

THE SOUTH AFRICAN LOBBY IN AMERICA:
THE BATTLE OVER SANCTIONS

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INTRODUCTION

The relationship between South Africa and the United States was, historically, quite mutually profitable. The South African government regarded the United States as an ally in the world and sought continued friendship with them. The United States was mildly critical of the South African system of apartheid, but they, however, viewed South Africa as an ally. During the 1980's the relationship between the two countries became strained as the anti-apartheid voices in the United States grew louder and louder. The movement sought to end the atrocities of apartheid and change American foreign policy toward South Africa. The strongest diplomatic means available to them was imposing economic sanctions on South Africa in an attempt to force political change in the country. The anti-apartheid movement lobbied extensively gaining support among the American public and eventually the U.S. Congress. The sanctions campaign culminated in the enactment of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) of 1986.

Prior to the enactment of the CAAA the South African government and its allies launched their own campaign in an

attempt to combat the imposition of sanctions. Lobbying played a key role in the process for those on both sides of the issue. For the anti-apartheid movement, lobbying was effective on the American public and the U.S. congress. For the South African government lobbying was effective on the conservative right wing and President Reagan and his administration.

In chapter 1, it is necessary to expound on lobbying and the foreign policy process. Interest groups play a key role in lobbying and lobbying plays a key role in foreign policy. They have flourished in an environment, such as the American system, because it is inherently open and democratic by nature. This allows for the free flow of opinions and ideas in the legislature. Because interest group lobbying plays a role in domestic policy, it is only natural that foreign policy should be effected by it as well. The case of the CAAA provides a prime example to illustrate this occurrence.

Chapter 2 examines the historical interaction between the United States and South Africa. It reviews U.S. foreign policy toward South Africa over the last 40 years, concentrating primarily on the post- World War II era. Each

president had a different foreign policy approach, ranging from a friendly relationship under Ronald Reagan in the first few years of his presidency, to a more critical relationship under the Carter administration. Finally, this chapter discusses the failure of Reagan's policy of constructive engagement and the success of the anti-apartheid movement.

Chapter 3 reviews the lobbying campaign, embarked on by the South African government and its allies, to combat the sanctions campaign of the anti-apartheid movement. It discusses the key players and their strategies concentrating specifically on the Reagan administration and their attempts to stop sanctions legislation. The final chapter analyzes the data presented and discusses the conclusions. It questions the effectiveness of foreign lobbys on United States international affairs and analyzes the effects of the power struggle between the executive and the legislature on foreign policy decision-making. These two questions need to be discussed as both can have an effect on future foreign policy decisions in the United States.

CHAPTER 1

Lobbying and Foreign Policy

Interest Groups and Lobbying

The American electorate and their political representatives see themselves as democrats and the United States as a liberal democracy. Because of this strong national sentiment, the political system is inherently open and easily accessible. The players with direct access and the most effect in this arena are interest groups. Miroslav Nincic defines an interest group as, " an association of people who, through their collective action, seek to influence domestic or foreign policy so as to promote their common interest " (Nincic, 1988, p.131). According to William Keefe and Morris Ogul, the one essential condition important to the proliferation of groups in American politics is freedom of association, and the conditions that nurture this are divided into three categories. They are legal-structure, political and ideological.

The structure of the American government encourages intense group action. The American system of federalism,

decentralizes power and distributes it between the branches of government, at the federal level, and between the states nationally. Because of this structure, interest groups can wage battles in numerous arenas. If they lose at the federal level they can then attempt to win at the state or local level. Dispersal of power between the branches of government also allows for significant group activity. For example, if the legislative branch refuses to consider a group's argument they are able to appeal to the executive. From the perspective of groups, governmental decentralization offers them more influence and ultimately more power.

The political environment also accounts for the significant presence of groups in the system. As a result of the decentralized governmental system there is also a decentralized party system. Stephen Bailey argues:

"The real issue is that the government, in a generation of prolific services and equally prolific regulation, has become a vast arena in which group interests and personalities struggle for power without sufficient reference to questions of the long-range public interest. These groups and personalities use the pressure points and divergent party roles and constituencies of the President, the bureaucracy, the national committees, and the two Houses of Congress as instruments of access and finagle. This produces a politics of "boodle" and accomodation, but not a politics of responsible power and clear national purpose (Bailey, 1959, p.10).

The weak legislative parties are unable to withstand the pressure of interest groups and therefore individual members

of congress are forced to use their own devices to seek support wherever they can find it. This indicates that groups can be more coercive and in turn more powerful than the parties themselves. Furthermore, the system of district representation also makes the congressmen vulnerable to large, powerful groups within their constituency.

Keefe and Ogul also suggest, "The virility of groups is related to the low ideological content of American politics. That American voters as a whole are not moved to act on stern ideological or programmatic grounds has been well documented" (Keefe & Ogul, 1985, p.269). On the contrary they are more than likely motivated by self-interest and restrained by apathy. As a result the lawmakers have adopted a similar attitude. A study of California, New Jersey, Ohio, and Tennessee legislators determined that out of several hundred only a handful concluded that they became interested in politics and motivated to participate as a result of their socioeconomic beliefs. Keefe and Ogul conclude that, "loosely or briefly linked to ideology, legislators may be particularly responsive to the demands of interest groups" (Keefe & Ogul, 1985, p.286).

Interest groups vary in size and therefore their power

in the legislature varies. Small groups use telephone calls, telegrams and the mail to voice their wishes. Large and more powerful groups hire professional lobbyists to represent their views personally in the legislature. Lobbying is considered a professional matter and effective lobbyists have long time standing and experience in the business. Most lobbyists add to their professionalism by being non-partisan. One study discloses that only about one-half of them participate in politics actively and less than one-third have held elective or appointive public office (Keefe & Ogul, 1985, p.271).

Communications and campaign contributions are the two most widely used and practical tactics employed by lobbyists in the legislature. Most powerful interest groups have an intricate communications network that can be rallied at any time to take up arms for the cause. They can also call on powerful constituents to make a few phone calls or write a few letters. Although some analysts argue that campaigns to rally the public are often unsuccessful, on occasion they have had a dramatic effect. They are particularly successful when used to fight tax increases or other finance related measures. For example, in the 98th Congress (1983-84) a very successful inspired mail campaign occurred. In response to a massive letter writing campaign, initiated by the banking

lobby, Congress repealed a new law which required financial institutions to withhold ten percent of interest and dividend income. In a period of three months, members of Congress received several million letters and postcards stating their opposition to the law. By all accounts this was considered one of the largest mail campaigns in congressional history (Keefe & Ogul, 1985, p.277).

Campaign contributions, social lobby and bribery are forms of lobby activity that cluster around the fringe of the legislative process. The most widely used and important of these activities is campaign contributions. Direct political action in the form of funds and assistance in campaigns may be offered to legislators by interest groups. According to the Federal Election Commission Record, in 1976, group political action committees (PACs) contributed \$22.6 million to House and Senate candidates; in 1982, their contributions totaled \$83.1 million (Keefe & Ogul, 1985, p.277). It appears that legislators are becoming increasingly dependent on interest groups for their campaign funds and in turn interest groups are increasing their power over legislators. Over 3,000 PAC's are registered under the federal law, and almost all are directly affiliated with special-interest lobbies (Findley, 1985, p. 42). Findley points out that political action committees can be very successful in

Washington D.C. by using significant campaign contributions. The largest pro-Israel PAC is the National Political Action Committee (NatPAC), headquartered in New York with Marvin Josephson, head of a theatrical and literary talent agency, as chairman. It draws money from the entertainment industry and got off to its start in 1982 when Woody Allen signed its first nationwide fund-raising appeal. The National Journal rates it as the nation's largest non-labour, non-business political action committee. "In 1982, NatPAC raised \$1.04 million and spent \$547,000 on 109 candidates for Congress. It gave the \$5,000 limit to each of 31 Senate candidates. Twenty-eight of these were elected. On the House side, 57 of the 73 candidates it supported won" (Findley, 1985, p. 43). There are numerous examples of how successful political action committees have been at, literally, buying congressmen. Money appears to be a very powerful tool for interest groups to manipulate the system in order to obtain the results they desire.

The social lobby refers to the practice of lobby groups entertaining the legislature. While bribery and sanctions are not often used they are weapons in the arsenal of the interest groups. Bribery is considered too risky by its very nature which diminishes its usefulness. Interest groups are wary in threatening to use sanctions against legislatures who

refuse their demands. They prefer to use more subtle means of coercion through intermediaries, stimulated letter writing campaigns, and alliances.

Interest groups seek a favourable public attitude toward their organization and its goals. They attempt to mould public opinion as well as to exert influence on decision makers in government. Public relations has become the center of the campaign to win public support and their aim is to gain widespread acceptance of their ideological positions. A grass roots campaign is the most successful when it enlists support from other influential powerful organizations or when the cause is considered morally just. When the people are properly instructed by the professional public relations team of an interest group, they should instinctively favour the right or morally correct side of the issue. Often times this can be a distorted picture of what is the "right" side of the issue, particularly if the public relations team has done its job. However, in certain circumstances it is not necessary for the public to look to adverts and slogan to determine the morally correct side of the issue. Most of these organizations tend to underestimate the intelligence and moral character of the people they are trying to persuade.

Foreign Policy and Lobbying

For the sake of this paper, it will be beneficial to explore what involvement interest groups have in the U.S. foreign policy process. But first let us explore foreign policy itself and its role in the political process. The two most prominent objectives of foreign policy in the universal realm are national security and national prosperity. In the case of the United States, more specifically "goals would include such external ideological objectives as the defense abroad of those political principles that the United States espouses at home" (Nincic, 1988, p.4).

