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LAND EXPROPRIATION AND LABOUR EXTRACTION UNDER CAPE COLONIAL RULE :
THE WAR OF 1835 AND THE 'EMANCIPATION' OF THE FINGO

by

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Abstract

The interpretations of the war of 1835 and the identity of the Fingo that were presented by the English settlers, have remained the mainstays of all subsequent histories. They asserted that the war of 1835 was the fault purely of 'Kaffir' aggression, that it was controlled by Hintza, the paramount chief, and that the ensuing hostilities were justifiable colonial defence and punishment of the Africans. The arrival of the Fingo in the Colony, it was claimed, was unconnected with the war. It was alleged that the seventeen thousand Fingo brought into the Colony in May 1835 were all Natal refugees who had fled south from the devastations of Shaka and the 'mfecane', and who had then become oppressed by their Gcaleka hosts. Both of these 'histories' need to be inverted. The 'irruption' of December 1834 was not unprovoked Rharhabe aggression, but the final response to years of the advance of the Cape Colony. Large areas of Rharhabe land had been expropriated, and their cattle regularly raided. Their women and children had been seized and taken into the Colony as labourers. The attacks were carried out by only a section of the Rharhabe on specific areas in Albany. The damage caused, and stock taken, was vastly exaggerated by the colonists. The Cape Governor, D'Urban, and British troop reinforcements arrived in Albany in January, and the Rharhabe were invaded two months later. D'Urban later invaded the innocent Gcaleka, took cattle, wreaked havoc and killed Hintza after he refused to ally with the Colony. The Fingo made their appearance at this moment. They were not a homogenous group. There were four categories within the term: mission and refugee collaborators (who were given land at Peddie and had chiefs appointed), military auxiliaries, labourers, and later, destitute Rharhabe seeking employment in the Colony. Only a small minority of the total Fingo were from Natal. The majority of the Fingo appear to have been Rharhabe and Gcaleka women and children, captured by the troops during the war and distributed on farms in the eastern districts to ameliorate the chronic labour shortage. Thus, instead of the year 1835 being one of great loss for the eastern Cape, as claimed by the settler apologists,

it was a catalyst to the economic development of the area. All Rharhabe land was seized, to be granted as settler farms. Well over sixty thousand Rharhabe and Gcaleka cattle were captured and distributed amongst the colonists. The security threat of the adjacent Rharhabe and the independent Gcaleka was removed. And a large colonial labour supply was ensured.

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Preface

Throughout the work on my thesis, which has turned into a fairly critical assessment of the impact of the English in the eastern Cape in the 1830s, I have been haunted by two ghosts. The one is Grahamstown itself, where I am based, and which formed the pivot of events in 1835 and their subsequent cover-up. The other is that I am descended from 1820 Settlers and Wesleyan missionaries. But I believe firmly that hagiography does no good - the English settlers of the 1830s must be portrayed as real people, which includes the painful exhibition of their faults; history *wie es eigentlich gewesen*.

I have a number of thank-you's, the largest of which goes to Dr Julian Cobbing, who supervised this thesis, and to whom I owe a great intellectual debt. He is one of the most stimulating teachers I have met, and it was he who first brought my attention to the topics in this thesis. He regularly bolstered my interest, through polemics and by example. Jeff Peires, also a superb teacher, provided me with a good grounding and interest with his under- and post-graduate courses on the Eastern Cape. He has been very helpful, especially in his comments on early drafts.

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I have three more personal debts: the first to my father, for his example of discipline and independent thought, and for kindling my historical awareness at an early age. The second is to Jurg Richner, fellow adventurer and a very determined historian. His company and interest made my research exciting, and his surprisingly unflagging confidence in me regularly kept me afloat. And thirdly, to Janet, who never ceased to give support and believe in me.

INTRODUCTION

My attention was first brought to the topic of the 'Fingo'¹ during an undergraduate course on the 'mfecane'. Having read the central work on the Fingo,² I was struck by the singular simplicity of Whiteside's descriptions of their history. Particularly noticeable were the inconsistencies and inaccuracies within Whiteside's work, and the way in which the subsequent historiography of the Fingo (small as it is) had retained the essence of his interpretation. Central to Whiteside's history is his claim that all Fingo were chased south from the Mzinyathi River in 'Northern Natal' by Shaka, whereafter they settled with Hintza and were rescued in 1835 by the British. My Honours dissertation, preliminary though it was, attempted to show the unreliability of Whiteside,³ and the inaccuracies in his work are outlined in chapters 1 and 4.

This thesis arises in many respects from the work of Cobbing.⁴ He has challenged the long-standing orthodoxy that the destabilisation in the 'Natal' and interior regions in the first four decades of the nineteenth century was caused by the 'mfecane', resulting from the rise of Shaka and the Zulu state. He proposes that 'African societies did not generate the regional violence on their own. Rather, caught within the European net, they were transformed over a lengthy period in reaction to the attentions of external plunderers.'⁵ He replaces Afrocentric explanations for the disruption of the sub-continent with

1 See Chapter 4, pp.132-3 for the reason why the term 'Fingo' is used in place of the modern term 'Mfengu'.

2 [J.Ayliff] & J.Whiteside, History of the Abambo, generally known as Fingo (1912).

3 A.C.Webster, 'Ayliff, Whiteside, and the Fingo "Emancipation" of 1835: a reappraisal', BA Hons Thesis, Rhodes University, 1988.

4 J.R.D.Cobbing, 'The Mfecane as Alibi: Thoughts on Dithakong and Mbolombo', Journal of African History, Vol.29 (1988); Cobbing, 'Grasping the Nettle: the Slave Trade and the early Zulu' (Seminar Paper, University of Natal - Pietermaritzburg, 1990).

5 Cobbing, 'Mfecane as Alibi'.

an analysis of the labour-centred incursions of Portuguese slavers at Delagoa Bay, Griqua and Coranna raiders in the Transorangia region, and expanding British control on the eastern frontier. The framework of this reinterpretation is revolutionary for South African history.⁶ His work is supported by Wright, who has concentrated on the Zulu and Natal.⁷ Wright shows that the 'Zulu revolution' was not what the settler orthodoxy proposes. He has also demonstrated that A.T. Bryant's Olden Times in Zululand and Natal (London, 1929), has, in crucial areas, little historical value. This, and similar work by Wylie on the writings of Nathaniel Isaacs, display the poverty of empirical accuracy in vital nineteenth-century works.⁸ The writing of Robert Godlonton and Joseph Whiteside belong in a similar category (see chapter 1). Richner, Maloka and Gewald have recently re-examined the Transorangia region, with special reference to the activities of the Griqua and Coranna, and the 'Mantatees'.⁹ Their conclusions are to a large extent supportive of the Cobbing proposals. The third area of European penetration - that of the British on the eastern frontier - is examined here.

If Shaka and the Zulu were not the force behind the Fingo move, what was? Did they come from Natal at all? Who were these Fingo? Cobbing sketched a radically new explanation for their arrival. He proposed that most of the

6 G.Hartley, 'Conversion at Kuruman: an analysis of the Kuruman mission, 1821-1829', BA Hons Thesis, University of Cape Town, 1989, has questioned Cobbing's interpretation of Moffat's motives and actions at Mbolombo in 1823. L.Thompson, History of South Africa (1990) has made the only published attack on the hypothesis, dismissing it out of hand.

7 J.Wright, 'Political Mythology and the Making of Natal's Mfecane', Canadian Journal of African Studies, Vol.23, No.2 (1989); and Wright, 'The Dynamics of Power and Conflict in the Thukela-Mzimkhulu Region in the late 18th and early 19th Centuries: a Critical Reconstruction', Ph.D. Thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, 1990.

8 J.Wright, 'A.T.Bryant and the "wars of Shaka"' (Seminar paper, University of Natal - Pietermaritzburg, 1990); D.Wylie, 'Utilizing Isaacs: One thread in the development of the Shaka myth' (Seminar paper, University of Natal - Pietermaritzburg, 1990).

9 J.E.Richner, 'The withering away of the "lifaqane": or a change of paradigm', BA Hons Thesis, Rhodes University, 1988; E.T.Maloka, 'Missionary historiography and ethnography: Casalis, Arbousset and Ellenberger, and the history of 19th-century Lesotho', BA Hons Thesis, University of Cape Town, 1988; J.B.Gewald, '"Mountaineers" as Mantatees. A Critical Reassessment of the Events leading up to the Battle of Dithakong', M.A. Thesis, State University, Leiden, 1989.

Fingo were Gcaleka and Rharhabe who had been seized during the war of 1835, which explained why the majority were women and children. This seizure had similarities to the raid at Mbolompo in 1828, where Ngwane were captured to be taken into the Colony as labourers. The Fingo were destined to solve the colonial labour shortage, and were 'supplied with a fictitious past' to disguise their illegality. This thesis takes these suggestions as a spring-board. Are they accurate?

The choice of topics for this thesis was between Fingo history per se, the Fingo as part of the evolving Cape labour system, or an analysis of the events of 1835, when they first made their appearance. I decided that without a full analysis of the war of 1835, which was a crucial and understudied turning-point in South African history, the other topics would lack grounding. The research soon showed that the orthodox understanding of the war of 1835 needed extensive revision, and that this revision was closely tied to the identity of the Fingo. The historiography of the war is rooted, like that of the Fingo, in one settler-oriented work. In this case it was Robert Godlonton's A Narrative of the Irruption of the Kafir Hordes (Cape Town, 1836), a particularly propagandistic work. He claimed that in December 1834 the settlers had been subjected to a massive, unprovoked attack by the 'Caffers' along the entire eastern frontier, which devastated large areas of the eastern districts. This was masterminded by the paramount chief Hintza, and the resulting war continued for nine months. The secondary sources have generally all been derived from this and similar interpretations, and I thus concentrated on the military records in the British Parliamentary Papers, the relevant official correspondence in the Cape Archives, Cape Town, and private diaries and papers in Cape Town and Cory Library, Grahamstown. Certain problems with this version of 1835 were revealed by this material: the immense power of the colonial army and the destruction it caused; the confusing evidence as to the Fingo movements in 1835, the unravelling of which became a primary aim of my research; and the lack of source material in crucial areas, for instance with regard to settler losses in 1835, and the comparative numbers of Rharhabe deaths and losses, and above all, to the Fingo in general, and specifically

their use as labourers in the Colony.

The results of my research indicated that the claims of Godlonton about the events and results of the war of 1835 needed to be inverted. The 'irruption' of December 1834 was clearly not 'unprovoked'. The Rharhabe¹⁰ on the eastern frontier of the Cape Colony had for decades faced the advance of the Colony, suffering periodic attack, cattle loss and land dispossession. By the end of 1834 they had had large areas of their land taken from them and given to Khoi and European settlers three times in fifteen months. An armed response was unavoidable. The attacks were carried out by the frontier Rharhabe over a short period, in two specific areas in the eastern settler district of Albany. The power of the Rharhabe attack, and the losses which the settlers suffered, were exaggerated both at the time and subsequently. The colonists retained military dominance in combat throughout. Colonel Harry Smith rode to Graham's Town in early January to take control of the military, and was followed by the Governor, Sir Benjamin D'Urban, and British troop reinforcements. In the following two months, while the British forces drove all Rharhabe out of the so-called Ceded Territory (the area between the Fish and Keiskamma Rivers), D'Urban and Smith, in conjunction with the 'Graham's Town faction' (see Chapter 2), planned the invasion of the Rharhabe.

Messages were sent to Hintza, paramount of the Gcaleka and Rharhabe,¹¹ instructing him to ally with the Colony and attack the Rharhabe from the rear. D'Urban planned to attack the Gcaleka if Hintza refused to follow these demands. Nervous of the whites, Hintza first acceded, and then refused to betray his people. He was initially accused of controlling the December attacks, and then it was claimed that all the cattle stolen from Albany had been sent to him for safe-keeping. In fact, he had remained uninvolved in the hostilities, but had been sent Rharhabe cattle for protection, once the

10 Comprising the people of Ngqika and Ndlambe, who occupied the land between the Kei River and the Colony. The main chiefs in 1835 were Ngqika's sons Maqoma and Tyali, and Nqeno, Bhotumane, Siyolo, Mhala and Qasana.

11 Although Hintza was paramount, he did not have political control over the Rharhabe chiefs, who were de facto independent (see Chapters 2 and 3).

Rharhabe had realised that they faced war, and were forced to flee eastwards. The colonial invasion force gathered in March, and began its concerted attack on the Rharhabe at the beginning of April. Leaving half the army to continue attacking the Rharhabe in the Buffalo/Amatole Mountains area, D'Urban led the rest of the troops straight into Gcaleka territory in mid April, whilst Somerset led his division through eastern Ndlambe territory, destroying what he could, and seizing cattle and women and children. D'Urban's force camped at Butterworth - Hintza's old *komkhulu* - for ten days, while D'Urban demanded that Hintza come to him. The latter refusing to do so, for fear of capture. D'Urban then let his troops loose. In four days they seized twenty thousand cattle, and destroyed countless huts, crops and lives. Hintza had no option but to capitulate, and he was taken prisoner, signing a promise to produce fifty thousand cattle and one thousand horses. Two weeks later, D'Urban completed the two main tasks he had set: he annexed all land belonging to the Rharhabe, and brought seventeen thousand Fingo¹² into the Cape. This provided the opportunity for extensive new grants of farm land for colonists, and plenty of labour to work it.

Hintza was murdered on 12 May, during a colonial sortie into south-eastern Gcaleka and Bomvana territory, led by Smith. Smith returned after a week with a further four thousand cattle and one thousand Fingo. After May, the war began to wind down. Many thousands of cattle had been seized, thousands of labourers and large areas of land had been provided for the colonists, the Rharhabe had been punished and their livelihoods destroyed, and the Gcaleka had been attacked and the recalcitrant paramount chief punished. But groups of Rharhabe continued to resist. They had no choice - all their land had been taken from them, and they faced desolation and exile if they assented to D'Urban's plans. D'Urban was running out of money and patience. More importantly, he had disobeyed his orders from London completely, which were to bring peace to the frontier region and extend British control by means of

¹² The exact number of Fingo who entered the Colony in 1835 remains unclear (see Chapter 4).

treaties, not force of arms. He needed to secure peace soon in order to show that his actions could be acceptable and 'beneficial' to both colonists and Africans.

Colonial patrols continued to burn huts and crops and destroy Rharhabe logistical support. By August, D'Urban realised that he had to change his plans if he was to get peace. The annexed land, named the Queen Adelaide Province, was to remain British territory. But the Ngqika and Ndlambe, it was conceded, were to be permitted to remain in designated areas, subject to British law, and governed by white government agents with the aid of the chiefs, who were officially appointed as assistants. Although this was far from an ideal solution, the embattled Rharhabe chiefs accepted D'Urban's proposal, their decision spurred on by a mass onslaught by the colonial forces on their stronghold in the Amatole Mountains in August. Peace terms were officially agreed upon in September. This system did not remain in place for long, as the Colonial Office found D'Urban's actions abhorrent. Glenelg, the new Colonial Secretary, overturned D'Urban's decisions, returned the land to the Rharhabe and fired the governor. But the fact that the system lasted only a year must not detract from its intentions - the events of 1835 must be understood within the context of D'Urban's belief that he was creating a new, permanent dispensation for the colonists.

How did the Fingo fit into these events? Given this revision of the events and results of 1835, and the intentions of the colonial authorities, the identity of the Fingo needs to be re-evaluated. Ayliff and Whiteside described the Fingo in simplistic terms. They said that all the Fingo were Bhele, Hlubi, Zizi, Ngwane and Reledwane - belonging collectively to the Mbo - who escaped the devastation of Shaka's Zulus by fleeing south. Hintza welcomed them at first, but within a few years they became slaves to the Gcaleka. From here the seventeen thousand survivors were rescued from oppression by the British in 1835, and were all settled at Peddie. This notion of all seventeen thousand Fingo having the same origins, the same identity, the same purpose in the Colony, and all being settled in the same area around Peddie is untenable.

There were very distinct categories of people within the blanket term 'Fingo'. There was a group of African military auxiliaries who fought with the colonial army in 1835, and were given land near King William's Town after hostilities ended. There was also a group of collaborators. Some of these were refugees originally from Natal, but the majority were Thembu, Mpondo and Gcaleka from the Wesleyan mission stations east of the Kei River. These men, women and children - less than a thousand - were provided with land at Peddie in May 1835. A second group, similar in constitution, was settled on the west bank of the Tyhume River in August.

By October 1835, both groups were being identified as 'Fingo', despite their local and disparate origins. At no stage were there seventeen thousand Fingo at Peddie. In 1835 and 1836 there were on average merely six hundred Fingo in the whole region around Peddie, most of whom were local 'Caffers'. Certain loyalist chiefs were appointed by D'Urban to aid the white Fingo commissioners in controlling these heterogenous groups. They were not well accepted by the 'Fingo', having no standing or real claim to leadership.

The military and collaborator Fingo totalled approximately five thousand in 1835. The majority of the Fingo who came into Albany in 1835, however, were labourers presented to farmers in the eastern districts to solve the serious labour shortage. For decades there had been a lack of labour in the Cape in general, and especially in the east. This was exacerbated by the inability of the Khoi, a pastoralist people originally termed 'Hottentot', to provide sufficient labour, and by the emancipation of Cape slaves in December 1834. Other Fingo moved into locations which were created outside the eastern Cape towns, the biggest of which were outside Graham's Town and Fort Beaufort. From here they were distributed on demand to farmers all around the district, and as far afield as Knysna and Cape Town. The Fingo numbers in these locations were boosted by an influx of Rharhabe throughout 1835 and 1836. The devastation, especially of food, caused by the invading troops left many of the Rharhabe with the option between starvation and seeking employment in the Colony as 'Fingo'.

Was the arrival of the Fingo, which solved the labour crisis, merely coincidental, as Ayliff claimed? The inversion of the orthodox understanding of the war of 1835 shows in particular the power of the Colony, and its ability to portray its actions as it wished them to be seen. Is it possible that the settlers had planned to obtain the 'Fingo' as a labour supply, before April 1835? Why then create such an elaborate history for them? An unavoidable hypothesis is that most of the Fingo were captured to be taken into the Colony as labourers. There were many precedents for the capture of Africans across the colonial borders during commandos, and the Colony in 1835 was militarily well equipped to carry out such a procedure. The ratio of men to women and children amongst the Fingo was abnormally unbalanced,¹³ reflecting the trend amongst the labour-seizing commandos over the previous decades. Most importantly, there is clear evidence that colonial patrols were capturing Rharhabe and Gcaleka women and children east of the colonial boundary from early April 1835.

The evidence for 1835 indicates that there were thousands of 'Caffer' women and children being seized and sent to labour inside the Colony. The story explaining the Fingo as refugees, all settled at Peddie, is just not true. Whenever a group of Fingos moved within or outside the Colony in 1835 they were accompanied by a military patrol. Why, if not to guard them? There were thousands of Fingo labourers in the Colony by late 1835, but very little is said of them, and it is difficult to trace even one. Significantly, a list taken of Fingo indentured to Boers in Graham's Town in May, of which many copies were made, cannot be found. The activities of the troops have not been accurately detailed in the official accounts of the war. Why is this? The settler version of Fingo history is inaccurate. Again, why?

The capture of labourers - in other words, slaving - was completely against Colonial Office policy, especially given the emancipation of the Cape's slaves in December 1834. The confused explanations of Fingo identity are

13 See Chapter 4, pp.153-5 and 160.

understandable if seen as part of an attempt to hide their true nature, for fear of censure and punishment from London. Given that Ayliff was an eyewitness to many events concerning the Fingo, and that he is demonstrably inaccurate in his representation of them, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that he was party to a cover-up. With the aid of D'Urban, he amalgamated aspects of the three Fingo identities into one 'history', removing all suspicious or illegal occurrences. This history was then applied to all people in 1835 who were termed Fingo. All Fingo were depicted as having come from Natal, fleeing the 'mfecane', and later being rescued from the Gcaleka by the British, and all settled at Peddie. The very different sequence of events is outlined in Chapter 4.

By re-analysing the war of 1835, the identity of the Fingo becomes clearer. I make no claim to having fully solved the identity of the Fingo, as - given the constraints of a thesis - a wealth of anthropological and ethnographic material has not been used. This interpretation of the Fingo derives from the enigma and inaccuracies in the standard accounts of the movements of Fingo in 1835, and the evidence that contradicts those accounts. The periods before and after 1835 still need to be reassessed. New questions have been posed and some have been answered, but the Fingo remain a complex and critical topic. The ramifications of this interpretation are enormous, and stretch throughout nineteenth-century South Africa history.

This thesis rests on two parallel struts - the war of 1835 and the Fingo. Whilst they are two different topics, they are inseparably intertwined and can only be understood within the context of each other. This has led to structural problems within the thesis - should the events of the war be interwoven with the emergence of the Fingo, or should the entire war be dealt with separately? I decided that the thesis needed to be as chronological as possible, but that the concept of Fingo identity needed to be approached as a whole. Chapter two thus outlines the expansion of the Cape Colony until late 1834, focussing on the dispossession of the Rharhabe and the attempts to solve the labour crisis. Chapter three deals with the Rharhabe response, and the war

of 1835 until early May, when the mass of Fingo first appeared. The Fingo are dealt with in Chapter four, and the rest of the war - its effect on the Rharhabe, its outcome for the colonists, and its later stages, form Chapter five. Chapter six shows how D'Urban's plans collapsed after 1835, and briefly outlines the methods of land expropriation and labour extraction which were designed by the Colony until the 1850s. I begin with Chapter one - an overview of the most important literature dealing with the two topics, and the manner in which the settler interpretation of both retained its hegemony.

CHAPTER 1
HISTORIOGRAPHICAL OVERVIEW

The year 1835 was one of major importance, both for the settlers of the eastern districts of the Cape Colony and for the African population to the east of the Fish River. For most of the year, war was waged between the two groups over a large geographical arena, and with devastating consequences. This war has come to be known as the 'Sixth Frontier War'. During the war, 'Fingos' entered the Colony, where they remained as labourers, military auxiliaries, and on land on the outskirts of the Colony. There was a strong and vociferous group of settlers in Graham's Town, who firmly voiced their interpretation both of the events of 1835, and of the history of these people. This interpretation has remained a mainstay of South African history.

The settler version of events is encapsulated in the work of Robert Godlonton, the chief architect and voice of settler opinion.¹ He claimed that war on the Colony was fomented and planned from early 1834 by the Rharhabe chiefs, under the leadership of Hintza. The Colony was then allegedly attacked simultaneously over the entire eastern frontier by over ten thousand Africans in December 1834. They overwhelmed all colonial resistance and gained control of the entire area between the Sundays and Keiskamma Rivers. 'Caffer' control was maintained for a month, during which time the districts of Albany and Somerset were looted and denuded of colonial stock, innumerable European homes were destroyed, and innocent settlers were killed. Governor D'Urban informed the London Colonial Secretary of State, Spring-Rice, in January 1835:

I cannot adequately point out to you the devastation and horror which these merciless barbarians have committed, this fertile and beautiful Province is almost a desert, and the murders, which have gone hand in hand with this work of pillage and rapine, have

¹ Godlonton, Irruption of the Kafirs.

deeply aggravated its atrocity.²

The hostilities, according to Godlonton, were carried into Rharhabe territory in January 1835. In April the Gcaleka were attacked. Godlonton said that this was in punishment for their alleged involvement in the 'irruption', and he accused Hintza of hiding all the colonial stock that had been taken in December 1834. Hintza was shot whilst escaping from his captors, which the settlers explained as justice for his complicity in the 'irruption', and subsequent duplicity in claiming not to be involved. Godlonton claimed that the settlers lost enormous numbers of stock, for which they were compensated with cattle taken from the Rharhabe and Gcaleka, and grants of Rharhabe land. He alleged that the war of 1835 was 'a war of necessity, and not of choice',³ and was deserved punishment for the 'unprovoked aggression' of December.

Godlonton wrote largely in an effort to counter the accusations and censure of the London Colonial Office and concerned humanitarians. He claimed that 'the relative characters of the Kafirs and Colonists have been shamefully misrepresented',⁴ by misguided philanthropists and that the colonists were innocent victims of a preconceived and merciless attack. He was supported in his interpretation by a phalanx of pro-settler writers, whose intention was to convince the Colonial Office - and posterity - of the innocence of the settlers in the war, and thus of their inalienable right to the spoils they received. Godlonton's book was written in 1835, and its purpose was to sway London into the retention of the annexed Rharhabe land between the Fish and Kei Rivers (the Queen Adelaide Province). In the same year A.B.Brand, editor of the pro-settler newspaper, De Zuid-Afrikaan, published a similar summary of

² British Parliamentary Paper (henceforth BPP) 252 (1835), p.132, D'Urban to Spring-Rice, 21 January 1835. In 1812 Cradock used almost the same description for the attacks on the Colony, which had supposedly 'rendered desert the most fertile part of His Majesty's Settlement'; see Cape Town Gazette and African Advertiser, 6 June 1812.

³ Godlonton, Irruption of the Kafirs, p.229.

⁴ Ibid.

the war, which seems to have been written by D'Urban.⁵ That same year John Heavyside, chairman of the Board of Relief which tabled the losses settlers claimed to have suffered, also published his report on the war and its consequences for the settlers. The Wesleyan missionary William Boyce followed, providing a particularly conservative and inflammatory explanation of the war and its causes. Three years later D'Urban published a collection of public statements - memorials and petitions from colonists around the country, and explanations of 'Caffer' savagery - in support of his policies.⁶ These pro-settler histories, though popular, did not convince London, and the settlers were subjected to Colonial Office anger and criticism in the home press. This spurred on the settler apologists to reiterate their stance throughout the century.

Cape writers until the twentieth century were without exception in favour of the settlers. J.C.Chase, a merchant and journalist, was a particularly staunch supporter of the settler cause.⁷ John Mitford Bowker, part of a large and influential settler family, took a particular liking to the attitudes and policies of D'Urban, and published similar views on the war. Sir Harry Smith, second in command of the forces in 1835, and Charles Brownlee, government agent and son of a prominent Wesleyan missionary, also aired their views later.⁸ Settler apologetics reached its apogee in the writings of George

⁵ A.B.Brand, 'The Kaffir War of 1835' (1836). It exhibits D'Urban's style and apologetics.

⁶ J.Heavyside, 'Abstract of the Proceedings of the Board of Relief for the Destitute' (1836); W.B.Boyce, 'Notes on South African Affairs, from 1834 to 1838; with reference to the Civil, Political, and Religious Condition, of the Colonists and Aborigines' (1838); Sir B.D'Urban, 'Public Documents showing the Character of Sir Benjamin D'Urban's Administration of the Government of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope... 1834 to 1838' (1838).

⁷ J.C.Chase, The Cape of Good Hope; and Chase, Natal: a Reprint of all the authentic Notices (1843). See M.J.McGinn, 'J.C.Chase - 1820 Settler and Servant of the Colony', MA Thesis, Rhodes University, 1975, for a good analysis of Chase, his beliefs and motives.

⁸ J.M.Bowker, 'Speeches, Letters and Selections from Important Papers' (1864); Sir H.Smith (ed. Moore Smith), The Autobiography of Lieutenant-General Sir Harry Smith, (1901); C.Brownlee, Reminiscences of Kaffir Life and Customs (1896).

Macall Theal and Sir George Cory,⁹ although they were less obviously propagandistic than Godlonton. Cory, a Professor of Chemistry, was particularly defensive of the settlers, slating the liberal editor of the South African Commercial Advertiser, John Fairbairn, for 'a disposition to seize upon every trifling occurrence and to twist it into some proof of their [settler] misconduct towards the natives.'¹⁰ Cory presumably felt that the many proven cases of settler misconduct were not worthy of mention, and would unnecessarily tarnish the settler reputation. In a short article in 1935, J.B.Ross took legitimate issue with Cory for his intentional calumny of Hintza.¹¹ Theal and Cory have been historiographically described as proponents of the Settler School,¹² recognisable for their portrayal of the settlers as bearers of Christianity and civilisation to the barbarous, threatening savages. Thus, nearly a century after Godlonton had written his book, his arguments remained fully accepted.

Parallel to the embedding of the settler interpretation of the war of 1835 came the development of the history of the Fingo. The central work on the history of the Fingo remains The History of the AbaMbo, written in 1912 under commission of the Methodist Synod by a contemporary of Theal and Cory, Rev. Joseph Whiteside.¹³ As Moyer said: 'Although some have interpreted the material differently or have embellished upon it, few have added more to our knowledge of the Mfengu'.¹⁴ Yet it is a book full of contradictions, exaggeration and myth, based marginally upon some of the writings of Rev. John Ayliff (claimed posthumously as co-author), with an infusion of Victorian

⁹ G.M.Theal, The History of South Africa from 1795 to 1872 (1920); Sir G.E.Cory, The Rise of South Africa (1919).

¹⁰ Cory, Rise of South Africa, Vol.3, p.91.

¹¹ J.B.Ross, 'The Fingo Slavery Myth', SA Outlook, July 1935, p.134.

¹² C.Saunders, The Making of the South African Past (1988); K.Smith, The Changing Past: Trends in South African Historical Writing (1988).

¹³ Whiteside, History of Abambo. I have referred to this book throughout under Whiteside's name, as Ayliff wrote none of it, and was merely inaccurately paraphrased for a small section of it.

¹⁴ R.A.Moyer, 'A History of the Mfengu of the Eastern Cape 1815-1865', Ph.D Thesis, London University, 1976, p.9.

conviction and imagination.¹⁵ In his first two chapters, supposedly describing all the Fingo in Natal, Whiteside draws extensively from Casalis, who was describing the movements of the Ngwane, not the Fingo.¹⁶ Many of his descriptions of the 'Mbo', and their numbers and movement, are adapted from Scully's writing on the Hlubi and Ngwane.¹⁷ Whiteside claimed that all Fingo were refugee members of the Hlubi, Zizi, Bhele, Reledwane and Kunene from the Mzinyathi River region in what is now north-western Natal, where they had all been part of what he called the Mbo tribe. Whiteside's history of the Fingo is rooted in the orthodox explanation of the 'mfecane' as the central factor in all African movement in the sub-continent in the 1820s and 1830s.¹⁸ This holds that the rise of Shaka and the overwhelming military power which the Zulu state had in the late 1810s, resulted in the rapid geographical expansion of the Zulu, accomplished by sundry death and destruction. The orthodoxy asserts that Shaka killed between one and two million people; Whiteside claimed that he had killed enormous numbers of Mbo. A small percentage of the survivors managed to flee south along the coast to Hintza, as refugees.

Hintza initially welcomed them, Ayliff's version continues, but soon forced them into oppressive slavery. Ayliff was the missionary with Hintza at Butterworth, and Whiteside claimed that, as a result of Gcaleka antagonism towards Ayliff, 'the church erected for the Gcalekas was crowded at every service by the Fingoes'.¹⁹ Ayliff was described as the 'Father of the Fingo',²⁰ and the Fingo at Butterworth supposedly flocked to him for protection and to be converted. Whiteside claimed that it was Ayliff who organised the 'rescue' of these oppressed people from their Gcaleka overlords,

¹⁵ Webster, 'Ayliff, Whiteside, and the Fingo "Emancipation" of 1835'.

¹⁶ Whiteside, History of Abambo, chs. 1 and 2; cf. E. Casalis, The Basutos (English translation, 1861).

¹⁷ W.C. Scully, 'Fragments of Native History', The State (1909), p. 285.

¹⁸ As outlined in J.D. Omer-Cooper, The Zulu Aftermath: a Nineteenth-century Revolution in Bantu Africa (1966).

¹⁹ Whiteside, History of Abambo, p. 20.

²⁰ See for example Gedyé's comment in Graham's Town Journal 1875, on 'the late revered, now sainted John Ayliff', who 'is still remembered by many of the now aged Fingos as their father'.

and that when the colonial troops entered Gcaleka territory in April 1835, the same 16,800 surviving Fingo were rescued by the British and given land around Peddie in the Ceded Territory. The Fingo were so grateful that they became allies of the Colony and supporters of the Church and education; promises outlined by the Fingo chiefs in Peddie on 14 May 1835.

The first 'history' of the Fingo was sent to D'Urban by Ayliff in May 1835, wherein he mentioned nine chiefs and the histories of the people.²¹ As shall be discussed,²² these men were not all appointed later as Fingo chiefs by D'Urban, and few of the Fingo had the identity which Ayliff claimed for them all. From 1830 to 1837 Ayliff wrote a daily diary of his life in Butterworth.²³ In this diary, he made scarcely any mention of Fingo, which implies that he had little contact before 1835 with those people termed Fingo. Where he took the information for this first history is unclear. In August and September 1835, Ayliff wrote three articles for the Graham's Town Journal, providing a rough summary of 'Fingo history',²⁴ that was to go into Whiteside. They are vague, sketchy articles; comments such as those on the dysentery and malnutrition at Peddie in 1835 were left out of Ayliff's more romanticised later versions. In 1851 and 1853 he wrote progressively more sophisticated 'histories' of the Fingo, with a strong anti-Gcaleka tone.²⁵ A proportion of Whiteside's history - chapters 4 to 7 - was based upon the 1853 manuscript, and the rest was garnered from other sources. In these later essays, Ayliff at no stage wrote independently on Fingo history, despite his supposed familiarity with his charges. Despite ninety pages of rambling about the destruction caused by Shaka, Ayliff concluded by saying that 'I am inclined to fear that the hellish practice of the slave trade thus begun on this [Natal]

²¹ (Cape Archives) - hereafter (CA) - A519/2, Ayliff to D'Urban, 1 May 1835.

²² See Chapter 4, pp. 145-8.

²³ (CA) A80, Papers of John Ayliff. The only part of this collection that has been used is his diary between 1830 and 1838. All subsequent references to A80 allude only to the diary.

²⁴ Graham's Town Journal (hereafter GTJ), 20 August, 3 September, 17 September 1835.

²⁵ (Cory Library - henceforth CL) PR 3826, Rough Notebook of Ayliff, c.1851; (CL) MS 15,543, Sketch of Fingo History for Cathcart, Ayliff, c.1853.

coast, was the origin of those wars which have nearly produced the entire extinction of the African Tribes of this Continent'.²⁶ In this manuscript Ayliff borrowed extensively from missionary journals, government and military literature, letters, and contemporary explorers, sometimes employing verbatim quotes in order to write the history of the Fingo.²⁷

Ayliff is an unreliable source. He (and Whiteside) described the 'country of the Fingoes' as 'a country rich in pasturage and in wood, healthy, well watered and abounding in game of all sorts....The climate appears to be, generally speaking, temperate'. But this is an unacknowledged quotation directly from Arbousset, who had in fact been describing the country of the 'Zula'.²⁸ The missionary, John Edwards, wrote in 1836 about the 'Mantatees', and how 'the accounts of their wars and bloodshed would affect the most hard-hearted...[and how] Thousands of human skulls strew the land.'²⁹ Ayliff borrowed these descriptions, but used them to describe the sufferings of the Fingo. Ayliff was also influenced by the lamentations of T.L.Hodgson on the savagery of Africa, and his hope that the English would bring civilisation and peace. Ayliff used the same phrases in his descriptions of the natural state of Africans and the tribulations of the Fingo.³⁰

Ayliff's computation of Fingo deaths in itself precludes him from consideration as a reliable source. He assumed without any basis that there were twelve Fingo tribes: a biblical derivative. He then estimated, arbitrarily, that there must have been sixty thousand in each tribe, thus

²⁶ (CL) PR 3826, p.1. cf. R.Drury, The Adventures of Robert Drury during fifteen years captivity on the Island of Madagascar (1807), p.442.

²⁷ In (CL) MS 15,543, Sketch of Fingo History, Ayliff did not describe the movements of the Fingo in May in his own words. He merely transcribed Dutton's Notice, Ndabakazi, 3 May 1835.

²⁸ Arbousset & Daumas Narrative of an Exploratory Tour to the North-East of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope (1846), p.133; (CL) MS 15,543, Sketch of Fingo History, pp.4-5; Whiteside, History of Abambo, p.2.

²⁹ The Wesleyan-Methodist Magazine, Vol.15, 1836, p.789, letter from Rev. J.Edwards, 17 March 1836.

³⁰ (CL) PR 3826, Rough Notebook of Ayliff, p.5, makes specific reference to the 4 August 1823 entry in Hodgson's diary; cf. R.L.Cope(ed) The Journals of the Rev. T.L.Hodgson (1977).

totalling 720,000 people. Basing his calculations on the number of Fingo in the Colony in 1835, he then seriously concluded that Shaka killed 690,000 Fingo.³¹ He described the Fingo as both poor oppressed servants, and as cunning, avaricious cattle owners in his later essays, which has remained a key contradiction within the orthodox history of the Fingo.³² This contradiction is derived chiefly from the juxtaposition of poor labourer and wealthy collaborator constituents within the 'Fingo tribe', as well as the anachronistic imposition of the fears of European farmers about Fingo economic competition in the 1850s. Ayliff even misquoted himself. In the 1853 manuscript, for instance, he described the ill-treatment of a girl whom he called 'Fingo',³³ whom he had described as 'Caffer' in his diary.³⁴ The propagandistic suggestion that the Fingo were Gcaleka slaves was first suggested by D'Urban,³⁵ which Ayliff awkwardly wove into his 1853 manuscript. From his diary, where the Fingo do not appear, Ayliff moved to a brief sketch of Fingo 'history' in 1835, to these full-blown essays in 1851 and 1853. The history of the Fingo thus does not come from the eye-witness Ayliff, but evolved in enigma, myth and military propaganda, from which Ayliff himself copied. Yet Ayliff and Whiteside are still uncritically accepted as authorities on the history of the Fingo.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, the histories of the war and the Fingo, which the settlers had created, were firmly entrenched. The settler view, both of the war of 1835 and the Fingo, has retained a continuity to the present, with the regular publication of justifications of settler actions and motives. The yearning for the lost power of the British, or the vested interests of genealogist descendants have produced a popular selective memory

³¹ (CL) PR 3826, Rough Notebook of Ayliff, p.5.

³² The dichotomy between the 'poor' Fingo and the same 'Jews of Cafferland' is clear in (CL) MS 15,543, Sketch of Fingo History.

³³ (CL) MS 15,543, Sketch of Fingo history, p.46.

³⁴ (CA) A80, Diary of Ayliff, 6 August 1834.

³⁵ First pronounced by D'Urban, Government Notice, 3 May 1835. See J.B.Peiros, The House of Phalo (1981), p.225; J.H.Soga, The South-Eastern Bantu (1930).

which barely resembles Albany of the 1820s and 1830s.³⁶ The exhibition of the faults of the settlers provided by contemporaries such as London Missionary Society (LMS) missionary James Read and the merchant Thomas Stubbs³⁷ have been disregarded or 'forgotten'. They are nothing like the hagiographical accounts produced subsequently, most of which retained the pro-settler biases of the 1820s and 1830s. Many twentieth century academics have also kept alive the settler view, as can be seen in Du Toit's uncritical acceptance of the propositions of Godlonton and Cory.³⁸

Afrikaner historiography between the 1920s and the 1970s has largely supported the settler history, partly because the enemies of the settlers were the enemies of the Boers, but also because settler racial philosophy coincided sufficiently with the burgeoning apartheid policies. E.H. Brookes, for instance, whose work had the sanction and help of J.B.M. Hertzog, felt that the disannexation of the Queen Adelaide Province in 1836 - essentially the official British disavowal of colonial actions in 1835 - 'was a most unfortunate event, deferring all progress in the task of civilising the Native tribes for eleven years and merely postponing the inevitable task which all South Africa Administrators have had to face.'³⁹ The confusion in Afrikaner historiography about 1835 and the Fingo is encapsulated in Five Hundred Years, an array of Afrikaner interpretations of South African history, edited by

³⁶ See for example M. Bell, They came from a far land (1963); A.W. Burton, 'The Highlands of Kaffraria' (1942); D.E. Rivett-Carnac, Hawk's Eye (1966); I. Mitford-Barberton, Comdt. Holden Bowker (1970); I. Mitford-Barberton & V. White, Some Frontier Families (1968).

³⁷ Read - for example in (CA) A50/4 and A1480 - made regular complaints about the greed of the settlers and the ill-treatment of the Africans on the frontier. Stubbs, in (CL) MS 7131, made a number of interesting, and derogatory, comments about the Graham's Town residents. Compare, for instance, the difference between Stubbs' descriptions of George Wood, and the eulogistic biography of him - They came from a far land - produced by his descendent May Bell.

³⁸ A.D. Du Toit, 'The Cape Frontier: a study of Native Policy with special reference to the years 1847-1866', Archives Year Book (1954).

³⁹ E.H. Brookes, The History of Native Policy in South Africa from 1830 to the present day (1924) p.18. This study reflects to quite an extent early twentieth century racial thought.

C.F.J. Muller.⁴⁰ Both topics are disregarded as unimportant, and a semi-digested, abbreviated version of Godlonton's Irruption of the Kafirs is produced.

The manner in which the themes of Godlonton and Whiteside have remained central to Eastern Cape historiography is best portrayed in a brief chronological survey. E.A.Walker adopted the line of Godlonton, although without his pyrothechnics.⁴¹ His summary claimed that the 'Caffers' ravaged the country from Algoa Bay to Somerset East, and that Hintza masterminded the attacks, for which he was justly punished. D'Urban was allegedly unable to subdue the Rharhabe, and had thus to opt for a reserve policy. Walker showed confusion as to the identity and movements of the Fingo, and saw the topic as merely an unimportant aspect of 1835.

W.M.Macmillan, whose focus rested chiefly on Rev. John Philip of the London Missionary Society, brought new insight to the events of 1835.⁴² His parameters were rather narrow, but his empirical concern for sources illuminated the ill-treatment of the Rharhabe on the frontier before 1835. For the first time, he suggested that there might be a different interpretation of 1835 to that provided by the settlers. His empiricism reached also to his brief analysis of the Fingo, where he relied very little on Whiteside. He noted the incidence of Fingo labourers in the Colony, although this was unfortunately subsequently disregarded. He suggested that the 'Fingo' were defectors who saw 'the advisability of being on the side of the big battalions'. D'Urban's role in stirring up Rharhabe-Fingo enmity as a divide-and-rule strategy was also stressed.

⁴⁰ C.F.J.Muller (ed), Five Hundred Years (1974), pp.488-9. The fact that no attention is given to these two topics - both of importance for the development of South Africa - reflects on the historians. See especially the chapters by C.F.Kotze, 'A New Regime, 1806-1834', C.F.J.Muller, 'Conclusion: Factors which shaped the history of South Africa', and D.Ziervogel, 'The Natives of South Africa'.

⁴¹ E.A.Walker, A History of South Africa (1929).

⁴² W.M.Macmillan, Bantu, Boer and Briton (1929), chs. 8-10, and Macmillan, The Cape Colour Question (1927), chs. 15-6.

J.Galbraith produced a review of imperialism three decades later.⁴³ He shows the tension of interests between the British metropole and its colonies, which is important in understanding the forces that led to 1835. As early as 1956, Le Cordeur in his M.A. Thesis showed Godlonton to be merely a propagandist.⁴⁴ He made it clear that Godlonton's radical support for the settlers made him not only an unreliable witness, but a manufacturer of myths and leader of frontier opinion. But this crucial exposure was not applied to 1835, even by Le Cordeur. Godlonton was laid open as completely untrustworthy, yet his interpretation of the war remained accepted.

The only study on 1835 in itself was produced by Seton.⁴⁵ He concentrated largely on the activities of the Wesleyan missionaries, but he took their interpretations of events completely at face value. This uncritical approach extended to his understanding of the war, which is simplistic and unimaginative. While his analysis of 1835 is detailed, it is really just a repeat of Godlonton. Omer-Cooper wrote at the same time, in the only attempt to encapsulate the 'mfecane' orthodoxy in a full book.⁴⁶ Because the 'mfecane' orthodoxy assumes the Fingo as an integral part of the 'Shakan movements', Omer-Cooper was forced to include a description of their 'history'. But it is clear that he had difficulty in connecting the 'Fingo' in the eastern Cape with the rise of Shaka, as shown by the mere four pages allotted to this pillar of the 'mfecane'. He used Whiteside as his only source, and provided a confused summary as the explanation for the history of the Fingo.⁴⁷

The first major attempt to understand the history of 'Nguni'⁴⁸ society from

⁴³ J.Galbraith, Reluctant Empire (1963).

⁴⁴ B.A.Le Cordeur, 'Robert Godlonton as Architect of Frontier Opinion', MA Thesis, Rhodes University, 1956.

⁴⁵ B.E.Seton, 'Wesleyan missions and the Sixth Frontier War, 1834-1835', Ph.D. Thesis, University of Cape Town, 1962.

⁴⁶ Omer-Cooper, Zulu Aftermath.

⁴⁷ Ibid., pp.164-7.

⁴⁸ See J.Wright, 'Politics, Ideology, and the Invention of the "Nguni"' (Seminar paper, University of Natal - Pietermaritzburg, 1983) for a discussion of the problems with this term.

'the other side' came from the anthropologist Monica Wilson.⁴⁹ Wilson felt strongly that 'the central theme of South African history is interaction between peoples of diverse origins, languages, technologies, ideologies, and social systems, meeting on South African soil',⁵⁰ although the emphasis on interaction obscured her view of the European-African conflict that was occurring. She provides a lucid overview of the expansion of the eastern frontier and colonial society, and was supportive of the impact of the missionaries on African society, which she felt was generally positive. But the material on the 1830s is thin, and conspicuously absent is any analysis of the labour shortage in the eastern Cape. The descriptions of the Fingo and their origins are derived directly from Whiteside, which clouds the understanding of one of the important motives behind the expansion of the Colony. Saunders, in his call for further research on frontier interaction and African societies, emphasised the point which Wilson underplayed, that the Rharhabe attacks of December 1834 were an act of resistance to dispossession, rather than one of aggression.⁵¹ The African resistance on the frontier was blamed by settler historians for what was really British aggression.

J.G.Pretorius took up from Macmillan with his extensive analysis of LMS activities in 1834-5 and the death of Hintza.⁵² This is an important study, which shows D'Urban and Smith manufactured a cover-story for the death of Hintza. But he was hesitant to question D'Urban's explanation of the results of 1835, and concluded that the war was waged essentially as Godlonton claimed. Research that deserves increased attention, on the other hand, is that of A.C.M.Webb, who concentrated on the economy of the English settlement and the

⁴⁹ M.Wilson, Reaction to Conquest; 'The Nguni People' and 'Co-operation and Conflict: the Eastern Cape Frontier' in M.Wilson & L.Thompson, A History of South Africa to 1870 (1986), first published as The Oxford History of South Africa (1969), Vol.1.

⁵⁰ Wilson & Thompson, History of South Africa, p.31.

⁵¹ C.Saunders, 'The Hundred Years War: Some reflections on African Resistance on the Cape-Xhosa Frontier' in D.Chanaiwa (ed), Profiles of Self-Determination (1976), p.60.

⁵² J.G.Pretorius, 'The British Humanitarians and the Cape Eastern Frontier, 1834-1836', Archives Year Book, Vol.2, (1988).

real financial impact of war on the settlers.⁵³ He shows convincingly that the results of the war were not what Godlonton claimed them to be, and that the colonists were more powerful than acknowledged. Most importantly, he provides evidence that the stock losses claimed by the settlers in 1835 were vastly exaggerated. The conclusion is not carried through, though, that Godlonton's version must be inverted and demythologised.

The only full-scale study of the Fingo is the doctoral thesis of Moyer.⁵⁴ His examination of the pre-1835 Fingo period is little more than an uncritical expansion of Whiteside. Moyer noticed no inconsistencies in Whiteside, and rooted the Fingo firmly in the 'mfecane' orthodoxy. He thus automatically accepted Godlonton's version of the war, too. Moyer's explanations of the Fingo identity show numerous contradictions, resulting from his acceptance of these three mythologies: Godlonton, Whiteside and the 'mfecane'. He suggested that the motivation for the Fingo move into the Colony was a dissatisfaction with the pace at which incorporation with the Gcaleka was taking place, and their impression that the British would treat them as equals upon their arrival.⁵⁵ This hypothesis is rendered implausible by the fact that most of the Fingo were labourers, as Moyer also points out, and thus expected to be of inferior status. He did not differentiate between categories of Fingo within the term, but saw them as a heterogeneous group with a particularly acquisitive and acculturative nature. This was ascribed to the destruction of their traditional and authority structures through the 'mfecane'. Because they lacked traditional chiefs, they found it easier to assume the economy and culture of the whites, and became archetypal peripatetic workers.

⁵³ A.C.M. Webb, 'The Agricultural Development of the 1820 Settlement down to 1846', MA Thesis, Rhodes University, 1975, and Webb, 'The immediate consequences of the Sixth Frontier War on the farming community of Albany', South African Historical Journal, No.10, (1978). It is surprising that this latter article has not been well utilised. It is an important contribution to the historiography.

⁵⁴ Moyer, 'History of the Mfengu'.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p.11.

Whilst some of the problems of understanding Fingo movements in 1835 are addressed, the causes and intentions are not. Moyer makes the pertinent point that British tribalisation, added to Rharhabe antipathy, 'caused the Mfengu to evolve from a mere collection of peoples with remotely similar origins into a cohesive political community which rivalled in size [by the 1850s], if nothing else, neighbouring Cape Nguni polities.'⁵⁶ But he then suggests that 'Mfengu' was an economic term, denoting socio-economic status, which is in direct contradiction to his claim that it indicates a certain clan origin. Bundy suggested that the 'Xhosa' and Fingo had a client-patron relationship, and that in the 1830s the latter were recovering morale and group cohesion and were beginning to prosper, which in turn estranged them from their Gcaleka patrons.⁵⁷ Bundy's emphasis on the Fingo as a post-1835 economic force is important, but his acceptance of Ayliff's complicated and illogical Fingo 'Jews of Kaffirland' hypothesis, and the notion of a cohesive Fingo group before 1835, detract from his conceptions.

The most recent study of Sir Benjamin D'Urban is that by J.C.S.Lancaster.⁵⁸ The study is very detailed, especially with regard to D'Urban's handling of Cape finances and administration. But D'Urban's writing and claims were read uncritically, which led to the assumption of the settler explanations for the war and the Fingo, and a defence of D'Urban's policies. This let slip the opportunity for a close scrutiny of D'Urban's character and attitudes that are essential in understanding the events of 1835. Lancaster does not explain whether D'Urban's actions in 1835 were rooted in his own conservatism and negrophobia, or whether he was just acceding to settler demands. There is little analysis of D'Urban's activities on the frontier and with the Fingo, and the enormity of these policies.

A major contribution to the history of the eastern Cape has come from

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p.16.

⁵⁷ C.Bundy, *The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry* (1979).

⁵⁸ J.C.S.Lancaster, 'A Reappraisal of the Governorship of Sir B.D'Urban at the Cape of Good Hope, 1834-1835', MA Thesis, Rhodes University, 1980.

J.B.Peires, who has concentrated on the history of the Xhosa.⁵⁹ He provides a more detailed explanation of African society in the 1820s and 1830s, and an analysis of the European penetration into African society on the eastern frontier. His emphasis on Gcaleka and Rharhabe culture and societal structures is of vital importance. But while the war of 1835 is described as one of devastation for the Rharhabe, the settler claims that Hintza masterminded the 'irruption', that the settlers suffered enormous losses, and that the Colony was not overly destructive, are retained. He accepts the essential argument of Whiteside, but couches it in a better understanding of Xhosa society. Peires rejects D'Urban's falsity that the Fingo were slaves of the Gcaleka, and suggests instead that there was a type of class distinction within Xhosa society, whereby the Fingo had to undergo a period of servility and inferiority before being accepted into Gcaleka society. This, though, assumes that there was a distinct class and unified group of Fingo before 1835. Like Macmillan, he notes the importance of the colonial labour shortage, but does not pursue the theme.

C.C.Crais has produced important analyses on the growth of the eastern Cape, socio-politically and economically.⁶⁰ The description of white Albany in the 1820s and 1830s in terms of class structure and conflict adds a new perspective to the settlement, although the terms of reference are narrow and insufficiently defined. His descriptions of the forces at work in eastern Cape society provide an essential context for the reinterpretation of 1835. Crais, though, has not explored the war and the Fingos, remaining largely dependent on the orthodoxies.

⁵⁹ J.B.Peires, House of Phalo, Peires, The Dead Will Arise (1989), and Peires, 'The British and the Cape, 1814-1834', Ch.10, in R.Elphick & H.Giliomee, The Shaping of South African Society (2nd Edition, 1989).


⁶⁰ C.C.Crais, 'Gentry and Labour in Three Eastern Cape Districts, 1820-1865', South African Historical Journal, No.18, (1986), Crais, 'Some thoughts on slavery and emancipation in the Eastern Cape, 1770-1838' (Seminar paper, Slavery Conference at University of Cape Town, 1989), Crais, 'Ambiguous frontiers' (draft manuscript, 1989), and Crais, 'Beasts of Prey: Capitalism and Resistance in the Eastern Cape, 1828-1849' (Seminar paper, University of Cape Town, 1989).

The most recent work on the war is Le Cordeur's editing of the war journal of Charles Lennox Stretch.⁶¹ This is a particularly useful work, for Stretch provided numerous examples of colonial mistreatment of the Rharhabe. Le Cordeur's thesis on Godlonton and his book on eastern Cape separatism centred on the power and errant propagandising of the Graham's Town faction, which is very useful in understanding how they manipulated frontier opinion and the descriptions of events on the frontier. But while Le Cordeur provides a succinct summary of the causes of the war in his latest work, he sidelines the role of the Graham's Town faction in 1835, and the power of expansionism emanating from Graham's Town, as a root cause of hostilities. He also underplays the essential dominance of the Colony and the destruction wreaked on the Rharhabe and Gcaleka. All this tends to reaffirm Godlonton's interpretation. He thus does not follow the logical conclusion of his earlier work: that Godlonton was a propagandist, and that his view of the war should be treated with great caution.

It is clear, in conclusion, that the interpretations of the war and the Fingo presented by Godlonton and Whiteside still retain great power and credibility, and are reflected throughout South African historiography. The argument of this thesis is that neither Godlonton nor Whiteside is an authoratative source. The interpretation of events in 1835 offered in this thesis is based on a rejection of both works, because of their unreliability. The following chapter addresses the events leading up to the war of 1835, not as the settlers saw them, but as a sequence of land expropriations, and the search for labour to work the settler farms.

⁶¹ Le Cordeur (ed), The Journal of Charles Lennox Stretch (1988); see also Le Cordeur, The Politics of Eastern Cape Separatism, 1820-1854 (1981).

MAP 2. Position of the African peoples, 1834.



CHAPTER 2THE ADVANCE OF CAPE HEGEMONY

The war of 1835 was an integral part of decades of the colonial invasion of Rharhabe territory, and the colonists' search for a permanent labour supply. Initially, the area of most dispute was the Zuurveld - between the Sundays and Fish Rivers - which was appropriated by the Colony in 1812, and reappropriated in 1819. The advance of the frontier provided land for Boers and five thousand British immigrants in 1820, but simultaneously created a severe labour shortage. Before the 1830s, dispossession in itself was not enough to drive the Africans in the area to work as labourers on the colonial farms, and other methods had to be adopted. After a ban on African labourers in the Cape imposed in 1809, the colonists were forced to rely on slave, free black and Khoi labour. With only the latter available in the east, legislation in the form of Hottentot Codes was passed to tie them to the colonial farms. These Codes - promulgated by Governors Caledon and Cradock in 1809 and 1812 - stipulated that Khoi either own land, which was forbidden to them in the Colony, or find employment with Europeans. Vagrancy clauses were included in the Codes, and were then extended in specific vagrancy ordinances that allowed colonists to force any Khoi they deemed 'idle' to labour for them. The vagueness of the wording meant that any Khoi in the Colony could be forcibly indentured by a colonist merely on the grounds of the European's claim that he was a 'vagrant'.

But supplementary labour was needed by the 1820s, and this was provided by the increasing incidence of the seizure of Africans, mainly women and children, from beyond the Colony. This was highly illegal, both because the slave trade had been abolished in 1807 and it was thus illegal to capture labourers, but in addition because in terms of the 1809 proclamation, Africans were not

allowed within the Colony. Explanations for the arrival of these Africans were manufactured to appease the Cape and London authorities: farmers claimed that they were either 'apprentices', as the 1812 Hottentot Proclamation allowed for the apprenticeship of orphaned or destitute children; alternatively they were described as 'Mantatees', with the mythical explanation that they were a tribe of refugees from the devastation of the 'mfecane'. Many of these workers were in fact seized by commandos beyond the frontier. The official duty of these patrols was the punishment of stock thieves, but they were used as well for the seizure of labourers.

But by 1834 there was still an acute labour shortage in the eastern districts. It was exacerbated by the failure of Ordinance 49 (1828) to attract African labourers into the Colony. It was never expected that authoritarian colonial employment would be attractive to Africans, but the ordinance gave permission for Africans to be in the Cape. The crisis was worsened by the overturning of a vagrancy ordinance (which had been designed to force the Khoi into service) by London in 1834, and the imminent emancipation of the Colony's slaves. The situation had been heightened by the annexation of further territory in 1829, 1833 and 1834. These evictions of Rharhabe from their traditional land were, by the end of 1834, the last straw in a long series of injustices suffered by them. Not only had the Colony been seizing labour for its new farms, but Rharhabe land and cattle were being systematically expropriated by the colonists. The mismanaged frontier administration, with its militant conservatism and heavy-handedness, merely worsened matters. The European advance was urged on by a powerful faction in Graham's Town that had extensive influence both throughout the eastern districts and with the colonial authorities. The decades leading up to 1835 were thus a period of virtual war by the settlers on the Rharhabe. The whites had the advantage of abundant access to weaponry that was infinitely superior to that used by the Rharhabe. In open conflict the Africans, no matter what their number, were no match for the guns of the Europeans. The Rharhabe chiefs tried numerous methods to placate and halt the whites, but none were successful. They co-operated with

the colonial legal and military system, they obtained missionaries to plead their cause, they parleyed with the frontier authorities, and tried to talk to D'Urban. But to no avail. By December 1834, the interaction of African dispossession, the colonial labour shortage, and European military penetration and dominance had left the Rharhabe chiefs only one option to retain their dignity, independence and land. Armed resistance was inevitable.

The Cape Colony, which had begun merely as a Dutch East India Company refreshment station in the mid seventeenth century, began to expand northwards and eastwards in the eighteenth century. New social structures began to evolve as the trekboers moved through Khoisan territory, appropriating large tracts of land for farms and spreading the influence of the European monetary economy. Towards the end of the century this ease of movement eastward was halted by the large Rharhabe settlements between the Gamtoos and Sundays Rivers. For the first (and only) time in African history, white colonists met a large mass of Africans along an extended frontier. Integral to this thesis is an explanation of the manner in which the colonial boundary moved progressively and inexorably eastward, bringing with it the incorporation of Africans within Cape society and the destruction of African independence and power. The expansion of the Cape is graphically portrayed by the simple observation that in 1770 the colonial boundary was the Gamtoos; by 1812 it was the Fish; by 1819 the Keiskamma; and by 1848 the Kei. In 1894 Pondoland was finally subjugated, leaving almost all of modern South Africa under white control.¹

In 1778 Governor von Plettenberg declared the eastern boundary of the Colony to be the Fish (Nxuba) River. This claim was repeatedly challenged; it made the Zuurveld - from the Sundays to Fish Rivers - an area of dispute for thirty years.² The open frontier of this period³ saw an inconclusive struggle for

¹ A clear overview of the way in which the white boundary progressed can be found in Wilson & Thompson, History of South Africa to 1870, pp.252-3. See also Saunders, 'The Hundred Years War'; Du Toit, 'The Cape Frontier: a study of Native Policy', p.2; N.C.Pollock & S.Agnew, An Historical Geography of South Africa (1963), ch.2.

