

**REFORM AND DEMOCRACY
IN
MOZAMBIQUE
1983 - 1991**

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ABSTRACT

Africa is currently experiencing a movement toward more democratic systems of government. The causes of such changes are numerous, but the literature on African democratization, like that on similar changes elsewhere in the world, places emphasis on the role of internal or domestic factors. The role of international pressures toward democratization is almost completely ignored.

The case of Mozambique illustrates the dangers of such an omission. During the past decade Mozambique has undergone considerable political change. The single-party, Marxist-Leninist oriented state has been replaced by a multi-party system, devoid of explicit references to any guiding ideology. The government has also expanded its contacts with the West, particularly by means of its assuming membership of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. These changes in Mozambique's political orientation have been accompanied by economic reforms, designed to arrest the precipitous decline in the Mozambican economy. In this dissertation I argue that the causes of both the economic and political reforms lie in this decline and in the government's need to secure capital and debt relief internationally. In order to do this, the Mozambican government had to change the aspects of its political system which were seen as being unacceptable by the West, in particular the lack of multi-party competition and its overtly Marxist orientation and close ties to socialist countries. Because the reforms had their primary genesis in Mozambique's need for international acceptance and not in the growth of popularly based democratic organisations, the reforms are fragile and their meaningfulness questionable.

INTRODUCTION

Reform may be a dirty word....but it begins to look more and more like the most promising route to success in the real world. I limit myself to **most promising** rather than **only** for the simple reasons that all certitude must now be suspect

Chinua Achebe *Anthills of the savannah*
(quoted in Sandbrook 1988: 264)

Democracy is sweeping through Africa. African countries, which have for years suffered under dictatorships, military or single party rule, are one by one beginning to introduce more democratic systems of government. Between 1988 and 1991, multi-party systems have been newly introduced into nearly twenty African countries (see Appendix 1) and thus far in four of these, Sao Tome and Principe, Cape Verde, Benin and Zambia, the ruling parties have been replaced by means of electoral defeat (*Africa Research Bulletin* 28, 1 & 3: 9723-4 & 10045).

These dramatic changes in the African political scene provide a welcome relief from the pessimism that has pervaded African politics for the past three decades, as the initial optimism accompanying independence gave way to a seemingly unstoppable decline into dictatorship and authoritarianism.

In making these changes, African governments seem to be following world trends. The past three years have seen dramatic changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Communism has largely been abandoned and the authoritarian systems of government that have characterised it over the past forty-five years have crumbled under a dramatic resurgence of popular democratic activity. Preceding this, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, many nations in Southern Europe and Latin America had undergone transitions from authoritarian rule to more democratic systems of government.

A concern with the turn toward democratization has dominated the literature on African politics to the point of having become hegemonic (Fatton 1990: 455). Within

this new literature, the changes in Africa are often seen in the light of the democratization occurring elsewhere in the world. They are seen as having been strongly influenced by these changes, especially those that have taken place in Eastern Europe. But, more than this, further causes of African democratization are also seen as being similar to those that brought about the fall of Communism and Southern European and Latin American authoritarianism.

Following the lead of the voluminous scholarship on Latin American transitions to democracy, the literature on African democratization lays particular stress on the effectiveness of groups and associations outside of the state, within civil society, in demanding more of a say in government. Both literatures also attach great importance to the role of the incumbent political leadership in initiating and controlling reforms. But in stressing these more contingent and voluntaristic causes of democratization, the new literature on Africa, like that on the changes elsewhere in the world, has either ignored or grossly underplayed the international factors important in bringing about the re-establishment of democracy.

This has led to a serious misunderstanding not only of the causes but also of the nature and the consequences of African democratization. To stress only the internal causes of the recent changes, the re-emergence of extra-governmental groups and associations and the decision by the political leadership to democratize, is to overestimate both the strength and capabilities of these two groups and their commitments to real democracy. Not only that, but it obscures the real, although often quite subtle role played by international factors at a number of different levels. These factors include Africa's serious economic and debt crisis and hence its ever increasing need for funding. This it has to seek in an environment where aid budgets are shrinking and where Eastern European countries are claiming an ever larger share, from a donor community that has become increasingly centralised under the influence of the two major international financial institutions the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.

The donor community in general has also started to assume a serious interest in

democratization, with a number of the major Western governments frequently talking publicly about linking further aid disbursements to democratization by African governments. The IFI's have been less direct in their demands and there is some doubts that they would ever go so far as to prescribe political reforms in the same way as they do economic policy. However, there are suggestions that they are attaching increasing importance to democratization, particularly in light of Africa's dismal economic performance and its obvious link to a lack of accountability in government.

Either way there is a clear perception on the part of African countries that to avoid economic marginalisation they need to emphasize their democratic credentials and their moves in the direction of democratization. This is shown not only by statements to this effect by representative organisations like the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) but also by the democratization efforts of numerous African countries in response to their own worsening budgets and their desire for more foreign funding.

This sort of change is well illustrated by the case of Mozambique. In the general literature on democratization Mozambique has been cited as one of the prime examples of African countries making the move from a Marxist-Leninist single-party, authoritarian state, to having one of Africa's more liberal constitutions enshrining multi-party competition and a number of other freedoms including that of the press.

Thus far little analysis has been done of Mozambique's political reform programme, most attention having been paid to the extensive economic changes introduced under the IMF sponsored Economic Recovery Programme (or PRE) and even this tends to be mostly of a descriptive nature. Few reasons are advanced as to why the significant political changes have been introduced.

It might be tempting, following the emphasis in the general literature, to ascribe a central role in bringing about political change to those groups opposed to the ruling party FRELIMO's monopoly over government and calling for free elections under a multi-party system. Since FRELIMO assumed power in the mid 1970s the most important amongst these groups has been the *Resistencia Nacional da Mocambicana*

(or Renamo) which has been waging a guerrilla war against the government since 1976.

However, to credit Renamo with the move toward democratization in Mozambique is to ignore a burgeoning literature on the way Renamo operates but, most importantly, it is to seriously misunderstand the nature of Mozambican politics. Renamo like many African "pro-democracy" movements has poor credentials in this regard but the primary impetus for democratization has come from within the upper echelons of the ruling party and government, in a hesitant, piecemeal and often contradictory manner.

The moves toward increased democracy have often been made against the wishes of the population and have little or no institutional structure to build upon. However, they have been made against the context of Mozambique's ever worsening economic and security situation and its increasing reliance on foreign funding.

Right from the beginning significant political concessions had to be made in order to get access to that funding but as time has passed further changes have had to be made. It is impossible to get a full picture of exactly what concessions were demanded and by whom - such details are concealed by the confidentiality of the donor-recipient relationship. It is also possible that political conditions or political demands were never explicitly stated.

However, it is clear that the major origin of Mozambique's political reform lies within the FRELIMO government who for economic reasons have been anxious to improve their relationship with the West. This is shown by the way that the first real discussions about making more democratic changes originated within the party, the way the changes have been introduced and their coming at a time when Mozambique is almost excessively reliant on foreign aid. Of course other more domestic issues, and specifically Renamo, have played a role in the democratization process but, I argue, this has been an ancillary one compared to that played by Mozambique's relationships with aid donors.

In order to show the linkage between Mozambique's political reforms and its need to address the wishes of external funders, I will first examine the new literature on African democratization, arguing that it vastly underestimates the role of international factors.

Chapter 1 DEMOCRATIZATION IN AFRICA

Introduction

The late 1980s and the early 1990s have been a time of immense change in African politics. Much of this change has been directed toward replacing the dictatorships, one-party states and military autocracies on the continent with more democratic systems of government.

Nowhere are the pro-democracy mood and these changes more apparent than in the press. In addition to describing the ongoing demands for democracy and the changes that they have brought about within individual African states, the press has begun to appreciate and to describe the more generalised nature of these processes and their broader ramifications. Africa is described as a "continent in transition" (*Independent* 29 July 1991: 2), swept by a "second wind of change" (*Stop Press* 3, 15, 1990:27) which has brought about a continent - wide "shift to democracy" (*Guardian*, 1 September 1990: 3). There is further talk of there being some kind of "contagion" to this wave of democratization with changes in one part of Africa sparking off, or encouraging, changes in another, much in the same way as happened in Eastern Europe in 1989/1990 (*Independent*, 2 June 1991: 9).

The enthusiasm for, and concern with democratization in Africa has also been reflected in the academic literature. Pre-dating by some years much of the actual change itself, this literature has its roots in Richard Sklar's seminal 1982 presidential address to the American African Studies Association in which he vigorously defended the ideal of democracy and called upon Africanists to reexamine their attitudes to African politics (Chabal 1986: 1). Sklar criticised scholars for not questioning the primacy of economic development over democracy, and the inherent incompatibility of the two. He adopted a far more optimistic tone in talking about the possibilities for democracy in Africa than had become the orthodoxy, referring rather to Africa's potential as a "workshop of democracy" (Sklar 1986: 18).

Sklar's call was at odds with the trend predominant in the literature on democracy in Africa in the 1970s and 1980s. This literature was of two types: that which argued that for largely historical reasons, the question of democracy in Africa was irrelevant, and that which focussed on the decay, decline and even the impossibility of democratic systems of government in Africa in the face of political and especially economic realities (for example see Jackson and Rosberg 1985; Huntington 1984 and Sandbrook 1985). But his call gave heart to those who saw some hope for the establishment of democracy in Africa. The result has been an increasing number of books and articles taking as their focus the possibilities for and the emergence of renewed African democracies.

This new literature on African democracy has been influenced by a number of factors. Not only have the growing number of African pro-democracy movements and the actual moves made toward increasingly democratic systems of government by numerous African countries been important, but so has the world-wide trend toward democracy, especially in Eastern Europe and Latin America. The renewed focus on economic reformism as a result of the adoption of International Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank sponsored structural adjustment programmes, has also led many scholars to reopen the question of African democracy, almost as a by-product of their concern with liberalizing African economies.

However, in **studying** renewed efforts at African democracy, scholars have been most influenced by the literature on the transitions to democracy in Latin America and Southern Europe. This literature has fed directly into the scholarship on African democratization which has reproduced many of its characteristic features: the use of individual case studies, a focus on the resurgence of democratic values and groups within society and on the role played by elites and by the ruling party leadership in moving from authoritarian systems to a form of democracy. In doing so, the new literature highlights a number of previously neglected areas of African politics but it has also duplicated many of the weaknesses of the material on Latin America and Southern Europe. In particular it grossly underplays the role of external forces in bringing about changes toward greater democracy. This role is increasingly becoming

more overt and is being documented in the press. However, its neglect within the literature has serious consequences for how we understand the democratization process in Africa and our predictions of its consequences.

Against the context of earlier work on democracy in Africa, this section examines reasons for the change in focus, the major themes in the new work on African democratization and its strengths and weaknesses. It is argued that the short-comings arise largely out of the very reasons for the renewed focus, but that it is necessary to overcome these weaknesses in order fully to understand recent African democratization.

Earlier literature on African democracy

Amongst many scholars, the granting of independence to African colonies in the 1960s was greeted with great enthusiasm and optimism for the new democracies (Crowder 1987). However, even from the beginning there was considerable pessimism regarding the sustainability of the democratic systems and institutions which had often been installed with the help of the departing colonial powers, and "realists warned that democracy in Africa... would bleed and die" (Sklar 1986: 17). Since then a lot of the literature on African politics has reflected this pessimism, arguing that the general tendency of African post-independence politics was toward authoritarianism, with the prospects for democracy very poor indeed (Chazan, Mortimer, Ravenhill & Rothchild 1988: 132; Markowitz 1977: 289; Jackson & Rosberg 1982: 266). This often led to downright "indifference" regarding the issue of African democracy (Ake 1991: 31), with the question most often being ignored in favour of more pessimistic analyses of the pathologies of African politics.

Initially, the pessimists focused on the obstacles facing African democracies. In particular these studies predicted that absolute levels of poverty common to much of Africa, (Sandbrook 1985: 157), the lack of a democratic tradition, especially in the institutional sphere (Jackson & Rosberg 1982), severe ethnic divisions and cultural practices iniquitous to democracy would serve to cause its decay (Joseph 1983).

These fears and reservations were largely borne out as country after country lapsed into military rule or dictatorship, constitutions were either ignored and rejected, and opposition crushed. Scholars now concerned themselves with describing precisely and vividly, the nature of these third-world lame "Leviathans" (Sklar 1987: 686). The breakdowns occurred in one of three ways: into personal dictatorships, into military rule established by means of a coup, or into one-party states.

Of these, the personal dictatorship was perhaps the most easily identifiable as being non-democratic. Examples of such rule abound in post-independence Africa, for example the presidencies of Kenyatta (and now Moi) in Kenya, Houphouet-Boigny in the Cote d'Ivoire, Amin in Uganda and Banda in Malawi (Jackson and Rosberg 1982).

Similarly, military rule was a widespread and clear example of the breakdown of democracy. Nearly half of all African states have experienced military intervention at one time or another, many of them more than once, for example Ghana and Nigeria (Shaw 1991: 197).

More difficult to comprehend however, was the African one-party state. Although this broke with most of the conventional understandings or definitions of democracy, it had its apologists who argued that it represented a unique form of democracy best suited to the difficult conditions which most African states faced. It was argued that the single party was a natural consequence of the struggle for independence, usually conducted by one umbrella nationalist organisation. It was necessary to carry this unity through into the post-independence period in order to prevent the divisiveness of multi-party competition in facing the severe economic and political challenges with which these new African states were confronted. It was also held that even though many of these states allowed but a single party, they were still democratic, as there was sufficient space for discussion and competition within the party. This argument was often closely connected to yet another justification of one-party rule which was that it most closely resembled the democratic nature of traditional African societies

which were inherently democratic in a consensual rather than an oppositional manner (Hodder-Williams 1984: 115-124).

These arguments in defence of the one-party state often also serve to criticise the literature on the absence of democracy in Africa, maintaining that the latter were either ethnocentrist or imperialist, trying to impose a limited and strictly Western understanding of democracy onto an unwilling and historically quite different Africa (see Staniland 1986: 54-55). Although much in vogue in the 1960s (for example see Carter 1964), such justifications became far less common as their inadequacy became clear in the face of the gross abuse of power occurring in many African states. They also increasingly came to be refuted on ideological grounds as being over idealised and patronising (Mhone 1972 and Bates 1971).

But far more common than either the misplaced optimism or the grim pessimism was an indifference to the issue of African democracy (Ake 1991: 31). For many scholars it simply was not an issue and instead they focused on the politics of development or on the nature and pathologies of the African state. Thus the recent interest in African democracy is surprising, especially in view of the fact that the obstacles which seemed to overpower it are still very much in evidence.

Why the new focus on African democracy?

The reasons behind the change in focus and the change in attitudes toward democracy in Africa are to be found in a number of quite different areas. Most obvious amongst these are the actual moves made toward democratization by increasing numbers of African countries. Less obvious as a cause, are the changes in Eastern Europe and also prior to these, those in Latin America and Southern Europe. The latter two regions, which experienced far-reaching democratic transitions in the 1970s and 1980s, are especially important in the way that they gave rise to a vast literature on transitions to democracy which has increasingly fed into and shaped the literature on democratization in Africa. A final reason for the switch in focus is to be found in the spate of structural adjustment agreements made between African governments and international financial institutions as a result of Africa's growing indebtedness and

economic marginalisation. Although primarily concerned with economic reform, the debates surrounding structural adjustment have also raised, amongst other things, the question of the necessity of a link between a free-market economy and a democratic polity, causing many scholars to start rethinking the question of African democracy.

The spread of democracy in Africa

Perhaps the most obvious reason behind the renewed interest in African democratization is the spate of recent moves in this direction by numerous African states or significant sections of their populations. Since the mid-1980s the majority of African states have either made moves toward increased democracy or else experienced protests or discussions about doing so.

In a large number of countries multi-party systems have been newly introduced, for example in Zambia, Mozambique and Togo (*Africa Research Bulletin* 28, 8, August 1991: 10240; 28, 9, September 1991: 10265), to replace the single-party systems, military governments or personal dictatorships that had existed previously. In other states there have been discussions about the possible introduction of multi-party systems in the future, for example in the Congo (*Africa Research Bulletin* 28, 6, June 1991: 10163) and Tanzania (*Africa Research Bulletin* 28, 3, March 1991: 10043). Military government has given way to civilian rule, for example in Benin, or else this has been put on the political agenda and a commitment made to doing so, as in Nigeria (*Africa Research Bulletin* 28, 3, March 1991: 10045; Oyediran & Agbaje 1991). Most promisingly, a number of incumbent parties or heads of state have been displaced by means of electoral defeat, for example in Sao Tome and Principe, Cape Verde and Zambia (*Africa Research Bulletin* 28, 1, January 1991: 9723-4).

Many countries have also experienced more subtle changes pointing towards democratization. Changes made to the way in which the head of state is elected, such as breaking the automatic link between the head of the party and the premiership so as to allow instead for direct election by means of popular vote. Mozambique represents one such example (Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique 1990: Article 118). Limiting the terms of office of the head of state, as has been done in

Rwanda, is a further subtle step towards democratization (*Africa Research Bulletin* 28, 1, January 1991: 9726). The holding of elections which, in many African countries, have been postponed or even ignored for years, is another, as is the introduction or re-introduction of a secret ballot in elections (for example Benin in 1991, *Africa Research Bulletin*, 28, 2, 1991: 1008). Many states have also introduced substantial improvements in human rights legislation, particularly in terms of political freedoms, hence liberalizing, if not actually democratizing their regimes. In a number of countries, society-based groups, especially students and the youth, have been demanding more of a say in government and an opening up of the political system, for example in Togo and Mali (*Africa Research Bulletin* 28, 3, March 1991 10051; 28, 4, April 1991: 10075).

An interesting feature of these changes is the way that democratization in one country seems to inspire or spark off similar sorts of changes in others. Authors have commented on this phenomenon which they have referred to in various ways, as "political parallelism" where one process of democratization has a noticeable "demonstration effect" (Fishman 1990: 427) on other countries, or as democratic "snowballing" (Huntington 1991: 13).

Thus far few explanations have been offered as to why this sort of chain-reaction has occurred (and its occurrence is not limited to Africa, - it has been a noticeable feature of the changes in Eastern Europe). Most authors imply that changes in one country inspire or provoke the population of another to demand similar changes of their own governments (for example, Kunz 1991: 224). However, one particular case of this "demonstration effect" is instructive, and this is the case of South Africa.

A number of authors have commented on the effect that the changes in South Africa since February 1990 under De Klerk, have had on other states in Africa in forcing them to tone down the more authoritarian aspects of their own regimes (for example, Anglin 1990: 432). Thus far a full analysis of why and how this should be has not been attempted. Most authors suggest that this pressure has come primarily from within the African countries themselves, from a populace whom, for the past number of years,

have been led to believe that South Africa represented the very worst type of undemocratic regime possible.

Changes in South Africa could provoke some severe questioning of the lack of real democracy in tropical African countries which have been vigorously opposed to apartheid. No doubt there is some validity in such explanations, but, given the fact that the factors operating against democracy in Africa are still very much in evidence, this is clearly not the only reason.

It would be wrong to interpret the "demonstration effect" of movement toward democracy in South Africa purely in terms of its impact on the domestic politics of other African states. Changes in South Africa have also affected Africa's diplomatic position. Many African countries which have in the past played a prominent role in the world-wide stand against apartheid, for example Nigeria, might have a little more of the spotlight directed at the realities of their own governments and polities, perhaps forcing them to adopt less authoritarian practices. Furthermore, the Organisation of African Unity which, throughout its existence, has been at the forefront of directing international attention against South Africa, has started to play a strong role in calling for greater democracy and accountability in government on the part of its own members (*Africa Research Bulletin* 27, 7, July 1990: 9747). How much more South Africa's political reforms have changed the international diplomatic and aid environment, particularly with respect to financial institutions and the availability of funding to non-democratic African governments is unclear, but is certainly a factor requiring more research.

The exact nature of democratic reform varies enormously from country to country. In many instances "democratization" thus far consists only of verbal commitments to change in response to rumblings from donors and international organisations, groups within society, or from within government itself. In nearly all cases it is far too early to tell exactly what the outcome of the changes will be. In most instances, what is under discussion is more the concept of change and the idea of democratization. In many countries there is also reason to doubt the sincerity of the reforms or promised

reforms. They have been promised before, but dropped as soon as the crisis giving rise to them had abated, as in Mobutu's Zaire (Diamond 1990b: 230).

But the changes made have permeated up into the literature on African politics, both in the form of individual case studies from which more general tendencies have been extrapolated (for example see Diamond et al 1988) and in more generalized articles (see Fatton 1990, Sandbrook 1988 and Kunz 1991). However, given the recent and extremely hesitant nature of a lot of these reforms, they are clearly only part of the reason for the growth in interest in African democratization.

The effect of democratization in Eastern Europe

Indeed, the spread of democracy has not been limited to Africa. The changes that have swept Eastern Europe in the last three years are a further reason for the new focus. There is evidence that these changes have affected perceptions and expectations of politics in Africa. Jeffrey Herbst states that it is natural to ask whether or not Africa will follow Eastern Europe's "march toward democratisation" (Herbst 1990: 92). Furthermore, in looking at the changes in Africa, the link between the two areas is often made. Colin Legum writes about how African popular dissatisfaction against not only individual rulers but entire systems is "reminiscent" of Eastern Europe (Legum 1990: 75).

Hence the world-wide "zeitgeist" (Diamond 1990b: 227) for democracy, so passionately displayed in the revolts in Eastern Europe, has also permeated African studies perhaps causing them to look for democracy and democratization where a decade ago they might only have sought its denial. However, although the literature is increasingly making the link between the "spread" of the "idea" of democracy in Eastern Europe and the taking-root of the "idea" of democracy in Africa (Young 1989: 22), the exact nature of this movement remains very unclear. It is also a link that, on the ground, is often denied. For example, Flight- Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings denied that the spread of democracy in Eastern Europe had any effect on Ghana where, he argues, the process was already underway (*Africa Research Bulletin* 28, 1, 1991: 9421). Similarly, President Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique argues that his government

embarked upon reform long before their Eastern European allies (*New African* 279, December 1990: 20).

Democratization in Latin America and Southern Europe

But the sources of the interest in African democratization are also to be found even further abroad than this. An undoubtedly important influence are the changes in Latin America and Southern Europe in the late 1970s and 1980s reflected in an already vast literature (see for example O' Donnell & Schmitter 1986 and Baloyra 1987). The notable fact about this literature is its degree of theoretical sophistication relative to that on transitions to democracy in Africa.

Briefly, it too grew out of a similar response to changing reality. Prior to this, the literature, especially on Latin America had focused on increasing authoritarianism and the "improbability" of democracy (Remmer 1991a: 479-80). Much of it was situated within the dependency paradigm which allowed for little economic development or real political democracy because of Latin America's peripheral and dependent position in the world capitalist system. At first, as changes in a democratic direction began taking place they were largely ignored, but eventually the transformations of the 1980s, and the literature on transitions to democracy to which they gave rise began to pose a serious theoretical challenge to the *dependencia* school (Remmer 1991a: 480; Levine 1988: 377).

This was not only because they allowed for the development of democratic systems of government in places doomed by dependency theorists to "endless authoritarianism" but also because of the sorts of issues on which they focus in explaining these transitions. Whilst the dependency school had had a macro and structural focus, looking at international determinants of domestic politics, the new theorists of democratization concentrate not only on the micro, internal dynamics of states, but on the more voluntaristic aspects of domestic politics. They examine issues such as the nature of the leadership within a particular state and the formation of pacts in negotiations and manoeuvring leading up to a democratic transition (Levine 1988: 377-385). It is most often within the leadership of the authoritarian regimes

themselves that the primary impetus for democratization is located (Fishman 1990: 427) and many of the studies look at the jockeying between these "soft-liners" and the more resistant "hard-liners" (O' Donnell & Schmitter 1986: 15).

The external determinants of democratization are down-played and under-emphasized. Transitions to democracy are explained as occurring "predominantly" due to "domestic, internal factors" (O'Donnell & Schmitter 1986: 18; see also Baloyra 1987: 10). Where such exogenous, international influences are examined, scholars tend to focus on the more obvious aspects, such as invasion by the army of a foreign power bent on effecting a "democratic" transition, or the actions of international human rights groups, and then only as additional factors (see Whitehead 1986; McEwan 1988: 119). The only structural role allowed the international environment is in imposing "ideological constraints" or economic pressures that "accelerate" democratization in an unspecified way (O'Donnell & Schmitter 1986: 18).

Within the literature a distinction is often drawn between "liberalization" and "democratization" (for example see O'Donnell & Schmitter 1986 and Baloyra 1987). The former is generally understood for example as "the process of making effective certain rights that protect both individuals and social groups", by which are usually meant basic liberal freedoms such as freedom of association and habeus corpus, whilst the latter is seen as the expansion of political institutions to include those previously excluded or to cover new issues (O'Donnell & Schmitter 1986 7-8). However, within the discussions both about liberalization and democratization, the concern in the literature is with liberal democracy, fairly narrowly defined in political rather than socio-economic terms (McEwan 1988: 117). Both liberalization and democratization are seen as occurring in a slow, gradual and piecemeal fashion with the former gradually leading into the latter (Diamond 1990b: 231-4).

