

**DISTURBING THE NEIGHBOURS:
AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN PSYCHOPATHOLOGY
AND SOCIAL FORMATIONS**

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THESIS

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ABSTRACT

This work attempts to confront certain political problems created by the individualistic bias in psychoanalytic thinking, and the resulting failure to adequately theorise the importance of social processes.

The thesis traces the origins of intrapsychic thinking to Freud's initial move from the seduction theory to the Oedipal theory. This development is offered as a prototype for the debates between conceptualisations of childhood traumatisation as a social problem of actual abuse occurring within defined power relations, and theories which locate pathology purely within internal conflicts occurring inside the individual. Several criticisms of this shift are offered, and its impact on later theory is considered. Here a contrast is offered between the theoretical approaches of Melanie Klein and Donald Winnicott, arguing for the usefulness of Winnicott's emphasis on environmental factors within psychodynamic theory.

The impact of these theoretical approaches is illustrated through a critical evaluation of Freud's case study of Judge Schreber. Additional historical material is brought in to show the importance of environmental considerations ignored by Freud, and contrasting psychodynamic readings of the case are offered.

As an alternative to purely intrapsychic approaches, a reinterpretation of certain strands of Critical Theory is then presented. Adorno's theory of the Authoritarian Personality and Marcuse's concept of One-Dimensional Man are extended using Winnicott's formulations concerning psychological development.

This leads to an examination of the question of the relationship between social structure and individual consciousness. Post-structuralist accounts of language and the construction of identity are explored. These are then developed drawing on theories of ideology, language and consciousness, integrating these with Winnicott's developmental theory to offer an alternative psychodynamic understanding of the relationship between social process and psychopathology. An attempt is made to reformulate the notions of consciousness and the unconscious in terms of the possibilities and difficulties of representation within available social symbolic codes.

In conclusion it is argued that psychology needs to integrate critical social theory and contemporary understandings of the social construction of consciousness in order to become a meaning force in positive social transformation.

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Psychology is one modern institution which has little to offer radicals. The institution needs to be opened up, deconstructed so that so that the conflicts within it become clear, so clear that it is too much too bear. This does not mean, of course, that no elements of psychological theory are useful - there are always helpful spin-offs from harmful enterprises, like non-stick saucepans developed from military space research.

Ian Parker Discourse Dynamics

My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. So my position leads not to apathy, but to hyper activism.

Michel Foucault Power/Knowledge

SITUATION

There is a time and place for research, perhaps, but not here, and not now. The journals are already full of facts, and a few new findings are hardly going to put the house in order. "Under the sign of alienation," protests Laing (1967, p53), "every single aspect of the human reality is subject to falsification, and a positive description can only perpetuate the alienation which it cannot itself describe, and succeeds only in further deepening it, because it disguises and masks it the more." Perhaps we should instead take some time out to think about what we're doing, because there are a few things that are bothering me at the moment.

South Africa is going through a massive transformation, a transformation directed at alleviating the pain and suffering of millions of individuals and ushering in a more humane mode of existence. The theoretical contributions come from every possible social science: politics, history, economics, law, education, industrial sociology, to name a few. But not psychology. Psychology, the discipline that one might have naively believed was dedicated to the relief of human suffering and the promotion of well-being seems to have very little to offer.

Let me begin with a conclusion: the fundamental problem with the entire project of psychology is the assumption that the subjective crises which people experience can be understood as being located inside the individual. Inside, whether that means neurological, psychodynamic, cognitive, or any other form, rather than between people, within the social meanings, experiences, structures, power relations and interactions that make up one's lived existence. It is this assumption which defines psychology as a separately existing discipline, as opposed to sociology,

anthropology, politics and others, weakening them all with this arbitrary distinction.

My argument is that this assumption has a very specific history and follows a particular course. By tracing certain aspects of its history and development we can deconstruct its current existence, and begin to recover the alternative conceptualizations that have been repressed along the way. And in doing that, we can move towards a psychology that can begin to talk meaningfully about the current issues of freedom and liberation, and offer more than an emotional band-aid to the casualties of an inhuman society.

PART ONE:

FIRST PRINCIPLES

Power and knowledge directly imply one another; there is not any power relation without the correlative constitution of some field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations.

Michel Foucault Power/Knowledge

A BRIEF HISTORY LESSON

What do we speak of when we say "Freud"? Not a man, usually (the Viennese doctor died in 1939), but an ensemble of ideas. As the theorist is effaced, the theory becomes prophetic (truth revealed through a human vessel), and a certain fundamentalism creeps in. The ideas become an enclosed system without history or contradiction, immaculately conceived in the great mind and handed down for the inspiration of lesser students like ourselves. Thus we can say "Freud says ..." (it is not even necessary to use the past tense) as if we are appealing to the authority of a complete, consistent and comprehensive theory of psychology.

Of course, the historical reality is that Freud's work was not written as a complete system, a final conclusive comment on the nature of things, but rather a series of continuities and ruptures, developing themes and reformulations, never reaching an end point.

Let's begin by examining the development of some of those ideas.