² Peires, House of Phalo, p.54.

territorial dominance. The Dutch East India Company, the British in their first occupation and the Batavian government were content to allow matters to remain equivocal and no real support, militarily or politically, was given to what was essentially a sparse, nomadic Boer population. With the arrival of the British for the second time in 1806, there came a new attitude towards the frontier. A philosophy of racial separation across the frontier became official policy, and it was decided that the Khoi, slaves and free blacks were to serve all colonial labour needs. All Africans west of the Fish were to be forced out of the Colony, to be banished as foreigners. This was supposedly to reduce racial friction; but the reason why the Cape authorities should have decided to expel its ideal labour supply is yet to be adequately explained. In 1812 the British army was introduced to the frontier for the first time, and with the demonstration of its superior weaponry its dominance was assured.⁴ There was a significant difference, though, between maintaining a full army for a short period and the continuous patrolling of the Fish River boundary that was now necessary. The Colonial Office could not afford to maintain a permanent force large enough to enforce the newly created frontier. Between 1806 and 1834, as a result of the Napoleonic wars and British economic depression, Britain steadily decreased its administrative and military force at the Cape, hoping that its annexations - like the Indian - would pay for themselves.⁵

The Africans most affected by the advent of this new force in the area were the Rharhabe. Rharhabe had seceded from his brother Gcaleka in the late eighteenth century, and his land was divided between his grandsons Ngqika and Ndlambe. Ngqika and Ndlambe were the two main chiefs of the Rharhabe in the

³ H.Giliomee, 'The Eastern Frontier, 1770-1812', Ch.9, in Elphick & Giliomee (eds), The Shaping of South African Society (1989), for a discussion of the concept of open and closed frontiers.

⁴ B.Maclennan, A Proper Degree of Terror (1986), provides an exposure of the methods of British colonial warfare and a very readable account of 1812 and the years until 1819.

⁵ Galbraith, Reluctant Empire, pp.63-4. Stanley issued a warning - (CA) GH 1/98, Stanley to Cole, December 1833 - that the Cape would be receiving less financial support, and detailed the areas in the Cape budget where expenditure was to be cut.

first three decades of the nineteenth-century.⁶ Their combined territory had stretched between the Sundays and Kei Rivers before 1811. Gcaleka's grandson Hintza maintained control of the land between the Kei and Mbashe Rivers for this same period.⁷

The relationship between Hintza and the Rharhabe chiefs is a very important one. The settler explanation of the war of 1835 rests to a large extent on their claim that Hintza must have been guilty of masterminding the attacks of December 1834, because he was the politically authoritative paramount, and the Rharhabe could not have acted without his permission (see Chapter 3). The issue of whether Hintza was the political leader of a 'Xhosa nation' or not is thus integral to one's conception of the war. Hintza, as direct descendent of Gcaleka, retained the theoretical paramountcy over all Gcaleka and Rharhabe followers. But was there a nation in the 1820s and 1830s? Wilson challenged the assumption of a 'Xhosa' unity. She proposed that it had dissipated as early as 1817, when Hintza could not enforce his judgement on a disagreement between Ngqika and Ndlambe.⁸ Each chief was essentially independent, and Hintza's authority was largely a cipher.⁹ The colonial term 'Caffer' cannot be directly translated into 'Xhosa', as the settlers, with their paranoia and misunderstanding of African society, applied the term arbitrarily to any African east of the Sundays River. The British were intent on finding - or imposing - a centralised 'Caffer' state with which to negotiate, and hence

⁶ Their people were described in terms of the chief's name.

⁷ Peires, House of Phalo, provides further detail on these societies.

⁸ Wilson & Thompson, History of South Africa, p.11. See also J.H.Soga, The South-Eastern Bantu (1930), pp.189-190.

⁹ Thompson, Travels and Adventures, Vol.1, p.219, Comments of Brownlee on his visit to Hintza in 1822; see also BPP 50 (1835), Report of Rutherford, December 1824, in which Rutherford said that Hintza's power was largely theoretical. J.E.Alexander, Narrative of a Voyage of observation among the colonies... and of a campaign in Kaffer-land, 1835 (1837), Vol.2, ch.22, reported that Hintza himself claimed to hold no sway over the Rharhabe. Soga, South-Eastern Bantu, pp.189-190, had the same view; see also W.D.Hammond-Tooke, 'The "other side" of frontier history: a model of Cape Nguni political process', in Thompson (ed), African Societies in Southern Africa (1969), p.239. Hammond-Tooke stresses that decisions in African society were consensus based, and that the paramount had no political authority over the other chiefs.

their recognition of Ngqika in 1817 as Rharhabe paramount, and Hintza as 'Caffer' paramount. Hintza was not the political leader of a unified 'Xhosa nation'; each chief was independent, and could make a choice on whether to fight the Colony or not.

Because the border was unenforcable, the inhabitants of the Zuurveld before 1812 - the Ndlambe and some Ngqika - began to move back into the area now devoid of any substantial population. In 1819 a large colonial force again moved onto the frontier and evicted the Rharhabe, and the Keiskamma River was declared to be the colonial boundary, with the area between it and the Fish (the Ceded Territory) to be a neutral zone with no inhabitants. This enforcement of the Keiskamma as boundary alienated a good percentage of Ngqika land as well. For the Ngqika, this loss of land came as a shock, as Governor Somerset had recognised Ngqika as paramount of the Rharhabe in 1817, and they had sided with the British against Ndlambe in 1818-9.¹⁰ The British actions had in fact been intended to create fratricidal hostility between the Ngqika and Ndlambe, and to divide the African opposition.

In order to ensure the closure of the frontier and the retention of the Zuurveld as colonial territory, five thousand British settlers were placed in 1820 in the Zuurveld, which had been renamed Albany. For the Rharhabe, apart from the land loss, the imposition of a boundary, which was a foreign concept, undermined the traditional practice of fission to alleviate intra-clan tensions and population growth. Previously, if more land had been needed, herds and families were merely gathered and moved. Rivers and geographical formations had never before delineated hegemony. There had been no 'private property' or legally defineable farms.

¹⁰ Ngqika's relationship with the Colony was complex. He wanted British support, and they wanted to create a stooge chief to undermine Rharhabe unity; see J.B.Peires, 'A History of the Xhosa c.1700-1835', MA Thesis, Rhodes University, 1976, p.188; M.Oloyo, 'The Cape Eastern Frontier in the Early 19th Century', Seminar paper, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, London, 1972.

The simultaneous penetration of missionaries and European culture formed an important part of this process of colonisation.¹¹ The mission impact is succinctly pinpointed in an East African saying: 'When the white man came here, they had the Bible and we had the land; now we have the Bible and they have the land.'¹² For the missionaries, Christianity was inseparably bound up with an acceptance of European culture and values. Converts on the stations were expected to indicate their acceptance of Christianity by rejecting traditional customs and beliefs, and by wearing clothes and working for wages. The chiefs allowed the establishment of missions in their territory in order to have a means of communication with the Colony.¹³ But the missionaries specifically attacked the power of the chiefs, who controlled the religious, political and social order. Conversions could only follow the destruction of the very framework of African society.¹⁴

The impact of an expanding Colony, with its concomitant dispossession of the indigenous people, lies at the root of interracial conflict for the period under study, and cannot be overly stressed. Critical to the permanent hostility on the frontier was the issue of who was able to control access to land, and its distribution. The annexation of Rharhabe land and its apportionment to settler farmers left the Africans with few options. They were forced either to evacuate their homes and move eastwards, or, after 1828, become servants to the new land-owner, or move into the Colony to search for

¹¹ There is not room for a detailed analysis of the missionaries and their impact. N.Majeke (Dora Taylor), The Role of the Missionaries in Conquest (1952), is a seminal work which started the debate on a previously uncontroversial topic. See also D.Williams, When Races Meet (1967), and D.Williams, 'The missionary personality in Caffraria, 1799-1853: a study in the context of biography', Historia, (May 1989). Possibly the best critique of missions is J.Cochrane, Servants of Power (1987) ch.2.

¹² K.West, 'Theorising about Imperialism: a Methodological Note', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History (Jan 1973), p.154n.

¹³ Williams, When Races Meet, p.60 notes that the Thembu chief Vusani requested a missionary in order to be able to summon British military commandos, having seen what they could do; Satchell, in (CA) GH 34/5, Satchell to Smith, 29 April 1835, says that Faku refused to let him leave in April 1835, as he said that he could not be without a representative.

¹⁴ See Peires, House of Phalo, chs.3 and 4.

work and subsistence. From the 1810s the eastern Cape economy expanded rapidly, and while the district economies of Graaff-Reinet, Uitenhage and Somerset were based on pastoral farming, Albany's (and especially Graham's Town) grew as a result of inland trade, the vast majority of which was with the Africans. There was an increased export demand for meat, hides, tallow, horns, ivory and ostrich feathers from around 1827, in which the eastern traders specialised. The African trade thus stimulated the Albany economy, but this gave support to the calls for expansion into new territory.¹⁵ The superiority of European military technology ensured that the Rharhabe could not defend their land losses, and to this was added the fact that many of the settlers, abandoning agricultural for pastoral farming, took inordinately large areas for farms, resulting in the expulsion of the indigenous population and providing a tempting target for cattle raids. Cattle-owners in the Zuurveld area required access to large areas of land because of the need for seasonal transhumance between the sweet and sour veld, but the colonists rejected the African practice of communal grazing by claiming sole ownership to land. This automatically deprived the Rharhabe of access to large tracts of grazing, which affected their economy drastically.¹⁶

The effect on the Rharhabe of the expansion of the Colony is clearly described by Dundas, civil commissioner for Albany, in 1827. He described the aboriginal character as essentially amiable and enterprising, 'but the Caffres, who, from the circumstances of having for many years past been brought into collision with the frontier Boors, have assumed a more warlike character than by nature belongs to them.'¹⁷ Alberti, the traveller in the early part of the century, had stressed that the attitude and actions of the Africans would be determined by those of the colonists, and that the security and cattle theft in a region

¹⁵ S.D. Neumark, Economic influences on the South African frontier (1957), ch.12; Webb, 'Agricultural development of 1820 Settlement', ch.3.

¹⁶ Pollock & Agnew, Historical Geography, pp.70-2.

¹⁷ BPP 252 (1835), pp.14-5, Dundas to Secretary to Government, Plasket, 10 April 1827.

was dependent upon the attitude of the colonists.¹⁸ The Scottish settlement of Glen Lynden on an exposed spot on the Baviaans River, for instance, seldom lost any cattle because it had good frontier relations.¹⁹

Three issues provided the main fodder for colonial-African disputes : land, labour, and security. Agar-Hamilton, in his study on the Voortrekkers, identified the twin problems of the Boer 'Native Question' of mid-century north of the Orange as being similarly land and labour and the exploitation of the indigenous population by the whites.²⁰ European settlers continually demanded increased land grants, and the extension of the 'frontier of civilization'. The seizure of their land in turn undermined the livelihood and security of those Africans living closest to the Colony, and it was these groups whose responses threatened the Colony. These responses, which came usually in the form of cattle-raiding, were often exaggerated and usually linked to the attempts by colonists to obtain workers and exert their authority. This continued throughout the century : the last message of the Thembu chief Mtirara in 1850 to his people was a disillusioned plea for them to move eastwards, as the Colony would forever complain of lost cattle which led inevitably to war, the loss of life, the capture of cattle, and the annexation of their land.²¹

Since its inception, the Cape Colony had had a labour shortage, and this remained a perennial problem. Van Riebeeck attempted to indenture the Khoi, but by 1657 resorted to slavery as a more viable alternative, and slave labour became the backbone of the Cape economy from that time until the early nineteenth century.²² The increase in white farming and the blossoming of the frontier economy from the late eighteenth century began to outstrip the slave

¹⁸ L.Alberti (Trans. W.Fehr), Ludwig Alberti's Account of the tribal life and customs of the Xhosa in 1807 (1968), ch.21.

¹⁹ J.Cappon, Britain's Title in South Africa (1901), p.288.

²⁰ J.Agar-Hamilton, The Native Policy of the Voortrekkers (1928), p.169.

²¹ (CL) MS 17,119, Oral Testimony of E.G.Sihele, Trans. T.Tisani, p.38.

²² R.Shell, 'Adumbrations of Cape Slavery: other forms of labour' (Seminar paper, Rhodes University, 1989).

supply, and many of the trekboers moving into the eastern districts were unable to afford slaves.²³ A new avenue of cheap labour had thus to be found. The abuse of the commando system on the northern and eastern frontiers in the 18th century led to the seizure of more persons to supplement the work force. With the abolition of the maritime slave trade in 1807, the Cape looked again to the Khoi, attempting to control their movements and availability as a work force via the so-called Hottentot Codes of 1809, 1812 and 1817.²⁴ These laws demanded, inter alia, that all Khoi have a fixed place of abode. But as they were not allowed to own land in the Colony, the options were to live on a mission institution, leave the Colony, or become labourers on a farm.²⁵ This turned the majority of Khoi immediately into illegal squatters, who could legally be forced by Europeans to become labourers.

The Caledon Code of 1809 paved the way for the creation of a master-servant relationship between the colonists and Khoi. This was progressively strengthened into the 1820s, with the allowal of child apprenticeship and the disallowal of land grants to the Khoi. The legislation on 'apprentices' and 'vagrants' lent itself to exploitation by the colonists, who could not openly defy Colonial Office regulations. They had to enforce labour within the framework and protection of the officially-sanctioned structures and laws. The apprenticeship regulations of 1812, which allowed for the apprenticeship - in other words, for the forced retention - of orphaned or destitute children until the age of eighteen, were exploited, as the landdrosts who were empowered to prosecute exploitation of the legislation were the same who benefitted from it.²⁶ The term 'apprenticeship' had none of its traditional

²³ R.Elphick & V.C.Malherbe, "The Khoisan to 1828", ch.1, in Elphick & Giliomee, Shaping of SA Society (1989); Crais, 'Some thoughts on Slavery'.

²⁴ For the text of the Hottentot Proclamations, see BPP 503 (1837), pp.166-8. Of importance is the preface to the 1809 Code: 'It is necessary that the Hottentots should have an encouragement for preferring entering the service of the inhabitants to leading an indolent life, by which they are rendered useless both for themselves and the community at large.'

²⁵ H.A.Reyburn, 'Studies in Cape Frontier history', The Critic, Vol.3, No.1, October 1934.

²⁶ Peires, 'British and the Cape', p.493.

connotations of learning a trade, with the employer's educational and social obligations; it was applied merely as a legal cover for child labourers. A child could easily be captured and described as an orphan; there could be no record of his real history. Agar-Hamilton showed how this system of 'apprenticeship' was adopted by the eastern Cape Boers, where it had been learnt from the British in the 1820s and 1830s. They carried it to Natal and the Boer Republics north of the Orange River. As he put it, most of the colonists saw it 'as merely a veil required by an unintelligible convention to cover the exploitation of child labour'.²⁷

Vagrancy legislation resulted from the claim by colonists that vagrant Khoi, San or Africans were threatening colonial security. They demanded that these people be employed by colonists or else removed from the colonial boundaries. The regular explanation for the legislation was that it would teach the Khoi the 'dignity of labour', improve their moral character, and remove the danger of vagrancy. The notion of vagrancy hardly involved security at all, but was an attempt (usually successful) to force the aboriginal population into labour.²⁸ A 'vagrant' was defined as a non-European who did not possess land or a job. As the indigenous population was denied property ownership, the majority were automatically 'vagrants'. 'Vagrancy' remained a useful method of enforcing labour: Cole in 1831, and Wade in 1833, when showing concern about the colonial labour shortage, proposed vagrancy laws as the best method of solving the problem.²⁹

Philip's objection to the Hottentot Codes was that they led to the

²⁷ Agar-Hamilton, Native Policy, p.171. He exposes many of the euphemisms employed in labour seizure, and the way in which the practices of the 1850s had very distinct roots in the 1820s and 1830s.

²⁸ (CA) LCA 6, Comments of Philip, June 1834, and Campbell, 4 July 1834. The latter said that a vagrancy ordinance would force the Khoi to work, to the benefit of the wealthier settlers. Fairbairn's disapproving views on vagrancy laws are in H.C.Botha, John Fairbairn in South Africa (1984), pp.97-104. Analyses of the intentions of vagrancy ordinances are provided in Macmillan, Cape Colour Question, ch.16; Peires, 'British and the Cape', p.501.

²⁹ Macmillan, Cape Colour Question, p.234.

maltreatment of the Khoi and the destruction of a free labour force. The colonists were quite happy with the law for the same reasons.³⁰ But for all the attempts to enforce a Khoi labour force, they still resisted service and could not meet the colonial labour needs. In consequence the emphasis began to shift towards the natural area for labour procurement - the large African population across the frontier. With a blueprint for subjugation and labour extraction proven on the Khoi, the Colony was set to create a similar process with the Africans.³¹

The commando system was a powerful method of enforcing white authority, augmenting stock numbers, and seizing labour. It was first introduced in the Colony in the late seventeenth century to control Khoi incursions,³² but by the nineteenth century it was being frequently abused in arbitrary, destructive raids for cattle and labour on the Africans and Khoisan. Mayhem accompanied these raids: Maynier, for instance, quoted a Boer who had seen over three thousand San killed on the commandos he had attended between 1803 and 1809.³³ By the time the British took over, the system allowed for the summoning of a commando by the local Field Cornet upon the reporting of stock theft, and the following of the trail to the nearest kraal across the border, whereupon up to ten times the number of cattle reported stolen were seized. The victim - usually innocent of any crime - was left to demand compensation from the perpetrators through the chief. Any resistance to a patrol resulted in the burning of the kraal and the death of its inhabitants. The only access to justice which the Africans had was the local military officer, who was often the leader of the offending party.³⁴

³⁰ S.Newton-King, 'The labour market of the Cape Colony, 1807-1828', ch.7, in S.Marks & A.Atmore, Economy and Society in Pre-industrial South Africa (1980), provides seminal work on labour and the attempts to control the Khoi during this period.

³¹ Elphick & Malherbe, "Khoisan to 1828", p.43.

³² For the growth of the system see I.D.MacCrone, Race Attitudes in South Africa (1937), ch.6.

³³ BPP 50 (1835), pp.29-30, Maynier to Commission of Enquiry, 1825.

³⁴ A summary of the system can be found in (CA) A1480, Read to Fairbairn, 13 April 1834; BPP 279 (1836), p.62, Glenelg to D'Urban, 26 Dec 1835. For descriptions of its injustices see (CA) GH 1/97 p.68, Stanley to Cole, 27

The avenues for abuse of the system were numerous. There was no method of checking the honesty of the plaintiff; there was little control on the destruction caused; and the number of cattle seized could not be verified. Stockenstrom thought little of a Boer oath, and estimated that 'nine out of ten would make a false oath to get cattle'.³⁵ Examples abound of these legal commandos becoming mere opportunities to plunder. Pringle and Huntley complained of Colonel Somerset's disastrous attempt in 1825 to punish Neuka (a Ngqika) for stealing cattle, when he led a secret commando which mistakenly attacked the innocent Bhotumane and then another chief, killing people and taking cattle.³⁶ In June 1830 a commando under Somerset and Stockenstrom raided the kraal of the Ndlambe chief Sekou in search of colonial cattle. Despite finding no evidence of any, they seized all his cattle and subsequently shot him and six of his unarmed men.³⁷ A commando in March 1833 took a hundred cattle from Tyali - who was innocent - which were then distributed amongst the members of the patrol, and not to Collett, whose cattle the commando had been formed to fetch.³⁸ Commandos were not restricted to the frontier region; Somerset periodically sent patrols almost to the Kei River.³⁹ The complaint of the chiefs was that they were seldom consulted about cattle theft, and that before they had a chance to find the offender, a patrol had seized cattle randomly from their *imizi*.⁴⁰

The English settlers denied taking part in commando raids into Rharhabe territory, blaming all atrocities on the Boers.⁴¹ But, while the commandos on the northern frontier consisted chiefly of Boers and Khoi, on the eastern frontier the English settlers and the colonial military regularly instigated,

November 1833; BPP 50 (1835), pp.175-7, Moodie, December 1823; Lancaster, "Governorship of D'Urban", ch.5.

³⁵ BPP 503 (1837), p.167, Read to Philip, 17 June 1834.

³⁶ BPP 50 (1835), pp.183-4, Pringle to Commission of Enquiry, January 1826.

³⁷ T.Pringle, Narrative of a Residence in South Africa (1835), pp.325-6.

³⁸ (CA) A50/4, Read to Fairbairn, 12 April 1833.

³⁹ BPP 503 (1837), p.151, Somerset to D'Urban, 26 September 1834.

⁴⁰ (CA) A1480, Read to Fairbairn, 13 April 1834; Ibid., Read to Fairbairn, 27 June 1834.

⁴¹ W.Shaw (ed W.B.Boyce), Memoirs of the Rev. William Shaw (1874), pp.164-5.

joined and led retributive patrols across the border. There was more common ground between the Dutch and English settlers than has been acknowledged. Whilst London deplored the regular abuse of the commando system, it could not afford the strict policing of the entire frontier. The only method of offering the 'adequate protection' demanded by the colonists, was to allow the colonists to defend themselves with the commando system, and a blind eye was turned to patrols until the 1820s.

But commandos were not used only to seize cattle and subdue the Africans; they were exploited to seize labour for the colonists. In the first few decades of the nineteenth century, the practice of seizing labour became more and more common, and by 1835 there was a long-standing precedent of illegal transfrontier raids, and the capture of men, women and children to work on colonial farms.⁴² Commandos were particularly effective in this regard. In the eastern districts between 1786 and 1795, over 2,504 Khoi were killed by commandos, and at least six hundred and sixty-nine (mostly children) were forced into servitude.⁴³ Newton-King has shown how commandos were being employed to seize San on the northern borders of the Graaff-Reinet district in the late eighteenth century, most of whom were women and children.⁴⁴ The 'war captive' labourer population in 1798 was twice the size of that of the slaves. Maynier was ordered in 1792 to encourage the taking of African prisoners on commando to be distributed as labourers in Graaff-Reinet or sent to Cape Town: and after the 1792 war 'captive women and children were distributed among the farmers....This was the normal condition of things throughout the district of Graaff-Reinet.'⁴⁵ On a commando in 1793, 'a considerable number of prisoners,

⁴² The practice of labour seizure on commando continued for decades. In 1840 a commando of Natal Boers attacked the Bhaca and captured cattle and many women and children, explaining unconvincingly that these captives were taken by their Mpondomise allies, and that the Boers were outraged at the idea. They then 'apprenticed' most of them; see G.M.Theal, The Republic of Natal and the Origin of the present Pondo tribe (1961), pp.19-20.

⁴³ Crais, 'Some thoughts on slavery', p.11.

⁴⁴ S.Newton-King, 'The Enemy Within' (Seminar paper, Slavery Conference, University of Cape Town, 1989).

⁴⁵ Thompson, Travels and Adventures, Vol.2, p.7.

men, women and children had been taken'.⁴⁶ Stockenstrom in 1817 showed concern at the increasing number of San children being captured and placed in service in the Colony, with the explanation of 'civilising them'.⁴⁷ In Graaff-Reinet in 1824, there were eight hundred and twenty-five San apprentices, a number of the children officially recognised as having been forcibly indentured.⁴⁸ Those seized by commandos until the early nineteenth century were largely Khoisan. But the failure of a colonial Khoi workforce under legislative enforcement was equalled by the ineffectiveness of physically coerced Khoi labourers. Colonists increasingly began to see Africans as an alternative.

The necessity for the Colony to have a substantial labour force, and the problems incurred in a shortage have always, until recent years, been downplayed by South African historians. Without sufficient manual labourers, the colonial economy was hamstrung. By the nineteenth century manual work was considered the work only of slaves or the indigenous population, and was regarded as demeaning for white men.⁴⁹ The intention of the 1820 Settler scheme was to create a buffer in the recently-depopulated Zuurveld, by settling a mass of Englishmen between the Rharhabe and the Colony.⁵⁰ It would also help to alleviate Britain's economic problems and unemployment. The authorities hoped to create a self-sufficient 'little England' in the Cape, complete with English class structure and labourers. A small percentage of the settlers were second-string aristocrats who were placed in charge of settler parties. The majority of the immigrants were labourers who were indentured to these leaders in Britain. By 1823 though, this scheme was collapsing, as the indentured English workers found the ease of access to land more attractive

⁴⁶ G.M.Theal, Records of the Cape Colony (1904), Vol.25, pp.386-7.

⁴⁷ BPP 50 (1835), p.56, Report of Stockenstrom, 1817; see also Ibid., pp.29-30, Maynier's replies to the Commission of Enquiry in 1825.

⁴⁸ BPP 50 (1835), p.144; Elphick & Malherbe, 'Khoisan to 1828'.

⁴⁹ The main work on early race relations is MacCrone, Race Attitudes. See also M.Legassick, 'The frontier tradition in South African historiography', ch.2, in Marks & Atmore, Economy and Society; R.Elphick & R.Shell, 'Intergroup relations: Khoikhoi, settlers, slaves and free blacks 1652-1795', ch.4, in Elphick & Giliomee, Shaping of SA Society (1989).

⁵⁰ Pollock & Agnew, Historical Geography, p.80.

than servitude.⁵¹ Many of the settler farmers were dogged by ineptitude, and for the successful the wheat product proved uncompetitive on the European import market, and could not match the western Cape harvest.⁵² There was thus a movement of settlers to urban areas, and at the same time an increase in the number of settler farms.⁵³

Thus, instead of easing the labour shortage, the settlers (who were prohibited slave ownership) exacerbated it, and the Khoi labour force remained inadequate.⁵⁴ Using the case of domestic workers, Cock has shown how the settlers began with indentured white servants, moved to Khoi, and by 1825 were depending on Africans, and specifically Mantatees or Tswana.⁵⁵ Three hundred English labourers were transported to the Cape in 1825, destined for Albany, but remained in Cape Town after offers of higher pay. The Cape Town merchant, Thomas Carlisle, attempted to ship out white labourers for indenture as there was a high demand for them, but his scheme failed after this first diverted shipload. The Cape administration explored the possibility of subsidising the immigration of unemployed Britons, as well as orphans, but the settlers were wary of white labourers after the failure of the 1820 scheme. African labourers were more accessible, more malleable and their wages were far lower.⁵⁶

From 1809 African labourers were illegal in the Cape.⁵⁷ The government began

⁵¹ I.E. Edwards, The 1820 Settlers in South Africa : a study in British Colonial Policy (1934), p.151.

⁵² Neumark, Economic Influences, ch.12.

⁵³ Webb, "Agricultural development of 1820 settlement", ch.2.

⁵⁴ Ibid.; Edwards, 1820 Settlers, p.151; Reyburn, 'Studies in Cape Frontier History', The Critic, Vol.3, No.1, October 1934.

⁵⁵ J.Cock, Maids and Madams: a Study in the Politics of Exploitation (1980), ch.6.

⁵⁶ For discussion on the labour shortage and comments on white labourers and comparative salaries, see the evidence to the Commission of Enquiry of Carlisle, Pringle, Shepperd, White, Francis, Ellis, Eaton and Thompson in BPP 404 (1826), pp.87-91, 226-8; and BPP 550 (1827), pp.144-9.

⁵⁷ J.S.Marais, The Cape Coloured People (1957), p.183; see also BPP 50 (1835), pp.168-9, for Somerset's proclamation of 1822 restating the prohibition of intercourse.

to become more lenient in its policy of frontier separation, and allowed a permanent trade fair at Fort Willshire in 1824, which attempted to control commercial and racial intercourse while retaining the strict pass system.⁵⁸ The Commission of Enquiry into Immigration in 1826-7 found the evidence of all its Cape witnesses unanimous on the issue that the Cape was suffering from a crippling labour shortage, specifically in Cape Town and the eastern areas, and that this was retarding agricultural production and the development of the Colony. In 1827 a questionnaire was sent to all civil commissioners for their views on the legalisation of African labourers in the Colony. The response was unanimous : allow Africans to work in the Colony, but maintain strict controls and impose vagrancy laws for both them and the Khoi.⁵⁹ The discussions made clear the intense lack of labour in the eastern districts, and the urgent need to solve it.⁶⁰

The disruptions and devastation in the interior of South Africa in the 1810s to 1830s provided a welcome source of labourers, exploited by farmers and patrols. In 1825-6 large groups of Mantatees and Tswana refugees began moving into the Colony from around the Transorangia region, most of whom were indentured as labourers. Robert Hart said that it was well known that the people 'generally denominated Mantatees are a mixture of various tribes from the interior who took refuge from their enemies in the Colony in the year 1826,' and who were distributed as labourers.⁶¹ This distribution of Mantatee labourers was performed by the Cape government. When the settler Phillips in Albany applied to the government in 1825 for labourers, he was provided with Tswana, called Mantatees.⁶² His wife explained how there had been a terrible

⁵⁸ Peires, "British at the Cape", p.485. For the figures of the fair in 1824, see BPP 50 (1835), p.190.

⁵⁹ BPP 252 (1835), p.10, Bourke to Bathurst, 30 June 1827 passed on the suggestion. The responses are in (CA) AC 11, Appendix to minutes of Advisory Council, 1833, and BPP 252 (1835), pp.11-14. Elphick & Malherbe, 'Khoisan to 1828' have analysed them.

⁶⁰ BPP 252 (1835), p.17. Cuyler, Landdrost of Uitenhage wrote to Secretary to Government, Plasket, on 19 February 1827, for instance, that 1,000 workers could be immediately indentured in his district.

⁶¹ (CA) 1/AY/8/86, Robert Hart to Campbell, 11 June 1835.

⁶² Webb, 'Agricultural development of 1820 Settlement', p.111.

shortage of labour, and how Africans from the interior had been driven south by men who attacked them and took them prisoners. 'Government at length determined on bringing them down here [Graham's Town] and distributing them amongst us as servants', she added.⁶³

Acting-Governor Bourke in 1827 observed that there were large numbers of refugees moving south from the interior into the Colony where they were placed on farms.⁶⁴ Although some may have been escaping Sotho attacks, most of these people seem to have been moving to escape the attentions of Griqua and Coranna slave raiders in the Orange River area. The Coranna were raiding as far south as the Hangklip (modern Queenstown) area in the 1830s.⁶⁵ Many of the Mantatees who came to work in Albany in the 1820s had moved south because they were being regularly attacked by raiders who took many prisoners.⁶⁶ The official explanation for a group of Tswana who entered the Colony in 1824, was that they had come to beg for food. Philip said that they had actually come in search of their children who had been abducted by Bergenaars, and 'apprenticed' - in other words sold - to farmers.⁶⁷ This makes it clear that raiders were seizing labourers from across the colonial frontier, and were then calling them 'Mantatees' and describing them as refugees whom they were rescuing.⁶⁸

Cobbing, Richner and Maloka have shown convincingly the power of the Griqua raiders, who operated virtually the entire length of the Orange in the 1820s, seizing cattle for themselves, and people to be sold into servitude in the

⁶³ A.Keppel-Jones (ed), Phillips, 1820 settler : his letters, pp.252-3, Mrs Phillips to Mrs Lee, 27 November 1835. The machinery of this labour movement remains unstudied.

⁶⁴ BPP 252 (1835), pp.21-3, Bourke to Goderich, 15 October 1827; see also (CA) LCA 6, Appendices to Legislative Council minutes, Letter from Campbell, 4 July 1834.

⁶⁵ (CA) AC 11, Appendix to minutes of Advisory Council, Campbell to ?, 29 June 1833.

⁶⁶ Keppel-Jones, Phillips, 1820 Settler, pp.252-3, Mrs Phillips to Mrs Lee, 27 November 1825.

⁶⁷ J.Philip, Researches in South Africa (1828); quoted Cobbing, 'Mfecane as Alibi'.

⁶⁸ Cobbing, 'Mfecane as Alibi'.

Colony.⁶⁹ Maloka provides evidence of raids on the Sotho by Europeans and Griqua, where Sotho were forcibly seized and taken into service in the Colony.⁷⁰ The general destabilisation resulted in an increase in the number of 'Fetcani' raids. 'Fetcani' was, according to Campbell, 'the term usually given to all unknown tribes' who raided in the 1820s and 1830s, usually armed with guns. He described an instance in 1833 when a group of armed Tswana raided the Winterberg Thembu, and were called Fetcani by their victims. These raiders, though, were usually Sotho.⁷¹ Like most terms of the period, 'Mantatee' is a complex term, as it was used at the same time to refer to raiders,⁷² refugees from raiders, and captives - the latter two usually Tswana or Sotho.⁷³ A myth evolved describing the Tlokwa as Mantatees. The Tlokwa were supposedly set on a marauding course by the devastations of the Zulu 'mfecane', a myth which blamed the Zulu for depopulating the Orange Free State and causing the destabilisation which actually resulted from European and para-European labour raiding.⁷⁴ Mantatees were in reality refugees who moved into the Colony in search of subsistence,⁷⁵ or captives labelled as such to disguise their illegality.

⁶⁹ Cobbing, 'Mfecane as Alibi'; Richner, 'Withering away of "lifaqane"'; Maloka, 'Missionary historiography and ethnography'.

⁷⁰ Maloka, 'Missionary historiography and ethnography', p.92.

⁷¹ (CA) AC 11, Campbell to ?, 26 June 1833 wrote of Bechuana Fetcani. BPP 252 (1835), pp.21-3, Bourke to Goderich, 15 October 1827, describes Fetcani attacks in September 1827, where he claimed that up to 7,000 Sotho were raiding the Thembu, and attacking the Rharhabe as far west as the northern Tyhume River. Maloka, 'Missionary historiography and ethnography', p.67, says that Fetcani were Sotho and Ngwane raiders. Warner, in (AM) SM 2067, History of Rev.J.C.Warner, described a Fetcani raid at Clarkebury, where women and children were taken. These Fetcani were Bhaca. The term 'Fetcani' - its origins and meanings - needs to be researched.

⁷² Maloka, 'Missionary historiography and ethnography', p.94; Richner, 'Withering away of "lifaqane"', p.19.

⁷³ Evidence for Tswana 'Mantatees': (CA) AC 11, Ziervogel to Campbell; (CA) 1/AY/1/4, Goosen, 17 October 1835; AC 11, Campbell to ?, 29 June 1833. For Sotho 'Mantatees' see Maloka, 'Missionary historiography and ethnography', p.99. Richner, 'Withering away of "lifaqane"' has analysed the identity of the 'Mantatees' at Dithakong in 1823. He suggests that the term arose partly as a result of commercial competition between the Thlaping and Maidu, and from the nonspecific European fear of the unknown.

⁷⁴ Cobbing, 'Mfecane as Alibi'.

⁷⁵ As described in (CA) LCA 6, Evidence of Campbell, 4 July 1834.

'Mantatees' were a possible solution to the labour problem, but the ban on African labourers had to be lifted to enable the source to be exploited. Thus in 1828 came paired legislation.⁷⁶ Ordinance 49 ensured a replacement labour supply, allowing for the invitation of potential transFish workers through magistrates and colonial agents; and Ordinance 50, in response to philanthropic agitation, officially though not practically, freed the Khoi from servitude. The effectiveness and implementation of Ordinance 50 (which has been hailed by many as a watershed of liberal values) was never thereafter enquired into by the Colonial Office, which assumed that the 'Hottentot Question' had been dealt with. Macmillan pointed out that while technically freeing the Khoi, Ordinance 50 made no provision to provide them with land; it thus failed to bring about any improvement in their condition, and they were left with the same dilemma - but fewer employment options - that the Hottentot Codes had created.⁷⁷ The implementation of Ordinance 49, though, was problematic, as few people outside the Colony would voluntarily choose badly-paid employment. As Campbell, Civil Commissioner for Albany, said, they would come only if they had no option, whether forced by war and destitution or coerced by the Colony.⁷⁸ It was widely recognised that the implementation of Ordinance 49 by itself would have little impact on the labour problem, as it was a purely theoretical invitation. Yet it was passed, and provided the legislative protection for labour seizure.

Why was Ordinance 49 passed, and what were its implications? Macmillan was the

⁷⁶ For the text of these ordinances see the declarations of Bourke in June 1828, in BPP 50 (1835), pp.171-3; and BPP 252 (1835), p.20. M.E.Donaldson, 'The Council of Advice at the Cape of Good Hope', Ph.D. Thesis, Rhodes University, 1974, ch.8, shows their interdependency, and with the intended vagrancy ordinance.

⁷⁷ Macmillan, Cape Colour Question, p.226; see also L.C.Duly, 'A Revisit with the Cape's Hottentot Ordinance of 1828', in Kooy (ed), Studies in Economics and Economic History (1972); Elphick & Malherbe, pp.46-8, 'Khoisan to 1828'; Newton-King, 'Labour market of Cape Colony'; Peires, 'British at the Cape', p.486.

⁷⁸ (CA) AC 11, Campbell to Bell, 12 July 1833. Stockenstrom advanced precisely the same argument in February 1827 when questioning the ability of Ordinance 49 to provide labourers; see BPP 252 (1835), p.13, Bourke to Bathurst, 30 June 1827.

first to see it as 'first and last a labour law, intended to meet a loudly voiced need.'⁷⁹ But he saw it as a vague and unassertive excursion by a military government, which was not strictly applied. Newton-King suggested that Ordinance 49 resulted from a realisation of the inefficacy of a forced labour system, and the decision to promote a free labour alternative. The two laws were facets of the same intention to produce labour, and were an important milestone in state regulation of the colonial labour market.⁸⁰ Cobbing suggested further that the labour shortage in the Cape remained critical throughout the 1820s, despite the influx of individuals and small groups.⁸¹ Bourke thus requested that 'whole tribes' be invited into the Colony through Ordinance 49.

Was there a labour shortage before 1828, and did it continue to 1835? Was the legislation in response to an influx of Africans,⁸² was it attempting to induce an influx, or was it merely the legal cover for the seizure of workers? And was the state intervention in the legislation obstructionist, or acceding to settler demands? There was clearly a severe labour shortage before 1828, as Newton-King shows. This was despite the influx of 'Mantatees' in 1825 and 1826. Of the Mantatees, some were captured labourers, some were Tswana looking for their captured children, and others were Tswana dispossessed by the dislocation of the Griqua raiders. But they made little real difference to the labour situation, especially in Albany, as their numbers were too few in ratio to the demand.⁸³ If 1828 was the transition from 'forced' to 'free' labour, why did patrols continue to seize labourers in the early 1830s, and why did the colonial troops capture so many 'Fingo' in 1835.⁸⁴ There is little evidence of an influx of labourers in the years immediately following Ordinance 49. The elision of the categories 'whites' and 'free blacks' in the

⁷⁹ Macmillan, *Bantu, Boer and Briton*, p.67.

⁸⁰ Newton-King, 'Labour market of Cape Colony', pp.192-200.

⁸¹ Cobbing, 'Mfecane as Alibi', pp.495, 501-2.

⁸² As suggested by Peires, 'British and the Cape', p.486.

⁸³ See Appendix 2: 'Population statistics of the Cape Colony', p.227, which provides an analysis of the potential labour supply in the 1830s.

⁸⁴ See Chapter 4, pp.153-8.

population records in the Cape Blue Books 1829 to 1836 makes it impossible to calculate the number of Africans in the Colony in these years, and therefore the exact impact of Ordinance 49. Estimates of the continued labour shortage must be based on the many settler calls for labourers.⁸⁵ In the early 1830s, Albany colonists were complaining even louder than previously about the shortage. Those Africans who did enter the Colony did so usually to barter, not to work. The laws could not solve the labour problem, something the civil commissioners specifically mentioned in 1827 and 1828, but they could provide legal permission for African labourers to come into the Colony. It was a measure, provided by the Cape authorities, which allowed for African labourers in principle. It made no provisions as to how the labour was to be attracted; and this gave the colonists scope to exploit it in the same way that they had exploited the legislation on 'apprentices', 'Mantatees' and 'vagrants'.

'Mantatees' continued to enter the Colony and supplement the work force. Campbell noted in 1833 that there was much commotion in the interior, with great numbers of Bechuana being 'attacked by Corannas and Bastards, who are provided with arms and ammunition, and consequently easily subdued and slaughter them.'⁸⁶ O'Reilly commented in Cradock in 1833 on the incredible number of Mantatees coming into the district, and the attacks on them in the northern areas by Coranna.⁸⁷ The 'Mantatees' formed a large proportion of the work force in Somerset and Graaff-Reinet in the mid-1820s to mid-1830s,⁸⁸ until the 'Fingo' took their place after 1835.⁸⁹ There were eighty-four

⁸⁵ See Chapter 4, pp.148-9.

⁸⁶ (CA) 1/AY/9/7, Campbell to ?, 12 July 1833; (CA) AC 11, Campbell to Secretary for Government, 12 July 1833.

⁸⁷ (CA) CO 2742, O'Reilly to Campbell, 8 July 1833.

⁸⁸ (CA) CO 2749, lists of passes and contracts issued; Donaldson, 'Council of Advice', ch.8.

⁸⁹ The change can be seen in the lists of passes and contracts granted to foreigners in 1834 and 1835; see (CA) LCA 7, Appendices to Legislative Council minutes. For the period July-December 1834, four of the seventy-five issued were to Fingo, and the rest to Mantatee. For the same period a year later, forty-three of the fifty-nine were Fingo. Most of these Fingo had Dutch names, given to them either on registration, or during previous indenture.

Mantatees - a majority of the work force - in the district of Bathurst in 1833.⁹⁰

The capture of Africans for labour was not limited to the northern frontier, and Peires and Donaldson give evidence of the regular practice of capturing Xhosa.⁹¹ In 1818, Rharhabe offered captives to white farmers, in exchange for European commodities.⁹² Philip described an instance in 1820 when Ngqika women and children, who had settled on the Fish after moving from the Kat, were fraudulently contracted to Boers in Uitenhage (on the understanding that they were being taken home), whilst their men were sent to Robben Island.⁹³ On his arrival in Port Elizabeth in 1820 Pringle saw a number of Rharhabe women and children who were to be placed in servitude in punishment for allegedly having crossed the colonial boundary.⁹⁴ Thomas Stubbs recalled how a large number of Rharhabe women, who had come to collect clay at Clay Pits near Graham's Town in 1822, were seized by the neighbouring settlers, taken to Graham's Town and hired out to farmers.⁹⁵ Around the turn of the century, and especially after 1807, there was a massive increase in the slave population, which can be explained only in terms of a large-scale secret slave trade and the supplementation of the slave population with Africans from commandos.⁹⁶ There was an internal slave market at the Cape. Crais estimates that approximately five hundred to seven hundred and fifty people were enslaved from beyond the colonial borders between 1807 and 1834,⁹⁷ although this figure seems far too low. Shell shows that there were five thousand prize Negroes - slaves confiscated by the British from Portuguese and French ships - who had been

⁹⁰ (CA) LG 7, Population returns, Bathurst, 1833. There were 35 males and 49 females.

⁹¹ Peires, 'History of the Xhosa', pp.101, 170; Donaldson, 'Council of Advice', p.341.

⁹² Crais, 'Ambiguous Frontiers', p.2.

⁹³ Philip, Researches in South Africa, Vol.1, pp.191-2; Pringle, Narrative of a Residence, p.15, describes a similar incident.

⁹⁴ T.Pringle, African Sketches (1834), p.133.

⁹⁵ Cock, Maids and Madams, p.199.

⁹⁶ Crais, 'Some thoughts on slavery'; Shell, 'Adumbrations of Cape slavery'.

⁹⁷ Crais, 'Some thoughts on slavery', p.15.

diverted, and were working in the Cape in 1800-1840.⁹⁸

The battle of Dithakong resulted in workers for the Colony. At least one hundred and seventy-nine women and children were seized as labourers and sent as far south as Graaff-Reinet.⁹⁹ The same occurred at Mbolompo in 1828, under the guise of aiding the Gcaleka and Tembu - the British officially seized twenty-five women and sixty-four children, some of whom were given to officers, and the rest distributed as workers in Fort Beaufort.¹⁰⁰ The actual total was higher, as a large number of women and children ended up in Graham's Town, where they were redefined as Fingo.¹⁰¹ In 1831 Bigge, commissioner of inquiry at the Cape, showed concern at the continuing illegal slave trade with the 'Caffers'.¹⁰² Boers were still getting slaves clandestinely from the interior in 1833.¹⁰³ Pringle complained in 1834 that British troops and settlers attack the Africans 'and carry the children into captivity'.¹⁰⁴

The twin motor of labour seizure - the expansion of the frontiers - was continuing apace. Territorial aggrandizement must be seen in tandem with the creation of labour policies. The increase in European farming land exacerbated the already acute labour shortage, and at the same time Rharhabe dispossession created possibilities of exploitative actions and legislation (vagrancy laws or commandos) in the 1830s. A preoccupation with labour was thus regularly at the root of legislation or actions euphemistically ascribed to security or land issues. The interlinking of the three issues is presented in Read's assessment of the increasing abuse of the commando system in 1833 : commandos were increasingly raiding from the innocent, in the hope of agitating the Rharhabe into a mass response. This would then provide the justifiable pretext

⁹⁸ Shell, 'Adumbrations of Cape slavery'.

⁹⁹ Richner, 'Withering away of "lifaqane"', p.8; see Cobbing, 'Mfecane as Alibi', for a reinterpretation of the events at both Dithakong and Mbolompo.


¹⁰⁰ (CA) 1/AY/8/18, Bell to Campbell, 24 June 1829.

¹⁰¹ Moyer, 'History of the Mfengu', p.605, Evidence of Jacob Tunyiswa.

¹⁰² Duly, British Land Policy, p.146.

¹⁰³ (CA) CO 2744, Campbell to ?, June 1833.

¹⁰⁴ Graham's Town Journal, 4 September 1834, Letter from Pringle.



MAP 3. Rharhabe evictions, 1829-1834

for seizing their land (and women and children) and augmenting the reduced Cape Corps for increased security.¹⁰⁵

The intention of the colonial authorities, and one that was repeatedly employed in later years, was to form concentric buffer zones around the colonial frontiers, by using allied or collaborator indigenous groupings as a cushion between the white colonists and the Africans. The two colonial frontier regions under the greatest security risk in the 1820s to 1850s were the Koonap to Tyhume Rivers area (from where the Ngqika were expelled in 1819, 1829, 1833, 1834, 1835 and 1847), and the lower Fish below Trompetter's Drift.¹⁰⁶ Their vulnerability bothered the authorities, who set up a settlement in the upper Kat River valley in 1829 to cover the first region,¹⁰⁷ and Stockenstrom proposed a similar settlement for the Gqunukhwebe (who were unofficially allied to the Colony) in the Ceded Territory below Trompetter's Drift.¹⁰⁸ Somerset recommended in 1833 that farmers be placed in the Ceded Territory between this drift and Fort Willshire,¹⁰⁹ the area where in 1835 one of the groups of Fingo were placed. It was only in June 1838, when the Fingo and Gqunukhwebe were received together as British subjects, that the region was cemented into a reasonable buffer.¹¹⁰

The insult of Somerset's theft of Ngqika land in 1819 was but the first for the Ngqika. From 1823 the Ceded Territory began to be settled by both Rharhabe and colonists. In 1829 it was decided that the Rharhabe should again be driven

¹⁰⁵ (CA) A50/4, Read to Fairbairn, 7 December 1833.

¹⁰⁶ These were the areas of most hostility in December 1834. Even in 1850 they proved insecure, and it was the military villages in the Tyhume River valley which were first attacked - see Peires, The Dead Will Arise, p.11.

¹⁰⁷ Analyses of the Kat River Settlement are limited. Crais, 'Beasts of Prey' summarises the progressive dispossession and destruction of the Settlement in the 1830s and 1840s, and T.Kirk, 'Progress and Decline in the Kat River Settlement, 1829-1854', Journal of African History, Vol.14 (1973), deals mainly with the lead up to the rebellion of 1851. But work still needs to be done on the early settlement.

¹⁰⁸ J.M.Urie, 'A Critical Study of the Evidence of Andries Stockenstrom before the Aborigines Committee in 1835', MA Thesis, Rhodes University, 1953, p.186.

¹⁰⁹ (CA) GH 1/96, Somerset to Cole, June 1833.

¹¹⁰ Boyce, 'Notes on South African Affairs', p.109.

back. In August 1829 Maqoma was evicted from the traditional seat of Ngqika power, in order to make way for a buffer Khoi settlement on the Kat River, a tributary of the Fish. The expulsion was a set-up, as Stockenstrom had previously advocated the removal of the Ngqika and their replacement with Khoi. A pretext was thus manufactured. The Graham's Town civil authorities alleged that Maqoma had ill-treated and maliciously attacked a group of Thembu in the Winterberg. The Thembu group in question had left the Thembu paramount, Vusani, after a dispute and settled at the foot of the Katberg in the mid 1820s. *En route* they were chased from Hintza's country for misconduct, and were attacked by raiders (either Sotho or Griqua) from the north-east. They remained troublesome, stealing cattle from Maqoma's people, the English settlers on the Baviaans River, and the mission there. It was a Thembu group under Galela that was chiefly to blame, and after they attacked and killed Bawana, a minor Thembu chief, Maqoma intervened and confiscated Galela's cattle as punishment. The Thembu complained to the colonial authorities, and Campbell took charge of the investigation. Despite the obvious unreliability of Galela's evidence and Maqoma's good reason to punish him, Campbell decided that Maqoma was the unjustified aggressor, and that he should therefor forfeit his territory. Surprisingly, Maqoma subjected himself to this colonial decision and left his land, leaving only the LMS missionary James Read to argue his case in 1833.¹¹¹ The Kat River Settlement which was then set up was comprised largely of retired soldiers and mission Khoi, with their families, and it took off almost immediately, with the rapid development of irrigation, agriculture and houses.¹¹²

¹¹¹ The Thembu evidence - falacious though it was - can be found in the interview with Bawana and Galela in (CA) LG 9, pp.151-5, 21 March 1831. Campbell's investigation is outlined in LG 9, pp.143-9 Campbell to Bell, 27 March 1829. The official version of the expulsions is given in BPP 252 (1835), pp.42-3, Cole to Murray, 14 June 1829; Maqoma's version is presented in (CA) A50/4, Read to Philip, 1 April 1833. See also A.Stockenstrom (ed Hutton), The Autobiography of the late Sir Andries Stockenstrom (1887), Vol.1, pp.305-311; Urie, 'Critical Study of Stockenstrom evidence'. Peires, House of Phalo, p.89, suggests that Maqoma's intention was to increase his hegemony and subjugate the Thembu.

¹¹² BPP 252 (1835), pp.55-6, Report of Judge Menzies, September 1830; Kirk, 'Progress and Decline'.

In July 1832, Colonel Henry Somerset, officer commanding the frontier, left for England, and in his absence, Colonel England took charge. Co-inciding with this was the start of a series of Rharhabe expulsions which, although discussed in previous studies, has not received sufficient emphasis. The Ngqika land was earmarked for settler farms. An effort was made in 1832 to remove Tyali from the Mancazana River (a tributary of the Tyhume River) area, but without success. In late 1833, there began a period of aggression against the Rharhabe sub-group, the Ngqika, now led chiefly by Maqoma and Tyali.¹¹³ D'Urban admitted that the war of 1835 was long brewing, but that central to Rharhabe dissatisfaction was the 'ill-advised measure, of expelling the tribes, composing the family of Gaika, Tyali and Maqoma from the grounds they had so long held on the Chumie, in Oct. and Nov. 1833'.¹¹⁴ On 1 September 1833 Tyali was forced to move from his seat on the Mancazana River east to the Tyhume Peak area; and in November Maqoma and Tyali were driven out of the Gaga River area, and across the Keiskamma. Nqeno and Bhotumane were also driven out of their lands lower down in the Ceded Territory at the same time. This was accomplished by a series of British military patrols, with canon and many troops, who burnt a large number of huts and crops, as well as seizing cattle. England, who supervised the expulsions was disappointed at the lack of resistance offered by the Rharhabe, who left the area almost without a murmur, as he had hoped to use his military might. He was thus very rude when Chalmers visited him to enquire of the reasons for the dispossession.¹¹⁵

On Somerset's return in January 1834, he allowed Tyali and Maqoma to return to the Gaga River (also a tributary of the Tyhume) to graze and reap the harvest, but they were driven out again by troops on 5 March, when Tyali burnt his crops himself in anger and frustration. Their bleak position, with the onset of winter without crops, was further aggravated by the fact that the area to

¹¹³ For a clear description of the evictions see (CA) A50/4, Read to Fairbairn; Chalmers to Stretch, 21 November 1833, in U.Long, An Index to Authors of Unofficial, privately-owned manuscripts relating to the History of South Africa 1812-1920 (1947), pp.81-4.

¹¹⁴ (CA) A519/20, p.159, D'Urban to Hay, 24 March 1835.

¹¹⁵ (CA) A50/4, Read to Fairbairn, 7 December 1833.

which they were expelled - around the Keiskamma - was subject to frequent droughts, one of which occurred in 1833-4.¹¹⁶ The Colony regularly performed expulsions during times of drought; this resulted in maximum Rharhabe retaliation, and would give reason for dispossession. Maqoma¹¹⁷ in 1829 was driven into one of the places most affected by the drought of that year; the expulsions of 1833-4 took place during a drought; and in both 1845-6 and 1849-50 there were again prolonged droughts, which added to the resulting violence.¹¹⁸ Maqoma in 1834 was not given a reason for his expulsion, and this fuelled his anger at the theft of his land as he was under the impression that he was entitled to all the land around the Tyhume.¹¹⁹ He moved to the valley of the Keiskamma, settling just south of modern Middledrift. The victims of this expansionism were understandably unhappy, and Nqeno's people especially agitated for the retrieval of their land and cattle. It was Maqoma, the one who was to receive the blame of the colonists for causing the hostilities of 1835, who attempted to instil calm in the region and return colonial cattle,¹²⁰ although he was unable to prevent an increase in colonial cattle theft.

Maqoma, the right-hand son of Ngqika, was regularly the victim of persecution and expansion. He was regarded by the authorities either as a potential

¹¹⁶ BPP 503 (1837), p.113, Somerset to Campbell, 5 March 1834; (CA) A50/4, Read to Fairbairn, 7 December 1833.

¹¹⁷ The life of Maqoma, and his relations with the Colony, is in need of a full study. He faced the onslaught of colonialism for most of his life, symbolically ending life as an alcoholic, like his father Ngqika and brother Sandile, see Soga, South-Eastern Bantu, pp.175-7.

¹¹⁸ Peires, 'History of the Xhosa', p.201; Pollock & Agnew, Historical Geography, p.80. (CA) A50/4, Read to Fairbairn, 12 April 1833 wrote that it was to be expected that cattle raiding would increase as a result of the drought. See M.D.D.Newitt, 'Drought in Mozambique 1823-1831', Journal of Southern African Studies, 1988, for a comparative study in Mozambique of the social tension produced by drought.

¹¹⁹ See Maqoma's complaints to Read in (CA) A1480; Peires, 'History of the Xhosa', p.206; Pringle, Narrative of a Residence, p.336. Philip wrote to D'Urban on Maqoma's behalf to ask if the Tyhume area belonged to him, see (CA) A519/1, p.68, Philip to D'Urban, 18 January 1835.

¹²⁰ Chalmers to Stretch, 21 November 1835, in Long, Index to Unofficial manuscripts, pp.81-4. The local Field Cornets corroborated his compliancy with the Colony, see BPP 503 (1837), p.134, Somerset to Dutton, 20 June 1834.

trouble-maker, or as a wealthy and powerful leader who needed to be subjugated, much like Hintza, Ndlambe and other royal victims of colonialism. Apart from his expulsions in 1829, 1833 and 1834, he suffered many commando raids. In December 1823 seven thousand of his cattle were taken and some of his men killed; and in November the following year he lost four hundred and eleven cattle and two peace envoys. Both raids were led by Somerset. In October 1833 Maqoma defied a military ban to attend a meeting of the London Missionary Society at the Kat River Settlement with Read, and was ignominiously arrested and removed during the meeting by troops, who further insulted him with the offer of alcohol.¹²¹ Read's versions of Maqoma's actions and attitudes are always diametrically opposed to those provided by the colonial authorities. Was Maqoma a real threat, or a scape-goat with good land? Read is an accurate witness, far more so than Campbell and the Graham's Town faction. His complaints about the treatment of Maqoma are almost certainly well-founded. Maqoma always tried to please the Colony: he did not condone cattle-raiding and was quick to reimburse settler losses; he was interested in Christianity; he did not oppose his dispossession; he always employed the official channels to protest; and he even let prisoners free in 1835 to show his leniency. But all this was to no avail.

The Rharhabe faced a powerful, influential group of settlers across the Fish River, whose economic interests demanded the subjugation of the African population and the extension of the Colony. There were divisions within the Cape Colony at large, between east and west, and within the eastern districts. The Boers in Somerset, for example, bore little resemblance to the English around Bathurst. Even the missionaries were divided, as the LMS and Glasgow Missionary Society missionaries with their exclusively indigenous missions and tertiary educations had very different agendas to the more apostolic Wesleyans.¹²² Yet there was an underlying unity amongst most of the eastern

¹²¹ Pringle, *Narrative of a Residence*, pp.311, 321-2, 331-4.

¹²² Williams, 'Missionary personality in Caffraria', provides a very useful comparative analysis of the backgrounds of the LMS, GMS and Wesleyan missionaries east of the Fish, and the impact it had on their philosophies and

colonists in the 1830s, which was to give rise later to demands for autonomy and self-government.¹²³

The expansionist rhetoric of the settlers was in direct opposition to the policy of the Colonial Office in London, which wished no extension of its responsibilities. The settlers regularly laid the blame for frontier unrest on what they claimed was a 'vacillating border policy' held by the Colonial Office.¹²⁴ They proclaimed that this, plus the 'moral state and predatory habits of the Caffres' exonerated the settlers of all blame for conflict. Yet Colonial Secretary Stanley's intervention on Ordinance 99 in 1833 (see below) and his successor Glenelg's in 1836 on D'Urban's annexation of the Queen Adelaide Province (see Chapters 3 and 6) indicate that the stated Colonial Office policy was being maintained - that of keeping peace. Rather than expensive military expansion, London favoured a tranquil and slow extension of authority, which would be less harmful to home opinion and coffers, and as effective. The Cape government, appointed and briefed by London, had nevertheless to placate settler demands, and thus had a fine line to tread between pandering to colonial interests and maintaining official sanction.

The chief eastern Cape interest group was that voiced by the 'Graham's Town faction'.¹²⁵ Its objectives were propounded through the media of Robert Godlonton and the administrative control of Duncan Campbell, with the support of the Wesleyan missionaries William Boyce and William Shrewsbury, and the merchants Moodie, Chase, White, Meurant and others.¹²⁶ As land-owning members

strategies.

¹²³ J.L.Stead, 'The Development and Failure of the Eastern Cape Separatist Movement', MA Thesis, Rhodes University, 1974; Le Cordeur, Eastern Cape Separatism. In BPP 279(1836), pp.58-9, D'Urban to Aberdeen, 21 June 1835, D'Urban requested the removal of government from Cape Town to Uitenhage in 1835, or the appointment of a Lieutenant-Governor there.

¹²⁴ BPP 252 (1835), pp.137-142, Shaw to Aberdeen, 7 April 1835. C.S.Grieve, 'The Policy of His Majesty's Government towards Europeans beyond the Colonial Borders, 1830-1846', MA Thesis, University of Cape Town, 1924, expands upon this theme.

¹²⁵ It was Stretch who first referred to this group as 'the faction'.

¹²⁶ The members of this group, and their precise power and role, need closer scrutiny.

of the rising Albany mercantile class, they used their influence to ensure the conservative, harsh legislation aimed at labour and security. It was they who provided the impetus for most of the events that led to the war of 1835. And it was their demands which D'Urban met.

Campbell and Godlonton were the real driving forces behind the Graham's Town faction. The instigator of the destructive and unnecessary policy of eviction was Civil Commissioner for Albany and Somerset, Duncan Campbell. Campbell was the most outspoken proponent of expansion. He had an intense dislike for the 'Caffers', a dislike that was increased by an attack on his farm on 26 December 1834.¹²⁷ It was he who countermanded Somerset and insisted on the expulsions of November 1833 and March 1834.¹²⁸ Read described him as the sworn enemy of the Rharhabe, who was leading public opinion and official policy towards the removal of all Africans from the Ceded Territory, and its resettlement with colonists.¹²⁹ In mid 1834 he proposed a tightening of the commando system, and suggested a large raid on the Rharhabe in the coming summer months.¹³⁰ This is what happened (see below).

Godlonton reflected settler views and demands through his editorship of the Graham's Town Journal.¹³¹ The newspaper was sensationalist in the extreme, and regularly distorted facts in favour of the settlers, to the point of intentional inaccuracy. Godlonton was conservative, dogmatic, intolerant and self-assured, earning the nickname 'Moral Bob' for his belief in his own opinions as moral absolutes. He saw the African population as perfect fodder for the colonial labour shortage, and even suggested the installation of a

¹²⁷ (CA) LG 13, pp.192-3. He claimed that he lost £204 worth of sheep and household goods.