Liberalization gives further space to groups within civil society to call for democratization and this "resurrection of civil society" is seen as an important factor in the establishment of democracy (O'Donnell & Schmitter 1986: 49). The emphasis

is very much on transitions to a fairly unspecific, though democratic, endpoint (Levine 1988: 377; Diamond 1990b: 228). This means that the literature is very short-term and narrow in its focus, looking at the contingent factors surrounding a democratic transition and the tactical manoeuvring leading up to it rather than its long term structural causes or consequences. However, there is a growing concern with the impact of the debt crisis on the long term future of the new democracies (see Remmer 1990a and 1991a: 481)

The literature has been subject to much criticism. Although rich in empirical material, it has been accused of over-reliance upon the case study method. Hence there are large numbers of case-studies focusing on the idiosyncratic conditions surrounding the democratization of, for example, Argentina, but little comparative study drawing out generalities (Remmer 1991a: 485). However, where this has been done, it has been argued that the result has been "theoretical asymmetry". The authoritarian regimes are explained, as having occurred as a result of structural and world-historical factors, whilst democratization comes about because of contingent voluntaristic factors (Remmer 1991a: 484).

This "excessive" voluntarism within many of the explanations has been strongly criticised (Karl 1990: 6). In part it is a result of the overly narrow and formalised notion of politics that many of the studies are working within. The less obvious aspects of power, particularly from a socio-economic perspective are ignored. Democracy tends to be defined in institutional terms, as the presence, amongst other things, of elections and "oppositional rights" (McEwan 1988: 117). Anything outside of this, for example about the economic bases of society and the general political culture, is excluded.

But the most striking weakness of the literature on democratization in Latin America and Southern Europe is its neglect of the international context of democratization. Like its narrow definition of domestic politics, it has a very narrow definition of international politics and therefore describes only the most obvious things like foreign invasion and political lobbying. It ignores the more subtle pressures operating within

the international diplomatic and economic environment that have pushed states to democratize, for example the pressures on the authoritarian regimes of Southern Europe to change in order to gain entrance to the European Economic Community (Huntington 1991: 14). Hence in the majority of the studies we are left with a very one sided view of the democratization process that would need to be supplemented with broader, structural analyses of the international aspects of their changes.

But the literature has been influential in shaping approaches to African democratization, both in a direct and in an indirect way. One of the most influential books in the literature on African democratization, *Democracy in developing countries*, by Diamond, Linz and Lipset (1988) is part of a larger four volume work, that includes a large number of Latin American case studies, and within the general articles there is a strong bias toward Latin American scholarship. Numerous references to the influence of this wider literature are made, for example Sandbrook (1988: 241), Shaw (1990: 206), Fatton (1990: 456) and Crawford Young (1989: 22). Further evidence of this influence is given by the similarity of the themes contained within both bodies of scholarship: the focus on the resurgence of associational life and its role in re-establishing democracy and on the role of the incumbent political leadership.

Structural adjustment programmes and economic reformism

Over thirty African countries currently have structural adjustment or stabilization programmes administered by the World Bank or IMF (Lancaster 1990: 43). These programmes have had the effect of bringing scholars attention to the issue of African democracy and democratization for a number of reasons.

Firstly, the implementation of the programmes has often been accompanied by widespread popular dissatisfaction at the harshness of the measures adopted. Where a regime has been undemocratic and lacked popular legitimacy, this dissatisfaction has also tended to be focussed on calls for greater democracy and much of the literature on structural adjustment and economic reform has started to take cognisance of this fact (see Shaw 1991). Secondly, the urgency of many African countries' need for

assistance and the severity of the economic crisis in much of Africa has caused many scholars to increasingly question the extent to which such problems are not the result of ungovernability arising out of a lack of democracy (Lancaster 1990: 44). Finally, the very presence of large scale and far reaching economic reforms within the majority of African countries has brought many political scientists to ask whether or not a similar range of political reforms is possible.

Hence the wave of economic reform currently affecting Africa allied with a world-wide concern with democratization, recently strengthened by the changes in Eastern Europe and informed by a vast and increasingly influential literature analysing democratization in the context of Southern Europe and Latin America, has brought about a significant shift in the study of African politics toward a new focus on democracy.

Themes within the new work on African democracy

Although the study of democratization in Africa has been said to have become "hegemonic" (Fatton 1990: 455) within African studies, the literature on the issue remains fragmented and hesitant, due largely to the emergent nature of the subject matter. However, a number of common themes emerge: the emphasis on the resurgence of "civil society" and its role in establishing democracy, the role of African leadership and pre-colonial traditions in the democratic renewal, the link between development and democracy, the connection between economic privatisation and political liberalization and the influence of the changes in Eastern Europe.

In speaking of democracy and its establishment in Africa, the literature tends to be concerned with liberal democracy, understood as

"a system of government that meets three essential conditions: meaningful and extensive competition among individuals and organised groups (especially political parties) for all effective positions of government power at regular intervals and excluding the use of force; a highly inclusive level of political participation in the selection of leaders and policies, at least through regular and fair elections, such

that no major (adult) social group is excluded; and a level of civil and political liberties - freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom to form and join organisations - sufficient to ensure the integrity of political competition and participation."

(Diamond et al 1988: xvi)

This sort of definition is common within the literature, although it has been criticised by more radical scholars as being an overly narrow and vague definition which effectively excludes the socio-economic issues involved in democratization (see Beckman 1989).

However, if such definitions are used, it is clear that no country in Africa would yet qualify as a democracy. Hence, in practice, democratization in Africa has been identified in terms of a number of other factors. Firstly, in the breakdown of extant political and economic institutions, secondly, in the abandonment of single-party systems and their replacement with multi-partyism, and thirdly, in the growing chorus against undemocratic forms of rule. It is also indicated by the establishment of centres for the promotion of pluralist political systems and in the spread of the African based human rights movements (Legum 1990: 79-80).

Therefore, much of the literature is attempting to catch the essence of a process that has only just begun, with events rapidly overtaking predictions and analyses. Things have happened so quickly and, in most countries, the more democratic systems promised have yet to be fully established or operational, and those that have are still to be tested by time.

The resurgence of civil society

This is partly why so much emphasis in the literature is placed on the invigoration of groups within society opposed to their own exclusion from the political process and demanding a say in government. Thus far, such protests and opposition movements constitute most of the evidence for democratization and by far the most weight is placed on this factor in explaining the process. It is looked at on two levels, at the level of popular protest and opposition to non-democratic regimes by students, the peasantry, traders and religious and ethnic groups., as well as on the more intellectual

level in terms of the spread of organisations devoted to the establishment of African democracy (Legum 1990: 81).

Kunz speaks of how liberalization should be seen as "issuing from the growing significance and maturity of social forces" (1991: 224) whilst Larry Diamond describes how "a rich and vibrant associational life has developed in African countries" and this "expansion of nonformal participation in autonomous, voluntary associations has become a major means for the limitation of state power" and "the cutting edge of the effort to build a viable democratic order" (Diamond 1988: 23-26). Other authors also place the main responsibility for the movement toward democratization squarely at the door of newly established or recently strengthened groups outside of the state (for example, Wieland 1991: 5), especially those recently squeezed by economic hardships introduced under structural adjustment programmes (Sandbrook 1988). Some have even gone so far as to ascribe more importance to these groups than to formal political institutions. Jean-Francois Bayart writes that "Africa's potential for democracy is more convincingly revealed by the creation of small collectives established and controlled by rural or urban groups (such as local associations) than by parliaments and parties" (1986: 125).

Particularly important are groups organised around religious and ethnic cleavages. Such divisions have traditionally been seen as working against any hopes for democracy (and indeed many of the studies on democratization in Africa still acknowledge the threat they pose, see, for example, Oyediran & Agbaje 1991: 234 and Sandbrook 1988: 259). But increasingly they are also being seen in a distinctly positive light, as potentially good sources of much needed plurality in African political life (Ronen 1986; Diamond 1988; Bayart 1986 and Bratton 1989).

Hence, for example, ethnic differences in Nigeria are seen as giving rise to forces acting against political centralisation and the dominance of either one person or one party (Diamond 1988b: 68). Similarly, in Cameroon and Senegal religious factors, particularly the division between Catholic and Muslim are seen as having contributed to democratization in those countries, with Islam also making a contribution to the

institutionalisation of democracy (Bayart 1986: 115). Another example cited is that of Kenya, where religious organisations are seen as one of the few means of mounting a popular challenge to the one-party state (Odhiambo 1988: 133).

The mass media, for example in Nigeria (Diamond 1988b: 68), students, for example in Togo and Zimbabwe (*Africa Research Bulletin*, 27, 10, 1990: 9860), organisations of professionals, as in Nigeria and Ghana (Diamond 1988b: 14; and Sandbrook 1988: 261), and organisations of commercial and peasant farmers in Zimbabwe (Sithole 1988: 244) are further examples of groups from whom pressures for democratization have been detected. Whilst many of these groups could be said to be members of an African "middle class", they tend in the literature not to be identified as such. This is surprising, given the long association between liberal democracy and the middle class, though it could be a reflection of many of the scholars hesitance to bring any issues of class or economic issues into their explanation

The emphasis has been placed on the reinvigoration of civil society to such a degree that it is increasingly being claimed that its study represents a significant shift away from the "state-centric" analyses that have till now dominated African politics, toward a more "society-centred" approach (see Kunz 1991: 224-226; Shaw 1991: 266 and Bratton 1989). The emphasis is now to be on looking at how groups "disengage" from the state (see Chazan et al 1988) and use this political space to gather support, establish legitimacy and then in time mount a challenge to the political domination of a single person, group or party.

However, there do remain some cautious voices who warn against being over-optimistic about the capacity of previously disempowered groups in society to play the predominant role in reshaping African states into democracies. In particular they warn against underestimating the structural constraints, especially those of an economic nature, acting against the pro-democracy efforts of such groups. Mahmood Mamdani, for example, argues against attaching too much importance to the efforts of the African peasantry in democratization for this reason (Mamdani, in Nyong'o, 1987).

The role of African political leadership

Seemingly at odds with the importance attached to popular opposition to authoritarian rule is the importance attached to the role of the African political leadership in moves toward democratization.

The focus has been on the role of the leadership in three main capacities. Firstly, on the ability of important members of the incumbent government to control divisions within their parties in the events leading up to the establishment of more democratic systems of government so as to prevent these divisions halting the process, for example in Nigeria (Diamond 1988b: 67). Secondly, on the instances where African leaders heading undemocratic regimes have themselves taken the initiative in instituting democratization, as, for example, with Senghor and then Diouf in Senegal (Coulon 1988). Finally, some attention has also been paid to the symbolic importance of the abjuration of one-party states by African leaders previously in their favour, such as Mugabe and Nyerere, who has recently begun arguing the case for looking to more conventionally democratic systems of government, saying that "having one party is not God's will" (Kunz 1991: 223).

However, within the literature, the concept of leadership tends to be narrowly defined and mostly the focus is only on the titular head of state and does not include their broader support base. There is little if any analysis on why these leaders have come to play the role of democracy 'broker' or why there has been a change of attitude on their part. In looking at the leadership as "controller" or "initiator" of democratization, the literature also ignores the possibility of transitions to less authoritarian systems occurring as a result of possibilities opened up by the loss of control on the part of the leadership. Malawi, with the ageing President Banda increasingly less able to stamp his personality on the political scene is an example of a country where such a situation might arise. Finally, the literature on African democratization tends also to pay relatively little attention to the role of the military in the political leadership bringing about democratization. This is curious given the emphasis on the military in the literature both on the decline of democracy in Africa and on transitions to democracy in Latin America.

However, overall there is not nearly as much emphasis placed on political leadership in the literature on Africa, compared to that on Latin American and Southern Europe. But it is still seen as being an important and positive factor, although its potential negative impact has also been acknowledged (Diamond 1988: 18).

The link between economic development and democracy

The literature on democratization in Africa has also raised the long-standing issue of the link between economic development and democracy. This is one of the few contexts where the issue of African democracy had been kept alive (see Ake 1991: 34-36 and Sklar 1987).

Although many scholars remain sceptical as the necessary link between development and democracy (see, for example, Beckman 1989: 88-90 and Sandbrook 1988: 246), others are at pains to emphasise the inaccuracy of the orthodoxy that there was a greater chance of development under authoritarian (and hence more efficient) regimes (see Sklar 1986; Ake 1991: 35 and Sandbrook 1988: 243-247, for a discussion of this debate).

Some are content to point to the crisis in legitimacy brought about by the inability of some states to effect economic development and the possibilities this raises for democratic forces (for example in Sierra Leone, see Zack-Williams 1990). Others have sought to show empirically how authoritarianism and democracy have not necessarily gone together, across a range of case studies (for example, Sandbrook 1988). However it seems to have been impossible to prove the opposite (Sandbrook 1988: 248), though some have attempted to suggest that the fact that some of Africa's more democratic states, such as Botswana, are better off economically is not accidental (Diamond 1988: 16).

Strong arguments are made that the lack of democracy in Africa is holding back efforts at economic development, specifically that the lack of accountability feeds directly into state weakness with deleterious consequences for its subsequent development capacity (Nyong'o 1987: 72). It is further argued that further

democratization must be accompanied by economic development, otherwise efforts at establishing democracy will break down under the severe economic strain under which most African countries find themselves (Uwazarike 1990: 57).

Democratization and economic privatization

Closely connected to the discussions about democratization and development are those concerning the linkage between democratization and economic reform and privatization, usually carried out under the influence of IMF imposed reforms (see Shaw 1991).

In this regard, the economic reforms and especially the further privatization of state dominated economies are put forward as being a positive influence upon democratization in the political sphere, although it is not proven in the literature. Diamond writes that "the increasing movement away from statist economic policies and structures is among the most significant boosts to the democratic prospect in Africa" (1988: 27).

Stress is also placed on the replacement of "socialism" with more free-market type reforms (for example see Kunz 1991), indicating a strongly ideological bent within a lot of the literature.

But the concern is not only with the consequences for democratization of economic reform at the formal policy level, but also at the level of the informal or nonformal economy (Bratton 1989: 423-425). As an example, Naomi Chazan quotes Richard Sklar on the subject of the parallel economy in Ghana which is seen as an expression of the "peoples will" and as a "democratic fact" (Chazan 1988a: 126). But it is not only in the way that it acts as a political counterweight to the centralised and undemocratic regime or the way that it affords non-regime societal actors with political space in which to operate, that the informal economy is important for democratization. It is also seen as an important breeding ground for the entrepreneurial or bourgeois class that are perceived to be the real hope for the survival of liberal democracy in Africa (Diamond 1988: 26).

The link with democratization in Eastern Europe

In addition to acting as one of the causes behind the renewed focus on democratization in Africa, the changes in Eastern Europe and their effects on African politics also feature as a theme within the literature itself. Mostly the focus is on the "demonstration effect" that these changes have had, either on authoritarian governments or on pro-democracy groups. However, in focussing upon this aspect, the literature has succeeded in underplaying the more concrete material impact which these changes have also had and which is described in the scholarship on other issues.

The literature describes how the fall of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe had the effect of destroying the models upon which a number of African socialist and Marxist-Leninist states were based (Kempton 1991: 2). This led to the official abandonment of Marxism-Leninism by the governments of many African countries, for example Mozambique and Benin.

The changes had a different effect upon other African governments, a number of whom saw the possible dangers that such an example could pose. A government sub-committee was established in Zambia to discuss the significance of the changes for that country whilst the ruling party in Tanzania had a national symposium to debate the same issue (Anglin 1990: 434).

The success of pro-democracy groups in Eastern Europe in bringing about the overthrow of authoritarian regimes has also had the effect of encouraging similar groups in Africa in their struggles against the central state (Kempton 1991: 15; Anglin 1990: 434).

But changes in Eastern Europe have also had a more concrete, material effect on politics in a number of African states. Democratization in Eastern Europe has had important and deleterious financial consequences for many African countries. Firstly, the changes have meant either an end to or a severe reduction in the financial and technical support with which these regimes supported numerous African states, such as Mozambique and Angola. Secondly, democratization has also meant that a large

proportion of Western aid that might otherwise have gone to Africa is now being routed to Eastern Europe (Anglin 1990: 438). Between the 1970s and the early 1990s, aid flows to Africa had been reduced from \$9 per capita to \$2, whilst that going to Eastern Europe had increased to an estimated \$34 per capita (Victoria Brittain in the *Guardian* 28 June 1991).

These changes could have the effect of causing African countries to alter their relationships with Western governments or to the domestic policies that have bearing on their relations with donors, in an effort to avoid economic marginalisation or to compensate for lost resources. However this link with Eastern Europe has not been emphasised by the literature on African democratization, which tends to focus more on the transmission of the "idea" of democracy.

International factors

Indeed, relatively little attention is paid to the influence of exogenous factors upon democratization. To the extent that this has been done, two points have been emphasised: the indirect political pressures placed upon the democratization process by the IMF structural adjustment packages which are a fact of life for most African countries at the moment, and the impact of external support in maintaining undemocratic regimes.

IMF stabilisation packages, and the austerity measures which necessarily accompany them, are widely perceived to pose a threat to the sustainability of democratic changes. The economic hardships brought on by these programmes are often most keenly felt by the previously privileged and politically volatile urban dwellers. Within the literature there is some concern over the vulnerability of new and more democratic regimes to the possible actions of this class who might feel that the new regime ought to have had the capacity to improve matters economically (for example see Sandbrook 1988: 257). Concern has also been expressed over the bureaucratic effects of having to implement far reaching and unpopular economic reforms tied to structural adjustment programmes. It has been argued that the urgent need to push through these tough economic measures will work against the growth and resurgence

of a civil society committed to democratic principles. In the context of democratization in Nigeria, it is maintained that

"the simultaneous pursuit...of political democratization and economic reforms in Africa...within the framework of WB/IMF sponsored structural adjustments assumes a more poignant meaning. While the logic of such programmes has been to reduce the salience of the state in the African economy, in reality the outcome has been to foster "commandism" in determining the tenor and pace of reform, especially in the face of growing popular reaction to the pains of restructuring the economy in an atmosphere of political liberalization. The backlash has often been the erection of an anti-mass platform reflecting a lack of faith in the people, identifying democratization with elite-propelled/defined development, institutional reform, and the ideology of domination and control, rather than with the voice and resistance of the masses, or as an end in itself. The aftermath has been that democratization in Africa has at once been overwhelming and fragile."
(Oyediran & Agbaje 1991: 220)

Less often, mention is made of the more positive effects of IMF packages in causing undemocratic regimes to take unpopular economic measures which finally destroy their legitimacy, encouraging people to take action against such regimes (see Diamond 1990a: 48-52 and Shaw 1991: 193).

Within the literature, reference is often made to the role of external forces in sustaining undemocratic regimes, for example French support for Eyadema in the Cameroons and American support for Mobutu in Zaire (Sandbrook 1988: 258). The continuation of this support was seen as being vital to the continued survival of these regimes and its withdrawal, either subtly or more overtly, is seen as being an integral part of the beginnings of changes in these countries (Kempton 1991: 15). But in discussing such cases of external support or lack of support, it is usually support in the most direct sense of the word, in a military or diplomatic sense, that is being meant.

Although the influence of external factors has either been underplayed or interpreted in its most literal sense, there are occasional glimpses of the sorts of effects that Africa's international position has upon democratization. Of particular interest here are the pressures created by structural adjustment programmes which often seem to

be working against further democratization either by inciting popular opposition to the government instituting democratization or by encouraging governments involved in such processes to become "commandist" or undemocratic in their execution.

Strengths of the new work on African democracy

In addition to its optimism, the new literature on African democracy has a number of strengths. In looking at the possibilities for democracy and the role of domestic factors, particularly popularly based groups and organisations, it represents a departure from analyses which stressed the overwhelming influence of Africa's international position (see Chege 1990) on shaping its politics. The renewed concern with democracy and the role of African associational life in its establishment or reestablishment, has helped move the focus within African politics away from the state (see Rothchild and Chazan 1988). The issue of the state had come to be dominant both because of the importance of the state as a political actor and also due to the move toward such emphases in political science in general (Skocpol 1985). This is a positive development, given the weakness and at times even the absence of the state, as generally understood, within the African political arena (Jackson & Rosberg 1982b). By looking further afield it becomes possible to get a far more accurate and complete picture of African political realities and dynamics.

The return to the question of democracy also brings the study of African politics back to the classic concerns of political science, to questions of what constitutes politics, democracy, accountability and good government (Chabal 1986: 1), and away from the exclusive focus on underdevelopment and dependence that have tended to characterise African politics in the recent past. However, in pursuing these new perspectives, the literature has also become prey to a number of weaknesses.

Weaknesses in the literature on democratization in Africa

Despite these advantages, the literature on democratization in Africa has a number of weaknesses. Although it has cast our attention toward civil society and its role in renewing demands for democracy, the evidence on which these claims are made is at times deficient. Also, in looking for democracy, the studies tend to be working with

an overly narrow and formalised understanding of the concept. But the major problem with the literature is its under-emphasis of the external forces acting upon democratization.

Partly as a result of the early nature of the changes, the work on democratization is empirically weak. Not enough evidence has been gathered and there has not been time to see the long-term results of many of the changes. Hence there is perhaps a disproportionate number of general articles based on too few in-depth studies.

Much of the literature appears to have been over-optimistic about the role of society-based groups, often relying on insufficient empirical evidence (see Bratton 1989: 425-438). Also the connection between the presence of such groups and their impact on the regime as forces for democracy is generally assumed rather than established. Claude Ake argues that in the case of many of these organisations, their "democratic potential is limited". Using the example of Kenya he makes the point that the presence of popular, legitimate, grassroots organisations is not enough to challenge the centralisation of power. There has to be some means of channelling this into institutions which would be capable of effecting long-term changes to the political status-quo (Ake 1991: 37). Similarly, in focussing on pro-democracy groups within society, many scholars are confusing the causes of democratization with its preliminary effects.

Furthermore, the literature, which is heavily historical in nature, is largely unable to explain the discontinuity that the current wave of democratization represents (see Van Donge 1990: 428). Many of the case-studies which have been done, are historical in their focus. Thus they describe in detail all the reasons why democracy has failed in the past: poverty, no history of democratic institutions, disruptive ethnic and religious cleavages, no democratic culture and so on, without explaining what has occurred to dull or to change the effects of these factors or to remove them completely. Hence there is a sort of explanatory 'gap' where no attempt is made to explain the disjuncture.

This is linked to the problematic definition of democracy that much of the literature is working within. Although they claim to be adhering to a broad, behavioural understanding of democracy (see for example that given by Diamond 1988 above), in practice democracy is seen in terms of the presence of conventionally understood political institutions, particularly a multi-party electoral system (Bratton 1989: 421). Hence not only are many authors inconsistent in their use of the terms democracy and democratization, but it is an overly narrow and shallow definition. It is a shallow understanding because it tends to exclude deeper analysis of the complex support structures that are essential for the survival of democratic systems, and it is narrow because it excludes most questions about power relations outside of strictly political institutions, particularly those relating to the economy (see Beckman 1989).

But the most serious weakness of the literature is its under- emphasis of external factors in explaining why the changes have come about. Only the most obvious aspects of the international environment's effects on democratization are described. Other more subtle pressures toward democratization such as reliance upon Western donors who might impose certain conditions of a political nature to their aid and indeed the effects of such reliance in the first place, are either ignored or down-played. This is despite the fact that during the 1980s Africa experienced a severe economic crisis (Parfitt & Riley 1987: 1) that caused it to look increasingly to outside donors for financial support from funds which have been consistently shrinking (Abernathy 1989: 81-84). This has led to a debt crisis which, although not large by international standards, is enormous relative to Africa's resources and far outweighs the abilities of most African countries ever to repay (Haynes, Parfitt & Riley 1987: 343).

The fact that many of these donors, particularly the IMF, which has enormous influence over other donors, including the Paris Club (Hodd 1986: 341; Parfitt & Riley 1987: 5-16 and Lancaster 1989: 103), attach stringent economic conditions to their aid has been well documented (see for example Biersteker 1990; Hodd 1987; Cohen, Grindle & Walker 1985 and Stein & Nafziger 1991). These conditionalities generally affect the recipients fiscal and monetary policies as well as often having the effect of reducing state involvement in the economy, particularly with respect to state

subsidies and parastatal organisations (Biersteker 1990).

However, relatively little attention is paid to any political conditionalities that may also be attached to such aid. Some scholars have sought to show that, especially as far as the IMF and World Bank are concerned, a country's regime type has little to do with whether or not it receives aid (for example, Moore & Scarritt 1990). This may be so, but there are also a myriad of smaller political conditions that have been attached to various types of aid for some time, effectively excluding or placing at a disadvantage some types of governments and admitting or favouring others. Examples of such political conditions are the Berlin Clause, whereby states which in the past refused to recognise West Berlin as part of West Germany were excluded from European Economic Community (EEC) aid. Similarly, all states classified as being Marxist-Leninist by the United States government have been excluded from receiving loans from the Export-Import Bank in New York as well as certain types of aid administered by Congress, including PL480 aid, an important source of food aid for many African countries (for example, these restrictions were all imposed on Mozambique in the early 1980s, *Southscan* 5, 4, 1990: 26).

A number of factors are likely to be involved when aid agreements are signed. Finance is a long established tool of international diplomacy. However with the increasing centralisation of aid that occurred in the 1980s, with more and more aid being given out under the aegis of international financial organisations, such as the IMF and World Bank, whose influence is such that bilateral aid will often not be given in the absence of an agreement with them (Hodd 1987: 338), these sorts of political conditions start to become more significant. This significance is enhanced by the closing off of some alternative sources of aid, from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and the shrinkage in the amount of aid generally being given out (Abernathy 1989: 81-84).

However, a number of factors have recently caused the political conditions attached to aid to become both more overt and more directed in terms of their content. One

of the major factors has been the ending of the Cold War and the reduction of the competition between aid donors that it entailed. This, combined with the renewed global concern for democracy and democratization, and the fact that all the Eastern European countries asking for aid from the West have been doing so against a context of extensive political liberalization, has encouraged Western donors to be forthright in their insistence that aid be accompanied by far-reaching political reforms on the part of the recipient countries. Furthermore, the severe economic crisis being experienced by most African countries and the problems connected with many of the structural adjustment programmes that many have entered into has created the perception amongst many Western donors that corruption and bad, especially unrepresentative, government is seriously holding back economic progress (Lancaster 1990: 43-44).