Freud's Early Career

Freud began his professional studies at the Medical Faculty of the University of Vienna in 1873. He developed an interest in neurophysiology, but felt that his real ambition was to be a scientist rather than a doctor. This idea was reinforced in his studies under Brucke at the Physiological Institute, where he excelled as a researcher. Brucke made a deep impression on Freud and, as the founder of Mechanism, influenced Freud's work with the postulate that all life should be investigated using the experimental

methods of physics and chemistry. It was Brucke, however, who advised Freud to abandon his ambition to be a scientist because of the poor financial prospects which it held, and thus Freud, with the responsibility of his approaching marriage to Martha Bernys, began his medical internship at the Vienna General Hospital in 1882 (Wollheim, 1971, pp19-47). At this time Freud was fascinated by a case of hysteria treated by his friend and colleague Josef Breuer. The patient, Anna O., suffered from various hysterical symptoms and hallucinations. Breuer discovered that if she described her hallucinations to him, she would experience relief from the accompanying anxiety. More importantly, he discovered that if he asked her to trace the symptoms back to their original occurrence, they always emerged as an initially meaningful response to a certain situation, and after describing this situation, the symptom would disappear. Although impressed by this "talking cure", Freud did not know what to make of it at the time, and it was only later that he used the evidence in his theory of hysteria (ibid, pp24-41).

After several years at the Vienna General Hospital, Freud left in 1885 to study under the famous and controversial Charcot at the Salpêtrière neurological clinic. Charcot had several innovative insights into the nature of hysteria: he showed that hysteria was a disturbance of function rather than structure by revealing that close examination found no physical cause for the symptoms, and that the symptoms did not correlate with the anatomy of the nervous system. Hysterical paralysis, for instance, might be localised in a ways quite unlike organic paralysis, ignoring the arrangement and boundaries of the nervous system. Charcot demonstrated that hysterical symptoms could be simulated using hypnosis, revealing that meaning, or more specifically, suggestion, was significant in the formation of hysterical symptoms. But despite showing this psychological aspect of hysteria, Charcot remained a confirmed Mechanist, insisting that hysteria was caused by heredity degeneration of the brain. (Roux, 1989, pp27-34)

Freud followed Charcot's lead and in 1887 began treating his patients using hypnosis. He gradually refined his techniques and began using the cathartic method, tracing the

hysterical symptoms back to earlier traumas, while introducing free association as the method of investigation in the place hypnosis.

The Theory of the Neuroses

Although (with the gift of hindsight) it is usually Freud's work on hysteria that is remembered from this period, it formed only part of his general theory of neuroses developed between 1892 and 1895¹. Freud divided the neuroses into actual neuroses and psychoneuroses, or neuroses of defense. The actual neuroses were claimed to be caused by current sexual practices: neurasthenia by masturbation and contraceptive practices that interrupted the normal progression of sexual intercourse, and anxiety neuroses by abstinence and unconsummated excitation. The psychoneuroses (hysteria and obsessional neuroses), on the other hand, were caused by earlier traumas. The actual neuroses were seen as neurophysiological rather than psychological problems, which could be alleviated only by facilitating proper sexual behaviour, that is to say, regular heterosexual intercourse with penetration leading to orgasm (for men at least). The psychoneuroses, however, could be treated by tracing the patient's symptoms back to a prior traumatic event and reliving the emotions which had been repressed in that situation.

¹Draft A: Problems raised by, and theses on, neurasthenia and anxiety neurosis (1892)

Draft B: The Aetiology of the Neuroses (1893)

Draft E: How Anxiety Originates (1894)

Draft G: Melancholia (1895)

Draft I: Migraine (1895)

in Extracts from the Fliess Papers S.E. vol 1

On the Psychical Mechanism of Hysterical Phenomena: A Lecture (1893) S.E. Vol 3

The Psychoneuroses of Defense (1894) S.E. vol 3

On the grounds for Detaching a Particular Syndrome from Neurasthenia under the Description "Anxiety Neurosis" (1895) S.E. vol 3

To the contemporary reader, the language of these early theories is almost embarrassingly physiological and mechanistic. Sexuality is understood purely in terms of physiological arousal which has certain detrimental neurological effects if it does not find the necessary channels of release. In the paper Migraine, for instance, Freud describes the "toxic effect caused by the stimulus of the sexual substance when this cannot find discharge" (Freud, 1953, vol 1, p 214). This approach is most clearly expressed in the Project for a Scientific Psychology (1895) where "the intention ... is to furnish us with a psychology which shall be a natural science: ...to represent psychical processes as qualitatively determined states of specifiable material particles..." (Freud, 1953, vol 1, p295). Yet at the same time Freud was working on a theory of hysteria which implicitly contradicted this theoretical framework.

Freud and Breuer's Studies in Hysteria was published at the same time as the "Project". It consisted of case histories of four of Freud's female hysterical patients and Breuer's patient Anna O. The thesis of the book can be summed up in Freud's claim that "hysterics suffer mainly from reminiscences". Hysterical symptoms were said to be caused by repressed memories of prior traumatic events. The original experience was forgotten because an appropriate reaction was not possible at the time, or because the experience was not acceptable to conscious thought. Although the memories were repressed by unconscious mechanisms, they remained active forces, and their affect was stored up and converted into hysterical symptoms. The symptom was removed by uncovering the original experience and releasing the emotion through reliving the trauma.