¹²⁸ BPP 503 (1837), p.104, Campbell to Bell, 27 February 1834; (CA) 1/AY/9/19, Campbell, 20 April 1834; (CA) 1/AY/9/7, p.41, Campbell, 7 June 1834; Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, p.164, n.41.

¹²⁹ (CA) A50/4, Read to Fairbairn, 7 December 1833; 1/AY/9/7, p.146, Campbell to ?, 27 February 1834.

¹³⁰ (CA) 1/AY/9/7, p.185, Campbell to ?, 1 July 1834.

¹³¹ Le Cordeur, 'Robert Godlonton as Architect'; A.L.Harington, 'The Graham's Town Journal - its founding, early history and influence', South African Historical Journal, No.1 (1969).

treadmill in the Graham's Town gaol. His writing was particularly propagandistic and he concentrated on vilifying and dehumanising the Africans, in his endeavour to provide legitimation for colonisation. The Journal had a media and information monopoly on the eastern frontier in the 1830s, and not only reflected settler opinion, but formed it.¹³²

Rev. William Shaw, head of the Wesleyan missionaries at the Cape, felt that 'a more truly respectable and worthy community than the first settlers in Albany never existed.'¹³³ The settlers portrayed themselves in this vein, as courageous, honourable bearers of civilisation to the savage. James Read, the LMS missionary with a Khoi wife and liberal views, was regularly at loggerheads with the settlers and their policies. In his view 'the Graham's Town people are the most infatuated blind Bigots in the world'.¹³⁴ The real attitude of the Europeans is reflected in J.M.Bowker's statement in 1844 to a meeting of frontier farmers, advocating that the Africans should be treated like the Springbok which had been all but exterminated by the white man, much to European benefit.¹³⁵ The general view of the Colonists towards the Africans was that they were untrustworthy and irreclaimable savages. They were regarded as a type of *untermensch*,¹³⁶ which made them automatically guilty of any action which the settlers claimed they had committed.

The settlers strove to justify their possession of power with moral and legal arguments. Their presence was represented as necessary for the spread of 'civilisation'. The terminology employed on the frontier exhibits the settler differentiation between 'good' might and 'bad' violence.¹³⁷ The 'Caffers'

¹³² Harington, 'Graham's Town Journal', p.22. London dismissed the paper as parochial nonsense, without realising the extent of its power.

¹³³ Shaw, Memoirs, p.140. His memoirs were edited by Boyce, a conservative reactionary.

¹³⁴ (CA) A50/4, Read to Fairbairn, 12 April 1833.

¹³⁵ Bowker, 'Speeches, Letters and selections', p.125.

¹³⁶ Crais, 'Beasts of Prey'; Cobbing, 'Mfecane as Alibi', pp.499-500.

¹³⁷ For discussion of the political use of violence and its imbedding in societies, see K.W.Grundy & M.A.Weinstein, The Ideologies of Violence (1974), ch.2.

were constantly described as unenlightened, barbarous or treacherous, and any act (whether justified or not) committed against a colonist fell under the derogatory labels of 'raid', 'degradation' or 'theft'. Yet precisely the same actions performed by colonists were described as 'punitive actions', 'patrol', 'seizure' or 'recovery of cattle'. Because the settlers maintained political - and media - hegemony, they were able to impose a moral differentiation between the actions of those for and against settler interests.

The extent of the unquestioning support for the Graham's Town faction, which gave a platform to Campbell's views, can be seen in the petition against the more liberal Cape Town-based South African Commercial Advertiser edited by John Fairbairn, whom Godlonton accused of presenting a biased view of the frontier and attacking the settlers. In his editorial of 27 December 1834 Fairbairn criticised the unnecessary violence of the Sparkes patrol of 2 December (see below), and the application of a bad frontier system. Only twenty-five copies of the paper were sent to Albany, but Godlonton immediately inflamed the people of Graham's Town against Fairbairn, misrepresenting his complaints as a personal attack on the settlers. He gathered a petition of 355 signatures, few of whom had even read the offending paper.¹³⁸ There was a continuous battle between the Advertiser and the Journal over events and policy on the frontier. Fairbairn offered the evidence supplied by his father-in-law, Philip, Thomas Pringle, Read and sympathetic missionaries, and Godlonton reflected the arguments of Campbell and the Graham's Town faction.¹³⁹

A problem inherent in the structure of both the Cape government and the local

¹³⁸ Botha, John Fairbairn, p.109. Fairbairn wrote a letter to the GTJ on 23 January 1835 to apologise if he had wronged anyone.

¹³⁹ James Read (Snr) has been taken as a crucial witness in this thesis. Unfortunately most of his papers and letters were destroyed along with those of Philip in 1931, in the Wits University Library fire, destroying important information on frontier activities. Macmillan, the only historian to have had access to these papers before they were destroyed, argued (see Cape Colour Question, pp.136-8) convincingly for the honesty and reliability of Read's evidence. The same cannot be said for that of Campbell.

frontier administration was the abundance of military men, who had no qualms in resorting to force.¹⁴⁰ The Cape governors from Cole to Maitland were all military men who had fought together in the Iberian Peninsular in the Napoleonic wars. Campbell was a retired military captain, and Somerset and England had little accountability for their military structures. Lord Glenelg, Colonial Secretary in London in 1835, blamed the long-standing tension on the frontier on the overbearing control by the Albany military authorities, who had virtually instated martial law well before 1835, and lacked communication with Cape Town.¹⁴¹ Colonel England contributed to the military mismanagement and aggressiveness. The Rharhabe were particularly incensed with Armstrong, third in command, and 'they were heard to say [on 25 December 1834] they only wanted him and Col. Somerset'.¹⁴² Campbell and Somerset, as heads of the civil and military authorities of Albany (both of whom D'Urban complained were incompetent¹⁴³), had an ambivalent personal relationship but essentially allowed the abuse of their structures to aid the settlers.

Colonel Henry Somerset was a prominent figure, although he was generally regarded as an incompetent fool who obtained his position through nepotism when his father, Lord Charles Somerset, was governor of the Cape.¹⁴⁴ He claimed Maqoma as a particular friend,¹⁴⁵ allowing him back to the Gaga River area in January 1834. Not surprisingly, Maqoma did not feel the same way. It was Somerset who organised the attack at Mbolompo¹⁴⁶ and the expulsion of Maqoma in 1829, as well as many severe commando raids on him. The power exhibited by the British in 1828 was obviously noted by the Africans. When the

¹⁴⁰ Macmillan, Bantu, Boer and Briton, p.119.

¹⁴¹ (CA) GH 1/108, Glenelg to Stockenstrom, 5 February 36. But, given the co-operation between the Cape authorities and Albany in 1832-4, Glenelg seems to have misunderstood the militancy of the Cape Town authorities.

¹⁴² (CA) A50/4, Read to Fairbairn, 18 January 1835.

¹⁴³ (CA) A519/18 pp.97, 102, D'Urban to Bell, July 1835.

¹⁴⁴ (CA) A519/1, p.63, D'Urban to Bell; Harington, Sir Harry Smith, p.21. Compare this to Rivett-Carnac's hagiographical biography of Somerset, Hawk's Eye.

¹⁴⁵ Peires, 'History of the Xhosa', p.203; Pringle, Narrative of a residence, pp.331-3.

¹⁴⁶ (CA) A50/4, Read to Fairbairn, 12 April 1833; Cobbing, 'Mfecane as Alibi', pp.501-3.

missionaries wished to stop Faku fighting against the Thembu and Mpondomise in 1838, they reminded him 'of the fate of Matiwane in 1828', whereupon he ceased fighting and moved eastwards immediately in case a commando was sent against him.¹⁴⁷ Somerset's name, according to Philip, consequently caused fear amongst the Rharhabe, and he regularly led patrols against them.¹⁴⁸ The chiefs complained of him specifically in December 1834,¹⁴⁹ although in November 1833 they were so despairing of Colonel England that they asked for Somerset's return, despite their dislike for him.¹⁵⁰ Somerset's insensitivity and violence on the frontier was one of the root causes of the war of 1835.

Of significance is the role of the Cape government on the frontier. Nineteenth-century Cape history has often been seen by settler historians as a battle between the colonists and backward colonial authorities. While the occasional hostility between the two is evident (as with the battle between the Albany settlers and Lord Charles Somerset in 1823-4) the authorities were often more concerned for the welfare of the settlers than has been credited them. Governor Cole (1829-1833) was very sympathetic towards the settlers, and it was he, with the urgings of Campbell, who pushed the Colonial Office in 1829 for the granting of the Ceded Territory to colonists for settlement.¹⁵¹ This began the five-year concerted pressure on the Rharhabe to move east of the Keiskamma, a policy pursued by three consecutive governors: Cole, Wade and D'Urban. Macmillan commented that Cole (like D'Urban) was a very ordinary and uninspired governor, but because he tried to please settler opinion, he was regarded as good, and has been ever since.¹⁵² Le Cordeur summarised Cole's administration as 'essentially negative and military: a policy of patrols,

¹⁴⁷ Theal, Republic of Natal, p.15.

¹⁴⁸ (CA) A1480, Philip to Buxton, 1 May 1835.

¹⁴⁹ BPP 503 (1835), pp.49-50, Chalmers to Somerset, 31 December 1834; and Ibid., p.48, Maqoma to D'Urban, 1 January 1835, where Maqoma said that Somerset was to a large extent to blame for the frontier tensions.

¹⁵⁰ (CA) A50/4, Read to Fairbairn, 7 December 1833.

¹⁵¹ BPP 252 (1835), pp.42-3, Cole to Murray, 14 June 1829. This policy was taken further in 1831 when Goderich suggested the settlement of colonists in the Ceded Territory.

¹⁵² Macmillan, Bantu, Boer and Briton, p.66.

commandos and reprisals.¹⁵³

Cole's concern for settler welfare is emphasised by his reaffirmation of Macartney's vaguely phrased commando legislation of 1797 in Ordinance 99 of June 1833, which allowed for military patrols across the Fish.¹⁵⁴ This ordinance extended and legalized the practices common in the area already. The Ordinance was passed because of the complaints of just two field-cornets, and passed through the legislative process unusually quickly.¹⁵⁵ The fact that Stanley, Secretary for State and the Colonies in London, disallowed the ordinance in late 1834 because of its potential for abuse¹⁵⁶ emphasises the unanimity of the Colony - administrative, Boer and Briton - in protecting its own interests and designs on the land and labour of the Africans. Of great importance is the fact that the implementation of Ordinance 99 co-incided precisely with the attempts in September 1833, ordered from Cape Town, to clear the Ceded Territory of all Rharhabe. This implies that the Cape government was involved in the expansion of the eastern frontier, against the orders of London, and in response to settler demands.

The expulsions of 1833-4 were ordered by Wade,¹⁵⁷ who was acting-governor from August 1833 to early 1834. His orders came as a result of settler complaints. Wade had warned in August 1832 that if Tyali's people gave any resistance to patrols they would be expelled from the Mancazana River area. Captain Doyle recommended to Colonel England on 21 June 1833 that Tyali be expelled because of alleged depredations of his people.¹⁵⁸ Reports show,

¹⁵³ Le Cordeur, Eastern Cape Separatism, p.46.

¹⁵⁴ For the details of Macartney's ordinance and Cole's explanation for Ordinance 99 see BPP 252 (1835), pp.60-6, Stanley to Cole, 27 November 1833; (CA) EC 286, Annexures to Executive Council minutes, 1834-6, Debates on the ordinance.

¹⁵⁵ The complaints came from Graaff-Reinet, see (CA) AC 10, Appendix to minutes of Advisory Council, pp.277-280; see (CA) AC 3 for the Advisory Council debates.

¹⁵⁶ (CA) GH 1/97, p.68, Stanley to Cole, 27 November 1833.

¹⁵⁷ BPP 252, p.103, D'Urban to Spring-Rice, 14 October 1834; (CA) A1480, Philip to Buxton, 1 May 1835; J.Milton, The Edges of War: A History of Frontier Wars (1983), p.99.

¹⁵⁸ BPP 503 (1835), p.95, Capt. Doyle to England, 21 June 1833.

though, that they took only seven cattle in that month. Major Cox and Lieutenant Jervis sympathised with Maqoma a few years later and the treatment he had received in 1833 and 1834, blaming Wade for it. Stretch claimed that England had been hesitant to act on Wade's orders in late 1833 to expel the Ngqika, and had waited for two months before carrying them out.¹⁵⁹ But given England's history of frontier violence it is unlikely that he would have hesitated to perform orders to evict the Rharhabe again. Wade, in his short term as governor, showed particular concern for the colonists. He assured slave owners that before the final apprenticeship of slaves in 1838, he would ensure the passing of legislation 'for securing a sufficiency of labourers to the Colony'.¹⁶⁰

D'Urban arrived with a specific brief to control the violence of the commandos, and maintain friendly relations with his Rharhabe neighbours.¹⁶¹ But he immediately went against his orders and suggested to Somerset in August 1834 that Nqeno be forced out of the Ceded Territory and replaced by Gqunukhwebe.¹⁶² There was thus a significant level of government interference on the frontier over an extended period, despite the official hands-off policy.

By 1834 an untenable situation had been reached. On the western side of the Fish was a powerful group of settlers, with a clear leadership and aim, intent on extending their land. They were supported by a Cape government with a history of intervention on behalf of the settlers. The new governor D'Urban, who was distinctly militarily orientated though not yet fully conversant with

¹⁵⁹ Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, pp.59, 127.

¹⁶⁰ Macmillan, Cape Colour Question, p.234. Peires 'History of the Xhosa', p.204, notes that Wade employed a particularly harsh frontier policy. He fully supported the settlers and attacked Stockenstrom in 1837 at the Aborigines Commission of Enquiry. There has not yet been any analysis of his policies and actions in his brief spell as Acting-Governor.

¹⁶¹ (CA) GH 1/97, p.68, Stanley to D'Urban, 27 November 1833. D'Urban began this policy by signing a treaty with Andries Waterboer in December 1834, but in 1835 he completely departed from the policy.

¹⁶² Galbraith, Reluctant Empire, p.108.

the attitudes of the Cape, was concerned in 1834 more with the slavery emancipation legislation, and solving financial and administrative crises in Cape Town. July saw the implementation of the administrative staff cuts at the Cape, and the trimming of its budget in the attempt to make it financially viable.¹⁶³ D'Urban's biggest challenge lay in the emancipation of the Cape's thirty-eight thousand slaves, with an estimated value of nearly £3 million, that was to ensure the freedom of all slaves by 1838. The western Cape depended completely on slave labour; and in the eastern districts, although Albany - where the settlers were not allowed slaves - would hardly be affected, the act was potentially disruptive. Somerset and Graaff-Reinet in 1833 had 1,756 and 2,247 slaves respectively.¹⁶⁴

The potential effect of emancipation is difficult to assess, as the mere act of emancipation did not give any higher social or economic status to the slaves, and few had much option but to remain in the Colony and find employment after 1838. But for the Colony as a whole there was to be a transition from a slave to a 'free labour' economy, and it had now to find a new source of labourers. One of D'Urban's duties was to form a Legislative Council, with a majority of colonists, which afforded some colonial representation in the legislature. The Council generally reflected the concerns of the colonists. It spent most of its time in 1834 with a proposed vagrancy ordinance, which was intended further to tie the Khoi and free blacks - including the soon-to-be-released slaves - to the farms to counter the loss of potential labour with emancipation. It was supported clamourously by the Colony,¹⁶⁵ and was passed with the dissent of D'Urban. It was disallowed by Spring-Rice in London who recognised the intention to secure and exploit a

¹⁶³ For an analysis of Cape finances and the problems which D'Urban faced see Lancaster, 'Governorship of D'Urban', pp.60-90.

¹⁶⁴ (CA) CO 53/57, Lists of Slaves in Cape Colony, June 1833.

¹⁶⁵ See the numerous petitions and requests during 1834 in (CA) LCA 6, Appendices to Legislative Council minutes. The Advisory Council was discussing a vagrancy ordinance as early as February 1832, see (CA) AC 3, Minutes of Advisory Council.

labour supply.¹⁶⁶ The Colony was thus faced in the mid-1830s with the critical problem of developing new methods of labour extraction and enforcement to ensure the stability of its economy.

To the east of the Keiskamma was confusion and anger. Dispossession and the enforcement of boundaries had caused overpopulation and overgrazing in the frontier areas, and the Rharhabe chiefs were decidedly threatened by the white penetration. Armed, mounted patrols of British soldiers, English settlers and Boers had caused fear and destruction for the past twenty years, with their arbitrary justice and superior weaponry. Read outlined the callousness of Colonel England and many of the officers and soldiers on the frontier, portraying the despair of the Rharhabe chiefs at the lack of communication and injustices to which they were subjected.¹⁶⁷ Ecological forces also played their part. There was a particularly severe drought which lasted from 1833 to early 1835,¹⁶⁸ which devastated grazing and caused food shortages. Pollock and Agnew stressed that while the colonists were able to find new grazing the Rharhabe were overcrowded and had no access to alternative pasturage.¹⁶⁹

The year 1834 began with the arrival of the new governor, D'Urban. But for the Rharhabe it was a year of increasing frustration and concern, as they attempted to stop the settler expansion through appeals to missionaries and the authorities. January 1834 saw the return of Tyali and Maqoma's people to the Gaga River area to graze and attend to their crops. Within two months they were evicted by Colonel England and his troops and forced into the drought-stricken regions of the Keiskamma. Large areas of Maqoma and Tyali's land between the Kat and Tyhume Rivers were then immediately apportioned to retired white soldiers. Cattle raiding on the settlers consequently increased, carried

¹⁶⁶ (CA) LCA 6, Comments of Philip, 1834.

¹⁶⁷ (CA) A50/4, Read to Fairbairn, 7 December 1833.

¹⁶⁸ Laing at Burnshill made mention in his diary throughout 1834 of the lack of rain, grass and food, and the dying calves. See also GTJ, 3 July 1834; Pollock & Agnew, Historical Geography, p.80; P.J.van der Merwe, Die Noordwaartse Beweging van die Boere voor die Groot Trek (1937), p.286.

¹⁶⁹ Pollock & Agnew, Historical Geography, p.80.

out in retribution and in search of food. The frontier chiefs for some reason credited John Philip with great influence in the colonial government, equal even to that of D'Urban, especially in land matters.¹⁷⁰ Maqoma complained about the expulsions in 1833 and his people's loss of grazing land and corn.¹⁷¹ Philip thus organised a meeting in June 1834 for the chiefs to voice their complaints. He had heard many colonial complaints of theft and unrest on the frontier in early 1834, but said that he found no evidence of it on his visit.¹⁷²

The chiefs believed thereafter that D'Urban would be visiting them, and cattle raiding decreased for the following three months. D'Urban later claimed that he had told Philip to negotiate with the chiefs on his behalf.¹⁷³ D'Urban told Spring-Rice that he had begun his brief of forming new treaties with the chiefs, as instructed by Stanley, and had told them of his friendly intentions through Philip.¹⁷⁴ But apart from his treaty with Adam Kok in December 1834, D'urban seemed to have no intention of being peaceful. By October there had been no change in the situation. The Rharhabe were still barred from their lands, and the young men of the Rharhabe were agitating for retribution against these invaders who took cattle and land, burned huts and killed people. Some of Tyali's people had moved back across the Tyhume, and some of Nqeno's across the Keiskamma, in a search for pasturage and food.

On 17 October D'Urban ordered Somerset to clear all the land west of the Tyhume for further white settlement, although he made a concession that

¹⁷⁰ BPP 503 (1837), p.80, Evidence of James Weir.

¹⁷¹ (CA) A1480, Maqoma to Philip, 18 November 1833; *Ibid.*, Maqoma to Philip (interpreted by Clark), 12 April 1834.

¹⁷² (CA) A1480, Philip to Buxton, 1 May 1835.

¹⁷³ (CA) A519/4, p.104, Beresford to D'Urban, 17 March 1836. BPP 538 (1836), p.268 indicates that Philip did carry a message from D'Urban to the chiefs. Philip, BPP 252 (1835), pp.117-9, denied that he was aware of D'Urban's policy.

¹⁷⁴ (CA) GH 23/11, pp.93-4, D'Urban to Spring-Rice, 5 May 1835.

Rharhabe be allowed to graze in the area temporarily during the drought.¹⁷⁵ But Campbell wanted no African presence whatsoever, and patrols were sent out to attack Tyali and Nqeno. One of the patrols provoked a response from a group of Nqeno's men, but he apologised. Somerset himself then led a series of extremely destructive patrols along the Tyhume and Gaga Rivers throughout late October and November. Philip described how the British troops had laid waste to twenty miles of Ngqika crops and huts.¹⁷⁶ The British violence continued to escalate through November and December. On 2 December Ensign Sparkes led a patrol against Tyali and seized the chief's own cattle, a severe insult to his dignity. Tyali's men followed the patrol and in the ensuing scuffle, Sparkes was wounded in the arm.¹⁷⁷ It is incredible that Somerset could have placed a teenaged ensign - who had 'no experience as an officer, and very little sense'¹⁷⁸ - in charge of a cross-border raid at so tense a period.

Severe retribution for the wounding of Sparkes was called for by the authorities. A patrol was sent against Tyali under Lieutenant Sutton on 12 December. This patrol was intentionally confrontational and again took Tyali's cattle. Again, incensed young men - armed with spears - followed the mounted patrol to retrieve the chief's cattle. Sutton claimed that these men wantonly attacked his official patrol, and that he restrained his men until it was necessary to defend themselves. Given the arrogance, power and history of atrocities of these young frontier soldiers it is far more probable that Tyali's explanation was correct. His view was that this was yet another unjust

¹⁷⁵ (CA) LG 9, pp.229-235, D'Urban to Somerset, 17 October 1834. Somerset in August refused Tyali's request that he be allowed to cultivate and graze in the Ceded Territory. D'Urban, BPP 503 (1837), pp.145-7, D'Urban to Somerset, 15 August 1834, said that Tyali, but not Nqeno, may do so. Campbell, BPP 503 (1837), p.157, Campbell to Bell, 31 October 1834, was again unhappy with this arrangement.

¹⁷⁶ (CA) A1480, Philip to Buxton, 1 May 1835. Philip gives a very clear picture of Rharhabe confusion and anger at the arbitrary and destructive actions of the Colony. D'Urban's explanations of the causes of the war in BPP 503 (1837), pp.56-7, D'Urban to Glenelg, 9 June 1836, bear little resemblance to reality.

¹⁷⁷ For the misguided nature of the Sparkes patrol, see BPP 503 (1837), pp.158-160; (CA) A1480, Philip to Buxton, 1 May 1835; Soga, South-Eastern Bantu, p.172; C.Brownlee, Reminiscences of Kaffir Life, 'The Old Peach Stump'.

¹⁷⁸ BPP 503 (1837), p.160, Somerset to D'Urban, 12 December 1834.

and violent attack. The group of men went after the patrol calling for the release of the cattle. In return they received a hail of bullets.¹⁷⁹ Among those wounded was a minor Ngqika chief, Xhoxho. While the extent of his head-wound was exaggerated, the chiefs and their people were incensed at the colonial disrespect for royal dignity. African society acknowledged that chiefs were not to be harmed or treated as ordinary men, but the colony had regularly disregarded this important belief.¹⁸⁰

Somerset had in the meantime on 5 December given an ultimatum to Nqeno to remove his people from the Ceded Territory.¹⁸¹ By this stage there was an unusually high number of wandering, hungry people in the frontier region. Laing remarked in mid December that he had never seen the frontier so disturbed.¹⁸² Somerset reported on 18 December that Tyali's people had increased cattle theft after the Sparkes and Sutton patrols, and were trying to graze in the Mancazana area. He asked if he could take a patrol to teach them a lesson.¹⁸³ By 20 December Somerset had driven all Nqeno's people living in the Ceded Territory between Fort Willshire and Line Drift over the Keiskamma.¹⁸⁴ The Rharhabe began to react violently in groups the following day - the 21 December, the supposed start of the 'irruption'. It is hardly surprising that the Rharhabe reacted in December; what is astonishing is that it had taken so long.

¹⁷⁹ (CA) A1480, Philip to Buxton, 1 May 1835. Sutton tried to exonerate himself; see Heavyside, "Abstract of Board of Relief", pp.88-9n. Compare Cory's removal of all colonial guilt for the patrols in Rise of South Africa, Vol.3, pp.55-60.

¹⁸⁰ Peires, House of Phalo, p.93; Brownlee, Reminiscences of Kaffir life, pp.320-7; Soga, South-Eastern Bantu, p.172. Even Sutu, the colonial ally, was angry about it; see (CL) MS 16,579, Diary of James Laing, 19 December 1834.

¹⁸¹ BPP 252 (1835), p.119, Somerset to D'Urban, 5 December 1834.

¹⁸² (CL) MS 16,579, Diary of James Laing, 17 December 1834; BPP 503 (1837), pp.156-7, Letters to Campbell from: Tomlinson, Koonap, 15 September 1834, Nel, Kat, 24 September 1834, Collett, Koonap, 20 October 1834; (CA) A519/1, p.43, Hudson, 19 December 1834, offered his help with the 'present unsettled state of affairs on the frontier'.

¹⁸³ BPP 252 (1835), p.120, Somerset to D'Urban, 18 December 1834.

¹⁸⁴ BPP 503 (1837), p.161, Somerset to D'Urban, 20 December 1834.

When one considers the litany of injustices which the Rharhabe chiefs dictated to Chalmers on 31 December 1834 as the reasons for hostilities, it is difficult to see December 1834 as the start of a 'war'. In 1829 Nqeno's son had been shot dead by a patrol after being falsely accused of cattle theft. No compensation had been forthcoming. In 1830 a disarmed chief, Sekou, was shot dead without compensation. When an officer from Fort Willshire was wounded while taking cattle from Nqeno, on the other hand, two hundred cattle were demanded in compensation. In the Xhoxho affair the soldiers fired six times before assegais were thrown, and then Somerset refused to discuss the incident. When Somerset returned from Britain he had enforced the Tyhume as boundary, which was closer to the Fetcani. D'Urban had failed to visit the frontier as had been promised. The land 'beyond' the Fish belonged to the Ngqika. The Rharhabe had always returned colonial cattle and thieves. Whites travelled through Cafferland with guns whilst armed Africans in the Colony were imprisoned. Patrols took the cattle of the innocent. Ngqika had been an ally of the British. And the British had committed three major offences - they had wounded and killed a chief, taken away land, and seized the cattle of a chief.¹⁸⁵ For all this the Rharhabe demanded compensation, as it had been demanded of them.

¹⁸⁵ BPP 503 (1837), pp.49-50, Chalmers to Somerset (for the Rharhabe chiefs), 31 December 1834.

Chapter 3

THE WAR OF 1835

An outbreak of extensive hostilities was, by 1835, long overdue. The Rharhabe had been pushed to the limits of their patience by a colony - driven by a beligerent, negrophobic faction in Graham's Town - which had the power to expand. Read warned in December 1833 that

There have been a number of the most aggravating circumstances possible, and every method contrived to agitate the Caffres with a view we think to have a pretext to take more land from them.¹

The opportunity to continue the eastern Cape expansionism arose in December 1834, when a few thousand Rharhabe launched a two-week spate of raids on the Albany farmers. The 'war of 1835',² as defined in the official parameters, began on 21 December 1834, and ended with the peace treaties of 17 September 1835. The war has been defined as the period between the attack on the Colony by the Rharhabe and their final subjugation. 'War' is an imperfect European term which does not accurately describe the local conflicts, guerilla-style warfare, and hazy chronological boundaries of events in the eastern districts. The year 1835 must be seen, not in isolation, but as part of a continuous chain of expansion eastwards by the Colony, marked by endemic violence in the form of cattle-raiding, land expulsions and deaths, interspersed with periods

¹ (CA) A50/4, Read to Fairbairn, 7 December 1833. See also Wilson & Thompson, History of South Africa (1986), p.252.

² A recurring problem has been how to refer to the conflict of 1835. The original pejorative denotation 'Sixth Caffer War' has disappeared, but its replacement, 'Sixth Frontier War', is also unacceptable. It is merely a numerical aid for schoolchildren to remember a series of altercations. The Unity Movement's suggestion of renaming the frontier conflicts the 'wars of dispossession', whilst accurate, is too emotive. Describing it in terms of someone's name (as with Nxele and Mlanjeni) emphasises just one aspect of the war. The 'war of Maqoma' emphasises the aspect of dispossession; the 'war of D'Urban' stresses the power of the whites; and the 'war of Hintza' is monument to the murder of the paramount. But none is sufficiently descriptive. I have thus opted for the politically and socially neutral term of 'War of 1835'.

of increased aggression (the 'wars'). Cattle-raiding by the Rharhabe was as widespread in late 1835 as it had been in the period of official hostilities. Each of the conflicts had different specific objectives, different alliances and different protagonists, but should all be seen as stages in a larger conflict. The limitation of the dates of the war is an artificial one, based on the official British declarations, and is integral to the settler conception of the war.

The 'war' was in fact declared by the Colony, long before 1835. The response of the Rharhabewas not the start of a war, but part of one which had been begun by the Europeans before 1835. The aggressive actions of the British from 1811 (outlined in Chapter 2) were nothing less - to the Rharhabe - than notification of their intention to control and expand the frontier region. In the specific context of 1835, the previous five years had provided a continuity of violence that would inevitably goad the Rharhabe into response. In 1829 Maqoma's land was taken away and given to Khoi to form the Kat River Settlement, and to white soldiers between the Kat and Koonap Rivers. In October 1833 Maqoma, Tyali, Bhotumane, Nqeno and Qasana's people were driven eastwards. Again in March 1834, Maqoma and Tyali were evicted from the new land and driven east. European settlers were immediately placed on their land, including on Maqoma's home near the Koonap. And again in November and December 1834 the colonial troops attacked Tyali and Nqeno, burning crops and huts, wounding a chief, and forcing them off their land for the third time in fourteen months. All of this was aggravated by increasing patrols and violence, and the seizure of women and children to work in the Colony. Not surprisingly, it was the people of Maqoma, Tyali and Nqeno who made the counter-attacks in December 1834. The response of the frontier Rharhabe in December was not a surprise mass attack. It was a desperate attempt to halt the settler advance. The settler interpretation has been rooted in the claim that the war began on 21 December 1834, which places the blame for hostilities firmly on the Rharhabe. The real war - the 'irruption' - came, rather, in March to May 1835, when the colonial forces invaded the Rharhabe, Gcaleka and

Bomvana.

Robert Godlonton, in his book Irruption of the Kafir Hordes - written in late 1835 as a vindication of the colonists, epitomises the settler view of 1835. This version of events is that a war on the Colony was fomented, masterminded and planned from early 1834 by the Gcaleka paramount chief Hintza, with the Rharhabe chiefs Maqoma and Tyali providing the vehicle of destruction. The attack on the Colony was carried out, according to Godlonton, simultaneously over the entire eastern frontier by massive numbers of 'Caffers', who quickly subdued what colonial resistance there was, and caused immense havoc for a month, gaining control of virtually the entire Ceded Territory and Albany - the area between the Keiskamma and Sundays Rivers.³ Godlonton claimed that the area all the way up to the Sundays River was infiltrated by 'Caffers'. Heavyside, chairman of the Board of Relief, alleged that the entire area south of Graham's Town between the Fish and Sundays Rivers was controlled by the Africans, and stripped of cattle.⁴ These allegations were supported by the imaginative creations of people such as April, a captured Tswana man, who claimed in February that Hintza and the Rharhabe chiefs had intended to kill all colonial farmers, seize Graham's Town in a night attack, and reward their Khoi supporters with grants of land in Albany.⁵

The arrival of Smith in early January and the British troop reinforcements managed to stem the savage tide, this version continues, and the 'war' was then reversed and carried into Rharhabe territory. D'Urban visited the Gcaleka in late April, and demanded back the colonial cattle which he claimed the Gcaleka had hidden. As punishment for their involvement in the planning and initial stages of the attack, fifty thousand cattle and a thousand horses were demanded in compensation. Soon thereafter Hintza proved his duplicity by being shot whilst escaping from custody. The 'war' was seen as deserved retribution

³ This view is encapsulated in Brand, 'Kaffir War of 1834-5', and Cory, Rise of South Africa, Vol.3.

⁴ Heavyside, 'Abstract of Board of Relief', p.22

⁵ (CA) LG 9, pp.127-8, Evidence of April, Bechuana, 21 February 1835.

for the 'unprovoked aggression' of December, but the Rharhabe and Gcaleka cattle seized during hostilities were regarded as insufficient compensation for settler losses in comparison with those stolen from the Colony. The annexation of the Queen Adelaide Province (the area between the Fish and Kei Rivers) was thus seen as a legitimate seizure of land forfeited by the Rharhabe in consequence of an aggressive attack,⁶ and the restitution of this land to the Rharhabe by Glenelg in 1837 was met with indignant protests. This version of events was held vigourously by the settlers, who seem to have felt genuinely hard done by. The essence of this interpretation has remained unchanged for the past century and a half.

The evidence suggests that the causes and results of 1835 were deliberately inverted by the settler apologists, and a very different explanation is presented. The counter-attacks of December 1834 and early January 1835 were undertaken by a minority of disgruntled Rharhabe, who attacked specific areas and farms in Albany in groups, rather than in a mass onslaught on the entire frontier.⁷ They took cattle (although nothing like the number claimed), burnt selected farmsteads, and killed twenty-five men, leaving women and children alone. It was not a mindless and unprovoked attack, but the understandable response to decades of colonial encroachment, aggression and injustice. It was not a mass 'Xhosa' response, planned well in advance by conniving chiefs, and masterminded by the paramount Hintza. It was a series of attacks by some of the frontier Rharhabe (on a smaller scale than 1819) who, after the settlers put up such a weak initial defense, were joined by many of the eastern Ndlambe. The participating Rharhabe chiefs, Maqoma, Tyali, Bhotumane, Nqeno and Qasana, did not wish a major confrontation with the militarily superior Europeans, but wished to bring to the attention of the whites their anger at their situation. They were pressurised by their people, who wished to make a stand after bearing the brunt of colonial expansion for two decades.

⁶ BPP 279 (1836), p.44, Shrewsbury to D'Urban, 16 January 1835.

⁷ Webb, 'Immediate consequences of Sixth Frontier War', p.38.

As Read noted above, the colonists often hoped that the Rharhabe could be goaded into a response if they were sufficiently pressurised. An armed reaction from the Africans would then give the settlers legitimate reason to invade and subdue them, and appropriate more land and cattle. The settlers had always to keep one eye on the Colonial Office, which would refuse to sanction anything it deemed illegal or unjust, and the colonists had always to remain within the bounds of what they could justify or claim by law. The responses of December proved the perfect pretext for the seizure of land and cattle, the removal of a dangerously independent paramount chief, and the solving of the colonial labour shortage. The initial shock of the 'irruption' had subsided by mid January 1835. By the end of the month, however, D'Urban and Smith had planned to annex the land west of the Kei, to invade the innocent Gcaleka if they refused to co-operate, to invade up the coast past the Mbashe River, and to introduce the 'Fingo' into the Colony.

By mid January the Europeans had regained control of most of the territory west of the Keiskamma River, and the Rharhabe warriors were retreating from the Ceded Territory. D'Urban and British troop reinforcements arrived between 13 and 23 January, not to protect Albany, but to carry the war into Rharhabe territory and claim their spoils. D'Urban, who had only been in the Colony for six months, was a conservative, officious, military man, who was firm in his belief in asserting military control. He found the Graham's Town faction very radical, but their views co-incided sufficiently with his own for him to provide the land, labour and military dominance which they demanded. The initial threat of the Rharhabe and the damage they caused was greatly exaggerated by the colonists, who wanted British financial compensation. D'Urban supported the settler version, as it justified his actions, which were completely against Colonial Office policy. The settlers also managed in this way to portray themselves as victims.

D'Urban also took the opportunity to invade and subdue the Gcaleka, from whom he took twenty thousand cattle and many women and children. This action (apart

from the illegal labour seizures, which were kept secret) was excused to the Colonial Office by accusing Hintza of masterminding all the hostilities, of providing men to aid the Rharhabe, and of keeping all the colonial cattle that were allegedly sent to his country. Hintza, however, did not plan the attacks, and he was rather nervous of the power of the Colony. He moved to the Amava area on the upper Tsomo River in late 1834, in order to be close to a group of Boers to whom he had granted land. As discussed in Chapter 2, the notion of him as leader of the 'irruption' purely because he was paramount of the Gcaleka and Rharhabe, ignores the independent and fragmented nature of the society. There was no 'Xhosa nation' over which he presided, and his paramountcy was largely nominal. He was prepared to accept and safe-guard the thousands of Rharhabe cattle that were sent to him, and to the Thembu past the Mbashe River. The Rharhabe sent their own - not colonial - cattle to him, and they had taken few enough colonial cattle as it was. D'Urban thus set him up, with supposed evidence of his help in stock theft, as the leader whom he could legitimately invade and punish. The fact that the Gcaleka were unjustly invaded (as Glenelg pointed out), and that Hintza was killed in the process, was thus sidelined.

The first incident in the Rharhabe response was on 21 December 1834, when a group of Ngqika killed a Boer farmer, Stephanus Buys, on his farm at the junction of the Kat and Koonap Rivers. For the ten days to the end of December the Rharhabe managed to infiltrate most of Albany east of Graham's Town. Patrols of a few hundred men attacked farms, chiefly in the Koonap and lower Albany regions. The Fish river was in flood on 22 December and impassable near Fort Brown.⁸ This alone would have made a mass onslaught of the type like Somerset's panicky estimates of ten to twenty thousand Rharhabe simultaneously attacking along the length of the Fish River quite impossible. Delport described in February how he had been attacked at his farm near the Fish River

⁸ (CL) PR 3563, Reminiscences of H.J.Halse. Halse is not generally a reliable source, but is corroborated on this point by J.B.Scott, 'The British soldier on the Eastern Cape Frontier, 1800-1850', Ph.D. Thesis, University of Port Elizabeth, 1973, pp.187-190.

on 23 December by one thousand 'Caffers', and how he and his thirteen year old son, whose gun did not work, had held them at bay.⁹ Stories like this abounded, and it is upon these fictional accounts that the settler version of 1835 is based. This example, though, is important in showing that the settler claims that the Rharhabe intended to wipe out Albany and all the settlers were incorrect. One man could not hold off any group - whatever size - seriously intent on slaughtering all whites. The aim of the Rharhabe was not settler annihilation; it was essentially retributive livestock-raiding. They also wished to retrieve their land. The parties of the first two weeks seem to have consisted regularly of a hundred or more men, but by mid-January they had shrunk to an average of about ten. Retief's report in mid-January and Ziervogel's in April shows this size to be the norm for cattle-raiding.¹⁰ Such groups posed little real threat to the armed colonists but were elusive and frustrating for the patrols.

The settlers huddled in Graham's Town in December with the Graham's Town Journal decrying the savagery of the 'irruption'. It claimed hysterically that the 'Caffers' had control of most of Albany, Somerset and Uitenhage, and that reinforcements were urgently needed.¹¹ People in Graham's Town first heard of the attacks on 22 December, although it took up to a week for the farmers in the outlying areas to hear of events and to move into town. Bathurst was attacked on 25 December and by the following day, when almost all of the cattle in the area had been taken, most of its inhabitants had fled to Graham's Town.¹² The people of Salem followed suit on 28 December¹³ after an attack which took most of their cattle. Graham's Town was a mass of paranoia.

⁹ (CA) 1/AY/8/86, Evidence of Delport, 23 February 1835.

¹⁰ (CA) 1/AY/8/86, Report of P.Retief, 16 January 1835; (CA) 1/AY/8/55, Report of Ziervogel, 8 April 1835.

¹¹ The hyperbole of the Journal is demonstrable, for instance, in its claim that the Ferreira brothers were attacked by 150-400 Rharhabe; see Graham's Town Journal 19 January 1835. Goldswain, who was in the area, numbered the attackers at ten; see Long, The Chronicle of Jeremiah Goldswain, Vol.1, p.76.

¹² (AM) SMD 948, Reminiscences of B.E.Bowker, p.61.

¹³ Long, Chronicle of Goldswain, pp.74-8 provides a quaint view of events in Salem.

The population blockaded itself inside Church Square, with the church acting as military headquarters and ammunition dump,¹⁴ and rumours of impending attack abounded. There were numerous claims of settler near-deaths; their validity, though, is doubtful, considering the small number of total European deaths and the size of the protecting force. The exaggeration of the threat was later employed to heighten the 'savagery' of the 'Caffers', and provide the moral justification for European domination. It is unclear quite why the people of Graham's Town were so paranoid in December, considering the effectiveness of the colonial patrols throughout December and January (see below). Was there really a sense of threat? The colonists' situation was not helped by the incompetence of Colonel Somerset, who had abandoned his frontier positions at Fort Willshire, Kat River Post, Gualana and Caffer Drift on 29 December and returned to Graham's Town, leaving Fort Armstrong to be burnt.¹⁵ All forts on the frontier, apart from Fort Beaufort and Hermanus Kraal, had been abandoned and sacked by the Rharhabe by late December,¹⁶ although within six weeks almost all had been re-established.

The raiding bands were controlled and organised by the Rharhabe chiefs, less from personal vendettas than to placate their young warriors who seem to have been itching to fight the Colony.¹⁷ For many years Maqoma and Tyali, ultra wary of the power of the whites, had handled the frontier authorities with kid gloves. Virtually no resistance was given to the evictions of 1829, 1833 and 1834, and the chiefs to a great extent enforced the demands and laws of the Colony. It is possible that they were playing a double game - unofficially supporting cattle-raids in exchange for a percentage profit and innocently returning some of the cattle and a 'thief' to ingratiate themselves with the

¹⁴ See Ibid., pp.78-84, for a description; also Heavyside, 'Abstract of the Board of Relief', pp.13-14.

¹⁵ (CL) MS 16,579, Diary of James Laing, 5 January 1835; (CA) A50/4 Read to Fairbairn, 18 January 1835.

¹⁶ Scott, 'British soldier on Eastern Cape Frontier', pp.195-6.

¹⁷ This interpretation is also presented by Macmillan, Bantu, Boer & Briton, pp.125, 127; Peires, House of Phalo, pp.93-4; Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, p.16.

settler authorities. But it seems more likely that they (especially Maqoma) were doing their utmost to contain cattle theft, for fear of retaliatory patrols.¹⁸ This attitude was not adopted by the Rharhabe people, who understood only that the Colony was seizing their land and cattle. The chiefs faced a possible mutiny, if some sort of retaliation was not allowed. Tyali thus wrote to Somerset, asking him to 'use your power, and cause me to pay for my people's folly', in order to stave off the violence he could foresee.¹⁹ A colonial show of strength would convince the Rharhabe that retaliation was impossible. The Rharhabe chiefs remained always in constant contact with each other.

The settler apologists argued that the attack must have been planned well in advance, but this assumes that it was a large, concerted attack, which it was not. There was presumably some talk of standing up to the Colony in late 1834, given the situation and Rharhabe anger, but there seems to have been no definite or discussed plan. It appears that the chiefs were trying to avoid hostilities if possible. As shown, tension had mounted throughout the frontier region in November and December. The Sparkes and Sutton patrols, with their cattle seizure from innocent people and the expulsion of Tyali's and Nqeno's people from the Ceded Territory in mid December, proved the last straw and made war inevitable. D'Urban was annoyed that he had not been warned of the impending attack, protesting that the organising of an invading force the size claimed by Campbell could not have been hidden. The fact that the missionaries noticed nothing until 19 December implies that it was a spontaneous and rapid mobilisation in self defence. Philip, with the agreement of Read, Brownlee and

¹⁸ Read continually protested Maqoma's innocence and acceptance of colonial wishes; see (CA) A50/4, Read to Philip, 1 April 1833; A50/4, Read to Fairbairn, 7 December 1833; (CA) A1480, Read to Fairbairn, 13 April 1834; A1480, Philip to Buxton, 1 May 1835; A1480, Read to Fairbairn, 27 June 1835. Peires, "History of the Xhosa", p.205n. notes that between 1823 and 1829, there were virtually no reports of cattle theft by Maqoma's people, and that he was making an effort to stop the theft of the other chiefs. He still bore the brunt of the accusations of cattle theft; see also Peires, House of Phalo, p.90.

¹⁹ BPP 252 (1835), p.123, Tyali to Somerset, through Chalmers, 20 December 1834; see also Peires, House of Phalo, pp.93-4.

Ross, argued that there was no evidence of a concerted or lengthy plan, but that it was just an automatic reaction to colonial actions. He believed that Somerset had tried to clear himself of blame for causing the hostilities by claiming that the reaction had been long premeditated. The missionary diaries reflect no untoward plans or movement until mid-December.²⁰

Some groups were so bent on revenge that they acted against the orders of the chiefs in late 1834.²¹ One, for instance, killed the trader Warren at Kayser's mission station on 23 December.²² Maqoma was annoyed with this, having promised protection to Kayser. After Kayser had complained of the threatening attitude of some of his men, he had given a strong warning to all the neighbouring kraals.²³ Chalmers was told that Maqoma's proposals of peace were not obeyed 'because the Caffres were not under one head; and that they often did what they pleased, and break the promises made by their chiefs'. What these comments emphasise is the lack of central planning and (to an extent) the ill-discipline that was a natural accompaniment to attacks that were spontaneous and angry.

Why did the Rharhabe attack where they did? The two main areas intended for attack were that centring on the Koonap River - a tributary of the Fish, north-east of Graham's Town, and that south of Graham's Town, breaching the lower Fish south of Trompetter's Drift. These two regions contained relatively dense colonial populations, the former chiefly Boer and the latter English. Heavyside's list of attacks in his Relief Board report shows that the majority of attacks in December 1834 were carried out on Boers in the Koonap area. In 1830-1 farms had been issued to one hundred discharged white military personnel between the Koonap and the Fish (the area vacated by the Ngqika in

²⁰ (CL) Diary of Kayser; (CL) MS 16,579, Diary of Laing; (CL) MS 9037 Minutes of Presbyterian Mission Meetings, p.304, Report of Bennie; *Ibid.*, pp.300-1, Report of Chalmers.

²¹ BPP 503 (1837), p.87, as told to Chalmers by Jan, a Caffer, 17 January 1835.

²² (CL) Diary of Kayser, 23 December 1834; (CL) MS 16,579, Diary of Laing, 24 December 1834; Heavyside, 'Abstract of the Board of Relief'.

²³ (CL) Diary of Kayser, 26 December 1834.

1819) to act as an additional buffer. In March and April 1834 thirty-eight farms next to the Koonap were surveyed and allotted to colonists by Campbell; one of them comprised eighty hectares of Maqoma's old *umuzi*.²⁴ It was they who were attacked, for reasons not difficult to comprehend.

In the last week of December and the first days of January, raiding bands of up to a few hundred attacked farms, aiming usually at farmers who had ill-treated labourers or were on Rharhabe land. A number of the attacks were led by Rharhabe fluent in English or Dutch. One such group attacked near Enon in early January. All its members had lived in the area at some time, and some of them on the Enon mission station.²⁵ They were returning to the land they had lost. The fact that they spoke a European language implies that they had had lengthy contact with the Colony, probably as labourers. In an attack on the Koonap region on 5 March, where the Rharhabe took two hundred sheep, most of the participants spoke Dutch.²⁶ William Shaw and the Southeys were attacked on their farms on the lower Fish by a group of Rharhabe led by Kosani, a former servant of the Southeys.²⁷ There was collaboration from the colonial labourers as well: April, a Bechuana servant of Howse and Sheffield described how some of Nqeno's men (ten of whom had guns) attacked the farm where he was working and took the cattle; all but four of the thirty-five Khoi and Bechuana workers aided the raiders and returned across the Fish with them.²⁸ The 'irruption' was the result of resistance to European domination, and the seizing of the opportunity to regain lost property and dignity.

²⁴ (CA) LG 7, Bell to Commissioner-General, 1834; (CA) LG 587, pp.179-180. See (CA) Maps M1/2451-3 for distribution of farms and the number of Boer farmers on the Kat and Koonap.

²⁵ (CA) CO 4381, Evidence of October, Bechuana, 8 January 1835.

²⁶ (CA) 1/AY/8/86, Vaughan to Campbell, 5 March 1835. Goldswain in Long, *Chronicle of Goldswain*, pp.71-4 described an attack on 27 December near Salem where all the Rharhabe spoke Dutch.

²⁷ (CL) MS 7131, Stubbs reminiscences, p.26.

²⁸ (CA) LG 9, pp.110-123, Evidence of April, Bechuana, 19 February 1835. Stephanus Buys, the first man to be killed, had been warned by his servant (who was from Bhotumane's people) of an impending attack - Heavyside, 'Abstract of the Board of Relief'.

It was only really Albany that was affected. The focus of aggression fell to quite an extent upon the trans-Fish traders and Koonap River Boers, although there were reports of Rharhabe raids as far north as the Kray River in the Graaff-Reinet district.²⁹ Ziervogel, Civil Commissioner for Somerset, reported in mid-January that the area around the Koonap and Baviaans Rivers had been devastated, and after initially grouping in laagers, most of the inhabitants had abandoned the region.³⁰ Campbell made a dire report on the state of the eastern districts in general.³¹ Most of the farmers from the Koonap area gathered at Tarka in the Winterberg Mountains.³² Again, the extent of the damage was overstated. In his report from the Kaga River near the Koonap in early January, Ziervogel stated that the area of the Baviaans, Karega and Kaga had suffered a few minor attacks, and that there were traces of many Rharhabe across the Fish, but that few cattle had been lost.³³ This report makes nonsense of his later statements of large-scale devastation in December. It describes few attacks and stock losses, and makes it clear that Boer patrols were in control and that the Somerset whites were paranoid.

Yet this description of relative peace and the military dominance of the colonial forces took place in precisely the area and period which Godlonton claimed was most affected by the 'irruption'. Halse gives a colourful - but apocryphal - story of his dangerous mission to the town of Somerset with the mail, surrounded all the way by marauding Rharhabe.³⁴ The Field Commandant for George and Uitenhage reported that all farmers in the Bushmans River area (the second region of attack) had deserted and that five to six thousand cattle had

²⁹ (CA) CO 4381, Graaff-Reinet civil commissioner to Campbell, 31 December 1834.

³⁰ (CA) 1/AY/8/55, Ziervogel to Campbell, 17 January 1835.

³¹ (CA) CO 4381, Campbell to D'Urban, 2 January 1835.

³² (CA) 1/AY/8/55, van Wyk to Campbell, 12 January 1835.

³³ (CA) 1/AY/8/55, Ziervogel to Campbell, 4 January 1835.

³⁴ (CL) PR 3563, Reminiscences of Halse. Halse wrote his memoirs in the 1870s for his grandchildren. His facts and chronology are regularly incorrect - cf. his conflicting report on a skirmish at Bushman's river in January in Long, Index to Unofficial manuscripts, p.164, F.Rex to father, 16 January 1835. There is no reason to believe his assertions of a massive Rharhabe presence in the lower Somerset district, but his account does emphasise the panic of the farmers unnecessarily deserting their homes in the area.

been taken and houses burnt, whilst patrols in the area had killed eighteen Rharhabe.³⁵ But van Wyk on 1 January corroborated Ziervogel's evidence that the Rharhabe were gathered chiefly in the Ceded Territory, and that few were in the Colony.³⁶ It is clear that many of the areas which the settlers claimed were stricken and devastated by the Rharhabe were not so.

The attacks were aimed at specific Boer farmers and certain Khoi collaborators who had given cause for anger,³⁷ rather than colonists as a whole, and were seldom carried out on military stations. The unsuccessful onslaughts on Fort Willshire on 29 January and Fort Armstrong on 19 February were exceptions.³⁸ Rademeyer was a Boer who lived near the Kat River, but who had always treated his Rharhabe servants well. When hostilities broke out he (and his oxen and cattle) went unmolested and was protected until he and his family were safe.³⁹

Traders across the Kei had regularly been the cause of Rharhabe anger, because of their attitudes and methods of trading.⁴⁰ Read complained in 1833 of the behaviour of the traders and the disputes which they regularly caused. He was concerned that the close links between the traders and Wesleyans would adversely affect the growth of the missions.⁴¹ Traders regularly disregarded the laws of African society, and their status as foreigners who needed to respect Rharhabe custom and authority. They flaunted their access to the colonial militia, and often deceived customers. But the traders, while subject

³⁵ (CA) CO 4381, Report of Field Cornet, Bushman's river, 1 January 1835.

³⁶ (CA) 1/AY/8/55, van Wyk to Campbell, 1 January 1835.

³⁷ As noted in (CA) A519/1, pp.47-9, Chalmers to Armstrong, Chumie, 1 January 1835. One of the Boers killed on the Koonap in December had wantonly killed a Rharhabe man in 1834 - (CA) 1/AY/9/62. The man had been looking for a relative on the Boer's farm and the drunken Dutchman had accosted him and killed him in front of his house, where he was having a party. It was this type of behaviour which probably caused retributive Boer deaths in the 'irruption'.

³⁸ At Fort Willshire six men were killed and all its cattle taken; see Scott, 'British soldier on the Eastern Cape Frontier', p.196.

³⁹ Le Cordeur, *Journal of Stretch*, p.117.

⁴⁰ As noted by Laing in his diary, (CL) MS 16,579, entries for 22 December 1834, and 6 January 1835,

⁴¹ (CA) A50/4 Read to Fairbairn, 12 April 1833.

to aggression in 1835, were not slaughtered wholesale as claimed by Godlonton. Warren was killed at Kayser's mission, and Rogers (who knew his murderers personally) near the Tyhume. But Marks (near Tyhume), Bourne (near Buffalo) and Eules (near Kei) were all allowed to escape.⁴² Their escapes were attributed to miracles, but this assumes that the Rharhabe had intended to kill all whites.

There were four stations where Europeans gathered: Wesleyville, Beka, Burnshill and Clarkebury. Again, the idea that they needed to be rescued implies that all Europeans were in danger, but there is no evidence of the dire need for protection in any area. It must be stressed that the intention of the Rharhabe was not to challenge or overthrow the Colony; it was to seek revenge and bring to the attention of D'Urban the situation they were in.⁴³ They wanted talks, not war. Philip told Buxton in May that the 'conduct of the Caffers towards us for months past is no more than a simple reaction of [sic] a system we have been carrying on against them for many years past.'⁴⁴ This 'system' was the entire frontier policy of dispossession and commandos. The chiefs attempted to get Somerset to talk to them on 21 December (the day the counter-attacks began) about the evictions of Tyali and Nqeno (although Chalmers alleged their intention was to entice him into an ambush) and then began a brief period of retaliation for colonial injustices. These included the seizure of Rharhabe land and the imposition of an unnegotiated boundary by means of guns, the regular seizure of cattle by patrols, and the death of forty-four Rharhabe in the past few years, including three royal members, without any compensation; all of which was succinctly explained in a letter to

⁴² Heavyside, 'Abstract of Board of Relief'. (CL) MS 16,579, Diary of Laing, entry for 1 August 1835, corroborates Marks' story.

⁴³ (CA) A519/1, D'Urban papers, pp.257-8, Report of T.Shepstone, 13 May 1835; Shepstone described how the messengers sent to Maqoma and Tyali in May returned to say that they had begun hostilities to force D'Urban to come to the frontier. They would then be able to sit with him and Somerset and discuss their grievances, and he would understand the cause of their conduct; cf. (CA) A611/5, Papers of George Southey, where Southey makes precisely the same statement. Peires, House of Phalo, p.146 stresses that hostilities were intended to be limited, in order to force settlement of their grievances.

⁴⁴ (CA) A1480, Philip to Buxton, 1 May 1835.

Somerset from the chiefs on 31 December.⁴⁵ After ten days of fighting, the chiefs called for peace.

Of the large number of Africans east of the Fish only a small minority joined in the attacks. At no stage in the history of the eastern frontier was there African co-ordination such that a concerted attack could be made on the Colony. This was largely due to the independence of each chief, and the absence of unity or 'Xhosa' cohesion. Each chief was faced in 1835 with a choice of whether to oppose or support the Colony. The key Rharhabe participants were two sons of Ngqika, Maqoma and Tyali, who were acting as regents until the child heir, Sandile, became chief of the Ngqika.⁴⁶ They were supported in 1835 by most of the Ngqika chiefs, except Tenta and Matwa, who took refuge in Graham's Town and were given land at Tyhume after hostilities. They also had the support of the western Ndlambe of Mhala, Siyolo and Qasana; by the Mdange of Bhotumane; and by the Mbalu of Nqeno.⁴⁷ The important common denominator amongst these groups is the fact that they (especially Maqoma and Tyali) had borne the brunt of colonial expansion and aggression. They had lost their land to the foreigners and had reason to react. Mqhayi (brother to Mdushane and Mhala), and Tshatshu of the Ntinde (who had close links with Read and Philip, and was taken to London in 1836) encouraged their people not to raid,⁴⁸ but split their people in the process. Tshatshu had to join Phato after his brother and followers joined the Ngqika.⁴⁹ The eastern Ndlambe were initially neutral, and the Gcaleka and Winterberg Thembu remained so.

The delineation of sides is not so simple though. The eastern Ndlambe began to take part in hostilities after December 1834, as indicated by a gun found on

⁴⁵ BPP 503 (1837), pp.49-50, Chalmers to Somerset, dictated by Caffer chiefs, 31 December 1834; (CL) MS 16,579, Laing diary, entry for 26 February 1835.

⁴⁶ See Brownlee, Reminiscences of Kaffir life, p.306 for their respective ages and the structure of the regency. See too (CL) MS 16,579, Laing diary, entry for 22 December 1835, where Laing mentions rumours that they were trying to consolidate their power before Sandile came of age.

⁴⁷ See Peires, 'History of the Xhosa', appendix.

⁴⁸ (CA) CO 4381, W.Shepstone to Campbell, 2 January 1835.

⁴⁹ Brownlee, Reminiscences of Kaffir life, pp.27-31.

one of Gasela's men in September, which had been taken from a soldier in the Fish River bush.⁵⁰ There were even some Fingo who fought with Gasela. The awkward position of the chiefs is well demonstrated by the case of Deacon, a trader on the Gonube River in Mhala's territory, who was warned on 24 December of an approaching Rharhabe commando, and sought refuge with a local chief. He and two other Englishmen were sent to Mhala where they were well treated for sixteen days. Long debates were held over their fate, as Mhala's councillors and people wished to kill him - an idea which Mhala resisted. Mhala was particularly concerned about the power of the Colony, and he eventually sent them to safety at Mount Coke.⁵¹ This example exhibits the complexities of delineating sides and opposition in 1835. Mhala was hesitant to attack the Colony outright, but his councillors and people set to with a vengeance, and he was able to do little to control events.⁵² He did, though, punish some of his people who were stealing cattle.

African groups who chose to be loyal to the Colony played an important part in augmenting colonial strength, and in decreasing the motivation of the Rharhabe resistors. The Mpondo and Thembu and the majority of the Gqunukhwebe allied with the Colony, and a number of them proved very useful in fighting for the British. Phato, chief of the Gqunukhwebe, whose people totalled only seven thousand five hundred,⁵³ and who had for a long time owed allegiance to the Rharhabe, played a Janus role in 1835. Phato officially sided with the Colony, placing - on Smith's insistence - his brother in custody in Graham's Town as hostage for his people's good behaviour.⁵⁴ He supplied approximately twelve hundred fighting men,⁵⁵ and was rewarded afterwards with land. The extent of the land that was given to the Gqunukhwebe after the September peace treaties

⁵⁰ (CL) MS 951, War diary of T.H.Bowker, 5 September 1835.

⁵¹ (CA) 1/AY/8/86, Report of T.Deacon, 4 February 1835.

⁵² For Mhala's attitude see also the evidence of 1/AY/8/86, Fingo prisoner, Graham's Town gaol, 22 February 1835.

⁵³ BPP 503 (1837), p.9, Census of Caffer tribes, October 1835.

⁵⁴ (CA) A519/18, pp.40-1, D'Urban to Bell, 6 February 1835.