The attachment of "political conditionalities", particularly democratization, to aid is increasingly being picked up in the press and the more popular literature on Africa. They document how many governments, particularly those of the United States, Britain and France are increasingly threatening to link the granting of aid to further democratization by African countries (*Financial Times*, 13 August, 1990: 18; *Guardian* 11 September, 1990: 33; Ake 1990: 39; Lancaster 1990: 43).

For example, the United States Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Chester Crocker commented at a committee meeting at Bretton Woods in April 1990 that democratization would become another condition for future US assistance (Ake 1990: 39). France's position was put forward by President Mitterand at a conference of Francophone countries at La Baule in June 1990 when he said that "France would link its contributions to efforts designed to lead to greater democracy" (Holman 1990: 18). Lynda Chalker announced in mid 1991 that in future Britain would allocate aid to the Third World with a view to promoting "good government", characterised by "sound economic policies" and "pluralistic decision making" (*Guardian* 26 June 1991). Later that year, John Major in addressing the Commonwealth Conference in Harare warned that future aid would be linked to improvements in human rights and good

government (*Daily Telegraph* 17 October 1991: 2). However thus far there is little indication as to how far governments have gone in carrying out these threats and it is probably too early to tell.

The role of IFI's in attaching political conditionalities is also unclear. Thus far they have not made the sorts of outright statements many government officials have, and there have been suggestions that their traditionally rigid distinction between what they see as their proper economic role and political interference would ever allow them to do so. It is also argued that their desire to get and keep structural adjustment programmes in place would prevent them from taking such steps (Lancaster 1989: 215-216). However, there have been suggestions that the linking of political conditionalities are being extensively discussed by IFI's (Lancaster 1990: 43-4) and that they are putting far more emphasis on democracy in their official policy statements (Stein & Nafziger 1991: 177). An example is the World Bank which has begun calling on African leaders to become "more accountable to their peoples" (*Financial Times* 13 August 1990).

Whether or not governments and IFI's are imposing or would impose political conditions to their aid, there is clearly some perception on the part of African countries that they are in danger of further economic marginalisation by Western donors if moves toward democratization are not made. This is shown in the declaration made by the OAU at their Addis Ababa summit in 1990, The political and socio-economic situation in Africa and the fundamental changes taking place in the world (*Africa Research Bulletin* 27, 7 July 1990: 9747). This sort of awareness is an important part of any understanding of the relationship between Western donors and African countries affecting as it does the moves and changes made by the latter, but it has been on just such issues that the literature has been noticeably silent.

The literature has similarly ignored the extent to which donor demands or donor preferences about political reform have been picked up and by some of the emerging opposition groups.

Conclusion

Clearly a tide of democratization is sweeping through Africa and a concern with this process has taken a similar hold on the study of African politics. The changes in African politics have come about due to a range of different factors. Some of these, such as the growth in popular opposition to unrepresentative governments as a result of economic hardship, are domestic in origin. Other factors encouraging democratization are of a more international nature. The most important amongst these is the ever more serious need for funding from Western donors who are increasingly concerned with democracy and whom, because of the changed nature of the funding environment, feel ever more able to impose the condition of political reform in the direction of democracy to their assistance. It is unclear whether or not such conditionalities really operate and really have an effect in the both uncompromising and yet murky world of international aid. But what is more certain is the fact that increasingly, recipient countries have felt the need to make democratic changes, often from above, in order to ease their relationship with aid donors. This is a factor much overlooked by the literature on African democratization largely because of the strong influence over that literature by the scholarship on transitions to democracy in Latin America which itself under- emphasised the international dimension.

However, the international causes of the current democratization process in Africa are particularly well illustrated by the case of Mozambique. There, between 1988 and the beginning of 1991, the moves made toward democracy have been dramatic and their origin lies largely in that country's growing reliance on foreign aid and hence its need to appease what were once quite hostile donors.

Chapter 2

PORTUGUESE COLONIALISM AND THE TRANSITION TO INDEPENDENCE IN MOZAMBIQUE

Introduction

The current reform and democratization in Mozambique can only adequately be viewed against the background of its history. The roots of the situation that the country has found itself in since the mid 1980s lie deep in its past, often strikingly and powerfully so.

Early Mozambican history has been interpreted as having been shaped by two successive "revolutions". The first of these was the migration of Bantu-speaking people into what is now Mozambique, and the successive processes of state formation and decline that followed. The second "revolution" involved the intensification of Mozambique's ties with the wider world by means of Arab-Swahili and, later, with European imperialism (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 11).

To this can be added a third and more recent "revolution": that commencing with nationalist struggles against Portuguese colonialism and ending with the establishment of an independent, socialist-oriented state under the leadership of FRELIMO.

None of these major turning points in Mozambique's history exists in isolation. Each was shaped by the effects of the stage preceding it, and in turn they have all cumulatively served to influence the most recent phase in the country's politics.

In order to set the context for a discussion of the reform and democratization in Mozambique, this chapter briefly surveys Mozambican history up until independence in 1975. Beginning with the Muenumutapa and Malawi kingdoms and their contacts with Swahili traders, the gradual establishment of Portuguese colonialism in the area is described. Particular attention is paid to the exploitative nature of this colonialism: to the way that it seriously undermined Mozambique's social, political and economic fabric, and helped engineer that country's position of overwhelming dependency.

Against this background, I examine the struggle for independence and the transitional period, following the coup in Lisbon in 1974, that led to the establishment of the independent People's Republic of Mozambique under a FRELIMO government in 1975.

Throughout the discussion emphasis will be placed on Mozambique's history of and vulnerability to external pressures, whether they be Swahili traders, the Portuguese colonisers or foreign business interests. All of what has happened in Mozambique's past is a result of the subtle yet complex nexus between domestic resistance and inertia on one side and powerful external forces on the other. Much of Mozambique's history bears testimony to the fact that the latter have tended to have the upper hand.

Pre-colonial Mozambique and the establishment of Portuguese hegemony

Some centuries before the first contact with its Portuguese colonisers, the area of what we now know as Mozambique absorbed numerous migrations of Iron-Age Bantu-speaking peoples. These groups either displaced or absorbed the stone-age hunter gatherers who had previously inhabited the area. They settled in agricultural communities, largely in the form of independent chieftaincies where land was controlled by the chief, assisted by a council of elders (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 11).

For much of the time, prior to the seventeenth century, these chieftaincies were loosely organised into one of two systems or confederations, the Muenumutapa kingdom in central Mozambique and present day Zimbabwe, and the Malawi confederation to the north (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 11-13; Henriksen 1978: 9). Both of these systems or 'states' had always been heavily involved in trade, especially in gold and ivory. They traded with Swahili merchants who, from their coastal centres, operated a trading network that stretched to both Asia and the Middle East (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 13-14; Henriksen 1978: 5).

However, Swahili control over trade in the region was challenged by the arrival of the Portuguese who began operating in the Indian Ocean area from around 1500.

Anxious to secure gold and ivory to finance their colonial adventures as well as to establish refreshment stations and further the spread of Christianity, the Portuguese took military action against the Muslim merchants. By 1525 they had gained control of the majority of the coastal centres as well as having established a number of trading settlements in the interior (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 13-14). These commercial undertakings were always accompanied by evangelical missions (Duffy 1959: 103-129). However, unlike the Swahili traders who had been content merely to trade, the Portuguese were more ambitious and wanted to control production as well. They initially tried to achieve this by converting the Muenumutapa elite to Christianity. However, with mixed results from this policy, they resorted to taking military action against the two confederations. Thanks to fierce opposition and the hostile terrain and climate, it took over thirty years before Portugal gained control of Muenumutapa gold mines and was recognised as having "suzerainty" over the area (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 14).

The prazos

In order to entrench their rather tenuous position in the interior, the Portuguese crown distributed land to a number of its citizens whose task it was to constitute a permanent Portuguese presence in the area, help subdue resistance to further Portuguese expansion and to extract wealth, particularly in the form of taxes. The huge tracts of land given were known as *prazos da coroa* and their owners *prazeiros*. The *prazeiros* were given free reign and controlled their own slave armies or *Chikunda*, ostensibly for use against hostile neighbours. One of the few conditions imposed by the Crown upon the *prazeiros* was that they maintain Portuguese civilisation and that they remained white (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 13-15). To this end, land could be passed down through only the female line and only if the heiress married a white Portuguese subject who had been born in the metropole (Mittelman 1981: 24). The grants were also made subject to review every three years so that these conditions could be enforced (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 13-15).

As an institution the *prazos* failed. Cut off from a somewhat distant metropole and with relatively unlimited power, many *prazeiros* became increasingly autonomous,

powerful and Africanised, adopting some local customs and marrying into the local communities. Consequently, many of the prazeiros in time came to oppose rather than represent Portuguese interests. This fact, combined with increasing resistance from the local communities, led to a severe decline in the Portuguese presence and influence in the area, and their role in regional trade was gradually assumed by Asians (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 15).

The slave trade

However, this situation changed dramatically after the mid- eighteenth century with the increasing demand for labour, first from the sugar plantations on the islands of Ile de France and Bourbon and later from Brazil, the United States and the Caribbean (Henriksen 1978a: 66). The slave trade revived Swahili and Portuguese interest and commercial activity in the area, but the Yao and Makonde tribes in northern Mozambique as well as the prazeiros also played a particularly active role. Of course slavery itself, as well as the trade in slaves, was not new to this part of Africa. Many of the traditional societies had made use of slaves, they had featured as an important commodity in the Swahili coastal trade and they had constituted the basis of the prazeiro's mode of production. However, whilst previously slaves had been procured on a local, relatively small scale, the expansion in demand for slaves coupled with the introduction of modern weapons meant that they were now being obtained in far greater numbers (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 16-18). By the early eighteenth century, the trade in slaves was the most important economic activity in Mozambique, accounting for approximately 85% of its exports at the beginning of the 1820s (Mittelman 1981: 26). Although the trade never reached Angolan proportions, over ten thousand slaves were being legally exported from Mozambique every year. Given the prevalence of smuggling the real numbers are no doubt much higher (Henriksen 1978a: 66; Duffy 1959: 29;146).

Although officially terminated, under British pressure, in 1836, the slave trade continued unofficially well into the 1880s (Duffy 1959: 145). In fact it even persisted after this until into the 1900s in various modified forms, for example as corvee labour sent to the cacao plantations of Sao Thome. (Henriksen 1978a: 66; Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 16-18).

It is estimated that over a million Mozambicans were removed from the country in this manner. Given that most of these would have been in their prime and probably amongst the most productive members of society, the social and economic effects are obvious. The situation was exacerbated by the fact that, to avoid being taken as slaves, many people escaped to inaccessible and usually unproductive areas, or even to outside Mozambique's borders. Furthermore, whilst removing the most economically active members of society, the slave trade contributed very little in return. The vast profits made were not invested locally and the goods received in exchange were usually cheap consumer goods such as cloth, beads and alcohol (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 18).

However, despite their extensive involvement in the slave trade, the difficulties posed by the climate and the geography as well as the weakness of the administration and military in the face of fierce local resistance, meant that the Portugal did not meaningfully colonise Mozambique until after the 1880s. Indeed, Portugal took steps to cement its claim to the area only after the Congress of Berlin, convened in 1884-1885 in order to settle disputes between competing colonial powers, questioned Portuguese sovereignty and argued that effective pacification and control were necessary before Portuguese claims could be recognised (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 21).

Portuguese colonialism

In order to achieve these objectives the Portuguese launched a series of military campaigns that took them thirty years to complete. They eventually succeeded in subduing most of the local resistance, including the 'warlord' prazeiros, and from the early 1900s they attempted to reorganise and strengthen their administration of the

colony. However, this proved difficult due to the Portuguese metropole's lack of resources and the problems which Mozambique posed to a potential coloniser. Hence they increasingly looked toward chartered companies, owned privately but given government charters to vast tracts of land, to perform this task for them (Vail 1976: 389).

Company rule

There were three main companies, the *Companhia de Mocambique*, in the centre of the country, the *Companhia de Zambezia* and the *Companhia de Niassa*, to the north. Although originally it had been envisaged that the companies would serve as vehicles by which Portuguese rule could be entrenched and Portuguese interests furthered, foreign capital came to predominate in all three (Vail 1976: 389-394). In return for relative autonomy and unlimited rights to the resources of, and taxes collected within their areas of jurisdiction, the companies' charters held them responsible for administration and infrastructural development.

They proved to be ineffective either as commercial enterprises or as agents of development. Furthermore, their administration of the area was particularly harsh, characterised by forced labour, high rates of taxation, inhumane working conditions and vicious punishments. On observing company rule in 1914 one man was led to comment that "as far as the natives are concerned, this is a land of blood and tears where the most brutal ill treatment is no crime and murder merely a slight indiscretion" (Vail 1981: 401)

The two major sources of profit for the companies were taxes and the export of labour. The latter was especially important, particularly for the Mozambique company which provided labour to Southern Rhodesia. The Niassa Company provided workers for sisal plantations in Tanganyika and for the copper mines in Katanga (Vail 1976: 399). Foreign capital dominated all three companies but very little real investment occurred.

Instead, they established a pattern of a brutal, rentier type system, based on a form

of direct exploitation which tied the country very closely to other countries in the region or to overseas. This was a pattern which the Portuguese inherited and continued, following the demise of company rule in the 1930s.

Portuguese colonialism under Salazar 1926-1962

The change occurred as a result of developments in metropolitan Portuguese politics. In 1926 the republican government was removed by a coup d'état and by 1932 the former finance minister Antonio Salazar had become Prime Minister of the "Estado Novo". Under his dictatorship, far more emphasis was placed on the role that the colonies ought to play in the development of the metropole (Mittelman 1981: 66-67). The colonies were defined as "Overseas Provinces" (Meyns 1981: 43) which meant, in addition to their being an important aspect of nationalist ideology, that they were seen as a vital source of cheap raw materials for the underdeveloped Portuguese industrial sector and a captive market for its uncompetitive wares (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 40).

In order to achieve these aims and in common with the chartered companies before them, the Portuguese colonial administration relied heavily on the exploitation of Mozambican labour. Besides making extensive use, throughout the country, of 'chibalo' or forced, unpaid labour, the Portuguese authorities in Mozambique also exported labour to South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. The government entered into a series of agreements with South Africa and the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA), starting in 1897 and culminating in the Portugal - South Africa Convention of 1928. These treaties gave WNLA recruiting rights in Southern Mozambique in return for 47,5% of all Transvaal exports being routed through the port of Lourenco Marques (now Maputo). In addition, the Portuguese government received a premium for each worker and their wages were to be paid to the Portuguese government in gold at the official price (Mittelman 1981: 61), which, from the 1970s was well below the market price. The Portuguese government would then pay the miners in Mozambican escudos and resell the gold on the world market, reaping a substantial financial profit for Portugal (Henriksen 1978: 120; Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 35; Meyns 1981: 45).

Labour was exported to Southern Rhodesia on a far smaller scale, but there was considerable transit traffic from both Southern and Northern Rhodesia through the port of Beira, bringing substantial tariff revenue for Mozambique. Also important in this regard was the heavy tourist trade from both Rhodesia and South Africa (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 48).

The heavy reliance on labour export and transit revenue was emphasised by Salazar's policies on investment and industrialisation in the colonies. Up until the late 1960s, the effect of Portugal's colonial policy was to block any foreign investment and any industrialisation in the overseas territories so that they could be protected markets for manufactures from the uncompetitive metropolitan industrial sector (Mittelman 1981: 29). Allied to this policy was the imposition of forced cotton cultivation introduced in 1938 to provide cheap cotton for Portugal's emergent and struggling textile industry. By 1945 over a million peasants in Northern Mozambique were being forced, on pain of imprisonment and under barbaric, serf-like conditions, to grow cotton for which they were paid extremely low prices and for which they received very little infrastructural support (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 41).

Those who were not involved in either cotton cultivation or migrant labour in neighbouring countries were forced by colonial tax and labour laws to find work elsewhere. Amongst the places where they did so were the large plantations which dominated the agriculture of central Mozambique. The conditions on most of these plantations seem little removed from the harsh conditions of company rule, with the management determined to get the most work out of their labourers at the lowest possible cost (Hanlon 1989: 19).

With the emphasis in their policy upon exploiting Mozambican labour, the Portuguese paid little attention to the provision of social services of any kind. Especially deleterious were their policies on education. This was practically non-existent for Black Mozambicans, although the Church did supplement what schools were provided by the colonial state. However, in both cases the high fees, a low maximum age of entry and the general shortage of places served to exclude the vast majority of

Mozambicans from any form of education (Mondlane 1983: 61-69).

Against the context of one of the harshest and most exploitative colonial regimes, it is hardly surprising that there was widespread resistance to Portuguese rule. However, the repressiveness of the state combined with the fact that the country is a predominantly rural one with areas quite isolated from one another, meant that this resistance seldom translated into organisations and movements capable of really challenging the Portuguese colonial state.

The Liberation Struggle

Indeed, the struggle for liberation against Portuguese colonialism only really got off the ground in the early 1960s. But the struggle itself is seen as having played an especially significant part in Mozambique's history because of the way that it served as a "laboratory" of government and democracy. Many maintain that it was during the liberation struggle that Frelimo as a party, as well as its policies and orientation were forged (for example see Henriksen 1978b, Meyns 1981, Luke 1982, Isaacman and Isaacman 1983 and for more sceptical interpretations of this process see Young 1988, Chabal 1983)

The founding of FRELIMO

Although the war itself only commenced in September 1964, the groundwork upon which the armed struggle was based had been being prepared since the beginning of the 1960s. A number of externally-based nationalist organisations had been established, the most prominent amongst which were UDENAMO (Uniao Democratica Nacional de Mocambique) based in Bulawayo, MANU (Mozambique African National Union) based in Tanganyika and UNAMI (Uniao African de Mocambique Independente) which was based in Blantyre. Each of these had its own particular, fairly specific regional support base reflecting in part the severe ethnic divisions extant within Mozambique itself (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 80; Henriksen 1978: 155-169; Seegers 1979: 69).

Early efforts by these organisations to drum up opposition to Portuguese colonial rule were unsuccessful. To an extent this was because of vicious repression by the colonial state. For example, a demonstration organised by MANU in Mueda in Northern Mozambique in 1961 was severely crushed by the police and 600 people were killed (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 80). However, the organisations also suffered the effects of isolation from one another and having to work so far away from Mozambique. This, combined with the lack of a coherent strategy and the divisiveness from which they suffered, meant that relatively little was achieved. However, the three organisations eventually came together in Tanzania in 1962 to form FRELIMO. This merger was the result of much encouragement by Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere and the *Conferencia de Organizacoes Nacionalistas das Colonias Portuguesas* (CONCP), the umbrella body of nationalist organisations in the Portuguese territories. Opponents of Portuguese rule from within Mozambique, particularly from the Makonde tribe, and Mozambican exiles also joined in forming the new organisation. A member of the latter group, Eduardo Mondlane, a Mozambican academic based in the United States, was elected its first leader (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 81; Henriksen 1978: 170).

FRELIMO's First Party Congress in September 1962 revealed relatively little about their policies and strategies (Seegers 1977: 67). They claimed to be focussed on the establishment of an independent Mozambique, free from Portuguese colonial rule, which they hoped to achieve by means of the creation of, as Mondlane put it, the "conditions for a successful armed struggle" (Seegers 1977: 66-67).

This commenced in 1964 in Cabo Delgado and Niassa provinces. FRELIMO forces, trained initially in Algeria but increasingly in Tanzania, started mounting small scale attacks aimed at weakening the Portuguese army by a process of attrition. (Seegers 1977: 68; Henriksen 1978: 186). It seems that the guerrillas had done relatively little mobilisation in Mozambique itself prior to launching the military campaign, but relied instead upon the "underground infrastructures" of MANU, UNAMI and UDENAMO as well as the sympathetic student organisation, the *Nucleo dos Estudants Secundarios Africanos de Mocambique* (NESAM) (Seegers 1979: 69).

Conflict within FRELIMO

However, the Party itself soon became wracked by internal schisms and dissent. To some extent these problems arose around ethnic, class and racial divisions within FRELIMO, but they soon became increasingly centred upon differences in strategy, both on a purely military and on also on a broader socio-economic level.

The ethnic divisions occurred largely between members from the northern and central parts of Mozambique, and those from the south. The divisions played upon tensions that had long been a feature of ethnic relations in Mozambique, with northerners complaining that people from the south were "aggressive", "domineering" and "corrupt" (Opello 1975: 69).

The problems began when a number of prominent northerners within FRELIMO claimed that, as a group, they were under-represented in the leadership which was dominated by southerners. There was also some dissatisfaction amongst a number of the black members over the important role played in the organisation by whites and mesticos (or people of mixed race). Opello (1975) persuasively argues that these splits over race and ethnicity merely served to disguise a lot of the jockeying for power that was happening at this time. But whatever their cause, these problems did give rise to some intra-party violence, for example the revolt by the students from the Mozambique Institute in early 1968 and the march on the Dar es Salaam FRELIMO office by a number of its Makonde members later the same year (see Opello 1975: 74).

The divisions and the way that they were handled also brought about the resignation and expulsion of a number of key people from the organisation, for example Matthew Mmole, Lawrence Millinga and Manual Mahluza (Opello 1975: 66-77; Seegers 1984: 31).

Dissent within FRELIMO also occurred over questions of strategy. From the beginning there had been an important split over what type of struggle FRELIMO

ought to wage. On the one side of this division were what are seen as the more "moderate" members who had comprised the leadership of the early nationalist organisations that gave rise to FRELIMO. They tended to be concerned with fairly narrowly defined nationalistic goals, specifically, the replacement of Portuguese colonialism with Mozambican self-determination. On the other side were the more "radical" members, most of whom had been active within Mozambique. The radicals aimed at effecting more thoroughgoing changes within an independent Mozambique, usually of a socialist nature. The differences in the strategies that each group wanted to pursue arose out of their different goals. The nationalists tended to favour a quick military solution, whilst the more radical group wanted a prolonged guerrilla-type struggle with a strong political content. They wanted not only to get rid of colonialism, but also to change the nature of the society as well (Seegers 1979: 67; Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 83).

The debate over strategy led directly to tensions within FRELIMO over the relative importance of the military and political wings of the organisation. FRELIMO structure had been based on a system of local level cells which combined together to form district and provincial level councils. The representatives of the different provincial councils formed the party's central committee which had various different departments and an executive which handled the day to day running of the organisation (Seegers 1984: 30). The political and military wings of FRELIMO were initially kept completely separate (Munslow 1983: 91), with the military organised along conventional Western lines (Seegers 1984: 30). By the late 1960s the split between the two sections over their relative importance had become serious, with the military wing claiming their function to be far more important than FRELIMO's political work. A bridging committee was organised to try to coordinate the two sections (Munslow 1983: 117), but the debate was only really resolved with the ending of the leadership struggle that followed Eduardo Mondlane's assassination in 1969.

Unable to decide on a successor, FRELIMO appointed a committee of three men, Samora Machel, Uria Simango and Marcelino Dos Santos, to take charge of the

party. A bitter struggle broke out between Machel, one of the "radicals" and Simango, one of the "moderates". Machel eventually triumphed and Simango was expelled from the party. With Machel's ascendancy to the leadership of FRELIMO, the military aspect of the struggle became subordinated to the political, and many of those strongly in favour of a purely military approach were expelled. This move was indicative of an increasing radicalisation of FRELIMO, a process which had already been emphasised by divisions that had occurred over economic policy within those areas of Mozambique said to be under guerrilla control.

These areas were known as the "liberated zones". They were areas in which FRELIMO claimed to operate with impunity, and to have control, to the extent of being able to establish an alternative social, political and economic setup. By the end of the war, FRELIMO claimed to have liberated nearly a third of the country and to be the de facto government for over a million people (Henriksen 1983: 145). Although it varied between one province and another, in these areas Frelimo reputedly set about changing social and economic relations and establishing new systems of government. They experimented with new ways of organising agricultural production and set up numerous "lojas de povo" or people's shops (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 86).

Dissent arose over the involvement of senior officials in commercial activities in the liberated areas. Some FRELIMO members, for example Lazaro Nkavandame who was party secretary in Cabo Delgado province, were reportedly enriching themselves, at the local peasants' expense' as part of the reorganisation of production (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 96). This caused enormous tension, within FRELIMO, which came to a head at its Second Party Congress held inside Mozambique, in Niassa province in July 1968. At the Congress the "radical" line, opposed to the formation of a neo-colonial bourgeois class prevailed. Soon after the congress many of those on the losing side, including Nkavandame, were expelled from FRELIMO (Egero 1987:20-25)

The radicalisation of FRELIMO

Thus FRELIMO emerged as a tightly knit organisation, whose "political culture" became increasingly radicalised (Young 1988: 167). Their emphasis on consensus within the leadership and their not allowing open dissent also meant that they ended up with a very narrow leadership base. But this policy also fostered the emergence of a number of splinter organisations, established by those expelled from the movement. Many of these existed only nominally and none ever seriously challenged Frelimo's claim to be the only representative of the Mozambican people. The most important amongst these organisations was the *Comite Revolucionario de Mocambique* (COREMO) based in Lusaka (Opello 1975: 78-79).

The radicalisation of FRELIMO was further emphasised by the fact that for much of the war, it received very little Western support or recognition. The substantial support it received from the communist bloc, in particular the Soviet Union and China, combined with FRELIMO's experiences in its "liberated zones" led them to adopt an increasingly radical and Marxist line (Seegers 1984: 33-34).

FRELIMO's experiences in the "liberated areas" further contributed to the radicalisation of their policies. There has been considerable debate as to the accuracy of picture sometimes painted of the liberated areas. Firstly, some doubt exists as to the degree to which Frelimo can accurately claim to have been in control of the areas said to have been liberated. Secondly, further doubt exists as to the extent to which they substantially altered socio-economic relationships within these areas (Henriksen 1983: 145-154; Seegers 1984: 32).