Freud and Breuer's collaboration eventually broke down over Freud's insistence that the original trauma was always of a sexual kind. Freud was dissatisfied because it was often unclear why the events associated with the onset of the symptoms should be so traumatic, and that, although the reliving of these events removed the hysterical symptoms, they were soon replaced by other symptoms. He concluded that a still

earlier trauma lay behind the problem and, as his theory developed, he traced this first to adolescent, and then early childhood sexual traumas.

The Seduction Theory

In 1896 Freud revealed these new ideas in a lecture delivered to the Society for Psychiatry and Neurology of Vienna entitled "The Aetiology of Hysteria". This lecture is important and warrants a detailed examination as it is here that Freud develops the controversial "seduction theory". Freud himself believed that this paper was extremely significant ("an important finding, the discovery of a source of the Nile", Freud, 1953, vol 3, p202) and, despite the overwhelmingly negative reaction it provoked, insisted on its publication.

Freud begins with the observation that hysterical symptoms are caused by, and derive their form from, traumatic experiences:

The symptoms of hysteria are determined by certain experiences of the patient's which have operated in a traumatic fashion and which are being reproduced in his (sic) psychical life in the form of mnemic symbols (ibid, p192).

He then examines instances where the symptom does not seem to relate to the situation in which it initially occurred, or where the situation would not normally be traumatic, and concludes that an earlier trauma must lie behind, and be invoked by, the situation.

We have learned that no hysterical symptom can arise from a real experience alone, but that in every case the memory of earlier experiences awakened in association to it plays a part in causing the symptom. If -as I believe- this proposition holds good without exception,

it furthermore shows us the basis on which a psychological theory of hysteria should be built. (ibid, p197)

In all 18 original cases of hysteria analyzed by Freud, he found that he could trace the origins of the symptoms through the situation in which they initially appeared, back to an earlier trauma. In every single case he eventually discovered that the patients had suffered sexual abuse in earliest childhood:

Whatever case and whatever symptom we take as our point of departure, in the end we infallibly come to the field of sexual experience. So here for the first time we have discovered an etiological precondition for hysterical symptoms (Freud, 1953, p 199).

This is the essential "aetiology of hysteria" referred to in the title of Freud's paper. The sexual experience referred to is not like the typical suggestive remark or embarrassing situation associated with the onset of the symptom, but rather what can bluntly be called rape:

...it is now no longer a question of sexual topics having been aroused by some sense impression or other, but of sexual experiences affecting the subjects own body... I therefore put forward the thesis that at the bottom of every case of hysteria there are one or more occurrences of premature sexual experience, occurrences which belong to the earliest years of childhood but which can be reproduced through the work of psycho-analysis in spite of the intervening decades (ibid, p203).

In this paper Freud stated that he anticipated that his audience would be outraged by his conclusions, and thus pre-empted their possible counter-arguments. He dismisses as improbable the possibility that, although all 18 of his patients reveal early sexual abuse, they may not reflect a general pattern. He rejects the more serious claim that

the patients may simply be fabricating the accounts of the sexual assaults for several reasons which are itemised below:

- 1) The accounts are offered only reluctantly after a rigorous exploration of unconscious memories, causing the patients extreme distress when recalling them.
- 2) The patients describe certain details whose sexual significance they do not understand, but which is clear to the analyst.
- 3) The details of the experience make sense of the whole case history, revealing the origins of unexplained symptoms.
- 4) Some of the accounts receive external verification - for example, in one case a brother confirms the sexual activity with his sister, in another two women independently report identical abuse at the hands of the same man (ibid, pp205-214).

Freud thus concludes in this paper that hysterical symptoms are caused by the unconscious memories of early sexual trauma, emerging in later situations in which these memories are evoked. Thus we see a combination of the new psychological ideas of repression and the unconscious, and the physiological formulations that link the neuroses with sexual experience. It is important that we do not retrospectively psychologise this understanding of sexuality, but notice instead how Freud locates the trauma, albeit ambiguously, not in the social but rather in the physical experience of sexuality, and draws attention to the physical sexual underdevelopment of the abused child (ibid, p211). The harm caused by the early sexual abuse is thus understood as being related to the fact that the child is not physiologically prepared for the sexual experience, rather than the issues of interpersonal and emotional violence involved with the interaction.

The presentation of The Aetiology of Hysteria received an overwhelmingly negative reaction, and was ignored in the journals that reviewed the other papers read before the Society. Freud wrote to his close friend and confidant Wilhelm Flies saying:

A lecture on the aetiology of hysteria at the Psychiatric Society received an icy reception from the asses, and from Kraft-Ebbing the strange comment: It sounds like a scientific fairy tale. And this after I demonstrated to them a solution to a thousand-year-old problem, a "source of the Nile"! ... They can all go to hell (Masson, 1984, p9).