In order to achieve foreign policy goals it becomes necessary to have the means of doing so in a complex and often hostile world. Often the foreign policy objectives of one country are not compatible with another, which often leads to friction and ultimately if the issue is unresolved conflict.

"Though foreign policy sometimes involves efforts to coordinate the pursuit of one nation's goals with those of other countries, it frequently implies the pursuit of external objectives even when these do not mesh with, or run directly counter to, the goals of other nations. One nation may try to get others to modify their objectives, to alter their goals so as to make them compatible with its own, but if this is not possible, the nation's aims may be pursued at the expense of other nations. Consequently, the major instruments of foreign policy are those of power and influence" (Nincic, 1988, p.11).

There are several ways to manipulate a nation's behavior: by convincing them the desired behavior is in their best interests, by offering incentives, or by inflicting some kind of punishment if the desired behaviour does not occur. The most practical way of ranking these means of manipulation is by their level of coerciveness. At the least coercive end of the spectrum lies inducement and persuasion, usually achieved through diplomacy and/or aid. At the other end lies force, usually achieved by inflicting punishment and pain on a society through military force. At the middle of the spectrum lie the increasingly used instruments of foreign policy. Their degree of coerciveness exceeds that of diplomacy but falls short of military force. "Among these measures are economic sanctions and the practice of external subversion of other nations through the informal and clandestine penetration of their political system" (Nincic, 1988, p.11).

Rather than concentrate on military force, an investigation of diplomacy and the middle ground will prove more worthwhile, as in the United States/ South Africa relationship diplomacy and middle ground tactics were used. Diplomacy is considered the process of communicating, persuading and negotiating (Nincic, 1988, p.14). It is the most widely used instrument of foreign policy and has been

employed historically since the formation of political groups and nation states. Most countries, including the United States, conduct the majority of their foreign policy through diplomacy. There have been numerous examples of diplomatic success, in the recent past; the negotiations between Israel and Egypt that led to the Camp David Accords, the reestablishing of cordial relations between the U.S. and China in the early seventies, and the U.S.- Soviet arms control agreements of the same time.

Communication is the essence of diplomacy, and how much communication diplomacy requires depends on the extent to which the two countries' goals are the same (Nincic, 1988, p.14). The chief purpose of U.S. diplomacy is to explain the nation's purposes and policies and to point out the links that bind its national interest with that of the other countries. If there is no need to do this, as the two countries see eye to eye, then diplomatic efforts consist of exchanging information between the concerned parties. When the goals of the two countries only partially correspond diplomacy becomes a matter of negotiating and bargaining. Diplomacy can be used hand in hand with more coercive means of influence and persuasion. For example, threats of military force can be used to induce cooperation, a practice commonly known as "gunboat diplomacy".

There are other foreign policy instruments that are more coercive than diplomacy but less than military force. Most U.S. foreign policy undertakings fall into this middle ground. Some analysts believe the reasons for this include the advance in military technology, as it becomes much more risky to use coercion when nuclear weapons are involved in the scenario. Another reason may be that the United States has developed and cultivated other tools for influencing the behavior of an uncooperative nation and therefore has broadened its policy options. Two prime examples of this are informal penetration, or subversion, and economic sanctions.

Often when diplomacy does not succeed the U.S. government chooses to act from within to alter a country's behaviour. In these cases, the U.S. gains access to elements of the target state's society and uses this access to influence the policies or stability of the government. The best known and most informal of these types of penetration is propaganda. "While propaganda pervades international politics, it is most extensively employed by those nations with the greatest external interests and the greatest resources for its use -especially the United States" (Nincic, 1988, p.19). The United States' Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is active in propaganda, as well as playing the leading

role in U.S. penetration efforts. Its most controversial activities have been those involved in removing foreign governments from office. During the Cold War, the CIA's main objectives included opposing the communist threat either by overthrowing governments not allied with the United States, or supporting those that were friends of the United States, even if they were politically unsavoury. Southern Africa, during the Cold War era, appears to be a prime example of this occurrence. In the seventies and early eighties, the CIA was a great financial and military supporter of UNITA during the Angolan War. Because both the South African government and the CIA supported UNITA, and they shared the same ideological belief that communism needed to be destroyed they found themselves covertly allied in southern Africa.

Another controversial foreign policy tool used by one country to alter another's behaviour is economic sanctions. "This practice involves withholding an economic advantage from another country in pursuit of some political goal" (Nincic & Wallensteen, eds., 1983). In some cases, as in that of South Africa, economic sanctions are designed to pressure a foreign government into discontinuing policies that the United States or the world community finds objectionable. For example, the United States used economic sanctions in an attempt to force Nicaragua to withdraw its military support of the leftist

rebels in El Salvador, who were threatening the unstable U.S. supported government there. In some cases the real purpose of economic sanctions is not to force reform but rather to oust an unpalatable government. The aim is that sanctions will create enough economic hardship within the country to precipitate an overthrow of the government by internal forces. The economic sanctions against Cuba, were probably instigated in the hope that Castro would be removed by a disgruntled public rather than forced into reforms. This was not to be the case. However, in contrast, in 1973, economic sanctions proved successful in securing the ousting of Chile's Marxist President Salvador Allende. More often, however, economic sanctions and outside pressure cause people to rally around their leaders, even if these leaders would otherwise be unpopular (Nincic, 1988, p.17).

Imposition of economic sanctions bears certain risks. It is possible that if the sanctioning nation has an economic relationship with the sanctioned nation that the sanctioning nation can also hurt itself economically. Also, it is hard to contain the affects of sanctions; by trying to punish an adversary, a nation may also hurt others which it harbours no ill will. Thus, economic sanctions can be viewed as a foreign policy instrument surrounded by controversy and mixed opinions.

Foreign policy decisions, as a whole, in the United States are viewed with mixed opinion. The process itself is often confusing, by its nature, and therefore viewed with frustration by the public. In the next few pages an analysis of the U.S. foreign policy decision making process and the role interest groups play in this process is necessary. In the United States, the public cannot play a direct and continuous role in foreign affairs. Therefore, the Congress plays this role on behalf of its constituency. As the public's trustees, representatives are relied upon to make the right decisions and to correctly interpret their constituency's preferences. Additionally, it is not only Congress' function to ensure that foreign policy making is democratic, but its role is also to promote U.S. foreign policy objectives.

Foreign policy authority is constitutionally divided between Congress and the president, and understandably, as is most times the case when power is jointly exercised, there is much contention over both side's appropriate share. "In the case of foreign policy, this division has been said to amount to "an invitation to struggle" between Congress and the president- certainly a good description of the situation since the late sixties" (Nincic, 1988, p.79). The United

States Constitution assigns congressional authority to specific areas of international affairs and also certain instruments of congressional control (Nincic, 1988, p.80). Congress has a significant controlling role in foreign policy, since its assigned responsibilities in some of the most crucial aspects of international affairs; war, treaties, and economic relations. Even though the President is commander and chief of the armed forces and is therefore at liberty to engage in military action, the Congress was granted the exclusive power to declare war by the U.S. Constitution.

The second major area of congressional responsibility addresses treaties. Since treaties are considered laws and Congress is the only body that can make laws, it follows that congress has a voice in the nation's treaty decisions. The Constitution does empower the President to make treaties. However, in order for them to be ratified the President needs a two-thirds majority vote from the Senate. The Congress is also empowered by the Constitution to make decisions on foreign trade. This prerogative is not only important in its own right, but it also has significant political implications. For example, the Congress can affect the nation's relations with its allies or adversaries by loosening or tightening restrictions on their exports to the United States. It has been said that "few of the economic

powers of Congress have more significant implications for foreign policy than its power to regulate commerce" (Crabb & Holt, 1984, p.55).

As well as specific areas of responsibility, Congress also has certain instruments of control that apply to facets of foreign policy. It can influence the choice of people selected to administer the nation's foreign affairs and most importantly it appropriates the funds for foreign policy programs. As far as money is concerned, the President proposes a budget and then Congress must approve the funds. Considering the powers Congress can wield over foreign policy it is surprising, to some analysts, that Congress, up until the mid-seventies, has not played a more decisive role in external politics (Nincic, 1985, p.82).

There are two special categories of lawmaking of constitutional origin. The first, involving the approval of treaties, is specified by the constitution and technically only involves the U.S. Senate in the process. The second category, the power to adopt constitutional amendments and thereby the power to alter fundamental law, is a function of the legislature. The initiative in making foreign policy does primarily rest with the president. But the stark words

of the Constitution offer only minimal indication of Congress's prerogatives and opportunities for influencing presidential decisions and the broad power of foreign policy. According to Keefe and Ogui, in recent years the significant increase in the number of international agreements and in the requirements for enabling legislation to effect broad policies have augmented the responsibility of Congress in the realm of foreign policy (Keefe & Ogui, 1985, p.273).

Because Congress's role in the adoption and ratification of foreign policy has increased, the role of interest groups in the process has as well. Even though interest groups are neither constitutionally mandated, nor popularly elected to play a role in making foreign policy decisions, they have become a major source of power in this realm. Because the international system impinges on U.S. citizens day to day lives it is only natural that interest groups will direct some of their effort to lobbying on foreign policy issues. This has been inclined to create controversy as some people believe foreign policy ought to represent the general interests of all the public rather than the special interests of those who are best able to influence foreign affairs. The reality of the situation is that special interest does play an active role in foreign policy formation. Business groups,

the farm lobbies, organized labour, ethnic lobbies, lobbies for foreign governments and public interest groups are a few of the special interest groups who influence foreign policy formation (Nincic, 1985, p.135).