However, there can be little debate as to the role played by the liberated zones in shaping FRELIMO ideology and much of their post independence development strategy. In 1973 Samora Machel articulated this importance, saying that "the establishment of the liberated zones creates the material basis for the transformation of the anti-colonial liberation struggle into a revolutionary struggle, a struggle for the establishment of new political, economic, social and cultural structures which give

expression to the complete power of the masses over the society in its totality" (Meyns 1981; 49).

By 1974, FRELIMO guerrillas were active in Cabo Delgado, Niassa, Tete, Manica e Sofala and Zambezia provinces (though not in the south), pursuing their policy of small scale hit and run operations against the Portuguese, aimed increasingly at economic targets. In 1974 the government of Marcello Caetano, Salazar's successor was toppled by a coup d'etat led by an organisation known as the Armed Forces Movement made up of a number of younger army officers. One of the things to which they were committed was to ending the wars in the colonies. However, although the coup and the sudden change in their situation caught FRELIMO off their guard, they did not bring a halt to their operations. Rather, FRELIMO persisted, determined to maintain their advantage and to come to the negotiating table in the strongest possible position (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 105-107).

The Transition to Independence in Mozambique

Although they experienced enormous difficulties agreeing on even the basic terms and principles of the negotiations (Mittelman 1981: 82), FRELIMO and Portuguese representatives eventually got down to talks in Lusaka in June 1974. After some tough bargaining on the part of FRELIMO, an agreement was reached on 7 September, which guaranteed the liberation movement virtually all they were asking for. Under the terms of this agreement, a transitional government was established, combining both Portuguese and FRELIMO officials. In this transition government FRELIMO held a number of important posts, including that of Prime Minister, for which position Joaquim Chissano was elected. Portuguese officials also combined with their FRELIMO counterparts to form a Joint Military Commission which was to act with the transitional government in a coordinating and caretaking role until the unconditional hand over of power that was to occur in June 1975 (Egero 1987: 61-64).

The transition period was characterised by sporadic outbreaks of violence by both blacks and whites, especially in the major towns and cities. A group of conservative whites in Maputo rallying around the slogan "Fico", or "I stay", seized the radio station

and called on South Africa for assistance in restoring white rule. They were quickly crushed by a combined Portuguese-FRELIMO force but this action, combined with a number of attacks on the settler community (sometimes in response to provocation), helped speed up an already massive flow of whites from the country (Egero 1987: 61-64). It is estimated that by 1976 approximately 90% of the 250 000 Portuguese settlers had left (Saul 1985: 64).

The massive exodus of whites caused the new FRELIMO government severe and immediate problems. Thanks to the skewed educational and employment policies of the colonial government, the vast majority of the most important jobs in all sectors of the state and the economy had been held by whites. With over 90% of the black population illiterate, there was a dire shortage of personnel to replace the Portuguese. Not only this, but most of them had abandoned their businesses and farms, taken all that they could with them and sabotaged what they were forced to leave behind (Egero 1987: 67-71; Collins 1978: 12). Thus both the state and the economy were in a precarious position.

The already difficult situation was further exacerbated by a number of other factors. Amongst these was the presence of over 30 000 black former members of the Portuguese colonial army who had been demobilised after FRELIMO had refused to absorb them into their ranks. There were also discipline problems within the ranks of FRELIMO itself, as the guerrillas tried to adapt to peace-time conditions. In particular, many felt that having been on the winning side entitled them to certain benefits and hence both corruption and tension arising from unmet expectations was rife. A further problem was the fact that FRELIMO was virtually unknown as a force in the south as well as in all the cities (Seegers 1984: 37; Collins 1978: 12).

In order to try to prevent a large scale economic collapse and at the same time entrench FRELIMO's position, the transitional government set up small-scale locally based organisations known as "grupos dinamizadores" or dynamising groups. It was their task to "raise the political consciousness of the masses" and to help overcome the worst of the crises in the economy and the bureaucracy by keeping enterprises

going and enforcing work discipline (Meyns 1981: 56). They also liaised between central government structures and the populace, explaining policy to the people and communicating feedback to the upper levels. There were numerous problems with the dynamising groups but they do appear to have been successful in helping to forge the sense of national unity with which Mozambique celebrated independence on 25 June 1975 under its first President, Samora Machel (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 117-18).

Conclusion

Mozambique began its new life as an independent state carrying with it a legacy of hundreds of years of both political and economic underdevelopment. Colonialism badly distorted Mozambique's economy, society and politics. Economically the voraciousness of the Portuguese colonists exploitation obviously denuded the country of its wealth. But the long-term structural effects were more serious and these existed on a number of levels. Firstly, the emphasis on the exportation of labour, and the reliance on income from transit traffic meant that Mozambique was left with an 'inbuilt' dependency upon other countries in the region. Not only this but the country as a whole became oriented toward the outside: railways, roads and other communications were never designed to serve Mozambique so much as to remove its wealth. Mozambique had become a "service economy" (Mittelman 1981: 30; 55).

The social consequences of these policies were insidious, particularly as regards education where at independence the illiteracy rate amongst Black Mozambicans was over 90%. Secondly, the widespread export of the most productive labour, combined with the forced cultivation of cash-crops for which there was little monetary gain, did serious damage to local society and economies, especially with regard to food production. Famine was widespread and many areas (Saul 1985: 41), particularly in southern and central Mozambique, became locked into a cycle of poverty and underdevelopment from which they seem never to have escaped. Finally, the discouragement of any industrial or infrastructural development, left Mozambique with a vulnerable and fragile economy, geared toward the production of relatively few primary products.

The damage done to the economy during the colonial period and by the disruption caused by the war, was exacerbated during the transition phase when departing whites destroyed or carried with them much of the wealth that had been created, leaving the incoming government with a lot of debt but not much else. To add to this the economy was suffering the effects of the oil crisis and its concomitant high inflation (Mittelman 1981: 82) with the result that by 1975 it was in a state of near collapse (Saul 1985: 62).

Such was the economic legacy of several centuries of imperialism: less often discussed are the political consequences. Although there had been a long and illustrious history of violent resistance to colonial rule this seems to have declined considerably after the 1920s as Portugal's grip on the country became firmer. Resistance to the excesses of colonialism continued until the 1960s, but it mostly took a localised, passive form such as tax evasion or emigration. Some instances of more directly political and organisational opposition to colonial rule are sometimes mentioned, for example amongst some urban labour movements, independent churches, student groups, mutual aid societies, tribal and regional organisations and some elements of the press. However, such groups activities were generally limited to urban areas and were often centred around *assimilado's* (blacks said to have been assimilated into Portuguese culture by fulfilling educational, professional and linguistic criteria) and *mesticos*, a very small proportion of the population (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 62-73; Mondlane 1969: 104-107). However, low levels of education and severe censorship and repression worked to keep organised resistance to a minimum (Munslow 1983: 63). Hence there does not seem to have been a strong and continuous tradition of alternative and democratic political structures operating within the country prior to the liberation war and in some areas, specifically in the south, until even after the war had ended. This is hardly surprising given nature of the environment in which they were forced to operate and the paucity of resources at their disposal. But it means that in much of the country there was little tradition of any sort of democracy, nor any widespread and well-established democratic political culture. This, combined with the multi-layered nature of its economic under-development meant that the new People's Republic of Mozambique almost didn't have a chance.

Chapter 3

INDEPENDENT MOZAMBIQUE AND THE EMERGING CRISIS

Introduction

The new FRELIMO government quickly introduced a wide range of fundamental political and economic changes. The essential structure of the new state was set out in the constitution published in 1975. This was complemented by a number of important policies introduced by FRELIMO at its first post-independence party congress in 1977.

The changes in Mozambique came against the context of years of colonial underdevelopment and the traumatic transition described in the previous chapter. As if this was not enough, FRELIMO's active support for the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) engaged in a liberation struggle against the minority white Rhodesian regime, meant that Mozambique almost immediately found itself at war with its neighbour. Even after the Rhodesian government was replaced after Zimbabwean independence in 1980, things improved little for Mozambique. The pseudo-liberation organisation, the *Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana* (Renamo), formed by the Rhodesians in 1976 in order to carry out undercover operations against both ZANLA and the FRELIMO government, continued to operate, and with increased support, from South Africa. Through the 1980s, the war that they have waged and the rural chaos and economic burdens that they have caused have proved almost insurmountable obstacles in the way of FRELIMO policy.

These problems have been compounded and exacerbated by the faults and the excesses inherent within the political structure and the policies themselves. The result has been that by the early 1980s, the country faced serious crises in both the economic and political spheres.

Against the context of the savage colonial inheritance and the ongoing war waged against the Mozambican government, this chapter outlines the political and economic changes introduced by FRELIMO after independence and the crises into which these

changes soon ran. Besides describing the nature and extent of the crises as a background to the reforms designed to correct them, I argue that although the strictly economic crisis was the most obvious manifestation of the problems into which the country soon ran, they obscured a serious political crisis or stagnation which had accompanied the economic decline. The political and economic problems interacted with one another, exacerbating the problems: the centralisation of political power and decline of democratic bodies often served to prevent the necessary economic action being taken whilst the growing seriousness of the economic crisis only worsened the political problems. The result was that by 1983 the country found itself in a crisis of unprecedented proportions. Domestically it did not have a lot of room to manoeuvre due to the poverty of its inheritance, the war and political decline and inertia. Hence it was forced to look internationally though even here its options were limited.

Changes introduced by FRELIMO at independence

Changes to the political structure

The substance of the new political structure was contained within the 1975 constitution. This set up a series of representative organisations with which, at all levels, the FRELIMO party was closely linked.

Legislature

At the apex of the legislative structure was the People's Assembly. This was defined by the constitution as the "supreme" representative body. Its membership was originally set at 210 members made up of FRELIMO's Central and Executive Committees, all Ministers and Vice Ministers, all Provincial Governors, FRELIMO representatives from the armed forces, two representatives per province of FRELIMO mass organisations, FRELIMO members chosen by the Central Committee, and ten citizens, also chosen by the Central Committee (Constitution of the Peoples Republic of Mozambique 1975: Article 37).

The People's Assembly enacted basic legislation, approved the budget and oversaw policy implementation. It was convened by the President of the Republic who automatically assumed that post as head of FRELIMO. The Assembly was meant to

meet twice a year, the routine administration being carried out by a Permanent Commission of 15 members proposed by the FRELIMO Central Committee.

However, much of the actual drafting and implementation of policy lay with the Council of Ministers, who were appointed and convened by the President, although technically answerable to the People's Assembly.

Assemblies were also established at provincial, district, city and local levels. It was made their task to legislate on matters of exclusive interest to their particular area. The Provincial Assemblies had been established in terms of the constitution, but all the lower legislatures were set up only after FRELIMO's Third Party Congress in 1977. The appropriate FRELIMO official automatically headed each level of the assembly structure, and by this means help closely to link the legislature to the party. Ordinary members were elected by electoral colleges except at the lowest level, the Local Assemblies, where they were directly elected by means of popular adult suffrage (Torp 1989: 67-69).

Party

The FRELIMO party structure itself closely paralleled the legislature, further helping to link the party to the state. The importance of the party is firmly stressed in the constitution, which describes FRELIMO as the "leading force of the State and Society" (Article 3). Having operated as a mass organisation for much of the pre-independence period, it was transformed into a vanguard party at the Third Party Congress in 1977, where it also formally adopted Marxism-Leninism as its official ideology. These changes did not really come as a surprise to those familiar with FRELIMO, as it had begun adopting an increasingly Marxist-Leninist tone as early as 1970, and the new vanguard role of the party was more in keeping with this new political line (Egero 1986: 125; Scott 1986: 40).

The decision to adopt a vanguard approach referred mostly to the party's preeminent role in society and meant in practice more a greater selectivity in the admission of members than to strictly limiting its size. Everyone who had joined FRELIMO prior

to the end of the liberation war in 1974 was given automatic admission, but prospective candidates since then had to undergo a vigorous selection process involving public discussion and debate, at their place of work or residence, about their personal history and politics. Party membership was effectively denied to all those who had in any way collaborated with the colonial government, to polygynists, religious leaders and private business people (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 123).

In 1977 party membership stood at only 15 000. FRELIMO worked hard from 1978 onwards to establish the party throughout the country so as to enable it to fulfil the function set out by itself as the supreme source of government policy and activity (Egero 1987: 110). The lowest level of the party were the cells, consisting of three or more members, and organised at the workplace and neighbourhood. Above these were committees organised on a sub-district, district and provincial level. Representatives of these are sent to the Party Congress, theoretically the highest party body, that is meant to meet every 5 years to define policy, develop guidelines to direct the state, and elect a new Central Committee (Partido Frelimo 1983b: Part IV).

The actual running of the party is carried out by the Central Committee and Politburo. The Central Committee is elected by the Congress and meets twice a year. It originally consisted of 67 members but was expanded in 1983 to 130 members (Torp 1989: 66). Theoretically it wields a tremendous amount of power, although most of its important functions, especially between meetings, are assumed by the Politburo (*Africa Contemporary Record* 1985-1986: B674).

This originally comprised 10 members whose official task it is to organise Central Committee meetings and appoint party leaders at Central Committee and Provincial level (Partido Frelimo 1983b: Part IV). However, much of the general decision making power, both in the party and in the government, seems to reside in this body whose membership has remained remarkably stable since independence (Torp 1989: 66). Within both the Politburo and the Central Committee there is great stress on unity. Matters are discussed until consensus is reached and open dissent is seldom seen (Ottaway 1988b: 215).

However, it was anticipated that most peoples participation in politics would occur through the medium of mass organisations, described by a report to the Third Party Congress as being "a school of democratic life and organised participation by the People". The first of these, the Organisation of Mozambican Women (OMM) had been formed prior to independence, and it was joined by Organisation of Mozambican Youth (OJM) in 1977. An additional organisation to accommodate workers, The Organisation of Mozambican Workers (OTM) was planned, but did not get off the ground until 1983 (Egero 1987: 11), largely because of disorganisation within the lowest level structures, the work-place based Production Councils, which were often seen by workers as mere arms of management (*Keesings Contemporary Archives* February 1982: 31330)

State Administration

The obstacles FRELIMO faced in building its party structures were severe, but they paled in comparison to those involved in keeping the machinery of state moving. At independence the country was in chaos as a result of the war and the subsequent rapid and wholesale departure of the Portuguese. The burdens of the government were added to when, in 1976, FRELIMO nationalised the land, hospitals, schools, communications, transport and all banking and financial institutions (Luke 1982: 433).

In addition there was a shortage of professionally trained Africans and the illiteracy rate in general stood at over 90%. FRELIMO itself had relatively few resources and was very short of cadres to carry out mobilisation and assume control of administrative structures. They partly overcame these problems by means of grupos dinamizadores (GD's) described in the previous chapter. However, soon after independence many of the functions of the GD's were assumed by more formalised party structures (see Collins 1978).

Despite FRELIMO's aims of bringing about a complete transformation of all aspects of Mozambican society, the shortage of trained and experienced cadres meant that they had to keep intact large sectors of the Portuguese colonial administration which had always been characterised by a high degree of centralisation. This, combined with

FRELIMO's own approach to administration, to some extent influenced by their Soviet allies central planning, meant that there was always a strong tendency toward the concentration of power and decision-making at the centre (see Galli 1987: 19-30 and Young 1988: 166-174). This was enhanced from 1978 onwards following the creation of a National Planning Commission.

Human Rights

Assuming power immediately after one of the more repressive colonial regimes, the new FRELIMO government took seriously the task of improving human rights within Mozambique. The new constitution reflected this concern and, in particular, FRELIMO's desire to do away with all forms of racism, sexism and traditional practices that permitted peoples exploitation and oppression (Article 4 and 26). FRELIMO seemed especially concerned to improve the position of women, and not only sought to promote their participation in all spheres of public life but also, for example, made bridewealth and polygyny illegal.

However, despite its commitment in the constitution to the maintenance of "individual freedoms", specifically "freedom to practice....a religion" (Article 33), the government took quite a hostile attitude toward religious followers and leaders. Amongst other actions taken, a lot of church property was nationalised, Muslim dress, education and the call to prayer was restricted and thousands of Jehovah's Witnesses were exiled to the rural areas (Maier 1988).

Foreign Relations

In its relations with the wider world, the FRELIMO government strongly committed itself to solidarity with all those nations struggling against "imperialism and colonialism" (Constitution of the People's Republic of Mozambique 1975: Article 20) as well as with its "natural allies the socialist countries" (Article 22).

Mozambique became a member of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and automatically assumed an important role as a Front Line State. It also joined the

Nonaligned Movement but none the less sought closer ties with the Eastern Bloc and the Soviet Union. In 1977 it signed a 20 year Treaty of Friendship with the Soviets (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 181) and from then on became one of their most important Third World allies. The Soviet Union, along with East Germany played an important role in helping FRELIMO reorganise the political system, party structure and the military after independence (Campbell 1988: 103-104).

Mozambique's relations with the West did not get off to such a good start. In reaction to North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) support for Portugal during its war against FRELIMO, neither the United States nor West Germany was invited to the independence celebrations and shortly after this both countries' consulates were closed down and Mozambique was subsequently banned from getting aid from the United States (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 184-185).

Although its trade ties with western nations remained important, Mozambique distanced itself somewhat by refusing to become a signatory to the Lome Convention which links African countries to the European Economic Community. This was largely due to Mozambique's hesitation in agreeing to the Berlin Clause incorporated in the Convention. This clause acknowledges West Germany's right to West Berlin, and was hence unacceptable to Mozambique's close ally, East Germany. However Mozambique's refusal to join the Convention had the effect of cutting the country off from EEC administered aid (Henriksen 1978: 446) which was unfortunate given the state of Mozambique's economy at independence.

Changes to the economic structure

On the economic scene, the FRELIMO government was, perhaps even more than most newly independent African governments, particularly concerned with the economic transformation of the country. The policies which they introduced following independence had been strongly influenced by their experience in the liberation struggle, particularly in the liberated areas (Young 1988: 165-6), where they had attempted to revolutionise social and productive relationships.

Reflecting the predominantly rural nature of Mozambique, the Constitution described agriculture as being the economic "base". However, industry was to be the "propelling and decisive factor" in the economy (Article 6). The importance of the state sector was also emphasised, being described as the "leading and driving" force behind the national economy (Article 10).

These basic principles were fleshed out at FRELIMO's Third Congress in 1977, which adopted a set of Economic and Social Directives. These summed up the insights gained by FRELIMO during the liberation struggle and put them forward as the new basic development guidelines (Meyns 1981: 49). The Congress also called for the drawing up of a 10 year development plan, the *Plano Prospectiva Indicativo* (PPI). This was produced, eventually, in 1981 and, although it was adopted by the People's Assembly, it was never published (Gunn 1988: 156; Torp 1989: 35). However, the principles underlying most of its policies were strongly reflected in those actually implemented in Mozambique's first period of independence (Saul 1985: 110).

The plan called for a massive increase in state involvement in agriculture. The Third Congress had argued that the state sector should be "dominant and determinant" and that they should receive the bulk of all technical resources (in Hanlon 1989: 95). Part of the argument was that the countryside needed to be modernised and agricultural production dramatically increased, and state farms were seen as being the most effective way of achieving this (Hanlon 1989: 100). Hence in the first few years of independence the government took over previously settler owned estates and farms and turned them into large, highly mechanised state farms (Meyns 1981: 61).

There was also much emphasis on the collectivisation of agriculture. This was to occur mostly by means of communal villages or *aldeias comunais* (Meyns 1981: 60). It was hoped that this strategy would both assist in increasing agricultural output and bring about rural transformation. It was hoped that by centralising the population it would be easier to provide rural dwellers with health, education and other basic services (Henriksen 1978: 452). By 1980, roughly 1000 communal villages had been established (Meyns 1981: 62).

Industrialisation of the economy was a further important aspect of the development strategy. The emphasis was to be on the strengthening of consumer industries, import replacement and the decentralisation of industry (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 163). Particular emphasis was to be placed on the development of heavy industry, particularly iron and steel (World Bank 1985: iv).

A new distribution system was set up to replace the departed Portuguese traders. The core of the system was the network of state owned people's shops, or *lojas da povo*, but the establishment of consumer cooperatives was also encouraged (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 159). Although the state never sought to completely replace private traders, and indeed even started divesting itself of smaller retail businesses as early as 1979- 1980, it did have a monopoly of all wholesale trade and maintained a firm control over the allocation of all foreign exchange with which all imports were purchased. The state also established a monopsonistic agricultural marketing board, Agricom, which was responsible for the marketing of all agricultural produce (Kyle 1991: 640).

The importance of centralised planning was constantly stressed. The Central Committee's report to the Third Congress argued that "the building of socialism demands that the economy be centrally planned and directed by the state" (quoted in Young 1988: 170). The National Planning Commission, set up soon after the Third Congress in 1978 played a central role in this task. The Commission centralised the planning process for the economy and set production targets, both for the national economy and for the different sectors of the economy (Young 1988: 175).

The government sought to pursue an ambitious policy regarding the expansion of social and welfare services. Education and health care both received particular attention. In the educational sphere a number of campaigns were launched around the expansion of school enrolment and adult literacy. By 1981 significant progress had already been made with school attendance almost double what it had been at independence and illiteracy reputedly down to around 75% (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 139). On the health front, FRELIMO tried to overcome the crisis it had faced

at independence when there were apparently only 87 medical doctors in the country. In particular it tried to expand health care in the rural areas by means of primary health care clinics and community based health workers or "barefoot doctors" (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 139-141).

In terms of its economic linkages with the wider world very little has been said in the literature on post-independence Mozambique. Although not completely hostile to foreign investment, the new government was naturally anxious that this should occur within the general development frameworks they had adopted and that it should fit in with their own plans. Whilst both aid and investment were received from the West, upon which Mozambique continued to remain heavily independent in terms of trade (Brochmann & Ofstad 1990: 21), it decided not to join the Lome Convention (Henriksen 1978: 446). They did seek to join the rival socialist oriented Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA or COMECON)(Brochmann & Ofstad 1990: 21), but in 1981 the Soviet Union refused them membership on the grounds that it was not prepared to subsidise Mozambique to the enormous extent that it would have to in order to bring it up to the same level of economic development of the other members (Torp 1989: 72).

The emergence of a crisis in Mozambique

The changes introduced by the new government never really got off the ground as the country was almost immediately plunged into a series of crises, emanating from sources both outside the government's control as well as from a number of the new policies themselves. The war, first with Rhodesia and then with Renamo, the climate and the world economic environment exacerbated the faults inherent within some of the policies and prevented others from ever taking effect. The resultant crises had both political and economic consequences, which were of course interconnected and often compounded one another, but which, for purposes of clarity, I have looked at separately.

The political crisis

At the heart of the political crisis engulfing the new FRELIMO government was the precarious security situation in which it found itself from 1976, and which seems to have become only increasingly worse. However severe these problems were (and indeed are), they ought not to detract from some of the other serious political problems plaguing the state. The decline in political activity and the extent to which representative bodies were not functioning effectively, the corruption and abuse of power and the problems that Mozambique was experiencing in its foreign diplomatic relations, all served to weaken the ability of the government to deal with the other crises, and have had a number of long-lasting consequences.

The war

The state of war that Mozambique found itself in with its westerly neighbour Rhodesia, and the ongoing struggle against the insurgent organisation Renamo, both have the same roots: Mozambique's stand as a Front Line State against the minority white regime in Rhodesia.

This resulted directly in numerous attacks on the country's economic infrastructure by the Rhodesian security forces, as well as a serious loss of revenue, described below. War with Rhodesia also involved attacks on ZANLA camps within Mozambique which further served to disrupt the country.

More insidious was the indirect war begun against the FRELIMO government by the Rhodesians. In 1976 the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) fashioned Renamo (or the Mozambique National Resistance or MNR, as it is sometimes known) as a front organisation to undertake operations against both the Mozambican armed forces and ZANLA. Initially they used former members of the crack anti-insurgent unit, the "flechas" formed and controlled by the Portuguese secret police, the *Policia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado* (PIDE). After independence many of those who had collaborated with the Portuguese fled Mozambique to Rhodesia. Included amongst these was Orlando Cristina (who later became Secretary of Renamo), a former PIDE agent who brought with him many of their files. The

Rhodesians used the information thus gained to blackmail people implicated in the files into joining Renamo (Metz 1986: 492-493).

Further recruits came in the form of deserters from FRELIMO. A number of guerrillas found the transition from liberation organisation to official army a difficult one. A number found themselves in FRELIMO "re-education" camps as a result of discipline problems, corruption, or ideological differences with FRELIMO. Some managed to escape or were released when Rhodesian forces attacked and "liberated" the camps (Fauvet 1984: 114). In addition a number of those who had left FRELIMO to form splinter groups during the crises of the 1960s also came to join Renamo, particularly at leadership level (Thomashaussen 1983: 125-126).

The guerrillas were trained at and initially operated from a camp inside Rhodesia. However, within a few years a permanent base camp had been established inside Mozambique under the command of a former FRELIMO quartermaster jailed for theft, Andre Matsangaiza. He was replaced in 1979 by his deputy, Afonso Dhlakama, after a violent leadership struggle (Fauvet 1984: 114; Metz 1986: 494).

The organisation was kept under the close supervision of the Rhodesians. The military and political wings were kept strictly separate with control of the latter resting almost exclusively in the hands of white Portuguese-speaking ex-Mozambicans. In terms of logistics and support the movement was heavily reliant upon the Rhodesian military who kept the numbers low, numbering approximately only 500 troops by 1980 and their operations were limited to the south and central areas of the country.