Despite the criticism Freud believed that he had discovered a crucial insight and continued developing the seduction theory for several months, locating the trauma even earlier in the child's experience - within the first three years with neurotic patients and in the first year-and-a-half in the case of psychotics. Freud went in the face of professional opinion and had the original paper on hysteria published and continued investigating the aetiology of hysteria in childhood seduction.

At the same time Freud's personal life was in turmoil. He was deeply distressed by the long illness and ultimate death of his father in October 1896, faced rejection by colleagues and superiors, and was beset by neurotic symptoms - depression, anxiety, inability to work, stomach and heart pains, and fear of travelling. He had increasingly immersed himself in his self-analysis, using the material he uncovered as the basis for his psychological theory. He followed up the question of the links between repressed experiences and neurotic symptoms, particularly by following the trails of associations that uncovered hidden parts of the psyche. This analysis was built on Freud's discovery that dreams are not meaningless, but rather can be decoded to provide the "royal road to the unconscious", revealing unconscious wishes in disguised forms. (Krull, 1986, pp43-55)

This self analysis became the basis of Freud's move into a truly psychological theory, focusing on the question of the unconscious and dealing with neurosis in terms of meaning rather than negative physiological stimulus. Several phenomena- neurotic symptoms, dreams, jokes, slips of the tongue- were shown to have hidden meaning once the workings of the unconscious mind are uncovered. By 1898 this thinking was formulated in The Interpretation of Dreams, considered by many critics to be the foundation of psychoanalysis. But it was in this period of personal crisis and self analysis that Freud, after relentlessly defending the seduction theory against massive negative response, quite suddenly retracted the initial formulation and began to develop an alternative account of the clinical phenomena with which he had been dealing. (Masson, 1984, pp107-110)

As Freud developed the new theory, published in 1905 as the famous Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, he appealed less to developmental experiences and more to sexuality as a constitutional factor, a powerful innate drive for gratification which came into conflict with the restraints of acceptable moral behaviour. Incidents which precipitated hysterical symptoms were no longer seen as being significant because they evoked earlier trauma, but rather recollections of childhood trauma were invoked to conceal the unacceptable sexual impulse present in the later situation.

In his self analysis Freud discovered a basic interpersonal nexus that was to become the core of his new theory: a profound love of the mother combined with a jealousy towards the father. This triangle is the basis of the Oedipal theory, the presupposition of the desire to eliminate the father and possess the mother as central in psychological development. At this point Freud fell back on his initial physiological assumptions, and formulated the desire for the mother as a biological sexual drive. He then reinterpreted his patient's reports of sexual abuse as attempts to conceal this socially unacceptable childhood sexuality by projecting it onto the parent, thus portraying the child as victim rather than carrier of sexual desire:

Since childhood masturbation is such a general occurrence and is at the same time so poorly remembered, it must have an equivalent in psychic life. And, in fact, it is found in the fantasy encountered in most female patients - namely that the father seduced her in childhood. This is the later reworking which is designed to cover up the recollection of the infantile activity and represents an excuse and attenuation thereof (Freud, in Masson, 1984, p11).

The theory that dreams contain fulfilment of hidden wishes was now extended onto the recollections of early trauma. The reported sexual experiences were now no longer instances of child abuse, but phantasies concealing illicit desires of the child (Freud, 1905).

This is an enormously significant theoretical move, for it shifts the causes of pathological development from actual interpersonal situations to representations of inner processes. In other words, from reality to phantasy.

Here is the heart of the debate. This reformulation is seen either as the very basis of psychoanalysis - the introduction of the crucial ideas of the unconscious and phantasy - or as the point where psychology closed the door on the real world and started being about it's own theory, removing people from the social world and reducing them to a cluster of internal processes.

THE END OF THE WORLD

The debates around the move from the seduction theory to Oedipal theory are astonishing in their vehemence. Proponents of Freud's move see it as the beginning of psychoanalysis, while opponents see it as the beginning of the end. The political aspects to the confrontation are no less striking. Sandor Ferenczi (Masson, 1984, pp148-153) was rumoured (by Freud and other leading analysts) to be suffering from mental degeneration and psychosis when he delivered a remarkably lucid and powerful paper at the 12th International Psychoanalytic Congress in 1932, exploring the trauma of early sexual abuse. More recently Jeffrey Masson (1984, 1987) was removed as director of the Freud Archives for publicly affirming the seduction theory, while Alice Miller (1981, 1985, 1987) reports how her work on child abuse was snubbed by the psychoanalytic community and its publishers despite enormous popularity and acclaim in other circles.

The dispute is not simply about certain empirical facts. There is the obvious issue of whether patients have, or have not, actually suffered early abuse at the hands of another person, but this is given relatively little attention. Proponents of Oedipal theory simply assume that such widespread abuse could not be occurring, but then in an interesting zigzag in their argument conclude that even if it were occurring, it could not be psychologically significant because the problems are related to other causes (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983, pp21-78). Both sides argue that the opposing position leads to the failure of therapy.