⁵⁵ Milton, The Edges of war, p.126. This book, written by a professor of law, is a most useful work. It outlines the advance of the frontier very clearly, and provides a succinct summary of life in the eastern Cape.

was decided on in mid 1835, and discussed with Phato and Khama on 14 July.⁵⁶

But April, a Tswana spy on Nqeno, claimed that he saw stolen colonial cattle at Phato's kraal in late February (a claim which D'Urban disregarded).⁵⁷ Phato also aided the Rharhabe, and British arbitration was needed at the end of the year to solve a dispute between Phato and Nqeno, as the latter said that Phato refused to give him back the cattle he had sent to him for safekeeping during hostilities.⁵⁸ In 1846 Phato actually fought against the Colony, but in 1835 he made a clear decision to opt for the more powerful Europeans. His choice earned him land, cattle and temporary colonial protection, and anger from the Rharhabe.⁵⁹

Stubbs claimed that it was Mqhayi - who loudly supported the Colony in 1835 - who organised an attack on farms on the west bank of the Fish on 26 December 1834. The Shaws' cattle were taken and John Shaw killed; Mqhayi then kept Shaw's gun.⁶⁰ It is unclear quite what role Mqhayi played in late 1834, but he quite possibly took advantage of the situation to take cattle, and reversed his allegiance upon realising the power of the Colony. D'Urban singled out the Fingo, the Gqunukhwebe, Mqhayi, Tshatshu, Sutu and Sandile, and Nonube and Siwane in 1836 for special protection, for their help during 1835.⁶¹ The

⁵⁶ (CA) A519/17, p.96, D'Urban to ?, 14 July 1835.

⁵⁷ (CA) LG 9, pp.121-6, Evidence of April, Bechuana, 19 February 1835; see also LG 9, pp.129-135, where Jonas made a similar claim, and said that Phato ordered all the colonial cattle to be slaughtered, so that they would not be found. See too LG 9 p.101, Bowker to Campbell, 11 February 1835, where Bowker claimed that Phato was stealing cattle from the settlers and bringing them into Graham's Town, pretending he had intercepted Caffers. In LG 9, p.108, Richard Southey produced similar evidence of Phato's involvement in December.

⁵⁸ See the record of arbitration in (CA) LG 9, pp. 138-141.

⁵⁹ Peires, 'The British and the Cape' argues that Shaw used his influence to persuade Phato not to join the attacks. His decision, though, was more one of expedience.

⁶⁰ (CL) MS 7131, Stubbs reminiscences, p.125. (CA) LG 9, pp.129-135, evidence of Jonas, corroborates Mqhayi's involvement in raiding; see also LG 9, p.105, W.Southey to D'Urban, 16 February 1835, where Southey felt that there was enough evidence to prove that Mqhayi killed his brother. Dugmore, (CA) GH 19/4, pp.995-6, Dugmore to D'Urban, 19 June 1835, protested Mqhayi's complete innocence in 1835.

⁶¹ (CA) A519/11, pp.102-3, D'Urban to Stockenstrom, 13 October 1836.

collaborators were made to work for their rewards though. In response to requests for land and cattle from Phato, Tshatshu and Mqhayi in June, D'Urban insisted that they had been useful but had not yet done enough. Phato had to bring in Maqoma and Tyali; Tshatshu had to 'show himself more zealous', and Mqhayi had to get hold of Nonube and Siwane.⁶²

The 'irruption' was thus carried out by a minority of dispossessed and angry Rharhabe. Their resolve to attack was strengthened by the apparent willingness of the Kat River Settlement and colonial Khoi to join them,⁶³ after the Khoi dissatisfaction at the proposed vagrancy ordinance in late 1834⁶⁴ which sought further to limit Khoi freedom and access to land. This general Khoi collaboration failed to materialise, although a small number of disgruntled Khoi, whose guns and knowledge of colonial weapons and tactics were of great help, joined the Rharhabe. Campbell had complained, prior to 1835, that the Khoi in the Settlement had become too friendly with the Rharhabe. Some Africans even settled there, and it was providing a gateway through the colonial boundary for settler traders and armed Africans without passes.⁶⁵ In the early part of the war, Khoi were specifically exempt from Rharhabe raiders, and the Africans encouraged them, as fellow sufferers, to join the attackers.⁶⁶ Instead, many of the Khoi formed an integral part of the colonial force, as auxiliaries and in the Kat River Legion.

The Rharhabe were surprised at the Khoi co-operation with the whites and Tyali, aggrieved that they had not at least remained neutral, told Tshatshu that he intended to punish them.⁶⁷ The Settlement was abandoned in early January because of the threat of attack, and its inhabitants moved to Fort

⁶² (NA) A96, T. Shepstone diary, entry for 4 June 1835.

⁶³ (CA) LG 9, p.120, Bechuana spy to Campbell; BPP 503, (1837), p.81, Extract from journal of Rev. Bennie; Ibid., p.87, Statement of Rev. Chalmers, 19 January 1835.

⁶⁴ (CA) A50/4, Hottentot Meeting, Graham's Town, 5 August 1834.

⁶⁵ (CA) CO 2742, Campbell to ?, 20 December 1833.

⁶⁶ (CA) CO 4381, Evidence of October, 8 January 1835.

⁶⁷ (CA) A50/4, Read to Fairbairn, 18 January 1835; (CL) MS 16,579, Diary of James Laing, entry for 30 December 1834.

Adelaide, under Armstrong. With the Rharhabe reaction in 1834 came a number of disturbances on the north-east boundary of the Colony as well, where there were no concerted attacks, but sporadic cattle-raiding. A number of 'Mantatee' labourers in the Somerset region took the opportunity in the general confusion to escape from their masters, taking cattle with them for good measure. Macoan, a Mantatee chief living between the Kraai and Orange Rivers had, by June 1835 a number of colonial cattle, taken from the Koonap River area.⁶⁸ Many Mantatees acted by themselves, or in collaboration with other Africans, on occasions throughout 1835.⁶⁹

But the chiefs had lost control of some of their people : the roving bands continued to raid for cattle and attack, against the orders of their chiefs. Laing felt that they were prevented from destroying all stations only by the orders of the chiefs.⁷⁰ Maqoma, who had been influenced by the missionary Ross, and was attracted to Christianity and European alcohol,⁷¹ was especially concerned with the safety of the missionaries, providing protection for Laing in December against Rharhabe attack and contemplating sending his family to the mission for safety.⁷² Sutu (Sandile's mother), living near Burnshill mission station, on several occasions rescued whites and protected them.⁷³ Maqoma called the LMS missionary Kayser to him in early January, to assure him that the chiefs had given orders that no missions be molested,⁷⁴ and a group raiding near Enon in early January said they had express orders not to touch

⁶⁸ (CA) 1/AY/8/55, Report of Ziervogel from Somerset, 26 June 1835.

⁶⁹ For example, (CA) 1/AY/8/55, Greyling to Campbell, Brak River, 31 January 1835; 1/AY/8/55, Oosthuysen to Campbell, 16 January 1835; 1/AY/8/55, Erasmus to Campbell, Kaga Post, 18 January 1835; (CA) A519/1, pp.233-8, England to D'Urban, 7 May 1835; (CA) CO 2756 provides information on their movements near the Kraai River in June 1835.

⁷⁰ For example, (CL) MS 16,579, Diary of James Laing, entry for 12 January 1835.

⁷¹ Peires, 'History of the Xhosa', Appendix. The Diary of Kayser shows that he attended services at the Knapp's Hope mission fairly regularly; see entry for 5 January 1834.

⁷² (CL) MS 16,579, Diary of James Laing, entries for 27 December 1834, 31 December 1834. (CA) A519/2, p.181, shows that Maqoma issued orders that William Shepstone must not be touched.

⁷³ (CA) A50/4, Read to Fairbairn, 18 January 1835.

⁷⁴ (CL) MS 16,579, Diary of James Laing, entry for 7 January 1835.

missions, Khoi or women and children.⁷⁵ There were regular rumours that all missions had been burnt; but while many were ransacked after their desertion, few were torched. Ayliff had a panicky view of events. In late December he told Davis, his colleague at Clarkebury, that all the traders between the Fish and Kei had been murdered and their property seized, and that all but two mission stations had been destroyed and the missionaries killed.⁷⁶

It was the young warriors, such as the rogue group described by October in early January,⁷⁷ who occasionally boasted of their intentions to destroy the Colony. Samuel Prins, a Khoi servant who with October had been captured with this band, added the melodramatic claim of these young men that 'the Fish river was stinking from the number of people they had killed', and that they would continue fighting for three years.⁷⁸ This was clearly an empty boast, designed to frighten or impress their captives. Some young men were so confident that they asked Chalmers to look after their women and children while they went to the salt pans near Port Elizabeth to construct their new *imizi* and huts.⁷⁹ It is ironic that the hyperbole of these men, so similar to the exaggerations of Graham's Town, supported the settler propaganda that excused their own dispossession.

For the Rharhabe to defeat the Colony was never a possibility.⁸⁰ The defensiveness of the Rharhabe tactics are made clear in the methods of attack: merely ten colonists were killed between 21 and 31 December. There were ten

⁷⁵ Long, Index to Unofficial Manuscripts, p.163, F.Rex to his father, 9 January 1835.

⁷⁶ (CA) A558, Journal of Davis, entry for 29 December 1834. He was incorrect; cf. (CL) MS 1272, Bailie to Jardine, 18 April 1835, Bailie commented on how nice the Butterworth mission was looking.

⁷⁷ (CA) CO 4381, Evidence of October, 8 January 1835.

⁷⁸ (CA) CO 4381, Evidence of Prins, 8 January 1835.

⁷⁹ Heavyside, 'Abstract of the Board of Relief', p.10n., Letter from Chalmers.

⁸⁰ The military dominance of the Colony had been asserted in 1812 and 1819, and in the latter year Nxele led a force of over ten thousand Rharhabe in an open attack on Graham's Town. Seven to eight hundred were killed in one day; see Scott, 'British Soldier on the Eastern Cape Frontier', p.118; Peires, House of Phalo, pp.143-5; MacLennan, Proper Degree of Terror, ch.23.

thousand whites in the districts of Somerset and Albany,⁸¹ with a troop force of under a thousand and thousands of experienced burgher commandos. With a population of about fifty thousand Ngqika and nine thousand Ndlambe,⁸² the Rharhabe chiefs had the potential manpower of less than ten thousand men if all participated. Five thousand African warriors in small groups, armed with spears, could be no match for two thousand British soldiers and trained colonists, mounted and armed with guns. William Shepstone wrote from Wesleyville at the beginning of January that the anger with the Colony, and desire to raid, was fading, but that: 'It is said these young chiefs [Maqoma and Tyali] are in a kind of despair already regretting their folly and even those who are now committing depredations do it in a kind of despair of ever healing a breach so wide'. Shepstone stressed that the raids did not enjoy complete support amongst the Rharhabe, and that a concerted colonial attack would 'strike terror into all the disaffected - and confirm the peaceable'.⁸³ By early January the raiding parties of the Rharhabe had diminished considerably.

Regular patrols of settlers (the Corps of Volunteers) were organised around Graham's Town from 24 December. These achieved success in shooting Rharhabe, but were generally ineffective in retaining stock theft. Burgher commandos began rapidly to be amassed and mobilised, and by 1 January there were two hundred burghers ready at Graaff-Reinet.⁸⁴ The Beaufort Levy was formed, made up of the farmers, with their servants, whose farms on the Fish and Koonap Rivers had been destroyed.⁸⁵ Settler history seldom acknowledges the presence of non-whites in the army, although they formed a large contingent of the force. The patrols used in the early stages of hostilities consisted regularly

⁸¹ (CA) LCA 38, Population census of Eastern Districts, 1837.

⁸² BPP 503 (1837), p.9, Census of Caffer tribes, October 1835; in (CA) LG 605, pp.1-122, November 1835, Boyce, Southey and Kidd numbered the Ndlambe at only 7,000.

⁸³ (CA) CO 4381, W.Shepstone to Campbell, 2 January 1835.

⁸⁴ (CA) CO 4381, Civil Commissioner of Graaff-Reinet to Campbell, 1 January 1835.

⁸⁵ (CA) A519/10, p.68.

of a majority of Khoi.

The colonists were effective in military contacts from the outset, which was not surprising, given their weapons superiority. Burgher parties under Piet Retief killed one hundred and thirteen Rharhabe in the Winterberg area between 24 December and 10 January,⁸⁶ and Somerset was fairly successful in his attacks on the Bushmans River.⁸⁷ A typical example of European dominance in direct confrontations occurred on 24 December when a party of eleven Boers went to aid a farmer near the Kat River. They were confronted by a large group of Rharhabe, who sent a hundred and fifty men onto the attack; whereupon the Boers grouped and fired repeatedly, killing seventy-five men without suffering even a wounding. This pattern was very common, although the number of Rharhabe involved was sometimes exaggerated. Despite this, the Rharhabe took two thousand cattle from around the Boer laager on Greyling's farm in the Winterberg that night.⁸⁸ The raiding parties were not always so lucky: a group of Rharhabe who took two hundred cattle at Kaga, north-west of Graham's Town, on the night of 11 January were caught the following day and fourteen were killed.⁸⁹ With the arrival of Smith came the real organisation and planning to inflict damage on the Rharhabe, rather than just patrols. It marked the real 'irruption' - that of the colonial forces across the Fish River.

Colonel Somerset received Maqoma's offer of peace on 3 January, but deferred a decision on it by replying that he was unauthorised to answer. Again, it was Campbell, supported surprisingly by the liberal GMS missionary from Tyhume, Chalmers, who objected to any cessation of hostilities so early, and who insisted that Somerset reject the offer so that the Colony could gather its forces.⁹⁰ By 7 January Colonel Harry Smith - confirmed supporter of violent expansion and later Governor of the Cape - had arrived, and there was no

⁸⁶ (CA) 1/AY/8/86, P.Retief to Campbell, 16 January 1835.


⁸⁷ (CA) CO 4381, Report of Colonel Somerset, 16 January 1835.

⁸⁸ (CA) 1/AY/8/86, P.Retief to Campbell, 16 January 1835.

⁸⁹ (CA) 1/AY/8/55, Erasmus to Campbell, 12 January 1835.

⁹⁰ (CA) CO 4381, Campbell to ?, 2 January 1835; (CA) A519/1, pp.47-9, Chalmers to Armstrong, 1 January 1835.

MAP 4. The War of 1835



chance of peace for the Rharhabe. Harington has described clearly Smith's megalomania and self-delusions, as well as his belief in the intrinsic superiority of Europeans.⁹¹ Smith's argument for rejecting the offer of peace was that the chiefs were not honest as hostilities had not ceased,⁹² and that the aggression must be punished. He intended to take the opportunity to destroy the Rharhabe and get more land and labour. By the time his reply reached Tyali on 15 January, the latter had fled into refuge after his *imizi* had been burnt. The reason for the continuation of some raiding has been explained, but Smith's second point epitomises colonialism. If the victim of expansion retaliates in any way to the onslaught on him, the imperial power may quite legitimately 'punish' him.

Upon his arrival in Graham's Town, Smith removed the unnecessary barricades around the town and immediately began to plan the punishment of the Rharhabe. He had at his disposal upon his arrival a total of 835 men of the Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers, 75th Regiment and Cape Mounted Rifles, that were scattered around the military posts of the Eastern districts,⁹³ as well as an ever-increasing number of Boers, and settler volunteers in groups such as the Mounted Burghers of Albany, the Corps of Guides and the Bathurst Volunteers. There were also Khoi auxiliaries. He was advised occasionally by Cuyler, a veteran of the frontier.⁹⁴ By mid January he had sent patrols of between fifty and two hundred burghers, British troops, settlers and Khoi against Nqeno and Tyali, killing thirty of Nqeno's men, two of his brothers and a son,⁹⁵ and setting fire to all the huts in the Tyhume valley.⁹⁶ Major Cox burnt Tyali's own *umuzi* (situated where modern Auckland is) on 14 January, although Tyali was in a hiding place twelve miles from the mission station. He also secured the

⁹¹ A.L.Harington, Sir Harry Smith - bungling hero (1980). See also Milton, Edges of War, pp.132-3. Smith's summary of the war - BPP, 503 (1837), pp.29-35 - provides a good example of his outlook.

⁹² BPP 252 (1835), p.133, D'Urban to Spring-Rice, 21 January 1835.

⁹³ See Scott, 'British Soldier on Eastern Cape Frontier', p.194, for the troop distribution on the frontier in 1834-5.

⁹⁴ Milton, Edges of War, p.113.

⁹⁵ BPP, 252 (1835), p.134, Smith to D'Urban, 18 January 1835.

⁹⁶ (CL) MS 9037, Minutes of the GMS, p.307.

safety, for the colonists, of the Zuurberg Mountains and upper Bushmans River areas.⁹⁷ It had never been the chiefs' intention to remain there, and the number of Rharhabe who entered the area was minimal.

By 14 January Smith had planned a concerted attack on Rharhabe, as well as Gcaleka, territory that would 'produce a lasting impression upon those Caffres who may survive the war'.⁹⁸ This idea, similar to the campaign of 1819, but much more extensive, was adopted after discussions with D'Urban. It was not secret: Piet Retief, for instance, suggested in mid January that the heavy retributive commando which he had been told of should not last too long, as the three months in 1819 had been tedious.⁹⁹ By 23 January an additional 472 British troops of the Royal Artillery and 72nd Highlanders had arrived in Graham's Town from Cape Town, and D'Urban had arrived to direct operations. It must again be stressed that this massive force was not intended for defence or even just to punish the offending Rharhabe. It was intended for the subjugation of all the Ngqika and Ndlambe, and for the invasion of the Gcaleka. At this stage most of the Rharhabe had been driven out of the Ceded Territory and those who were left were concentrated in the almost impenetrable bush of the Fish River banks and in the Amatole Mountains. By mid January, the Rharhabe around the Keiskamma sources were fleeing en masse.¹⁰⁰ The chiefs, aware that they faced settler invasion, were preparing their people for defence. Few raids were being carried out, apart from a number in the Bathurst region, and the main concern by this stage for the Rharhabe was how to defend themselves against the colonial patrols.

The Rharhabe depended largely upon traditional weapons and manoeuvres in their

⁹⁷ BPP 252 (1835), p.134, Smith to D'Urban, 18 January 1835; (CA) A519/18, pp.40-1, D'Urban to Bell, 6 February 1835; Scott, 'British Soldier on Eastern Cape Frontier', pp.198-9. Harington, Sir Harry Smith does not think that these areas were secured.

⁹⁸ G.M.Theal, Documents relating to the Kaffir War of 1835 (1912), pp.10-14, Smith to D'Urban, 14 January 1835.

⁹⁹ (CA) 1/AY/8/86, P.Retief to Campbell, 16 January 1835.

¹⁰⁰ (CL) Diary of Kayser, 15 January 1835.

fighting, although they were beginning to use European techniques and guns. In 1818 they had had few guns,¹⁰¹ but by 1835 had built up a small collection, which increased during the hostilities. A group of seventy Rharhabe, armed with guns and mounted on horses, were seen in early January;¹⁰² but there were merely one hundred to two hundred guns in total in the possession of the Rharhabe. By August they were able to amass a force of three hundred armed and mounted men.¹⁰³ Many of the Gcaleka, for instance, were barely acquainted with, and scared of, guns,¹⁰⁴ but they began to acquire them soon after 1835.¹⁰⁵ There was a constant settler trade in fire-arms with the Rharhabe that produced a sizeable revenue.¹⁰⁶ Some Graham's Town settlers continued supplying guns to the Rharhabe even in 1835; Holden Bowker claimed that James Howse was still selling fire-arms in February.¹⁰⁷ The effectiveness of most of the guns was limited, as traders usually sold inefficient and obsolete muskets, and the Africans were not trained in weaponry. Gunpowder was still being sold across the border of the Graaff-Reinet district in July, at a rate of a cow for two cups, so a law was passed against it in that month.¹⁰⁸

Patrols were sent out from Graham's Town continuously in January to the frontier regions and across the Fish into the Ceded Territory. In early February, Colonel England was ordered to clear the Fish River bush of all the Rharhabe gathered there. His attempt was hampered by the difficulty of the terrain, the smallness of the colonial force, and his decision to desert his troops and report to Graham's Town. The Fish River follows a winding course, with high outcrops on either side of the river, separated by a flat valley of a few hundred metres. Throughout the valley and on the hills overlooking it

¹⁰¹ D'Urban, in BPP 279 (1836), D'Urban to Spring-Rice, 27 February 1835, said that the Rharhabe had no guns. Peires, House of Phalo, indicates that the Rharhabe possessed firearms as early as 1818.

¹⁰² (CA) 1/AY/9/7, Campbell to ?, 2 January 1835.

¹⁰³ Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, p.120.

¹⁰⁴ As described in (CA) A983, Memoirs of the Kafir War - Caesar Andrews, 14 May 1835.

¹⁰⁵ Peires, House of Phalo, pp.116-7.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., pp.156-7.

¹⁰⁷ (CL) MS 951, Diary of T.H.Bowker, 14 February 1835.

¹⁰⁸ (CA) A519/17, p.19, Notice of Campbell.

there is thick, thorny scrub which provides perfect places for defence and hiding. The area in the bush of most activity in 1835 was that south of Trompetter's Drift, where Nqeno and Qasana had lived. After England's attempt, Smith planned and led a large offensive on the Fish River between Trompetter's and Committee's Drifts, where Bhotumane, Qasana and the old, sickly Nqeno¹⁰⁹ (who had been living just south of Fort Willshire since 1833) were based. This bush provided perfect protection for the nearly two thousand Rharhabe there¹¹⁰ and their guerilla-style warfare, and hampered the British, who were unused to such confined quarters.

Because of its proximity to the Colony, and the need to destroy this strategic stronghold, the area had to be controlled by the British. The Khoi auxiliaries, who seem to have willingly provided canon fodder, proved most useful in this close combat, and their clothes and skin were shredded by the large thorns in the bush.¹¹¹ Phato, the Gqunukhwebe chief now siding with the British, joined Smith there with two hundred men.¹¹² Smith was unable to win a decisive victory¹¹³ and the bush remained a refuge for bands of resistors throughout the year.¹¹⁴ There were a large number of Rharhabe there in late March,¹¹⁵ and twenty-one Rharhabe were reported killed in action there on 12 September.¹¹⁶ The British suffered their heaviest casualties of the year in the bush in February, but made enough advance to drive most of the chiefs into the stronghold of the Amatole Mountains. The preponderance of Khoi deaths illustrates the methods of warfare employed, the Khoi auxiliaries invariably forming the vanguard of attack.

¹⁰⁹ Information on Nqeno is to be found in Theal, Documents relating to the Kafir War, p.50, D'Urban to Bell, 5 February 1835; and Brownlee, Reminiscences of Kaffir life, pp.328-333. Nqeno was about seventy-five years old in 1835.

¹¹⁰ Information of Louis Arnoldus in May in Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, p.63.

¹¹¹ (CA) A983, Memoirs of Caesar Andrews. He was complimentary about the vigour of the Khoi.

¹¹² (CL) MS 951, Diary of T.H.Bowker, 14 February 1835.

¹¹³ See (CL) PR 3563, Reminiscences of Henry James Halse.

¹¹⁴ Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, p.112.

¹¹⁵ (CL) MS 951, Diary of T.H.Bowker, 26 March 1835.

¹¹⁶ BPP 503 (1837), p.258, Moultrie to D'Urban, 12 September 1835.

D'Urban spent February and March in Graham's Town preparing for the massive advance into Rharhabe and Gcaleka territory in April and May. The time spent for this was similar to that spent in preparation for the advance of the troops in 1819, when Col. Willshire led the British and colonial forces well into Rharhabe land, and the land west of the Keiskamma River was annexed as the Ceded Territory. Caesar Andrews, aide to D'Urban, reported that the delay was caused by the outfitting of the Khoi.¹¹⁷ In late February D'Urban wrote to Bell, who had been left in charge of the government in Cape Town, that almost all the Rharhabe who had attacked the Colony seemed to have moved beyond the Buffalo River and to the sources of the Kei, where he intended to 'visit' them.¹¹⁸ D'Urban's information made it clear that most of the Rharhabe men were in the Amatole and that it was the women and children who had moved towards the Kei. The fact that the majority of labour seizures in 1835 were women and children probably underlines D'Urban's real reason for following the fleeing Rharhabe into Gcaleka territory. Did he not move east of the Buffalo chiefly to collect labourers?

The settler view of the war, which was endorsed, supported and in many respects created by D'Urban, gives the impression that the army operations of April and May were relatively haphazard, and that the invasion of Gcaleka territory in particular was a decision of the moment, as was the 'emancipation' of the Fingo and the annexation of the Queen Adelaide Province. These three events, though, were the specific objectives of the colonial forces, and were in fact performed as part of a meticulously-planned and carefully conducted campaign. There has been a long-standing proposal that D'Urban was a tame foil to the energy and expansionist ideas of Smith, to whom has often been attributed the motivation and ideas behind the waging of the war.¹¹⁹ Lancaster's study of D'Urban makes it clear, as does the evidence of this thesis, that D'Urban was a strong controlling figure, who regularly

¹¹⁷ (CA) A983, Memoirs of Caesar Andrews, 20 April 1835.

¹¹⁸ (CA) A519/18, p.51, D'Urban to Bell, 27 February 1835.

¹¹⁹ See for example B.J.Barnard, 'n Lewensbeskrywing van Majoor Henry Douglas Warden', MA Thesis, University of the Orange Free State, 1943, ch.2.

checked Smith's carelessness and over-exuberance. It was he who was the source of the planning of 1835.¹²⁰ Smith in 1847 acknowledged that it was D'Urban's ideas that he was following when he annexed British Kaffraria, the same area which D'Urban had annexed.

By 22 February D'Urban had finished the plans for the invasion, as they were carried out. This specifically included an attack on Hintza and on the Bomvana and as far north as the Mbashe River¹²¹ (see below). Khoi levies were formed into two provisional battalions to accompany the invading force as infantry auxiliaries. When it was advertised in January that Khoi were needed for fighting the response was extensive, possibly because of the hope of reward. Four hundred Khoi were enrolled from colonial volunteers in March; they were to be used in the first line of defence of the Colony.¹²² Smith was impressed by the Khoi, saying that 'more spirited, gallant and able fellows in the bush I never saw, capable of bearing the greatest fatigue, and for future operations this force cannot be too much augmented.'¹²³ They were always effective. The heroic stand of Rademeyer's Boer patrol against overwhelming odds in the Fish River bush in early March, as reported by the apologists,¹²⁴ is described rather differently by Stretch, who took his information from an eye-witness. Simmons of the 72nd, described how the Boers were particularly cowardly, and that it was the accompanying Khoi who fought and defeated the Rharhabe.¹²⁵ Throughout February patrols of soldiers and farmers were sent into the Ceded Territory and western Rharhabe territory with the promise of a can of grog for each dead African.¹²⁶ The intention was now to launch a

¹²⁰ Lancaster, 'Governorship of D'Urban'; see also Cory Rise of South Africa, Vol.3, p.241.

¹²¹ Outlined in BPP 279 (1836), pp.26-7, D'Urban's Orders, 22 February 1835. See also footnotes below 98 and 181.

¹²² BPP 279, pp.24-5, D'Urban to Glenelg, Enclosure No.2, 22 March 1835.

¹²³ Quoted in Harington, Sir Harry Smith, p.24. George Rex to father, 7 May 1835, in Long, Index to Unofficial manuscripts, p.169, had similar praise for the Khoi. Stretch - in Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, p.55 - noted that the Khoi were always placed first in the firing line.

¹²⁴ Graham's Town Journal, 15 May 1835, General Notice 13 May 1835; Godlonton, Irruption of Kafirs, pp. 238-9.

¹²⁵ Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, pp.35-7.

¹²⁶ (CL) PR 3563, Reminiscences of Halse.

concerted attack on the Amatole/Buffalo region, with a sizeable attack on Hintza and the people past the Kei.

The colonial force gathered in late March in four divisions of around eight hundred men in each. Each took up a position along the Ceded Territory; the total force comprised over three thousand armed men, including four hundred regular British soldiers.¹²⁷ A further two thousand troops and settlers remained to defend the Colony against the remote possibility of an attack.¹²⁸ The 1st Division under D'Urban and Smith gathered at Fort Willshire, the 2nd under Somerset at Tyhume, the 3rd under Cox at Fort Beaufort and the 4th, consisting only of Boers and led by van Wyk, met at Tambookie Vlei. The 4th Division moved north-east in order to surround and attack Ntaba ka Ndoda (the highest peak in the Buffalo Mountains range) from behind; for the following two months their brief was to patrol the Amatole Mountains and the area north of the mountains in order to control the northern section of Rharhabe territory. The 3rd Division was intended to maintain pressure on the Rharhabe in the Amatole and Buffalo Mountains and surrounding flats, whilst the 1st and 2nd formed the thrust of the attack against the eastern Ndlambe and Gcaleka.

Smith began with a patrol attack on the Amatole on 29 March, where they took twelve hundred cattle.¹²⁹ The advance of the other three divisions commenced on 31 March. The 1st Division stretched impressively over five miles.¹³⁰ The force gathered at the Debe Flats two days later, and began with a concerted attack on the Rharhabe stronghold in the Buffalo mountains surrounding Ntaba

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp.199-200. The invasion force consisted of 396 British troops, 358 settlers, 761 Khoi auxiliaries and 1639 Dutch burghers. It seems for some reason that the number of Khoi used in the army was deliberately understated. Stretch, Le Cordeur, *Journal of Stretch*, p.55, said that there were 2,100 Khoi auxiliaries. Andrews, (CA) A983, *Memoirs of Caesar Andrews*, also said that there were over two thousand Khoi.

¹²⁸ BPP 279 (1836), p.12, *Return of the Forces upon the Eastern Frontier*, 19 March 1835.

¹²⁹ (CA) CO 4381, Smith to D'Urban, 29 March 1835.

¹³⁰ (CA) A983, *Memoirs of Caesar Andrews*, 31 March 1835; cf. (CL) MS 1272, *Bailie to Jardine*, 18 April 1835.

ka Ndoda.¹³¹ Here for the first time the Rharhabe witnessed the destructiveness of a canon. The chief, Nqeno, apparently just escaped death from a shell.¹³² The Thembu and Gcaleka had seen canon in action at Mbolompo in 1828, so its existence and power were known. Holden Bowker commented on the luxuriance of the vegetation across the Keiskamma and how good it would be for sheep farming.¹³³ This was just what D'Urban's intentions for it were.

After December 1834 the Rharhabe had generally stopped raiding and declared a truce. Some groups of raiders continued to take colonial cattle against the orders of the chiefs. There was an attack on the Koonap River area on 5 March where two thousand sheep were taken;¹³⁴ but raids were increasingly directed at survival and stealing food. The patrols of January showed them that there was to be no immediate peace, and from January women and children fled to the Amatole Mountains and the Fish River bush and east of the Buffalo River.¹³⁵ Maqoma sent his wives, children and cattle to Hintza's land for protection. Most of the Rharhabe cattle were sent to the coast between the Buffalo and the Kei Rivers or beyond the Kei for safety against the patrols. Streams of Rharhabe cattle flowed into Gcaleka land in the first few months of 1835 to be kept under Hintza's protection. Information given to Stretch in mid August was that Bhotumane and his people, and Maqoma's cattle, had been sheltering north of the Mbashe for some time.¹³⁶ This was contradicted by Maqoma's messengers, who said that Bhotumane had remained in the Amatole Mountains.¹³⁷ Stretch is

¹³¹ (CA) A983, Memoirs of Caesar Andrews, 2 April 1835.

¹³² Alexander, Narrative of a Voyage, Vol.2 pp.82-3.

¹³³ See (CL) MS 951, Diary of T.C.Bowker, entry for 31 March 1835; and (CL) MS 1272, Bailie to Jardine, 18 April 1835, for descriptions of the beauty of the country. The colonists commented regularly on the beauty and verdance of the pasturage east of the Fish in 1835. These same areas now form the modern homelands of Ciskei and Transkei - overpopulated, overgrazed and irreparably damaged. The ecological comparison is a severe indictment of the government's 'homeland' policy.

¹³⁴ (CA) 1/AY/8/86, Vaughan to Campbell, 5 March 1835.

¹³⁵ (CL) MS 16,579, Diary of Laing, 13 January 1835; (CA) CO 4381, Brownlee, Station on the Beka River, 6 March 1835; CO 4381, D'Urban to Campbell, 13 April 1835.

¹³⁶ Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, p.123.

¹³⁷ (CA) A519/27, pp.65-70, Information of Fingo women, King William's Town, 23 July 1835.

correct about Maqoma's cattle being sent east, but Bhotumane seems to have remained behind. It is probable that many of these cattle were to be taken by the troops as alleged stolen colonial cattle. A Tswana spy described how Nqeno was warned of the approaching British and how his people and cattle moved from the Keiskamma to the Buffalo in one day while he, being sick, remained concealed in the Keiskamma bush.¹³⁸ The women and children increasingly became the focus of colonial aggression, as the troops attempted both to destroy the morale and logistical support of the men who continued to fight and to capture labourers.

Despite the continued paranoia of the settlers about Rharhabe attacks inside the Colony, there were very few raids after January, and those that took place were chiefly to gather food to replace the rapidly-diminishing Rharhabe supplies.¹³⁹ There were a few groups in the Bathurst and Kat River areas raiding for cattle for survival, an occurrence exaggerated by the Graham's Town settlers.¹⁴⁰ Possibly the biggest Rharhabe victory occurred on 6 March, when Trompetter's Drift was attacked and the camp and ferry across the Fish destroyed and eight colonial men killed.¹⁴¹ Even while the main body of the colonial force was advancing eastwards, a few scattered raids occurred within the Colony, largely in the lower Somerset and lower Albany areas. Ziervogel reported that a total of twenty-three horses, fifty-five oxen and one hundred and thirty-eight cattle were stolen from the Goba/Kaga area north-west of Graham's Town in April, by parties of approximately ten.¹⁴² Colonel England, who had been left in charge of the defence of the Colony, noted in April that there had been no body of Rharhabe entering the Colony south of Graham's Town, and only a few individuals in the north; and some cattle were stolen along the

¹³⁸ (CA) LG 9, pp.124-6, Evidence of April, Bechuana.

¹³⁹ (CA) A519/1, pp.190-2, Stretch to D'Urban, 24 April 1835.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Scott, 'British Soldier on Eastern Cape Frontier', pp.198-9.

¹⁴² (CA) 1/AY/8/55, Ziervogel to Campbell, 15 April 1835.

Koonap River.¹⁴³ In May there were a number of thefts in the Bathurst area.¹⁴⁴ In early May it was claimed that a few cattle were still being stolen near Graham's Town.¹⁴⁵ It is at least as likely that they had strayed. There was no real threat to the Colony throughout 1835.

The effectiveness of the combined troop attack on the Buffalo Mountains on 2-7 April¹⁴⁶ drove the chiefs Maqoma, Tyali, Nqeno, Bhotumane, and Qasana and most of their people north-west to the more inaccessible shelter of the Amatole, and the kloofs of the high banks of the Keiskamma River behind Ntaba ka Ndoda.¹⁴⁷ Most of the Rharhabe, whether involved or supportive of the raids or not, were forced to take refuge with their chiefs or flee eastward in the face of the indiscriminate destruction of the colonial troops. Stretch described how most of the *imizi* in the Amatole and Buffalo areas were virtually deserted, and how 'they [the Rharhabe] appear excessively terrified and at our approach fled to the bush leaving their cattle in our possession...without evincing the least dispossession to oppose us.'¹⁴⁸ They had good reason to be scared: the advancing colonial force was 'burning and destroying everything that came their way'. In some places only the women were left.¹⁴⁹ An unusual occurrence, considering the normal attitude of the authorities, was Goldswain's claim that D'Urban threatened on 3 April to court-marshal him for setting fire to Rharhabe huts.¹⁵⁰ If this is true, it

¹⁴³ (CA) A519/1, pp.159-164, England to D'Urban, 9 April 1835. The Graham's Town residents, though, remained jittery throughout 1835. Stubbs, (CL) MS 7131, p.33, describes an invasion scare in mid-year when hundreds of settlers were trying to cram into the barricaded church.

¹⁴⁴ (CA) A519/1, pp.262-5, England to D'Urban, 14 May 1835.

¹⁴⁵ As claimed by Frederick Rex to his sister, Graham's Town, 7 May 1835, in Long, Index to Unofficial manuscripts, p.169.

¹⁴⁶ For a clear picture of these events see (CA) A983, Memoirs of Caesar Andrews.

¹⁴⁷ (CA) CO 4381, D'Urban to ?, 13 April 1835; see also P.H.Butterfield (ed.), Peace and War on the Frontier 1828-1835: the Journal of Major William Cox (1982), entries for 12 April - 31 May 1835.

¹⁴⁸ (CA) A519/1, pp.190-2, Stretch to D'Urban, 24 April 1835.

¹⁴⁹ Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, pp.46, 49. This was not a new method of warfare - it had been employed by Graham in 1812 and Willshire in 1819, as described in MacLennan, Proper Degree of Terror, ch.15.

¹⁵⁰ Long, Chronicle of Goldswain, p.92, entry for 3 April 1835.

departed from the general strategy of burning Rharhabe fields, grain and dwellings.

The dominance of the European weaponry was clearly demonstrated in the attack on Ntaba ka Ndoda on 5 April. Despite the fact that the Rharhabe held the upper reaches of the rocky outcrops the troops stormed the area in a matter of hours, leaving dead strewn everywhere. Holden Bowker recorded that the Rharhabe had only four guns.¹⁵¹ Barnard described the attack in clear detail,¹⁵² but concluded surprisingly that it was not particularly successful, as most Rharhabe escaped and only minimal cattle were taken. This view is in stark contrast to the eye-witness accounts of Andrews, Alexander, Shepstone, Halse, Bowker and D'Urban, who describe a complete massacre. The Khoi leader Louis Arnoldus (a deserter from the Cape Corps who had joined the Rharhabe) was captured, as was his elephant gun, and he proved a useful source of information.¹⁵³ Despite his plea-bargaining for acquittal in return for information, he was executed a few weeks later, after he had told all he knew about Maqoma and his actions.¹⁵⁴ There are conflicting reports on the results of the attack on Ntaba ka Ndoda, but at least four thousand Rharhabe cattle were taken,¹⁵⁵ and Stretch felt that many more could have been gleaned had Smith not been so impatient to attack.¹⁵⁶

There was a second combined attack on the ravines of the upper Buffalo River on 9-10 April, in an attempt to trap Rharhabe escaping from Ntaba ka Ndoda. Cox and his 3rd Division were left to continue the onslaught on the Debe/

¹⁵¹ (CL) MS 951, Diary of T.H. Bowker, 7 April 1835. Goldswain, who is a less reliable witness, thought that they had many more guns; see Long, Chronicle of Goldswain, p.92.

¹⁵² Barnard, 'Lewensbeskrywing van Warden', ch.2.

¹⁵³ Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, p.63. Arnoldus' role and fate are described well in Alexander, Narrative of a voyage, Vol.2, pp.82-5.

¹⁵⁴ See (NA) A96, Papers of Theophilus Shepstone: diary for 1835, entry for 7 April 1835. Shepstone describes the capture of Arnoldus and his gun. He makes it clear that the British had always intended to hang Arnoldus.

¹⁵⁵ BPP 279 (1836), p.28, Dutton, Official Notice, 3 April 1835, where it was claimed that fifteen thousand were taken.

¹⁵⁶ Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, p.52.

Buffalo Poorts/ Buffalo mountains area, while the other divisions moved into other areas. The Boers of the 4th Division, having joined in the onslaught on the Buffalo, were then sent back to concentrate on the Tyhume, Amatole and northern region. The 2nd Division set off down the Buffalo River to the sea, collecting cattle and corn, and seizing women and children, torching huts and killing Rharhabe as they went.¹⁵⁷ They arrived at Butterworth via this circular route on 20 April, although suffering motivational and logistical problems.¹⁵⁸ Despite this, they managed to capture seven thousand cattle and kill seventy-two Ndlambe.¹⁵⁹ The 1st Division had in the meantime moved straight towards Gcalekaland, crossing the Kei on 15 April. This was much to the consternation of the resident Gcaleka¹⁶⁰ who had until this point, according to D'Urban, been neutral in the 'war'.¹⁶¹ Two days later the troops camped outside Butterworth, near the old *komkhulu* of Hintza.

The reasons for D'Urban's invasion of Gcaleka territory have never been questioned. More importantly, the events of late April have seldom been regarded as an invasion. The settler version was that D'Urban's attack on Hintza was justified retribution for Hintza's role as mastermind of the Rharhabe 'irruption'. The assumption critical to this explanation - that Hintza was the politically authoritative paramount, and must therefore have been in charge - has already been shown to be incorrect.¹⁶² Each of the Rharhabe chiefs had independence to make their own political decisions. Why did D'Urban attack Hintza? Barnard suggested that, 'die werklike motief vir die skielike vyandigheid teen die Gcaleka-opperhoof was 'n sug na goedkoop militere roem, 'n onversadigde beeste-honger en boweal, die noodlottige beleid

¹⁵⁷ See for example, (CA) A519/1, pp.151-3, Somerset to D'Urban, 7-8 April 1835; (CA) GH 19/4, D'Urban to Somerset, 8 April 1835; A519/1, pp.185-7, Somerset to D'Urban, 20 April 1835.

¹⁵⁸ (CA) A519/1, pp.177-180, Somerset to D'Urban, 17 April 1835.

¹⁵⁹ (CL) MS 951, Diary of T.H.Bowker, 18 April 1835.

¹⁶⁰ As described in (CL) MS 1272, Bailie to Jardine, Butterworth, 18 April 1835.

¹⁶¹ BPP 503 (1837), Glenelg to D'Urban, 26 December 1835.

¹⁶² See Chapter 2, pp.33-4.

van uitbreiding en anneksasie.¹⁶³ Peires suggested that D'Urban's intention was merely to take Hintza's cattle as a 'soft option', rather than deal with the Rharhabe in the Amatole.¹⁶⁴ But the reasons are more complex than either of these interpretations. He is still regarded as an African hero, who was maltreated by the whites.¹⁶⁵ Hintza's situation needs to be understood within the context of his relations with the Colony in the previous decade and a half.

According to Willshire, Hintza was involved in the hostilities of 1819. The colonial forces moved right up to the Kei in October of that year, and Hintza was summonsed to appear before Willshire; but he sent his brother, Burhu, in his place because he feared capture.¹⁶⁶ White traders began trading east of the Kei on a regular basis in the early 1820s. A mission - Butterworth - was set up near Hintza's *umuzi* by Shrewsbury in 1827. Hintza was at first unhappy with the idea when suggested in 1826, but by the following year was prepared to accept one; he remained suspicious of the missionaries, however. In 1828 he had joined the British and Thembu at Mbolompo in defeating the Ngwane, where he witnessed the fire-power of the British, which re-inforced the wariness he had of them which he had exhibited in 1819. He had since refrained (unlike the Thembu and Mpondo) from entering into even a casual alliance with the Colony, preferring to retain his autonomy. Colonial power was a threat, and when a commando attacked a settlement on the Buffalo River in 1829, there was much consternation in Butterworth.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶³ Barnard, 'Lewensbeskrywing van Warden', ch. 2. Translation: 'the real motive for the sudden aggression against the Gcaleka paramount was a desire for cheap military fame, an insatiable cattle-hunger and above all, the urgent calls for punishment and annexation.'

¹⁶⁴ Peires, *House of Phalo*, p.109.

¹⁶⁵ See for example the speech given by Nelson Mandela on his release from prison in 1990: 'I greet the traditional leaders of our country. Many among you continue to walk in the footsteps of great heroes like Hintsa...', *The Daily Despatch*, 12 February 1990.

¹⁶⁶ *Cape Town Gazette and African Advertiser*, 23 October 1819, "News from the frontier".

¹⁶⁷ S.Kay, *Travels and Researches in Caffraria: describing the character, customs, and moral condition of the tribes inhabiting that portion of Southern Africa* (1833), p.302.

John Ayliff replaced Stephen Kay, who had taken over at Butterworth for a year, in 1830. He was enthusiastically met by Hintza's councillors, with enquiries as to the health of the English king and offers of help and co-operation.¹⁶⁸ Hintza invited him around to his *komkhulu* soon after his arrival, presented him with a white ox (a symbol of respect), and for two years the two lived amicably. During Ayliff's entire period at Butterworth, Hintza allowed him occasionally to preach to large gatherings at the royal *komkhulu*, and he was unhampered in his itinerant prozelytising.¹⁶⁹ From 1832, though, Hintza began to become upset with Ayliff's challenges to his authority, although each outburst was followed by an apology and a gift. Hintza was trapped. He needed Ayliff, not as a spiritual guide, but as a source of European commodities and guns, and to mediate with the Colony.¹⁷⁰ But he was being undermined by him at the same time.¹⁷¹ Unfortunately for Hintza, his missionary was not like Read, who argued regularly in support of his chief. Ayliff was unquestionably pro-Colony.

In the following two years Hintza became increasingly uneasy, with the evictions of his Rharhabe neighbours. By mid 1834 Ayliff was becoming a problem for him. Coupled with this was the colonial outcry over the murder of the trader Purcell in July 1834, just east of the Kei, for which Hintza was blamed for indirect responsibility. Hintza showed surprising deference to

¹⁶⁸ For examples of his welcomes, see (CA) A80, Ayliff diary, entries for 7, 8, 10, 26, 27 October, and 6 November 1830.

¹⁶⁹ (CL) MS 15,704, Minutes of the AGMs of the Wesleyan Methodist Preachers in the Albany District, Report of Ayliff, 1831, where Ayliff stressed Hintza's friendliness and the freedom given to him. Three of Hintza's daughters were attending Mrs Ayliff's sewing lessons; see also (CA) A80, Ayliff diary, entries for 9 and 10 November 1830, for Ayliff's preaching at Hintza's *komkhulu* and the latter's respect for the service. On 8 December 1831, Ayliff commented that Hintza 'saluted me in his usual friendly way'.

¹⁷⁰ In (CA) A80, Ayliff diary, entry for 29 October 1830, Hintza quite openly said that he wanted a missionary purely to tell the Colony of his good behaviour. His request to Ayliff for guns was refused, see entry for 12 June 1833.

¹⁷¹ In (CA) A80, Ayliff diary, entries for 24 August 1832, 30 March and 9 September 1833, 2 March and 11 July 1834, Ayliff stated clearly that his intention was to undermine Hintza and divide the Gcaleka. He accepted converts to the station on condition that they 'renounce the bad practices of the Caffirs', see entry for 28 June 1831.

colonial laws, and fear of the authorities; when, for instance, a Khoi man was killed in his country in 1832, he got Ayliff to write to Graham's Town to apologise. He showed much concern for the colonial authorities in 1834 after the death of Purcell, urging Ayliff to write a full report of his efforts to find the murderer.¹⁷²

Anti-Hintza feeling in Graham's Town was becoming increasingly strident, led by the Graham's Town Journal. By September 1834, he decided to move further from the Colony, northwards to the Amava area on the upper Tsomo River, a tributary of the Kei. The trader Rowles complained in December that Hintza had become aggressive towards whites in late 1834, and that after he moved to the Amava his people mistreated the traders.¹⁷³ Hintza was moving closer to the group of Boers in the area, to whom he had granted land¹⁷⁴ (on the Thembu border), and away from any colonial threat. These Boers, among them Louis Trichardt, were strongly anti-British, and had moved out of the Colony with their slaves in protest at the Cape regulations on the treatment of labourers. They adopted much of the Gcaleka mode of life, and during 1835 supplied arms and ammunition to the Rharhabe and encouraged continued fighting against the Colony.¹⁷⁵ D'Urban later argued that this move proved Hintza's involvement, as he was moving to the Amava to be in better communication with Maqoma in the Amatole.¹⁷⁶ But Hintza moved northwards to the Amava area six months before

¹⁷² (CA) A80, Ayliff diary, entries for 13 March 1833 and 6 August 1834. A white trader, Hanger, shot a Gcaleka man at the Knubo River in 1830, but Hintza waited for the colonial authorities to punish him, see entry for 6 December 1830; see also entry for 21 March 1832 for further examples of his submission to colonial law.

¹⁷³ BPP 503 (1837), pp.212-3, Deposition of John Rowles to resident magistrate, 17 December 1834.

¹⁷⁴ This is also Stretch's opinion, see Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, p.59. For descriptions of these Boers, see Peires, House of Phalo, p.118; Peires, 'The British and the Cape'.

¹⁷⁵ Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, p.120; (CL) MS 16,579, Diary of Laing, entry for 1 September 1835; Peires, House of Phalo, p.94. cf. Smith's comments on Trichardt in (CL) MS 2033, Correspondence of D'Urban: Boer emigration, p.31; and BPP 503 (1837), p.34. In (CA) A519/3, p.19, Ziervogel to Campbell, 30 September 1835, the Somerset civil commissioner describes a patrol sent out in September to capture Trichardt. He escaped and became a legendary Great Trek leader and exalted Afrikaner nationalist figure.

¹⁷⁶ (CA) CO 4381, D'Urban to Campbell, 13 April 1835.

Maqoma moved into the Amatole, which was a defensive, not offensive position. More importantly, Hintza specifically asked Ayliff to move with him on a number of occasions.¹⁷⁷ He needed the missionary for protection, and to communicate with the Colony.

Then in December 1834 came the 'irruption'. The first person to implicate Hintza in the attacks was Campbell. He decided on 23 December that Hintza was responsible. He had no evidence at all - the first attacks had only just begun - but he wrote to D'Urban immediately to assure him of Hintza's complicity. D'Urban received the letter on 5 January 1835, and in turn sent the same message to Spring-Rice in London.¹⁷⁸ Campbell insisted again on 2 January that there were chiefs other than those of the Ngqika and Ndlambe involved, and that Hintza was masterminding it all.¹⁷⁹ But there is ample evidence that he had no role on what for him was a distant frontier¹⁸⁰ and was, instead, the victim of British aggression.

Read wrote to Philip on 5 January to say there was no reason to believe that Hintza had anything to do with Tyali, a belief which was echoed by Piet Retief.¹⁸¹ According to William Shepstone, Phato sent a message to Hintza in late December to inform him of the hostilities, which Hintza had not heard of.¹⁸² When Piet Uys called in at Hintza's *umuzi* on 15 January on his return from Natal, Hintza stressed that he had played no part in the hostilities.¹⁸³

¹⁷⁷ When he moved to the Amava area initially in September 1834, Hintza asked Ayliff to accompany him on two occasions, see (CA) A80, Ayliff diary, entries for 3 and 7 September 1834. When Ayliff moved to Clarkebury, he threatened to attack the Thembu for 'stealing' his missionary, see (CA) A80, Ayliff diary, 3 March 1835.

¹⁷⁸ (CA) GH 23/11 p.94, D'Urban to Spring-Rice, 5 January 1835. D'Urban noted that his information was based on Campbell's note of 23 December 1834, which reached D'Urban on 5 January 1835.

¹⁷⁹ (CA) CO 4381, Campbell to D'Urban, 2 January 1835.

¹⁸⁰ Stressed in (CA) A519/1, p.67, Read to Philip; and Alexander, Narrative of a voyage, Vol.2, p.42.

¹⁸¹ (CA) A519/1, p.67, Philip to D'Urban, 18 January 1835; (CA) 1/AY/8/86, P.Retief to Campbell, 16 January 1835.

¹⁸² (CA) CO 4381, W.Shepstone to Campbell, 2 January 1835.

¹⁸³ Alexander, Narrative of a voyage, Vol.2 pp.42-3; (CA) A558, Journal of Rev. W.C.Davis, entry for 17 January 1835.

Laing said, ironically, that Hintza was being attacked by 'Fetcani' from the east, and that he sent men in early January to ask for Ngqika support against these attacks.¹⁸⁴ Platjie, a prisoner at Somerset, claimed upon first questioning in February that he was a Gcaleka who had joined the invasion. He later acknowledged that he was an Ndlambe who had come to steal sheep in early January, but whose group had been shot by Boers. He admitted that Tyali had instigated the war, that Nqeno's people committed most murders, and that Maqoma, Bhotumane, Mqhayi, Mhala and other Ndlambe were involved, but not Hintza. He added that all stolen cattle were sent to the Buffalo (not the Kei).¹⁸⁵

The trader Richard Walker in Butterworth claimed in February that thousands of colonial cattle were streaming into Hintza's country, and that the Gcaleka were moving to the Amava to make space for the Rharhabe.¹⁸⁶ How it was possible for Walker to distinguish between colonial cattle, and Rharhabe cattle being sent to Hintza for safe-keeping is unclear. In times of hostility cattle were often sent to a neighbour for safe-keeping. Hintza sent his cattle to the Thembu in 1819, and in 1835 Nqeno sent his to Phato. Four thousand cattle arrived in Graham's Town on 17 April, very few of which were colonial, which supports the assertion that few colonial cattle were taken by the Rharhabe. But Godlonton distorted the explanation. He claimed that it showed that the Gcaleka had sent all the colonial cattle further eastwards. This, he said, was reason enough to continue taking cattle from the Rharhabe, and to attack the Africans further east.¹⁸⁷ Soga also suggested that the reason why cattle had been moving eastwards in early 1835 was that the Rharhabe were sending their cattle to Hintza for protection from the colonial raids.¹⁸⁸

D'Urban arrived on the frontier, and was faced with a decision about Hintza.

¹⁸⁴ (CL) MS 16,579, Diary of Laing, entry for 13 January 1835.

¹⁸⁵ (CA) 1/AY/8/55, Ziervogel to Campbell, 1 February 1835.

¹⁸⁶ BPP 503 (1837), p.214, Statement of Richard Walker, 9 February 1835.

¹⁸⁷ Graham's Town Journal, 17 April 1835, Godlonton editorial.

¹⁸⁸ Soga, South-Eastern Bantu, p.174.

Campbell remained emphatic that Hintza was guilty, and he and Smith were strongly in favour of as much expansion as possible. Further, an independent paramount with apparent control of a huge area to the immediate east of the Colony's boundaries was a potential threat to colonial hegemony that could not be allowed to remain.¹⁸⁹ But if Hintza could be persuaded to ally with the Colony, much military cost would be saved. Ayliff and Davis thus went to Hintza on 15 and 16 January to find out what his attitude towards the Colony was. He treated them in a kindly way, assured them that he had only friendly intentions towards the whites, and gave them an ox as a token of friendship.¹⁹⁰ This, at the time when he was supposedly master-minding a concerted attack on the Colony. With the positive response of the missionaries, van Wyk was sent in January, and again in February, to test Hintza's attitude towards the Colony. Smith's order was to urge Hintza to attack the Rharhabe from the rear.¹⁹¹ In early February Hintza acceded to the colonial demands, and offered a thousand men to fight the Rharhabe.¹⁹² But he soon vacillated. The Rharhabe were his people; how could he attack them? More importantly, if the Rharhabe were defeated, the colonial boundary would become the edge of his own territory, and he would suffer in the same way they had. Whatever the reason, Hintza did not wish to be involved in the hostilities.¹⁹³

D'Urban was prepared for non-compliance with his demands. While he was making plans in January and February for the invasion of the Rharhabe and the annexation of their land, he also made plans for asserting authority over

¹⁸⁹ Soga, South-Eastern Bantu, saw D'Urban's intention as destroying Xhosa cohesion.

¹⁹⁰ (CA) A558, Journal of Davis, entry for 17 January 1835.

¹⁹¹ BPP 503 (1837), p.213, van Wyk to Smith, 25 January 1835; Ibid., p.213-4, Smith to van Wyk, 1 February 1835.

¹⁹² BPP 503 (1837), p.214, van Wyk to Smith, 12 February 1835.

¹⁹³ van Wyk, in BPP 503 (1837), pp.215-6, van Wyk to Smith, 12 February 1835, suggested that Hintza was weighing up which side to join; and Bonatz, Ibid. 503 (1837), p.180, Bonatz to Armstrong, 3 March 1835, told Armstrong that a similar rumour persisted; Armstrong, Ibid. 503 (1837), p.216, Armstrong to Smith, 13 February 1835, suggested that they encourage Hintza to join them, with a show of strength.

Hintza by attacking him, if necessary.¹⁹⁴ It is less than co-incidental that Ayliff left Butterworth for Clarkebury in February, precisely at the time at which D'Urban and Smith were formulating their plans to attack Hintza. D'Urban had not finally decided to attack the Gcaleka, but had left room for Hintza to become an ally, like the Mpondo. He must either be a clear supporter of the Colony or subjugated. But Hintza chose to retain his independence. He was very worried about the advance of the Europeans, and was trying to halt them before his territory. Christiaan Muller, one of van Wyk's Boers, spoke to Hintza in February, who was confused as to why some Boers were fighting and others (his allies on the Tsomo) were not. He offered the restoration of all Boer cattle in three days if they would stop.¹⁹⁵

Before Hintza was attacked, D'Urban intended to have him surrounded by colonial allies. Hintza's position was endangered by his immediate neighbours, the Thembu and Mpondo, with whom relations in the previous decade had been unstable.¹⁹⁶ Ngubengcuka (or Vusani), the Thembu chief, had not returned Hintza's cattle after they had been sent to him for safe-keeping during the war of Ndlambe in 1818/19, when the British attacked the eastern Ndlambe. Hintza had then allied with the Bomvana, who had recently moved south, in a war against the Thembu, and a few years later had taken cattle from the Thembu whilst they were fighting their neighbours, the Bhaca.¹⁹⁷ In 1830 Ngubengcuka died and Vadana took over as regent for Mtirara. He was particularly pro-

¹⁹⁴ Macmillan, Bantu, Boer and Briton, p.110; also cf. Chapter 3 above, footnotes 98 and 121. In (CA) CO 2756, Campbell to D'Urban, 29 January 1835, Campbell suggested that D'Urban annex all the land up to the Kei. D'Urban replied that he agreed, and thought that Natal should be annexed at the same time.

¹⁹⁵ BPP 503 (1837), pp.216-7, Armstrong to D'Urban, 21 February 1835.

¹⁹⁶ Hintza also had a long-standing dispute with his brother, Burhu; see Kay, Travels and Researches in Caffraria, p.502; and (CA) A983, Memoirs of Caesar Andrews, 2 and 17 May 1835; and BPP 503 (1837), pp.226-230, Ayliff to D'Urban, 19 June 35.

¹⁹⁷ Kay, Travels and Researches on Caffraria pp.269-270; see (CL) MS 17,119, Testimony of E.G.Sihele on Thembu, for a description of relations between the Thembu, Gcaleka, Bhaca and Bomvana in the 1820s and 1830s, although the chronology is vague. See Peires, 'History of the Xhosa', p.194 for the slightly changed alliances in 1832.

British and retained the casual alliance forged with the Colony in 1828.¹⁹⁸ The Mpondo had sided with the Thembu against the Gcaleka in the cattle dispute, and they too had an alliance with the Colony. Ayliff had visited Faku in October 1834 (claiming he saw thirty thousand warriors there), presumably in order to lay the foundations for an alliance. Ayliff was in close contact with the Colony and between July 1834 and February 1835 had 'a very lengthy correspondence with the Government authorities'.¹⁹⁹ He was informing them of the movements of Hintza and his neighbours.

In February the Wesleyan missionary Davis was sent to Faku and Vadana to secure the support of the Mpondo and Thembu against the Gcaleka from the east,²⁰⁰ virtually surrounding Hintza.²⁰¹ H.F.Fynn, who had visited Faku on various occasions, was sent in March, via Port Natal, to remain with Faku, in order to ensure that he attack the Gcaleka.²⁰² Hintza probably did not realise the extent of the forces against him, but by April it was too late to capitulate. It is unclear when D'Urban finally decided to invade Hintza, but it was probably when van Wyk returned from visiting Hintza for the third time, in March, to say that Hintza did not appear to be willing to side with the British.

War was officially declared (the European convention which the Colonial Office recognised, but which was meaningless to the Africans) on Hintza only on 24

¹⁹⁸ See (CL) MS 17,119, Testimony of E.G.Sihele, p.65, where Sihele describes Vadana's attitude towards the Colony.

¹⁹⁹ (CL) MS 15,543, Sketch of Fingo History, Ayliff, 1853, p.19.

²⁰⁰ BPP 279 (1836) p.17, D'Urban to Aberdeen, 19 June 35; (CA) A558, Journal of Davis; Theal Documents relating to the Kaffir war, pp.71-3.

²⁰¹ (CA) A558, Journal of Davis, entry for 8 October 1835. Alliances were particularly fluid, and soon after Davis left Clarkebury in May and Hintza surrendered, a body of Sotho with horses and guns attacked Vadana. Faku, accompanied by a white man (possibly Fynn) subsequently attacked the Thembu three times that year without success.