Business group lobbies derive power from numerous sources, especially from interests that are clearly identified, narrowly focused, and substantially supported by financial resources. According to Nincic, political activity is engaged in through business and trade organizations, through informally concerted efforts, and through individual companies. Naturally, the bigger and more influential a company the more successful it will be in influencing policy outcome. Not only do business lobbies influence domestic policy but they can also affect foreign affairs. The more focused business lobbies, involved in foreign affairs, tend to be those representing individual corporations or trade associations (Nincic, 1988, p. 136).

Farm lobbies and organised labour are two interest group categories that deal primarily with domestic policy making. Agricultural lobby has mainly focused on matters of domestic farm policy, and its major accomplishment has been a system of support prices and supply controls. However, farm lobbies

have occasionally been active in the foreign policy realm as well. For instance, in the case of the Soviet Union and wheat sales, during the seventies, the farm lobby was very supportive of a detente approach to the Soviet Union as it would ensure increased grain sales to that country. This illustrates that in certain cases foreign policy can be subordinate to the needs of domestic policy.

Even though most of organized labour's lobbying is directed at domestic issues, it can also play an active role in foreign policy. For example, the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), has lobbied hard for restrictive immigration legislation, and especially for provisions that require the government to certify that an applicant for immigration to the United States is not, by way of his profession, likely to take a job that may otherwise be filled by an American worker. Another threat to the American worker is the influx of cheaper goods from Mexico that were previously made in the United States. It is often the case that organized labour groups can increase political pressure on policy makers forcing them to make decisions conducive to the labour unions' wishes.

Ethnic lobbies have a marked influence on foreign policy making. The United States is a nation of people with varying

national and ethnic backgrounds. Therefore, it is not surprising that they show interest in the countries to which they trace their roots. A particularly powerful ethnic lobby in the United States, as mentioned earlier, is the Jewish lobby, who seek to advance a foreign policy that is supportive of Israel. "Although the nation's Jewish population amounts to only 2 percent of the total, its political strength is magnified by the intensity of its commitments, its generally high level of education and political activism, its substantial campaign contributions, and its concentration in states that account for a large number of electoral votes" (Nincic, 1988, p.142). Ethnic lobbies represent legitimate interest groups with strong emotional commitments to their cause. Yet, it is more complex than that as often political interests conflict and loyalties can be painfully divided. Therefore, it can be said, that the ethical and political issues involved in the ethnic lobbies are far more complex than other lobbies.

While most lobbies in the United States act on behalf of domestic issues, a number act on behalf of foreign governments. Because Congress plays a role in foreign policy decision making, foreign government lobbies often seek to make amiable contact with its members in order to influence decisions. These lobbyists are usually U.S. citizens and are

frequently lawyers and public -relation specialists specifically hired for the job. Most foreign lobbying revolves around economic issues. For example, the United States -Japan Trade Council, which is predominantly funded by the Japanese government, has lobbied, not always successfully, against import restrictions on cars, electronic apparatus, textiles, and steel. The risk of foreign government lobbying arises when lobbies attempt to guide U.S. foreign policy in the direction of their own international objectives, resulting in policies that may conflict with the interests of the United States. However, this is rarely the case and in most instances foreign lobbies act as useful diplomatic tools.

Public interest groups, a development of the last few decades, have been established to promote general notions of public good or specific identifiable ideologies. For example, a number of these groups were started to support or oppose arms- control. SANE, a group formed to support arms control and better relations with the Soviet Union, conducted a rather successful public- education campaign on the benefits of arms limitations and detente in the early eighties (Nincic, 1988, p.146).

Presidential Foreign Policy Power

Foreign policy decisions are not only limited to Congress. On the contrary, the President has most of the power to shape and manage U.S. external affairs. Congress is certainly, historically, increasing its power to influence the direction of foreign affairs but it is still limited in the degree of control it can exercise. Most of the foreign policy decisions are left to the president and his administration. Presidential policy is shaped considerably by the pressures of the electoral process. The President is accountable to the voters; therefore his foreign policy is often guided by the electorate's wishes.

After World War II, with the United States emerging as a formidable world power, the president found himself playing an increasingly major role on the international stage. Also, the impact of the issues the president confronts abroad are often more exciting and dramatic than those on the domestic front. Constitutionally, the president has the authority to make treaties with foreign nations and is commander and chief of the armed forces. The Constitutional provision that gives him the most power is the one that affords him the "executive power" of the national government (Article II, Section I, U.S. Constitution). The wide variety of powers and

prerogatives the president has been granted allows him many incentives and punishments to use when seeking endorsements for his foreign policy pursuits. This is particularly true when dealing with Congress, as he can provide incentives to political allies and, in certain ways, punish opponents. For example, when Senator Church opposed President Johnson's call for a military solution to the war in Vietnam, and cited the political columnist Walter Lippmann as being on his side, Johnson said, "The next time you want a dam in Idaho, you just go to Walter Lippmann for it" (Steel, 1970, p.49). It can therefore be assumed the president and his administration are a very powerful lobby in the Congress.

The president, because of his high public profile, is well placed to persuade the nation of the benefits of his policies (Neustadt, 1981). Because he constantly has the attention of the media, and because of the respect associated with the office, he is in a position to appeal directly to the public for support for his policies. Often his high profile and his popularity enable him to manipulate Congress and bend their will by arousing public support for his cause. Because of his popularity with the electorate President Reagan was often successful in using this tactic when confronted with legislative opposition to his policies. However, there can be limits to the effectiveness of this

approach, as illustrated by Reagan's failure to lobby support and funds for the Contras in Nicaragua. He also failed, as will be illustrated later, to prevent economic sanctions from being imposed on South Africa. Even so, a president does have great resources at his disposal, and quite frequently they do work.

Both the legislative and the executive branches of government, influenced by interest groups and the electorate, determine U.S. foreign policy. Historically, these opponents and other players have been embroiled in a power struggle over who dominates the foreign policy process. Increasingly, Congress, supported by powerful interest groups, has won decisive victories in the realm of foreign policy decision-making. Bearing this in mind, using the American political process as a backdrop, it is necessary to examine a case study where all these components come together to do battle over a high profile foreign policy issue. The war waged over the imposition of economic sanctions against South Africa, specifically the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, provides this study.

CHAPTER 2

Environmental Context: The Climate Prior to Sanctions

In order to explore the issue of United States' sanctions against South Africa effectively, it is necessary to examine the historical interaction of these two countries. Specifically, this will provide a backdrop which will aid in better understanding the complex relationship between the key players in this situation. The United States' association with South Africa, as with most countries, was and is built around bettering their own economic and political standing in the world as illustrated by the nature of its foreign policy actions. In my opinion, U.S. government foreign policy, past and present, toward the region of Southern Africa, and South Africa especially, was based upon this notion.

In the pre- World War II era, U.S. foreign policy toward South Africa, was much the same as its policy toward British colonial possessions of the time. As long as there was continued white rule and economic gains were to be made the situation was considered mutually beneficial to those in the power positions within the United States and the colonies. The predominant thinking of the time saw nothing wrong with the situation in South Africa.

Two hundred years ago, southern Africa was part of the maritime frontier of the United States. American pirate, whaling, and trading vessels made frequent calls to Cape Town and American missionaries, frontiersmen, and prospectors made their way to southern Africa. By 1914, about half of the United States trade with Africa was conducted with South Africa. Even so, the South African share remained less than 1 percent of U.S. exports, in terms of the total U.S. foreign commerce (Gann and Duigan, 1991, p.137).

Prior to the 1900's, the U.S. and South Africa shared similar views concerning white -non-white relations. In the southern states of the United States and the Boer republics, in the second half of the 19th century, there was a policy of institutionalized racial separation. In the northern U.S. states, as in the Cape Colony, in principle, a policy of no discrimination was followed. However, in practice, separation and discrimination was fairly widely accepted and followed (Kapp and Olivier Eds., 1987, p.9). Even after the U.S. Civil War and the emancipation of black slaves the attitude of most white Americans was indifference. The population was too eager to heal the wounds left by the Civil War to push the issues of racial justice and equality. Even though legally American blacks were equal, in principle, discrimination continued well into the 20th century. In the

south, especially, a society based on the premise of "separate but equal" emerged and was only challenged and systematically eliminated in the 1950's and 1960's. In contrast the same segregation system developed in South Africa historically about the same time. This similar progression of race relations offers an insight into the United States' tolerance of South Africa's racial policies during the colonial era and into the 20th century.

After World War II, economic contacts between the United States and South Africa grew closer, specifically in the nuclear industry, where South Africa supplied the United States with uranium and other strategic minerals. The United States' investments in South Africa increased and U.S. holdings in South Africa made up about 18 percent of South Africa's total foreign investment (Gann and Duigan, 1991, p.138). According to authors Gann and Duigan, in the 1950's the United States was far more concerned with South Africa as a minor ally in the cold war than with South African apartheid. The United States bureaucratic establishment did not pay significant attention to South African issues, or African issues for that matter, as they were more concerned with wooing Western Europe, their chief cold war allies.