In fact the debate over seduction versus Oedipal theory is exemplary in the positions it identifies with respect to philosophy of science. The Oedipal theorists see Freud's move according to the Popperian model- a moving closer to the truth through the

scientific process of conjecture and refutation. The proponents of seduction theory tend to adopt a Kuhnian perspective. The change is a paradigm shift - a different way of explaining the same phenomena, adopted for reasons which have nothing to do with the scientific method (Ibid, pp9-20). The interesting aspects here are the types of motivation that are offered for the paradigm shift.

Jeffrey Masson: The Assault on Truth

By shifting the emphasis away from the actual world of sadness, misery and cruelty to an internal stage on which actors performed invented dramas for an invisible audience of their own creation, Freud began a trend away from the real world that, it seems to me, is the root of the present-day sterility of psychoanalysis and psychiatry throughout the world (Masson, 1984, p144).

Keeping up the seduction theory would mean to abandon the Oedipus complex, and with it the whole importance of Phantasy life, conscious and unconscious phantasy. In fact, I think that there would have been no psychoanalysis afterwards (Anna Freud quoted in Masson, 1984, p113).

Masson has provided the most acclaimed attack on Freud's abandonment of the seduction theory in recent years. Acclaimed partly, no doubt, because of his polemical style, charismatic personality, media manipulation and social connections, but these factors cannot be taken as criticisms of his actual research and arguments. Masson became the blue-eyed boy of the psychoanalytic inner circle and personal friend of Anna Freud until he was appointed director of the Freud Archives. There he had access

to unpublished documents and correspondence that led him to believe that there had been a deliberate suppression of areas of Freud's writing that revealed his ambivalence in renouncing the seduction theory. He sensed that he had uncovered an important political issue, and began an investigation of this aspect of Freud's work (ibid, pp xvii-xviii).

Masson found that Freud discovered sexual abuse in patients in his initial work with Breuer (Studies in Hysteria 1895), but that Breuer had been reluctant to publish these findings. Not only did the knowledge of sexual abuse predate The Aetiology of Hysteria, but at several points later in his career after the disavowal of seduction theory, Freud acknowledged the significance of early sexual abuse:

I cannot admit that in my paper "The Aetiology of Hysteria" (1895) I exaggerated the importance of the influence [of seduction], though I did not then know that persons who remain normal may have had the same experiences in their childhood, and though I consequently overrated the importance of seduction in comparison with the factors of sexual constitution and development (Freud, 1905, p53).

The seduction theory was thus not a momentary detour from the truth, but rather a recurring theme in Freud's work. A theme, however, which is suppressed from Freud's later publications by Ernst Kris and Anna Freud, who expressed concern that it might create "confusion" in the minds of readers (Masson, 1984, pxvii). This anxiety was built on the assumption that if Freud had not abandoned the seduction theory, he would never have become aware of the power of unconscious phantasy, the first principle of psychoanalysis.

Masson (1984) reveals the problems that the seduction theory brought for Freud. Not only did Breuer refuse to publish this work, but when Freud went public with the theory it was received with uniform hostility. Freud wrote to Fliess and confided:

I am as isolated as you could wish me to be: the word has been given out to abandon me, and a void is forming around me (Masson, 1984, p10).

Freud faced total rejection by the professional community, and only Fliess shared his views on the sexual aetiology of neurosis. Fliess, an ear, nose and throat specialist, developed the theory in a different direction, not dealing with the question of childhood abuse; but asserting a physiological link between the genitals and the nose. He believed that problems of the sexual organs could be treated by nasal surgery. However far-fetched this theory may sound today, he certainly had the support of Freud, who sent him an early patient, Emma Eckstein, for nasal surgery because of menstrual problems. The operation was followed by severe complications which almost resulted in her death. These complications were caused by a serious professional oversight on Fliess' part. A large piece of gauze had been left in the wound, causing infection and preventing it from healing.

Freud's reaction to this disaster was to absolve Fliess (and thus also himself) of all responsibility. At the time he was dealing with the widespread rejection of the seduction theory, and exploring the idea of dreams as wish fulfilment, and managed to create an explanation for Emma Eckstein's near death. In his letters he offers Fliess "an explanation of Eckstein's haemorrhages which will give you much pleasure", explaining that "her episodes of bleeding were hysterical, were occasioned by longing, and were probably at the sexually relevant times". He asserts that her haemorrhages were a result of "an old wish to be loved in her illness" and cites as evidence nosebleeds in childhood. He concludes that "as far as the blood is concerned, you are completely without blame".

Here we have the first formulation of the new theoretical tendency: taking a traumatic event and explaining it away in terms of inner processes. The obvious cause of the haemorrhaging - Fliess' medical malpractice - is ignored, and instead explained in

terms of the patient's sexual drives. The motivation for this strange shift is clearly found in the desire to protect Fliess, Freud and their relationship. This may be read as the model for future analysis, such as where the disturbing reality of child sexual abuse is avoided, and the resulting psychological problems are conveniently attributed to the sexual drives of the child.