²⁰² Alexander, Narrative of a voyage, Vol.2, p.46; see also D.G.L.Cragg, 'The relations of the AmaPondo and the colonial authorities (1830-1886)', D.Phil. Thesis, Oxford University, 1959, p.38. In (CA) A519/17 p.111, D'Urban congratulated Faku on being such a good ally. H.F.Fynn regularly appears - he was given 110 pounds for 'secret service' work in 1835, which D'Urban refused to explain to Glenelg, see A519/29 p.102.

April. But by that time an invasion force of one and a half thousand colonial troops, with guns and canon, had been camped in the heart of Hintza's territory for ten days. The crucial question is what so many fully armed troops were doing in foreign territory for so long? D'Urban only described Hintza's supposed collaboration, as a reason for war, much later in 1835. When he declared war on 24 April, the stated reasons were that: Hintza had not replied to the messages sent with van Wyk from D'Urban in February and March demanding that Hintza ally with the Colony and supply warriors to fight the Rharhabe; the trader Purcell in 1834 and colonist Armstrong in April 1835 had been killed; and violence had been committed against Ayliff and British traders. For this, compensation of one thousand horses and fifty thousand cattle was demanded.²⁰³

None of these complaints is valid. D'Urban's demand that Hintza ally himself with the Colony against his people was unacceptable for him;²⁰⁴ Hintza had sent the murderer of Purcell into the Colony and Armstrong had been drunk; and Ayliff exaggerated his own danger, with no reason for Hintza to be involved. Glenelg was, not surprisingly, confused as to why D'Urban attacked Hintza, as D'Urban had written to him in March to say that Hintza had nothing to do with the hostilities, and that the war would be over in a month.²⁰⁵ A month later D'Urban led his troops in an attack on the Gcaleka, hundreds of kilometers beyond the colonial border. He then repeated Campbell's claims of late December that Hintza had caused the whole war.

D'Urban now needed to convince Glenelg that the invasion of Hintza had been justifiable and necessary. Evidence was collected to prove Hintza's involvement in the war. Taken at face value, it seems to implicate him in the hostilities.²⁰⁶ The chief evidence for Hintza's involvement comes from April,

²⁰³ BPP 279 (1836), pp.33-6, D'Urban's statement to Hintza, 29 April 35.

²⁰⁴ BPP 503 (1837), p.213, van Wyk to Smith, 25 January 1835.

²⁰⁵ BPP 503 (1837), Glenelg to D'Urban, 26 December 1835.

²⁰⁶ BPP 503 (1837), pp.212-244; see also Cory, Rise of South Africa, Vol.3, pp.53-5.

a Tswana servant who had joined Nqeno's men in December 1834 after they attacked the farm where he worked. He claimed that Hintza had sent a huge number of men into the Colony and controlled hostilities, had ordered Maqoma and Tyali to attack Fort Willshire, and that all colonial cattle were sent to his country for safe-keeping.²⁰⁷ It is enlightening to note that D'Urban regarded April's information very selectively. That condemning Phato was claimed to be false, whilst that implicating Hintza was highlighted as correct.

In 1836 Tyali, Maqoma, Nqeno and an 'anonymous chief' blamed Hintza for instigating the war, and this evidence has been paraded as irrefutable proof of his participation. But this evidence, and especially that of the 'anonymous chief' who said that Hintza planned the war from mid 1834, cannot be seriously considered. The Rharhabe chiefs all repeated to Smith that Hintza was deceitful and deserving of death, that the British were justified in all that they did in 1835, that little damage was caused by the Colony, and that their 'people are now very happy; never were so happy as now; we have all faith in Smith, and love him with all our hearts.'²⁰⁸ These statements were taken by Smith in the military head-quarters in King William's Town, from men he had conquered and humiliated, and probably co-erced. If all the blame could be laid at the feet of the dead Hintza, the Rharhabe chiefs might be able to get land or provisions concessions from the British. It was also precisely the sort of support which he and D'Urban needed to defend themselves against Glenelg (see Chapter 6).

The advance into Gcaleka territory in April involved the strongest section of the colonial force - only half was left to fight the people (the Rharhabe) who were hostile to the Colony. This huge force of over fifteen hundred men camped menacingly in the middle of the Gcaleka, next to Hintza's old *komkhulu*. The

²⁰⁷ (CA) LG 9, pp.110-123, Evidence of April, Bechuana, 19 February 1835.

²⁰⁸ BPP 503 (1837), pp.231-2, 234, 237, Depositions of: 'a great chief', 23 April; Maqoma, 28 April; Tyali, 4 May; and of Nqeno, 23 May 1836.

Butterworth mission had not been burnt, contrary to Ayliff's fears.²⁰⁹ They were officially only on a mission to talk to Hintza, but were the troops not collecting cattle and women and children already? The Gqunukhwebe chief Phato and a contingent of his men arrived in Butterworth on 17 April to 'share in the captured cattle', although he was then sent back to fight the Ndlambe.²¹⁰ Hintza continually delayed seeing D'Urban, who was personally supervising the invasion; he was naturally suspicious of such a large force which threatened him. He remained near the Tsomo River with most of his peoples' cattle. Inebriation seems to have been the order of the day amongst the colonial invaders in Butterworth; alcohol resulted in two deaths. Corporal Kelly fell over a cliff in his drunken stupor, and the settler, Armstrong, was killed after he wandered from camp in a similar state.²¹¹ D'Urban then claimed that the latter had in fact been a messenger on his way to the Colony, and his death was named as the official pretext for war. On 24 April D'Urban declared war on Hintza, after having been camped in his territory for ten days, and large-scale pillage began. D'Urban needed an official reason to explain his presence in alien territory, and to be able to cover the seizure of 'Fingo'.²¹²

The troops moved rapidly north towards Hintza's headquarters near the Tsomo Mountains, accompanied by two hundred and fifty military Fingo. They adopted a zig-zag course as they collected cattle and burnt huts and crops. At the same time Captain Warden attacked the Gcaleka from Clarkebury in the east with five thousand Thembu under Vadana (who wanted British aid against Ncapayi and

²⁰⁹ (CL) MS 951, Diary of T.H.Bowker, entry for 17 April 35; see also (CL) MS 1272, Bailie to Jardine, 18 April 35; and Alexander, Narrative of a voyage, Vol.2, ch.21, describes how the Khoi with the colonial forces destroyed Ayliff's garden. The mission was only burnt after the murder of Hintza.

²¹⁰ (CA) A983, Memoirs of Caesar Andrews, 17 April 35; (CL) MS 1272, Bailie to Jardine, 18 April 35.

²¹¹ For descriptions see (CL) MS 951, Diary of T.H.Bowker, entries for 13-24 April 1835. Shepstone, (NA) A96, Shepstone diary, entry for 27 April 1835, blamed Armstrong's death on his drunkenness.

²¹² See Chapter 4.

Hintza) and a few Sotho, seizing about four thousand cattle,²¹³ while Somerset remained with his men in Butterworth to co-ordinate the cattle and Fingo brought in. By the time D'Urban arrived back at Butterworth on 1 May, Somerset had all the Fingo collected and in a military camp on the Ndabakazi River between Butterworth and the Kei. Ayliff and the missionaries then joined the military camp on 3 May, having had nothing to do with the collection of the Fingo. The missionaries were brought back from Clarkebury, where they had gathered in late April, by Warden and his troops, with five hundred followers from their stations.²¹⁴ By April 1835 Vadana was concerned that he had seriously alienated the Gcaleka and would suffer later, and asked the British for promises of protection.²¹⁵ Faku's offer of men to attack the south-eastern Gcaleka was not taken.²¹⁶

The area between the Tsomo and Xolobe Rivers - tributaries on the upper reaches of the Kei - and west of the Kei, was then systematically stripped of cattle by the 1st Division, now split up into smaller units to obtain more booty. Most of the inhabitants seem to have deserted their huts (which were set alight) and fled either to Hintza in the mountains or west across the Kei. Most of their cattle were sent north-east of the Tsomo, or down to the coast and east across the Mbashe River. Hintza just escaped capture in the Tsomo mountains on the 26th, but by the 28th the soldiers were wreaking such havoc that Hintza capitulated and came to D'Urban's camp under a truce. D'Urban had promised him safety if he would come in to talk. But D'Urban reneged on his word: Hintza's retinue was disarmed immediately and the chief was made a

²¹³ Cory, Rise of South Africa, Vol.3, p.137; Alexander, Narrative of a voyage, Vol.2, p.140, says that there were two thousand Thembu, and that they were hesitant to fight.

²¹⁴ The identity of these 'Fingo' is crucial to this thesis. It is dealt with in Chapter 4.

²¹⁵ BPP 503 (1837), p.226, Davis to D'Urban, 21 April 1835. D'Urban intended to alienate the Thembu and Gcaleka, which was why he forced Vadana and Faku to join him against Hintza, see (CA) A519/1, pp.197-200, Warden to D'Urban, 26 April 1835.

²¹⁶ BPP 279 (1836), pp.30-3, Dutton, Official Notice, 27 April 1835. Faku presumably wanted a chance to get cattle.

prisoner on 28 April.²¹⁷

Apart from the fifteen thousand cattle (twenty thousand according to Andrews²¹⁸) seized and innumerable huts burnt, Hintza was forced to sign an agreement to provide the Colony with fifty thousand cattle and one thousand horses, half immediately and the rest within a year. D'Urban claimed that this was in just compensation for the colonial cattle stolen by the Rharhabe and placed under Hintza's care. Where he derived this figure from is unclear. Hintza had no option but to agree, knowing that it was an impossible feat, but fearing death if he refused. According to D'Urban, of the ten thousand cattle taken by Smith in the Tsomo mountains, only about a hundred were identified as colonial.²¹⁹ If D'Urban could only find a hundred, how could he countenance claims of a hundred and ten thousand stolen? D'Urban forced Hintza to send messengers to Maqoma and Tyali so as to force them to accept the peace offered on 6 May by Warden and Cox. He complained that Hintza had in fact warned them not to deal with the British, as he had been made a prisoner. While it is possible that Hintza did warn them, the case provides another example of the over-estimation of Hintza's power; he certainly did not have the control to order the cessation of hostilities.

The movement of troops into Gcaleka territory did more than disrupt the area: it seems to have precipitated a civil war amongst Hintza's people. When D'Urban crossed the Kei on his way to Butterworth, he was met by a large group of people willing to co-operate with the Colony in exchange for land. To the first group he promised the land around Peddie (which belonged to Qasana's Ndlambe) in exchange for a thousand men. These men were then used as

²¹⁷ (CA) A983, Memoirs of Caesar Andrews, 2 May 1835; (NA) 96, Shepstone diary, entries for 27 and 28 April 1835. Hintza had little reason to trust his captors - Driver offered to speak to D'Urban on Hintza's behalf in exchange for a horse, and when he received it, told Hintza that he would urge his hanging, see (CL) MS 951, Diary of T.H. Bowker, entry for 7 May 35. D'Urban claimed, incorrectly, that Hintza stayed of his own free will, see (CA) GH 19/4, D'Urban, Official Notice, 10 May 1835.

²¹⁸ (CA) A983, Memoirs of Caesar Andrews, 30 April 1835.

²¹⁹ BPP 279 (1836), pp.30-3, Official notices, 27 April 1835.

intelligence gatherers on Gcaleka movements, as messengers, cattle herds, foot soldiers, and to collect cattle and women. They were rewarded with land at King William's Town after hostilities ended. The second group (the Clarkebury group), who arrived in Butterworth at the start of May, were those from the mission stations who had chosen to support the British. They were given land at Peddie and Tyhume supposedly as a buffer for the Colony. The third group were taken, either voluntarily or involuntarily, into the Colony to labour. All three groups were called Fingo (see Chapter 4). The Gcaleka population was estimated in 1837 to number eighty thousand²²⁰ (although this is probably too high) so that a split of seventeen thousand people from the chief's control (twenty percent of his people) would have been a major upheaval. The animosity between the Rharhabe and Gcaleka, and the collaborators did not abate; it led to regular assaults on the land which had been taken from the Rharhabe and turned into Fingo locations, and until recently it fuelled election disputes in modern Ciskei.²²¹

Three important events, which had been planned already, occurred ten days later. On 9 May Somerset and his 1st Division set off for Graham's Town with approximately seventeen thousand Fingo, most of whom were women and children; and the following day D'Urban announced the annexation of all the Rharhabe land, which he named the Queen Adelaide Province.²²² At the same time Smith set out with a patrol of three hundred and fifty men, accompanied by Hintza, with the intention of seizing cattle. Precisely why he took Hintza with him is unclear. Whilst D'Urban wrote that it was Hintza who suggested the patrol in order to get the cattle from his people, Harington has shown that it was Smith's idea and motivation, and that Hintza accompanied him because he had

²²⁰ Estimated population on 'Map of the Eastern Frontier... and the Kaffir tribes', 18 March 1837, in the unaccessioned collection of Royal Engineer Manuscript maps, Wits Africana Library.

²²¹ See Anonymous, 'Ethnicity and Pseudo-Ethnicity in the Ciskei', in L.Vail & L.White (eds), The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa, (1989), for a description of the way in which Lennox Sebe manipulated and created Fingo myths in order to retain power in the 1980s.

²²² Proclamation, 10 May 1835. He later increased the boundary in the north-eastern area to the Stormberg on 16 June 1835, and again on 14 October 1835.

been threatened with removal to Robben Island, and with the confiscation of his land.²²³ It is vital to note that the reason given by D'Urban and Smith for the patrol was that it was intended only to collect the fifty thousand cattle which Hintza had agreed to give them; none of which had yet arrived. They explained it as a momentary decision, based on the failure of the Gcaleka to meet their agreement. But this patrol, like the annexation, was planned in February.²²⁴ What were D'Urban and Smith up to?

The patrol moved rapidly, and by 12 May was at the Nqabara River (halfway between the Kei and Mbashe). Here Hintza was shot in cold blood by George Southey and his body was mutilated after he had attempted to escape from his captors.²²⁵ The removal of his ears had a precedent - Halse spoke of the rewards (normally a can of grog) given by Smith in March to Boers who were able to produce Rharhabe ears as proof of death.²²⁶ Southey's actions were commended in the Official Notice,²²⁷ to which Glenelg later objected. A cover story was thereafter created by Smith,²²⁸ after Dr Campbell in Graham's Town had informed Philip and Buxton of the deed, and a Commission of Enquiry had been appointed. All stood to lose if the truth were exposed, and the witnesses

²²³ (NA) A96, Shepstone diary, entry for 10 May 1835; (CA) A983, Memoirs of Caesar Andrews, 10 May 1835; Harington, Sir Harry Smith, p.42.

²²⁴ BPP 279 (1836), pp.26-7, D'Urban's Orders, 22 February 1835.

²²⁵ Debate has arisen over the death of Hintza. Shepstone, (NA) A96, Shepstone diary, entry for 17 May 1835, says that Hintza cried for mercy. Hintza had been disarmed and shot three times - how could he be a threat? His mutilation and death are described by Stretch - see Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, pp.94-6; and (CL) PR 3563, Reminiscences of Halse. See also Pretorius, 'The British Humanitarians and the Cape Eastern Frontier', for a full investigation; and Peires, House of Phalo, pp.111-2; and J.Naidoo, Tracking down historical myths (1989).

²²⁶ (CL) PR 3562, Reminiscences of Halse.

²²⁷ BPP 279 (1836), pp.48-51, Report of Smith to D'Urban, 18 May 1835.

²²⁸ (CL) PR 3563, Reminiscences of Halse pp.31-2. Halse told Dr Ambrose Campbell of the events, who in turn told Philip. But Halse went into the interior before he could be subpoenaed to the Commission of Enquiry into Hintza's death. 'All the other witnesses being well primed, denied any knowledge of the mutilation, and the enquiry came to an end, much to the annoyance of Dr Campbell who tried, but could not revive it after my return.' Glenelg, in BPP 279 (1836), p.115, Glenelg to D'Urban, 3 February 1835 corroborates Halse's story. See also Peires, House of Phalo, pp.111-2. Smith's cover-up is clear. All the official evidence thus needs to be viewed with the utmost suspicion.

to the commission were rehearsed to swear that Hintza had been aggressive, had run away, and had been killed in self-defence when about to attack his pursuers.²²⁹ Naidoo's hesitant suggestion that the death of Hintza was planned by D'Urban and Smith is not far-fetched.²³⁰ It is in many ways the logical explanation for an event which was so patently surrounded by lies, and which would be quite within the context of the re-interpretation offered here. Naidoo almost withdraws his accusation, as he finds it 'almost inconceivable' that Smith and D'Urban - responsible colonial officials - could engineer the killing of a chief. Yet these are the men who lied on numerous occasions about their actions, and who perpetrated possibly the biggest cover-up in South African history.²³¹

By 13 May Smith had reached the Iqora River, half-way between the Mbashe and Mtata, in his quest for cattle. This was described by the authorities as Gcaleka territory where cattle could be taken to settle the debt owed by Hintza. The area was actually populated by the Bomvana, who were allied to, but separate from the Gcaleka.²³² The Bomvana had settled between the Mbashe and Mtata Rivers under their chief Gambushe in the early 1820s.²³³ During the Thembu-Gcaleka cattle dispute (see above) they allied with the Gcaleka, and had nothing whatsoever to do with the hostilities of December 1834.

The death of White, one of the participants on the commando with Smith, on 14 May reflects the entire spirit of 1835. His memorial plaque in the Cathedral of St. Michael and St. George in Grahamstown describes his death as part of a

²²⁹ After the war, preference was given to the Southeys, the Bowkers and Theophilus Shepstone for land in the newly annexed territory, for their support in the cover-story and for other duties, see Galbraith, Reluctant Empire, p.120.

²³⁰ Naidoo, Tracking down historical myths, pp.80-1.

²³¹ Chapter 4 deals with the extent of their cover-up, specifically with regard to the Fingo.

²³² Thompson, Travels and Adventures, Vol.2, p.190, although he confuses the Bomvana with the Thembu. Cragg, 'Relations of the AmaPondo', p.40, says that there were also Thembu there.

²³³ P.A.Cook, Social Organisations and Ceremonial Institutions of the Bomvana (1931), pp.2-7; (CL) MS 17,119, Oral testimony of Sihele; Wilson and Thompson, History of South Africa (1986), p.177.

heroic effort to defend the Colony against the barbarous attacks of the Caffers. He was in fact over three hundred kilometers from the border of the Cape, and part of a force invading a perfectly innocent people, which took thousands of cattle and pillaged and burnt as it went. He was surprised and killed away from the camp, while carelessly sketching the topography of the Mbashe valley. This was merely a day after Hintza had been murdered. In White's case the Colony was unarguably the aggressor without cause, but the apologists inverted the situation and gave the forces the moral high ground.

Smith's mission lasted a week. The soldiers 'rescued' a thousand 'Fingo',²³⁴ and then returned to D'Urban at the newly-formed Fort Warden, just west of the Kei. Thus, in a neatly-planned campaign which was rapidly executed, D'Urban had moved over the Kei, taken thousands of cattle and 'Fingo', destroyed crops and huts, murdered the Gcaleka chief, and removed the threat of the independent Gcaleka. The infliction on the Gcaleka is reflected in the two hundred cattle sent to D'Urban by Sarhili and Burhu on 10 January 1836. This was all they could afford to pay of D'Urban's demanded fifty thousand. The reasons given were that they had lost thousands of cattle in 1835, and that driving the Gcaleka cattle into the mountains for safety had killed the calves. The fact that a strip of Gcaleka land up to Butterworth was then given to the Colony in lieu of cattle indicates the seriousness of their situation.

In conclusion, it is clear that the settler view of the war of 1835 is completely untenable, and should be inverted in most details. There was no massive 'irruption' in December 1834. There was a series of counter-attacks by a percentage of the Rharhabe, on certain areas, with no intention to overthrow or annihilate the settlers. It was not as destructive as the settlers claimed, and their own losses were exaggerated. Further, it was not 'unprovoked' or surprising. It was a part of an ongoing war between the Colony and the Rharhabe, in which the settlers were the chief aggressors. It was the reaction

²³⁴ See Chapter 4, pp.157-8.

to a lengthy period of dispossession and despoliation. The start of the 'war' was not the Rharhabe response, but the colonial decision in January 1835 to invade the Rharhabe, confiscate their land and extract labourers in the process. Hintza was also ordered to join the Colony, and was invaded because he refused. The biggest army in contemporary African history was employed. It marched easily through Rharhabe territory, devastating whatever it passed. In April the 1st Division crossed the Kei and captured Hintza, continuing its destruction and cattle-theft. By May the Colony was in a strong position: militarily dominant, with new territory and a labour supply in the Fingo.

Chapter 4THE FINGO : THEIR IDENTITY AND MOVEMENTS IN 1835

The arrival of the Fingo in the Colony was the most important event of the year 1835, and the one most shrouded in mystery. The orthodoxy on their appearance and history is rooted in Whiteside's work of 1912, which was derived partly from the writings of Ayliff and D'Urban, and largely from contemporary mythology.¹ The thrust of his argument was that the Fingo of 1835 had moved south-east from 'north-western Natal', and finally into the Colony. This movement was generated firstly by the devastations of Shaka in the Natal region, and then by their ill-treatment at the hands of the Gcaleka, who turned them into slaves. Ayliff claimed that the Fingo numbered 16,800 and were all refugees from Natal. He claimed further that all belonged to the Hlubi, Bhele, Zizi and Reledwane and that they moved voluntarily en masse from Butterworth to Peddie in May 1835, where they settled. Some offered their services as soldiers in the colonial army. Their settlements covered half of the Ceded Territory, where most became peasant farmers, and they acted as a useful buffer between the Colony and the Rharhabe.

As is the case with the most powerful myths, Whiteside's version is based, in certain respects, on truth. There were indeed a few men in 1835 who were called Fingo, who were Ngwane, Hlubi, Bhele or Zizi, and who came originally from the Natal area. There was a Zizi man in the Colony in February 1835 who was called Fingo, who said that he had moved south along the coast; he had lived with the Mpondo from 1825 to 1828, with Hintza until 1832, and with

¹ See Chapter 1, pp.15-19.

Mhala subsequently.² Stephen Kay found a few small groups of Fingo living amongst the Thembu in 1829 and 1830, who occupied a semi-servient position.³ In 1837 the Fingo chiefs said that the Fingo were wanderers, some of whom had settled with Hintza before 1824. They had earned cattle through trade with the Gcaleka, traders and missionaries, and bartered Mpondo ivory at Fort Willshire.⁴ There were Fingo who settled at Peddie, and there were Fingo who fought for the army. Aspects of Whiteside's interpretation are thus in specific cases verifiable.

But these cases were the exception, not the rule. Even in these examples there is not one person who moved from the Mzinyathi River region away from Shaka, down through the 'Transkei' and to Butterworth where he became a slave and converted to Christianity under Ayliff, from where he was rescued by the British and remained permanently at Peddie. Yet this was the route and history claimed for every single Fingo. Of the many thousands of people termed Fingo in 1835, I have been able to trace a total of merely a few hundred who were Hlubi, Bhele, Zizi or Reledwane. Of these there is only one case of a man arriving in the Colony via a slow coastal route - the one quoted above. The contemporary sources are virtually unanimous that those Fingo who came into the Colony from any distance, were directly from the interior - the Caledon River region. There was a group of a thousand men who were employed in the army in 1835 and were called Fingo, but their true identity remains enigmatic. And there was a settlement of Fingo at Peddie, but it was nothing like Whiteside's description. At its most populous - in May 1835 - it had fewer than a thousand inhabitants, most of whom soon left. Most importantly, the majority of the people at Peddie were Thembu, Mpondo and Gcaleka, who were only called Fingo after they arrived at Peddie. These were not successful peasant farmers; they were small, antagonistic groups who had sought protection with the Wesleyan missionaries and who clustered around the safety

² (CA) 1/AY/8/86, Graham's Town gaol report, 22 February 1835. He had joined a raiding party of Mhala's men in December 1834 and was stranded in the Colony.

³ Kay, *Travels and Researches in Caffraria*, pp.133-4.

⁴ (CA) A519/7, pp.101-4, Statement of Fingo chiefs, Bowker to D'Urban, 5 September 1837.

of Fort Peddie, and had to be supplied with provisions by the British. Whiteside is thus dramatically inaccurate in the most crucial aspects of his description of the Fingo and their identity in 1835.

The orthodoxy is distorted in two vital respects. Firstly, Whiteside's interpretation is patently oversimplified, which led to the covering up of the fact that there were different categories of people within the term 'Fingo', and the assumption that all Fingo met Whiteside's description. Secondly, thousands of Fingo became labourers in the Colony in 1835. These labourers spent no time in Peddie (or Natal), but were channelled immediately onto settler farms throughout the eastern districts from May. A list was taken in May, detailing the names and farms of Boers who received labourers, and the number of Fingo allotted to each. The fact that there were Fingo labourers, let alone that there were thousands of them, is not dealt with in the Fingo orthodoxy. Why is that? Perhaps the most startling fact to emerge about 1835, which has not hitherto been noticed, was that the colonial troops were capturing Rharhabe and Gcaleka women and children during the invasion across the Keiskamma River after April 1835.⁵

Who were the Fingo? Four types of Fingo can be pinpointed in 1835: military auxiliaries; mission and refugee collaborators; colonial labourers; and destitute Rharhabe seeking employment. None of these seem to have had interaction with Shaka, and their move into the Colony was rooted in the growth of the Colony and its power, and its explosion in January 1835. The Fingo were not a homogenous group who moved into the Colony together, and each group had different motivations and characteristics.

There were people called Fingo scattered, as individuals, families or groups, over much of the area between the Sundays and Umzimvubu Rivers before 1835. In 1827 the traveller Cowper Rose described a group of refugees gathered around

⁵ The first suggestions that labour seizures were being performed in 1835 came from Julian Cobbing, in lectures at Rhodes University in 1987, and in 'Mfecane as Alibi', p.514.

Butterworth, who were called Fingo.⁶ William Shaw described them in June 1827 as 'Africans of several distinct nations, who, in consequence of wars and commotions in the interior, have been scattered and driven from their native countries, and have sought refuge in the country of Hintsa, who has treated them kindly, and allowed them to settle among his people.' He noted that some came 'from the neighbourhood of the Portuguese settlements on the east coast', in other words 'from the vicinity of Delagoa Bay.'⁷ A month later William Shrewsbury claimed that there were five to six thousand Fingo at Butterworth, all of whom had been 'subdued by Chaka'.⁸ Given subsequent evidence, Shrewsbury's estimate of Fingo numbers is probably too high. Shaw's evidence is crucial in three respects, which contradict Shrewsbury and Ayliff. He says that some Fingo moved originally from near Delagoa Bay. He stresses that Hintza treated them well, as custom dictated for strangers. And he notes that they came, not from the coast, but from the interior.

If Whiteside was correct about the Fingo moving along the coast, they would have had to move right across and through 'Natal', for which there is no evidence. But there is much material to show that those Fingo who were refugees, came from the interior - the modern Orange Free State and western Lesotho region. Ayliff mentioned on a number of occasions that the Fingo were refugees from wars in the interior.⁹ Brownlee met a group of people at Hintza's kraal (Butterworth) in 1822 who had been there for a number of years. He assumed that they were Bechuana or Damara, as they came from north-west of Lattakoo.¹⁰ The wars of the interior, reported Kay in 1829, had forced destitute refugees to the south, where they had been accepted by the Xhosa and Thembu. They were good iron smelters, like the Tswana. He found a Fingo hamlet east of the Mbashe River whose leader was an *isanuze* of Vusani, and who had

⁶ C. Rose, Four Years in Southern Africa (1829), pp.93-5.

⁷ The Report of the Wesleyan-Methodist Society, for the year ending December, 1827 (1828), p.42, Letter from W. Shaw, 19 June 1827.

⁸ Report of Wesleyan Society, p.45, Letter from W. Shrewsbury, 12 July 1827.

⁹ (CL) MS 15,543, Sketch of Fingo history; (CL) PR 3826, Rough Notebook of Ayliff.

¹⁰ Thompson, Travels and Adventures, Vol.2, p.219; cf. Philip, Researches in South Africa, Vol.2, ch 10.

been driven there by war in the interior.¹¹ Somerset said in 1833 that the Fingo came from the north; that they had lived with the 'Goes' north of the Bastards, and had been driven south into the Colony.¹² In October 1835, Judge Menzies, while travelling through the districts of Albany, Uitenhage and George, found 'many "Natives of the Interior of Africa", called, or calling themselves, Fingoes'.¹³

This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis of Cobbing - that there was a movement, amongst others, from Delagoa Bay (away from slavers), into the Caledon area, and then south after Griqua attacks. These 'wars of the interior' were not fratricidal holocausts generated by Shaka and raiding bands. It was the dislocation which resulted from the penetration of Griqua and Coranna slavers and raiders that produced the upheavals in the Transorangian interior referred to. Movement in the interior had been dictated partly by intra-African hostility, but largely by European penetration in search of forced labour. Portuguese slave traders and their African middlemen had begun to have a major impact on the Delagoa Bay/northern Natal hinterland from the 1810s.¹⁴ This increased disruption forced weaker groups - such as the Ngwane, Hlubi, Bhele and Zizi on the Mzinyathi and upper Tugela Rivers - to move, while the stronger groups like the Zulu and Dlamini Swazi were able to grow as defensive states. Components of the weaker groups moved south-west into, amongst other places, the Caledon River area, attempting to escape the disruption caused by the slave raiding. But here again there was no safety, as by the early 1820s bands of armed Griqua and Coranna raiders were penetrating the area from the west, in search of women and children to be captured and sold to colonial farmers as 'apprentices' or 'Mantatees'.¹⁵

¹¹ Kay, Travels and Researches in Caffraria, pp.133-4, 293-4.

¹² (CA) GH 1/97, p.125, Report of Somerset. It is not clear to whom Somerset was referring, but is likely to have been the Ghoya, who were in the northern 'Orange Free State' area.

¹³ (CA) 1/AY/8/24, Judge Menzies to D'Urban, 3 October 1835. Original stress.

¹⁴ Cobbing, 'Mfecane as Alibi', pp.504-7; and Cobbing, 'Grasping the Nettle', pp.8-19.

¹⁵ See Chapter 2, pp.46-7.

A similar collision again occurred, and from here there was a gradual flow moving south throughout the 1820s. They moved individually in different directions, to settle with varying acceptance among the peoples from the Thembu to well into the western parts of the Colony, and were called 'Fingo'. Those who moved south into African polities were incorporated within them with varying status. Almost all Fingo who moved to the Colony became labourers. Civil Commissioner Campbell in 1834 described how 'within a few years back a great influx of Bechuanas, Fingos, Mantatees, and other native tribes have been driven upon the Colony by the devastating wars of the interior, thus affording a valuable supply of servants, who are esteemed as herdsmen and shepherds, beyond what the Hottentots ever were, and who have superceded them in these situations in the District of Albany, and very generally in the District of Somerset also'.¹⁶

The earliest documentation of a Fingo that I have found was in 1824, and by the mid 1830s they were to be found scattered throughout western Rharhabe territory. There were 'Fengus' at Pirie mission station in 1824,¹⁷ who had come from the north where they had been dispossessed by Mantatees. In this case Zizi refugees were surprisingly elided with Mantatees, with specific differentiation between them and 'Fengus'. By 1833 there were one hundred and twenty Fingo at the Kat River Settlement,¹⁸ and Fingo nearby with Bawana of the Winterberg Thembu.¹⁹ Laing spoke of Fingo living near Anta on the upper Keiskamma, and in the Gaga and Buffalo River areas in 1832.²⁰ Two Fingo families, attached to Matwa and expelled from the Mancazana River area with the Ngqika in 1833, decided to move to Burnshill mission.²¹ Kayser, at Knapp's Hope Station near Burnshill, made a few references in 1834 to Fingo who came

¹⁶ (CA) LCA 6, D.Campbell, 4 July 1834, in reply to Philip's complaints about the proposed vagrancy bill.

¹⁷ (CL) MS 2642, Letters of Mrs Ross, April 1824.

¹⁸ (CA) 1/AY/9/7, p.38, Population of the Kat River Settlement, 7 June 1833. There were also 426 Tswana.

¹⁹ (CL) MS 17,119, Testimony of Sihele, p.35.

²⁰ (CL) MS 16, 579, Diary of Laing, entry for 18 September 1833; (CL) MS 9037, Minutes of Presbyterian Meetings, pp.261, 280.

²¹ (CL) MS 9037, Minutes of Presbyterian Meetings, p.261, Report of Laing.

to his mission or worked for him, one of whom had to be given permission by Maqoma to stay with him, as he had escaped punishment.²²

The only group to have maintained cohesion in the move southwards was the Ngwane, who were attacked by the British in 1828 at Mbolompo.²³ In his movements into the Caledon and then south over the Drakensberg, Matiwane had gathered refugees, who became part of his doomed state and assumed the Ngwane identity. A clear case of the elision of the terms Fetcani, Ngwane and Fingo occurred in 1829, when two Fingo came to Butterworth to be married by Kay. The man had been with the Mantatees at Dithakong, whereafter he fled south-east and joined the Ngwane in the Caledon area, whom the woman had already joined. This group of Matiwane's was then forced south by the Griqua dislocation in the area, and was scattered by the British at Mbolompo.²⁴ Precise classification of groups in the 1820s and 1830s is impossible, as each group contained refugees and disparate members. It must be stressed that the couple in question did not see themselves as Fingo until they came into contact with whites in 1829, and their original identities are unknown.

Many of the Ngwane captured in 1828 were taken to Graham's Town involuntarily, from where they 'were distributed amongst the farmers in the Graham's Town District. From there they were distributed amongst the Fingos on the border and in the Eastern Cape.' They were then redefined as Fingo.²⁵ An Ngwane woman, who called herself Fingo, took refuge at Morley in 1829 after she had been taken by a Thembu man as his wife-cum-servant.²⁶ Umjojo, a Fingo in the Graham's Town gaol in February 1835, described himself as an Ngwane who had joined the Thembu in 1831, and had moved to the Ndlambe chief Gasela the

²² (CL) Diary of Kayser, 19 and 22 February, 12 April, 31 May, 25 July, 4 August, 11 September, and 17 October 1834.

²³ Cobbing, 'Mfecane as Alibi', pp.500-3.

²⁴ Kay, Travels and Researches in Caffraria, pp.299-300.

²⁵ Moyer, 'History of the Mfengu', p.605, Evidence of Jacob Tunyiswa. See also Bird, Annals of Natal, Vol.1, p.123, Evidence of H.F.Fynn to Native Commission. Cory, Rise of South Africa, Vol.3, p.165n. interviewed an old Ngwane man who called himself Fingo, and who gave a brief synopsis of Ngwane history, and described all Ngwane as Fingo.

²⁶ Kay, Travels and Researches in Caffraria, p.333.

following year. He and three other Fingo had then formed part of a raiding group of nine who attacked the Colony in December 1834. The other Fingo had gone to the Kat River Settlement and he, for some reason, had given himself up to the Field Cornet at Daka's Flat.²⁷ Ayliff's obfuscation of Fingo identity is reflected in his contradictory claim that all Fingo were chased south from Natal by the Ngwane, and the terms could be interchanged to show that the Fingo were attacked by the Fingo, or that the Ngwane were chased south by Fingo.

It is possible that some of the pre-1835 Fingo were Rharhabe dispossessed in 1812 or 1819, who had moved east for protection, or Thembu and Gcaleka displaced after the 'Fetcani' raids from the Mokhoteli (Sotho) in the 1830s. It is also likely that a number of Fingo were Gonah (a Khoi group), who had been driven east by the expansion of the Colony. The settler Captain Bailie described the Fingo in Butterworth in 1835 as semi-European.²⁸ Ayliff described in detail the history and character of the Gonah in his notes on the Fingo, and the fact that they were living in substantial numbers around Butterworth, placing surprising emphasis on them.²⁹ Nowhere else are they mentioned. The year 1835 provided the turning point for the Fingo: the name was applied to the thousands of Africans of disparate backgrounds who joined the Colony as military auxiliaries or labourers, or who were settled in the Ceded Territory. These groups, along with the pre-1835 Fingo, had little to do with each other, despite their joint false history, but were welded into a 'tribe' in the nineteenth century, a history which in turn was welded into the general 'mfecane' theory.

The etymology of the term 'Fingo' remains elusive. 'Mfengu', the word used to describe the Fingo in modern historiography, is assumed to derive from the

²⁷ (CA) 1/AY/8/86, Statement of Umjojo, Graham's Town gaol, 22 February 1835.

²⁸ (CL) MS 1272, Bailie to Jardine, 18 April 1835.

²⁹ (CL) PR 3826, Rough Notebook of Ayliff. The Gonah suffered greatly from the expansion of the Cape. Sparrman found them living between the Gamtoos and Sundays Rivers at the start of the nineteenth century, from where they moved progressively eastwards, later joining the Gqunukhwebe, and then adopting Rharhabe culture and lineage.

verb 'ukumfenguza', meaning 'to wander about seeking service'.³⁰ This supposedly alluded to the social status of all the Fingo. But if, as Whiteside claimed, the British had saved the Fingo from poverty amongst the Gcaleka and given them all land, why should they need employment, and why should they be destitute wanderers within the Colony? The missionary Laing at Burnshill was virtually the only person to use a derivative of this term contemporarily.³¹ 'Mfengu' only became standardised in the 1960s as an Africanisation of 'Fingo', and the term 'Fingo' has thus been retained in this thesis, as the anglicised word for a British creation. 'Mfengu' should not be used to refer to nineteenth-century Fingo.

Two alternative contemporary definitions of the word 'Fingo' are instructive. A 'Caffer' dictionary of 1857 defines 'iFingo' (pl. amaFingo) as meaning 'to force, urge'.³² This would co-incide with the idea that most of the Fingo were forced into the Colony to work. It also has a Latin form, having a literal meaning of 'to form/shape, or to alter/change (with the intention of untruth)', and a figurative meaning of 'to form by instruction, or to contrive/invent'.³³ Latin was known by a number of missionaries, and the first occurrence of the term Fingo known to me was on the Pirie mission in 1824 (see above). There is a recurring relationship, whereby where there were Fingo there were missionaries. It is not impossible that 'Fingo' was the term applied by missionaries to those who came to the stations; which was then bastardised and adopted as the name for a created tribe. The object of the missionaries was to 'form' or 'alter' the Africans. Were those who did alter called Fingo? Still, the term 'Fingo' is both misleading and unclear, and more research is necessary to establish its precise roots and meaning.

The first amalgamated group of Fingo to appear in 1835 was that which acted as military auxiliaries. According to D'Urban, upon the 1st Division's arrival in

³⁰ Whiteside, History of Abambo, p.15.

³¹ He used variations of it in 1833 and 1834. See (CL) MS 9037, Minutes of Presbyterian Meetings, p.261 - "Umfengu"; and p.280 - "Amafengu".

³² J.L.Dohne, A Zulu/Caffer Dictionary (1857).

³³ C.T.Lewis & C.Short, A Latin Dictionary (1966).

Butterworth, nine hundred and seventy 'Fingo' warriors were offered by the Fingo chiefs to help in the fighting. These Fingo were used in the army for the rest of 1835. Of those used in Gcaleka territory, fifty were sent to Clarkebury, forty helped to ferry cattle between the Tsomo River area and Butterworth, and one hundred and thirty aided Smith in the Tsomo mountains in late April.³⁴ Quite a number acted as messengers,³⁵ and the others were particularly effective in capturing cattle.³⁶ It seems unlikely that these men merely appeared, as the military reports claimed; the British army was not in the habit of summarily adopting untrained, untrusted locals to aid in its operations. There is very little evidence to point to the history or identity of these people.

But, if they needed to be trusted and trained, it is possible that they were Ghona or Rharhabe auxiliaries, who moved east with the army in April. At least seventy Ghona men from the Kat River Settlement were used in the army.³⁷ There were a number of Fingo living and working in the Colony before 1835, who could have been commandeered, and there are references to unnamed auxiliaries and volunteers (separate from the Khoi), who joined the troops.³⁸ Halse reported that the Provisional Battalions, the Khoi divisions used in the army, included many Africans,³⁹ and T.H.Bowker described a party of Fingo and two 'Caffers' that was sent out to spy on the Gcaleka in late April; they were armed with short muskets.⁴⁰ The 'military Fingo' accompanying the 'rescued Fingo' moving into the Colony in May had been issued with rifles,⁴¹ and Theophilus Shepstone noted in June that the Fingo needed more guns.⁴² That Africans were armed at all is particularly significant, as they must have had training. All 'Fingo'

³⁴ (NA) A96, Shepstone Diary, p.31.

³⁵ (CA) A519/1, p.201, Somerset to D'Urban, 26 April 1835.

³⁶ (NA) A96, Shepstone Diary, entries for 24-8 April 1835. For Smith's view on the cattle-capturing ability of the Fingo, see W.Brinton, History of the British Regiments in South Africa (1977), p.51.

³⁷ BPP 503 (1837), p.84, List of men in army.

³⁸ (CL) MS 951, Diary of T.H.Bowker, entry for 23 April 1835.


³⁹ (CL) PR 3563, Reminiscences of Halse, p.15.

⁴⁰ (CL) MS 951, Diary of T.H.Bowker, entry for 30 April 1835.

⁴¹ (CL) MS 15,543, Sketch of Fingo history, p.80.

⁴² (NA) A96, Shepstone Diary, p.28a.

MAP 5 The Fingo locations, 1835.



who joined the army were initially placed in the 2nd Division under Somerset,⁴³ although Fingo were then used in various parts of the army throughout 1835.⁴⁴ A number of Tswana men - who are never otherwise mentioned - fought as well.⁴⁵ The number of African auxiliaries killed in 1835 is impossible to compute, as they were not regarded by the colonists as important enough to note. Why has this evidence on the use of Africans in the army in 1835 not been commented on?

The Fingo military group was given land at King William's Town after hostilities ceased and was settled under the charge of William Fynn, who received a farm on the Keiskamma River in payment.⁴⁶ D'Urban said that he had promised them half the Ceded Territory in April in exchange for their help. There were also Fingo from the Kat River Settlement who were used to augment the defending forces before the commando left in March. Armstrong, who was in charge of them, found them troublesome and thieving, and most refused to go to Graham's Town to help Jarvis herd the cattle captured from the Rharhabe.⁴⁷ Stretch complained that the Fingo used in early June in the 3rd Division in the Amatole Mountains were cruel to the Rharhabe women, stripping and flogging them.⁴⁸ In a particularly gruesome assault, a Fingo attacked a pregnant Rharhabe woman on 21 August, and slit her from the throat down.⁴⁹ Who were these men, who were willing to fight for the Europeans, and who were so vicious against the Rharhabe and Gcaleka? Were they trained mercenaries?

The group that chiefly assumed what was to become the identity of the Fingo was a 'collaborator' group. Most of them were from the trans-Fish mission stations, and they formed the basis of the settlements at Tyhume and Peddie.

⁴³ (CA) LG 420, pp.124-7, W.Fynn to D'Urban, 1 November 1836.

⁴⁴ For example in the 3rd Division in the Amatole Mountains in August; see Butterfield, Journal of Cox, p.19.

⁴⁵ Heavyside, 'Abstract of Board of Relief', p.87.

⁴⁶ (CA) LG 420, pp.124-7, W.Fynn to D'Urban, 1 November 1836.

⁴⁷ (CA) 1/AY/8/86, Armstrong to Campbell, 2 May 1835.

⁴⁸ Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, p.87. Dutton, Official Notice, 15 June 1835, said that the Rharhabe had 'just cause to dread' the Fingo military.

⁴⁹ Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, p.123.

Ayliff claimed that all 16,800 Fingo were settled at Peddie in May 1835, where they remained. The Peddie location, according to D'Urban, was to encompass almost half the Ceded Territory,⁵⁰ and act as a buffer between the white colonists and their neighbours. D'Urban made a further suggestion in July that all the land between the Fish and Keiskamma Rivers, between Fort Willshire and Peddie, be allocated to Fingo in small fortified villages. He indicated that a list had been made of all Fingo settled there, and their locations, although I have not been able to find this list.⁵¹ Somerset reported that he had followed orders and placed the Fingo in the entire area.⁵²

But the statements differed from what was happening on the ground. The Peddie location consisted in reality, not of an extensive buffer system, but of a small settlement of less than forty square miles, clustered around the protection of the fort and the Boers stationed there.⁵³ An 1835 map places the Fingo specifically on the Clusie (near Peddie) and Tyhume Rivers, not in any extended settlement.⁵⁴ Very few Fingo actually ended up in the Ceded Territory. The assumption of all subsequent historians has been that D'Urban's intentions were fulfilled. Crais, for instance, who has in most respects a very perceptive grasp of the eastern Cape in the 1830s, accepted that 1835 was particularly destructive to the settlers, and believed that the Ceded Territory was filled with a chain of peasant Fingo villages.⁵⁵ There was no such chain, and few 'villages'. In 1855 more Fingo were granted land around Peddie, which tripled the size of the 1835 settlement. Yet even this was less than half the size of that claimed to be populated by Fingo in 1835.⁵⁶ Any

⁵⁰ (CA) GH 19/4, p.953, D'Urban to Campbell, 4 May 1835; (CA) A519/17, pp.25-31, D'Urban to ?, 12 July 1835; BPP 279 (1836), pp.38-40, Somerset to D'Urban.

⁵¹ (CA) A519/17, p.28, D'Urban to ?, 12 July 1835.

⁵² BPP 279 (1836), p.39-40, Somerset to D'Urban.

⁵³ (CA) Map M3/379; (CA) 1/AY/8/24, Sketch of Fingo at Peddie; (CA) 1/AY/8/86, J.M.Bowker to Campbell, 2 June 1835; BPP 279 (1836), p.109, D'Urban to ?, 12 July 1835.

⁵⁴ (CA) Map M1/2728.

⁵⁵ Crais, 'Ambiguous Frontiers', p.38. Peires, 'British and the Cape', p.489, also assumes that seventeen thousand Fingo were settled at Peddie.

⁵⁶ For the extent of the locations in 1835 and 1855 see (CA) Map M3/379; see also (CA) 1/AY/8/24, Sketch of the Fingo at Peddie, for the distribution of the Fingo from the missions.

idea of a buffer seems to have been ruined by the rapid dispersal of the Fingo left at Peddie, leaving only a skeletal and troublesome group.⁵⁷ By October 1835 there were a mere six hundred and ninety eight 'Fingo' at Peddie.⁵⁸

One of the most important findings of this thesis relates to the identity of these Fingo at Peddie. Not only was there a very small settlement, but hardly any of these 'Fingo' at Peddie came from Natal. In late April, Captain Warden had been despatched to Clarkebury with a patrol (which also included military Fingo) on a two-fold mission. He was to organise a Thembu attack on the Gcaleka, and he was to fetch the trans-Kei missionaries and traders gathered there. The Europeans (including Ayliff) were brought to the British camp on the Ndabakazi on 5 May, along with 524 'station people'. The larger, but quite separate mass of 'Fingo' had already been collected there by the 1st and 2nd Divisions in the previous week. Whiteside's claim that Ayliff organised the 'rescue' of the Fingo is incorrect. The whole Clarkebury group tagged along with the 'Fingo exodus', which left on 9 May, and arrived at Peddie on the 14th. These 524 'station people' came from the missions at Morley, Buntingville, Clarkebury and Butterworth,⁵⁹ where they had been faced in 1835 with the choice of white or traditional allegiance, and chose the more powerful. Given the low success rate of the missions, very few were likely to have been actual converts.⁶⁰ It is vital to note that this group from Clarkebury was enumerated on the official list specifically as Gcaleka, Mpondo and Thembu.

⁵⁷ The Fingo commissioners complained to D'Urban about this from Peddie - (CA) A519/3, pp.26-8, 5 October 1835.

⁵⁸ (CA) A519/3, pp.29-34, Census of Fingo at Peddie, 5 October 1835.

⁵⁹ BPP 279 (1836), p.38, List of persons removed from Clarkebury, 3 May 1835.

⁶⁰ For a report on the state of the missions and conversions, see (CL) MS 15,704, Minutes of the AGMs of the Wesleyan Methodist preachers in the Albany District. In 1834 there were 22 converts at Butterworth and 92 attending school. At Clarkebury there were 12 converts and 29 at school; at Morley there were 24 converts and 330 at school; and at Buntingville there were 11 converts and 329 at school. Laing noted (CL) MS 16,579, entry for 28 December 1834, that many Ngqika who used to reject the station were coming to him for protection, or to get the advantages it offered.

It was this small group that was settled around Fort Peddie on the Clusie River, under government agents John Mitford Bowker, Captain Halifax, Lieutenant Moultrie and Ayliff.⁶¹ But in the population census of October 1835, these same people were no longer described as Thembu, Mpondo or Gcaleka. They now came under the designation 'Fingo'.⁶² To this group there had been added sixty-two Hlubi, thirty Bhele and thirty-two Relidwane. Of all the Fingo at Peddie, there were, therefore, only one hundred and thirty-four men, women and children from Natal. Umhlambiso, chief of this Hlubi group, with a mere sixteen male followers, had been appointed overall chief, on the orders of D'Urban, from a recommendation by J.M.Bowker.⁶³ Ayliff's attempt to create a Fingo history is clearly exhibited here. In May 1835 he correctly described the people at Peddie as 'Native Inhabitants to the number of 500, who from attachment to the Missionaries, or dread of the Kafirs, had accompanied them [Warden]'.⁶⁴ Yet in his restructured notes of 1851, he described this same group as Fingo who had lived for many years with the Thembu.⁶⁵ Ayliff and D'Urban were wholly misleading in their descriptions of Peddie. The majority of the small settlement was 'Caffer', who had been 'formed' or 'altered' by the missionaries. A small Natal group was placed with them, and a loyal chief was appointed by the government. This was only a fraction of those who were designated 'Fingo'; but Whiteside described all Fingo as living here.

Many of the Fingo at Peddie in May left under four of the chiefs, soon after their arrival, and squatted at Tyhume,⁶⁶ where they were used in August as the

⁶¹ (CA) A519/3, pp.26-8, Fingo Commissioners to D'Urban, Peddie, 5 October 1835.

⁶² (CA) A519/3, pp.29-34, Census of the Fingo at Peddie by Fingo Commissioners, 5 October 1835. But cf. (CA) 1/AY/8/24, Sketch of Fingo at Peddie, where they are still described as Gcaleka, Mpondo and Thembu, and the land apportioned to them is indicated.

⁶³ (AM) SM 1176, J.M.Bowker to D'Urban, 2 July 1835.

⁶⁴ Graham's Town Journal, 22 May 1835. The collaboration between D'Urban and the missionaries is evident in the fact that D'Urban had described the same event in precisely the same words a week previous; see (CA) CO 4381, D'Urban to Campbell, 15 May 1835. A similar description had been given by Davis, BPP 503 (1837), p.225, 19 April 1835.

⁶⁵ (CL) PR 3826, Rough notes of Ayliff, p.14.

⁶⁶ (CA) A519/3, p.29, Fingo census, 5 October 1835; A519/4, p.41, Armstrong to D'Urban, 2 February 1836.

core of a formal settlement. The Peddie settlement was never stable, and by October, Umkwenkwezi was left with a mere thirty followers. Of the rest some became labourers on Dutch farms, others moved to Graham's Town, and the rest moved either to Tyhume or King William's Town.⁶⁷ The exodus from Peddie seems to have been occasioned largely by general malnutrition, dying cattle, dysentery and the exposed position of the settlement to Ndlambe attack.⁶⁸ Even Phato's people stole from the Fingo.⁶⁹ D'Urban gave the impression that the Fingo wanted for little, largely as a result of twenty thousand cattle which he claimed they had stolen from their 'Gcaleka oppressors' in May. Again, D'Urban was not truthful. These cattle were not taken by the Fingo, and certainly did not end up in Peddie.

There were at least twenty thousand cattle,⁷⁰ but they had been 'captured in Hintza's country [by the colonial troops] during the five days of operations which had preceded the treaty of the 30th April'.⁷¹ D'Urban's records make it clear that they were cattle seized from the Gcaleka by the 1st Division in late April and from the Ndlambe along the Buffalo River by Somerset earlier between 8 and 17 April. They were sent into the Colony to be placed by Jarvis with the other captured cattle.⁷² Somerset's orders were to take 'all the captured cattle collected at the time of his movement, and all the Fingoe race who shall have collected at the same time' into the Colony.⁷³ In 1837 the Fingo chiefs denied ever having stolen Gcaleka cattle.⁷⁴ The simple observation that the censuses for Fingo at Tyhume and Peddie in October 1835

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p.30.

⁶⁸ *Graham's Town Journal*, 17 September 1835, Ayliff article; (CA) 1/AY/8/86, J.M.Bowker to Campbell, 2 June 1835.

⁶⁹ (CA) A519/3, p.103, J.M.Bowker to Campbell, 10 November 1835.

⁷⁰ (CA) A519/18, pp.82-3, D'Urban to Campbell, 5 May 1835; cf. Chapter 5, pp.181-3, and especially footnote 89.

⁷¹ Theal, *Documents relating to the Kaffir war*, D'Urban to Aberdeen, 19 June 1835.

⁷² Theal, *Documents relating to the Kaffir war*, p.217. Ayliff, (CL) MS 15,543, Sketch of Fingo history, first claimed that the Fingo had acquired twenty thousand cattle through judicious trading. He later said that these same cattle were stolen from the Gcaleka in May.

⁷³ (CA) LG 596, pp.42-5, D'Urban's instructions to Somerset, 5 May 1835.

⁷⁴ Bowker, "Speeches, Letters and Selections", pp.39-41, Statement of Fingo chiefs, Bowker to D'Urban, 5 September 1837.

together totalled less than two thousand cattle, and that the Fingo had to be supplied with goats and provisions by the British two weeks after they arrived because they had no cattle,⁷⁵ is enough to prove this point. Again it was denied that the motor for destruction and theft came from the Europeans. Historians have explained the aggression between the Fingo at Peddie, and the local Rharhabe as resulting from this alleged theft of Gcaleka cattle. But the tension came rather from the fact that the Colony had stolen the Rharhabe land around Peddie, and settled it with 'Caffer' collaborators, not from some imaginary theft of cattle three hundred kilometers away. The Fingo did not take the cattle. The British did.

A second settlement, along the lines of that at Peddie, was created in the Tyhume River area in late August 1835, under government commissioners Captain Armstrong, Thomson and Dr Minto. 2,014 men, women and children were settled around Fort Thomson, with adjacent land reserved for European farmers, as well as a possible Khoi settlement and an area for Fingo from the Kat River Settlement.⁷⁶ Jantjie of the Kat River Settlement asked D'Urban for land on the west bank of the Tyhume,⁷⁷ and there were a number of applications in late 1835 from colonists hoping for allotments between the Fingo locations at Block Drift on the Gaga River, a tributary of the Tyhume. Captain Bain and Charles Miller were singled out for preference on the recommendation of Armstrong; and the latter had a farm surveyed for him there in November because of his 'usefulness with the Fingo in May'.⁷⁸ The area around the Tyhume was a wooded, particularly fertile one with a moderate climate and good rainfall - superb farm land. Brownlee described it in 1822 as a densely populated region with the best pasturage throughout Ngqika territory.⁷⁹ It formed the geographical axis of the expulsions of 1829, 1833, 1834 and 1835 and was the heartland of the Ngqika. It was the area from where much of the impetus for the Rharhabe

⁷⁵ (CA) 1/AY/8/86, J.M.Bowker to D'Urban, 4 June 1835, 5 June 1835.

⁷⁶ (CA) 1/AY/8/24, D'Urban to Thomson, Armstrong & Minto, 24 July 1835; (CA) A519/3, p.73, D'Urban to Fingo commissioners; 1/AY/8/24, Fingo commissioners to D'Urban, 29 August 35.

⁷⁷ (CA) CO 3979, Jantjie to D'Urban, no date.

⁷⁸ (CA) CO 4381, Armstrong to Smith, 10 November 1835.

⁷⁹ Thompson, Travels and Adventures, Vol.2, p.215.

response sprang.

D'Urban claimed that his original plans were to use the Fingo as a buffer, with an extensive settlement covering both sides of the Tyhume to all the way south of the Keiskamma/Tyhume confluence. But land had to be apportioned to Matwa - the senior loyal Ngqika chief, who had been staying in Graham's Town - as well, as D'Urban had promised him land on 16 June.⁸⁰ D'Urban wanted to use the Ngqika and Fingo loyalists, as at Peddie to cushion against possible Rharhabe attacks. Within a month the actual Fingo settlement consisted only of a cluster around Fort Thomson on the west bank of the Tyhume.⁸¹ It is possible that Tyhume consisted mainly of mission collaborators like those at Peddie, as two of the Fingo chiefs, Umhlambiso and Umkwenkwezi, were placed in charge of Peddie, and the other four, Matomela, Ungwana, Umbilasi and Makalima, were recognised at Tyhume. The Fingo at both locations: some as collaborators and buffer,⁸² and others as labourers, were provided with goats, implements, food and seed corn until 1837,⁸³ and were encouraged to plant gardens and establish themselves.

Although Fingo were only organised at Tyhume in August, it is clear that the land was earmarked for Fingo settlement well before any Fingo arrived in Peddie in early May, and most of the Fingo moved to the Tyhume area before August. At a meeting in the Amatole Mountains with Lieutenant Granet on 13 May, Maqoma (who was plied with brandy until drunk) was threatened that areas of his confiscated land would be given to Fingo.⁸⁴ When D'Urban first decided to grant land to Fingo is uncertain. Maqoma retaliated against the Fingo who had moved onto his land at the Tyhume by attacking them on 4 August, killing

⁸⁰ (CL) MS 16,579, Diary of Laing, entries for 26 June, 4 Aug 1835; BPP 503 (1837), p.177, Laing to D'Urban, 4 February 1835, for Matwa's request; (CA) GH 34/5, D'Urban to Bain, 14 October 1835, for D'Urban's grant of land.

⁸¹ (CA) 1/AY/8/24, Thomson, Armstrong, Minto to D'Urban, 29 August 1835.

⁸² As outlined in BPP 279 (1836), p.16, D'Urban to ?; (CA) 1/AY/8/24, D'Urban to Thomson, Armstrong, Minto, 24 July 1835.

⁸³ (CA) CO 4381, Fingo commissioners' letters 21 August to 21 November 1835; (CA) LG 14, pp.173-4, Palmer to Campbell, 2 November 1835; (CA) A519/7, p.21, Bowker to Campbell, 20 October 1835.

⁸⁴ Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, p.76.

some and taking their cattle.⁸⁵ He did not have it all his own way, though. Smith blamed the Fingo in November for the ill-feeling on the Tyhume; he noted it was they who were aggressive and stole cattle.⁸⁶ Maqoma offered in late August to hand over the Cape Mounted Rifles Khoi deserters who had joined him, in exchange for his 'Hottentot' deserters - the Fingo.⁸⁷ This implies that he regarded many of the Fingo as traitors to their own people. With the Fingo installed on the Tyhume as a new buffer, the area between them and the Kat River in the west became safe for the settlement of colonists, and in October Campbell was already supervising its surveying for farms.⁸⁸

There was a separate Fingo location at Fort Beaufort on the town commonage, although the size is unknown. Some Fingo waited at Fort Beaufort until land could be apportioned to them at Tyhume, while others waited to be sent to farms to work, and this transitional location was growing by late 1835.⁸⁹ It is strange that the Fingo locations there and at King William's Town were not included in the detailed maps of the towns, drawn in late 1835.⁹⁰ Were the locations excluded from official records because they were labour camps? The Fingo commissioners at Fort Beaufort reported in November that the Tyhume settlement was growing, with huts erected, crops sown and more people, and suggested that more land be allotted to Fingo at Tyhume.⁹¹ A similar progress report was made three months later.⁹² By July 1836 Laing was describing sixty-seven 'Fingo hamlets' in the area around Fort Thomson, where Lovedale was to be placed.⁹³

The Fingo settlement on the west bank of the Tyhume was, by October 1837, twice as densely populated as when the Ngqika lived there. The precise

⁸⁵ Ibid., p.113.

⁸⁶ (CA) A519/3, p.173-181, Smith to D'Urban, 22 November 1835.

⁸⁷ F.Rex to father, 20 August 1835, in Long, Index to Unofficial manuscripts, p.177.

⁸⁸ (CA) A519/3, p.73, Campbell to Campbell, 23 October 1835.

⁸⁹ (CA) A519/3, pp.154-5, Armstrong to D'Urban, 14 November 1835.

⁹⁰ See (CA) Maps M1/2729 and M1/2730 respectively.

⁹¹ (CA) A519/3, p.156, Minto & Thomson to D'Urban, 13 November 1835.