The Sharpeville riots of 1960, where 67 people lost their lives, focused the world's attention on the horrors of apartheid. The United States government reacted with a temporary withdrawal of American capital, but military, nuclear, intelligence, trade, and investment links between the two countries continued uninterrupted. None the less, during the Kennedy administration, in the early 1960's, Africa was given a new importance in foreign policy. In the United States African studies programs in universities expanded, thereby creating a new academic lobby committed to the struggle against colonialism and white oppression in Africa (Gann and Duigan, 1991, p.139). In the State Department, a leading member of the Democratic party's liberal wing, G. Mennen Williams, was put in charge of African Affairs. Anti-apartheid criticisms increased and relations between Washington and Pretoria began to cool.

The United Nations, in the 1960's, encouraged by the newly independent African states, began to persist in putting Southern African issues on the agenda of the General Assembly, thereby impelling governments to present formal positions and vote on them. "These moves were intended to mobilize "international opinion" and "international morality" and to force Western governments to join the symbolic commitment against the idea of white minority rule" (Kapp &

Olivier, 1987, p.30). The unwillingness of the United States, Great Britain and France to support direct action against the South African government was exploited to embarrass these governments by presenting them as supporters of the Pretoria regime. The annual United Nations pressure forced the United States to adopt a two pronged approach: "forestalling Black African initiatives, especially if they implied any future commitment of political, economic or military resources, while at the same time taking a stronger verbal stand against South African policies and issues" (Kapp & Olivier, 1987, p. 30).

In 1963, under increased internal and international pressure the United States government announced that America would stop all sales of arms to South Africa, but that present contractual obligations would be met and that the United States would "reserve the right in the future to interpret this policy in the light of requirements for assuring the maintenance of international peace and security" (U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin, 1963, p.325). In response South Africa accused the United States of surrendering Western military and security interests to short-term political considerations. Military and commercial interests in the United States were strongly opposed to the embargo (Lake, 1974, p.144-146). In the period August 1962

to March 1966, the embargo is alleged to have cost the American manufacturers at least \$60 million in lost sales (U.S. Congress Hearings, 1966, p. 27&53). However, rather than weakening South Africa militarily, sanctions succeeded in making them more independent and self-reliant. In 1969 Armscor was established as a State corporation for the development and obtaining of armaments for the South African Defence Force and by 1983 Armscor was able to satisfy 73 percent of the Defence Force's requirements (Kapp & Olivier, 1987, p.33).

The Middle East War, in 1967, and the closing of the Suez Canal led to a re-evaluation of the role of the Cape sea route and the strategic importance of South Africa. The South African government encouraged this development, underlining their willingness to cooperate with the West and emphasizing the value of their natural resources. Foreign Minister Hilgard Muller declared in 1966:

"We acknowledge and we honour the United States as a leader of the Free World today.... It is the policy of this Government to steer clear of points of friction with the United States as much as possible... but to concentrate on points of common interest" (RSA: Debates in the House of Assembly, vol.7, col.2915).

Even though the United States recognised South Africa's strategic importance they concluded that military co-operation would prove too politically risky as it would

validate the United Nation's claims that the United States was a supporter of white minority rule in southern Africa.

With the Nixon Administration's succession in 1969, U.S.-South Africa relations were placed in the context of wider strategic considerations. This was contained in National Security Study Memorandum 39(NSSM 39), one of many U.S. foreign policy reviews ordered by the President's national security adviser, Henry Kissinger. Rejecting force as an option and accepting the need to balance America's economic, scientific and strategic interests against the political interest of dissociating herself from the white minority regimes in Southern Africa, the report proposed five policy options:

1. A closer relationship with the white states.
2. A broader association with both black and white states in an effort to encourage moderation in the White state and to enlist co-operation of the black states to reduce tension and encourage better relations in the area.
3. A position much closer to the black states with limited involvement with the white regimes, but with an opposition to violent solutions.
4. Dissociation from the white states.
5. A neutralist position, dissociation from both black and white.

The Administration believed that black independence in Southern Africa was a long way off and therefore Option 2 was chosen as the best approach (Khawas & Cohen, 1976, p.82).

Evidence of the United States government policy shift included resumption of grey-areas sales of light planes, helicopters, and communication equipment; exchanges of high-level officials; relaxation of restrictions on Export-Import Bank financing; and a softening of criticism of Pretoria at the United Nations.

During the Ford administration, in the early 1970's, United States policy toward South Africa remained much the same as during the Nixon years. Henry Kissinger and the State Department were primarily concerned with the liberation struggle in Rhodesia and the military coup in Portugal which left Angola and Mozambique under Marxist governments. However, with the election of Jimmy Carter as president in 1976 U.S.-South Africa relations entered a period of deterioration. The administration embarked on a broad re-evaluation of international and domestic trends affecting foreign policy with the purpose of changing both the style and substance of the its African policy.

Carter and many of his closest advisors saw African

nationalism, not Communist aggression, as the driving historical force in southern Africa, as it was a force deemed largely consonant with American interests. Based on this premise a broad reassessment was made of international and domestic trends affecting foreign policy with the intention of changing both the style and the substance of the administration's African policy. As the Carter administration publicly supported majority rule in South Africa and openly opposed apartheid, its relations with the South African government soured significantly. Other reasons for the deterioration of relations between the United States and South Africa included the detection of a suspected nuclear weapons test site in the Kalahari by the Soviet Union and the South African governments increased oppression of opposition movements following the death in detention of Steve Biko (Baker, 1989, p.xii). In November, 1977 Carter personally initiated a more stringent arms boycott against South Africa, requested American bankers to withdraw and tried to force South Africa to submit to American demands on nuclear policy. However, during the second half of his term Carter became wary of Soviet and Cuban involvement in southern Africa. This resulted in confusing signals being sent to South Africa and the administration's domestic audience within the United States.

"While its anti-apartheid rhetoric was strong, the Carter administration seemed reluctant to end all nuclear cooperation with South Africa, unclear about what it expected white South Africans to do and at what pace, unwilling to consider the threat of economic sanctions, and inclined to encourage U.S. businesses to stay and play an active role in South Africa" (Baker, 1989, p.xiii).

The Reagan term saw perhaps the most change in U.S.- South African foreign relations. Reagan's approach to foreign policy was based on the idea of realism that argued "the international power struggle still continues, but in a more subtle and indirect form" (Kapp & Olivier, 1987, p.77). It also assumed that a lasting peace can only be assured through a position of strength and that a strengthened United States should therefore again start acting like a real super power. With these convictions driving the administration, it formed its foreign policy regarding South Africa and the southern African region. During his term, according to Pauline Baker;

"where Jimmy Carter made southern Africa one of his top foreign policy priorities and gave it a high public profile during his presidency, Ronald Reagan tucked the region into the background and stressed "quiet diplomacy." Where Carter emphasized human rights and worked on multilateral diplomatic initiatives, Reagan played up the threat of communism and adopted a more unilateral approach. And where Carter became personally involved and appointed a team of advisers to shape his policy, Reagan remained largely aloof from the issue and depended primarily on one individual- Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester A. Crocker" (Baker, 1989, p.7).

During the first four years of the Reagan administration

Chester Crocker was given free rein in southern African affairs.

Crocker became an ardent advocate and supporter of the Reagan administration's policy of constructive engagement in southern Africa.

"Constructive engagement, he implied, was a new beginning. It was "neither the clandestine embrace" of the Nixon administration nor "the polecat treatment" of the Carter years (Crocker, 1980/81, p.346). Crocker was convinced that a number of factors combined to create an unprecedented opportunity for U.S. diplomacy in South Africa and the region" (Baker, 1989, p.9).

He further indicated that a new relationship could be established between the United States and South Africa based on the political reality within South Africa. "The Botha government," he wrote, "has committed itself to a moderate reformist process whose ultimate end remains utterly unclear.... The current fluidity does not make meaningful change certain, but it does make it possible" (Crocker, 1980, p.85).

In 1980, according to Kevin Danaher, a series of confidential State Department memos, outlining the policy of constructive engagement were leaked. The secret memos proposed two goals:

"U.S. ability to develop full relations with the

South African government depends on success of Prime Minister Botha's reform programme and extent to which it is seen as broadening the governments domestic support; and "an internationally acceptable settlement in Namibia (preferably excluding SWAPO) in order to gain greater acceptance of South Africa within the global framework of western security" (TransAfrica News Report, August 1981). It was hoped that these changes would "foreclose opportunities for growth of Soviet influence in southern Africa" (TransAfrica News Report, August 1981). And in pursuit of the latter, the Reagan Administration planned covert operations against Angola in support of South Africa's destabilization efforts" (Danaher, 1989, p.133).

In the United States public sentiment about South Africa was cautious and mixed. The policy of constructive engagement bred guarded optimism during much of Reagan's first term. Reagan, himself, played a large part in shaping the public's perception of the Administration's policy toward South Africa. President Carter, a southern liberal democrat, believed the United States had to support and fight for racial equality and human rights in South Africa. In contrast Reagan, an ideological conservative, believed the United States had to oppose communist aggression and protect its strategic interests in the region. His public addresses were invariably made within this ideological context (Baker, 1989, p.25).

By the end of 1982, criticism of constructive engagement was increasing. The opinion in Africa and the U.S. Congress was that the policy had failed to achieve its objective of a Namibian settlement and was secretly encouraging South Africa's destabilization of its neighbours. Most importantly, it seemed to be having no effect on the Botha government's position on political and equal rights for blacks. Congress became of great concern to the administration as a number of bills and resolutions condemning South Africa and U.S. policy and encouraging varying degrees of sanctions were implying slowly increasing Congressional opposition. The administration attempted to appease its critics by taking a more definitive stand condemning South Africa and managed to stave off opposition until the latter part of 1984.

