     | 4. Bereng                  |
|                     | 5. Tshipinare              |
|                     | 6. Tshabadira              |
|                     | 7. Richard                 |
|                     | 8. George<br>(Morwagabuse) |
|                     | 9. Koko                    |
|                     | 10. Ntirelang              |
|                     | 11. Molekane               |

## APPENDIX D

Memorial of Samuel Moroka laid before  
the Volksraad on 2 June 1883

Geeft met eerbied te kennen Samuel, wonende te  
Roodewalsleegte district Boshof =

Dat hy een zoon is van wylen Morocco opperhoofd der Barolong by  
zyne eerste vrouw Matau

Dat uit het huwelyk van zynen vader met gezegde Matau zes  
kinderen geboren zyn te weten =

1. Senaye            een Meisje
2. Mpobe            do
3. Tsae             do
4. Sehunelo        een zoon (overleden)
5. Tsabaliza        een zoon (overleden)
6. Samuel

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