⁹² A519/4, pp.38-41, Fingo Commissioners to D'Urban, 2 February 1836.

⁹³ Cory, Rise of South Africa, p.197.

identity and role of these Fingo is unclear, but it seems that many were collaborators, who were given land. With the disannexation of the Queen Adelaide Province in early 1837,⁹⁴ the Colony needed to bolster its buffer regions, the most important of which was in the Tyhume area. The population had risen to approximately three thousand, with well over three thousand cattle and a similar number of goats. It is plain that the Fingo were acculturating rapidly to colonial farming techniques and culture, as they worked particularly hard in clearing and cultivating the area, selling a corn surplus after their first year. The shedding of any remaining traditions is particularly obvious in the way in which men and women had begun to share in agricultural operations by 1837.⁹⁵ In 1835 Fingo women had done the work alone, as custom dictated.⁹⁶ The Fingo had expressed a desire for a missionary and D'Urban appointed James Weir at Tyhume, ahead of Ayliff. The latter had fallen from grace, despite his protestations that he qualified for the post,⁹⁷ and wanted to be transferred from Peddie.

Like Tyhume and Peddie, King William's Town in 1835 and 1836 had the dual role of supplying land and labour. Fingo were being distributed well into the Colony from King William's Town (see below). The Fingo chiefs Jokweni and Mabanthla moved there voluntarily in August, but other Fingo were kept in transit before being indentured in the eastern districts as labourers. By October there were over five hundred Fingo families (about two thousand people) at King William's Town,⁹⁸ where W.Fynn was made superintendent of all Fingo in the Queen Adelaide Province. They were attacked in August by the local Ndlambe men, who were repulsed by the soldiers guarding the Fingo.⁹⁹ Fynn complained in October that the King William's Town Fingo were not getting

⁹⁴ See Chapter 6, pp.191-203.

⁹⁵ The information on the Fingo in 1837 comes from an informative report from Thomson to D'Urban, A519/7, pp.176-8, 23 October 1837.

⁹⁶ The sex delineation was commented on by the Fingo commissioners, (CA) LG 14, pp.15-6, Fingo commissioners to Hudson, 11 November 1835.

⁹⁷ (CA) A519/4, p.41, Armstrong to D'Urban, 2 February 1836.

⁹⁸ (CA) LG 13, p.165, W.Fynn to Hudson, 29 October 1835.

⁹⁹ Cory, Rise of South Africa, p.196.

enough supplies,¹⁰⁰ and needed more land, and D'Urban responded immediately with seed corn.

What was the plan behind these three Fingo locations? As can be seen, the evidence on Fingo in 1835 is scanty and piecemeal. It does show distinctive categories within the term 'Fingo', and it does give glimpses of movement and hints of a general policy. But there remain huge gaps in the jig-saw, and especially on the activity in these three settlements. There are certain consistencies between and features common to Tyhume, Peddie and King William's Town. Each settlement had elements of each type of Fingo: labourer, collaborator (peasant farmer) and military. The Tyhume complex included Fort Beaufort, where there was a large Fingo camp on the commonage, from where Fingo were distributed as labourers in southern Somerset and northern Albany. There were land-owning collaborators around the Tyhume, and a military contingent in Fort Thomson, in the centre of the settlement. Peddie regularly sent labourers into the Colony; it had a gradually weakening collaborator settlement; and a military force in Fort Peddie. King William's Town provided many labourers for the Colony, as far west as Knysna (see below), and had its share of collaborators with land. Because it was furthest into African territory it had the largest military force, with a fort, Khoi soldiers and most of the Fingo military. Each of the settlements was attacked on a number of occasions by local Rharhabe.

A further feature common to all three was the placing of settler farms in their immediate vicinity in 1835, after the annexation of the Queen Adelaide Province. A substantial number of farms were granted along the Buffalo River, near King William's Town, and the Fingo commissioners at both Tyhume and Peddie had instructions to intersperse the Fingo land grants with European farms, which were surveyed in late 1835. It is unlikely that African peasant farmers would be set up in direct competition with white farmers, so what was the point of the Fingo locations? Were they specifically engineered as

¹⁰⁰ (CA) LG 13, p.165, W.Fynn to Hudson, 29 October 1835.

agriculturally self-supporting and militarily self-defending units situated strategically in the newly conquered territory, to extract local labour for the colonial market, and to provide the adjoining new settler farms with a permanent labour supply? In other words, were they the basis of a consolidation of the expanded settler farm land, in terms of both security and labour, and a rural labour pool for colonial farms?

Because there was no such thing as a 'Fingo tribe' before and during 1835, it was impossible for there to be natural chiefs. If the Fingo were being amalgamated and tribalised, there had to be African men in charge of them, apart from the white commissioners. Whiteside claimed that the Fingo chiefs were all from Zizi, Hlubi, Bhele and Reledwane royal lineages, and that they had pretended not to be chiefs when with the Gcaleka, to avoid victimisation. But the evidence suggests that they were collaborators and opportunists, who were prepared to follow British orders on the management of the Fingo. The collaborators from the missions were placed under them, and it was claimed that the labourers who had disappeared as farm labourers also fell under their control. The chiefs in 1837 claimed the history which Ayliff wrote in the Graham's Town Journal in 1835, as their own. But was this genuine or were they supporting a myth? The chiefs changed fairly rapidly. In May 1835 Ayliff said that the chiefs were Umhlambiso, Matomela, Jokweni, Umkwenkwezi, Ucwana, Uhliso, Umkwali, Unontshatsho and Umkuzongwe;¹⁰¹ D'Urban gave land to Umhlambiso, Matomela, Jokweni, Umkwenkwezi, Ungwana, Umbilasi, Amandoda, Makalima and Mabanthla.¹⁰² In 1845 the recognised chiefs of the 'Fingo tribe' were Jokweni, Matomela, Umkwenkwezi, Mabanthla, Kaulela, Pahla and Jama.¹⁰³ In 1854 the only two left of the original nine were Jokweni and Matomela.¹⁰⁴ Within two decades, the entire chief hierarchy had changed, presumably as a result of the dismissal of chiefs not meeting British expectations.

¹⁰¹ (CA) A519/2, Ayliff to D'Urban, Clarkebury, 1 May 1835.

¹⁰² (CA) A519/3, pp.29-34, Census of Fingo at Peddie, 5 October 1835; (CA) 1/AY/8/24, Thomson to D'Urban, 29 August 1835.

¹⁰³ (CA) GH 19/5, Treaty between Maitland and the Fingo chiefs, January 1845.

¹⁰⁴ Moyer, 'History of the Mfengu', pp.595-8.

There seems to have been indecision in 1835 as to who was to be appointed as chiefs. The chiefs at Tyhume¹⁰⁵ were not those whom Ayliff had listed as chiefs in May 1835.¹⁰⁶ They in turn differed from Theophilus Shepstone's list of April,¹⁰⁷ where the Fingo totalled merely 1,120. Shepstone had said on 19 April that there were only three Fingo chiefs, and that it was they who offered nine hundred and seventy military men.¹⁰⁸ Jokweni, who by the 1850s was one of the wealthiest Fingo chiefs, was no hereditary chief, but because of his post-1835 importance, ethnographers like Bryant inserted him into the Zizi royal genealogy.¹⁰⁹ He clearly had the support of the British in 1835,¹¹⁰ although he moved from Peddie to King William's Town, and finally settled back at Peddie.¹¹¹ Makalima had lived near Ayliff for a while before 1835, and his loyalty could thus be trusted.¹¹² It is significant that when Ayliff listed the 'Fingo chiefs' in May 1835, Makalima was not among them.¹¹³ It was decided to appoint him as a chief only once he had arrived in the Colony. Mabanthla was also recognised as a chief for the first time when inside the Colony. Both became Fingo chiefs with British backing. Veldman Bikitsha later commented that Umkwenkwezi, Jokweni and Umhlambiso did not appear in the respective Bhele, Zizi and Hlubi royal genealogies.¹¹⁴ If this is correct, not one of the men given land in 1835 and appointed as chiefs had any claim to a position, apart from their loyalty to the British. They were all collaborators. Bouch has also found British appointments of Fingo chiefs in the Queenstown area in the 1850s and 1860s.¹¹⁵

¹⁰⁵ (CA) 1/AY/8/24, p.129, Fingo commissioners to D'Urban, 29 August 1835.

¹⁰⁶ (CA) A519/2, Ayliff to D'Urban, 1 May 1835.

¹⁰⁷ Moyer, 'History of the Mfengu', p.90c. Moyer, *Ibid.*, p.190, commented on the dissimilarities in the various lists of chiefs made between 22 April and 9 May, which is when D'Urban was choosing whom he was to recognise.

¹⁰⁸ (NA) A96, Shepstone Diary, entry for 19 April 1835.

¹⁰⁹ Moyer, 'History of the Mfengu', p.184n.

¹¹⁰ As stressed by Bowker, 'Speeches, Letters and Selections', pp. 20-1.

¹¹¹ (CA) A519/3, p.103, J.M.Bowker to Campbell, 10 November 1835.

¹¹² (CA) 1/AY/8/24, Fingo commissioners to D'Urban, 29 August 1835.

¹¹³ (CA) A519/2, Ayliff to D'Urban, 1 May 1835.

¹¹⁴ (CA) NA 623, Evidence of Veldman Bikitsha to the Lagden Commission, 1905.

¹¹⁵ R.Bouch, '"Clan segments" and economic stratification amongst the Queenstown Mfengu, 1850s to late 1870s', Seminar Paper, Rhodes University, 1989.

It is hardly surprising that the chiefs had little power and less respect,¹¹⁶ as there was little bond between the newly created tribe and the appointed collaborator leaders. Less than a month after their settlement, J.M.Bowker sent a batch of letters complaining about the Fingo at Peddie, and the way in which they were divided and fighting - even killing - each other. There were clearly problems in getting the Fingo to unify and accept the chiefs, and some Fingo refused to acknowledge chiefly authority and remained independent. Bowker had to arrest and remove a Khoi, Hermanus, as he was attracting Fingo away from the chiefs.¹¹⁷ This view is far from the mystical tale of spontaneous Fingo unity and joy given by Veldman Bikhitsa and Whiteside later in the century.¹¹⁸ In order to entrench the appointed chiefs as leaders, they were given suits and knives by the British;¹¹⁹ they also received and distributed land, which their followers were unhappy about.¹²⁰

Rivalry between the Fingo chiefs to create a following began immediately, and continued throughout the century, with the power of the chief depending less on his claim to hereditary chieftaincy, than on his ability to ensure colonial support and land grants. Whites also became involved in the chiefly rivalries. James Read junior accused Henry Francis Fynn of organising the murder of Makalima in 1843.¹²¹ At Peddie Theophilus Shepstone took over from J.M.Bowker in 1839 as agent. By 1845 he was the self-proclaimed paramount chief of the Fingo. The fortunes of the Fingo chiefs can be easily charted over twenty years by seeing who was officially recognised by the Colony.¹²²

The Fingo chiefs fulfilled the role of sub-magistrate, under the Fingo

¹¹⁶ (CA) 1/AY/8/86, J.M.Bowker to D'Urban, 4 June 1835.

¹¹⁷ (CA) 1/AY/8/86, J.M.Bowker to D'Urban, 5 and 9 June, 20 October 1835; (AM) SM 1176, J.M.Bowker to D'Urban, 2 July 1835.

¹¹⁸ (CA) NA 623, Evidence of Veldman Bikitsha to Lagden Commission, 1905.

¹¹⁹ (CA) A519/3, p.103, J.M.Bowker to Campbell, 10 November 1835.

¹²⁰ Graham's Town Journal, 17 September 1835, Ayliff article. They were also given cattle to distribute to their followers, see (CA) GH 34/5, p.21, Campbell to D'Urban, 14 July 1835.

¹²¹ Moyer, 'History of the Mfengu', p.200.

¹²² Ibid., pp.595-8 for an analysis of the Fingo population and property in the 1850s.

commissioners, in order to create a structure of control over the Fingo, as suggested to D'Urban by Bowker.¹²³ In 1836 Makalima was appointed Veld Commandant at Tyhume, and Mhlambiso at Peddie. Others were appointed to the posts of Veld Cornet¹²⁴ on the recommendation of the Fingo commissioners in order that the chiefs 'would possess a more defined authority over their people than they do at present'.¹²⁵ This system of co-optation became increasingly wide-spread in the Stockenström period after 1836, and had proved an effective method of subjugation by the 1850s.

The Fingo, then, can be seen as a case of intentional tribalisation - a disparate group of mainly Rharhabe and Gcaleka, with Mpondo, Thembu and a few Ngwane, Hlubi, Bhele, Zizi and Reledwane, given the identity and name of a small minority, who were imposed as leaders, with a manufactured history. Ranger has described how the British set up systems and traditions which those Africans who wished to ingratiate themselves with the authorities or gain power through them, adopted and followed. These alien systems and traditions were later accepted as customary, and their origins forgotten.¹²⁶

D'Urban made it clear that a chief reason for bringing Fingo into the Colony was of 'furnishing a supply of hired servants to the colonists'.¹²⁷ A substantial percentage of Fingo ended up as labourers.¹²⁸ That there was a labour shortage in the 1820s and 1830s (especially in the Eastern Cape) is indisputable. Bathurst in 1833 had a mere one hundred and forty Khoi and Mantatees to provide labour for the nine hundred Europeans,¹²⁹ although this was an improvement from the complete lack of servants in 1824. The population figures for the late 1820s show the eastern Cape with 86 non-whites (42 in

¹²³ (AM) SM 1176, J.M.Bowker to D'Urban, 2 July 1835.

¹²⁴ Moyer, 'History of the Mfengu', p.197. A similar system was applied to the Ndlambe; Mhala and Mqhayi became Field Commandants, and Siyolo and Qasana Field Cornets.

¹²⁵ (CA) A519/4, p.40, Fingo commissioners to D'Urban, 2 February 1836.

¹²⁶ T.Ranger, 'The invention of tradition in colonial Africa' in E.Hobsbawm & T.Ranger, The Invention of Tradition (1989).

¹²⁷ (CA) 1/AY/8/24, D'Urban to Campbell, 14 October 1835.

¹²⁸ (CA) LG 420, pp.124-7, Report of W.Fynn, 1 November 1835.

¹²⁹ (CA) LG 7, Population returns for Bathurst, 1833.

Albany) to every hundred whites, compared with the Western Cape median of 134 to a hundred.¹³⁰ The labour shortage was regularly a subject of concern to the eastern colonists: 'W.G' wrote to the Graham's Town Journal in 1833 to describe the scarcity of labour as 'the cause of all our troubles'.¹³¹ The 1836 Cape Blue Book is vague as to the number of 'aliens' (Fingo, Mantatee and Bechuana) in Albany and Somerset, but makes it clear that: 'Great numbers of these are in the service of the farmers.'¹³² It lists 1,575 aliens working for farmers in Graaff-Reinet. By 1838, there were officially over six thousand Fingo in the Colony (3,517 in Albany), which inverted the figures to 134:100 in the East, and 119:100 in the West. In summary, in Albany in 1828 there was a ratio of forty-three non-whites (potential labourers) to every hundred whites. In 1838 there were one hundred and forty-one to every hundred whites. The war of 1835 completely inverted the labour situation in Albany.

The 'arrival of the Fingoes,' wrote Ayliff, 'conferred an invaluable boon on the Colonists, who at that time were greatly suffering from the want of labour'.¹³³ The missionary at Bethelsdorp commented in 1837 that 'there has not been the same demand for labourers as formerly, a great number of Fingoes having come into the Colony, who are employed at lower wages than those usually given to Hottentots.'¹³⁴ In the same year a group of eighty Fingo (with families) were prepared to sell their cattle in order to ensure employment at Slaai Kraal.¹³⁵ Moyer noted the large number of Fingo workers in Port Elizabeth in the 1840s who were ousting the Khoi as cheap labour.¹³⁶ By 1842 there were several thousand Fingo and Tswana working in Cradock alone.¹³⁷ It is significant that the myth of the Fingo was generated in the

¹³⁰ For a population analysis, see Appendix 2, population of the Cape etc.

¹³¹ Graham's Town Journal, 14 February 1833, Letter from 'W.G.'.

¹³² Cape Blue Book, 1836, p.201.

¹³³ (CL) PR 3826, Rough Notebook of Ayliff, p.2. Ayliff pinpoints Ordinance 50 and the Emancipation of the slaves as most harmful to the labour situation, but says that the abundant Fingo labour solved it.

¹³⁴ Macmillan, Cape Colour Question, p.253.

¹³⁵ (CA) 1/AY/8/50, Hudson to Campbell, 22 July 1837.

¹³⁶ Moyer, 'History of the Mfengu', ch.4. See Chase, Cape of Good Hope, p.238, for Fingo surf labourers at Algoa Bay.

¹³⁷ Long, Index to Unofficial manuscripts, p.261.

region which stood to gain most from their arrival - Albany - and received generous support from the whole eastern Cape, to which they were such a boon.

The first extensive group of Fingo brought in to work was that accompanying Somerset (who had organised the Mbolompo affair) in May 1835, who were, according to the Ayliff/Whiteside myth, settled at Peddie. Some were retained at Fort Wellington¹³⁸ and Fort Warden¹³⁹ to work on the buildings, and at least two hundred accompanied Somerset to Graham's Town, where they were immediately indentured.¹⁴⁰ In his attempt to explain why there were Fingo employed in the Colony, Ayliff wrote that most of the Fingo at Peddie wanted to work in the Colony.¹⁴¹ It seems that virtually all the 16,800 Fingo moved immediately to Graham's Town, where a location was set up on the outskirts of town. Fingo awaiting employment were to reside there, from where the Graham's Town residents eagerly took labourers.¹⁴² There were so many Fingo entering into contracts in Graham's Town with colonists, that an extra clerk was appointed in July to countersign the service contracts.¹⁴³ In the same month Godlonton complained that the area around Graham's Town was 'teeming' with unemployed Fingo.¹⁴⁴ The influx of labourers influenced the evolution of a sub-culture of Fingo, other Africans, and Khoi, whose ribald behaviour in High Street led to regular arrest.¹⁴⁵

When the Fingo were brought under military escort to Graham's Town in May, Colonel England took a list of their names and those of the Boers to whom they

¹³⁸ (CL) MS 951, Diary of T.H.Bowker, entry for 22 May 1835. There were twenty men, forty women and fifty children.

¹³⁹ Alexander, Narrative of a voyage, Vol.2, p.215; (CL) MS 951, Diary of T.H.Bowker, entry for 10 May 1835. There was still a large number there in 1836, see (CA) LG 420, pp.124-7, Report of W.Fynn, 1 November 1835.

¹⁴⁰ Webb, 'Agricultural development of 1820 settlement', p.209; see also (CA) CO 2756, Jarvis to Campbell, 26 May 1835.

¹⁴¹ Graham's Town Journal, 17 September 1835, Ayliff article.

¹⁴² (CA) CO 2756, Jarvis to Campbell, 26 May 1835.

¹⁴³ (CA) 1/AY/9/62, W.Smith to Campbell, 4 July 1835. Aldwin was appointed.

¹⁴⁴ Graham's Town Journal, 28 July 1835, Godlonton editorial.

¹⁴⁵ See (CA) 1/AY/1/4, Graham's Town Magistrate's Records, 1835-6, for numerous examples.

were being indentured, and distributed it to all Civil Commissioners.¹⁴⁶ This list has not been found, which is particularly suspicious. At least ten copies must have been made, but none of them have survived. One list of Fingo labourers would have completely undermined D'Urban's explanation of their origins if it had somehow come to the attention of the Colonial Office. Did D'Urban order them to be destroyed? The majority of the Fingo were employed on farms as far afield as Graaff-Reinet, but the magistrate's records do show Fingo women working as domestics in Graham's Town.¹⁴⁷

An important insight into the status of the Fingo and rare impartiality of colonial law - which was in practice a racially-tiered system - is the case of Macapella, a Fingo, who in December 1835 took his master Norris of Assegai Bush to court for maltreatment. After hearing oral testimony from the colonist and his servant, the magistrate found in favour of Macapella.¹⁴⁸ The Fingo, as British subjects,¹⁴⁹ and despite their social status, were accorded access to the law, and even justice. The court records show Fingo working in Graham's Town and its surroundings at average wages, in the line of three heifers a year. Some were also working for money by July, implying an early immersion in the colonial economic system. Some of these Fingo had been labouring in Albany since early 1834, but most came in 1835.¹⁵⁰ As early as February 1835 there was a convict labour party of twenty Fingo working outside the Graham's Town

¹⁴⁶ England wrote to D'Urban from Graham's Town on 10 May 1835 - (CA) A519/2, p.24 - saying that he had made lists and made them available. Despite an extensive search, I have not been able to locate one copy in the Cape Archives.

¹⁴⁷ For example, (CA) 1/AY/1/4, Magistrate's Records, Graham's Town, 11 January 1836.

¹⁴⁸ (CA) 1/AY/1/4, Magistrate's Records, 22 December 1835. For other examples of Fingo access to the law, see the cases of (CA) CO 2756, November 1835.

¹⁴⁹ The question of what Fingo were entitled to as British subjects, and how the authorities responded to the unique situation, is dealt with in Chapter 6, pp.210-212.

¹⁵⁰ See the examples of earlier indenture in (CA) 1/AY/1/4, Magistrate's Records, Graham's Town, 21 and 28 July, 15 and 24 August 1835, 8 February 1836. For Fingo working near Graham's Town, see also (CA) 1/AY/8/86, 16 May 1835.

gaol, some of whom had joined the invasion of the Colony.¹⁵¹ At the outbreak of hostilities, a considerable number of Bechuana and Fingo servants were sent with their masters' cattle to the safety of Theopolis.¹⁵² Alderman was appointed superintendent of the Fingo in Graham's Town in November, with a salary retroactive to 20 May, where he had been supervising all the many 'Fingo' looking for employment in Graham's Town.¹⁵³ By November Campbell was noting that 'the Fingo people [are] continuing to arrive in Graham's Town from the new [Queen Adelaide] Province in greater numbers than can find employment with the farmers here',¹⁵⁴ and promised to send fifty families to Uitenhage immediately. It is significant that these Fingo were coming from Ndlambe and Ngqika territory where the colonial army had destituted the Rharhabe. It was these people who formed the fourth category of Fingo - destitute Rharhabe.

Of crucial importance in determining the identity of the Fingo, is the manner in which they entered the Colony. Circumstantial and empirical evidence indicates that a good percentage of the Fingo who ended as labourers came involuntarily. There was, as outlined in Chapter 2, an extensive precedent of colonial seizure of aboriginals for labour purposes. This leads to obvious questions about the maintenance of co-ercion after indenture, and the ensuring of the secrecy of the action. Ayliff's fantasy of leading the Fingo into salvation, like Moses and the Israelites, is untenable; he had little to do with the movement of the Fingo. Henry Dugmore in the 1850s extended this biblical metaphor, likening the Fingo to the exodus of the Children of Israel from Egypt, whereby the Kei became the Red Sea and the Colony the land of promise.¹⁵⁵ Ayliff's theological impositions on the history of the Fingo are

¹⁵¹ (CA) 1/AY/8/86, Graham's Town gaol report, Statement of Umjojo, 22 February 1835. There were a number of Fingo who fought against the Colony in 1835: (CL) MS 951, Diary of T.H.Bowker, entry for 5 September 1835, where Bowker talks of Fingo fighting for Gasela.

¹⁵² BPP 503 (1837), p.180, Barker to Campbell, 13 January 1835.

¹⁵³ (CA) 1/AY/8/24, W.Smith to Campbell, 12 November 1835.

¹⁵⁴ (CA) 1/AY/9/19, Campbell to Uitenhage Civil Commissioner, 6 November 1835.

¹⁵⁵ H.H.Dugmore (ed. van der Riet & Hewson), The Reminiscences of an Albany Settler, (1958), p.87. A.M.McGregor, 'A History of the Fingoes 1835-1879', B.Ed Thesis, University of Cape Town, 1930, is based on the extended metaphor of the Jews and Fingo having parallel histories and characters.

also evident in the way in which, as noted, he arbitrarily decided that there must originally have been twelve tribes (each sixty thousand strong) from whom the Fingo were descended.¹⁵⁶ But disregarding Ayliff's explanation leaves open the question as to how the Fingo did enter the Colony, and to what extent they came to labour voluntarily. Whenever there is mention of Fingo movement in 1835 there is an armed guard or escort with them. This clearly needs an explanation.

During the attacks on the Amatole Mountains in early April a number of Rharhabe women were captured and brought into camp,¹⁵⁷ but very little was said of them, as was the case with women and children captured in the Fish River bush.¹⁵⁸ T.H.Bowker reported that fifty women joined the British during the attack on Ntaba ka Ndoda on 7 April, and that the following day many women - apparently Nqeno's people - came to the camp.¹⁵⁹ No further mention is made of them, and they were presumably either employed for the pleasure of the troops or taken into labour. The Rharhabe women around Burnshill were advised by the 3rd Division to move out of the bush, but they refused, as those who had fled to D'Urban's camp had been raped.¹⁶⁰ On 7 April Smith led a patrol into the bush around the Pirie mission where he 'captured 2500 cattle[,] 15 women and a hottentot of the name of Lewis Arnoldus'.¹⁶¹ T.H.Bowker's diary provides oblique references to the capture of Gcaleka women and children in late April while his patrol was hunting for Hintza.¹⁶²

¹⁵⁶ (CL) MS 15,276, Papers of John Ayliff, p.5.

¹⁵⁷ Long, Chronicle of Goldswain, pp.94-5; Alexander, Narrative of a voyage, Vol.2, p.80.

¹⁵⁸ Harington, Sir Harry Smith, p.30.

¹⁵⁹ (CL) MS 951, Diary of T.H.Bowker, entries for 7 and 8 April 1835.

¹⁶⁰ Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, p.61.

¹⁶¹ (NA) A96, Shepstone Diary, entry for 7 April 1835. See also Alexander, Narrative of a voyage, p.80. A similar description is given by Goldswain, Long, Chronicle of Goldswain, pp.94-5, who mentions that one of the women had given birth the previous day but had been forced to walk five miles.

¹⁶² (CL) MS 951, Diary of T.H.Bowker, entries for 26 April 1835: 'catch several horses, and some Kafir women and children, these latter were let go as useless'; they moved on and 'find some more women and children'; 28 April 1835: shot a woman by mistake 'and return without taking her'; 6 May 1835: 'Maqoma and Tyali's cattle and women and children have not been found and taken'.

The evidence for the seizure of Rharhabe women and children west of the Kei in 1835 is clear, but that for the taking of captives east of the Kei more circumstantial. The fact that there was definitely capturing of Rharhabe by the troops, and yet the evidence for it has always remained intentionally hidden, merely emphasises the extent to which this illegal behaviour was taking place and being covered up. There was no question that the Colonial Office would have launched a high level enquiry, with very serious consequences for the Cape authorities, had it been known that Africans were being captured and forced to labour and that the British administrators were actively involved in planning this. D'Urban had planned for the invasion of the innocent Gcaleka before April, and by May he brought seventeen thousand 'Fingo' into the Colony, most of whom were labourers. Had he planned a general labour seizure to deal with the colonial demand? It was not co-incidental that this solved the acute labour shortage in the eastern districts. There had been a long precedent for the capture of African women and children outside the Colony and brought in under euphemistic explanations to work. Labourers were being captured west of the Kei in 1835. The reasonable conclusion is thus that most of the 'Fingo' were Gcaleka (and Rharhabe) women and children captured illegally, and that the methods and accounts of capture were censored in official documents and excluded from private papers.

The seizure of women continued. Bailie returned to King William's Town from the Pirie area on 21 June with a large patrol (just before he was killed), having killed eight Rharhabe and 'captured 100 Caffre women with as many children'.¹⁶³ Was his death in the same area three days later¹⁶⁴ retaliation for these captures? Godlonton described this patrol as 'most judiciously and spiritedly conducted', but neglected to mention the captives.¹⁶⁵ A second patrol was sent out westwards from King William's Town to the Debe Flats, also on 21 June, under Sutton and Granet. They returned with four women and sixteen

¹⁶³ Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, p.98, 22 June 1835.

¹⁶⁴ See Chapter 5, p.170.

¹⁶⁵ Godlonton, Irruption of the Kaffir, p.196.

children.¹⁶⁶ A party of military Fingo chasing the Ndlambe eight miles outside King William's Town on 2 July seized twenty women, who were brought back with the other plunder.¹⁶⁷ They were presumably sent to Boer farms as forced labourers. Stretch received a complaint from an elderly Ndlambe man in 1836 that his son had been forcibly seized from his garden on the Keiskamma by D'Urban's forces returning to the Colony, and made to work on the farm of a Boer named O.Niekerk.¹⁶⁸

It is important to remember that women and children formed the majority of the labour seizures in the Caledon valley, and were the preferred captures, as the women were pliable and the children young enough to be subdued and inculcated to fulfill colonial labour demands. Men could defend themselves.¹⁶⁹ Newton-King provides similar explanations for why the majority of labour captives in the Graaff-Reinet district were women and children.¹⁷⁰ Eighty-eight percent of the May Fingo were women and children. Were they not mainly captured labourers? It is probable that the British seizure of cattle in Rharhabe territory - from the Amathole, Keiskamma and Buffalo areas - and Gcaleka territory (especially in the week of 17-24 April in Butterworth) was accompanied by the capture of Africans, who were brought back to work. Why else would the Fingo have needed the entire 2nd Division (including military Fingo) to 'protect' them on their journey into the Colony, when Warden needed only a small patrol to ferry six hundred people through Gcaleka territory? A fake history would then have been necessary to cover the actions.

Between 24 April and 14 May there were a number of attacks on the main group

¹⁶⁶ Godlonton, *Irruption of the Kaffir*, p.197.

¹⁶⁷ (NA) A96, Shepstone Diary, entry for 2 July 1835.

¹⁶⁸ (CA) LG 420, p.57, Report of Stretch, 1836.

¹⁶⁹ See for example the arguments proposed by the Advisory Council in 1827, *BPP* 252 (1835), p.12, when discussing the implementation of Ordinance 49. The civil commissioners from around the country had suggested that children be used as the main labour supply because of their obedience and inability to protest or rebel.

¹⁷⁰ Newton-King, 'The enemy within'.

of Fingo, by Gcaleka in Butterworth,¹⁷¹ and by Ndlambe on their way into the Colony. There were also innumerable attacks on the Fingo who were aiding the Europeans militarily.¹⁷² Most of the attacks occurred after the capture of Hintza, and D'Urban responded by threatening to hang Hintza and kill two of his entourage for each Fingo killed, unless the attacks ceased.¹⁷³ What was happening? There are various explanations for these attacks, each of which depends on the identity of the mass of Fingo gathered by the army. Godlonton's explanation (reflecting Fingo orthodoxy) was that the attacks resulted from the anger of the Gcaleka at the loss of their Fingo slaves, and their theft of twenty thousand Gcaleka cattle. This has been shown to be incorrect. A second possible interpretation is one based on the suggestion that most of the Fingo were collaborators - Gcaleka traitors - and that they were being attacked in anger by their countrymen for their rejection of their people. A third possibility is that the attacks on the mass of Fingo resulted not from anger, but from frustration and fear. If the troops were capturing Gcaleka women and children and herding them into a fortified compound, the Gcaleka men would have been in a panic to rescue them. Likewise with the Ndlambe when the train of Fingo, surrounded by an armed division of colonial soldiers, marched from the Kei into the Colony. Somerset had spent two weeks in eastern Ndlambe territory in April - was he not collecting labourers?

Somerset claimed that the Fingo near the Winterberg Mountains were selling their children to the Boers as servants, or abandoning them,¹⁷⁴ as was apparently happening at Peddie in June.¹⁷⁵ T.H.Bowker also described Fingo mothers throwing away their children.¹⁷⁶ Somerset's explanation of this phenomenon was that the Fingo were greatly concerned to provide for their

¹⁷¹ See for example (CA) A519/1, p.201, Somerset to D'Urban, 26 April 1835; (CL) MS 951, Diary of T.H.Bowker, entry for 24 April 1835.

¹⁷² (CL) MS 951, Diary of T.H.Bowker, entries for 28 April, 2 and 4 May 1835.

¹⁷³ Graham's Town Journal, 15 May 1835; Whiteside, History of Abambo, pp.31-2; Godlonton, Irruption of the Kaffirs, pp.155-6. D'Urban is depicted heroically in each case as the humanitarian saving the poor Fingo.

¹⁷⁴ (CA) A519/3, p.68, Somerset to D'Urban, 23 October 1835.

¹⁷⁵ (CA) 1/AY/8/86, J.M.Bowker to Campbell, 2 June 1835.

¹⁷⁶ (CL) MS 951, Diary of T.H.Bowker, entry for 10 May 1835.

children by selling them as labourers, and that if the Boers would not take them as apprentices they would have to be abandoned, and would die. The explanation is an obvious non sequitur: the Fingo supposedly wished to sell their children into virtual slavery because they cared for them greatly, and if they could not, they would be forced to abandon them. Somerset's father had used precisely the same argument to support his legalisation of the apprenticeship of young San children in the 1817 Hottentot Proclamation.¹⁷⁷ This is much like the explanation used to cover the illicit seizure of labour that had been occurring on the Orange River for years. Under the guise of philanthropy, the Albany settlers were able to use the existing legislation, allowing for the apprenticeship of orphans, to legitimise their labour captures. The Boers apparently refused to take any of the Fingo children, unless a mandatory apprenticeship to the age of eighteen was imposed. This was because they wanted legal authority to secure their labour for an extended period.

The 'labour Fingo' were supplemented in mid-May by one thousand 'Fingo' taken by Smith. He claimed that they were under Gcaleka oppression, 'who, from their remote situation, had been unable to join their country men now under British protection'.¹⁷⁸ Smith's raid on the Bomvana has been discussed in the previous chapter,¹⁷⁹ and the pursuit of these Fingo seems to have formed an important reason for his attack past the Mbashe. These Fingo were gathered at Smith's camp on the Guada River on 14 May and little information is offered as to their identity or background. Given the general use of the term 'Fingo', and the fact that on the 13 and 14 May, while Smith was chasing cattle within sight of the Mtata River, most of his force had remained at the mouth of the Mbashe,¹⁸⁰ as well as the precedence of labour seizure, it can be reasonably assumed that these were Bomvana and eastern Gcaleka, taken by a whirlwind commando to work in the Colony. Har-ington has shown that D'Urban and Smith

¹⁷⁷ BPP 50 (1835), pp.167-8, Proclamation of Lord Charles Somerset, 1817.

¹⁷⁸ General Order No.18, Smith, Fort Waterloo, 21 May 1835; Cory, Rise of South Africa, Vol.3, p.157.

¹⁷⁹ See pp.119-121.

¹⁸⁰ For Smith's description of the patrol, see BPP 279 (1836), pp.48-51, 18 May 1835.

lied when they said that it was Hintza who suggested the patrol. It was on this same patrol that Hintza was murdered, after which Smith constructed a false explanation of events. There is no reason whatsoever to believe Smith's report on the identity of these Fingo. Dutton, D'Urban's aide, recorded only that Smith returned with a thousand cattle, making no mention of Fingo.¹⁸¹ There was no trumpeting of this 'rescue', as in the case of the Butterworth 'emancipation', and it was kept very quiet.

These people were called 'Fingo' and most were placed temporarily in the King William's Town Fingo location where Smith found them useful.¹⁸² From here a number were distributed in the Colony. Frederick Rex, Assistant Quarter-Master at King William's Town, sent a group of ten Fingo to his sister in Knysna in August, taken to her by some Khoi taking leave, and another twenty to his parents, also in Knysna, in September, after his father had written to him in June to ask for Fingo labourers.¹⁸³ Rex had chosen his group because they were the 'best-tempered' of the many available in King William's Town. He felt 'that having them driven to the Island [at Knysna] and back again once a day may have a good effect upon their scabby old legs.'¹⁸⁴ He also contemplated sending some to a friend as a present, with the warning that some Fingo needed to be flogged to ensure productivity.¹⁸⁵ In September, after reports from the town of George about the laziness of Fingo, George Rex asked that his son send him only women and children, with the explanation that civilisation would thereby be spread.¹⁸⁶ These facts all point to the assertion that forced labour was being distributed throughout the Colony from a base in King William's Town.

¹⁸¹ BPP 279 (1836), p.48, Dutton, Official Notice, 18 May 1835. The same occurred in (CL) MS 951, Diary of T.H.Bowker.

¹⁸² BPP 279 (1836), p.109, D'Urban to Smith, 12 November 1835.

¹⁸³ Long, Index to Unofficial manuscripts, p.195, G.Rex to son, Knysna, 11 June 1835; pp.174-7, F.Rex to sister, King William's Town, 28 July 1835; F.Rex to father, 28 August 1835.

¹⁸⁴ Long, Index to Unofficial manuscripts, p.177, F.Rex to father, 28 August 1835.

¹⁸⁵ F.Rex to Duthie, 25 September 1835, in Ibid., p.180.

¹⁸⁶ G.Rex to son, 18 September 1835. in Ibid., pp.195-6.

With Graham's Town and Fort Beaufort acting as bases, Fingoes were distributed wherever they were needed. Three hundred and fifty-two women and five hundred and sixty-seven children were taken from Graham's Town to King William's Town in June, against their will.¹⁸⁷ The Civil Commissioner for Graaff-Reinet complained in October of a labour shortage, whereupon surplus Fingo from Albany, Somerset and Uitenhage were sent there.¹⁸⁸ Part of a group of thirty-three Fingo families being transported to work in Uitenhage in November escaped in the night and returned to Graham's Town.¹⁸⁹ Most of these Fingo movements were accompanied by armed military patrols, which indicates that the Fingo were not moving voluntarily. With this threat of enforced removal to farms, any unemployed Fingo in Graham's Town rapidly found service, if only carrying firewood and water in town.¹⁹⁰ A prospective Cape Town employer, on the advice of J.C.Chase, asked Campbell to send him sixty to eighty male Fingo, aged twelve to twenty.¹⁹¹ In 1837 there were a thousand applications for Fingo workers from Cape Town alone.¹⁹²

These applications were to government, which seems to have had a hand in controlling Fingo in much the same way it had helped control Mantatees in the previous decade.¹⁹³ A good percentage of the Fingo in 1835 seem to have been distributed amongst the Boers, who were set to lose their slave apprentices within three years. This raises questions as to the real motives for the Great Trek.¹⁹⁴ These examples emphasise the manner in which the colonial authorities were responding to settler demands.

¹⁸⁷ (CA) A519/23, p.269, D'Urban to Smith, 30 June 1835. D'Urban commented that 'many of the women are by no means willing to come.' I am grateful to Julian Cobbing for this reference.

¹⁸⁸ (CA) A519/17, p.156, W.Smith to Campbell, 1 December 1835; (CA) CO 2756, Orders from Campbell, 4 December 1835; A519/6, p.98, Campbell to Graaff-Reinet civil commissioner.

¹⁸⁹ (CA) A519/3, pp.189-190, Campbell to D'Urban, 27 November 1835; (CA) 1/AY/9/19, Campbell to D'Urban, 29 November 1835.

¹⁹⁰ (CA) 1/AY/9/8, Campbell to D'Urban, 11 March 1836.

¹⁹¹ (CA) 1/AY/8/86, Letter to Campbell, 30 October 1835.

¹⁹² Webb, 'Agricultural development of 1820 settlement', p.209.

¹⁹³ See Chapter 2, pp.45-6.

¹⁹⁴ See Chapter 6, pp.205-6.

Fingo numbers, because of the nature of their identity and the different categories, are difficult to determine. According to Trotter, who alleged he took a count of the Fingo while they were moving *en bloc* through a mountain pass in May, there were 16,800 (2,000 men, 5,600 women and 9,200 children), with 20,000 cattle.¹⁹⁵ However, D'Urban initially described the Fingo as totalling 6,000, then 5,000 and finally 10,000 at different times in May 1835,¹⁹⁶ but in 1836 his estimate had risen to 15,000.¹⁹⁷ The latter number was that which was used by the colonists when praising D'Urban for his policies.¹⁹⁸ Either three of the numbers are wrong, or an extra 10,000 Fingo were added to the original group between the Kei and Peddie, or there was never a count of the Fingo. 'Fingo' numbers were increasing as the definition broadened, and as more labourers were added. Were there 16,800 labourers, or did this number include the collaborators? Or were there 5,000 collaborators and 10,000 labourers? Dugmore later claimed that he saw the column of Fingo near the Keiskamma River, and the Fingo stealing cattle to supplement their 'spoils'.¹⁹⁹ Dugmore, who only wrote his memoirs in the 1870s, was probably confusing the Fingo identities.

By October 1835 there were two thousand Fingo at King William's Town, two thousand at Tyhume and seven hundred at Peddie.²⁰⁰ There were hundreds in Graham's Town and an unknown number labouring on farms. The Blue Books indicate that there were up to eight thousand Fingo west of the Fish by 1837, although it is unlikely that even the majority will show in the official statistics. As Neumark pointed out, the opgaaf figures were used for tax

¹⁹⁵ BPP 279 (1836), p.37, Estimate of Trotter, 14 May 1835.

¹⁹⁶ Respectively: (CA) CO 4381, D'Urban, General Order, Ndabakazi, 3 May 1835. Two days later he said there were 5,000 - (CA) A519/18, p.82, D'Urban to Campbell, 5 May 1835; this number was corroborated by (CA) LG 596, pp.64-6, Somerset to Campbell. In his General Order, 23 May 1835, D'Urban claimed there were 10,000 Fingo.

¹⁹⁷ D'Urban, 'Public Documents', p.11.

¹⁹⁸ For example, BPP 503 (1837), p.181, Address from Port Elizabeth residents, 1835.

¹⁹⁹ Dugmore, *Reminiscences of Albany settler*, pp.88-9.

²⁰⁰ (CA) LG 13, p.165, W.Fynn to Hudson, King William's Town, 29 October 1835; (CA) 1/AY/8/24, Fingo commissioners to D'Urban, Fort Beaufort, 29 August 1835; (CA) A519/3, pp.29-34, Fingo commissioners to D'Urban, Peddie, 5 October 1835.

purposes, and were therefore subject to understatement.²⁰¹ Illegal labourers would need to be similarly hidden. Duly, in studying Ordinances 49 and 50 (1828), commented that the official channels to record or regulate labour contracts were generally bypassed or ignored.²⁰² This is shown in 1835 when in September the clerks of the peace for George and Uitenhage claimed that no passes or contracts had been issued since the previous October, and Albany had recorded only 143 passes since the previous September.²⁰³ These figures are nonsensical when they are compared with how many Africans were actually coming into these districts to work. There are likely to have been thousands of Fingo working in the Colony who do not appear in any records. A likely estimate of the number of Fingo working in the Cape by 1836 is double that officially stated, that is, approximately fifteen thousand (D'Urban's estimate). This number could easily have been accommodated in the labour starved Colony.

What does this reconstruction of Fingo history mean for John Ayliff? His description of 1835 contained many clear inaccuracies, as shown above. He has retained an unblemished historical record as the humanitarian and spiritual guide of the Fingo, although Majeke's accusations that he conspired with the colonial authorities are worth noting.²⁰⁴ The fact that Ayliff was present with the Fingo in 1835, and yet made such simple errors as describing the Fingo as Gcaleka slaves, who were all settled at Peddie, can lead to only one conclusion. He must have been consciously involved in the construction of a cover-story for the Fingo. Ayliff's actions, and especially his diary entries in his period at Butterworth from 1830 to 1835, provide a key to his situation. His intention, integral to mission philosophy,²⁰⁵ was to divide

²⁰¹ Neumark, Economic Influences, p.74.

²⁰² Duly, 'Revisit with Hottentot Ordinance'.

²⁰³ (CA) 1/AY/8/24, Judge Menzies to D'Urban, 3 October 1835.

²⁰⁴ Majeke, Role of the missionaries, pp.34-5. Dora Taylor is not given sufficient credit for the importance of her ideas. Whilst there are overstatements and weak empiricism, her insight and intuition are revolutionary.

²⁰⁵ Majeke, Role of the missionaries; Williams, When races meet; Cochrane, Servants of Power, ch.2.

the Gcaleka by undermining Hintza's power,²⁰⁶ and offering an alternative (European) power source. He attracted Gcaleka opportunists and social misfits, and the mission 'proved itself an asylum for not only the destitute and afflicted, but it has proved itself a refuge for those appointed to die'.²⁰⁷ The few converts²⁰⁸ whom he attracted were largely Gcaleka (Caffers).²⁰⁹

Ayliff's diary makes it clear that he had little contact with 'Fingo': there are but twelve mentions of the word in his daily diary entries between 1830 and 1837. Only four of these occur before July 1834. He makes no mention of Fingo in his annual reports on the state of the mission and conversions.²¹⁰ Why does the 'father of the Fingo' not talk about his charges? How can it be claimed that Ayliff had a close relationship with the Fingo? Moyer commented disappointedly on the lack of detail on the Fingo in Ayliff's pre-1835 diary, but did not question their alleged relationship with Ayliff. An inexcusable fault in Moyer's work is his numerous misquotations from Ayliff's diary, which makes it seem as though Ayliff spoke more about the Fingo than he did. On many occasions he imposed the term 'Mfengu' onto Ayliff's diary when the latter actually referred to 'station people' or something similar.²¹¹ One cannot assume that Ayliff was talking about Fingo when he does not specifically say so. This resulted from Moyer's acceptance of Whiteside's paradigm, and its imposition onto the source material. The difference between Ayliff's diary - his unwitting comments at the time - and his articles of 1835 and essays of 1851 and 1853 do not correspond. The diary reveals little more than a passing awareness of the existence of 'Fingo', and no knowledge of their past. Yet

²⁰⁶ Clearly stated in (CA) A80, Ayliff Diary, entries for 24 August 1832, 9 September 1833; 11 July 1834.

²⁰⁷ (CA) A80, Ayliff Diary, entry for 12 June 1837.

²⁰⁸ As noted by Ayliff, *Ibid.*, entry for 26 January 1834. By February 1834 he had a total of 22 converts and 92 attending his school.

²⁰⁹ Examples of Gcaleka conversions: *Ibid.*, entries for 14 April 1831, 25 June 1831, 25 June 1832, 7 August 1833. See also J.V.B. Shrewsbury, *Memorials of Rev. William J. Shrewsbury* (1868), p.334, who comments, 25 December 1827, that there had been numerous Kafir converts, but only one Fingo.

²¹⁰ (CL) MS 15,704, Minutes of AGMs of Wesleyan preachers. He also made no mention of Fingo in 1837, when summarising his achievements at the station, see (CA) A80, Ayliff Diary, entry for 12 June 1837.

²¹¹ Moyer, 'History of the Mfengu', pp.133, 142, 145, 149, 150, 189, 520, for instance.

Ayliff subsequently wrote convoluted and lengthy 'histories' of the Fingo, based almost solely on secondary sources. The inference is clear.

But who thought of applying the general Fingo story to the labourers? D'Urban? As shown, there were occasional references to Fingo refugees in the late 1820s and early 1830s. When Ngwane women and children were captured at Mbolompo in 1828 and taken into the Colony to work, they were called Fingo. A precedent was thereby created where people seized illegally to labour were described as Fingo. By the early 1830s there were a number of 'Fingo' working in Albany and Somerset. The equation of the Fingo with labour came again in 1833, when Godlonton complained of the labour shortage. He suggested that the 'Fingoos' and 'Mantatees', who were living 'under the most despotic control of the Caffers', should be encouraged to enter colonial service, as their 'industry is almost proverbial'.²¹² D'Urban was centrally involved with the Fingo in 1835: he was at the head of the invading forces in April and May, he appointed the Fingo chiefs, he organised the creation of the collaborator settlements. And it was he who first described the Fingo as slaves of the Gcaleka in April 1835. By portraying the Fingo as slaves being rescued by the British, it would be possible to escape Colonial Office censure. He and the colonists, in their public statements, constantly equated the 'Fingo rescue' with 'the true spirit of the sweeping emancipation made by the mother country',²¹³ thereby inverting the identity of the captured labourers.

The only feasible explanation is that Ayliff then intentionally wrote the 'Fingo history', probably with the aid of D'Urban and Godlonton. The initial stories of Natal refugees were taken, and interwoven with the contemporary myths of the destruction of Shaka.²¹⁴ To this was added elements of each category of Fingo: that some fought in the army, some settled at Peddie, and some were refugees. All of this was amalgamated into one history, so that

²¹² Graham's Town Journal, 16 May 1833, Godlonton editorial.

²¹³ For examples, see (CA) CO 4381, D'Urban, Official Notice, 3 May 1835; BPP 503 (1837), pp.181-207, Addresses to D'Urban from residents of Port Elizabeth, Cape Town, Caledon, Graham's Town residents, and others.

²¹⁴ See Chapter 1, pp.15-19.

every Fingo supposedly had the same origins. Automatically, the thousands of illegal labourers had an identity that was acceptable to London. The story was polished when Ayliff was in Graham's Town - not ministering to the Fingo, as Whiteside claimed - between May and September. He published the new history in August and September, and reworked it again in the 1850s. Ayliff never met D'Urban's expectations, and D'Urban (who in 1835 and 1836 had control of mission appointments) removed him from both of the important Fingo settlements, Peddie and Tyhume. His confused efforts at explaining Fingo history seem to have annoyed D'Urban, who complained to Smith that 'Mr Ayliff was a very improper person to send to Butterworth, imbecile, timorous and weak. Mr Boyce and Mr Palmer [actively pro-settler Wesleyan missionaries] both described him thus to me, and said that he was unfit for any post of trial.'²¹⁵ Ironically, Ayliff's 'history' was so effective that it has not been challenged for a century and a half.

This reassessment of the Fingo identity places a number of issues in a new light. The invasion of Hintza's territory was not aimed merely at cattle and subjugation: it was planned to supply forced labourers. At precisely the same time that the Cape's slaves were being emancipated (with a short apprenticeship), a new labour supply was ensured. It explains the missing information on Fingo movements in 1835, and the reason why Ayliff and Davis stopped writing their diaries. It also explains why there are so many inconsistencies and rank inaccuracies in Ayliff's and Whiteside's histories. The orthodoxy has elements of accuracy, but is otherwise misleading. Different groups of people were described as having the same identity. This new interpretation of the evidence makes it clear how the labour shortage was solved so rapidly in 1835, and that the arrival of the Fingo was not coincidental. And the fact that this could have taken place at all, and has since been covered up so completely, bears witness to the immense power and dominance which the British enjoyed on the eastern frontier in 1835, and their apologists have had since.

²¹⁵ (CL) MS 2033, D'Urban to Smith, 10 June 1836. See also A.T.C.Slee, 'Some aspects of Wesleyan Methodism in the Albany District between 1830 and 1844', MA Thesis, Rhodes University, 1946, p.49.

CHAPTER 5

THE RESULTS OF THE WAR

By mid May D'Urban's objectives had been satisfied, and the colonial effort decreased. D'Urban wrote to Bell in early May, saying that 'I shall now speedily wind up matters with the border tribes - it may cost me the trouble of a few desultory inflictions, but the result I think is certain and not distant'.¹ The 'war' continued to be merely the advance of the Europeans. The Boers were sent home at the end of May to sow their crops, and the remaining troops were reorganised into more defensive groupings. Maqoma asked for peace on 3 and 12 May, but D'Urban's offer was rejected, despite the critical state of Rharhabe munitions and food, and their complaints of the shooting of Rharhabe women.² The demand that they move over the Kei River was considered far too harsh. By agreeing to D'Urban's peace, the Rharhabe would have been forced to give up all their land and move onto foreign territory, where they would be overpopulated and dependent upon the goodwill of the Gcaleka. After Maqoma's refusal of the May proposals, Cox was thus ordered on 11 May to continue the hostilities, and 'spare neither age nor sex'.³

D'Urban's plan in May, which was the one sent to London, was to force all the Rharhabe east of the Kei River. The new boundary would then be patrolled by the increased troops that he recommended the Colonial Office send to the Cape. Between May and August the troops were employed in forcing Rharhabe - mainly women - eastwards out of the Queen Adelaide Province, with the object of implementing D'Urban's plans to clear the area of its inhabitants.⁴ This plan

¹ (CA) A519/2, p.33, D'Urban to Bell, 12 June 1835.

² Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, p.65.

³ Ibid., p.73.

⁴ Smith to D'Urban, 7 June 1835, as quoted in Godlonton, Irruption of the Kaffir; Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, p.77. Given the colonial actions in 1835 it seems that the calls of the 'Graham's Town faction' for the

was completely impractical. The Queen Adelaide Province was an enormous area of land whose boundaries would, given the Cape budget, be impossible to patrol. The anger caused by the seizure of all Rharhabe land would lead inevitably to further conflict. By September D'Urban had realised that he must allow the Rharhabe to remain in designated areas.

After May the situation remained much the same, with patrols in the Amatole and Buffalo areas, many led enthusiastically by Smith. These concentrated now more on destroying crops and stored food than capturing cattle, as there was little livestock left. Five thousand cattle were captured from between the Buffalo and Kei Rivers in June,⁵ an area that had hardly been raided previously. Bowker described two patrols of Boers and military Fingo from Peddie and Fort Willshire who were ordered on 4 June to burn all huts in their path between the Keiskamma and Buffalo - prime Ndlambe land. They returned the following day having burned three hundred and two huts.⁶

Laing felt in mid July that D'Urban was giving in too much to the Graham's Town settlers and that the destruction that continued was unnecessary. The goats being taken were particularly unnecessary, as they were of little value to the colonists, but it was all that the Rharhabe had left to live on.⁷ With the capture of cattle and the burning of crops and stored food the Rharhabe depended on goats to survive.⁸ The Debe/Buffalo River area seems to have been devoid of people by May, with troops marching around empty ravines shooting at nothing.⁹ Cox and his 3rd Division remained, from April to August, based on the Debe Flats between the upper reaches of the Keiskamma and Buffalo Rivers.

'extermination' of the Caffer meant just that. All Rharhabe must be removed from their land - those who refused must be killed.

⁵ BPP 279 (1836), pp.100-5, Dutton, Notices.

⁶ (CA) 1/AY/8/86, J.M.Bowker to D'Urban, 4 June 1835; see too (NA) A96, Shepstone Diary, entry for 6 June 1835, where Shepstone said that Smith was taking a cannon on his patrols and shelling any area where there was a fire.

⁷ (CL) MS 16,579, Diary of Laing, entry for 11 July 1835.

⁸ For examples of the extent of the slaughter of goats see Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, p.56.

⁹ Ibid. p.63.

Almost daily patrols of fifty to two hundred burghers and troops were sent into the Buffalo, Amatole and Tyhume mountains in order to kill Rharhabe and harass and fatigue the survivors. Fort Cox was set up in a pivotal position, in order to control the Amatole Mountains. The possibility that labour was being gathered here too should not be excluded. The diary of Cox (written after 1835) shows reticence about his success in the mountains, and almost gives the impression that the troops had little effect in their four months there. A much clearer view of the power and actions of the whites is to be found in the diary of his subordinate, Stretch. He gives much detail on the atrocities committed by the colonial forces.

This indecisive guerilla warfare lasted much longer than D'urban had expected or intended. This was cause for concern financially, and with regard to the home government, as lengthy hostilities against the indigenous peoples of the Colonies was against Colonial Office policy. Erasmus complained in mid-June of the number of Rharhabe in the Kaga mountains eighty kilometers north-west of Graham's Town, some of whom had been shot.¹⁰ Tensions also began to arise within the white force, as evidenced by the fight between some Scotsmen and Boers, wherein D'Urban and Smith delighted in seeing the latter beaten.¹¹ It is difficult to assess whether the tensions were chiefly between the Boers and the British troops, or whether the English settlers were also hostile to their fellow Dutch colonists. There was both a sense of unity and one of opposition between the English and Dutch settlers: they shared the same land and aims, but had different cultures.

Part of D'Urban's plan for the subjugation of the African polities was the incorporation and control of their chiefs.¹² There were three young boys who in 1835 were heirs to the chieftaincies of the three important 'Xhosa' groups: Sandile of the Ngqika, Siwane of the Ndlambe, and Sarhili of the Gcaleka. If

¹⁰ (CA) 1/AY/8/35, Report of Erasmus, 18 June 1835.

¹¹ Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, pp.98-9. Smith commented that the Boers were inferior to the Khoi.

¹² (CA) A519/2, p.63, Bell to D'Urban, 12 June 1835.

D'Urban could support them and make them subject to British control, he would have only three chiefs to deal with.¹³ Sutu and Nonube, respectively mothers of Sandile and Siwane, were supportive of D'Urban's intention to control their sons in return for support, and hoped to prevent any possible succession dispute. Sutu supported the Colony,¹⁴ and hoped to use the whites to fend off her son's uncles, Maqoma and Tyali, during the Ngqika interregnum so as to secure the Ngqika chieftaincy for Sandile. After D'Urban declared his support for Sandile in May, Maqoma hid him from Sutu, who wanted to bring him to the British camp at King William's Town for protection.¹⁵ The first condition of peace with the Ngqika in August was that Sutu and Sandile be given over to the care of Warden.¹⁶ Sandile was to be recognised as chief. 'I hope,' said D'Urban, 'to make him in that capacity, a powerful instrument of our views'.¹⁷

Nonube was in a similar situation, with Qasana and Siyolo and their Ndlambe followers openly hostile to the Colony in 1835. She was the Great Wife of Mdushane, and prided herself on her descent from a shipwrecked white woman, claiming kinship with the English on the basis of her light skin. In response to D'Urban's promise to recognise her son as chief of all the Ndlambe (and Sandile as chief of the Ngqika),¹⁸ she and Siwani moved to Mount Coke where they remained with the missionary Dugmore.¹⁹

¹³ Colonial control of an African chief was obviously an important step in controlling his people physically and psychologically, and was attempted on various occasions. The most notable was Grey's education of the sons of Sandile; Mhala; Anta; Khama; and several grandchildren of Maqoma at his Kaffir College (Zonnebloem) in Cape Town in the 1850s. Lobengula's sons, Njube and Njuboenna, were also sent there in the 1890s. The intention was to turn the heirs apparent into black Englishmen. But none of the schemes worked, as the people rejected the educated chiefs, and succession crises resulted. See Peires, *Dead will arise*, p.265.

¹⁴ For a summary of her actions in support of the Colony see A519/1, pp.100-1, Laing to D'Urban, 24 February 1835.

¹⁵ (NA) A96, Shepstone Diary, entry for 5 June 1835.

¹⁶ (CA) A519/17, pp.54-5, D'Urban instructions.

¹⁷ (CA) A519/18, p.100, D'Urban to Bell, 2 June 1835; see also A519/1, p.100-1, Laing to D'Urban, 24 February 1835, where Laing urged D'Urban to support Sutu, and thus get early influence with Sandile.

¹⁸ (NA) A96, Diary of Shepstone, entry for 4 June 1835. In the 1830s there was an Ndlambe succession dispute, see Peires, 'History of the Xhosa', p.191.

¹⁹ See Dugmore, *Reminiscences of Albany settler*, pp.73-4, for information on Nonube.

Hintza's son Sarhili was imprisoned with his father and uncle Burhu. As soon as D'Urban heard of the death of Hintza he crowned Sarhili ceremoniously as heir at Fort Warden on 19 May, claiming control of a title which the British had never had a say in.²⁰ Sarhili and Burhu were held in the Graham's Town prison until late July as hostages for their people, which emphasised the power of the British to control the chiefs. Sarhile's mother, Nomsa, had been ostracised by the Gcaleka, and his smooth succession to the chieftaincy was hampered by the increasing independence of his father's councillors. His power could possibly have been consolidated with help from the Colony, but he chose to earn his position, becoming eventually a particularly revered chief.²¹ The groundwork of control set up by D'Urban in 1835 was disrupted by the disannexation of the Queen Adelaide Province, although by 1855, at least, Siwane was a long-time colonial ally and despised by his people.²²

The Rharhabe resistance morale was boosted in late June with the killing of Bailie and his patrol near the Pirie mission station.²³ The hagiography of Baillie's death by apologists such as Godlonton is nothing but propaganda.²⁴ It was claimed that Bailie and his followers were ambushed, but managed to defend themselves in a group until their ammunition ran out. There were no colonial survivors to describe what was supposedly a heroic stand akin to that of Custer.²⁵ The patrol was in fact captured; and Maqoma had ordered the sparing of Baillie's life for the diplomatic advantage it would afford. But the anger of Baillie's captors overruled him.²⁶ Bailie and his patrol had attacked this same area merely three days previously, and had captured two

²⁰ (NA) A96, Shepstone Diary, entry for 19 May 1835; Cory, Rise of South Africa, Vol.3, p.167.