The politically violent protests, triggered by the new constitution going into effect, brought South Africa back into the political limelight. They were initiated partially by long simmering local issues like rents and education. The predominant reason though was the new constitution, which established a tricameral, racially segregated Parliament that gave limited voice to Coloureds and Indians but excluded black Africans. The government responded by declaring a state of emergency, that saw the occupation of townships by

the security forces, the detention of thousands of protesters and the stifling of the press. However, because of the American and international press the atrocities in South Africa were televised on the nightly news, personalizing the struggle of the South African masses for the American public. Consequently, at the end of Reagan's first term, as apartheid became a major political controversy in the United States, constructive engagement had little to show, when questions were raised about the effectiveness of U.S. foreign policy in southern Africa. Instead of withdrawing from Angola, the South African government had increased its aid to UNITA and continued to supply RENAMO covertly with military supplies. The Namibia talks had stalled and Pretoria showed no signs of opening a dialogue with black South African leaders. As the crisis in South Africa increased, Chester Crocker and the Administrations policy of constructive engagement, therefore found themselves increasingly in the crossfire.

The President, in response to nationwide criticism, issued an executive order that created a high-level bipartisan group to examine the policy of constructive engagement. The report listed four interrelated premises at the core of constructive engagement:

"First, South Africa's overwhelming economic and military predominance in southern Africa and its powerful internal security apparatus would, at least in the short term, enable Pretoria to 'manage' internal and

external pressures for change. Second, the Botha government could be induced to agree to an internationally accepted settlement in Namibia if South African withdrawal were linked to a withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and the prospect of an improvement in U.S.- South African relations. Third, an early Namibian settlement would set in motion a self-reinforcing spiral of positive developments in South Africa and the region, thus validating the constructive engagement approach. Fourth, progress could be made more quickly on apartheid issues if the U.S. government used official rather than public channels for its criticism and pressure" (Secretary of States Advisory Committees on South Africa, 1987, vi.).

The Administration stated its opposition to apartheid, but without the conviction of its predecessor, the Carter Administration. Instead, the Reagan administration limited its public criticism of Pretoria and offered cautious praise for reforms.

Public Sentiment toward South Africa

Public sentiment toward South Africa saw a drastic change with the launching of the anti-apartheid campaign by the Free South Africa Movement (FSAM). The movement was comprised of a loose coalition of organisations and individuals brought together by activists, like Randall Robinson, the executive director of TransAfrica, to protest apartheid and Reagan's policy of constructive engagement.

FSAM organized demonstrations, rallies, and lobbying activities across the United States that attracted major media attention and rallied a wide array of student, labor, church and civil rights groups.

As the public concern about conditions in South Africa increased so did public action by a nationwide network of grassroots activists who were continually exerting pressure on state and local government to disinvest in U.S. firms operating in South Africa. The main organizations were the New York-based American Committee on Africa, founded in 1953; the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, set up in 1971; the Washington Office on Africa, formed in 1972; and the American Friends Service Committee, an organization that started its Southern Africa Project in 1977. And finally, the most well known and active organization was TransAfrica, a black lobbying organization concerned with African and Caribbean affairs. By lobbying congress to enact laws that would make apartheid more expensive for the South African government, they became the principle organization initiating the drive for comprehensive mandatory sanctions.

Since the 1970's, these organizations made slow but steady gains. However, after 1984, their impact increased significantly as the public became more aware of apartheid

through the increased and extensive media coverage of the crisis in South Africa. By mid-1985 disinvestment legislation had been enacted in six states, with fourteen others considering similar action. Twenty-three cities had either passed or were considering various forms of disinvestment. In a study done by Mitchell Investment Management Company, Inc., a specialist in social investing, "by 1986 South Africa related investment restrictions of some sort affected institutional assets of more than \$220 billion; these represented the pension or endowment funds of 19 states, 68 cities and counties, and 131 colleges and universities" (Baker, 1989, p.3).

In Washington, the Congressional Black Caucus, consisting of twenty-one members of the House of Representatives, took the leading role in directing the wave of popular concern over the South Africa crisis into Congressional political action. Congressman Ronald Dellums, a democrat from California, introduced a bill that proposed cutting all economic ties with South Africa. The Reagan administration realized its policy of constructive engagement was threatened when the Dellums legislation, previously thought to be rather extreme, passed the House by voice vote in June 1985. The Senate rejected the bill, but the House's action gave the sanctions campaign new momentum.

The vote on the Dellums bill also brought attention to the increasing importance of black power in the U.S. political process. There appeared to be an increasing number of blacks holding key political offices in large American cities and counties, including New Orleans, Atlanta, Los Angeles, Detroit, Washington D.C. and Philadelphia. According to the Joint Center for Political Studies, a private research group, the number of elected black officials in the nation rose from 1,469 in 1970 to 6,056 in 1985. By 1986 five of the twenty-two standing committees in the House of Representatives were chaired by members of the Congressional Black Caucus.

The anti-apartheid movement's political dynamics in the United States were not limited to black activism. According to Pauline Baker, "the anti-apartheid campaign rekindled a collective spirit of social activism that had been dormant since the 1960's" (Baker, 1989, p.32). Numerous church groups including the National Council of Churches proclaimed their support of sanctions. Civil rights organizations, labour unions, women's associations, and Jewish groups and their leaders, added their support to the sanctions campaign. Campus activism played a key role in sharpening the debate. Shanties were erected as symbols of protest on

many campuses throughout the United States. Students encouraged university trustees to sell their holdings in American companies doing business in South Africa.

Pressures on companies operating in South Africa increased significantly, not just from universities but also from local and state governments, a number of which divested or passed antiprocurment legislation that prevented such corporations from bidding for public service contracts. California, for example, in August 1986, required that nearly \$11 billion of state investments in companies doing business in South Africa be withdrawn (Baker, 1989, p.35). As a result of these pressures, there was an increase in the rate of U.S. corporations either substantially reducing their investments or completely pulling out altogether. Foreign bank loans to South Africa were also on the decline. At the end of July 1985, Chase Manhattan Bank, accompanied by other American and European creditors, refused to roll over their short-term loans. As a result, the rand was devalued and the government temporarily closed its currency and stock markets and froze repayment of foreign debt. The Financial Times commented on these events, as follows,

"The reality is the unexpected emergence of the banking system as a conduit for the U.S. public's attitude towards the situation in South Africa. It has allowed the shareholders, depositors and the public directly to impose an economic sanction without having to persuade their government to do so" (Sampson, 1987, p.42.).

The anti-apartheid movement and the sanctions campaign worked hand in hand in a continued effort to bring an end to apartheid in South Africa. From the grassroots level they moved their campaign into the state and local legislature and eventually to the Senate and House of Representatives. As the situation in South Africa deteriorated and domestic pressure within the United States increased the role of Congress became more active. In 1985 the drive for sanctions was led by the democratic-controlled House of Representatives, where a number of Republicans, joined the Democrats in a 295-127 vote in favor of sanctions (Baker, 1989, p.39). A measure banning new loans, new investments, computer sales and imports of Krugerrands followed the sanctions vote through the House of Representatives in the summer of 1985. After the failure of the Reagan administration to produce any worthwhile results in its diplomacy, a modified version of the House's bill was passed by the Senate, and a House-Senate conference committee was established to resolve the differences.

In order to preempt legislatively imposed sanctions that would be difficult to reverse, majority leader in the Senate, Robert Dole, and then Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Richard Lugar, negotiated a compromise with the administration that resulted in an executive order

by the president imposing limited sanctions in September 1985. The order banned Krugerrands, incorporated the Sullivan Principles, a voluntary code of conduct for American firms operating in South Africa, into law, and restricted technology exports and bank loans. However, it excluded a key provision that would have automatically initiated further sanctions if significant political reforms had not been adopted by the South African government. It also left the power to lift sanctions in the hands of the president rather than the Congress.

Neither the left nor the right wing were satisfied with the president's actions. The left felt Reagan's executive order was just a substitute for more comprehensive sanctions. Congressional Democrats continued to call for tougher measures. Hard-line conservatives, on the other hand, believed Reagan's action would tilt the United States toward South African black radicals and play into the hands of the Soviet Union. The President responded by stating the executive order was neither a tactical maneuver nor a strategic retreat.

The South African situation saw a glimmer of hope in late 1985, with the formation of a Commonwealth peace initiative led by an international delegation known as the

Eminent Persons Group. The mission spent six months attempting to initiate dialogue between the South African government and anti-apartheid leaders. As they appeared to be on the verge of reaching an agreement, Pretoria launched a ground and air assault against alleged ANC bases in Zimbabwe, Botswana, and Zambia. Even though South Africa had been attempting to destabilize its neighbours for decades, these raids aroused particularly strong reaction from the international community as they occurred while a peace initiative was underway. In response to South Africa's actions, the United States recalled its military attache and expelled his South African counterpart.

In June 1986, the mission issued its report stating that the South African government had demonstrated no genuine interest in dismantling apartheid or entering into negotiations with black leaders. As a result, Commonwealth leaders met in August and, with the exception of Britain, imposed economic sanctions against South Africa. The Commonwealth action set a precedent that encouraged members of the United States Congress and the general public to argue for tougher sanctions against South Africa. This climate set the stage for the introduction and subsequent lobbying over the sanctions legislation known as the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986.