However, things improved considerably for Renamo when, following Zimbabwean independence in 1980, the organisation came under the tutelage of South Africa (Fauvet 1984; Metz 1986 and Legum 1986) although there had been some contact between the South African military, Renamo and the Rhodesians prior to Zimbabwean independence (see Flower 1987). The South Africans had three major interests in Renamo and the destabilization of Mozambique. Firstly, South Africa was opposed to the loose grouping of southern African states known as the Southern

African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) formed in Tanzania in 1979 in order primarily to reduce the dependence of its members on the South African economy. SADCC was immediately effective in attracting a lot of international attention and aid to the region and was also a direct affront to President P.W. Botha's own plans to set up a Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS) in which South Africa would be hegemonic. Mozambique played a crucial role in SADCC, particularly in the transport sector, as it provided the only viable alternative routes for the export and import of goods to and from Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi, other than South Africa. Destruction of Mozambique's economic and transport infrastructure would vastly diminish the role it could play in reducing the region's transportation dependence on South Africa, and there is evidence that it is into this role that the SADF anticipated Renamo would fit (see Hall 1990: 58). Secondly, Mozambique represented an example of a Front Line State that had overcome colonial rule and instituted a strategy aimed at socialist transformation. It thus posed something of an ideological threat to the white minority South African regime. Finally the South African military was also concerned that FRELIMO should not play the same role in offering sanctuary and bases to African National Congress (ANC) guerrillas attempting to overthrow the South African government in the same way that they had done with ZANLA in the late 1970s.

To these ends the SADF assumed responsibility for Renamo in April 1980. Renamo personnel and supplies were airlifted out of Zimbabwe by the South African Defence Force and taken, reportedly, to bases in the Transvaal (Legum 1986: 2; Metz 1986: 494). Their new South African mentors apparently provided them with improved training and logistical support as well as allowing the organisation considerably more freedom and independence. Under this new regime Renamo shifted its strategy, focussing far more on economic destabilisation, with particular emphasis on disrupting the country's vital transport network (Fauvet 1984: 116-117). The scope of Renamo's activities also expanded greatly until it was soon operating in nearly the whole country, and not just in the southern and central parts (Metz 1986: 495; Young 1990: 497).

South Africa also encouraged Renamo to improve its international image, important in which was the attempted development of a political and economic programme. Offices were opened in a number of western capitals and a *Manifesto and Programme* was published. In the programme it stated its goals and objectives in quite broad terms, describing itself as firmly opposed to Communism and in favour of a free-market economy (Thomashaussen 1983: 125-126; Renamo Provisional Economic Manifesto for a Free Mozambique, undated). It demanded a government of national unity, the amalgamation of its own forces with those of the government into a single army and democratic elections (Young 1990: 501).

Since 1980 Renamo's activities inside Mozambique have steadily increased, until by 1982 it numbered between 8-10 000 (Hall 1990: 3). Since then it has been active throughout Mozambique, claiming at times to control up to 85% of the rural areas (although the extent and nature of this "control" has been disputed, as will be discussed below).

The organisation is, in theory, controlled by a National Council (which includes a civilian cabinet) under the leadership of a Secretary-General, but real power is in the hands of its President, Dhlakama, who is based in Mozambique (Minter 1989; 14; Dhlakama message to the US, press conference, Washington 28 October 1986 in USA 1987: 81). He also heads Renamo's military wing which is conventionally hierarchically structured and divided at regional, provincial and battalion level. Close radio contact is maintained between the different levels of the military structure (Minter 1989: 9-12).

Renamo's methods of operation have been described from eye-witness accounts of refugees and documented for the US State Department by Robert Gersony. He describes three basic modes of interaction between Renamo and the local populace. In some places, labelled as "destruction areas", Renamo limits itself to military attacks especially on economic and FRELIMO targets. In other areas, which Gersony labels "tax areas", Renamo forcibly extracts food, clothing and services, particularly labour for transport, from the local populace. Finally, in areas where it constitutes a

particularly heavy presence, often having a base nearby, or "control areas", Renamo forces most of the population to work for it under extremely brutal conditions. The people are usually engaged in growing food for Renamo forces, although they are also often used as porters to carry supplies often over very long distances (see Gersony 1988).

Throughout the country, Renamo's actions are characterised by brutality, often of an almost unbelievably extreme nature. Numerous large scale massacres have been carried out but the violence they commit is often of an intense nature. There are reports of Renamo fighters crushing the skulls of their victim (USA 1987: 44) and a report released by the Southern African Catholic Bishops Conference describes atrocities such as people being beheaded, heads being stuck on spikes and paraded around villages and children being boiled alive in front of their parents (Africa Research Bulletin 21, 9, October 1984: 7363; see also Gersony 1988 and Young 1990: 500). Even against material infrastructure, Renamo's violence is extreme. An eye-witness report described a Renamo attack on a town as being an "annihilative frenzy: each tile of a mosaic smashed, each pane of a glass block wall painstakingly shattered" (Finnegan 1989: 48).

Given this style of operation and this level of brutality it seems unlikely that Renamo would have established any "local" roots. In many ways it has not, having to rely heavily on forced recruitment in order to provide itself with person power (see Minter 1989). However, it has recently been argued that it is wrong to see it merely as a tool of external interests (see Hall 1990, Young 1990 and Morgan 1990). This remains important although Renamo's external ties have become far more diversified since its days as a Rhodesian and then South African protege. Since the early to mid 1980s Renamo has also received support of various types from Malawi, possibly connected to President Hastings Banda's long-standing claims to parts of northern Mozambique or his connections with South Africa (Isaacman 1988: 27-31). Former members of the white Portuguese business community who either lost or abandoned property in Mozambique at independence have also played a role in supporting Renamo (Gunn 1985: 3). West German interests (Gunn 1985: 4), right-wing organisations in the US

(*Africa Confidential* 29, 22, 1988 and 28, 25, 1987), Kenya (*Africa Confidential* 31, 11, 1990) as well as through the Comores and Oman, though the exact support of these funds are unknown (Gunn 1986: 4). There is little Renamo relies mostly upon forced recruitment. No doubt the famine and general chaos in the rural areas contribute greatly to its membership. Because of the weakness of its political programme there seems little in the way of common issues around which Renamo troops are mobilised. In the early days of Renamo, Shona speakers were well represented in the organisation, particularly at leadership level. However, with the growth of Renamo since 1980 there does not seem to be any particular ethnic identity to the organisation. However, at times there have been indications that Renamo has tried to drum up popular resentment to the presence of a number of non Mozambicans in important positions within FRELIMO (*Africa Concord* 16 January 1986: 103). Similarly, FRELIMO's erosion of the power and authority of traditional chiefs and their hostile approach to religion have seemed to have played a role in motivating Renamo, but the evidence for this is patchy and it is unclear how much of an issue these things really are (see Hall 1990).

Despite the fact that Renamo make so little effort to actively win support from the rural population, the FRELIMO government did not have much success in dealing with the threat that Renamo posed to their sovereignty. Much of the responsibility for this lies with the military which, after its transformation in 1975 from a guerrilla movement to a conventional army, found itself unable to cope with the low-intensity type of war that Renamo wages. Morale amongst the troops was also been something of a problem, due largely to the army's inability to get supplies to the operational areas because of either transportation or funding problems. The FRELIMO government increasingly had to look outside the country for help. Zimbabwean troops came to play an important role, particularly in providing vital security along the Beira corridor connecting the port of Beira with Mutare on Zimbabwe's eastern border. By 1984 there were up to 10 000 Zimbabwean troops in Mozambique (Isaacman 1988: 28-31)

Despite this assistance, FRELIMO has been forced to divert a lot of attention and resources to the military. During the 1980s, defence regularly came to consume over 40% of the budget (Isaacman 1988: 34) and security concerns were reputedly behind many of the shifts and indeed splits within the Politburo. However, because both of the nature of the war and the inability of the Mozambican military to deal with Renamo, the government was also forced to deal with the matter on a diplomatic level. Although often denying that it would ever enter into talks with Renamo, the government started some indirect negotiations as early as 1984. It also sought to improve its relationship with South Africa, hoping that by so doing it would deprive Renamo of its most important source of support. To this end it signed the Nkomati Accord with South Africa in 1984. Implicit in the terms of the Accord was an agreement that Mozambique would withdraw active support for opponents of the South African state operating out of Mozambique, in return for which South Africa would cease supporting Renamo. These efforts were unsuccessful in bringing an end to or even a lessening of Renamo instigated violence which continued to grow in scale and intensity.

Questions have been raised as to the extent to which Renamo can actually be said to control its forces in the field, and to what extent the situation has not, in parts, lapsed into one of social banditry. In either case the ever deteriorating security situation significantly contributed to the political crisis in Mozambique both in terms of a direct challenge to the legitimacy and sovereignty of the FRELIMO government but also more indirectly in the way that it has fed into the breakdown of political and economic activity.

The breakdown in political activity

One of the clearest signs of political crisis was the decline in political activity both within the state and the party to the point where one observer commented that politics just was not happening (*Africa Contemporary Record* 27, 1984-1985: B676). One of the results of this was the breakdown of political structures and the resultant increase in the centralisation of power within the central FRELIMO structures.

Partly as a result of a shortage of suitably trained people and partly as a result of Renamo activity, the legislative structure set up by the government after independence soon ran into problems. Local Assemblies were a popular target for Renamo attacks which helped worsen an already precarious situation with deputies widely dispersed and very short of material resources and expertise (*Mozambiquefile*, 150, January 1989: 9). Many of these structures met irregularly, if at all (*Africa Contemporary Record* 27, 1984-1985: B676), a result of which was that questions were raised as to the extent to which these structures at all played a meaningful role and did anything more than rubber-stamp decisions taken higher up (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 132).

A similar decline was apparent within party structures. By 1982, problems in the functioning of party structures, particularly at the lower levels, were discussed in the FRELIMO Central Committee (*Keesings Contemporary Archives* 29, No. 5, May 1983: 3211). At FRELIMO's Fourth Congress in 1983 it was acknowledged that one of the reasons for the spread of Renamo was the weakness, and in places the absence, of the party in the rural areas (Campbell 1984: 847). These problems emerged because the growth of party structures had not kept pace with the growth in numbers, having grown by 635% between 1977 and 1983 (Scott 1986: 97), and the party's geographical extent. The poor quality of available cadres was also acknowledged as a problem (Partido Frelimo 1983a: 83).

The popular organisations such as OJM, OMM and OTM which were meant to have played an important role in accommodating the masses into mainstream political activity also did not live up to expectations. Their activities turned out to be not very meaningful, often overly "ritualized" (Scott 1986: 130), rigid in their style of operation (Egero 1987: 111) and, like much of the rest of the party, overly bureaucratic (Egero 1987: 117). Membership of these organisations, for example OMM, had increased rapidly at first but had tailed off quite rapidly (*AIM Information Bulletin* 141, April 1989: 9). This was for a number of reasons, the most important of which seems to have been the fact that the popular organisations lacked legitimacy and were seen rather as mere mouthpieces for the upper echelons of state and party or as

instruments of control (Roesch 1988: 28). They lacked any semblance of autonomy (see *Mozambiquefile* 157, 1989: 9) and did not function as the vehicles for mass participation for which they had been intended.

The decline was even apparent at the highest levels of the party. Between 1983 and 1986 the Central Committee, which was meant to meet at least twice yearly, had only met on four occasions. The Politburo and People's Assembly had also not been functioning as regularly as they had been legislated to do (*Africa Contemporary Record* 28, 1985-1986: B674).

The fact that the party was not working quite as anticipated, contributed to a further problem, an inadequate distinction between itself and the government. This exacerbated a situation already made bad by the extent to which state and party structures paralleled and interlocked with each other (see Campbell 1984: 854; Egero 1986: 119 and World Bank 1985: 20). Too often all the best Party personnel were in government, weakening the Party and to a large degree undermining both the efficiency and the legitimacy of those government structures, which often became seen as mere extensions of the party.

This weakness of both party and government, especially away from the major urban centres (see Egero 1987: 114), meant that political power was highly centralised. As state and party capacity declined further, the balance of power between political core and periphery became worse (see Egero 1987: 118). The gap between what the leadership wanted done, and what was possible, became greater and greater leading to ever increasing "commandism" and "paternalism" (see *Mozambiquefile* 157, August 1989: 9; 153, April 1989: 14). This was exacerbated by the growing security crisis in the rural areas, in the face of which the government and party structures became increasingly less consultative (see Mittelman 1990: 10).

There was always a tension between what FRELIMO sought to achieve in terms of popular democracy and the thoroughgoing nature of the changes they sought to bring about in the harsh context in which they were working (Saul 1990b: 69). However, the

inadequate functioning of state and party apparatus, whether due to the war, insufficient trained personnel or an overly bureaucratized elitist organisational culture, led to a real decline in meaningful political activity and a fading of the democratic ideal with which FRELIMO had started.

Corruption

It was further eroded by corruption and abuse of power within state and party apparatuses. This receives relatively little attention in the literature on Mozambique which always seems much more free of this problem than many of its neighbours. However, occasional references to problems in the early independence period have emerged. Shifts within the Council of Ministers and the Politburo in the early 1980s have been put down to accusations of power abuse (*Africa Research Bulletin* 21, 5, June 15, 1984: 7269; *Economist* 291, 7347, 23-29 June 1984: 58). Similarly, corrupt practices are widely acknowledged to have been behind the Political and Organisational Offensive launched by Machel in late 1980 by which it was hoped to root out some of the problems plaguing state and party bureaucracies (Egero 1987: 115). Despite these efforts, by the Fourth Party Congress in 1983, bribery, nepotism, favouritism, racism and tribalism in the state apparatus were identified as some of the most serious problems facing the country (Partido Frelimo 1983c: 21-22).

Although these examples reflect a readiness on the part of the leadership to recognise and deal with the problem, this is perhaps misleading. It has been argued that as a result of their shared experiences during the liberation struggle, Machel felt too close to most of the leadership to be able to take effective executive action (Saul 1990a: 22). This is borne out by the fact that apart from occasional campaigns like the Offensive relatively little real action was taken. Cabinet members were shuffled and reshuffled but none of the top people was ever permanently removed from their post or expelled. As one observer commented, "FRELIMO promotes and demotes but it only rarely throws any cadre into the wilderness" (*Africa Contemporary Record* 28, 1985-1986: B677).

This fact, together with the enormous emphasis within the upper levels of FRELIMO upon unity and consensus, possibly reflects a response to the violent and damaging conflicts that the party went through in the 1960s. By keeping the membership of the main decision-making bodies fairly constant and limiting the number of powerful people moving out of the Central Committee and Politburo orbit, a degree of stability was maintained both within the core bodies of the party and within Mozambican politics in general. This was probably achieved partly by the strength and charisma of Machel's leadership, by the strong bonds between the main leaders most of whom were veterans of the liberation struggle and partly by a unity borne out of shared opposition to the threat posed by Renamo. However, although conflict and particularly the emergence of splinter groups was minimised, the result was that there was little new blood in the party leadership and consensus became almost as much of a weakness as a strength and there are suggestions that the party lapsed into a kind of "groupthink". Thus the domestic political problems affecting Mozambique have perpetuated themselves.

Human Rights

Despite its energetic efforts to secure radical improvements in most aspects of human rights, the FRELIMO government's record began deteriorating fairly early on. Mozambicans faced strict controls on their movements and required permits to travel around the country (the *Economist Human Rights Report* quoted in USA 1987: 105). The number of detainees was consistently high (*Amnesty International Report* 1985: 69-70), many of whom were held without trial and many of whom were subject to torture (*Amnesty International Report* 1989: 70; USA 1987: 28). Cases connected to state security were tried by a body known as the Revolutionary Military Tribunal, established in 1979. Although it was anticipated that it would be an interim measure, it remained in place until 1989 and did not recognise rights of habeus corpus nor did it have a mechanism to deal with appeals (*Amnesty International* 1989: 71). The death penalty was also reintroduced in 1979 and in 1983 the government started publicly flogging people convicted of a range of crimes including economic offenses, such as trading on the parallel market, and minor offenses, for example not showing sufficient "respect" to the authorities (*Keesings Contemporary Archives* 29, 5, May 1983: 32117;

Amnesty International Report 1985: 72). By 1983 Renamo rebels were being publicly executed in the presence of government ministers (*Africa Research Bulletin* 20, 1, February 1983: 6696).

The timing and nature of these human rights abuses suggests that they are connected to the deteriorating security situation. The travel restrictions, detentions, torture, use of a military tribunal and the reintroduction of the death penalty are all signs of FRELIMO's efforts to cope with an increased threat, first from Rhodesia and then Renamo. The introduction of public executions and floggings is also possibly connected to the war and the state's efforts to counter people's fear of Renamo with an even greater fear, by example, of the consequences of collaboration. The serious and public crackdown on people convicted of smuggling or dealing on the parallel market reflects, to a far lesser extent, the government's efforts to cope with trying to restructure and reorient the economy in the face of economic crisis and limited administrative infrastructure. Clearly it was contingent rather than ideological factors motivating the decline in human rights as the government's attitude toward religion, which had been hostile from the start did not deteriorate further and indeed improved somewhat (see Hall 1990:47).

Diplomatic crises

Although officially pursuing a non-aligned policy with regards to foreign affairs, the FRELIMO government as a result of its ideological convictions and their experiences with foreign support during the liberation war, had always allied itself quite closely with socialist countries (see Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 172). Machel once commented that "socialist countries were and are at all times our safe rearguard" (in Jinadu 1988: 16). This attitude was further reflected in the friendship treaties that the government signed with, for example the Soviet Union, in the increase in trade between Mozambique and socialist countries in the first five years of independence, and in particular, in the important role that the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc countries played in reshaping the Mozambique military in an effort to deal with the threats from Rhodesia and Renamo. The Soviet Union especially came to play a vital

role, being the most important source of military aid to Mozambique (Jinadu 1988: 32).

But it would be wrong to see Mozambique as a mere "client" of the Soviet Union or other socialist countries (Steele 1985: 285). This is evidenced both by its voting pattern at the United Nations and by its consistent refusal to grant the Soviet Union the requested naval base in Mozambican waters (Gunn 1988: 150), sticking to its principle of attempting to keep the Indian Ocean a "non-nuclear zone of peace" (Constitution of the People's Republic of Mozambique 1975: Article 24). Its foreign policy was always more nationalist than partisan in character (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 171). It kept its options open, for example by seeking bilateral aid agreements with a number of Western nations such as the United Kingdom, Italy, France and Canada (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 186). But despite this, its exports to and imports from OECD countries dropped appreciably (Jinadu 1988: 37).

However, from the beginning the FRELIMO government's relationship with the United States was problematic. This was despite the promise offered by an amicable meeting between Jimmy Carter and Samora Machel in 1978 (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 185). The initial hostility with which the two countries had regarded each other at Mozambique's independence worsened during the first years of the stridently anti-communist Reagan administration. The 1981 expulsion from Maputo by the Mozambican government of suspected Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) spies, and the United States refusal to replace their ambassador or allow Mozambique to import much needed aircraft and agricultural equipment from the US, reflected the extent to which the relationship had deteriorated (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 187). During a 1981 visit to Mozambique, United States Secretary of State for Africa Chester Crocker commented that he found the government "harshly confrontational and critical of virtually everything we did and stood for" (United States 1987: 3).

The result of these diplomatic problems was that the obstacles that the United States had placed in the way of Mozambique's access to Congressional and multilateral finance and aid remained in place. Unfortunately for Mozambique, this was a gap that

could not be plugged with assistance from the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc. Aid flows from the socialist countries were far below Mozambique's needs, and even the military aid that Mozambique did receive was often outmoded (Jinadu 1988: 33). The Soviet Union's refusal in 1981 to allow Mozambique to join the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) on the grounds that it was not prepared to subsidise Mozambique to the enormous extent that it would have to in order to bring it up to the same level of economic development of the other members, was a serious blow for the FRELIMO government (Torp 1989: 72):

It thus found itself in the invidious situation of being on bad terms with an enormously influential United States and in an almost "second-class citizen" type of relationship with its "natural allies" the socialist countries. The consequences of this were serious given the extent and severity of the economic crisis into which the economy, by the early 1980s, had lapsed.

The economic crisis

The changes and new policies introduced by FRELIMO were implemented against the context of the serious underdevelopment that colonialism had wrought and the trauma of the transition to independence. Despite this, with one or two minor setbacks, the first six years of FRELIMO government, between 1975 and 1981, saw a modest increase in GDP as production disturbed by the anti-colonial war resumed (*Africa Research Bulletin* 1984: 7222). This growth occurred also in spite of a drought in northern Mozambique, serious floods in central and southern Mozambique in 1976 and 1978 (Saul 1985: 104) as well as the severe problems that Mozambique began to experience with its neighbours, Rhodesia and South Africa. However, as the economic effects of the war and some of the new policies began to make themselves shown, it soon became clear that the country was mired in a severe economic crisis from which the problems inherent in its politics, particularly its relations with the outside world, prevented it from easily escaping.

Economic effects of the war

As a result of the government's decision to implement the United Nations' embargo on trade with the minority Rhodesian regime, Mozambique lost substantial port and rail transit revenues, estimated to be in the region of US\$150 million per year (*Mozambique News*, no 136, 1987: 6) amounting to a total of approximately US\$550 million (*Keesings Contemporary Archives* 1980: 30611).

In addition, partly in response to changing labour needs and partly as a result of the South African government's hostility to an independent Mozambique, the number of Mozambicans working on South African mines was reduced from 120 000 in 1975 to 45 000 in 1982. This, combined with the fact that South Africa ended the agreement they had had with the Portuguese, whereby part of the miners wages were paid to the government in gold at a preferential rate, meant that in the seven year period to 1982, Mozambique suffered a US\$3,2 billion loss in anticipated income. South Africa also substantially reduced the amount of goods it routed through Maputo, resulting in a further loss of earnings for Mozambique of approximately US\$250 million (Isaacman 1988: 21).

More dramatically, the Mozambican economy suffered from the direct attacks against economic infrastructure by the Rhodesian army and its surrogate, Renamo (Munslow 1984: 12). The war also contributed indirectly to a loss of income, for example from the important tourist industry and from lost sales of Cahora Bassa power (*Mozambique News* 136, 1987: 2).

Surprisingly all these setbacks did not prevent some modest growth in the economy in this period. However this fact, although often quoted, especially by the Mozambican government, is somewhat misleading. It obscures the fact that the economy grew at a rate less than the birth rate (*Africa Research Bulletin* 20, 11, May 1983: 6840) and it also serves to hide the fact that, in real terms, production had not caught up with what it had been before the disruption of the liberation war (see table below).

The agricultural and industrial decline 1973 - 1980

	1973	1980
Industrial output	100	77
Marketed agricultural output (volume)		
cashew	100	45
cotton	100	45
maize	100	54
rice	100	37

* Constant 1980 prices

1973 is taken as the last "normal" year of production

adapted from Brochmann & Ofstad 1990: 19

These declines occurred partly because of the war but also because of the ill conceived or poorly implemented nature of many of FRELIMO's economic policies.

FRELIMO's economic policy problems

The state farms which were meant to constitute the "dominant and determinant" aspect of the agricultural sector proved to be a huge disaster. They tended to be unmanageably large, for example one project in Southern Mozambique, the Limpopo agro-industrial complex was formed from 1 500 previously settler owned farms. They were also overly mechanised despite the fact that there were few people trained in the use of the equipment which was also often inappropriate for the job. The state planners had misunderstood the labour requirements of the farms and the labour structure of the rural areas with the result that the farms often found themselves without an adequate labour source (Munslow 1984: 213). Hence, despite the fact that over 90% of all government spending on agriculture went into these state farms, they were unproductive and ran at a loss. On average they produced a mere 20% of agricultural output (Raikes 1984: 102-103; Isaacman 1988: 21).

The second aspect of the government's agricultural policy, the collectivisation of agriculture into communal villages, was equally unsuccessful. Collectivisation often proved unpopular with the local people and on occasion the government had to resort to force. However, they too contributed little to increasing agricultural production and

their total output is said to have halved between 1979 and 1981 (Hanlon 1989: 101). The cooperatives tended to be mismanaged, were insufficiently funded by the state, and often badly positioned (Munslow 1984: 210-15; Isaacman 1988: 20). Hence they too landed up contributing very little to agricultural output.

Because all the government's energy and funding was being ploughed into state farms and collective villages, the small scale family sector which provided the bulk of agricultural production was neglected and they received practically no support. Family sector output also suffered the effects of pricing policies biased in favour of urban consumers, which gave very low returns for agricultural produce. These low prices discouraged production as it was often just not worth while selling crops on the open market as the returns were either lower than costs, or were substantially below that which could be gained on the black market (Munslow 1984: 215-217; Raikes 1984: 95; Munslow & O'Keefe 1984: 19-21) .

The shortage of consumer goods and agricultural inputs such as hoes, seeds and fertiliser acted as a further disincentive. The lack of these goods was in part a result of government import policies which emphasised the capital goods needs of heavy industry and the requirements of the highly mechanised state farms above the more modest needs of the small scale farmers and consumers (Munslow 1984: 215-17).

The absence of these goods in the rural areas was also the result of inadequacies in the marketing and transportation systems. Trucks and the spare parts to maintain them were either not imported or allocated to the marketing people in sufficient quantities, leading to situations where the goods were available in the cities but could not be transported to the rural areas or where agricultural produce rotted because it could not be taken to market to be sold (Munslow 1984: 215-217). Many parts of the country had reverted to barter due to this breakdown in the marketing structure and the growth of the parallel market or *candonga* (Mackintosh 1986: 562).

The net result of these policies was a severe decline in marketed agricultural produce leading to severe food shortages approaching famine conditions in some areas.

The industrial policies adopted by FRELIMO in the first years after independence did little to achieve their goals of import substitution, closer linkages between agriculture and industry and decentralisation. Priority was given to the creation of new, usually very large projects often funded from outside the country. These were often built with little thought given to real needs and the availability of suitably trained personnel, domestic raw materials and foreign exchange (Torp 1989: 41-4).