²¹ Peires, House of Phalo, pp.115-7.

²² Peires, Dead will arise, p.68.

²³ Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, ch.4, for evidence of new motivation amongst the Rharhabe and descriptions of Bailie's patrol.

²⁴ Godlonton, Irruption of the Kaffir, pp.195-202.

²⁵ The descriptions of the Bailie patrol are very similar to those on the Wilson patrol in Matabeleland in 1893, which occupies a more pronounced position in Rhodesian settler historiography.

²⁶ (CA) A519/27, pp.65-70, Information of Fingo women, 23 July 1835.

hundred women and children.²⁷ It is likely that he was returning to collect more labourers, and was attacked. Yet settler historiography has highlighted Bailie's death as a prime example of African savagery and the bravery of the colonists.

The Rharhabe were still receiving some weapons at this stage. Smith blamed James Read and his servant Andries Stoffel for supplying guns to the Rharhabe from the Kat River Settlement.²⁸ This was merely calumny of Read whose ideas on racial integration were regularly blamed for any Rharhabe hostility. The Rharhabe were getting guns instead from the Boers outside the Colony, and from a schooner 'James', which landed at Chalumna on 9 July.²⁹ Cory suggested that the Griqua were also supplying guns. This led to an unsuccessful attempt to storm Fort Wellington.³⁰ The Rharhabe continued to be always on the defensive. After December 1834, there were only four real attacks on a colonial base. This defensiveness was partly of necessity, and partly tactical, in order to prove to D'Urban and the Colonial Office that their intentions were not aggressive. The diaries of Cox and Stretch indicate a degree of communication between the 3rd Division and the Ngqika, as there were regularly verbal exchanges in the bush. In each case the Ngqika answered in English or Dutch, which again implies prior contact with the Colony. It is likely that the Rharhabe who resisted were those who had had to work in the Colony when they were dispossessed, and who realised that colonial expansion, once achieved, was irreversible.

By August it was clear that a final offensive was needed to force the Rharhabe into submission. A large colonial force therefore gathered on the Debe Flats in early August to launch a decisive attack on the chiefs in the Amatole

²⁷ See Chapter 4, pp.154.

²⁸ Theal, Documents relating to Kaffir war, p.282; Cory, Rise of South Africa, Vol.3, p.192; BPP 503 (1837), p.266, Evidence of Majecco; Ibid., p.91, Atherstone to Campbell, April 1835.

²⁹ BPP 538 (1836), p.256; BPP 503 (1837), pp.74, 88; Cory, Rise of South Africa, Vol.3, p.201.

³⁰ (CL) MS 951, Diary of T.H.Bowker, entry for 20 July 1835.

Mountains. Very little was actually needed, as the Rharhabe who still resisted lacked food, ammunition and motivation,³¹ and wished to plant their crops before it was too late. If they continued to fight they would not be able to sow a new harvest to replace that destroyed by the troops. It took merely a few hours of fighting after a large night attack on 14 and 15 August,³² to convince the Rharhabe of the need for peace, and hostilities officially ceased. Warden was called in specially to parlay with the chiefs, as he was trusted by them and had been for years. In mid August Smith sent a confidential note to D'Urban saying that if he could get hold of Maqoma and Tyali he was sure that he could get them to actually recommend the occupation of the Queen Adelaide Province by whites. But he needed special, diplomatic men - 'no Moultries or Bowkers' - to help him.³³ If D'Urban and Smith could get the 'Caffers' to agree with the annexation of the Province, they would have plenty of ammunition with which fight Glenelg's opposition to their anti-policy actions.

Thus the missionaries Boyce and Shepstone, with the collusion of D'Urban, were sent with messages to Maqoma, Tyali and Mhala urging them to accept the peace terms offered. They warned of a possible second invasion which was to be more aggressive.³⁴ Duff argues that it was they who helped persuade D'Urban that his May intentions were too severe and impractical, and proposed the September offer to bring about peace.³⁵ Maqoma asked for peace initially on 15 August, and accepted the conditions of the treaties on 17 September. D'Urban's conditions were that Sutut and Sandile and all Khoi had to be handed over; and that the Rharhabe must evacuate the country of the Amatole, Tyhume, Keiskamma,

³¹ (CA) A519/27, pp.65-70, Information of Rharhabe women, 23 July 1835. It was a situation directly comparable to that in Zululand in 1879 and in Matabeleland in 1896.

³² For a description see F.Rex to father, 18 August 1835, in Long, Index to Unofficial manuscripts, p.176; Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch; Butterfield, Journal of Cox.

³³ (CA) A519/2, p.171, Smith to D'Urban, 18 August 1835. Smith did manage to coerce Rharhabe support for the British actions and occupation in 1836. cf. Chapter 3, footnote 208, p.115.

³⁴ (CA) A519/2, pp.130-1, Boyce to D'Urban, 28 July 1835.

³⁵ Duff, 'Some aspects of Wesleyan Methodism', pp.85-90.

Buffalo Mountains and Debe Flats, and move to King William's Town. There they were to hand over all guns and ammunition and be settled as British subjects under three commissioners (Smith, Warden and W. Shepstone) in the area between the Kabousie River and the coast, and the Gonube and Kei Rivers.³⁶

The real agenda of the September treaties is evident in D'Urban's confidential notes on them. The Rharhabe were to be distributed under magistrates, with a Rharhabe subordinate, appointed by government. Smith held an elaborate ceremony in King William's Town in November to appoint Maqoma, Tyali and Mhala as special magistrates under British supervision. 'Meanwhile, their system of clanship, by this very arrangement, will be at once broken up; and its spirit and feeling will be rapidly subdued and forgotten, as the power of the chiefs shall be seen to have ceased and passed away', and British control would be easily imposed. Again D'Urban's concern to provide for a labour supply is evident when he stressed that this system was the only method 'of converting a Savage and vexatious Enemy into peaceable and useful servants'. He went further to say that the Rharhabe would thereby be 'civilised', and that it would improve trade.³⁷ The blueprint for this policy seems to have come from J.M. Bowker in July, who suggested that precisely this structure be applied to the Fingo.³⁸

Stretch complained that D'Urban's harsh peace terms were a result of the influence of the Graham's Town faction, which continually proposed 'war and extermination'.³⁹ They wanted all Africans removed from the area of the newly-claimed settler farms. The Rharhabe must either be driven off their land, be

³⁶ (CA) A519/17, pp.54-60. For the specific treaty with the Ndlambe, see BPP 279 (1836), pp.97-8.

³⁷ (CA) A519/5, pp.55-63, D'Urban to ?, 17 September 1835; Ibid., pp.52-3, D'Urban to ?, 30 September 1835; (CA) GH 34/5, pp.114-7, D'Urban to ?, 17 September 1835.

³⁸ (AM) SM 1176, J.M. Bowker to D'Urban, 2 July 1835. As Lancaster pointed out the system of British indirect rule was derived from their Indian model. But this was its first application in Africa. It was a system which was then to spread throughout Africa in the nineteenth century, as a means of subjugation and control.

³⁹ Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, p.128.

turned into servants, or must be killed. Throughout 1835 the people of Graham's Town, led by Godlonton and his newspaper, retained their nervousness and denunciation of the Caffers. Laing disliked the settler and official descriptions of the Africans as savages; he felt that such language could excuse their extermination. 'The feeling in this town,' he wrote, 'against the black and yellow people is bad indeed. Surely people so much under the influence of prejudice are unfit for the enjoyment of that power which they seek.'⁴⁰ The feeling in Graham's Town in October was that peace had been made too easily and that not enough punishment had been meted out. The seizure of all Rharhabe land, most of their cattle, many of their women and children, and the destruction of substantial amounts of their food supplies was not sufficient. The Journal was the chief propagator of racial tension and negrophobic propaganda. In November Laing commented exasperatedly that the latest edition showed 'a spirit of no ordinary stupidity, or of no ordinary honesty. I wonder that the people here are so easily duped.'⁴¹

The Rharhabe began to take cattle from the colonists immediately, raids which increased steadily, largely because of the lack of food east of the Fish River. D'Urban claimed incorrectly that the area had never been so peaceful. Stockenstrom noted that depredations had increased; and the official reports show the same.⁴² J.M.Bowker reported to D'Urban in October 1836 that cattle thefts had increased because of the massive devastation and starvation that

⁴⁰ (CL) MS 16,579, Diary of Laing, entry for 5 June 1835; see also entries for 1 and 8 June, 7 July, 30 October, and 6 November 1835.

⁴¹ Ibid., entry for 6 November 1835; see also (CA) A1480, Philip to Buxton, 1 May 1835, in which Philip complained that De Zuid-Afrikaan and the Graham's Town Journal continued 'to spit venom against the Caffers; they are represented as crafty savages; as monsters who have placed themselves beyond the pale of humanity.' Stretch had complained in April that Godlonton's reports concerning cattle theft 'as usual are very highly coloured' and grossly exaggerated (reference lost - probably in (CA) A50/4).

⁴² (CA) A519/15, p.62; Long, Index to Unofficial manuscripts, pp.179, 184, F.Rex reported in September and December that there were many cattle thefts; A519/3, p.189, Campbell to ?; 1/AY/8/55, Report of Erasmus, 11 September 1835, reported that cattle were still being stolen in the Winterberg by small groups; (CA) GH 14/1, Halifax, June 1836, complained that there was as much theft as before 1835.

had been caused.⁴³ Stock theft had reached epidemic proportions by the late 1830s. There was little real fluctuation in the numbers stolen throughout the 1820s and 1830s.⁴⁴ Somerset reported from Shiloh in October that the Winterberg Thembu felt that the Rharhabe made peace in order to cultivate, and intended to fight again after the harvest, and that Gamba (brother of Mhala) intended going beyond the Orange to elicit the aid of the Coranna against the Colony.⁴⁵ These, it seems, were just rumours.

There was an obvious problem with D'Urban's September settlement. How was the Colony to control thousands of Africans within its borders? And as they were all to become 'subjects', what political standing and legal rights did they have? As Bell said, 'I confess I have not the least notion how this instant conversion of recent enemies into fellow subjects is to work in practice'.⁴⁶ How could the Africans suddenly become British subjects? The settlement was the first time that still-powerful African groups had been incorporated within a colonial state. The settlers did not really have the option of exterminating the Africans, as in America and Australia, as there were too many. They had thus somehow to be brought under British control and rule. Somerset was sent on a tour of the Winterberg and northern districts in October, to inspect the implementation of D'Urban's policies and to give a show of force to eliminate unrest.

The Rharhabe were never dominant in the hostilities, and apart from some minor skirmishes spent the time on the defensive. The hostile factions in the Ngqika and Ndlambe managed to survive in mountain strongholds, while the British troops moved freely through the territory across the Keiskamma River. The

⁴³ Bowker, 'Speeches, Letters and Selections', p.24, Bowker to D'Urban, 30 October 1836. (CA) LG 420, miscellaneous letters, indicates that cattle theft in Albany and Somerset increased throughout 1836.

⁴⁴ In 1812 Cradock had announced that the Zuurveld had been cleared of Rharhabe, yet in 1813 cattle raiding increased; see Maclellan, Proper degree of Terror, p.154.

⁴⁵ (CA) A519/3, p.87, Somerset to D'Urban, 24 October 1835.

⁴⁶ (CA) A519/3, p.4, Bell to D'Urban, 25 September 1835.

British philosophy was clear:

Well do we know the number of milch-cows and goats we have taken, and the enormous quantities of corn we have destroyed. We have made them congregate and reduce their possessions to one general stock, and experience in war teaches us that when the prospect of a scarcity of food is before us, no one can possess or destroy enough.⁴⁷

The labour is, as usual, left out. Smith suggested to the trader Driver after the war that if he wanted to make a lot of money he obtain a trader's licence and sell goats to the Africans around King William's Town, who were nearing starvation.⁴⁸ The tactics of burning huts and crops, attacking women and children, and taking cattle on a large scale had been pioneered by John Graham in 1812, and was copied, with a larger force and more effect, by Willshire in 1819.⁴⁹ The commando system turned it into a common expectation for colonial raids. But never had it been carried out so extensively - in respect of the size of the force, the area decimated, the time period it covered, and the damage it caused - as in 1835. The Queen Adelaide Province made the Rharhabe aliens in their own land. At no stage did the Rharhabe pose any real threat to the Colony in 1834 and 1835.

This destruction of Rharhabe livelihood was one of the keys to the increase in Fingo numbers from the end of 1835. Apart from the three categories of Fingo in 1835 - collaborator, military and labourer - there were many Africans who came into the Colony to seek work as the only means of survival. They either called themselves Fingo or were subsumed by the colonial authorities within the name. Apart from the Fingo forced to become labourers, there were a number of African peoples who moved into the Colony, either attracted by employment, or forced by poverty in 1835 and the period following it. The immense

⁴⁷ Smith to D'Urban, 30 August 1835, in Theal, Documents relating to Kaffir War, p.358.

⁴⁸ (CA) A1653, Military Board papers, Smith to Driver, 10 October 1835.

⁴⁹ For a discussion of these methods, see MacLennan, Proper Degree of Terror.

destruction of Rharhabe food and livelihood by the troops in 1835, coupled with the seizure of the Queen Adelaide Province, produced landlessness and poverty, to be solved by colonial indenture. LMS missionary Kayser noted in 1836 that the formerly well-populated areas around the Keiskamma were poverty-stricken, and that 'the Kaffers are now very much seeking work to get only food for payment.'⁵⁰ Even some of Phato's people undertook indenture.⁵¹ While 1835 was not on the scale of the dislocation caused by the Cattle-Killing of 1856-7, it forced a large number of Rharhabe into the Cape. Because of the multi-faceted, vague nature of the 'Fingo' these people were easily subsumed as members of it.⁵²

There is notable confusion in the sources relating to 1835 as to whether the Fingo should be referred to as a single tribe or as an amalgamation of peoples. Very soon the tribalisation process became active, and the Fingo began to be referred to as a tribe.⁵³ Beinart noted that the Nxasana of the Qumbu district, who fought as Fingo against the Mpondomise in the late nineteenth century, were actually associated with the Mpondomise chiefs before the 1820s, and came originally from the same region, despite Bryant's error in claiming that they came from the southern Natal region.⁵⁴ It was as a result of the incorporation of Africans from beyond the Fish into the 'Fingo', that the Fingo 'nation' grew. In Peddie, for instance, there were 8,650 Fingo in 1854.⁵⁵ Three years later, there were 13,048. In the 1837 and 1839 population censuses there were large numbers of 'aliens' working in Albany, described as

⁵⁰ Kayser to Ellis, 4 January 1836, quoted by Crais, 'Ambiguous frontiers', pp.43-4.

⁵¹ F.Rex to Duthie, 25 September 1835, in Long, Index to Unofficial manuscripts.

⁵² The mechanics of the process of tribalisation - and specifically that of the Fingo - have not been sufficiently explored here. It is a vital aspect of the growth of the 'Fingo', and needs to be researched.

⁵³ For example (CA) GH 19/4, Treaty with the Fingo tribe, 10 December 1836. But see (CA) CO 2756, Bowker to Campbell, 14 July 1835, where Bowker described himself as the agent to the Fingo tribes.

⁵⁴ W.Beinart & C.Bundy, Hidden Struggles in Rural South Africa (Johannesburg, 1987), p.101.

⁵⁵ Moyer, 'History of the Mfengu', pp.595-8.

Fingo. Yet the 1838 census refers to this same group as 'Kafirs',⁵⁶ showing the confusion and relation between the two identities. According to Whiteside there were 350,000 Fingo in the Colony in 1904. It is quite impossible for an increase of this sort to have resulted from a natural birth rate. In his 1935 census, van Warmelo found only 15,000 people who termed themselves Fingo in the old Colony, all of whose lineage and origins were unknown.⁵⁷ Many of the terms used in the nineteenth century to identify people are vague and unclear.⁵⁸

From July 1835, the eastern civil commissioners complained of 'Fingo vagrancy',⁵⁹ - Fingo moving around armed with assegais and refusing service. Over six hundred were reported in the Winterberg area in August,⁶⁰ although it is unclear whether they originated outside or inside the Colony. As early as July, Ziervogel had complained to Campbell that there were Fingo, armed with assegais, wandering around Somerset district, to which Campbell replied that they were to be arrested and transported to Graham's Town.⁶¹ A complaint came from the Graaff-Reinet civil commissioner that there were many Fingo, Bechuana and Mantatee wandering around his district, and causing a disturbance by stealing cattle and refusing to enter service under the Boers.⁶² The civil commissioners of Uitenhage and George reported similar situations.⁶³ The possibility exists that these 'wanderers' were Rharhabe who refused to become labourers. Integral to D'Urban's plans for the Colony was that there were to be no unemployed Africans in the Colony, as they would pose a security threat - much the same argument used in favour of vagrancy ordinances. The pass laws for 'Caffers' were to remain the same, and all Fingo must be controlled too.

⁵⁶ Blue-Books for the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, 1837-9.

⁵⁷ N.J.van Warmelo, A Preliminary Survey of the Bantu Tribes of South Africa (Pretoria, 1935), p.65.

⁵⁸ For instance, in 1864 there were 3,540 'Bhele' in Natal, of whom 3,256 were 'collections' from other tribes'; see Bird, Annals of Natal, Vol.1, p.142.

⁵⁹ (CA) 1/AY/8/24, O'Reilly to Campbell, Cradock, 22 September 1835; 1/AY/9/19, Campbell to D'Urban, Graham's Town, 24 July 1835.

⁶⁰ (CA) 1/AY/8/86, Report from Field Cornet, Winterberg, 7 September 1835.

⁶¹ (CA) A519/6, p.95, Ziervogel to Campbell, July 1835.

⁶² (CA) A519/3, p.194, Bell to D'Urban, 4 December 1835.

⁶³ A519/17, p.156, W.Smith to Campbell, 1 December 1835.

He thus ordered the 'apprehension' of all wandering, unemployed Fingo, Bechuana and Caffers, to be sent to Fort Beaufort or Cradock, from where they were to find employment, settle in a location near a town or in the new Ceded Territory locations, or leave the Colony.⁶⁴

Although D'Urban's orders were carried out and many Fingo arrested, there were still disturbances throughout 1836 from wandering Fingo and Mantatees, and from armed Africans from the interior.⁶⁵ Armstrong was in charge of placing the captured Fingo in the Fort Beaufort location, from whence many were distributed as labourers. Noted Armstrong:

I have held out every encouragement to the farmers to take the Fingos into their service and have already disposed of about 20 families in this way. I have also apprenticed several children to the farmers. The Graff Reynet and Beaufort burghers are desirous of taking a number of Fingos to their districts as servants, and I hope to dispose of a good many of them in this way.⁶⁶

The Fort Beaufort/Tyhume area thus became a vital source of labour, with a fluid, large population of controlled prospective workers.⁶⁷ D'Urban spoke approvingly in November 1835 of the agricultural progress of Peddie and Tyhume, and how many of these Fingo were becoming contract labourers throughout the Colony.⁶⁸ It can be argued that the origins of controlled labour migration lie here - Fingo men moved into the Colony for a year at a time, in exchange for livestock and upkeep,⁶⁹ and returned to their land on the Tyhume. Sometimes their families accompanied them, as in the case

⁶⁴ A519/17, pp.121-4, D'Urban to all civil commissioners, 14 October 1835. Somerset was sent out to oversee the implementation: see A519/3, p.65, Somerset to D'Urban, 23 October 1835; A519/3, pp.97-100, Somerset to D'Urban, October 1835.

⁶⁵ (CA) A519/6, p.99, Campbell to Hudson, 16 April 1836; LG 420, p.105, Report of Bradshaw, Bathurst Field Cornet, 21 September 1836; 1/AY/8/49, Hudson to D'Urban, 19 November 1836; 1/AY/8/50, Report of Stockenstrom, March 1837; 1/AY/8/56, Ziervogel to D'Urban, 15 November 1836.

⁶⁶ (CA) CO 2756, Armstrong to Campbell, 19 October 1835.

⁶⁷ See Chapter 4, pp.144.

⁶⁸ BPP 279 (1836), p.109, D'Urban to ?, 12 November 1835.

⁶⁹ For examples of the contracts entered into between masters and servants (Fingo contracts were much like any other), see (CA) 1/UIT/14/11-4.

of the one hundred and three Fingo under Amandoda at Tyhume. They went to seek service in Graham's Town in August 1835, on the recommendation of Armstrong, who promised to reserve land for them on their return.⁷⁰ The Fingo locations were clearly designed in 1835 to provide the eastern Cape towns and farms with labourers.

There was a certain state of flux between the Fingo locations in 1835. Of the Fingos brought to Peddie in mid-May to settle, a large number deserted immediately to squat at Tyhume, where they were later given land. Jokweni and Mabanthla and some followers went at the same time to King William's Town. On 11 October Mabanthla and eighty followers (mainly women and children) returned to Peddie, and five days later sixty of Jokweni's followers did the same. Jokweni remained in King William's Town until 1836. There was a constant flow of Fingo men and families between King William's Town and Peddie,⁷¹ and a hundred Fingo moved from King William's Town to the Gaga River area in November.⁷² There were also many Fingo, looking starved and wretched, moving to Fort Wellington near the Gonube River, from King William's Town.⁷³ They were obviously not escaping indenture, as they were moving to another colonial settlement, so they were presumably unhappy with the land and provisions granted at King William's Town. But Fingo were encouraged or forced to remain within their allotted locations.⁷⁴ This was requested by the colonists, who needed a permanent labour population.⁷⁵ J.M.Bowker was unhappy with the movement of the Fingo describing them as an 'unsettled race'. He suggested to D'Urban in July that no Fingo be allowed to leave their locations without a pass issued by the resident agent.⁷⁶ D'Urban was unhappy with the parties of

⁷⁰ (CA) 1/AY/8/24, Thomson, Armstrong, Minto to D'Urban, 29 August 1835.

⁷¹ (CA) 1/AY/8/86, Bowker to Campbell, 20 October 1835; (NA) A96, Shepstone Diary, entry for 3 June 1835.

⁷² (CA) LG 14, pp.15-6, Fingo commissioners to Hudson, 11 November 1835; A519/3, pp.154-6, Fingo commissioners to D'Urban, November 1835.

⁷³ (CL) MS 951, Diary of T.H.Bowker, entry for 17 September 1835.

⁷⁴ (CA) GH 34/5, p.33, D'Urban to Armstrong, 25 July 1835; (CA) CO 2756, Armstrong to Campbell, 19 October 1835.

⁷⁵ For example the request from Field Cornet van Wijk of Cradock, A519/2, pp.161-2, 19 September 1835.

⁷⁶ (AM) SM 1176, J.M.Bowker to D'Urban, 2 July 1835.

Fingo moving northwards and westwards from Peddie without permission, and ordered Armstrong to apprehend them, take them to Fort Beaufort and place them at Tyhume.⁷⁷

The war of 1835 was not a 'frontier war' or an attack by the 'Caffers' in general, but an explosive continuation of creeping colonial conquest. Stockenstrom criticised the D'Urban system of direct conquest and rule (supported by most of the colonists)⁷⁸ against his own.⁷⁹ He claimed that the British were lucky to secure peace in September, and that the cattle seized and destruction caused by the Colony had been vastly exaggerated by Smith and D'Urban.⁸⁰ Stockenstrom claimed that the British had not been successful in that they had failed to subdue the Fish River bush area and Amatole permanently; it took eight months to bring peace; and not much lasting impact was made on 'Caffer' power and independence, as the determined resistance in the wars of Mlanjeni and the Axe showed. Peires has argued the same line, saying even that the Ndlambe emerged from 1835 virtually unscathed, and that D'Urban had to modify his plans to dispossess the Rharhabe completely, because they were not defeated.⁸¹

The evidence presented in Chapter 3 and below makes it clear that the British had an overwhelming military superiority in 1835. It is shown in the land and cattle taken from the Rharhabe, from the number of Africans killed in comparison with the number of Europeans, and in the ease with which the colonial forces swept through Rharhabe and Gcaleka territory. The failure of

⁷⁷ (CA) 1/AY/8/24, D'Urban to Armstrong, 25 July 1835.

⁷⁸ See the petitions in R.Godlonton, 'Sunshine and cloud; or, light thrown on a dark page of Frontier History' (1855).

⁷⁹ See Chapter 6, p.199.

⁸⁰ Sir A.Stockenstrom (ed. Hutton), The Autobiography of the late Sir Andries Stockenstrom (Cape Town, 1887), Vol.2, p.328. This was supported by (AM) SMD 948, Reminiscences of B.E.Bowker, pp.63-4. Lancaster, 'Governorship of D'Urban', p.189 agrees. He quotes Dr A.Smith in 1851 (p.287) as saying that some Rharhabe felt they had been duped into peace by the missionary delegation.

⁸¹ Peires, House of Phalo, pp.112-3. Le Cordeur argues the same in Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, p.115. See also Harington, Sir Harry Smith.

D'Urban's initial intentions is not surprising, considering its enormity. His plan had never been feasible, and modification of it was inevitable. The fact that he did seize large areas of prime Rharhabe land for settlement by the Gqunukhwebe, Fingo, Mqhayi, other collaborators and colonial settlers and force the Rharhabe into demarcated areas, makes Stockenström's argument a non-sequitur. The failure of the troops to dislodge a few dissenters from the very dense bush and steep ravines of the Amatole Mountains is little reflection on colonial military strength. Smith actually tendered his resignation in November over what he felt was D'Urban's soft attitude towards the Rharhabe in allowing them to have peace, and not permitting him to kill everyone in the Amatole.⁸²

Smith was prone to exaggeration but the records show that D'Urban's estimate of sixty thousand cattle seized from the Rharhabe and Gcaleka in 1835,⁸³ is merely the number sold and given to settlers in claims in the public auctions held between July and September.⁸⁴ The auctions were really just occasions for settlers to collect Rharhabe cattle. Settlers who put in claims for lost cattle (be they strayed, eaten or stolen) were given a certificate to the amount of fifteen percent of what they had supposedly lost. These could be exchanged for captured cattle at one of the weekly sales.⁸⁵ Settler claims were based on the estimation of six cattle to the pound. Twenty-three thousand cattle had been taken from the Ndlambe in 1819, of which half were sold to defray war expenses. This set the example for 1835.⁸⁶ The pattern that developed in 1835 was that cattle were taken by the invading colonists throughout the year. The cattle were then transported under Khoi or Fingo guard to the holding pounds in Bathurst, Salem and the Bushman's river.

⁸² (CA) A519/3, pp.173-181, Smith to D'Urban, 22 November 1835.

⁸³ (CA) GH 1/108, p.123, D'Urban to Glenelg.

⁸⁴ (CA) LG 47, Lists of losses and captured cattle, shows that a total of 59,797 cattle were sold at the weekly auctions, most in July. There were a total of 820 claims, worth £8639. Webb, 'Immediate consequences of Sixth Frontier war', p.40n. gives a neat summary of this system.

⁸⁵ (AM) SM 5502, Papers of T.H.Bowker; (CA) LG 596, pp.104-5, Records of Jarvis, Pound master for captured cattle.

⁸⁶ Reyburn, 'Studies in Cape Frontier History', February 1936, p.108.

D'Urban said that cattle should not be sent to Graham's Town, as they would be 'a source of considerable embarrassment'.⁸⁷ Jarvis was put in charge of the cattle, and their auctioning, and had pound masters at the various cattle holdings.

Throughout 1835 batches of captured cattle of varying numbers were sent to him,⁸⁸ the biggest of which came with Somerset after the raids on the Buffalo and the Gcaleka. According to D'Urban, he sent forty thousand cattle on this occasion; they were distributed in groups of a few thousand at holding areas in the Cowie/ lower Fish/ Kariega/ Bushmans area.⁸⁹ Rharhabe and Gcaleka cattle were originally held in Bathurst, but with the continuous influx, new pounds had to be created as the pasturage was running out.⁹⁰ Cattle were even sent to Tsitsikamma and Uitenhage for safe-keeping. All the cattle had been distributed by October, mostly free to settlers who had certificates detailing the losses which they claimed to have suffered.

The number of cattle taken from the Rharhabe and Gcaleka, including those lost, killed for military consumption or syphoned secretly onto the farms must have been much greater than just the sixty thousand given to settlers. Cory adopted Boyce's argument that no more than thirty thousand cattle were taken, but that the number was exaggerated by the inability of the military to count large herds.⁹¹ This is a feeble argument. Commandant Beyers, a member of Somerset's division, suggested in April that the two thousand cattle seized on the Buffalo River be distributed immediately to farmers in the Fish, Koonap and Kat River areas, rather than suffer the inconvenience of following the

⁸⁷ (CA) A519/18, p.46, D'Urban to Smith, 14 February 1835. Quite what he meant is unclear.

⁸⁸ For example (CA) LG 596, Lists of cattle recieved by Jarvis; (CA) CO 2756, p.152, Report of Jarvis, 17 June 1835; 1/AY/8/86, Hudson to D'Urban, 24 June 1835.

⁸⁹ (CA) GH 19/4, pp.951-3, D'Urban to Campbell, 4 May 1835; (CA) LG 596, p.49, D'Urban to Somerset, 5 May 1835; A519/27, pp.46-7, Smith to Campbell, 3 May 1835, provide the details of these forty thousand cattle, and where they were to be distributed.

⁹⁰ (CA) A519/18, pp.74-7, D'Urban to Campbell, 4 May 1835.

⁹¹ Cory, Rise of South Africa, Vol.3, p.129n.

official procedures.⁹² A group of burghers under Erasmus deserted from the force in May, taking with them one hundred and thirty-eight captured cattle. This upset D'Urban far more than the death of Hintza, and he issued orders for their court-martial.⁹³ Cox felt in August that Maqoma and Tyali had generally been treated unfairly, citing an instance where seven thousand cattle were taken from Maqoma and then merely distributed among the Boers and Khoi by Somerset.⁹⁴ The Gcaleka around the Tsomo River fared no better, and more than four thousand cattle were captured there on 26 April alone.⁹⁵ There are copious examples of the troops of the colonial force regularly killing substantial numbers of captured livestock to eat. The mania exhibited by the invading forces in capturing cattle (at which the 'military Fingo' especially excelled)⁹⁶ makes startling reading,⁹⁷ and shows clearly the extent of dislocation caused in 1835. 'You gallop in,' enthused Smith, 'and half by force, half by strategem, pounce upon them (the Kaffers), wherever you find them, frighten their wives, burn their homes, lift their cattle, and return home in triumph.'⁹⁸ The war of 1835 provided the opportunity for probably the biggest cattle raid in African history.

The psychological and physical impact produced by an armed force of the size employed in 1835 cannot be overstated. Whilst the Rharhabe were continuously losing warriors, the 1st Division, for instance, had lost only four men by late May - two through alcohol-induced accidents, and one Boer in a shooting accident.⁹⁹ D'Urban made it clear to Fynn in September that he considered 'the

⁹² (CA) A519/1, pp.177-180, Somerset to D'Urban, 17 April 1835. See also (NA) A96, Shepstone Diary, entry for 3 June 1835, where Shepstone said that Phato and Mqhayi were receiving cattle for their help.

⁹³ (CA) GH 19/4, p.956, D'Urban to Campbell, 15 May 1835. cf. A519/18, p.89, D'Urban, 15 May 1835. D'Urban was particularly upset that burghers were taking cattle that had been captured at such pains.

⁹⁴ Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, p.127.

⁹⁵ (CL) MS 951, Diary of T.H.Bowker, entry for 26 April 1835.

⁹⁶ Brinton, History of British regiments, p.51.

⁹⁷ For the extent of cattle seizure see the BPP military records, and the diaries of Shepstone, Halse, Andrews, T.H.Bowker and Alexander.

⁹⁸ Quoted in Cory, Rise of South Africa, Vol.3, p.130.

⁹⁹ (CL) MS 951, Diary of T.H.Bowker.

coercive effects' of the colonial force to be responsible for their victory.¹⁰⁰ Success should not be judged relative to total annihilation and the complete depopulation of the land west of the Kei; it must be gauged with regard to the damage done. The Rharhabe were clearly the losers in 1835.

The settlers claimed to have lost enormous numbers of cattle in the 'irruption', and D'Urban appointed Hougham Hudson to investigate the claims. Hudson's estimate of 111,000 cattle lost by colonial farmers is completely inaccurate.¹⁰¹ Hudson himself acknowledged that most of the claims were exaggerated. The Board of Relief had registered claims for just over fifty thousand lost cattle by the end of 1835. Hudson voiced his suspicion of Campbell, whom he said was backing the false claims of the farmers. Robson noted in 1836 that he knew many Boers who had claimed remuneration for losses they had never suffered,¹⁰² and G.Palmer of Bathurst, for example, claimed for the loss of twenty-eight cattle that were later found to have wandered off through his own negligence.¹⁰³ Nevertheless, Hudson's report still claimed that damage worth 288625 had been done to the Colony in 1834-5: 111,000 cattle, 5,438 horses and 156,878 sheep and goats were stolen, and 455 houses burnt.¹⁰⁴ These claims are still accepted as accurate inventories of the war in the two latest publications on the topic.¹⁰⁵

Webb makes it clear that these figures were unfounded, and based upon claims impossible to verify.¹⁰⁶ He gives good reasons why the enormous figure of sheep and goat losses is so vastly incorrect. The only reason why the Rharhabe would steal sheep - which had little value in their society - was to eat. There was little history of sheep theft prior to 1835; sheep could not be driven far; and the wool trade was hardly affected by 1835 and in fact took

¹⁰⁰ (CA) A519/7, p.107, D'Urban to H.F.Fynn, 27 September 1835.

¹⁰¹ (CA) LG 13, p.7, Hudson to D'Urban, 1 December 1835.

¹⁰² A519/4, p.100, Robson, 3 March 1836.

¹⁰³ (CA) LG 13, p.169. (CL) MS 923, Letter from Hudson, no date, acknowledged that many cattle were lost merely through straying.

¹⁰⁴ LG 46, List of Losses in the war, 1835.

¹⁰⁵ Peires, 'British and the Cape', p.489; Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, p.160, n.182.

¹⁰⁶ Webb, 'Immediate consequences of the Sixth Frontier war', pp.38-48.

off immediately afterwards. Webb surmises that the majority of sheep and goat losses that were suffered would have been through straying or the depredations of wild animals because they were unattended.¹⁰⁷ The Bowkers at Tharfield (near Waaï Plaats) had been told by Campbell on 26 December 1834 to abandon their farm and leave all their stock - amounting to seven hundred cattle and twelve hundred sheep - as these would be compensated after hostilities.¹⁰⁸ It is possible that the colonial authorities turned a blind eye to the exaggerations of the colonists in the hope of getting money from the British Treasury to pay the war expenses, and in support of D'Urban's argument that the Colony had been unjustly and massively attacked. D'Urban probably hoped that an exaggeration of the size of the alleged 'irruption' would justify his dramatic and anti-policy annexation and retaliation. The scanty records for Albany and Somerset in 1835-7 which do exist are in such a mess that the precise impact on those districts is impossible to calculate, and the lack of records might not be altogether innocent. Even the 1836 records are in a mess. At any rate, a comparative analysis of the stock losses during the fighting of 1834-5 is virtually impossible. If there were no records, there could be no criticism of settler claims.¹⁰⁹

In comparison with the scorched-earth policy of the Colony, the Rharhabe seem to have waged a genteel war, killing only one white woman, Mrs Trollip¹¹⁰ (an accident for which Maqoma apologised), and not burning crops. On numerous occasions women and children were allowed to escape to safety, such as the Rogers' near Tyali,¹¹¹ the Hendersons and Mahoneys at Clay Pits,¹¹² and the

¹⁰⁷ Webb, 'Agricultural development of 1820 settlement', pp.160-9; 'Immediate consequences of Sixth Frontier war', pp.144-5.

¹⁰⁸ (AM) SMD 948, Reminiscences of B.E.Bowker, p.60.

¹⁰⁹ Ziervogel in Somerset could not understand why no statistics were taken for Albany for the period, as all other districts were analysed; see (CA) 1/AY/8/56, Ziervogel to Campbell, 21 June 1836.

¹¹⁰ Heavyside, "Abstract of Board of Relief".

¹¹¹ Ibid., p.85. De Kock and Delport were killed near the Koonap, but their wives and children were allowed free, see Ibid., pp.15-7; see also Cory, Rise of South Africa, Vol.3, p.73.

¹¹² Ibid., p.86; (CL) MS 7131, Journal of Stubbs, p.27.

Forbes' at Waai Plaats.¹¹³ They were fighting a defensive war, attempting to protect their own land, women and children. The concept of 'total war', as carried out by the Colony, was foreign to the Rharhabe, who were without the weapons to produce destruction on the same scale, and were not used to the indiscriminate killing of the British. The Rharhabe had little reason to trust the Colony. Stretch, for example, described how in early April a Rharhabe messenger arranged to come unarmed and peacefully to the colonial camp to talk, but was seized and held on his arrival, although he managed to escape 'to relate this instance of our perfidy.'¹¹⁴ Stretch gave many more examples of atrocities, especially against women,¹¹⁵ who preferred the risk of being shot to coming near the Christians. When the forces crossed the Keiskamma River in early April T.H.Bowker noted that the men, when resting for half an hour, 'amuse themselves by firing the Kaffir huts.'¹¹⁶ Because of their own guns, and their attitude towards the Africans as animals, the colonists (more than the British soldiers) regarded 1835 almost as an extended partridge shoot. This was evidenced by Frederick Rex's comments when on patrol in early January on the Rharhabe as the 'game' of which he hoped to 'bag a brace or two before the season's over'.¹¹⁷

Godlonton claimed in mid May that 'it is not the character of British troops, notwithstanding the example of the enemy, to put them [Rharhabe] to death when not actually in arms against us.'¹¹⁸ This whitewashing of the colonial forces is obvious propaganda, but it is the version which has survived.¹¹⁹ Stretch bewailed in his diary the fact that the British were not, by mid-1835, shooting in self-defence, but at starving people who were always running away. He wrote of a lone man who was seen on the Debe Flats on 10 June who ran at

¹¹³ Graham's Town Journal, 25 Dec 1834; Long, Chronicle of Goldswain, pp.78-84.

¹¹⁴ Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, p.49.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., pp.59-62.

¹¹⁶ (CL) MS 951, Diary of T.H.Bowker, entry for 1 April 1835.

¹¹⁷ F.Rex to father, 16 January 1835, in Long, Index to Unofficial manuscripts, p.164.

¹¹⁸ Graham's Town Journal, 15 May 1835, Godlonton editorial.

¹¹⁹ cf. Cobbing, 'Mfecane as Alibi', pp.513-4.

the sight of the whites and hid in a hole at the side of a river. Sixty troops followed and burnt the grass until he emerged, whereupon he was 'shot as a sportsman (or rather a poacher) would his game. This is British colonial warfare.'¹²⁰ Settler society was in many ways rather violent. In a particularly macabre scene, the three Cape Corps deserters responsible for the death of Lieut. Crowe in May provided the pretext for a show of discipline. After their arrest and interrogation in Graham's Town, they were marched to the Provost, dressed in grave clothes and accompanied by a firing squad, a band playing funereal music, and a crowd of onlookers. They were placed at the foot of three newly-dug graves, and ceremoniously shot into them, whereupon the band struck up a lively tune and everybody left.¹²¹ The respective attitudes and practices of the two sides leads one to wonder who really deserved the title of 'irruption of the savages'.

Settler historiography has bemoaned the destruction which the savages caused to the Colony. But it was the Africans who were the losers. The Europeans suffered a mere forty-three civilian¹²² and twenty-nine military deaths throughout the period of hostilities. Only twelve of the military deaths occurred in action;¹²³ the rest were as a result of accidents and illness, such as the ten Britons and Boers of the 1st Division shot in March by their own men,¹²⁴ or the men killed in April when Somerset's sentries fired at a group of horses, thinking they were being attacked. In comparison with the approximately four thousand Rharhabe and Gcaleka deaths,¹²⁵ the number is negligible. Little deference to women was shown by the whites. But the fuss

¹²⁰ Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, pp.91-4.

¹²¹ See (CL) MS 7131, Journal of Stubbs, p.30, for a description.

¹²² BPP 503 (1837), p.336. J.Cappon, Britain's Title in South Africa (London, 1901), ch.16, drew attention to the imbalance between the losses suffered by the Colony, and those caused by it.

¹²³ Scott, 'British soldier on Eastern Cape Frontier', p.213.

¹²⁴ (CL) MS 951, Diary of T.H.Bowker, entry for 21 March 1835; corroborated in (CL) PR 3563, Reminiscences of Halse, p.18. See also (NA) A96, Shepstone Diary, entry for 2 April 1835.

¹²⁵ Calculated from the Ngqika and Ndlambe census in October, BPP 279 (1836), p.89. The number of deaths is probably much higher. More importantly, this figure excludes Gcaleka deaths.

made of a single white death, and the total disregard for 'barbarian' deaths, are crucial in understanding the manner in which the results of 1835 have been inverted. The 3rd Division alone killed fifty-five Rharhabe (including two women) in April and May and wounded many more,¹²⁶ taking six thousand cattle just between 10 and 19 April. 'We have long been tired of this war,' was the message from Maqoma in August; 'all our best men are dead, there are no more Caffers left. You have had some soldiers killed, but our loss has been very great.'¹²⁷ The Colony did suffer a loss of agricultural manhours, with the farmers and the Khoi labourers fighting and Mantatee servants escaping, but in comparison with the losses of the Rharhabe, colonial losses were negligible.

Rather than suffering enormous losses, many of the settlers seem to have gained more than they lost in 1835. The settlers argued that because their houses were made of stone they were more permanent and therefore more of a home which it was morally reprehensible to attack. Yet the many thousands of huts which the troops burnt were as much homes to their inhabitants. The Relief Board claimed that by February there were between fifteen hundred and two thousand destitute colonists gathered in Graham's Town - who had to be fed from the Disaster Fund - and that ophthalmia, dysentery and fever were rife.¹²⁸ Whilst there were certainly many genuine cases of need, a number of the settlers used the opportunity to enrich themselves at colonial expense. Many Boers in 1835 'claimed relief from Mr Heavyside both in cloth and food, when their kraals were well stocked with cattle and sheep'.¹²⁹

George Wood (a subsequent Graham's Town luminary), for instance, made a substantial profit by overpricing his clothing supplies to the Khoi auxiliaries, and Cock managed a similar deal.¹³⁰ Halse made £150 profit in a week by selling horses to the army.¹³¹ Stretch mentioned that 'Colonel

¹²⁶ Le Cordeur, *Journal of Stretch*, ch.2.

¹²⁷ (CA) A519/2, pp.156-9, Maqoma to Cox and Warden, 15 August 1835.

¹²⁸ Heavyside, 'Abstract of Board of Relief'.

¹²⁹ (CA) A519/4, p.100, Robson to Campbell, 3 March 1836.

¹³⁰ Le Cordeur, *Journal of Stretch*, p.196, n.68.

¹³¹ (CL) PR 3563, *Reminiscences of Halse*, p.15.

England strongly suspects Mr Godlonton [who was appointed to the Board of Relief to allocate relief funds] has his finger in the public chest "secret service money".¹³² The costs of the war were borne by the Cape Treasury, which was in turn largely supplied with money by grants and loans from the London Treasury. 'It is therefore not surprising', remarked Stretch sarcastically, 'these Graham's Town worthies were desirous the "war should proceed. The Caffres were not sufficiently punished"'.¹³³ The incidence of settler destitution caused in 1835 was largely localised and minimal, and occurred in December 1834.

While some settlers made a profit from 1835, much of the advantage gained would have been potential, with the extended gains in land and labour. As Webb has pointed out, the Colony rapidly recultivated, rebuilt and revived. The Graham's Town Journal even protested against the free land granted in the Queen Adelaide Province as payment for service in 1835, complaining that it was 'nonsense to talk of persons not having the means to pay for farms'.¹³⁴ Hudson's comment in November 1835 was that the Boers around the Koonap were still suffering, but that in general the eastern Cape was fairly well off and reaping the harvest.¹³⁵ The Rharhabe had no harvest to reap, and little stored food to rely on. Stretch was forceful in his condemnation of the actions of 1835:

The year 1834 may be described as one of unremitting plunder. Indeed, it seems to me that it was the expressed object of some persons in the colony about this time to provoke the Caffres to a war, anticipating that the result of such a movement would end in a still further seizure of the territory of the Amakosae[sic]... and when I find that immediately after the war - and indeed before the sword was quite sheathed - numerous applications were made for extensive grants of the conquered country, it seems to me certain

¹³² Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, p.141.

¹³³ Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, p.196; cf. (CL) MS 7131, Journal of Stubbs, pp.27-8 for an account of Woods' profiteering.

¹³⁴ Graham's Town Journal, 3 December 1835, Godlonton editorial; see also Webb, 'Immediate consequences of Sixth Frontier war', p.47.

¹³⁵ (CL) MS 921, Letter from Hudson, 27 November 1835.

that the unremitting provocations by the colonists at this time were, in fact, a speculation to enrich themselves with large and fertile domains.¹³⁶

¹³⁶ Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, pp.17-8.

CHAPTER 6THE D'URBAN SYSTEM OVERTURNED

By the end of 1835 the year, for D'Urban, had been a success. British hegemony had been secured: the Rharhabe had been subjugated and the Gcaleka punished for refusing to side with the Cape. The murder of Hintza, D'Urban felt, was unfortunate only because the London humanitarians might exploit it. Large new areas of land had been secured for settler farm settlement, and an entire labour force - the Fingo - was available. D'Urban had thus created a completely new dispensation for the settlers, which he expected to remain in force. All he needed to do was to convince the Colonial Office of its efficacy. But here lay the undoing of his scheme. A new Whig government returned to power in April 1835, determined to continue trimming colonial expenses. A new colonial policy had been devised in 1833 by the Whigs: the spread of indirect British rule, and the cutting of the cost of the colonies. D'Urban failed completely to follow this policy - his military advancement and increased financial requirements were the opposite. Further, he had deliberately misled London as to his objectives and actions. It was inevitable that his system would be overturned. All Rharhabe land was returned to them in 1837, by order of Glenelg in London.

But D'Urban still managed to keep the Fingo secret. London failed to see the true identity of the Fingo, and they remained as an eastern Cape labour source. This led to legal problems, though. The Cape law system made specific differentiation between subjects of the Colony, who came under Masters and Servants legislation; and African foreigners, who came under influx control. The Fingo were suddenly British subjects, the first time that Africans had fallen under Cape rule. They should technically have come now under colonial

legislation, but it was decided, paradoxically, to maintain control over them under influx control. The legislative difficulties were magnified by the retrocession of the Queen Adelaide Province in 1837. How were Fingos to be designated now?

D'Urban annexed the Queen Adelaide Province and brought the Fingo into the Colony with the knowledge that the British Whig government had just fallen, and in the belief that the new Tory government¹ - a more conservative, imperialist group - would overlook what amounted to a direct breach of his instructions to renew relations and peace on the frontier and trim the financial excesses of the Cape. D'Urban's actions might have been accepted had it not been for the fall of the Tories in April in a snap election, news of which reached D'Urban only in July 1835.² The brief Tory Colonial Secretary, Lord Aberdeen, had seemed in March 1835 to support D'Urban's actions, stressing the need for frontier security, which gave D'Urban reason to feel that his actions were permissible.³ The Whig Colonial Secretary Stanley's orders on Cape frontier policy in 1833 had distinctly outlined London's intention to infiltrate across the border slowly with agents and increasing control of the chiefs, and not through direct force as Wade, D'Urban and the settlers wanted.⁴ Stockenström's treaty system of the late 1830s - so hated by the Albany settlers - was merely a return to Stanley's policy after D'Urban's refusal to follow orders.⁵

¹ The Whigs under Lord Melbourne fell in December 1834. The Tories came to office under Sir Robert Peel, but fell in turn in April 1835. Melbourne returned to power, and the Whigs remained until 1841. The Whig Colonial Secretaries had been Stanley until December 1833, who was succeeded by Spring-Rice. His Tory replacement for four months was the Earl of Aberdeen. Glenelg took over on 18 April 1835.

² Lancaster, 'Governorship of D'Urban', p.203.

³ GH 1/104, pp.109-110, Aberdeen to D'Urban, 20 March 1835. D'Urban was surprised when Glenelg took over and criticised him.

⁴ GH 1/97, pp.122-3, Stanley to D'Urban, 27 November 1833.

⁵ See below, pp.199-200. Brookes, Native policy, pp.14-15, argues that Glenelg was merely maintaining the status quo in his castigation of D'Urban.

Galbraith suggested that D'Urban realised in mid-1835 that the fiscal strictures imposed on the Cape would undo the Province. But as Lancaster shows he continued to try to persuade Glenelg that the Province could pay for itself, though with no hope of success.⁶ There were rumours amongst the troops in King William's Town in July (that Smith attempted to stamp out) that the Province would be lost.⁷ It is possible that D'Urban hoped that if he took long enough the Tories would return to power and sanction his actions. Bell, D'Urban and the settlers saw opposition to the annexation and concern over the death of Hintza as a political matter. To them, the issues had nothing to do with philanthropy or colonial economics. They showed great concern for the ammunition which it could provide for the Whigs and Exeter Hall against Tory colonial policy, and accused Glenelg of exploiting the issues to gain home support.⁸ Beresford was sent to London to argue D'Urban's case for his policy steps of May. He met initial support, especially from King William IV, who had the capital of the new province named after him, and the district after his consort. But soon Beresford became aware of the antagonism of the humanitarian movement and Glenelg, as well as British public opinion.⁹

Aberdeen's replacement as Secretary for State and the Colonies in April 1835 was Charles Grant (Lord Glenelg) who was a well-informed and intelligent minister, an active member of the humanitarian movement, and who supported the Whig trimming of imperial obligations.¹⁰ His policy for the Cape was similar to that which was being pursued in New Zealand: to extend British responsibility without the extension of her sovereignty.¹¹ Whilst commending

⁶ Galbraith, Reluctant Empire, p.115; Lancaster, 'Governorship of D'Urban', ch.6.

⁷ For example, Long, Index to Unofficial manuscripts, p.173, F.Rex to his father, 14 August 1835.

⁸ (CA) A519/2, p.36, Bell to D'Urban, 29 May 1835; A519/18, p.95, D'Urban to Bell, 15 May 1835; Boyce, in 'Notes on South African Affairs', made similar comments.

⁹ J.G.Pretorius, 'Lord Glenelg's Four Visitors', Historia, Vol.14, No.2, June 1969, gives a good description of the machinations of Major Cloete and Captain Beresford (D'Urban's spokesmen), and the philanthropists vying with them for the sympathy of Glenelg. See also Lancaster, 'Governorship of D'Urban', ch.6.

¹⁰ Edwards, 1820 Settlers, p.11.

¹¹ G.Martin, 'Two cheers for Lord Glenelg', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, January 1979.

D'Urban's repulsion of the Rharhabe attacks in his first communication, in December 1835, he was critical of the unnecessary violence of the oversized colonial force, of the 'acts of retaliation, injustice and spoliation' committed by commandos prior to 1835, of the unwarranted attack on the Gcaleka, of the introduction of the Fingo, and of the economic burden of the new Province. Glenelg's information came, indirectly, from James Read. Glenelg was briefed on Cape affairs by Buxton, a parliamentary member of the philanthropic movement, and later by Philip. Buxton was provided with information by Philip. And Philip in turn derived much of his detail through correspondence with Read. Philip and Buxton managed to institute an inquiry into 1835 and the treatment of the aborigines. This thesis in many ways echoes Glenelg's disagreements with the actions of the settlers. Glenelg was given the opposite view of affairs by the despatches of D'Urban, but he gave very little real information.¹²

Within two years of the declaration of peace, D'Urban was unemployed, having been dismissed as governor, ostensibly for his insubordination and petulance in the series of diatribes that passed between himself and Glenelg. The real reason, though, was because his aggressive notions of expansion and military control were incompatible with the objectives of the London Government. It is important to note that, even when the Tories returned to power in 1841, he was never trusted with an important posting again. He had completely misled the Colonial Office when he wrote to Aberdeen in March 1835, promising a cessation of hostilities within a month, but neglecting to mention the massive onslaught planned for two days later. He then wrote nothing more for three months, leaving Glenelg to assume that the war was over. He complained to Glenelg that his force had not been large enough, that he had faced forty thousand savages, that frontier control had been very benevolent before 1835, that the Sparkes

¹² For a complete record of their correspondence, see BPP 503 (1837). Lancaster, 'Governorship of D'Urban', ch.6, points out that D'Urban wrote only two letters in 1835, and took an inordinately long time to answer Glenelg's questions, hoping for a second fall of government. Lancaster provides a good summary of the dispute. See also J.E.Holloway, 'The Glenelg-D'Urban Dispute', Historia, Vol.18, No.2, June 1973.

and Sutton patrols had been well-behaved, and that the settlers had been the victims of a long-fomented plan of aggression.¹³

These deliberately fallacious claims are vital to an understanding of 1835. They provide the foundations for the central myths of the settler version of the war - that the settlers were innocent and justified in punishing a huge invading force. This shows how closely D'Urban was involved in the creation and spread of the myth. One of the main reasons for the longevity of the settler version has been the 'official' corroboration it received from D'Urban, who was supposedly a neutral imperial official.

There was much common ground between the views of D'Urban and the settlers, and he was popular at the Cape. He left behind him a Colony seething with anger at London and its representatives, and it supported him virtually unanimously, as his policies had been designed to answer their needs. The Rharhabe had been decisively beaten (although they continued to raid the settlers for cattle); a barrier of co-operative indigenous peoples had been established; a 'free labour' alternative had been provided; and new land, vulnerable as it was, was available. D'Urban had dealt with the three concerns of the Colony - their provision with land, labour and security. His subsequent attempt in April 1836 to pass an ordinance indemnifying any person acting under his authority for the duration of martial law,¹⁴ though, was overturned by Glenelg. He shared to quite an extent the views and attitudes of the settlers. This was especially so with regard to the Africans. In May 1835 he commented that 'in good truth I am not aware that any two living things more perfectly resemble each other than the wolf and the Kaffir'.¹⁵ This was a remark which led Glenelg to reconsider seriously D'Urban's suitability for his colonial posting. D'Urban was a military man; he was not a politician or diplomat. He favoured expansion of colonial control into Natal, in order to

¹³ BPP 503 (1837), pp.62-3, D'Urban to Glenelg, 9 June 1835.

¹⁴ (CA) LCA 7, Minutes of Legislative Council, April 1836.

¹⁵ (CA) A519/2, p.34, D'Urban to Bell, 4 May 1835.

pre-empt foreign designs on the area,¹⁶ an idea that was anathema to the Colonial Office, but welcomed by the settlers.

In mid 1835 there was a sudden flood of petitions from all over the Colony in support of D'Urban and his policies. Most of them had similar wording. In all there was a reference to the release of 'ten to fifteen thousand Fingoes' and the invariable attack on the 'misrepresentation of events in 1835' by Philip. This seems to have been part of an orchestrated attempt by the 'Graham's Town faction' to place D'Urban in a good light and show colonial support for his actions.¹⁷ Godlonton and William Boyce were his most vociferous supporters, and continued to argue publicly in his favour for decades. Godlonton so admired him that he named his son Benjamin D'Urban Godlonton in his honour. Boyce, although a Wesleyan missionary, was also a land owner with a farm on the Koonap, which he began to stock with sheep in late 1835.¹⁸ D'Urban obsessively collected evidence in support of his policies until his appointment to Canada in 1847. He continued to give advice to the Cape Governors Napier and Maitland and when Smith finally annexed the land west of the Kei in 1847 he claimed it as the resolution of D'Urban's policy.¹⁹

In the minds of many of the colonists, the Province had been annexed since

¹⁶ Campbell suggested the settlement of the entire area up to and including Natal, see (CA) CO 2756, Campbell to D'Urban, 29 January 1835; Lancaster, 'Governorship of D'Urban', p.280.

¹⁷ See the list of petitions, mainly from the eastern districts but even from Cape Town in D'Urban, Public Documents. Godlonton, Sunshine and Cloud produced another list of particularly partisan supporters from the Legislative Council, government agents, Gqunukhwebe and other colonial allies. D'Urban certainly had rural support, but it is unclear to what extent he was supported in Cape Town, where De Zuid-Afrikaan favoured him, but the Commercial Advertiser was critical. Philip, surprisingly, was in favour of retaining the Province in 1836, but as a means of civilising the Africans, see BPP 538 (1836), p.625.

¹⁸ (AM) SMD 948, Reminiscences of B.E.Bowker, p.65. Boyce can surely not be taken as a serious commentator, as he describes Smith as liberal and benevolent! see 'Notes on South African Affairs', p.59.

¹⁹ Lancaster, 'Governorship of D'Urban', pp.12, 346, agrees with this. But 1848 was not a vindication of D'Urban's policy - it was proof of British might. Lancaster's strong support for D'Urban and his policies leads him to brush lightly over the fact that D'Urban was never again trusted with office because of the lack of confidence in him.

February 1835. Boyce informs us that the planned annexation was common knowledge in Graham's Town in January, although D'Urban told Glenelg that he had announced his plans for annexation for the first time on 8 May.²⁰ On 18 January Smith argued that the only way to afford future security to the Colony was 'to include within our future boundary line a large portion of the country which is now occupied by treacherous and murderous savages'.²¹

This seizure of land was seen by most settlers as justified. D'Urban's explanation for the annexation was that it was the 'only measure that could promise to repay the expenses of the war...and place a defensible barrier between the heart of the colony and the savage tribes of Central Africa, provide security for the future, and a just indemnification for the past.'²² Only once did he claim the Queen Adelaide Province by right of conquest (the argument which Smith adopted); he usually justified the annexation as a retributive measure, or because it extended 'civilisation'.²³ D'Urban claimed that the Kei was a more easily defensible frontier than the Fish, that it would take fewer troops to patrol, and would therefore be less expensive to maintain. Whether this was strategically accurate or not, he omitted to mention the number of extra British troops that would be needed to retain control of the vast expanses of newly-annexed territory.

Land began to be apportioned to soldiers and settlers in the Queen Adelaide Province (chiefly along the Buffalo River) and in the Ceded Territory in lieu of war compensation. Different criteria were used to those applied to the distribution of the captured cattle. Charles Michell, who was in charge of the

²⁰ Galbraith, *Reluctant Empire*, p.113; Boyce, 'Notes on South African Affairs', p.48; BPP 279 (1836), p.44, Shrewsbury to D'Urban, 16 January 1835, suggested that the area be annexed, but his views were, however, disowned by the Wesleyan London office.

²¹ BPP 252 (1835), p.134, Smith to D'Urban, 18 January 1835.

²² BPP 279 (1836), D'Urban to Aberdeen, 19 June 1835.

²³ (CA) A519/18, p.100, D'Urban to ?, 2 June 1835. He said that the Rharhabe had conquered and driven away the Khoi, and therefore had no hereditary right to the land. Campbell, like Smith, used this argument, see (CA) CO 2756, Campbell to D'Urban, 29 January 1835.

'topographical squad' and was with D'Urban at Warden's Post, told Frederick Rex in May that land would be apportioned to 'young heroes' who had fought well.²⁴ Stanton received a plot of three thousand morgen in the Ceded Territory from D'Urban for services rendered by fighting in the army, although he was only able to retain it for six months. Scanlen was similarly granted a large farm on the west bank of the Keiskamma as compensation for war losses and as reward for fighting.²⁵ Within a year there were four hundred and thirty claims for land, most of them put in by Boer soldiers in May and June 1835.²⁶ By November 1835 farms were being surveyed along the Fish for Lieutenant Moultrie and other soldiers in return for their service and help with the Fingo.²⁷ Old soldiers, like the Fingo collaborators, made good buffers. Giving them land in disputed areas, such as had been done in 1829 at the Kat River Settlement with retired Khoi soldiers, rewarded them for their service and provided protection for the Colony.

Whilst D'Urban was wrangling with Glenelg, Smith had set himself up as egomaniacal 'king' of the Rharhabe, with his seat of power in King William's Town.²⁸ A series of forts were set up throughout the new Province in late 1835, most of which were removed after the disannexation of 1836.²⁹ All was not well in the new Province. Despite his boast that after three months all his charges had come to regard him as their father, Smith, who was known to have been involved in the murder of Hintza, was struggling. Although the Rharhabe had been beaten, he had at his disposal a force of fourteen hundred troops to control an area the size of Somerset and Albany together, with a

²⁴ Charles Michell to F.Rex, Warden's Post, 18 May 1835, in Long, Index to Unofficial manuscripts, p.143.