CHAPTER 3

The Lobbying Campaign Against the CAAA of 1986

In the summer of 1986, as the sanctions debate continued to rage throughout the United States, moderate Republican members of the Senate, Senators Lugar, Dole and Kassenbaum, the chairperson of the Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs, warned Reagan that unless he moved forcefully to pressure the Pretoria government, Congress would legislate further sanctions. There were repeated appeals to the White House, from the Senate, to avoid a congressional showdown and reach a compromise that included stiffer measures. The administration began negotiating with the Senate, but in the end the president flatly rejected their recommendations. This unyielding stance coupled with the controversial nature of the debate set the stage, in the legislature and political arena, for the introduction and subsequent heated lobbying over the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986.

Arguments and Players Opposed to Sanctions

There were numerous key players involved in lobbying in opposition to the imposition of U.S. economic sanctions on

South Africa. These included the South African government, led by the Nationalist Party, right wing political organizations, individual South Africans, American businesses with interests in South Africa, and Ronald Reagan and members of his administration. They adopted various strategies in an effort to sway Congress and the American public from supporting sanctions. These strategies involved lobbying influential individuals, including the President and members of Congress, and using the media in an attempt to sway public opinion.

Through out the Cold War, the United States ignored the internal policy of South Africa in an attempt to retain them as an ally in the fight against the communist threat. Specifically, in southern Africa the need for an ally appeared even greater after the independence of Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Their Marxist systems of government, often aided militarily and financially by the Soviet Union, were viewed as hostile toward South Africa. The South African government believing they were threatened and in an endeavour to maintain the minority's exclusive way of life embarked on their regional policy of Total Onslaught. They sought to destabilize their neighbours by supporting rebel groups who made these countries virtually ungovernable through violent means. The South African government's

foreign policy, until the early eighties, was to a certain extent condoned by the United States as it was not contrary to that government's policies. As a result, the South African government had numerous allies in the U.S. political system who viewed them as the only hold out against communism on the African continent.

In the United States, a variety of networks were easily accessible to the Pretoria hardliners.

"For the true believers- credulous individuals who contributed funds to help disguised SADF fronts deliver radios and Bibles to RENAMO in Mozambique- the motive was support of a politico- religious cause. For wealthy conservatives- the sort who loaned the UNITA leadership VIP aircraft and subsidized expensive overseas offices and lobbyists- the motive was the thrill of bankrolling an invisible, privatized foreign policy apparatus. For institutionally based activists, the motives could range from empire building and fundraising to the simple ambition to participate on the right side in Washington's wars. Careers, lifestyles, organizational budgets, and even electoral campaigns can be based on causes like "the struggle for freedom in Southern Africa," whether that struggle is anti- communist or anti- apartheid. Finally, for actual or would- be policy players, the motives ranged from personal ambition or jealousy to deep ideological conviction" (Crocker, 1992, p.282).

Whatever the motives they allowed the South African government and their allies to continue their policies in Southern Africa unhindered.

Crocker refers to South African government operatives as "Pretoria's hawks" and claims they were involved in

"hiring lobbyists of their own to promote their policy preferences with favored American interlocutors; and passing self-serving "information" to our government through intelligence liaison channels. In practice, the hawks had their own diplomatic service, with their own message, code language, channels, delivery system, and network of friends scattered amongst conservative circles in predictable places around Washington and other Western capitals" (Crocker, 1992, p.281).

With the growth of the anti-apartheid movement and the sanctions campaign the South African government and their American allies had to pull out all the stops in an attempt to prevent an economic embargo. As the call for sanctions increased the American right wing supporters of the South African government found themselves in the middle of a heated debate. Their most often used argument was that which favoured the strategic importance of South Africa. The South African government and its allies argued and believed that secure strategic relations required close ties with the apartheid regime. There is a great deal of literature that supports this idea. Four arguments are central to this belief:

1. It is important geopolitically for the west to maintain control of the sealanes around the Cape of Good Hope.
2. South Africa is a bulwark against the Soviet/Cuban threat to southern Africa.
3. South Africa is the dominant military power in Africa. It may even be a nuclear power. It has bases and facilities that potentially could be extremely useful to the USA and other western countries if there was a major conventional war in the Middle East or Indian Ocean region. Moreover, South Africa seeks

friendly relations with the USA and other Western countries. Therefore, it should be embraced as part of a global coalition of regionally dominant pro-western powers.

4. South Africa uniquely possess key minerals that are increasingly critical to the economies of the industrial democracies. Assuring this continued access is thus seen as a central consideration in any policy formulation towards South Africa" (Chan, 1990, p.268).

The Cape sea route argument hinges on the key commodity: oil. Since the mid- 1960's there has been an increased volume of goods, made up of imports to the United States and other Western countries, traveling around the southern tip of Africa. There are several reasons for this: the overall expansion of world trade and the growth of imports, the altered character of world shipping after the closure of the Suez Canal in 1967, the increased use of oil supertankers that are too big to use the Suez Canal, and others. There has been an increased growth in oil traffic around the Cape, from 0.8 million barrels per day in 1965 to 18 million barrels per day in 1976 (Kemp, 1977, p.51, 53). In the report of the Study Commission on US Policy toward southern Africa, published in 1981, similar data showed the Cape route as the shipping-lane carrying the largest volume of oil traffic in the world. For its supporters, South Africa became strategically significant because it sat astride this important shipping- lane. The need to protect the Cape Route

was taken for granted and the South African government was seen as the player who could most effectively do that.

With the successes of the liberation struggles in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, the protection of the white buffer-states that used to guard South Africa's northern borders had collapsed, leaving the last bastion of white minority rule in Africa more exposed than ever. At the time, there were many ideas associated with the perceived or presumed threat of the Soviet presences in southern Africa. One was that if the Soviet Union and its alleged proxies could gain access to ports in Mozambique, Angola and other African states, they would be in a position to successfully harass Western shipping and hinder the movement of oil and raw materials that either came from or went around South Africa (Chan, 1990, p.270).

The South African government sought to foster fears of wider Soviet/ Cuban involvement in southern Africa in the hope that its willingness to stand with the West against the communist threat would lead to closer strategic relations. In 1980, Prime Minister Botha argued that "today we are witnessing an encircling strategy which is being deployed step by step across the globe," (RSA House of Assembly Debates, 1980, col.3317) and "the main object of the

onslaught on the Republic of South Africa, under the guidance of the planners of the Kremlin, is to overthrow this state and to create chaos in its stead, so that the Kremlin can establish its hegemony here" (RSA House of Assembly, 1980, col.3321). From the South African government viewpoint, the Soviet/ Cuban argument was particularly appealing, as it had tried for years to find a rationale for its importance to the west that would defuse the criticisms and tensions associated with its internal policies. For those in the west who felt the overall Soviet threat was of more important political concern than South African domestic policy, the Soviet and Cuban involvement in southern Africa provided a useful rationale (Chan, 1990, p.272).

During the years of the Nixon administration elements in the United States government began to recognise that South Africa was becoming a dominant regional power. The case was made that such powers should be drawn into the Western camp and supported if at all possible. Based on this premise the Nixon Doctrine made several arguments that remained prevalent in the ongoing argument for South Africa's strategic importance. These arguments were: "it is important to support countries that are strongly anticommunist and it is extremely valuable to have allies that are strongly committed to spending their own resources for their own

defence" (Chan, 1990, p.273). In addition, it was also recognised, at this time, that South Africa possibly had nuclear capability. These factors lent to the argument that it was more beneficial to the United States to have South Africa as an ally in the region.

The final argument used for South Africa's importance to the west and the United States centered around its extensive mineral wealth and natural resources. Overall South Africa, in the early eighties was the world's fourth largest non-fuel minerals producer (South Africa: Time Running Out, 1981, p.331). These minerals included- gold, diamonds, antimony, vermiculite, vanadium, chromium, the platinum group metals, uranium, and manganese, among others. Of the twenty-seven minerals, identified by the US Geological Society, that are critical to industrial societies, the United States imported seven from South Africa- chromium, manganese, vanadium, the platinum group metals, gold, copper and coal-as well as two key alloys: ferrochromium and ferromanganese (South Africa: Time Running Out, 1981, p.331).

Two other points are argued when making a case for South Africa's mineral importance. First, Western Europe and Japan were even more dependent than the United States on South Africa for imported raw materials. And secondly, concerns

were viewed that for these critical minerals the Soviet Union was usually the major world producer. Policymakers feared that if South African supplies were cut the United States may find itself beholden to the Soviet Union, and also fear of a Soviet/ South Africa price conspiracy if a regime friendly to the Soviet Union was to emerge in South Africa (Chan, 1990, p.277).

Taking into account the extent of South Africa's mineral production, and the Soviet Union's position as the alternative supplier, it is not surprising that the importance of South African minerals was probably the argument most commonly used to explain the strategic importance of South Africa, and justify continued ties with the apartheid government. President Reagan, early in his first term, held to this theme when he remarked, "can we abandon a country that has stood by us in every war we have fought, a country that is strategically essential to the free world in its production of minerals that we all must have?" (Getler, 1981) The policy reasoning that emerges from this line of rationalization is fairly straightforward. South Africa has been a reliable trading partner to the United States and its western allies for a long time; the government in Pretoria assured the west that it would continue to keep the minerals flowing to their countries; the west's need for

these minerals was quite clear; therefore, the United States and the west should be very wary of political changes that might jeopardize the security of supply (Chan, 1990, p.278).