The more generalised roots of these problems in agricultural, marketing and industrial policies and their execution lie in the way that planning was carried out. Most of the problems seem to stem from the over centralisation of policy making and the great extent to which the policies are premised on larger, often quite vague goals such as the transformation and socialisation of the economy rather than on actual conditions.

Hence one of the major criticisms of the FRELIMO government's management of the economy during this period is its lack of attention to financial viability or general resource availability on either a macro, sectoral level or a micro, enterprise level. This was reinforced by the relative weakness and at times absence of financial and budgetary controls leading to serious overspending (IMF 1986: 2).

These problems were exacerbated by the highly centralised nature of the economic management system which was structured around the National Planning Commission. The planning process itself was detailed and complex and tended to be very hierarchical in nature, stressing vertical rather than horizontal linkages (IMF 1986: 2; World Bank 1985: vi). Also, there was far too much emphasis on huge projects (Saul 1985: 110).

Conclusion

By 1982 it was already clear that Mozambique was in trouble economically. In that year the economy experienced negative growth of approximately 7% (Hanlon 1989: 86) and for the first time it could not meet the interest payments on its foreign debts (Brochmann 1990: 21). In 1983 the government did not publish a budget, a clear sign that something was very wrong (Hanlon 1989: 88)

The decline in production and the growing costs of the war created a need for extensive foreign borrowing. However, due to the fact that Mozambique was not a member of the IMF or World Bank, its access to multi-lateral credit was severely restricted. Its access to aid administered by the United States Congress and the EEC was also blocked. Mozambique thus had to rely either on bilateral loans at considerably higher interest rates or else loans from private banks. It was able to get some financing from more amenable multilateral bodies such as OPEC or the African Development Bank but these constituted only a very small portion of the funds it required (*Africa Research Bulletin* 1984: 7222; Miech-Chatenay 1986: 53).

However, corresponding to this need for foreign money, the general economic decline and the over-valued exchange rate meant that exports and export earnings were decreasing. In addition the prices fetched on the world markets by Mozambique's primary products began to fall precipitously. The average price of Mozambique's exports fell by approximately 11% in 1982 alone (Hanlon 1989: 87). Hence the money to pay off the loans as they became due was not available. A report released by the Mozambican government in 1984 described the position vis a vis debt repayment as "precarious". Indeed, by that time debt service payments, alone, amounted to over half what Mozambique earned from exports (*Africa Research Bulletin* 1984: 7222).

Hence by 1983-84 the Mozambican government found itself in an unenviable situation. On all levels and due to a whole range of factors, described above, production was declining. Economic assistance from outside the country was limited and hence trying to address the causes of these limitations by means of reform became an obvious option. Also, by this time, a number of the mistakes and the problems inherent in the policies had become apparent to members of the FRELIMO hierarchy and so reforms to address these were increasingly called for (Munslow 1984).

However, the severity of the security and economic crises which precipitated the call for reform in Mozambique, also had the effect of obscuring the very real political decay which had occurred. The result was that the reform was always going to address

only the more obvious aspects of the economic and security crises, largely ignoring the political decay. Further, because of the way politics had become so centralised, the reform itself would occur in a top down fashion.

CHAPTER 4

REFORM AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN MOZAMBIQUE 1983-1991

Introduction

Finding itself with its back against the wall as a result of the war, policy errors and its isolated international position, the FRELIMO government in 1982-1983 embarked on a series of reforms. It thus began a process that was to occupy it into the 1990s. There were two aspects to the reforms. Changes were made on the one hand to the government's internal policies and structures and on the other to its external orientation, in terms of membership of international financial institutions and its relationships with western countries, particularly the United States.

Both strands of reform can be divided into four chronological periods. The first period covers the reforms made between 1982 and 1984. During this time, FRELIMO began to make the first contacts with the IMF, World Bank and EEC, sought to end the war by means of the Nkomati Accord between itself and South Africa and, following its Fourth Party Congress, to introduce a number of economic policy reforms. The second follows directly on from the first and covers the time from 1983 to 1986. During this period, the FRELIMO government tried to implement some of the reforms coming out of the Fourth Congress, but in most cases the ongoing war made this impossible. Nkomati caused Renamo only a minor setback and the violence and rural destruction continued. The result was an increasingly worsening economic situation in the country, against which context the government continued its negotiations with the IMF and World Bank. These and earlier moves were interpreted internationally as a "move" to the West, but at the same time Mozambique maintained its ties with the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc, especially with regard to military aid. The third period covers the years 1987 till 1990, when the IMF and World Bank sponsored structural adjustment programme, the Programa de Reabilitacao Economica (Economic Recovery Programme or PRE), was introduced, with its resultant social tensions and reliance upon external aid. The reforms introduced during the fourth and final period, from 1988 to 1991, are almost exclusively of a political nature. This period covers the Fifth Party Congress in 1989, the start of

direct negotiations between the FRELIMO government and Renamo, the debates around, and the introduction of the new constitution, including the change to a multi-party system.

Against the context of the political and economic crisis provided in the previous chapter, and using the periodisation outlined above, this section describes the continuing reform in Mozambique. I argue that the process should be seen as a single, unbroken one. Although there are divisions between the four different periods, these are blurred and indistinct and serve only to highlight the agglomerative and incremental nature of the reforms. This is further emphasised by the fact that the reforms become both increasingly extreme in degree and political in content. The extent of the reform changed from the relatively mild reforms of 1983-1984 to the introduction of one of Africa's most thoroughgoing structural adjustment programmes in 1987. Similarly, the content of the reform increased from the almost apolitical reforms of the early period, and the consistent refusals to negotiate directly with Renamo, to the far-reaching changes introduced in 1989-1990 and the start of direct negotiations.

It is important to see the reform as a single, incremental process in order fully to understand its causes. These remain essentially the same, from 1982-1983 until 1991: the ever worsening war and economic crisis and the FRELIMO government's efforts to deal with these. Although the crises were of both internal and external origin, the reforms arose largely as a result of international pressure of either a direct or an indirect nature. The government was vulnerable to this pressure partly because of the war, and its complex external dimensions and the army's inability to deal with the threat, but mostly because of its reliance upon and problems in obtaining foreign capital (in the form of aid, loans and debt rescheduling) for its ever weakening economy.

First Period: Early Reform, 1982 to 1984

By 1982 the FRELIMO government found itself in the position of being able neither to pay its international debts nor raise new capital. The credit squeeze came against the context of an extremely weak economy, undermined by decades of colonialism, a traumatic transition to independence, some serious mismanagement, and the escalating war waged by Renamo in the rural areas. Hence 1983-1984 was to prove to be a watershed year for Mozambique (Nowicki 1989: 20). The FRELIMO government brought about a number of changes, both in terms of Mozambique's international position as well as to domestic policies.

Changes on the international front

In a speech made in 1984, President Samora Machel said that by 1982 it had become clear to the FRELIMO leadership that the country's isolation had to be broken (Hermele 1990: 2). To this end, the government, in 1982, began to make contact with the IMF and World Bank with a view to acquiring membership, and hence getting increased access to multilateral funding. By 1984, Mozambique had been admitted to both organisations, and although this did not in itself lead to immediate financial assistance, it did open a lot of other doors. Membership of the IMF had been a condition attached to the granting of a lot of other aid, as well as to debt rescheduling by the Paris and London Clubs (Hermele 1990: 2; Hanlon 1991: 29) with whom the government also entered into negotiations. However, in order to be admitted to the IMF and World Bank, concessions had to be made. The pressures to make these concessions were quite subtle, but related to negotiating an end to the war and making economic policy changes, both of which will be described below. Other steps were also taken in an effort to improve the country's international position, and these too required the FRELIMO government to make concessions. In particular, the government in 1982 accepted the previously problematic Berlin Clause (Kuhne 1989: 183), and by 1984 Mozambique was a signatory to the Lome Convention, opening it up to EEC trade and aid (Adam 1988: 189).

Partly as a result of international pressure but also realising the role played by the war in undermining the economy and helping bring about the crisis in the first place, the government also tried to cut Renamo off at its source by making a deal with South Africa, Renamo's principle backers. Negotiating with South Africa was, in many respects, repugnant to the FRELIMO government given their strong opposition to apartheid, their support for liberation movements, including the ANC, and their role as a Front Line State and member of SADCC. However, given their inability to overcome the challenge from Renamo on a political or military level, they were forced to take diplomatic steps in order to achieve this. Hence in 1983 the FRELIMO government entered into talks with the South African government and in March 1984 signed the Nkomati Accord. According to the terms of the agreement, both sides undertook "to forbid and prevent in their respective territories the organisation of irregular forces or armed bands". The Accord also proscribed the provision of transit routes or the logistical support of such groups (Metz 1986: 495- 498).

In making the Accord, the South African government was attempting to deprive the African National Congress (ANC) of support from FRELIMO and, particularly of bases in southern Mozambique (Davies 1987: 9). The Mozambicans saw the Accord as the obvious way of cutting Renamo off at its roots. However, there was also strong international political pressure on the government to reach a settlement with South Africa. In general terms, the FRELIMO government believed that it would ease the international environment in which they had to operate, particularly with respect to the US. FRELIMO veterans interviewed by John Saul argued that "the neutralisation of American hostility was front and centre in the calculations that underlay the signing of the Nkomati Accord" (quoted in Saul 1990a: 22). More specifically, the reaching of a peace agreement was both essential to the continuation of Mozambique's talks with the IMF and World Bank (Ottaway 1988a: 203) as well as being, along with membership of the IMF, part of the conditions behind Mozambique getting "access to concessionary financing and debt rescheduling" (Hermele 1990: 2) which was crucial in view of its severe debt crisis.

FRELIMO's Fourth Party Congress 1983

But it was not only with regard to Mozambique's international position that changes were made. Partly in response to international pressure (Ottaway 1988b: 217) and partly coming out of the substantial and fundamental criticisms levelled at government economic policy at the Fourth Party Congress in 1983, numerous internal policy reforms were made. Delegates vociferously criticised the over-emphasis on the role of the state, particularly in agriculture, and the subsequent neglect of the small-scale family sector. The inefficiencies of the state run marketing system and the government's stress on very large projects were also attacked. Similarly criticised were the state's investment policies, which de-emphasised replacement investment, thus contributing to breakdowns, as well as their pricing policies, which kept producer prices very low (Partido Frelimo 1983a: 25). Problems were also raised with the way that planning took place, especially the way that it occurred on a national rather than a provincial or district level and with the way that policy was generated at the top levels of government and then filtered down, rather than the other way around. It was argued that this was the result of the persistence in state structures of "methods that marginalise the people in the resolution of social and economic problems" (Partido Frelimo 1983a: 25) rather than a problem with specific policies.

The Congress documents recommended a greater role in agriculture for small scale and private farmers, price liberalization, and greater efficiency in management and planning. However, they also reiterated the importance of the state sector and the need to "protect and enlarge" it, as well as stressing the need for more emphasis on Party control of the state and economy (Partido Frelimo 1983b: 18-34). In fact the Congress as a whole, despite the context against which it took place, reflected a basic optimism, and there is little talk of far reaching structural changes or dramatic reversals in policy.

Similarly there is little talk of political changes apart from strengthening the party, particularly in the rural areas (Partido Frelimo 1983a: 83). The Central Committee was enlarged to accommodate new members from the provinces (*Keesings Contemporary Archives* 29, 12, 1983: 32538), but it was argued that the past six years

experience had shown that the decision to form a vanguard Marxist-Leninist party had been the correct one, "strategically and tactically" (Partido Frelimo 1983a: 83). The party hence reaffirmed its commitment to develop and consolidate its "relations with the international working class movement and with other Marxist-Leninist parties, our natural allies" (Partido Frelimo 1983b: 31).

Despite the retention of important elements of the status quo, the reforms of 1983-1984 do represent quite a substantial change of course on the part of the government. The causes of the changes are clear: a serious debt crisis and an ever worsening economy combined with the realisation on the part of the government that Renamo constituted a very real threat with which it could not deal on a purely military level. However, it is important to see the changes as strategic moves on the part of the FRELIMO government. They knew that Mozambique's position *vis a vis* important western donors had to be improved and that it carried a price. This included membership of both the World Bank and the IMF which they had heretofore resisted in an effort to maintain their independence and carry out the socialist transformation that had been envisaged. The costs also included the Nkomati Accord, which, although it carried with it the hope of an end to the ever escalating war, was also linked to relieving international pressure. The policy changes introduced at the Fourth Congress need to be seen in a similar light. These too had their primary genesis in the problems inherent within and peoples dissatisfaction with especially the agricultural policies. However aspects of some of the new policies were an important part of Mozambique's entry into IFI's (Ottaway 1988b: 217), while at the same time the FRELIMO government was trying to retain the basic principles they had introduced in 1975 and 1977. FRELIMO was thus aware of the very real international pressure being placed upon it and the limited nature of its options. It thus acted to maximise these, trying to balance its cost with the gains it hoped to reap of an improved foreign capital flow, an end to the war with Renamo and a halt to the economic decline.

The short-term effects of the changes were improvements in Mozambique's international position and the amelioration of its relationships with a number of

western nations and bodies. The immediate results of this was an easing of the country's debt crisis by the London and Paris Clubs, and increased international assistance, for example from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (Ottaway 1988b: 211). In the longer term, the changes resulted in the attempted introduction of some of the new policies mooted at the Fourth Congress and ongoing dialogue between the FRELIMO government and the World Bank and IMF.

Second Period: Consolidating Reform, 1983-1986

During the period 1983 to 1986, the government tried to introduce the changes coming out of the Fourth Congress. However, their implementation was severely inhibited by the security situation which had improved little after Nkomati, and indeed got worse through the mid 1980s. Part of the result was that the economy did not improve, despite the new easier international environment. On this front the government continued in its lengthy negotiations with the IMF and World Bank. These and other continuing contacts were widely hailed as representing a fundamental change in the FRELIMO government's ideological orientation, specifically as a "turn to the west". However, during this time Mozambique steadily maintained its previously close relationships with the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc countries.

In 1984, soon after the Congress, the government published a Programme of Economic Action (P.A.E.). This, following the discussion at Congress, stressed the need to improve production and productivity, efficiency in management, and trade, particularly in the rural areas. The PAE proposed numerous policy changes toward these ends, as well as stressing the need to deal with emergency issues, especially serious food shortages (Mozambique 1984a: 1-9; World Bank 1985: ix). The government also introduced a new code on foreign investment. This was an effort to "stimulate and promote" foreign investment and was far more accommodating than previous legislation although it did reserve some sectors specifically for the state (Mozambique 1984b).

The PAE was followed up by talks between government and private sector

representatives in 1985. These also emphasised the need for more realistic prices, more autonomy for management and for more flexibility in foreign exchange allocation (World Bank 1985: ix). However, apart from some price and trade liberalisation, the break-up of a number of the larger state farms (Ottaway 1988a: 207) and the decentralisation of some of the economic planning with more power being given to individual ministries (Mackintosh 1986: 572), relatively few of these reforms were ever implemented. Some commentators have ascribed this as being partly due to the government's lack of administrative capacity and to the FRELIMO leadership's lack of commitment to the changes (Ottaway 1988b). It is certainly true that the administration, as described in the previous chapter, was weak and that the state lacked the necessary reach and capacity to implement a lot of the policies planned at the central level. In this context, carrying out reform would be likely to be particularly difficult, given the need to explain the changes and policy reversals and bureaucratic inertia and confusion. It is also true that the government's attitude to the reforms was complex. As discussed above, FRELIMO had not undergone a road to Damascus experience. The changes were strategic and pragmatic and designed to fit goals to capacities, whilst at the same time improving Mozambique's international standing so as to ease the debt problem. However, whilst both these issues are important, they both pale in significance compared to the continuing war, which made even limited implementation of the reforms impossible.

Despite the fact that, following the terms of the Nkomati Accord, the Mozambican government took action against ANC members in the country, searching a number of residences, forcing a number of personnel to leave the country and allowing only diplomatic representation (Davies 1987: 9), South Africa did not keep its part of the bargain.

Documents captured by Mozambican and Zimbabwean troops in a raid on Renamo headquarters at Gorongosa in 1985, point clearly to the South African military having made a considerable effort prior to Nkomati to provide Renamo with large amounts of material in order to keep it going for some time, as well as continuing support afterwards (Metz 1986: 498; Isaacman 1988: 25; Davies 1987: 4).

Hence the war continued unabated and by 1986 had worsened considerably (Munslow 1988: 28). The costs were enormous, not only in terms of the ever larger slice of the budget that had to be devoted to defence, but also in terms of lives, infrastructure and lost income. By the end of 1986 the government estimated that the war had directly cost over 100 000 lives. Further, it had resulted in the destruction of 500 rural medical units, the removal of over 300 000 pupils from school, over \$5 billion in direct economic damage and an estimated \$568 million in lost foreign income (*Africa Research Bulletin, Economic Series*, 24, 1, February 1987: 8551). In addition, many hundreds of thousands of people had been displaced as both internal and external refugees, and the lives of many others had been seriously affected by the fighting, often by famine caused by the disruption of production.

The less direct cost of the continuing war was the fact that the policy reforms proposed at the Fourth Congress and embodied in the PAE were not implemented. This, combined with the escalating rural disruption and dislocation, meant that despite the fact that things had looked, in 1984, as though they were about to improve, they began to get steadily worse (Hanlon 1991: 31).

Production of most crops fell during 1983, 1984 and 1985. By 1986, overall production had dropped by a third over 1982, exports and foreign exchange earnings were dramatically down and the debt service ratio had nearly doubled (see Isaacman 1988: 28- 29 and Kyle 1991: 639), to the point where Mozambique's debt repayments were double what it earned from its exports (*Africa Research Bulletin, Economic Series*, 24, 1, February 1987: 8551). By mid 1986, more than 3,5 million Mozambicans (or roughly a quarter of the population) were suffering from acute food shortages (Isaacman 1988: 29), and by early 1987 this had risen to four million as a result of the rapidly deteriorating security situation (*Africa Research Bulletin, Economic Series*, 24, 3, April 1987: 8620).

During this time aid flows to Mozambique had increased considerably (see Hanlon 1991: 61). Negotiations between the FRELIMO government and the World Bank and IMF also continued. During 1985 and 1986, they had, between them, sent 27

delegations to Mozambique (Hanlon 1991: 60), and by mid 1987 the talks had reached the advanced stage (*Africa Research Bulletin, Economic Series*, 24, 4, May 1987: 8657). This was despite a number of problems, including dissent within FRELIMO over the issue. Politburo member Sergio Vieira expressed some of the opposition to closer ties with the IMF by saying "let no one come here in the name of the IMF or the World Bank and spit on the blood that we have shed" (quoted in *Africa Contemporary Record*: 1985-1986: B693). There were also problems between the government and the IFI's who demanded even more far reaching policy reforms than the government had put forward in their position papers and programmes (IMF 1986: 2). There is some evidence that the FRELIMO government was to an extent pressurised into an agreement (which came in 1987) by bilateral donors linking further aid to the reaching of such an agreement (see *Africa Research Bulletin*, 24, 5, June 1987: 8519).

Mozambique's activities on the international front were widely interpreted as a "turn" to the west. In September 1985 Samora Machel visited the US for the first time. The visit resulted in the granting of emergency aid which was defended by the Reagan administration as "responding to Machel's desire to move from socialist domestic policies and reliance on Moscow" (*Africa Research Bulletin*, 22, 9, October 1985: 7803). Similarly, Cabinet reshuffles carried out in mid 1984 were seen as a "move away from Russia" and the replacement of Marxist hardliners with "pragmatists" (*Economist* 291, 7347, 23-29 June 1984). However, it is clear that the US in particular did not see their role only as "responding" to Mozambique's "move", but also in more active terms. The new policy and aid was seen as being instrumental in "weaning Mozambique away from the Soviets" (Secretary of State, George Schultz quoted in *Africa Contemporary Record* 1985-1986: B678). The FRELIMO government, for its part, showed its awareness of the extent to which their relationship to the Soviet Union was linked to aid and assistance from the west and their own willingness to play on these fears in order to increase assistance. With reference to getting the west to pressurise South Africa into halting support for Renamo in 1983, Chissano, then Foreign Minister argued that "if international measures are not taken to stop South Africa from escalating its aggression, Mozambique may require more military assistance from

socialist countries" (*Economist* 286, 7282, 26 March 1983: 63).

Despite this sort of dialogue however, FRELIMO denied that Mozambique has changed its international orientation. Chissano, who took over the Presidency in 1986 following Machel's death in a plane crash, denied that Mozambique had "turned to the West" and argued instead that the West had, at last, turned to Mozambique (*Africa contemporary Record* 1986-1987: B693). In fact Mozambique's ties with the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc remained very much intact, reaching a peak in 1987 (*Mozambique Information Office News Review* 142, December 1989: 7). Soviet assistance to Mozambique improved under Gorbachev (Isaacman 1987: 26) and over the period 1985-1987, military aid from both the Soviet Union and East Germany increased noticeably (*Africa Research Bulletin* 24, 9, October 1987: 8649). These facts were not lost on the US, who, despite their public embracing of Mozambique's changes imposed new restrictions on aid. In 1986 the Reagan administration placed a new ban on Mozambique's access to certain types of US based loans by virtue of its being a Marxist-Leninist state. By late 1987 a lot of potential US aid was still being held up by Congressional opposition (*Africa Contemporary Record* 1987-1988: B640).

Hence the period from 1983 to 1986 saw not so much the introduction of new reforms but the working through of those made earlier. However, during this time, the causes that drove the government into making the reforms in the first place, the war and the economic crisis, continued to worsen. This, no doubt, helped give extra momentum to the government in its negotiation with IFI's, which FRELIMO continued in an effort to create an easier international economic environment. By 1986 they had started to reap some of the rewards of their work in the form of debt rescheduling and increased aid flows.

However, they continued to remain under considerable pressure, particularly from the Reagan administration in the United States who showed itself willing to use aid in an instrumental fashion, not only to "wean" Mozambique from its traditional socialist alliances, but also in an effort to dissuade it from maintaining its Marxist-Leninist

status. The demands made of Mozambique and the shifts interpreted in its policies seem to grow the more changes were made. This is partly due to increased expectations on the part, for example of the US, but it is also linked to Mozambique's growing need for even more assistance, and hence increased vulnerability, as a result of the worsening war and economy.

Third Period: Structural Adjustment and the PRE 1987-1990

Mozambique's third period of reform began in mid 1987 when the government's negotiations with the IMF came to fruition with the institution of a structural adjustment programme, the *Programa de Reabilitacao Economica* (PRE). The results of the programme have been mixed, with some recovery in the economy, but at the cost of a serious dependence on outside aid and continuing problems in meeting debt repayment obligations. The economic recovery has also been adversely affected by some of the social tensions generated by the structural adjustment package as well as the continuing war with its attendant rural destruction and dislocation. These problems were exacerbated by the substantial decline in assistance from the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc as a result of Eastern Europe's political flux and economic uncertainty in the late 1980s. The overall result has been an increase in Mozambique's vulnerability, especially toward its major Western donors in the context of an ever harsher international environment.

The Programa de Reabilitacao Economica (PRE)

By mid 1987 the government had reached an agreement with the World Bank and IMF, according to which Mozambique would initially receive \$35 million from the IMF and \$90 million from the World Bank, as well as the promise of a lot more bilateral aid and debt rescheduling (*Africa Research Bulletin, Economic Series* 4, 24, May 1987: 8670). The structural adjustment programme which the Mozambican government had to implement in return, contained substantial monetary, fiscal and planning changes. The objectives of the programme were:

to improve the economic and financial management systems, paying particular attention to banking and the management of foreign debt, adjustments to the exchange rate so as to make it more realistic and exports more

competitive,
to liberalise trade practices, and in particular, to allow for more freedom in the use
of foreign exchange.
to seek debt relief,
to reduce the government deficit by decreasing spending and reforming the tax
system.
to reduce domestic liquidity by tightening up the money supply through the banking
system.
to liberalise the price policy, with more realistic prices and fewer fixed prices,
to reduce the degree of administrative allocation of resources and allow for more
freedom in the distribution system.

There are also specific sectoral reforms focussing on, in particular, agriculture, industry and fiscal policy (Mozambique 1987: 15-18).

There was some debate about the extent to which the programme represents a typical structural adjustment package or not. The Mozambican government claims that crucial aspects of their own adjustment options have been included in the programme so as to make it different from the norm. These are said to relate to the provision of social services such as health care, the timing of the currency devaluations, the degree of involvement of the private sector, the timing of repayments and IMF inspection of the economy (Mozambique 1987; *Southern African Political and Economic Monthly* 2, 9, June 1989: 4; *Africa Contemporary Record* 1986-1987: B695). However, most commentators, for example Hermele (1990: 12) and Tarp (1990: 176) argue that it is indeed a traditional IMF adjustment programme. The FRELIMO government's claims probably have more to do with trying to maintain a semblance of autonomy and control over the introduction of the PRE. With reference to the programme, President Chissano declared that "basically we had started it and developed it ourselves and this made it possible for us to give it a certain orientation." (quoted in *Southern African Political and Economic Monthly* 2, 9, June 1989: 4). However, the World Bank and IMF did seem to take the lead in policy formulation for the PRE, as is shown by the fact that most of the policy prescriptions appeared in their

documents before appearing in those produced by the Mozambican government (Torp 1989: 59). For example, during the 1985 consultations with the government, the IMF argued that although security was a crucial and limiting factor, more "fundamental changes in economic policy were required", particularly to monetary policy, planning and prices (IMF 1986: 2).

In either case, it was hoped that the policies prescribed in the PRE would halt the decline in the economy and that the GDP would achieve 5% growth per annum by 1990, that exports would be increased and inflation decreased (Mozambique 1987: 15).