²⁵ (AM) SM 5502, Papers of T.H.Bowker, pp.2-4. The land grants in Queenstown in the 1850s were also dependent upon service in commandos and the wars, and on losses suffered in hostilities.

²⁶ (CA) BK 32, Applications for farms in the Queen Adelaide Province; Chase, Natal Papers, p.298, provides statistics on the applications for land.

²⁷ (CA) A519/3, pp.142-4, Bowker to D'Urban, 10 November 1835.

²⁸ Harington, Sir Harry Smith; Peires, House of Phalo, pp.113-4.

²⁹ Lancaster, 'Governorship of D'Urban', map on p.197.

hostile population of around 65,000.³⁰ He burned seven hundred huts in one week, and nearly caused another war when he seized the cattle of two chiefs. Smith's fantasies about his effectiveness made him oblivious to the faults of the system, and the fact that it depended purely on force.³¹

The disannexation of the Queen Adelaide Province was ordered by Glenelg in 1836 (a direct censure of D'Urban's policies) and Stockenstrom was sent back to the Cape to take control of the eastern districts as Lieutenant-Governor. His task was to implement more subtle ideas of conquest through a treaty system and informal British control and influence outside the Colony, as had been ordered in 1833. Rather than destroy the power of the chiefs, as D'Urban had intended, Stockenstrom wanted to use their influence to govern their people.³² His emphasis was on market expansion rather than military offence. Stockenstrom was immediately thereby against the settlers. The emphasis of government in the eastern districts changed from military to civil. The frontier administration consisted of the Lieutenant-Governor, Agent-General (Hudson) and four agents (Stretch, J.M.Bowker, H.F.Fynn, W.Fynn) in the neighbouring polities. A 'Native Police' force began to be recruited,³³ which was to become an important method of controlling the African population by means of Africans.

Stockenstrom's job was made virtually impossible from the beginning. D'Urban dismantled the systems of control (specifically martial law in the Province) before Stockenstrom arrived in order to undermine his ability to organise the new system.³⁴ The colonists strongly opposed any system opposed to D'Urban's (which benefitted them most); and they regarded Stockenstrom (born and bred in

³⁰ BPP 503 (1837), p.9, Census of Caffer tribes, October 1835; see Scott, 'British soldier on Eastern Cape Frontier', pp.216-7, for troop distribution in the Province.

³¹ Galbraith, *Reluctant Empire*, p.120; BPP 503 (1837), pp.251-2, Smith report. He made incredible claims about his effectiveness in completely destroying the traditional customs and social system, see *Ibid.*, pp.259-263.

³² Stockenstrom, *Autobiography of Stockenstrom*, Vol.2, p.34.

³³ Lancaster, 'Governorship of D'Urban', p.163.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p.249.

Graaff-Reinet) as a traitor.³⁵ He met the full force of the power and fury of the Graham's Town faction, especially of Godlonton, who accused him of jumping on the philanthropic bandwagon for promotion.³⁶ He symbolised opposition to settler demands. Faced with the non-cooperation and anger of Graham's Town with its media and leaders against him, his scheme, whatever its merits, had no chance of success. He sued Campbell unsuccessfully in 1838 for conspiring against him, believing that he was instigating the settler antagonism against the treaty system. Given Campbell's record, it is most likely that he was undermining him, but there was no real proof of it. Godlonton successfully alienated Stockenstrom from the settlers, and petulantly retained his personal animosity towards him. Much like the status accorded to the death of the discredited Krushev in Pravda in 1967, all that the Graham's Town Journal had to say of Stockenstrom's death in 1864 was: 'The death of Sir Andeas Stockenstrom is reported by telegram. The Colony paid deceased a pension of 750, which will now be saved.'³⁷

There has long been confusion over what constituted the boundary of the Colony between 1819 and 1835 - whether it was to be the Fish or Keiskamma River. After his meeting with Ngqika and a verbal treaty in October 1819, Lord Charles Somerset described the newly-acquired land as the Ceded (not Neutral) Territory, and proclaimed the Keiskamma River, not the Fish, to be the boundary of the Colony.³⁸ (See Map 5, p.134). White farmers were not to be allowed east of the Fish, and Africans were not permitted west of the Keiskamma, but it was the latter that formed the official boundary. The terms

³⁵ Godlonton, Sunshine and Cloud, is a very strong attack on Stockenstrom, wherein he is accused of self-interest and of trying to undermine D'Urban. Godlonton inverted the actual process of disannexation, claiming that Stockenstrom moved first and destroyed D'Urban's system before the latter was ready.

³⁶ Urie, 'Study of evidence of Stockenstrom', provides a convincing defence of Stockenstrom; see also Le Cordeur, Eastern Cape Separatism, Ch.4.

³⁷ Graham's Town Journal, 17 May 1864. The alienation of Stockenstrom was reinforced by the writing of J.C.Chase - see McGinn 'J.C.Chase - 1820 settler'.

³⁸ Cape Town Gazette, and African Advertiser, 30 October 1819, Somerset Report, 14 October 1819. Somerset described the area specifically as the Ceded Territory.

of reference to the boundary have caused considerable confusion, with each subsequent delineation differing from the previous, and most maps providing a different interpretation of the boundary. There was no official accompanying map in 1819 and the terms of the treaty were very vague. The expulsions of 1829, 1833 and 1834, according to the treaty demarcations, were not extensions of the boundary, but enforcements of it. The colonial vagueness was echoed by Rharhabe confusion. Philip wrote to D'Urban in January 1835 to obtain clarity on the precise line of the boundary; he drew attention to the fact that the chiefs were under the impression that they held the entire Tyhume area, but that apparently the British were claiming otherwise.³⁹ Why was the boundary not clearly delineated? The lack of a definition gave more lee-way to settler interpretations of what land they possessed.

The continued confusion is evident in 1836 when D'Urban ordered the retrocession of the annexed land. Article 29 of the December 1836 treaty with the Ngqika makes specific allowance that the Fingo on the west bank of the Tyhume outside the Ceded Territory be allowed to remain unmolested until their crops were harvested,⁴⁰ which would have been early 1837. This treaty states that the boundary of the Colony was to be Somerset's boundary of 1819 - the Keiskamma/Tyhume - but that the area between the Fish and Keiskamma was to remain neutral territory. Again the border was not drawn. This left the Colony the option of creating its own interpretation of where it lay. Stretch, Cory, Whiteside and Slee described the entire Tyhume Fingo settlement as being destroyed by mid 1837 because it fell outside the colonial boundary. The map delineating the position of all African groups in March 1837 surprisingly makes no reference to any Fingo at Tyhume, although showing the Peddie settlement.⁴¹

Yet the Fingo commissioner Thomson refers to a growing, successful Fingo

³⁹ (CA) A519/1, p.68, Philip to D'Urban, 18 January 1835.

⁴⁰ Government Gazette, 9 June 1837, Treaty between Stockenstrom and Sandile, Maqoma, Tyali, Botman and Eno, 5 December 1836.

⁴¹ 'Map of the Eastern Frontier', 18 March 1837, Wits Africana Library.

settlement on the Tyhume in October 1837, after there had been a dispersal of some of the Fingo in July 1836.⁴² Colonel Somerset corroborated Thomson in August 1837 by saying that the Tyhume Fingo were nervous, but that an effort must be made to keep them in a group, near Fort Beaufort.⁴³ The implication seems to be that the boundary, in being restored to its 1819 state, bisected the Fingo settlement on the Tyhume, dispersing half and leaving the rest. The treaties stipulated that the boundary ran along the foot of the ridge leading up to Juanasberg, from where it was to be taken below Fort Beaufort on the Kat River in the west, and to the Tyhume River in the east. This is supported by the fact that in 1834, after being expelled from the Ceded Territory, Tyali settled in what became Auckland, in the Tyhume valley north of the mission and the line between the Tyhume and the Juanasberg ridge.⁴⁴

The disannexation of 1837, which gave the land east of the Tyhume back to Maqoma and Tyali,⁴⁵ caused a setback for the idea of a Fingo labour reservoir in the Ceded Territory, and the Fingo locations disintegrated to a large extent.⁴⁶ Fort Beaufort was retained; and Fingo could still be congregated there, to be distributed to Albany farmers. Of the Fingo who left the west bank of the Tyhume, three hundred moved in mid-1837 to the Winterberg Tembu of Mapasa, some went to Boers on the Riet river, and the vast majority placed themselves voluntarily under Maqoma.⁴⁷ Most of the Fingo who amalgamated with the Rharhabe did so, according to W.Fynn, because of a sense of ill-treatment at the hands of the Colony.⁴⁸ Stretch noted that this quiet dispersal greatly angered 'the faction' in Graham's Town. Stockenstrom placed a number at

⁴² (CA) A519/7, pp.176-8, Thomson to D'Urban, 23 October 1837.

⁴³ (CA) A519/12, p.129, Somerset to D'Urban, 3 August 1837.

⁴⁴ The Tyhume area continued to be one of discord: in 1848 three hundred settlers were placed in military settlements at Juanasberg, Woburn, Auckland and Ely. Their presence was a cause of war in 1850. Today the valley is still fertile, but increasingly overpopulated as a result of the "homelands" policy.

⁴⁵ Moyer, "History of the Mfengu", p.199. For the text of the disannexation, see D'Urban's proclamation in the Government Gazette, 3 February 1837.

⁴⁶ Cory, Rise of South Africa, Vol.3, p.196.

⁴⁷ (CA) A50/4, Stretch to Fairbairn, 4 July 1837.

⁴⁸ (CA) LG 420, pp.124-7, Report of W.Fynn, 1 November 1836.

Tsitsikama,⁴⁹ and most of these ended as labourers in the Colony. The rest were brought back to Peddie by Napier in 1838. Some Fingo even moved to Butterworth with Ayliff,⁵⁰ which further contradicts the idea that the Fingo had been oppressed by the Gcaleka. Stockenstrom commented that the Fingo who remained under Maqoma or moved eastwards were safe and comfortable, whilst those who came into the Colony continued to be objects of persecution.⁵¹ For those who moved back east across the Keiskamma/Tyhume boundary line, they no longer had to work or be regarded as traitors.

The Peddie settlement suffered a similar disintegration, as did King William's Town, which was well into Ndlambe territory. The Fingo land around Peddie (a very small area) was delineated in a treaty in December 1836.⁵² The entire area was officially given to the Gqunukhwebe (apportioned after the treaties of December 1835), but the local people of Siyolo and Nqeno resented the Fingo presence on what had been their land until 1819, and which they had been trying to regain since.⁵³ A young Fingo herd boy was murdered in January 1837, and a destructive attack was launched on the Fingo in August 1837. A permanent military force of Boers and the 72nd Regiment had to be retained in the fort to protect the Fingo and keep the peace with the Gqunukhwebe.⁵⁴ Richard Southey reported that after the attack in August, which seems to have been sparked by Fingo actions, the area was particularly tense. Maqoma, Siyolo, Nqeno and even the colonial ally Mqhayi made it clear that as long as there were Fingo in the Ceded Territory there would be trouble, and that they must be punished, or the Gqunukhwebe and then the Colony would be attacked.⁵⁵ The Fingo who were at Peddie were African collaborators, who were regarded by

⁴⁹ Whiteside, History of Abambo, p.39; Boyce, 'Notes on South African Affairs', pp.139-140.

⁵⁰ Slee, 'Aspects of Wesleyan Methodism', p.49.

⁵¹ (CA) A519/12, p.132, Stockenstrom to D'Urban, 3 August 1837.

⁵² (CA) LG 602, p.68, Treaty between Stockenstrom and Jokweni and Umhlambiso, 10 December 1836. It was stressed (Article 2) that the land in the Ceded Territory was on loan.

⁵³ (CA) A519/12, p.129, Somerset to D'Urban, 3 August 1837; Bowker to D'Urban, 3 July 1827, in Bowker, "Speeches, Letters and Selections", p.26.

⁵⁴ (CA) A519/5, p.84, Report of Lowen, 27 September 1836.

⁵⁵ (CA) A519/7, p.56, R.Southey to Campbell, August 1837.

their own people as traitors. It was too much to expect there to be no reaction to their provocative settlement.

As Galbraith and Peires have proposed,⁵⁶ it was unfortunate that at this period the tension was eased by the removal of some of the Fingo to Tsitsikama and the retrocession of Rharhabe land, as this disguised the complete unviability of the D'Urban system, and allowed the settlers to reminisce on it as a Golden Age. With the disannexation, Bowker's position at Peddie changed from commissioner to the more advisory Diplomatic Agent. As a buffer, Peddie was not a success in the mid-1830s - unlike Tyhume, which grew steadily in population and agricultural produce⁵⁷ - and by October 1836 the Peddie population had slumped to a mere four hundred and ninety.⁵⁸

It was largely the increase of labour that heralded the economic take-off of the eastern Cape.⁵⁹ Wool production, for instance, increased significantly in the eastern districts during 1835 and 1836,⁶⁰ despite its labour intensive nature.⁶¹ Merino sheep had been slowly acclimatising to Cape conditions in the 1820s and 1830s. Wool was a lucrative product, in demand by the large textile industry in Britain, but farmers needed a large labour force: semi-skilled workers for shearing, and unskilled labourers for herding and menial jobs. As a result of its inability to produce a proper labour system in the 1820s, the Cape had lagged behind on the international export market. Australia, with its access to endless cheap convict labour, had streaked ahead in wool production during the 1820s and 1830s.⁶² The Cape economy had for decades been dependent on wine and wheat for its exports. These crops did not flourish in the eastern

⁵⁶ Galbraith, Reluctant Empire, p.122; Peires, House of Phalo, p.115.

⁵⁷ (CA) A519/7, pp.176-8, Thomson to D'Urban, 23 October 1837.

⁵⁸ Bowker, 'Speeches, Letters and Selections', p.22, Bowker to D'Urban, 3 October 1836. There were 120 men, 140 women and 230 children, with 640 cattle.

⁵⁹ As described by Le Cordeur, Eastern Cape Separatism; Crais, 'Beasts of Prey'. This proposal needs closer examination than has been given in this thesis. The impact of 1835 on the economy of the eastern districts requires further research.

⁶⁰ Webb, 'Agricultural development of 1820 settlement', p.48.

⁶¹ Ibid., p.210; Peires, House of Phalo, pp.120-1.

⁶² Neumark, Economic Influences on Frontier, p.166.

districts, and sheep-farming was thus tried as an alternative. The sudden increase in labour in 1835 - with the apportionment of large numbers of unskilled Fingo labourers to eastern farmers - gave the region the impetus to gain a foothold in export markets. For the first time the eastern Cape economy began to rival that of the west.

The war of 1835 cost the colonial treasury more than D'Urban had intended, and the Colony was only rescued from bankruptcy by three shiploads of silver from London in 1837.⁶³ This in effect meant, though, that the British Treasury paid for the war, which was against its policy of making all colonies self-sufficient. An important question is why D'Urban embarked on a full-scale campaign when the Colony was already in financial straits. Did he expect to make a profit? The war was waged between colonial harvesting and sowing, and this meant that the settlers were able to leave their farms without agricultural loss. The colonists also stood to make a profit if they could capture enough cattle. Those settlers who were genuinely stricken in 1835 were helped with funds from the Storm Fund. The local economy of Graham's Town was stimulated simply by the presence in the area of a full colonial army for six months. Graham's Town merchants were able to make a profit, despite the conditions.⁶⁴

The complaints from Boers in 1835-6 (which reflected the reasons for the Great Trek) were concerned not with a shortage of labour, as they were being provided with Fingo by the colonial authorities, but with the lack of legislation to control the labour, and the curbs on the maltreatment of workers.⁶⁵ A good percentage of the Fingo labourers went to the Boers. Agar-Hamilton suggested that the Boers, in their movements and the setting up of their states, employed the forms (and legal explanations) of labour

⁶³ Lancaster, "Governorship of D'Urban", p.86.

⁶⁴ As described in Chapter 5, pp.188-9.

⁶⁵ (CA) A519/3, pp.48-50, Robson to ?, 14 October 1835; (CA) 1/UIT/15/16, Complaints from Uitenhage, 11 August 1835; A519/7, pp.38-44, P.Uys to ?, 7 August 1837, outlined the grievances of the Boers who had left. One was that D'Urban spoke sense, but was being ignored by London.

procurement learnt in the eastern districts.⁶⁶ Crais suggests that the Boer treks resulted from an increasing threat to the maintenance of Boer control over land and labour, both by the accession to control of the eastern districts by the British, as well as by the growing autonomy of proletarianised and emancipated free blacks.⁶⁷ De Kiewiet pointed out that when the direct route to Natal was blocked by the retrocession in 1837, the Boers opted to skirt the area and conquer the land to the north instead.⁶⁸ It is possible that the Great Trek was not a Boer attempt to escape British humanitarian encroachment, but an extension of white dominance as a result of the demonstration of colonial military power in 1835.⁶⁹ The way was now open for the conquest of the entire sub-continent.

The introduction of the Fingo in 1835, coming in the year following the emancipation of the slaves, played a crucial role in the transition from a slave-based economy, to one based on 'free' labour. Fingos were restricted largely to the eastern districts. This meant that the farmers of the western Cape - whose economy rested on slave labour - had to find ways of incorporating and controlling the released slaves after 1838 through legislation. Fairbairn argued for the advantages of a free labour force and the capital that would be released in slave emancipation. But even he stressed the right of the colonists to the retention of labour discipline and control in the new system. Peires argues that the preconditions of a capitalist free market - the revamping of the judiciary, civil service, currency, administration and the labour situation - were being met in the 1820s, and that this gave the Cape economy the freedom to evolve after 1835. He sees the economy in the 1820s and 1830s as hamstrung by its roots in 'a close association between government and commercial enterprise, coupled with a poorly capitalised productive sector reliant on coerced labour'.⁷⁰ Crais

⁶⁶ Agar-Hamilton, Native Policy, ch.10.

⁶⁷ Crais, 'Some thoughts on slavery', p.38.

⁶⁸ De Kiewiet, History of South Africa, p.53.

⁶⁹ Suggested by Julian Cobbing, personal communication.

⁷⁰ Peires, 'British and the Cape', p.490; see also pp.510-1.

argues that the growth of the state in the 1820s and 1830s began not in the areas of greatest capitalist development, but in the towns and mission stations of Albany and Uitenhage.⁷¹ It was 1835 that provided a further major catalyst to this capitalist transition, especially with regard to labour.

The Colony continued to expand throughout the nineteenth century, as did its methods of controlling what was by mid-century a sizeable labour supply. The Fingo in 1835 solved the immediate labour shortage, but the rapid growth of eastern Cape capitalism outpaced the rate of worker influx in the 1840s, so that the government soon had the same problem to solve again. In 1848 twenty of the twenty-one Cape districts reported a scarcity of unskilled workers. Ten of these districts claimed a chronic shortage. Smith, then Governor, introduced a vagrancy law and apprenticeships to deal with it, although a permanent solution was only achieved a decade later after the Cattle Killing.⁷² This thesis proposes that the labour situation underwent a series of peaks and troughs, the peaks manifesting themselves after periods of increased hostility and the troughs during economic development.⁷³ Dispossession and war produced a surplus of labour.⁷⁴ The period immediately following the colonial offensive of 1835 was a peak, but the rapid growth of the region and the expansion of its borders in 1848 caused a second shortage. Crais stresses the manner in which increased wool production spurred the need for workers: the Cape exported 586,000 pounds of wool (mostly from the eastern districts) in 1839, and 5,500,000 pounds in 1850.⁷⁵ This labour need soon outstripped the Fingo supply and the number of Rharhabe entering the Colony.

⁷¹ Crais, 'Beasts of Prey'.

⁷² Peires, Dead Will Arise, pp.246-7.

⁷³ Webb, 'Agricultural development of 1820 settlement', p.211, also argues that the labour influx was particularly erratic from the 1820s to the 1840s.

⁷⁴ See the analyses of Bundy, Rise and Fall of Peasantry; Crais, 'Beasts of Prey'.

⁷⁵ Crais, 'Beasts of Prey'; see tables in Webb, 'Agricultural development of 1820 settlement', p.214.

Whilst the problem in the eastern districts in the 1820s and 1830s had been the chronic shortage of workers, and the development of subsequent methods to procure them, the huge amount of Fingo labour obtained in 1835-7 meant a shift in the labour problem from one of shortage to one of the control and retention of workers, in this way bringing the eastern Cape into line with the west. For the Africans, the change from forced to 'free' labour was not necessarily advantageous. A slave, as a material possession, had to be cared for to an extent; but the indentures of the Khoi and Africans made no provisions for illness, retirement or capital accumulation.⁷⁶ Forced labour occurred on a large scale in 1835, and continued periodically throughout the century, but it was not a viable long-term solution.

Essential to the philosophy of free labour is the psychological conditioning of the worker. Optimum production could only be attained if the worker chose - for whatever reason - to seek employment. The Colony opted for the attenuation of the African land base through dispossession. Further, Africans after the 1840s were forced to enter the money economy through the payment of hut taxation, and the need to earn colonial wages to survive. The discipline that had to be maintained in the system derived from economic rather than physical forces. Integral to the socialisation of the workers was the imposition of the capitalist notion that hard work is morally and socially beneficial, and the entire process of colonisation stressed this notion. Under Ordinance 49, African workers had labourered for a year and had then returned home. This was counter to the farmers' need for periods of lengthy contract, which later legislation attempted to ensure.

Taxes and cattle pounds were imposed on the African population from the late 1830s, gathering momentum in the 1840s, to ensure that people were driven into employment as the only means of survival and paying their taxes.⁷⁷ Hut taxation, the universal symbol of imperial domination, came into existence for

⁷⁶ As suggested by Cock, Maids and Madams, p.176.

⁷⁷ Crais, 'Beasts of Prey'; Peires, Dead Will Arise, p.291.

the first time in Africa in the Cape and British Kaffraria (what had temporarily been the Queen Adelaide Province) and Natal in 1849. This forced all Africans within the colonial ambit to pay a specified tax - in colonial currency - in proportion to the number of huts they owned. Any livestock found 'straying' - and many merely taken from homesteads - were put in a pound, for whose release the owner had to pay a lump sum in colonial money. The Boers in Natal and north of the Orange introduced a system of 'labour tax' in the 1850s, whereby Africans performed an annual period of work as a form of taxation.⁷⁸ This in effect set the Boer republics up in competition with the Cape for enrolment of 'free' labourers, as the latter insisted on the payment of tax in money, to feed its economy.

An important inducement for Africans to enter the Colony was the destruction caused in their territory by colonial invasion and the seizure of their land, as had happened in 1835, and was to happen again in 1847 and 1850-3. The Cattle Killing provided a new chance for Africans to become labourers. Africans entering the Colony were forced into growing locations, either in the Fingo locations or around all the eastern Cape towns, where they remained in a separate, accessible concentration. These locations, created for the Fingo, thus soon incorporated all African labourers because, as the missionary Elliot commented in 1844, the object of forcing people into locations 'is to force persons of colour into contract service'.⁷⁹

The control of labour was a dominant concern throughout the nineteenth century. With the decision in 1828 to introduce African labour to the Colony came two complementary laws, Ordinances 49 and 50. The first was designed to control the entrance of African labourers - foreigners - into the Colony. The other was intended to control the actions of those subjects (specifically Khoi and later Fingo) already within the Colony.⁸⁰ They had two distinct

⁷⁸ Agar-Hamilton, Native Policy, ch.10.

⁷⁹ Crais, 'Beasts of Prey'.

⁸⁰ See Chapter 2, p.48.

lines of descent through the century and into the next. Ordinance 49 was the original influx control law, and was expanded in Article 4 of Ordinance 2 of 1837, to regulate incoming labour⁸¹ and prohibit unauthorised rural or urban locations,⁸² although there were insufficient police to enforce the law. Subsequently there came Acts 23 and 27 of 1857, Act 24 of 1859, Act 23 of 1860 and Act 17 of 1864 all of which provided amendments to Ordinance 49.⁸³ Ordinance 49 remained the essential measure of influx control until Act 22 of 1867. This, coming after the incorporation of British Kaffraria in 1865,⁸⁴ amalgamated the past legislation and remained in force for the rest of the century. Each amendment to the influx control measures of 1828 was as a result of the expansion of the Colony, and the subsequently increased supply of available destitute Africans for labour. With a growing potential labour supply, the law had to become more wide-reaching and powerful.

Ordinance 50 provided the roots for the Masters and Servants Ordinance of March 1841. This type of legislation defined the legal rights of employers and employees and the method and terms of contracts and apprenticeships. But as Macmillan pointed out, the 1841 ordinance merely gave increased power to colonial employers and provided sureties and controls on the labour force.⁸⁵ Duly added that it gave local magistrates much wider powers and laid the system of justice for labourers open to abuse, allowing oral contracts of up to a year.⁸⁶ This important ordinance of 1841 was amended by an Order in Council in 1842 and Act 4 of 1855, and in 1856 was revamped to form the seminal Act 15. This act remained in force (in tandem with the influx control Act 22 of 1867) for the rest of the century, with a few minor amendments. The

⁸¹ Macmillan, Cape Colour Question, pp.255-7.

⁸² Crais, 'Beasts of Prey'.

⁸³ For the texts of all the legislation, see Tennant & Jackson, Statutes of the Cape of Good Hope, 1652-1895 (1896).

⁸⁴ See T.R.H.Davenport, South Africa: a modern History (Johannesburg, 1987), map on p.126, for a clear view of the advance of the frontier through the nineteenth century.

⁸⁵ Macmillan, Cape Colour Question, pp.255-7.

⁸⁶ Duly, 'Revisit with Hottentot Ordinance'; see also C.Armstrong & N.Worden, 'The Slaves, 1652-1834', in Elphick & Giliomee, Shaping of SA Society (1989).

Masters and Servants legislation - Act 15 (1856) - was extended in Proclamation 206 (1893) and Proclamation 340 (1894) to cover all Native Territories and East and West Pondoland. Peires has shown clearly how the destruction of the war of Mlanjeni and the subsequent Cattle Killing, combined with Grey's opportunism, ensured the Colony of a cheap and constant source of workers,⁸⁷ and Act 15 was clearly intended to control this labour force within the Colony.

This dichotomous legislation led to confusion as to which should be applied to the 'Fingo' in 1835.⁸⁸ A clear distinction was always made between foreigners/'Caffers', who fell under the influx control legislation, and the Khoi and free blacks who came under the Masters and Servants control. In 1835 for the first time, Africans came potentially under the latter legislation, when the Fingo became British subjects. This confused the previously simple colour distinction between the application of the two laws. 'Fingos' were those people who lived in the Colony, in employment. 'Caffers' were foreigners outside the Colony. Thus the confusion in late 1835 when D'Urban ordered the expulsion of all Caffers and Basuto,⁸⁹ and the collection of all Fingo to be placed in employment.⁹⁰ What he was really demanding was that all unemployed Africans leave the Cape.

The civil commissioners naturally had great difficulty in differentiating between who should be placed in the two groups. D'Urban made it clear that Ordinance 49 was to be enforced, but as Ziervogel, the assistant civil commissioner for Somerset, queried, how could it be applied to the Fingo, as British subjects?⁹¹ As such the Fingo should have fallen not under Ordinance 49, but Ordinance 50. Yet Ordinance 49 was, somewhat illogically, still

⁸⁷ Peires, Dead Will Arise, p.297.

⁸⁸ An explanation derived in discussion with Julian Cobbing.

⁸⁹ (CA) A519/3, p.98, Somerset to D'Urban, 26 October 1835.

⁹⁰ (CA) A519/3, p.71, Somerset to D'Urban, 21 October 1835; S.van der Horst, Native Labour in South Africa (1942), p.15.

⁹¹ (CA) GH 34/5, pp.155-7, D'Urban to Campbell, 14 October 1835; (CA) 1/AY/8/55, Ziervogel to D'Urban, 22 July 1835.

applied to the Fingo. Robson in Graham's Town contracted the Fingo Ungxokezela in August, who was in the Colony with a pass granted under the ordinance.⁹² The confusion arose partly as a result of the lack of a specific Fingo identity, partly because of the confusion as to the colonial boundary line, and partly because of D'Urban's unclear pronouncements on expulsions. His policy was clear, but could not be publicly stated and had to be phrased in ambiguous language.

The Fingo entering into contracts in Graham's Town in 1835 were doing so under Ordinance 49.⁹³ The chief justice of the Colony, Judge Menzies, declared in October 1835 that the Fingo, and those pretending to be Fingo, should be dealt with under this law.⁹⁴ As British subjects, the 'Fingo' had access to advantages not available to 'Caffers', and controls had thus to be set up on those being incorporated within the 'tribe'. William Smith, D'Urban's secretary, complained in Uitenhage that the Caffers were pretending to be Fingo, but that he was managing to place all the Fingo in service, and to evict all the Caffers.⁹⁵ As early as July Ziervogel was struggling to identify Fingo and worrying about Caffers slipping into the Colony as Fingo.⁹⁶ The confusion in deciding identity arose not only from the physical and cultural similarity (to the Europeans) between all Africans, but on the looseness of the definition of 'Fingo'. Africans had little option once within the Colony: either they entered employment, moved to a Fingo location, or were labelled Caffer and evicted.

The idea of Fingo reserve labour pools in the Ceded Territory, which had fallen apart after 1837, was reintroduced ten years later after the re-annexation of the territory in 1848 to form British Kaffraria, and the Fingo

⁹² (CA) 1/AY/8/56, Ziervogel to ?, 4 May 1836; (CA) LG 420, p.24, Campbell to Hudson, 16 April 1836.

⁹³ (CA) 1/AY/9/62, W.Smith to Campbell, 4 July 1835.

⁹⁴ (CA) LG 420, pp.28-9, Menzies to D'Urban, 3 October 1835.

⁹⁵ (CA) A519/17, p.156, W.Smith to Campbell, 1 December 1835.

⁹⁶ (CA) 1/AY/8/55, Ziervogel to Campbell, 22 July 1835; note a similar complaint from 1/AY/8/86, Winterberg Field Cornet to ?, 7 September 1835.

locations were enlarged. The Fingo locations outside all the eastern Cape towns grew apace as local labour pools with the progressing capitalism.⁹⁷ Specific regulations were laid out for the Fingo locations to ensure the control of the labour supply and its Europeanisation. Fingos had to pay quitrent, headmen were appointed, passes were issued, and awards were given in such categories as 'most respectable and decently clothed' and 'best and largest quantity of European produce'.⁹⁸ The chiefs in these locations created their own power bases and competed for followers by distributing land within the locations. By 1854 the lower Albany area was completely dependent on Fingo labour, as it had been largely for the previous two decades. The labour divisions within the Colony were not split purely on racial distinction, as by 1842 the richer Khoi inhabitants of the Kat River Settlement were employing Fingo, Mantatee and 'Xhosa' as domestic servants.⁹⁹

By the late 1840s and 1850s most Fingo had been confined to specified locations in the newly-established Victoria and Fort Beaufort districts, where they remained as available workers. Calderwood in 1855 reported on a Fingo location near Peddie 'of from seventeen to twenty families, with the view to a supply of labour'.¹⁰⁰ The two lines of labour control are reflected clearly in modern South Africa - the dual tenets of apartheid legislation rest on homelands and migrant labour in the rural areas, and racial separation and influx control in the urban. Theophilus Shepstone, who shaped the reserve system which is regarded as the basis of the modern homelands policy,¹⁰¹ was a nineteen-year old aide to D'Urban in 1835, and witnessed at first hand the implementation of D'Urban's policies. It was D'Urban, not Shepstone, who posed the idea of African reserves away from the European towns so as to provide

⁹⁷ See Blue Book G15 (1855), pp.401-2, Report of Calderwood, March 1855, for distribution of Fingo, number of locations, and communal wealth.

⁹⁸ Government Gazette, 15 February 1849, Regulations for Fingo locations in the Victoria district.

⁹⁹ Crais, 'Beasts of Prey'.

¹⁰⁰ Blue Book G15 (1855), p.406, Calderwood report.

¹⁰¹ For an analysis of the system see D.Welsh, The Roots of Segregation: Native Policy in colonial Natal (1971). He pays little attention to the early influences on Shepstone, though.

migrant labour. The areas set up in the Ceded Territory by D'Urban as Fingo locations form the heart of the modern Ciskei homeland. The Fingo locations which he placed outside Graham's Town, Fort Beaufort, Cradock, Somerset East and Uitenhage laid the basis for the policy of urban segregation. The D'Urban system of 1835, regularly supported by settlers and historians, formed the roots of both of the cornerstones to the modern apartheid system.

The policy of creating concentric concentrations of 'friendly' Africans who doubled as a buffer and labour supply that D'Urban had created in 1835, was reintroduced in 1847 with the extension of the boundary of the Colony to the Keiskamma and the enlargement of the Fingo locations.¹⁰² In 1845 Maitland granted land on loan (not perpetuity) to the Fingo chiefs in certain areas between the Kat and Keiskamma Rivers.¹⁰³ He proposed in 1846 that thirty thousand Fingo, Bastards, Khoi and Tswana be settled in military villages between the Fish and Buffalo Rivers in order to form a buffer as had been envisaged in 1835.¹⁰⁴ The area was instead distributed to European settlers (mainly Irish and German) between 1848 and 1855, leaving areas for Fingo locations. The settlements at Tyhume and Peddie were reconstituted and a new group of Fingo locations near Whittlesea - Kamastone and Oukraal - were set up. After 1853 the Fingo locations in the entire area from Tarkastad to East London were enlarged, as Moyer points out, to provide a barrier and a labour pool.¹⁰⁵ The Fingo population of the new location at Healdtown, where a school and industrial college were set up for Fingo in 1855, was already 5,255 within two years.

The pattern of placing Fingo on the periphery of newly-declared areas was used again in 1865 when the Cape boundary became the Kei, and thirty thousand Fingo were immediately placed in what had been Gcaleka territory. This time, though, the Fingo were outside the colonial boundary. This was an extended repeat of

¹⁰² See (CA) Map M3/379, allocation of Fingo land, 1836, 1855.

¹⁰³ (CA) GH 19/5, Treaty between Maitland and Fingo chiefs, January 1845.

¹⁰⁴ Blue Book G15 (1855), pp.43-50, Calderwood report.

¹⁰⁵ Moyer, 'History of the Mfengu', p.225.

1835, with African collaborators given newly-annexed territory as the vanguard to European settlement. The region of British Kaffraria in the period 1848-65 had been merely under British jurisdiction, and thus fell under the Ordinance 49-type influx legislation, rather than Ordinance 50-type Masters and Servants. Fingo were given land in exchange for loyalty to the Colony, but at the same time this placement set up a pattern of colonial control of Africans. In 1854 loyal Xhosa and Fingo who had fought for the Colony were given land in the new Crown Reserve, part of which had been the Ceded Territory. But it was distributed on the proviso that they group themselves into units of not less than twenty huts and each pay a quitrent of ten shillings per annum.¹⁰⁶

The Fingo began to amalgamate in the nineteenth century such that twentieth-century anthropologists termed them a tribe. With the loose definition that denoted a Fingo, the population grew rapidly, at a rate many times in excess of a natural birth rate. In 1854 there were 8,650 Fingo in Peddie and 17,059 in the eastern Cape.¹⁰⁷ Three years later there were 13,048 in Peddie alone. There were two thousand Fingo in Graham's Town by 1847, before Fingo Village was granted. By the end of the nineteenth century there were Fingo living as far afield as the Orange Free State, Bulawayo and Windhoek.

In 1853 Reverend F.Gladwin, accompanied by a military column, brought seven thousand 'Fingo' and fifteen thousand cattle out of Butterworth and settled them in the Fingo locations. The official explanation was that this was the long-awaited emancipation of those Fingo left behind in 1835.¹⁰⁸ The explanation, so reminiscent of that provided for 1835, seems remarkably similar to that offered for the raid on the Bomvana by Smith. Twenty years after the 'emancipation' of the Fingo, the likelihood exists that Africans were still being seized and incorporated within what was by this stage an increasingly unified group.

¹⁰⁶ Pollock & Agnew, Historical Geography, p.89.

¹⁰⁷ Moyer, 'History of the Mfengu', pp.594-8.

¹⁰⁸ Whiteside, History of Abambo, pp.50-1. Blue Book G15 (1855), p.412, Calderwood report, said that there were four thousand Fingo.

CONCLUSION

A reassessment of the history of 1835 and the Fingo is long overdue. For a century and a half the voices of the settler apologists have dominated eastern Cape historiography. Many of their assertions were deliberately inaccurate, but have become accepted. The writings of Godlonton and Whiteside have been adapted; their central claims remain integral to South African history. Both of these texts are not only misleading; they actually inverted the events of 1835. The Rharhabe were not the unprovoked aggressors who attacked the Colony. The Colony had been attacking the Rharhabe for decades, and then in January 1835 launched a full-scale war as soon as the Rharhabe responded. This war included the seizure of Africans to solve the colonial labour shortage. They were called Fingo. This process of capture was invertedly described as the humanitarian emancipation of a maltreated slave class that had been oppressed by the Gcaleka.

Nineteenth-century texts have for too long been uncritically retained as mainstays of historical interpretation in South Africa. Caution, and an extensive revision of these texts is needed to prune South African history of its mythologies. Wright has shown the serious shortcomings in the work of A.T. Bryant, whose authority was unchallenged; and Wylie has similarly deconstructed Nathaniel Isaacs. Richner and Maloka have found many problems in the writing of Ellenberger. Godlonton and Whiteside may be added to the list of discredited authorities. Many more need to be examined.

This interpretation has important ramifications for the theory of the 'mfecane': the assumption that Shaka lay at the root of almost all African movement and devastation on the sub-continent in the 1820s and 1830s. The 'mfecane is merely mythology - its status as orthodoxy and longevity of

acceptance do not heighten its accuracy. The Fingo had nothing to do with Shaka. They had much to do with colonial expansion. The adaptation of the Shaka myth was vital to explaining the presence of the Fingo in 1835, the justification of the actions of the troops in Gcaleka territory during the war, and the subsequent validity of the historical concept 'mfecane'. The theory takes the 'history' of the Fingo as a pillar, so what does the removal of this central myth mean for the orthodoxy? Cobbing (see introduction) proposed that the Fingo were largely Gcaleka and Rharhabe, who were captured in 1835 to solve the colonial labour shortage, and given a false identity. This hypothesis was derived as a necessary part of his case against the 'mfecane' orthodoxy. This thesis to a large extent vindicates this intuitive suggestion, and his counter-hypothesis is thus valid in this sphere. The accuracy of the rest of his proposals also needs testing.

The knowledge that the settler interpretations of the events of 1835 are untenable leads to a brief summary of the findings of this thesis. The key to understanding the war lies in the power of the Cape Colony to expand and the ability of the Cape authorities to answer the needs of the colonists, which were largely for land, labour, and security. During the 1820s and 1830s there was a severe labour shortage in the eastern districts. The authorities attempted to alleviate this through legislation tying the Khoi to the land, and then through permission to employ Africans in the Colony. The colonists supplemented the labour supply with the illegal seizure of Africans beyond the frontier on commando raids, but neither measure was sufficient. In tandem with the need for labour came a settler desire for land. This was obtained with the help of British troops in 1812, 1819, 1829, 1833 and 1834, during which process the frontier Rharhabe were evicted from their land. The biggest land seizure, however, came in 1835.

By the end of 1834 the Rharhabe had little option but to respond. For two decades they had been repeatedly forced off their land, their cattle had been raided, women and children captured, their possessions and dwellings burnt by

commandos, and their autonomy threatened. Griqua and Sotho raiders to the north, powerful neighbours to the east, and the advancing Colony in the west put increasing pressure on the Rharhabe to defend themselves and assert their independence. A counter-attack on Albany was thus launched in December 1834 by groups of the Rharhabe most affected by colonial mistreatment. The attacks centred on two areas: the Koonap River and lower Albany regions, where cattle were taken and houses burnt. Relatively few Europeans were killed, and they were mainly traders and Boers against whom the Rharhabe had grievances. The attacks were not extensively premeditated, and nor were they a mass 'Caffer' onslaught.

Boer and settler patrols retained control in most areas throughout the period of the 'irruption'. Smith, D'Urban and extra British troops arrived in Albany in January, not to protect the colony, but to launch an invasion of the Rharhabe. The armed response of the Rharhabe provided the opportunity for the amelioration of the settler demands for land and labour. It also provided a chance to ensure the recognition of British hegemony by all 'Caffer' chiefs. The Rharhabe had not accepted the authority of the Colony, and had therefore to be militarily subjugated. The Mpondo and Thembu were prepared to acknowledge and aid the British. But the Gcaleka were recalcitrant. After a period of planning in Graham's Town a massive force of British soldiers, colonists and Khoi made its way through Rharhabe territory, burning huts and crops, taking cattle, killing men and capturing women and children. Hintza was commanded to side with the British. But he vacillated, and the army continued straight into his territory in April. The failure of Hintza to meet D'Urban's ultimatum for the Gcaleka actively to aid the Colony led to a full-scale war on the Gcaleka. They, too, had their homes destroyed, their cattle taken, and their women and children captured. After surrendering to the overwhelming power of the British, Hintza was imprisoned and murdered two weeks later.

The most significant aspects of the invasion of the Rharhabe, Bomvana and Gcaleka was the capture of women and children to solve the colonial labour

crisis. These people were called Fingo, and distributed secretly amongst the colonists in the eastern districts. They were elided with two other groups with the same name - military auxiliaries and refugees and mission collaborators. The 'Fingo' were not a homogenous group, settled together at Peddie as D'Urban and Ayliff claimed. There were Fingo locations at Peddie, King William's Town and Tyhume which contained groups of collaborators, militia and labourers. There were also locations at Graham's Town, Cradock, Fort Beaufort and Somerset whose purpose was to provide Fingo labourers for the eastern Cape. These were two very different types of Fingo. In the Fingo locations, certain British loyalists were appointed as chiefs to ensure that the settlement followed instructions. And all 'Fingo' were described in terms of the same history and identity created by D'Urban and Ayliff, which was intended to mask the highly illegal fact that the Colony was capturing African labourers.

The colony made substantial gains in 1835. Large new areas of land were opened up as settler farms. Thousands of cattle taken from the 'Caffers' were given to settlers. Seventeen thousand labourers were made available to eastern Cape farmers. D'Urban found that he could not drive the Rharhabe across the Kei and exterminate the remainder, and his final peace settlement allowed them to remain in designated areas. But their autonomy was undermined as they were under British control. For various reasons the settlers exaggerated the threat of the 'irruption' and the losses they had suffered: they wished, firstly, to portray themselves as innocent victims of barbarous aggression, ensuring them of the moral high ground in analyses of the war; secondly, they wanted as much financial compensation from London as possible; and thirdly, they wanted their own losses to compare with the number of stock taken from the 'Caffers' so that it would appear that they had fair justification for attacking the Rharhabe.

The notion that there was a Colony-wide conspiracy to hide the large-scale illegal seizure of thousands of African workers for indenture in the Eastern

Cape seems highly implausible. Further, that the secret could remain unnoticed for a century and a half is virtually unbelievable. But there were good reasons why nothing was said about these illegal practices. It has been shown how the investigating commission into the death of Hintza, which reached rather inconclusive findings, was completely misled by the planned misinformation of Smith (with the co-operation of D'Urban) and the fearful departure of Stubbs, the witness who refused to follow Smith's lie. The motivating force behind the commission and the informant on colonial misdemeanours - Philip - left the Cape in early 1835 and remained in London for two years. The media outlet for colonial philanthropy and exposure of wrongs was provided by Fairbairn, who took a back seat in 1836 and 1837 after years of tribulations. By 1837 he was involved in lengthy libel suits with Moodie and Chase for his championing of Stockenström's case.

The third member of the trio vilified by the Settler School - James Read - had provided Philip and Fairbairn with much of their knowledge of injustices in the 1820s and early 1830s. In early 1835 he was removed from the Kat River Settlement (Smith and D'Urban falsely accused him of inciting the attacks of 1834 and of supplying the Rharhabe with guns) and he moved to Bethelsdorp. His application to return across the Fish in July 1835 was turned down by D'Urban on the grounds of private 'information acquired'.¹ Thomas Pringle, who had also publicised frontier misdemeanours, died in 1834. Thus in 1835 and the years following, the men who had come to champion indigenous rights were not present. The fact of the sitting of the Aborigines Commission, inconclusive though its findings were, covered the need for further exposure, which no 'Justus' rose to fill. The eastern Cape settlers and farmers, who benefitted from the increased labour, had no reason to publicise events, and the Fingo themselves, alienated on the white farms, had no means to.

The problem of tampering with evidence is a most important one. Crucial

¹ (CA) A519/17, p.14, Read to D'Urban, July 1835; A519/17, p.149, D'Urban to Read, 11 November 1835.

evidence about 1835 and the Fingo is unfortunately missing. Attention has already been brought to the two separate lists (with a number of copies) of Fingo indentures and settlement which cannot be found.² D'Urban, who was normally a prolific correspondent, wrote little in February and March (his period of planning) and that which he later wrote on the Fingo contains quite blatant fallacies. Ayliff's writings generally display such enigma, vagueness and inaccuracy that it is difficult to take him seriously. More importantly, while he was a conscientious diarist, he has no diary entries for March to September - the crucial months. Davis similarly stopped in January and began again in September. Why? In the early nineteenth century Theal copied three volumes of documents on 1835 for publication - two of which were refused for publication. An analysis of (CL) MS 2033 (his copies) shows clear censorship by him of the copies made by his students.³ It is not impossible - given Theal's period of employment in the Cape Archives and his work on the relevant documents - that he tampered with the sources. If it was not he, then D'Urban may have ordered a purge of any incriminating documents and a censorship on any comments.

A good percentage of the sources have to be approached carefully, as they were written well after the events, although they often purport to be contemporary. The 'diary' of Cox (written in late 1835), and the reminiscences of Halse (written for his grandchildren in the 1870s), of Goldswain (1870s), Stubbs (1850s) and Andrews (1877) are likely to be tainted and anachronistic. Goldswain, for instance, regularly transcribed sections of the Graham's Town Journal or Godlonton's Irruption of the Kaffir Hordes into his diary.⁴ As Ayliff and most others did, he used Godlonton's description of the Fingo at Butterworth in April, despite being there himself. The papers of Philip and Read were unfortunately lost in the University of the Witwatersrand library

² References to the missing lists are in (CA) A519/2, p.24, England to D'Urban, 20 May 1835; A519/17, p.28, D'Urban, 12 July 1835.

³ Pointed out to me by Jeff Peires. For an analysis of Theal, see Saunders, Making of South African Past.

⁴ Long, Chronicle of Goldswain, pp.91-101; cf. Godlonton, Irruption of the Kaffir, pp.138-145.

fire of 1931, and a re-examination of Read's comments is thus impossible.

It must be stressed that the orthodox history of 1835 and the Fingo is based largely on uncritical interpretations of military reports, and of the writings of settler apologists. Yet there are numerous proven cases of these reports and accounts being not only factually inaccurate, but specifically designed to mask the real events. D'Urban, in a colourful overstatement, described Albany as a barren and devastated desert before he had even arrived in the district. He blamed Hintza for organising the attacks of December before he could have had any evidence of it. The report on the Smith patrol past the Mbashe River in May lied about the intentions of the patrol, about who suggested it, about the circumstances of Hintza's death and about the identity of the 'Fingo' taken. D'Urban later claimed that he had only decided to annex the Queen Adelaide Province on 8 May, when it had been planned since January. D'Urban regularly alleged that the Fingo were slaves of the Gcaleka, when he knew that they were not. He also said that he had settled 16,800 Fingo around Peddie, which was incorrect. He deliberately misled the Colonial Office about the size of the 'Caffer' force, about the effectiveness of his own troops, and about the length of the hostilities. The settlers, with the collaboration of D'Urban and the Cape colonial authorities, exaggerated their losses and the destruction of late 1834. These are all crucial aspects of the war and the identity of the Fingo, and are demonstrably incorrect.

The year 1835 is not yet fully understood. The avenues for questions and uncovering mysteries and myths are merely opening. This thesis has attempted to answer some, but many remain unanswered, and a number of new questions have arisen. What was in D'Urban's mind in 1835? Was he an arch-conservative with long-standing plans for expansion, was he a weak governor captured by the Graham's Town settlers, or was he an ambivalent expansionist, who formulated his plans in conjunction with the settlers as he went along? What happened in Gcaleka territory between 15 and 24 April, when the large invasion force was camped in Butterworth for ten days? Were they capturing 'Fingo'? How many

Fingo were there in 1835, and, more specifically, how many of them were labourers? How were the Fingo labourers controlled once within the Colony? Forced labour implies manacles, labour distribution camps and armed guards. Were these in use? How were Fingo retained once on the farms? Who were the 'wandering Fingo' in late 1835: were they escaped labourers or destitute Rharhabe? What was happening in the Fingo locations, and what was their purpose?

Significant areas of research are affected. The origins of the Great Trek need to be reviewed. Nineteenth-century labour history, and the beginnings of African proletarianisation are affected by this interpretation of the identity and function of the Fingo. The theory of the 'm fecane' is likewise in need of reassessment. The entire history of the Fingo and their role in the eastern Cape requires revision. Fingo case histories need to be found in order to trace the movements and origins of Fingo labourers. Analyses are due on the power and authority of the Graham's Town faction, on the growth of the eastern Cape economy based on the gains of the war and the Fingo labour, and on why settler historiography has maintained its psychological hegemony.

It is clear that the year 1835 was of crucial importance both for the settlers and the Rharhabe. For the Europeans, contrary to their claims, the year led to the meeting of many of their needs. For the 'Caffers' it was disastrous. As D'Urban said, the Rharhabe loss in 1835

amounted to 4000 of their warriors or fighting men, and among them many captains. Our's [sic] fortunately has not in the whole amounted to 100, and of these only 2 officers. There have been taken from them also, besides the conquest and alienation of their country, about 60,000 head of cattle, almost all their goats, their habitations every where destroyed, and their gardens and

cornfields laid waste. They have, therefore, been chastised not extremely, but sufficiently.⁵

⁵ (CA) GH 1/108, pp.122-3, D'Urban to Glenelg.

APPENDIX 1Chronology of the war of 18351829August

Maqoma and his people expelled from the Kat River area.

1832July

Somerset leaves for England. Colonel England takes over and tries to expel Tyali and his people from the Mancazana River area.

1833September

1 Tyali forced to leave the Mancazana area.

4 Col. England burns all Ngqika huts south of Gaga River area.

October

Junior officer, Isaacs, takes all Tyali's cattle and threatens him. Cox returns the cattle.

November

Armstrong orders Tyali to evacuate Gaga River area. All huts burnt.

1834January

20 Somerset returns; gives land at Gaga back to Tyali.

March

5 Tyali chased out of Gaga area; all corn destroyed.

December

2 Sparkes patrol.

5 Somerset gives Nqeno ultimatum to move across Keiskamma.

12 Sutton patrol.

21 First attack on a settler.

28 Attack on Salem.

29 Bathurst burnt.

1835January

3 Martial law declared in the eastern districts.

Tyali sent peace proposals - were refused.

8 Martial law declared in whole Colony.

13 Smith arrives from Cape Town - Board of Safety disbanded.

12 Attack on Nqeno's kraal by Cox.

16 All huts and kraals in Tyhume valley burnt.

20 Mounted Burghers of Albany formed.

27 Military Board set up for recruitment. Board of Relief, under Heavyside, set up. Missionaries fetched from Burnshill.

31 Attack on Fort Willshire.

February

11-15 Chief advance on Fish River bush, in three columns.

19 Attack on Kat River Settlement. Attack on Fort Armstrong.

March

6 Effective attack on Trompetter's Drift by Caffers.

9 Smith leads Boers in battle in Fish River bush.

- 26 Smith leads raid from Fort Willshire.
- 31 Invasion force leaves Fort Willshire.

April

- 1 Smith and Somerset camp on Debe Flats.
- 2 Night march to Ntaba ka Ndoda.
- 3 Attack on Ntaba ka Ndoda.
- 7 All forces attack Ntaba ka Ndoda. Louis Arnoldus captured. 1st and 2nd Divisions move towards Buffalo River.
- 8-9 Attack on Buffalo Poorts by 1st, 2nd and 3rd.
- 10 1st moves towards Kei, 2nd down Buffalo, 3rd remain in Buffalo Poorts, 4th to Tyhume.
- 15 1st crosses Kei, camps at Ndabakazi.
- 17 1st reaches Butterworth, Phato arrives.
Surprise attack by 3rd on the Amatole, capture 5,000 cattle.
- 18 Hintza sends white ox to Butterworth as present.
- 20 2nd arrives in Butterworth.
- 22 Armstrong found murdered.
- 23 Warden sent to Clarkebury.
- 24 War declared on Gcaleka.
- 25-7 Troops wreaking havoc in Tsomo River area. Warden and Vadana attack eastern Gcaleka.
- 29 Hintza comes to D'Urban's camp.
- 30 Peace terms agreed upon. War declared to be over.

May

- 3 Maqoma sends plea for peace.
- 5 Warden and missionaries with 524 "station people" arrive at Ndabakazi from Clarkebury.
- 6 Messengers from Hintza to Maqoma arrive in Amatole. Maqoma offered peace.
- 9 Fingo procession leaves Ndabakazi.
- 10 Queen Adelaide Province annexed. Smith leaves on patrol with Hintza. D'Urban moves to set up Fort Wellington.
- 12 Granet met Maqoma and Tyali for peace talks. Terms refused.
Hintza killed.
- 13 White killed. Smith in sight of Mtata River.
- 14 Fingo arrive in Peddie. Allegedly swear allegiance to the King.
Smith's 'Fingo' suddenly appear near Mbashe River.
- 23 D'Urban arrives in King William's Town to make it HQ.
- 25 Beresford left for London, taking Burhu and Sarhili to Graham's Town.
- 28-7 Smith and Cox sweep through entire area between Chalumna and Keiskamma, Amatole and sea.

June

- Patrols sent throughout Queen Adelaide Province for whole month.
- 27 Bailie party killed near Pirie.

July

- 20 Attack on Fort Wellington with guns.

August

- 14-5 Large force attacks Amatole.
- 15 Maqoma and Tyali talk to Warden and Cox. Hostilities cease.

September

- 5 Gasela and Mhala make peace at Fort Wellington.
- 17 Peace treaties signed.
- 19 Maqoma appointed chief magistrate of Ngqika.

APPENDIX 2Population of the Colony, 1810-1839¹

	<u>Western Cape</u>	<u>Uitenhage</u>	<u>Albany</u>	<u>Somerset</u>	<u>Graaff-Reinet</u>
1810					
Whites	22055	2817		5865	
Non-White	39160	3462		7563	
Ratio ²	100:176	100:123		100:129	
1827	32284	3066	5156	5990	9531
	43153	4377	919	5401	10333
	100:146	100:141	100:44	100:90	100:108
1828	34449	3397	4200	5370	7939
	46248	4166	1786	5139	6862
	100:134	100:123	100:43	100:96	100:86
1829-1836 ³					
1837 ⁴	41032	5128	8001	5169	8808
	51207	6487	3216	6525	6814
	100:125	100:127	100:40	100:126	100:77
1838	44997	5128	6608	5096	7213
	53341	6487	9312 ⁵	7022	9837
	100:119	100:140	100:141	100:138	100:136
1839	44777	4628	6608	5025	7072
	50669	6487	9312	5359	9283
	100:113	100:140	100:141	100:107	100:131

1. The population records of the eastern districts are in a mess for the period. But I have attempted to give an indication of the potential labour force of the eastern districts by comparing total white population to the total non-white population. The Western Cape figures have been included as a median.

2. The ratio is of Whites to Non-Whites.

3. For the years 1829 to 1836, the figures for "Whites" and "free blacks" were elided, making a comparison of population sizes impossible. This has implications for studies of the effects of both Ordinance 49 (1828) and the war of 1835.

4. The figures for 1837 - which were taken at the start of the year - are muddled. The figure for whites in Albany, especially, seems incorrect.

5. This is a very important figure. Why did it suddenly increase? Was there an influx of Africans? The more likely explanation is that the Fingo were only at this stage being officially registered, and that there was a time-lag between the entrance of Fingo labourers - many illegally - and their appearance in the official records. The statistics for 1838 were taken at the start of the year, and this figure is in effect that for 1837. cf. Chapter 5, p.185, footnote 109, for Ziervogel's comments that the records for Albany for 1835 and 1836 were non-existent.

LIST of the NAMES of PERSONS, not belonging to the ARMY, who lost their Lives during the late Caffre War, in the Years 1834 and 1835.

No.	N A M E.	O C C U P A T I O N.	D A T E.	P L A C E.
			1834 :	
1.	Albert Kirkman -	trader - - -	22 Dec.	Trompétter's Drift.
2.	Stephen Buys -	farmer - - -	"	Kat River.
3.	— Creamer -	labourer - - -	23 Dec.	near the Clay Pits.
4.	H. W. Henderson -	merchant - - -	24 Dec.	Clay Pits.
5.	Thomas Mahoney -	builder - - -	"	- ditto.
6.	John Shaw -	clerk - - -	"	Kat River.
7.	Alexander Forbes -	farmer - - -	"	Irish Party.
8.	F. Silverhoorn -	ditto - - -	25 Dec.	Espaags, Fish River.
9.	Piet de Fager -	ditto - - -	"	New Year's River.
10.	N. Van der Meulen -	schoolmaster - - -	"	- ditto.
11.	James Blakeway -	farmer - - -	"	Koonap.
12.	— Warren -	trader - - -	"	Missionary Station.
13.	F. Dougal -	mason - - -	"	Zuurberg.
14.	— Newman -	labourer - - -	December	Woodlands.
15.	— - -	- - deserter, 75th regiment.	"	- ditto.
16.	— Kent -	trader - - -	"	near Chumie.
17.	— Budding -	ditto - - -	"	- ditto.
18.	John Stamford -	ditto - - -	"	near King William's Town.
19.	R. Hodges -	ditto - - -	"	Eno's Country.
20.	J. F. Ferreira -	farmer - - -	26 Dec.	Kowie Bush.
21.	G. Iles -	trader - - -	December.	
22.	Robert Rogers -	ditto - - -	"	Tyali's Country.
23.	S. Turner -	farmer - - -	"	Lushington Valley.
24.	Robert Shaw -	ditto - - -	"	Trompétter's Drift.
25.	— Cane -	ditto - - -	"	Caffreland.
			1835 :	
26.	John Brown -	agent - - -	January	Clay Pits.
27.	Philip Whitaker -	mason - - -	"	- ditto.
28.	Samuel Webber, jun. -	- - -	"	Sunday River.
29.	— Lewingeld -	from Orange River	7 January	near White's Farm.
30.	Carel Matthys -	farmer - - -	9 January	Zuurberg.
31.	William Matthys -	ditto - - -	12 January	- ditto.
32.	Cornelius Engelbrecht -	ditto - - -	"	- ditto.
33.	A. H. De Lange -	ditto - - -	4 March	Koonap.
34.	Mrs. Trollip -	- - -	May	Collett's Farm.
35.	J. Jubber, jun. -	- - -	15 June	Bathurst.
36.	— Chipperfield -	farmer - - -	"	near Bathurst.
37.	J. Bentley -	ditto - - -	"	- ditto.
38.	— Faber -	labourer - - -	- - -	Klip Plaats.
39.	J. Jenkins -	ditto - - -	- - -	Howard's Party.
40.	— Rawlin -	trader - - -	- - -	Tambookieland.
41.	— Titterton -	carpenter - - -	- - -	Trompétter's Drift.
42.	J. Bilson -	- - -	- - -	- ditto.
43.	T. Thurrat -	messenger - - -	September	Botha's Hill.

(signed) *D. Campbell,*

Civil Commissioner for Albany and Somerset.

Civil Commissioner's Office, Graham's Town,
6 May 1836.

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- EC 1 Minutes of Executive Council, 1834-1843
 EC 286 Annexures to Executive Council minutes, 1834-6

(iv) ADVISORY COUNCIL

- AC 3-4 Minutes of Advisory Council, 1829-1834
 AC 10-11 Appendix to minutes of Advisory Council, 1833

(v) LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL

- LCA 1 Minute book of Legislative Council 1834-6
 LCA 4A Index to Legislative Council Minutes 1825-1836
 LCA 6-7 Appendices to Legislative Council minutes
 LCA 37 Appendices to Legislative Council meetings
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(vi) LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR

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