Masson (1984) shows that although Fliess remained a close friend of Freud's and they shared a common interest in the sexual aetiology of certain problems, even Fliess did not necessarily support Freud's attempt to trace neurotic problems back to child sexual abuse. In his last work, Symptom, Dream, and Psychosis, Fliess' son Robert argues for the importance of returning to the insights of the seduction theory, and makes references which suggest that he was sexually abused by his father in this sort of way. If this is true, then Wilhelm Fliess can hardly have provided support for Freud, and even he may have provided further pressure to abandon the seduction theory.

Masson concludes that the professional pressure, isolation and rejection were so strong that:

...what Freud had uncovered in 1896 - that, in many instances children are the victims of sexual violence and abuse within their own families - became such a liability that he literally had to banish it from his consciousness (Masson, 1984, p xxii).

These forces, according to Masson, rather than any new discoveries, or the flimsy arguments outlined by Freud in his letter to Fliess, explain why Freud turned away from the realities of early abuse and towards a theory of phantasies emerging from biological sexual drives.

Marianne Krull: Freud and His Father

Krull (1986) provides a detailed and scholarly account of Freud's family history and relationships, attempting to understand the period of acute personal crisis that occurred in 1896/7. This was the time between the first publication of the seduction theory, through the death of Freud's father and into his period of intense personal analysis, until his formulation of the Oedipal theory. Krull traces the connection between Freud's personal analysis and his retraction of the seduction theory, using records of dreams and personal correspondence, particularly the letters to Fliess.

Freud's major work during this period was The Interpretation of Dreams, where he introduced the concept of unconscious sexual drives being a causal factor in many psychological phenomena. The ideas in the book were developed primarily through his self-analysis, and Freud mentions the importance of his father's death in the introduction:

For this (The Interpretation of Dreams) had a further significance for me personally - a significance which I only grasped after I had completed it. It was, I found, a portion of my self-analysis, my reaction to my father's death - that is to say, the most important event, the most poignant loss, of a man's life (Krull, 1986, p 11).

It is clear that the death of his father had a major effect on Freud, and Krull attempts to understand the nature of this influence. She reveals Jacob Freud as a Jewish patriarch, instilling in Sigmund a deep sense of filial duty, not only towards him as an individual, but as a representative of the Jewish culture, providing symbolic grounding in a lineage and cultural identity. This bond, strengthened by the biblical imperative to honour the father, is contrasted with the sordid relations which permeated the family. Krull reveals a web of parental affairs, sibling sexual explorations and incestuous contacts in the extended Freud family. She shows how Freud's self-analysis became

deeply disturbing and that he was afflicted with a range of neurotic symptoms- headaches, paralysis, phobias- and seemed to have to pull back from finally recovering his own early history. In a letter to Fliess he revealed an important dream:

I must tell you about a pretty dream I had the night after the funeral [of his father]. I found myself in a shop with a sign saying:

You are requested

To close the eyes.

(Freud, unpublished letter cited in Krull, 1986)

"Closing the eyes" can refer to both a last service to the dead body, as well as a deliberate avoidance of some experience. Thus Freud is compelled to honour his dead father by avoiding the truth of his family history. This recalls the reason given by Freud for rejecting the seduction theory:

In all cases, not excluding my own, the father had to be accused of being perverse (Freud in Masson, 1984, p32).

This is obviously a conclusion which Freud was drawn to, and yet which remained, for him, completely unthinkable. If hysterical symptoms were caused by paternal sexual abuse, then the existence of such symptoms in himself and his siblings implicated the father, a step which Freud was unable to take. An alternative explanation for the symptoms and the patients memories of sexual abuse thus had to be found.

A letter to Fliess reveals the following unpublished dream:

Not long ago I dreamed I was feeling over-affectionately (sic) towards Mathilde [Freud's eldest daughter], but her name was "Hella".... Mathilde may have been so called because she has been weeping so bitterly over the Greek defeats. She has a passion for the mythology of the ancient Hellas, and naturally regards all the Hellenes as heroes. The dream of

course fulfils my wish to pin down a father as the originator of neurosis and to put an end to my persistent doubts (Krull, 1986, p51).

Krull asks whether this could refer to Mathilde's disillusion with her idealised father, having its roots in some abuse, or if this could be Freud himself, with his interest in Greek mythology, confronting the same disillusion with his own revered father.

Interestingly, nearly all Freud's sexually significant dreams are either omitted from The Interpretation of Dreams, or modified so as to exclude their obvious sexual content. Fortunately, they remain preserved in his notes and letters to Fliess. One of the dreams suggests that he was sexually initiated by a nursemaid (who played a more important role in his early care than his mother), but the published version, the famous "staircase dream" is changed to play down the sexual aspect. Freud was not only concerned to conceal this material from public scrutiny, but also shows an uncharacteristic failure to mention even the most strikingly obvious sexual interpretation of his own dreams. These factors, combined with the dramatic hysterical symptoms that accompanied the self-analysis, seem to indicate the operation of both conscious and unconscious resistances to the uncovering of personal abuse.

As soon as Freud finally rejects the seduction theory, he feels immediate relief. In the letter to Fliess announcing his turn he says:

Here I am again... refreshed, cheerful... Were I depressed, jaded, unclear in my mind, such doubts may be taken for signs of weakness. But I am in the opposite state ... and I am proud that after penetrating so far I am still capable of such criticism.... I have more a feeling of triumph than defeat. I vary Hamlet's remark about ripeness - cheerfulness is all (Krull, 1986, p55).