The government hoped to achieve these ends and implement the policies contained in the PRE by reducing centralised administrative controls in the economy and encouraging private sector participation, by giving a greater role to the market, by putting more stress on economic performance and improving the quality of policy making (Torp 1989: 50).

A central aspect of the changes was the devaluation of the metrical, always a crucial aspect in IMF related programmes. Two large devaluations were carried out in the first six months of the programme leading to a ten-fold decrease in the value of the currency (*Africa Research Bulletin* 1987: 8766). Devaluations were then carried out, on average, twice a year. Price reforms were also implemented, with the prices of some commodities increasing by over 500% as a result (*Africa Research Bulletin* 1988: 9070). The price increases also reflected the reduction, and in some cases the removal, of state subsidies on certain products, and to state firms. However, the subsidy cuts were quite modest (Torp 1989: 52). In order to keep pace with the devaluations, increased prices and subsidy cuts, wages for urban workers were increased, though not on the same level as the prices have risen (*Southern African Economist* 2, 2, April-May 1989: 15-17).

Changes were made to the management of state firms. Far more emphasis was placed on profitability, and their deficits were no longer automatically financed by the central

bank (*Africa Research Bulletin* 1987: 8551). Many other state firms were privatised, with only roughly half of all industrial enterprises in state hands at the end of the programme, compared to over three quarters before the PRE was instituted (*Africa Research Bulletin* 1991: 10274). The foreign exchange system was also liberalised with firms producing for export being allowed to keep a portion of the forex they earned for reinvestment and purchase of inputs (*Africa Research Bulletin* 1990: 10152).

From the beginning there was a certain amount of pessimism about what the PRE would achieve. Even the IMF was not overly optimistic about it. In particular, they were aware of the problems posed by the war. An IMF report argued that "even these strong policy initiatives will probably not be sufficient to yield a sustainable growth and balance of payments outcome. Nevertheless the reform and adjustment measures provide a framework for more effective utilization of both domestic and external resources in support of structural and institutional changes" (quoted in Hermele 1988: 18).

But some success was achieved. The decline in GDP was halted and, in 1987, the first year of the programme, the GDP grew by 4%. In 1988 and 1989 the GDP grew by a further 4,5% per annum (Bowen 1990: 227).

As an indirect result of the programme, Mozambique's access to foreign capital was also improved. Aid inflows increased dramatically and the government was able successfully to conclude debt rescheduling arrangements with the Paris and London Clubs on "extremely favourable terms", far better than those they had received from the two organisations in 1984 prior to their agreement with the IMF (*Africa Research Bulletin, Economic Series*, 4, 6, July 1987: 8756; Bowen 1990: 227).

These developments were partly a result of Mozambique's constantly improving image with the West. In 1987 a US spokesperson commented admiringly that the PRE "policies...represent one of the most far-reaching programs of economic restructuring undertaken by any African country" (United States of America 1987: 5). Mozambique's economic policy changes continued to be seen by the US government

as linked to a shift in its political leanings, particularly in terms of its orientation toward the Soviet Union. Chester Crocker praised Mozambique's "hesitant, yet by all evidence, genuine defection from the Soviet orbit", which, he argued, proved that capitalism and the market subverted totalitarianism more than did guns (*Facts and Reports* 17, 6, June 1987). He clearly saw the US's aid efforts as being instrumental in this task, saying that "the Soviets have been dealt a severe setback in Mozambique because of what we and other western countries have been doing" (USA 1987: 21).

In response to these sorts of perceptions, the Mozambican government again denied moving toward the west. Teodato Hungwana, then Information Minister, argued that "Mozambique is not shifting from one side to another, from East to West, we are staying at the same point, defending our independence" (*The Times* 7 March 1987). Chissano also denied moving toward the west, but agreed that the relations between Mozambique and especially the US were much improved, which he put down to the West having changed its position and "understanding" Mozambique far more (in *Mozambiquefile*, 150, January 1989: 12).

However, the PRE also had its disadvantages, important amongst which were the social tensions to which it gave rise. The social costs of the programme proved to be severe (see Marshall 1988) both in terms of the increased costs to the public of health and education services which were cut back and were no longer free, and in terms of the rise in the cost of living. As a result of the currency devaluations, subsidy cuts and the lifting of price barriers, by 1988 basic commodity prices had risen by 570%. Urban consumers bore the brunt of these increases (*Africa Research Bulletin, Economic Series*, 25, 3, April 1988, 9070) as it was in the cities that PRE policies had most effect (Torp 1989: 55). According to the General Secretary of the OTM, by 1989, over 16 000 workers had been made redundant as a result of the PRE (*Economist Intelligence Unit* 1, 1990: 24).

Not surprisingly, by 1988 there was already growing "popular political irreverence" toward the government and FRELIMO (Roesch 1988: 8) and a general "erosion" of FRELIMO's legitimacy amongst urban dwellers (Hermele 1988: 21). By late 1989 and

early 1990 there was widespread student and worker demonstrations outside party structures (*Economist Intelligence Unit* 1, 1990: 24; *Africa Research Bulletin*, 27, 1, February 1990: 9547). One result of this unrest flowing out of the restrictive economic measures introduced under PRE was that the secret police, SNASP, vigilance was stepped up (USA 1987: 118).

A further indirect consequence of the PRE was the noticeable increase in corruption, connected to the vastly increased amounts of foreign aid flowing into the country as well as the activities of the multitudes of NGO's (see Hanlon 1991: 228-238). This both affected the government's relationships with donors but also the state structures themselves. One commentator argued that nobody knew the real extent of corruption in the army (Mafeje 1989: 42). By early 1989, Chissano was speaking out against corruption in state structures (*Mozambiquefile* 154, May 1989: 8) and by the end of that year it was being debated in the national assembly (*Mozambiquefile* 162, January 1990: 4).

Even FRELIMO itself was not immune from some of the side-effects of the PRE. In 1987 anti-white sentiment and tensions surfaced within the top ranks of FRELIMO (*Africa Contemporary Record* 1987- 1988: B623), due no doubt in part to some of the problems associated with implementing such policy reversals.

The effects of the war on the PRE

But the problems were not confined to the urban areas and the party. The security situation continued to be a significant problem. In late 1986 there had been a massive escalation of the war (Hanlon 1991: 33) and by 1987 Renamo claimed to control over 85% of the country (*Africa Research Bulletin*, 24, 2, March 1987: 8406) and, although the extent to which this control was at all meaningful is open to dispute, it does give an indication of their activity and an idea of the degree to which state control of the rural areas was open to question. In mid 1987 Chissano carried out a number of reforms within the military, bringing in a lot of new blood, particularly at top leadership level. Many of the most senior officers were veterans of the liberation

struggle and, it was felt, not ideally suited to new methods and tactics (*Africa Research Bulletin*, 24, 6, July 1987: 8540).

These changes did seem to have a positive effect. By 1988 the military situation had started improving for the government (*Africa Contemporary Record* 1987-1988: B626). By 1989 there was apparently a "stalemate" in the war in the rural areas, with no side being able to gain a permanent, decisive advantage. However, by 1990 things had again started to improve for the government (Hanlon 1991: 34).

What these broad perspectives on the military balance disguise, however, is the extent to which the war in the rural areas persisted. Renamo continued seriously to disrupt rural production, marketing and transport networks, making huge areas of the country economically inviable and no-go areas for government and development officials. The majority of Mozambicans remained "trapped in a nightmare of chaotic violence" (Meldrum 1988: 24). The number of people seriously affected by the war actually increased during this period (see table below) and by December 1990, a World Bank report described almost half the population as facing starvation as a result of the war (*Keesings Contemporary Archives* 36, 12, December 1990: 37909).

People seriously affected by the war (millions)

CATEGORY	1986	1988	1989	1990
Refugees outside Mozambique	0.3	0.7	1.0	1.0
Displaced within Mozambique	1.0	1.1	1.7	2.0
Affected (production capacity reduced)	2.5	2.2	2.9	2.4
Urban people needing food aid	2.5	2.6	3.1	3.7
TOTAL	6.3	6.6	8.7	9.1
<i>% of population</i>	<i>47%</i>	<i>47%</i>	<i>60%</i>	<i>62%</i>

(adapted from Hanlon 1991: 38)

FRELIMO's refusal to negotiate

Despite the seriousness of the situation and the inability of the army to clear the rural areas of the Renamo threat, the FRELIMO government consistently refused to enter into direct negotiations with Renamo in order to bring an end to the war. During 1986 Chissano had made a number of tough speeches about the prospect of negotiations, saying that he would only negotiate with the people controlling Renamo (*Facts and Reports* 16, 4, November 1986). In 1987 when the Catholic Church had called for negotiations in a pastoral letter, Chissano had publicly chastised them (*Africa Contemporary Record* 1987-1988: B626), although a year later in 1988 he did agree to allow Church representatives to meet with Renamo outside Mozambique, and in late 1987 had offered a full amnesty to all Renamo rebels who surrendered (see Schneidman 1991: 3).

It was not only the fact that Renamo was seen to be controlled from outside Mozambique that caused FRELIMO to reject the notion of talks. The FRELIMO government also had problems with the violence and intimidation with which Renamo operated (*Economist Intelligence Unit*, 4, 1989: 20). At the opening of the People's Assembly in January 1989, Chissano stressed that there would be no negotiations with Renamo, saying that "The people will not allow us to talk to assassins" (*Southscan*, 5, 30, August 1990: 223).

To some extent these denials and the portrayal of Renamo as an immoral, brutal creature of outside interests was probably a standard government ploy, designed to mobilise opposition to Renamo and emphasise the difference between them and the government as well as further decrease any legitimacy they may have enjoyed. To a certain degree there also seems to be an element of the government not wanting to lose face by suddenly backing down and recognising Renamo after all the years of seeing and explaining them as not having an existence in their own right. In addition, the growth of Renamo and the degree to which it took on a life of its own and hence became a force that had to be directly reckoned with, possibly took many members of the leadership by surprise. However, there is more than mere propaganda to the FRELIMO's leadership's attitude toward Renamo and negotiations. It is impossible

to read government documents and policy statements without getting a sense of the sincerity with which Renamo and their activities were rejected at the most basic level. They were after all very closely connected, particularly in their early days, to the South African military, and their methods of operating were particularly brutal, as described in the previous chapter. Hence the FRELIMO government's hesitance to enter into negotiations with Renamo and their constant denials that this would occur.

The Effects of the PRE and the Continuing War

The war and destabilisation thus continued, with serious consequences for the economy. The launch of the PRE in 1987 had arrested the serious economic decline of the mid 1980s, but by 1990 the economic growth rate had slowed down enormously and was lower than at any point since the implementation of the programme (*Africa Research Bulletin*, 28, 2, March 1991: 10296). Most economic indicators, particularly marketed agricultural production, were showing a sharp decline (*Africa Research Bulletin* 1991: 10296). The trade balance got steadily worse through the PRE period (see Kyle 1991: 639) and by 1990, exports continued to decline (*Africa Research Bulletin, Economic Series*, 27, 1, February 1990: 9837). Inflation was a serious problem and was as high as 160% in 1987 in the early stages of the programme and never dropped below 40% during most of the PRE period (*Africa Research Bulletin, Economic Series*, 25, 5, June 1988: 9140). Government spending increased considerably during the PRE, by 221% in the first year (*Africa Research Bulletin* 1987: 8551), and by the beginning of 1990 there were actually more state functionaries than there had been at the start of the PRE (*Mozambiquefile* 164, March 1990: 15)

As described above, the war played an important role in the inability of the PRE to bring about more than some short term success. Faults within the actual conceptualisation of the programme were also responsible, particularly its emphasis on price reform, monetary and management changes and its consequent neglect of deeper, structural issues (for example, see Tarp 1991). Problems within FRELIMO, including opposition to the programme as well as problems in the execution of some of the programmes are also partly to blame (see Ottaway 1988b). However, a serious contributory factor has been the extent to which the whole PRE has been structured

around external aid and loans.

Much of the early growth achieved during the PRE occurred not because of improvements to the economic structure or policies but because of the "massive injection of foreign resources" (Torp 1989: 54) to which the PRE gave rise (see *Africa Research Bulletin, Economic Series*, 24, 2, March 1987: 8586) . Aid was particularly important when it came to the provision of food. During the PRE period, between 80-90% of all Mozambique's grain needs were imported (Kyle 1991: 645) and a lot of the general economic activity was associated with aid and the activities of the up to 180 Non Governmental Organisations (NGO's) that were largely responsible for administering it (Hanlon 1991: 64; *Economist* 314, 7648, 3 March 1990: 49). Reginald Green aptly described the economy as being "donor driven" (quoted in Hanlon 1991: 250).

By as early as the financial year 1988-1989, foreign aid accounted for 76% of Mozambique's GNP, compared to a sub-Saharan average of only 11%. Not surprisingly aid officials and business people in Maputo were beginning to refer to the country as the "Donors Republic of Mozambique" (*Facts and Reports*, 21, C, February 1991).

This reliance had two interconnected results. Firstly, it seriously deprived the FRELIMO government of a lot of autonomy in decision making, particularly with regard to economic policy. This occurred both because of the sheer influence that controlling the purse strings gave especially to the IFI's who, as Bowen put it "have eroded the governments options for self determination" (Bowen 1990 217) but also because of the parallel structures that many donors established which had the effect of weakening and undermining the government (Hanlon 1991: 248-258). In addition the unreliability of their income combined with the fact that much of it had been tied to specific uses by the donors meant that the government lost much of their capacity for long-term planning. The Planning ministry, long one of the largest and most important, was eclipsed by the Finance ministry, and state planning was reduced to "specific projects and investments" (Egero 1989: 43).

Connected to this loss of control in the face of outside pressure and having to implement tough and unpopular policies, was the increase in the "commandism" of the state (Mittelman 1990: 18). This even filtered down to the lowest levels of the state structures (see Roesch 1988: 28) which as a result became plagued by problems associated with a lack of accountability (*Mozambiquefile* 162, January 1990: 5).

Secondly, the reliance on foreign aid caused the government to become extremely vulnerable to the continued flow of aid. This is particularly so because most of the aid had come in the form of repayable loans so that new aid increasingly had to go to pay debt, with the result that after 1984 the net capital flow was often negative (*Facts and Reports*, 21, C, February 1991). Mozambique found itself becoming increasingly indebted as the reform period progressed. Its total external debt almost doubled in the five years from 1982 to 1987, and then more than doubled again in the two years to 1989, to \$4,3 billion. Hence it increasingly impossible for Mozambique to pay its debts (in Mittelman 1990: 18).

Also, the government's ability to attract new aid declined after reaching a high in 1987 (*Economist Intelligence Unit*, 2, 1990: 31). Partly this has been because new emergencies elsewhere in the world have attracted donor attention and because of problems with corruption and theft of aid (Maier in *Facts and Reports*, 20, H, April 1990; *Economist Intelligence Unit*, 2, 1990: 31). However, the two major reasons for the government's difficulties in being able to get new aid and in sustaining previous levels of assistance are the changes experience by Mozambique's allies, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and the increasing impatience on the part of donors with the political situation.

The reduction of aid and military assistance from the former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries, especially the German Democratic Republic (GDR) had, by 1990, become a serious issue for Mozambique. By early 1990 all types of support from Eastern Europe were sharply down on previous levels (*Facts and Reports*, 20, H, April 1990) and the former Soviet Union carried out severe cut backs in the oil credits granted to Mozambique. Soviet oil accounted for roughly two thirds of

Mozambique's needs, and although it was supplied at market prices, it was provided on credit so its reduction was a real blow to the Mozambican government. The Soviets also sought to review the cooperation treaty with Mozambique, which had come up for renewal in 1990 (*Facts and Reports*, 21, B, January 1991), and stressed that the new agreement would emphasise trade rather than aid (*Southscan*, 6, 1, January 1991: 6). Mozambique received a further blow when 18 000 of its migrant workers were repatriated from the former GDR following German unification in 1990 (*Economist Intelligence Unit*, 2, 1990: 23; *Mozambiquefile*, 164, March 1990: 15), losing an approximate \$16 million a year in migrant remittances as a result (*Africa Research Bulletin, Economic Series*, 27, 9, September 1990: 10114).

However, by far the greatest role the former Soviet's and East Germans had had in Mozambique was with the military. Soviet military personnel began to withdraw in large numbers in 1989 and by 1990 over 550 of the approximately 800 military advisors had left (*Africa Research Bulletin*, 26, 6, June 1989: 9323; *Economist Intelligence Unit*, 2, 1990: 23). The seriousness of this was heightened for the overstretched Mozambican military by the withdrawal of Tanzanian troops in 1988, and the suggestions of a possible reduction in the Zimbabwean military presence as Robert Mugabe came under domestic pressure to withdraw his troops from the country (*Economist Intelligence Unit*, 3, 1990: 21).

Much of the shortfall in aid from Western donors occurred as a result of, what commentators have come to term "donor fatigue" (for example, Karl Maier in *Facts and Reports*, 20, H, April 1990). This was largely connected to the lack of progress on the political front, including the FRELIMO government's hesitation in negotiating directly with Renamo. According to US officials, it was made clear to President Chissano on his visit to the US in early 1990 further aid would depend on the outcome of the peace talks (*Economist Intelligence Unit*, 2, 1990, 23). Similarly, the "lukewarm attitude" of many donors to Mozambique's 1990 emergency aid appeal was interpreted as a "potent signal" that Western government's sympathy and support was waning as the country's political problems continued (*Economist Intelligence Unit*, 3, 1990: 21)

The effects of these cutbacks was keenly felt by the government and served to heighten their feelings of vulnerability to their international donors. By as early as 1988 the government was describing Mozambique's foreign debt as an "enormous burden" and by 1990 there was serious concern about shortfalls in even emergency aid (*Africa Research Bulletin, Economic Series*, 25, 8, September 1988: 9256; 27, 1, February 1990: 9837). In his budget speech to the People's Assembly in March 1991, Prime Minister Mario Machungo stressed FRELIMO's continued concern about Mozambique's reliance on foreign aid, specifically its "abnormality" and "uncontrolability" (*Africa Research Bulletin*, 28, 2, March 1991: 10296).

The third period of reform thus saw the implementation of the first initiated in the early 1980s when contacts between the FRELIMO government and the World Bank and IMF were first initiated. The nature of the PRE combined with Mozambique's increasingly precarious economic position and its ever growing reliance on aid meant that to a large extent, although the government saw even these reforms in "tactical terms" (Loxley 1988: 5) they had effectively lost much of their control over them. However, in common with the previous reforms, they were interpreted as indicating Mozambique moving toward the west. To an extent this was true, but only by default as Mozambique's ties with the socialist world declined as the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe underwent political change and their own economic crises. This had two interconnecting effects. Firstly, it increased the competition for aid in the international arena, making Mozambique's task in attracting new aid even more difficult (see Chapter 1). Secondly, it seemed to help focus the attention of the donors, particularly the US, on Mozambique's internal politics. Whilst previously aid had been used in an instrumental way in an effort largely to change Mozambique's external orientation, especially in removing it from its perceived "orbit" around Moscow, with the changes in Eastern Europe and the end of the Cold War, the emphasis seems to have shifted more to its internal policies, particularly to questions around the lack of political pluralism and its continued retention of Marxism-Leninism.

The failure of the PRE to address some of the structural problems affecting the economy and the lack of a really long term economic recovery in concert with the continuing war meant that Mozambique grew ever more reliant on external aid and hence ever more susceptible to the pressure being placed upon it to carry out political reform. Ironically, the economic and security crises and the tough policy reforms carried out under the PRE served, at the same time as they pushed Mozambique toward political reform, to increase political centralisation and commandism, leading if anything to a decline in democratic activity.

Period Four: Political reform 1988-1991

It was thus political issues that came to dominate the fourth period of reform, from 1988 to 1991. The process started with the discussions leading up to the Fifth Party Congress held in 1989, and was followed by the debates around the new constitution introduced in 1990. Within these two forums a number of substantial changes were made, including the introduction of a multi-party system, substantial human rights improvements and alterations to Mozambique's guiding ideology. In addition, direct negotiations were opened with Renamo.

The Fifth Party Congress 1989

Each of FRELIMO's four party congresses had signaled a significant turning point for Mozambique (Munslow & O'Keefe 1984: 16), and this was particularly true of the Fifth Congress held in 1989. It was scheduled to have taken place in 1988 but was postponed till the following year (*African Contemporary Record*, 1987-1988: B623). However, discussions for the Congress started late in 1988 with the preparation of draft theses for the actual congress. These set both the agenda and much of the tone for the Congress. The greatest emphasis in the draft theses was the call for national unity, but they also stressed the need for greater democracy, less emphasis on Marxism-Leninism and, especially, for peace, even if this involved negotiating with Renamo (*Africa Research Bulletin*, 27, 1, February 1990: 9547).

One of the most striking aspects of the Congress was its change of tone compared to previous meetings. Commentators noted the extent to which the reports presented to

Congress were shorn of, as one put it, "left wing rhetoric" (see *Africa Research Bulletin*, 26, 7, August 1989: 9343). The party dropped all references to Marxism-Leninism and made the decision to change the country's name from the People's Republic of Mozambique to the Republic of Mozambique. Although FRELIMO reaffirmed its commitment to socialism, the new programme was described as putting the country's problems on a "real framework" rather than the idealistic one which they perceived that they had been working with previously (*Economist Intelligence Unit*, 3, 1989: 20).

This pragmatism was particularly reflected in the party's position on foreign policy. The new programme abandoned the concept of a "world anti-imperialist front" and no longer privileged the "international working class". Instead, it placed greater emphasis on Mozambique's immediate struggle, saying that FRELIMO applied "an independent foreign policy based on the defence of national interests, founded on real goals, and in the first place on the elimination of destabilisation, the eradication of terrorism, and the defence and reconstruction of the Mozambique nation" (*Mozambiquefile*, 157, August 1989: 15).

The discussions at the Congress also stressed the need to open up the party and return to the broad front adopted during the liberation struggle (Hermele 1990: 31). Reference was made to problems experienced in the functioning of the party, particularly with respect to mass organisations, who complained of the party's "commandist" attitude toward them, and in the rural areas where over 300 party branches operated ineffectively if at all, despite the fact that party membership had increased by 82% since the Fourth Congress in 1983 (*Mozambiquefile*, 157, August 1989: 9-11). Hence, changes were made to the party's definition of itself. It was transformed from being a "vanguard of the peasant-worker alliance" to "a party which seeks to express the will and feelings of all the people". Although FRELIMO technically remained a "vanguard" party, membership was opened to practicing Muslims, Christians, private business people and polygynists in rural areas, so long as they held Mozambican citizenship (*Mozambiquefile*, 157, August, 1989: 14; *Africa Research Bulletin*, 26, 7, August 1989: 9343). In addition, the Central Committee was

expanded from 130 to 160 members (*Africa Research Bulletin* 26, 8, September 1989: 9379).

The Congress also addressed the question of the role of the state. It seems, from the draft theses presented to the Congress, that FRELIMO was trying to tread a fine line between maintaining its traditionally important role, especially in the economy, and withdrawing. Hence they argued that "the party must exert a 'leading role' in state and society but should not confuse its role with that of state bodies" (*Mozambique Information Office News Review* 143, 4, December 1988: 3). The report goes on to argue that "an irreplaceable task falls to the state", especially in promoting equality. It saw the state as continuing to play an important role in directing the economy, but allowing "greater administrative and financial autonomy to economic agents" (quoted in Hanlon 1991: 242).

These sorts of semi-reversals and contradictions give a strong sense that more than just a search for national unity was going on at the Congress. Clearly it was also seen as having an important role to play in improving FRELIMO's image overseas and, to a lesser extent, to sell a number of political changes to its constituencies. The former purpose was obviously involved in the repeated references to state disinvolvement from society and the economy, and specifically in the change in tone and the switch away from Marxism-Leninism. Politburo member Jorge Rebelo, speaking to party members before the Congress said that there was "the problem of the United States. At a meeting between US Congressmen and President Chissano, the key point was: 'Are you a Marxist?' If so, you are our enemy." (quoted in Hanlon 1991: 48). FRELIMO's efforts produced quick results, by the beginning of 1990, Mozambique had been removed from the list of countries banned from receiving certain types of US aid (*Africa Research Bulletin, Economic Series*, 27, 1, February 1990: 9830).

The way that the Congress was used as a means of "selling" previously made ideas to its members is shown by the fact that in strong contrast to previous congresses, the Fifth Congress was characterised by relatively little discussion and open democracy and a far greater proportion of it was held in secret, closed sessions (see for example

Hanlon 1991: 157). However, the Congress gave momentum to and officially set in motion two processes that were fundamentally to reshape Mozambican politics over the next two years: firstly the start of direct negotiations with Renamo and the drawing up of a new constitution.

The Government Opens Direct Negotiations With Renamo

A week prior to the Congress, FRELIMO had released a 12 point statement of principles for peace, as a way of normalising society. The statement was the means by which FRELIMO offered direct talks with Renamo, on the condition that they agreed, in principle, to renounce violence, recognise the legitimacy of FRELIMO as the government of Mozambique, and abide by the constitution. Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya and Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe were named as potential mediators for the talks (Isaacman 1989: 56). At the party Congress, Chissano's plans for negotiations received full support, although there was concern that there should be "a peace that is not a reward for terrorism". Specifically, party members were concerned that Renamo should not be brought directly into the government, but FRELIMO's refusal to grant them the status of a party, both in the document and the discussions at Congress, temporarily removed this threat (Isaacman 1989: 57).

Renamo released its own 16 point plan in response to FRELIMO's, soon afterward, in August 1989. In the document they argued that it was not their intention "to change the existing order in Mozambique through armed force" (point 6) and called for negotiations and recognition as a political force (points 5 and 16) (*Southern African Political and Economic Monthly*, December 1989/January 1990: 44).