The argument that South Africa was strategically important to the United States and its western allies was used by opponents of sanctions in an attempt to convince Congress and the American public not to alienate South Africa through the imposition of sanctions. Specifically, the American right wing was instrumental in perpetuating this line of thought. Through the media and organisations like the John Birch Society, the Hoover Institution, and other right wing establishments this argument and others were made. By way of publications like the "Journal of Defense and Diplomacy" and the John Birch Society mouthpiece, "The New American", the South African government and its right wing allies could make a case against sanctions. In true jingoistic fashion these journals made the case that the United States was betraying South Africa. In a "New American" opinion piece Warren L. McFerran writes,

"South Africa is a close friend and time-tested ally of the United States and, because of her geographic position and valuable mineral deposits, is strategically important to the survival of the Free World. The Republic of South Africa is under attack by subversive forces that are clearly under the control of Moscow. Those revolutionary forces are torturing and murdering the very peoples they claim to be liberating.

Most important of all is the incontrovertible fact that our government is supporting those revolutionary forces" (The New American, 1987, p.34).

In the wake of the changes in the then Soviet Union these statements seem inconsequential and almost ridiculous, but at the time, the right wing and even Ronald Reagan himself was proclaiming the Soviet Union as the "evil empire". In that particular climate the statements made by "The New American" and the right wing were regarded as a bit extreme but nevertheless they were taken seriously by some key lawmakers in the Congress and the Reagan administration.

Another argument used by the anti-sanctioners reasons, that in the short-term, sanctions adversely affect the economy (especially in the sphere of access to international loans, new investments, and withdrawal of capital), and thereby the broader society. They argue that one of the major effects of sanctions is escalating unemployment which will manifest itself largely amongst black people and, ironically, the strategy of sanctions will hurt the very people it is supposed to assist. They argue further that

"the political effects of sanctions will strengthen the hand of the opponents of 'reform', causing further polarization amongst blacks and whites inside the country. Therefore whites who support 'reform' will feel that their efforts are not being acknowledged by the international community or the domestic black population, causing them to harden their attitudes and

further retreat into the laager. Simultaneously sanctions will set back the "reform strategy" (initiated by the National Party government), since the government would receive no credit or assistance from blacks internally or the international community in terms of their "reform achievements". Paradoxically, therefore, sanctions could lead to a strengthening of apartheid" (Black Caucus, 1989, p.21).

This argument was used, not as fervently by the right wing, but rather by businesses with interests in South Africa, members of the Reagan administration, and prominent South African individuals opposed to sanctions. For example, Helen Suzman, a vocal opponent of apartheid, has for the last two decades spoken out against the concept of punitive economic sanctions. She viewed the introduction of economic sanctions and disinvestment as self-defeating and contradictory. "Self-defeating because it blunts the one weapon the blacks are able to use to insist that their demands be accommodated- the power to withdraw skilled labour" (International Freedom Foundation, 1988, p.59).

Mangosuthu Buthelezi, leader of the KwaZulu homeland, lobbied extensively in the United States and elsewhere in the world against sanctions. He supported the above argument by claiming that sanctions would have to destroy the South African economy if they were to be effective, and by doing

that they would cause mass poverty and threaten the development of democracy (Leadership, vol.7, no.5).

Furthermore,

"black people must liberate themselves. Apartheid must be challenged from within South Africa. Those who are most oppressed must do the most about their oppression or else there will be no democracy. The introduction of blacks to the cash economy has advanced black bargaining power and this will increase with economic growth" (Black Caucus, 1989, p.29).

One of the more prominent and vocal campaigners against the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act and the hasty use of punitive economic sanctions was the Reagan administration, led by Chester Crocker. Crocker argues,

"the threat of sanctions can sometimes bring influence, if carefully targeted and skillfully deployed. But, as with other types of threat, credibility is greatest when you never actually have to carry out the threat. Once implemented, the influence derived from the threat is gone and you end up with less than you had before" (Crocker, 1992, p.269).

Crocker continued to support the idea of constructive engagement in southern Africa, believing it allowed the United States more options when dealing with South Africa. By imposing economic sanctions the United States was taking a decisive stance that would alienate the South African government, thereby lessening the State Department's diplomatic influence on political changes in the country. "The thing to be avoided," Crocker claimed, "was current or

prospective damage to South Africa's economy- as well as the imposition of a legislative straitjacket that would sharply reduce our flexibility and control of policy" (Crocker, 1992, p.266). It appears that the administration's biggest fear was that they would lose complete control of the situation in South Africa if they relinquished policy decision making to Congress. The power struggle between the two branches of government, the executive and the legislative, over South African foreign policy was in full swing during the battle over the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act.

In an attempt to combat the increased call for economic sanctions against South Africa, in mid- July, Secretary of State Shultz and Chester Crocker prepared a speech for Ronald Reagan that once and for all declared the administration's foreign policy stand toward South Africa. It was agreed that Reagan would state his reservations about punitive economic sanctions, but also note that the United States did not oppose sanctions on principle; but rather they were to be used as a last resort when all else fails. He would further note that the United States was applying more sanctions to South Africa than her allies. He would not rule out further measures, but would stress the need for the importance of having the industrial democracies "speaking together as a force for moderation and reconstruction. Thus, Reagan would

create a two- to three- month "window" for rethinking in South Africa, consultation with our allies, and preparing a future report to the Congress and the American people" (Crocker, 1992, p.321).

This proposed speech regarding sanctions was not the one that Reagan was eventually to make. Instead Pat Buchanan, a noted right winger, and conservative members of the National Security Council, altered the speech significantly offering a stridently polarizing message. According to Chester Crocker,

"a presidential veto of economic sanctions was threatened up front. There were two or three lines about Pretoria's official violence and nearly a page about ANC terrorism and the "necklacing" of blacks by township comrades. South Africa was compared favorably to the rest of Africa, and our interests in the region reduced essentially to an anti- Communist manifesto. The real bottom line was to keep South Africa's minerals and ports out of Soviet hands! There was no diplomatic game plan, no effort to reposition ourselves in the debate, no call for contact and negotiation with the ANC, no regional assistance program in the Front Line States, and no real call to action or threat of action. This draft was not even equivocal; it was pro- Pretoria" (Crocker, 1992, p.321-322).

Reagan's speech was to mean the defeat of the anti- sanctions campaigners in Washington D.C. His strident pro- Pretoria bias disarmed those in Congress who preferred to let the executive make decisions on foreign policy toward the complex region of southern Africa. The speech triggered a bi- partisan storm that literally forced a split in the

Republican party in the Senate and compelled legislators to make the best of a bad situation.

On August 15, the Senate voted 84 to 14 for a sanctions bill; the President carrying only 25 percent of his own party. The bill ended landing rights for SAA planes; banned new investment and new public and private sector loans; entrenched in law the President's September 1985 executive order; prohibited petroleum exports; and banned import of agricultural and fisheries products, coal, uranium, textile products of iron and steel. The President was instructed to report back in one year which additional measures he favoured imposing if no progress had been made.

On September 12, after the summer recess, the House passed the Senate sanctions bill by a vote of 308 to 77. The administration then had 10 days to decide whether to sign the legislation, veto it, or let it become law without taking any action. Reagan favoured vetoing the bill, but there was no hope of sustaining a veto unless the administration could propose a new set of sanctions alternatives through an executive order. After vain attempts by the administration, the Senate and the State Department to reach a compromise Reagan vetoed the bill on September 26. But on October 2,

the Senate overrode Reagan's veto, 78-21, and the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 became law.

CHAPTER 4

Analysis and Conclusions

After presenting the information in a study it becomes necessary to embark on an analysis of that information. Certain questions or assertions the researcher has made have to be addressed and adequately reviewed in order to ensure the paper is complete. In this particular study some pertinent and interesting foreign policy observations can be made. Firstly, I would like to address the effectiveness of lobbying on foreign policy decision-making, specifically concentrating on the implementation of punitive measures like sanctions. Secondly, I would like to review the effect foreign lobbies and internal lobbies have on this process as well. And finally, I would like to analyze the power struggle, in the realm of foreign policy, between the U.S. executive and legislative branches of government and how much effect it has on decision-making; again using this study as an example.

**Effectiveness of Lobbying on Foreign Policy Decision- Making;
Specifically the Implementation of Sanctions**

In Chapter One, Lobbying and Foreign Policy, the role of interest groups and lobbying in the foreign policy decision-making process is discussed. It is pointed out that lobbying plays a significant role in the U.S. legislative process in domestic issues. It therefore follows that because international events can and often do directly affect the lives of American citizens much interest is taken in the process. As individuals the American public is limited in its ability to directly effect the course of foreign affairs, therefore they must resort to using special interest groups to carry out their wishes. These interest groups, as discussed earlier, thrive in the inherently open and democratic environment of the United States Congress. Even in the case of foreign government lobbies, the system is easily accessible.

Foreign government lobbies can receive direct access to the Congress by hiring noted lobbyists to argue their cause on Capital Hill or by allying themselves with members of Congress or those in the government who are sympathetic to their cause. As was the case of the South African

government's lobbying efforts both options were used to their fullest advantage. Pretoria, specifically, befriended right wing members of Congress and sympathizers within the administration. Some of their noted allies were Communications Director for the Reagan administration and noted conservative, Pat Buchanan, CIA Director, William Casey and above all Ronald Reagan himself (Crocker, 1992, p.322).

From this study one may make the wrong assumption that a foreign government lobby does not have a significant effect on U.S. foreign policy decision-making. On the contrary the South African government and its allies may not have been able to stop the legislating of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act but up until that point they had been successful in keeping U.S. foreign policy going their way. The few losses, such as the various arms embargos of the sixties and seventies and the sanctions of the eighties, were minor in comparison to the victories surrounding the continued indirect support, by the United States, of apartheid and desatabilization of southern Africa.