That the decision to retract the theory causes such euphoria seems to underline the personal issues at stake.

Krull detects an interesting "Freudian slip" in the choice of the Oedipal myth as an alternative to the seduction theory. Freud refers only to the later part of the story, where Oedipus has killed his father Laius and married his mother Jocasta, as prototypical of the sexually driven desire to dispense with the father and possess the mother. He omits (but must have certainly been aware of) the other half of the story. The Oedipus saga was a punishment for Laius, who while a guest of Pelops' court, abducted and seduced his son Chrysippus. Pelops placed a curse on Laius, that he would be murdered by his own son, and the Sphinx had been sent by Hera for the same reason. The fateful meeting of Laius and Oedipus at the crossroads occurred when Laius was on his way to Delphi to find out how to get rid of the Sphinx. It was Laius who first struck Oedipus, causing the fight that led to his death. Oedipus then married Jocasta as reward for solving the riddle of the Sphinx.

Not only did Laius abuse the young Chrysippus, but when he was told that he would be killed by his own son, he pierced Oedipus' feet and ordered that he be left on the mountainside to die. It was only the mercy of a shepherd that saved Oedipus' life. The Oedipus myth is thus not a story of death wishes towards the father and sexual desire for the mother, but of the consequences of a violent and sexually abusive father. Significantly, when Oedipus discovers the truth of the situation, he blinds himself. Here, perhaps, is the final metaphor for Freud's denial of the reality of sexual abuse.

Catherina Roux: Obedient Daughter, Silenced Witch

In her unfortunately unpublished M.A. thesis (Rhodes University, 1989), Roux draws on and develops the arguments of Masson and Krull. She examines Freud's understanding of female hysterics from a feminist perspective, dealing with the roles

and discourses available to women, and how these are positioned within patriarchal gender arrangements. She argues that:

...the seduction theory was shaped as much by Freud's adherence to the nomonological model as by the empirical evidence of child sexual abuse. A renunciation of the theory was inevitable, not because the accounts of the daughters were lies, but because the methodology was inappropriate
-(Roux, 1989, p (i)).

Freud adopted a scientific framework of causality, which required that given effects had to be explained in terms of specific causes which operated in an identical manner in every case. Thus when Freud established a link between early sexual abuse and hysteria, he inferred that hysteria would always be a direct effect of sexual abuse. We must beware of retrospectively psychologising Freud, and keeping in mind his theory of the neuroses outlined in Chapter 1, remember that for him sexual abuse was not primarily damaging because it was a type of interpersonal or emotional violence (like child battering), but rather a type of inappropriate sexual stimulation (like masturbation). Thus Freud is looking for a physiological cause rather than a set of psychological conditions to explain hysteria. This means that, although Freud discovered a link between sexual abuse and hysteria, he did not explore the structure of the relationships in that situation, a move which would have allowed him to go beyond the sexual domain into a more general understanding of child abuse and neuroses.

Roux asserts that:

...where the physical rape does not take place in actuality, the hysteric's embodiment of mental rape is not a fantasy, but an inability to

compromise, a refusal to allow rape to go unacknowledged in any of its expressions in the relational structure of the sexes (Roux, 1989, p 126).

Freud ultimately fails to see the meaning of the hysterical symptoms, not only because patriarchal ideology conceals the power differential which exists between the sexes and the effects that this has for women, but because his academic/scientific discourse excludes the symbolic discourse of the hysteric. Despite his massive insight that symptoms have meanings, Freud wanted to tie these meanings to physiological, specifically sexual, processes. If there were hysterical symptoms without sexual abuse, an alternative physiological basis had to be sought, and it was this that the Oedipal theory, with its focus on infantile sexual desire, provided. Both the seduction and Oedipal theories, however, failed to comprehend the emotional structure of the nuclear family and thus the meaning of hysteria. What was needed was not a move from seduction theory to Oedipal theory, but rather simply to realise that *sexual abuse is a type of emotional abuse*, and that this emotional abuse is at the core of psychopathology.

Alice Miller: Thou Shalt Not Be Aware

Alice Miller (1983, 1983, 1987), as a psychotherapist, is less interested in the historical reasons behind the move away from the seduction theory, than the contemporary therapeutic implications. She views the theories with the retrospective wisdom of recent work on child development, and her work begins with the observation that infants exist in dependency on adults, with fundamental needs, not only for the physiological requirements of the body, but also psychological demands for respect, mirroring and affection. The failure to meet these needs thus constitutes traumatization for the child.

In a similar way to Roux, who shows the effects of gender inequalities on the father-daughter relationship, Miller shows that a massive imbalance of power exists between

adults and children, and that children are traditionally defined in terms of the needs and desires of adults. Not only are the needs of children often not met, but the resulting trauma is not acknowledged, because these needs have not been understood and articulated in the adult-centred world. Moreover, the child usually protects itself from the pain of the disappointing parents by idealising them.