The new moves toward negotiations followed up on initiatives taken in August 1988 by the Catholic Church, and sanctioned by the government. Leading Mozambican church representatives met with Renamo outside the country, but with not a great deal of success (Isaacman 1989: 58). The timing of the moves toward negotiations by FRELIMO, has been interpreted as being "determined by the emergence of a real, if fragile, political and military equilibrium between Renamo and Frelimo" and the beginning of Renamo's emergence as a "somewhat coherent political organisation"

following its first Congress at Gorongosa, inside Mozambique in June 1989 (Schneidman 1991: 4). FRELIMO was also encouraged to start the process following moves on part of US to talk directly with Renamo, something that they had avoided previously (Schneidman 1991: 5-6).

The first meeting between Renamo and government representatives took place on 10-14 August 1989 in Nairobi. From the start the process was dogged by problems arising out of Renamo's continued questioning of the legitimacy of the FRELIMO government (which was one of its preconditions for negotiations) and FRELIMO's continued demands for a cease-fire, before talks could begin. Eventually, thanks to US intervention, some of these obstacles to real negotiations were circumvented and, after abandoning plans to meet in Malawi in June 1990, negotiations began in July 1990 in Rome. They were hosted by the Santo Egidio Community, a Catholic lay organisation, and the Catholic church. Starting in mid 1990, the negotiations continued on from there, despite running into serious problems over the setting up of the Joint Verification Commission (JVC) to monitor the partial cease fire, Renamo objections to the presence of Zimbabwean troops in Mozambique, and their unease with the reforms introduced by Chissano (Schneidman 1991: 6-8)

The Drawing Up of a New Constitution and the Introduction of a Multi-Party System

The Fifth Party Congress was also followed by discussions around the introduction of a new constitution. A draft constitution was prepared and discussed in meetings and amongst organisations all around the country. It generated considerable debate in intellectual circles, but there was general apathy and cynicism in the poorer suburbs of the large cities. According to the Mozambique Information Agency, AIM, a number of meetings in the Maputo high density suburbs had to be cancelled because poor attendance meant that there was no quorum (quoted in *Economist Intelligence Unit*, 2, 1990: 20).

The constitutional debates covered a whole range of issues including the role of the state and the nature of the economy. However, it was obvious from the start that the crucial question was going to be about the possible introduction of a multi-party

system (*Mozambiquefile* 167, June 1990: 8). The original draft of the constitution kept FRELIMO as the only legal party (see *Africa Research Bulletin* 27, 1, February 1990: 9547), and this was the position that FRELIMO maintained during the discussions.

FRELIMO spokespersons argued that not only did the majority of people prefer a single-party system, but more parties would only serve to foster divisions and conflict within the country.

Following their meeting in December 1989, the FRELIMO Central Committee released a statement saying that "the existence of several parties at this stage of the nation would feed divisions" (*Economist Intelligence Unit* 1, 1990: 17). It went on to argue that "A single party system should not be imposed upon the people, but it is equally unacceptable for a multi-party system to be imposed upon the people by outside pressures or by violence". The report maintained that the central problem facing Mozambique was the "deepening of democracy, both inside the party, and in society at large, so as to broaden the space for a pluralism of ideas, and so that all citizens may feel free to express their views on questions that concern the nation, and may participate in the process of governing". To this end the report recommended the further expansion of party membership, the simplification of application procedures and the alteration of party structures to make them more flexible (*Mozambiquefile* 162, January 1990: 9-16).

The Central Committee's opposition to the introduction of a multi-party system was shared by most of those participating in the debates, particularly by those in the rural areas (*Mozambiquefile* 168, July 1990: 8). However, a number of people in urban areas started to come out in favour of a multi-party system, including some influential groups, for example civil servants and the Catholic church (*Economist Intelligence Unit* 3, 1990: 23; *Mozambiquefile* 167, June 1990: 9-10).

Despite this, by February 1990, President Chissano was still firmly opposed to a multi-party system, arguing again that "The realisation of national unity is a fundamental task for us all. The creation of several parties could present an obstacle

to the vital strategic objective" (in *Africa Research Bulletin* 27, 1, February 1990: 9547).

However, in July 1990 the Politburo took the sudden decision to over-rule the Central Committee and begin the process of introducing a multi-party system. It took the decision after analysing the results of the nationwide debate, concluding that whilst "the majority of our people, a big majority, would be in favour of a one-party system for a variety of reasons", "there is also an appreciable number of people who are in favour of a multi-party system" and "we in the Political Bureau think that it is not right to prevent those citizens who want to form parties from doing so" (quoted in *Southscan*, 5, 30, 3 August 1990: 223). However, given the widespread opposition to the move, including from within the upper echelons of FRELIMO, it seems most likely that the multi-party system was introduced, like most of the reforms, for strategic reasons rather than because of popular consensus or pressure.

In August the FRELIMO Central Committee followed the Politburo and voted unanimously, after 9 days of debate, in favour of a multi-party system. (*Africa Research Bulletin* 27, 8 August 1990: 9741). It released a statement saying that "It is the consensus of the Central Committee that the choice made by the Political Bureau is opportune, just and correct and in accordance with the reality in the country, in the region and in the world" (*Mozambique Information Office: Special Report* 1 1990: 2)

The Central Committee also accepted the main outlines of the new electoral law which essentially disallowed parties without a national base, separatist, discriminatory or anti-democratic parties as well as those organised along ethnic and racial lines (*Africa Research Bulletin* 27, 8 August 1990: 9741).

Renamo's response to the introduction of a multi-party system was instructive. They expressed their dissatisfaction at the introduction of a multi-party system and at the new laws relating to political parties, despite the fact that the call for an end to one party rule had always been at the centre of their rather thin political agenda. Even up until late 1989, in their negotiations, Renamo insisted on the introduction of a multi-party system in response to FRELIMO's retention of the idea of a single party state

(*Africa Research Bulletin* 26, 12, January 1990: 9528). Responding at the peace negotiations in Rome, Renamo argued that the multi-party system was unacceptable to them partly because they had not been consulted, but also because, as one of their spokespersons put it, "we are the ones who fought for freedom for more than 15 years" and hence only they deserved to be included in the broadened political arena (*Southscan*, 6, 21, May 1991: 184).

This response is obviously due to Renamo's concerns that it will not be able to defeat FRELIMO in an election given its weak political infrastructure and experience, as well as its reputation for brutality and long history of being controlled by outsiders, particularly South Africa. Chissano himself argued that Renamo's position was weakened by a multi-party system with open competition (in *Economist Intelligence Unit* 4, 1990: 23). Renamo obviously sees its chances as being greatest through a negotiated two way settlement with FRELIMO, and not through open competition.

In making the move to a multi-party system, FRELIMO made a sudden and dramatic reversal which fundamentally changed the face of Mozambican politics. Most explanations of why the sudden switch was made, link it to the negotiations with Renamo. It is argued that it was part of the FRELIMO government's strategy to outwit and out manoeuvre Renamo. Having realised that they were not going to defeat Renamo militarily or isolate them by diplomatic means such as the Nkomati Accord, the government is perceived to have attempted quietly to accede to most of Renamo's political demands, thus substantially weakening their position at the negotiating table (see, for example Schneidman 1991).

Chissano denied that the introduction of the multi-party system in particular had anything to do with either Renamo or the negotiations (*Mozambiquefile*, 169, August 1990: 4), arguing that the changes were an expression of FRELIMO'S strength rather than being under pressure (*Africa Research Bulletin* 27, 8, August 1990: 9741). However, given their effectiveness in radically changing the complexion of the negotiations where it is no longer a "reformist" movement pitted against a government committed to holding a monopoly of political power, Chissano's obvious calculations

about Renamo's real position with regard to political pluralism and his history of willingness to use whatever strategy was necessary to isolate Renamo, such uses are obviously a factor behind the reforms.

One of the other reasons used to explain the change to a multi-party system was the changing nature of the FRELIMO leadership, specifically the more pragmatic approach of Chissano and the growth in influence of a younger, better educated party elite (*Africa Research Bulletin* 26, 7, August 1989: 9343). Like the government's efforts to out-manoeuvre Renamo this too must have been a factor as Chissano does have a very different style to his predecessor, Machel, and has long been perceived to be more pragmatic and flexible (for example see *Africa Research Bulletin* 23, 11, December 1986: 8300). This certainly seems to be the impression of the US administration. In 1987 Chester Crocker argued that relations between the US and Mozambique had "accelerated" under Chissano (USA 1987: 4). However, it does not fully explain the changes, particularly not the rapid turn-around in the official position on the multi-party system, nor the volte face in Chissano's public statements on the issue. Membership of the Politburo remained relatively stable during this period and so, although new blood was brought in, particularly into the army, the important decision making body was the same. Further, Chissano's assumption of leadership of FRELIMO and Mozambique dates from 1986 which predates by three years the really fundamental political changes. Added to this Chissano has on a number of occasions denied bringing about changes in FRELIMO's overall strategy and has stressed the continuity in policy. Whilst this may represent merely an effort to deny the seeming abandonment of Mozambique's socialist transformation as well as an effort to maintain unity, there is a degree of continuity and hence some truth to his statements.

So whilst changes within FRELIMO, as well as their need to weaken Renamo's negotiating position are part of the reasons behind the reforms, other factors are clearly important. Amongst these is FRELIMO's need to expand both national unity and its own legitimacy in the face of a number of recurrent problems, such as the decline in the number of operative party branches and "weakened" grassroots

organisations (*Mozambiquefile*, 164, March 1990: 15). The increased separation between party and state seems to have been seen as having an important role to play in improving FRELIMO's legitimacy and fostering a recovery in involvement in party structures. Politburo member Oscar Monteiro argued that 15 years after independence, the time had come for the state to take on its own role, independent of the party. He said that "FRELIMO interests are no longer best served by constitutionally enshrining its leading role - it rather needs social acceptance, without which its leading role has no meaning" (*Mozambiquefile*, 166, May 1990: 15). However, it is unlikely that this is the only or even the major reason behind the reforms. FRELIMO is unlikely to have gone to the length of changing the whole political system in order to increase its legitimacy, especially in the face of growing political tensions within its own ranks including tensions within the army over the reform and serious outbreaks of anti-white sentiment (*Economist Intelligence Unit*, 1, 1991: 3; *Indian Ocean Newsletter*, 462, January 19, 1991: 4).

Hence the most important and decisive reason behind the political reform was the international pressure that FRELIMO was under given its chronically weak economy and its reliance on external aid in an environment when it was becoming hard to get and when it was being increasingly linked to political change, both generally and in Mozambique's case in particular. The removal of the ban on US Export-Import Bank loans in early 1990 was an immediate response to some of the changes but Mozambique's longer-term position as far as aid is concerned also shows some of the effects of an improved international image. In 1991 the US agreed to write off nearly \$50 million worth of debt, and pledges at the World Bank Consultative Group meeting on Mozambique in the same year were considerably up on the previous year and exceeded the government's expectations (*Africa Research Bulletin* 28, 12, December 1991: 10684; 10661). Mozambique also began to get new aid from the US, specifically designed to finance its new democratic political institutions (*Africa Research Bulletin, Economic Series*, 28, 9, September 1991: 10569). The improved aid flows were seen as being a "reward" for the switch to political pluralism (*Africa South* 9, March-April 1991: 32), and during Chissano's March 1990 visit to the US President George Bush said that the political steps taken enhanced the ties between the US

and Mozambique (*Economist Intelligence Unit*, 2, 1990: 23)

Certainly the one place from which the change toward a multi-party system had not come, was from the grassroots. This is shown not only by the apathy surrounding the debates around the constitution and the widespread of a multi-party system but also by the way that the Politburo took the eventual decision, against the prevailing trend and over the heads of even the Central Committee. One member of the Politburo was even reported as saying that reform was happening too fast and that it had no "popular base" (*Economist Intelligence Unit*, 4, 1990: 25)

Further changes in the new constitution

The new laws setting up a multi-party system supplemented a number of other changes going into the new constitution which was published in November 1990. The new constitution was far longer and far more technical in its provisions than the previous one, but it differed mostly in its tone, in the extent to which it separated FRELIMO from the organs of government and state, and in its entrenchment of basic human rights.

In terms of its tone, the constitution formalised the decision taken at Congress to change the country's name from the People's Republic of Mozambique to the Republic of Mozambique and similarly changed the name of the highest legislative body from The People's Assembly to the Assembly of the Republic. It made far less reference to the historical emergence of Mozambique and the struggle against colonialism than had the 1975 constitution. Further, the new constitution dropped all references to Mozambique's commitment to socialism or its "natural allies the socialist countries" although it retained its right to "support and be in solidarity with the struggles of peoples for their national liberation" (Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique 1990: Article 64).

The new constitution also radically reduced the importance of FRELIMO's role in society. Whereas the old constitution had enshrined FRELIMO's leading role, stating that "power belongs to the workers and peasants united and led by FRELIMO (

Constitution of the People's Republic of Mozambique 1975: Article 2) and that Mozambique was "guided by the political line laid down by FRELIMO, which is the leading force of the State and Society" and which laid "down the political orientation of the state and directs and supervises the work of state organs" (Constitution of the People's Republic of Mozambique 1975: Article 3). In contrast, the only reference to FRELIMO in the new constitution was that "the state shall retain as a national heritage the decisive role played by FRELIMO in the victory over colonialism" (Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique 1990: Article 7: 2). In changing this aspect, the constitution effectively reduced the role that FRELIMO had played in the leadership of the country, especially by means of its control of the armed forces and the legislature by virtue of the head of FRELIMO automatically becoming Commander in Chief of the armed forces and President of the Republic. The party network within the armed forces was also begun to be dismantled (*Economist* 318, 7696, March 2 1991: 55).

The new constitution emphasised the diminished role that the state would play in economy and society although important concessions were maintained. During the discussions around the constitution, there had been moves to define the economy specifically as a "market" economy, this had been blocked by the Governor of the Bank of Mozambique who argued that it was not normal practice to put such clauses into the constitution (*Economist Intelligence Unit* 1, 1991: 28). The state was to retain all ownership of land (Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique 1990: Article 46) and was still seen as having an important role to "promote and coordinate economic activity, acting directly or indirectly to solve the basic problems of the people and to reduce social and regional inequalities" (Article 49).

The constitution vastly expanded the extent of various freedoms to be enjoyed by Mozambicans to include freedom of association, of religion, the right to strike and freedom of the press. In addition, a lot more attention was paid to the legal system. The judiciary was made a lot more independent of the state and the principle of innocence until proven guilty was enshrined in the constitution. These constitutional changes supplemented the ban on flogging and capital punishment which had been

announced earlier (*Africa Research Bulletin*, 27, 1, February 1990: 9547; *Economist Intelligence Unit* 4, 1989: 22).

Whilst retaining the basic legislative structure, the constitution also improved the degree of democratic participation by making both the President of the Republic and the Assembly directly elected by universal adult suffrage rather than by an electoral college. However, provincial governments were still to be appointed by the central government (Article 114).

The reforms in the constitution partly reflect FRELIMO's felt need to clear the political space and liberalize the state structures in the face of the impending multi-party system. Hence they had to remove their own constitutional role from the state and formalize a far broader type of political participation. However, the reasons for the nature and style of the changes to the constitution go far deeper than this. The changes, like the switch to a multi-party system, can be linked to the negotiations and FRELIMO's shrewd efforts to outmanoeuvre Renamo. By instituting a liberal constitution, Renamo's already weak position at the negotiating table was further undermined. However, as with the switch to political pluralism, it goes further than this. The highly technical nature of the constitution and the extent to which human rights are stressed and especially FRELIMO's efforts to include a statutory definition of the economy as market based, point again to the government's efforts to improve its image with its liberal- democratically minded western donors.

Despite the fact that it embodied all the political changes that they had ever called for, Renamo immediately rejected the new constitution on the grounds that it was drawn up by an "incompetent, unconstitutional" and unrepresentative Assembly made up only of FRELIMO members, and because it had not been consulted. It also expressed dissatisfaction with the lack of clarity in the constitution about election procedures, about the fact that provincial governments are appointed by central government (*Africa Research Bulletin*, 27, 11, November 1990: 9894), with the continued state monopoly on land and with what they saw as the concentration of too much power in the hands of the President (*Southscan*, 6, 9, March 1991: 95).

However, although they had criticised both the new multi-party system and the constitution that enshrined it, Renamo showed signs by early 1991 of building on the start it had made at its First Congress in 1989 and was trying to transform itself into a more political organisation. Reports from Zambezia describe it as apologising for atrocities and sending many of its most brutal members to other areas as well as building schools (*Economist Intelligence Unit*, 1, 1991: 30). However, this could well be just a limited regional initiative on the part of one local commander.

The months following the promulgation of the new laws also saw the launch of a number of new political parties in Mozambique. By mid 1991 there were six new such parties, UNAMO (Mozambique National Union), PALMO (Liberal and Democratic Party of Mozambique), MANU (Mozambique African National Union), COINMO (Mozambique Independent Conference which was very critical of the government), MONAMO (Mozambique National Movement which strongly supported Renamo) and the PCM (National Convention Party) (*Southscan*, 6, 21, May 1991: 184).

However, the activities and support bases of these parties tended to be confined to the major towns. Even there it seems unlikely that they were able to construct much of a mass base given the existence of a number of factors serving to inhibit political activity, such as strikes, power cuts and the high cost of living and the burdens it placed on urban dwellers, especially their need to participate in the black market (*Mozambique Information Office Special Report*, 1, 1990: 2).

FRELIMO itself suffered a serious decline in activity amongst its members, even in the urban areas both as a result of the factors mentioned above but also because of problems experienced by the grassroots bodies. These complained during 1990 of the fact that they had no serious role to play as they had come to be regarded by the upper echelons of the party and the government as mere "transmission belts". They were hence seldom informed about anything, never mind consulted (*Mozambiquefile* 164, March 1990: 15). This is no doubt connected to the government's need to push through a range of political reforms from above. Consultation did occur, but far less, and in a far less meaningful way than had previously been the case with FRELIMO

(see the comments about the Fifth Congress above), and the end result had very little to do with the messages coming out of the consultations. The political reforms were made by the Politburo, acting alone. Thus the tendency already noticeable in the previous period of reform, of commandism and political centralisation and a decline in democratic political activity, continued to worsen as an indirect result of the reforms themselves.

Conclusion

The eight year period from 1983 to 1991 saw a substantial turnaround in Mozambique's policies, both domestic and foreign. The economic policies introduced in the first five years of independence were largely reversed as a result first of the reforms coming out of the Fourth Party Congress and then the IMF sponsored structural adjustment programme, the PRE. Similarly, Mozambique moved from either rejecting or being excluded from most IFI's to being a closely cooperative member, reliant on ever increasing aid flows. On the political scene, Mozambique moved from being to a Marxist-Leninist oriented one-party state to having a multi-party system, with FRELIMO ready to withdraw substantially from its dominance of the state and its constitution enshrining a wide range of human rights.

These reforms are all interconnected, both in terms of the process and the causes. These lay in a range of factors, including changes in FRELIMO leadership, FRELIMO's search for greater legitimacy and their desire to out manoeuvre Renamo at the negotiating table. However, the most important cause behind the reform lay outside Mozambique, amongst the IFI's and other donors, particularly the US. Mozambique's weak economy and indebtedness drove it to seek assistance from the international community. This set in motion a process of ever more stringent economic reforms, starting with the FRELIMO generated changes of 1983 to 1986 and culminating in the PRE. However, as the success of these changes continued to be prevented by the ongoing war, more political reform and a negotiated end to the fighting became both an explicit and implicit demand of the donors. There had always been an ideological component to FRELIMO's accommodation with aid donors but this tended to be limited to economic issues and to Mozambique's links with the

Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. But as the conflict in Mozambique dragged on and the international environment changed, combined with Mozambique's closer relationships with the donors and its reliance to the point of absurdity on its aid, the demand for change became more strictly political in nature.

The link between the largely economic reforms of the previous periods and international pressure are clear (see also Bowen 1990). Not to see the political change which followed the economic reform as a continuation of this process would be a mistake. Mozambique, right from the beginning had become locked into an ever worsening dependency relationship with donors who had been prepared from the start to use their aid in an instrumental fashion in order to bring about a range of reforms in Mozambique. These increasingly became focused on the movement away from Marxism-Leninism on the one hand and toward a multi-party system on the other. A consequence of the reforms that started early on and worsened as the tempo of reform increased was a decline in political participation and in the power that grassroots party bodies wielded. This is a consequence too of the external causes of the reform. The changes were forced on Mozambique from outside, causing the top political leadership to make the necessary strategic decisions which then had to be implemented often against the wishes of the majority and certainly not in consultation with them.

CONCLUSION

Democratization is occurring throughout Africa. Scholars of African politics have picked up this trend and, following the literature on similar changes in Latin America, Southern Europe and most recently, Eastern Europe, they have identified the causes of democratization as being largely of internal origin. Thus, identifying democratization with liberal democracy and the increase in political activity, particularly elections, improvements in human rights and especially in the introduction of multi-party systems, its spread is seen as the result of the resurgence of civil society, initiatives on the part of the African political leadership, or a side-effect of economic privatization. To the extent that international factors are seen as being important as causes of democratization, attention is paid only to, for example, the introduction of structural adjustment programmes and the spread of the idea of democracy following the changes in Eastern Europe. Too little recognition is given to the growing influence of western aid donors whose role has become more important in the African debt crisis and who are becoming increasingly vocal about linking further aid to improvements in human rights government, specifically to increased political pluralism and the introduction of multi-party systems. This pressure is unlikely ever to have been the only issue at work, pushing countries toward democratization, but it is clearly becoming an issue for donors who are making more and more statements linking governability, democracy and further aid. It is most likely to have interacted with the internal issues identified by the literature, for example the resurgence in civil society and initiatives of the political leadership, to advance and perhaps at times inhibit the process of democratization.

However, the effect of the literature's lack of cognisance of the importance of international pressures and the aid issue in particular in causing democratization is to ignore some of its consequences, crucial amongst which are its fragility, because of the weak internal basis, and the fact that it is being imposed from above, as a necessity, by leaderships aware of their nation's limited financial options. The result has been a democratization of the formal political space, defined by the constitution

and embodied most often in a multi-party system and human rights legislation. But the fact that democracy has usually been imposed from above, in response to economically linked pressure, and already weak political structure, has normally meant that it has been superimposed upon actual decrease in democracy and an increase in commandism within the state.

Mozambique is an example of a country where exactly this process is occurring. The country has always been strongly shaped by its international context and the current period is no exception. The colonial experience, by undermining the economic and political base had the effect of both threatening the country's effort to establish a new type of society and ensuring the country's continued reliance on both its trade and aid partners. The ambitious transformation attempted by the FRELIMO government after independence in 1975 had, as one of its goals, the reduction of this dependence both regionally and internationally. However, other aspects of its policies, its adoption of elements of Marxism-Leninism, its attempt at introducing a number of socialist oriented changes, its efforts to seek closer ties with its "natural allies" in the socialist world, its support for the independence struggles of its neighbours, and their combined support for SADCC's efforts to decrease reliance on SA, had the effect of alienating Mozambique from a number of regional and international powers.

Mozambique's international isolation, in the form of its limited access to much western aid and the regional hostility it faced, first from Rhodesia and then from South Africa and Renamo, had the effect of undermining Mozambique's already weak economic base. Furthermore, the continuing security crisis also contributed to a political decline in terms of political participation within FRELIMO and state structures. These external causes of Mozambique's problems interacted with numerous internal causes, particularly some of FRELIMO's misguided policies and a tendency toward overcentralisation, to produce a crisis of such serious proportions that the government knew it would have to make considerable changes to its positions and policies. The focus of the reforms was external: Mozambique had to improve its international standing in order to deal with its debt crisis. However, part of this also involved internal policy changes which FRELIMO embarked upon in 1983.

Mozambique's continuing contacts with IFI's in its efforts to reschedule debt and improve its aid flows set in motion a whole train of economic reforms, culminating in the structural adjustments programme of PRE in 1987. Especially with the US, improvements in Mozambique's position with regard to aid and debt rescheduling had always been linked to efforts to change its international orientation toward the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc as well as to encourage it to move away from Marxism-Leninism. However, as the international environment changed, and as Mozambique's contacts with socialist countries decreased, the emphasis switched to internal aspects of Mozambican politics. Specifically, pressure began to be put on Mozambique to negotiate a settlement with Renamo and to introduce a more democratic multi-party political system.

These pressures were not the only ones operating to bring about the dramatic political changes that occurred in Mozambique between 1989 and the beginning of 1991. Other factors, for example Renamo's establishment of a stronger political identity after 1989, the FRELIMO leadership's shrewd efforts to outwit and outmanoeuvre Renamo at negotiations, changes within FRELIMO leadership and calls for more democracy from amongst some groups such as the Catholic Church were also important. But just as the international pressure was the decisive factor pushing the FRELIMO government into starting the reforms, so it and Mozambique's overwhelming dependence on continued and massive flows of foreign aid was the decisive factor prompting the political reforms.

However, the fact that the main impetus for reform came from outside has two important consequences. Firstly, it means that a lot of the reforms are designed more to relieve and answer to this pressure than really to increase democracy. Marina Ottaway (1988b) refers to the reforms as being "symbolic" mostly because the state did not have the capacity to implement them. In many respects the reforms are symbolic but not so much because of lack of state capacity (although this is a problem) but because they are so strongly geared toward outside consumption. Secondly, the fact that the pressure for political reform came from abroad meant that they had to be imposed from above, against the tenor of popular discussion and

against even upper level FRELIMO structures. This means that the reforms are fragile in nature particularly given the political decay described in Chapter 3. It also means an increase in the degree of political centralisation and a decrease in the role of low level structures.

It is possible that an opening up of the political sphere will foster the emergence of democracy in Mozambique. However, given the likelihood of continuing violence and conflict, even it at a lower level, and the fact that an economic recovery is likely to be a very long way away, the chances of this happening are small.

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