Since the 1960's U.S foreign policy has deviated between literally embracing the white minority regime and applying fairly mild punitive measures against them.

"The closest embrace between the U.S. government and apartheid has come under the Reagan administration's policy of constructive engagement. The most punitive measures were achieved under Carter with his administration's support for the 1977 UN mandatory arms embargo and the continuation of economic sanctions against Rhodesia even after some blacks had joined that government. Even though on occasion the U.S. government has issued verbal condemnations of apartheid or applied some negative pressure, never has it used repeated or consistent strong measures against the white minority regimes while at the same time building close ties to or identification with the guerrilla movements and newly independent black states in southern Africa" (Love, 1985, p.13).

For forty years, the South African government had been mildly criticised by the United States for its internal policies, but overall, for the sake of maintaining an ally in southern Africa, the U.S. government chose to ignore Pretoria's "little indiscretions". The South African government's attempts at keeping the United States fearful of a communist threat and convinced that the white Republic was the only fully industrialized nation in Africa were exceedingly successful. Lobbying was a useful tool to the South African government and their allies because it enabled them to have a certain degree of control over U.S. policy concerning southern Africa, and South Africa specifically.

On the other hand, it has also been illustrated in this paper that domestic lobbies can be even more effective than foreign lobbies in influencing U.S. foreign affairs. The most obvious example of the effectiveness of domestic lobbies

is exemplified in the anti-apartheid movement. The movement was instrumental in making the American public and members of Congress aware of the atrocities of apartheid. They successfully lobbied the public, the media, businesses and government in an effort to pass sanctions measures. The end result that; they saw the CAAA become law, putting punitive economic sanctions on South Africa in an attempt to end apartheid.

The anti-apartheid movement were very specific on who they targeted in order to ensure the United States, as a powerful world leader, took a strong stance on the apartheid issue. Their main targets were the lawmakers and businesses who had investments in South Africa. They used institutional investors, a third party usually with significant holdings or investments, to influence businesses. The institutional investors that were targeted included, churches, labour unions, insurance companies, foundations, universities, student associations, and state and local government. (Love, 1985, p.21) With the support of these powerful institutions the movement was guaranteed to influence not only businesses but also lawmakers. Lawmakers, who wanted to satisfy their constituency which included these institutions, were backed by a movement growing in popularity and size. Domestic lobbies are at an advantage as they can gain more local support for

their cause. Increased public support means members of Congress are more inclined to listen as their main goal in office is to be re-elected. If the constituencies' wishes and whims are not catered for there is less chance of re-election. In the case of lobbying for sanctions, the anti-apartheid movement had national public support therefore Congress was motivated to ensure sanctions legislation was passed.

Effect of Foreign Policy Power Struggle on the Implementation of Sanctions

The battle over sanctions against South Africa, and the CAAA in particular, can be viewed as one of many power struggle skirmishes between the executive and legislative branches over foreign policy decisions. Even though the United States Constitution assigns specific powers to each branch, there is still room for disagreement and ultimately serious contention. In most cases day to day foreign policy decisions are made by the executive, and more often by his administrative staff. The logistical aspect of foreign affairs is usually handled by the State Department, under the

Secretary of State. The legislative branch of government rarely becomes involved in the less volatile areas of diplomacy and the administrative stages of decision.

However, Congress' role, constitutionally, is quite necessary when dealing with the more crucial aspects of international affairs; wars, treaties, and economic relations (Nincic, 1988, p.79). The less volatile of these three, awards Congress the power to make treaties and ensure that if the President does the same, he needs a two-thirds majority vote from the Senate to ratify it. In the case of war, the President being the commander and chief of the armed forces is at liberty to embark on military action without the permission of Congress. However, Congress was granted the exclusive right to declare war by the Constitution. This has lead to occasional friction between the executive and the legislature. In the case of Vietnam the executive initiated military action without the permission of Congress. War was never declared. When the military action was over, ten years later, to avoid a repeat of the incident, Congress passed the War Powers Act. The act stipulated that if the executive took military action, within 30 days he was required to report to Congress, who would then decide whether or not to declare war. In the event that Congress did not declare war

or sanction the action, within another 30 days, the president was required to withdraw all American military personnel.

This flexing of Congressional muscles met with aggressive resistance from the presidency as it meant a limitation of its power. Not to mention, the executive claims, the law is in violation of the Constitution. It is necessary for a law like this to become an amendment to the Constitution and in order for that to occur there needs to be a two-thirds majority vote of the states for ratification. Because Congress did not seek to make the War Powers Act an amendment to the Constitution, argues the executive, it is not necessary for the president to acknowledge it. It seems in the area of military action the executive and legislative branches are embroiled in an on going struggle for decision-making power.

The case of economic relations is no different, as illustrated by the battle over the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act. The prospect of sanctions on South Africa provided a volatile high profile foreign policy issue that pitted congress against the president. Congress was supported by the anti-apartheid movement and public sentiment while the president was backed by the right wing and key members of his administration. At the same time the

State Department, headed by George Shultz, and head of African Affairs, Chester Crocker, were walking a tightrope as they attempted to prevent extreme right wing elements of the administration from losing the sanctions battle. The State Department preached moderation by attempting to persuade the president to compromise with Congress on the sanctions issue. On sanctions Shultz declared,

"We are prepared to take action with our allies, to change the mix of our pressures-positive and negative-to meet the rapidly changing course of events in South Africa and to play an essential supporting role in advancing South Africans toward the objective of a decent, democratic, prosperous and civilized society for all who live there. This is not a situation in which we can afford to be locked in the strait jacket of rigid legislation, no matter how well intentioned, or carefully drafted, to anticipate events that may or may not occur" (Crocker, 1992, p.324).

Crocker and Shultz believed that if Congress passed economic sanctions the United States government would lose all bargaining power with the South African government and forfeit influence over political change that may be occurring, therefore, limiting the State Department's power over the political and economic future of southern Africa.

Chester Crocker, the creator of the policy of constructive engagement, was quite bitter over Congress's sanctions victory, as he writes, "But, no matter how skillful, legislators cannot conduct diplomacy, and most of

them realize it. Only we could have done these things in mid-1986. But the daylight robbery masquerading as the "U.S. foreign policy process" had not permitted us to do our job" (Crocker, 1992, p.323-324). In his opinion Congress managed to tie the State Department's hands when it came to the issue of South Africa.

The sanctions battle between the executive and legislature could have effectively set a precedent on foreign policy issues. Anytime the legislature feels a foreign policy issue important enough for them to become involved they can now use the sanctions example as justification. In this particular case the executive's power over foreign policy decisions was significantly weakened, as was the State Department's. As a precedent, the sanctions case may be one of a number of cases where the executive is increasingly losing its power over foreign policy.

It is possible that the authors of the U.S. Constitution intended that Congress take an active role in foreign policy decision-making. The overseeing of international affairs guarantees an empowerment that can be overwhelming. If one branch of government has exclusive rights over that power there can, in many cases, be an abuse of that power. To assure against that happening the authors of the

Constitution wrote it in a way that the rights assigned to each branch conflicted somewhat, thereby creating a system of checks and balances. The overlapping and conflicting nature of the assigned powers ensures that abuses of those powers are limited. Henceforth, the South African sanctions battle could be viewed as Congress reminding the president that they are empowered with foreign policy decision-making control and that foreign affairs is not the president's exclusive realm.

Lobbying plays an intricate role in the American system of governing, specifically in the realm of decision making. When looking closer it becomes clear that the system itself is inherently open, thereby creating an environment conducive to lively lobbying activity. But lobbying is not limited to domestic issues, on the contrary, it plays a significant role in international affairs as well. The case of South Africa and sanctions is no exception. In fact, it appears that foreign lobby's can play a role in the system. With the aid of powerful allies they can attempt to influence policy toward a more friendly viewpoint. Whether or not they are successful can depend on the domestic strength of their opponents. In the sanctions case, the South African government and their allies were competing against a powerful

domestic lobby with public support and an anti-apartheid position arguing from the moral high ground.

The sanctions case, as illustrated, introduces another interesting facet of the American foreign policy process. There is an ongoing power struggle between the president and congress over decision-making in the realm of foreign affairs. The constitution does assign specific duties to each branch, yet it is vague about the specifics of the process. Therefore, there are overlaps in power causing friction between the branches. Foreign policy decisions are usually left up to the president's and his administration's discretion. But in this particular case Congress intervened as the president was not taking appropriate steps fast enough. Constitutionally, the Congress was well within their rights to decide on an economic relations issue. But even so the president's foreign policy decision-making power was challenged and to a certain extent severely undermined.

The future of foreign policy, in the United States, will continue to be determined primarily by the president and the State Department staff. However, it appears Congress may want to become increasingly involved in the process on issues that are high profile or politically volatile, as was the sanctions case. Lobbyists will continue to play a decisive

role in the process as long as the governing system remains democratic and open. I would argue that the slight inconveniences that accompany lobbyists are a small price to pay for the continued democratic nature of the system. And it is that system, through incidents like the sanctions case, that continues to have a form of checks and balances that ensures one branch of government does not accumulate too much control over the powerful region of foreign policy decision-making. This case does illustrate a marked shift in U.S. foreign policy toward South Africa. With the introduction of sanctions the United States began to take an active role in the future of South Africa. They no longer passively sat back to watch the goings on, but actively condemned the system of apartheid and the instigators of that system. With this shift the United States has taken on a new responsibility to see through the process of change to a democratic society in South Africa. The future of South Africa can have a better chance of survival with the support of the United States and the world community as a whole.

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