Miller argues that Freud was on the way to uncovering the basis of emotional trauma in the seduction theory, but that even he was influenced by the powerful unconscious desire to repress the child's pain and idealise the parent, which led him to an alternative explanation that avoided the realities of early abuse. Psychoanalysis is now trapped in that framework, because:

Since the psychoanalytic drive theory encourages the patient's tendency to deny his trauma and blame himself, it is more likely to conceal than reveal the sexual and narcissistic abuse the patient experienced as a child (Miller, 1987, p7).

Miller believes that emotional healing works through uncovering the hidden traumas of infancy and releasing the repressed emotions in the therapeutic setting. Oedipal theory, in attributing psychological problems to innate sexual and aggressive drives, re-enacts the early abuse by denying again, in the present, the original needs and suffering of the child:

"If it is an axiom of psychoanalytic training that everything that happened to the patient in childhood was a result of his drive conflicts, then sooner or later the patient must be taught to regard himself as wicked, destructive, megalomaniac or homosexual without understanding the reasons for his particular behaviour. For those narcissistic traumas - humiliation, rejection, mistreatment - inflicted on the child and considered a normal part of child-rearing are not touched and thus cannot be experienced by the patient. Yet it is only by addressing these concrete

situations that we can help the patient acknowledge his (sic) feelings of rage, hatred, indignation, and eventually, grief (Miller, 1987, p51).

The problem is not the interpersonal structure uncovered in the Oedipal theory, but in the attribution of innate drives. Miller acknowledges the love for the mother and jealousy towards the father, but these are related to *emotional needs*, not *sexual drives*. The failure to understand these emotional needs further obscures the reactive nature of destructiveness - the fact that destructive aggression is an expression of frustration and rage resulting from deprivation and abuse - and makes it necessary to hypothesise a death drive to complement the sexual drive. The origins of self-destructive and antisocial behaviours are thus mystified and the harmfulness of emotional child abuse is concealed.

Individuals who suffer this abuse, but repress the trauma, are forced to deny these needs experienced in others as well, including their own children, creating a cycle of trauma and abuse that is then perpetuated through the generations. Oedipal theory, by concealing the reality of child abuse and attributing problems to conflicts between innate drives, becomes party to this cycle of violence, suffering, and mystification. Miller thus argues that it is essential that therapists take the patients reports of abuse seriously as the essential focus of therapy, rather than explaining them away as phantasies concealing sexual and aggressive drives.

In summary, it may be said that the critics observe that the reasons offered by Freud for abandoning the seduction theory are hopelessly inadequate, and seem to indicate that a concealed motivation was operating, be it social pressure, unconscious fear, or an inappropriate epistemology. Whatever the reasons, the implications remain - in turning away from the seduction theory and toward the Oedipal theory, psychoanalysis became an intrapsychic enterprise, blinded to the psychological effects of the social world.

POSSIBLE FUTURES

Freud's theory did not end with the Oedipus complex, and psychoanalytic theory did not end with Freud, but it was at this point that a certain set of assumptions became embedded and constrained the scope of further theorising. Fundamental to the theory of psychosexual development was the assumption that psychological life is based on innate drives. These drives (or "instincts" in the Standard Edition translation) were at the interface of mind and body, arising from physiological states of stimulation and impinging on the mind in such a way as to motivate behaviour towards their release:

By an "instinct" is provisionally to be understood the psychical representative of an endosomatic, continuously flowing source of stimulation...The concept of an instinct is thus one of those lying at the frontier of the mental and physical... (They) are to be regarded as a measure of the demand made upon the mind for work. What distinguishes the instincts from one another and endows them with specific qualities is their relation to their somatic sources and to their aims. The source of the instinct is the process of excitation occurring in an organ and the immediate aim of the instinct lies in the removal of this organic stimulus (Freud, 1950, p 164).

Freud explained the drives as consisting of three components: source, aim, and object. The source was the particular state of physiological tension (e.g. sexual arousal/hunger), the aim being the process of release of that tension (the sexual act/feeding), and the object being that target which provided for its release (the sexual object/breast). Freud formulated these processes within the imagery of nineteenth century physics, adopting a hydraulic metaphor for the internal flows of energy, and

viewing the individual as a closed energy system. The primary goal of the system was the elimination of tension and the maintenance of homeostasis.

Freud's radical innovation was the integration of this biological theory with a theory of meaning, asserting that the drives exist also at the level of their mental representation, and that the uncovering of repressed memories allows abreaction and release of the pathological tension within the organism. The uncovering of the unconscious memories of trauma through the decoding of hidden meaning (comprehensible to the analyst through an understanding of the underlying drives and their repression) allows for the release of affect and the attainment of a more satisfactory homeostasis within the organism.

But if this is a theory integrating biology and meaning, it is clear that the biology is prior and causal, and the meaning secondary and derivative. Although in Freud's case histories the recovery of meaning is always central, his metatheory locates the framework of interpretation within the biological. We are left with an image of the person as a discrete, self-contained organism which can largely be accounted for with reference to internal processes. The drives and their repression provide sufficient explanation of human behaviour. Even consciousness and experience, meaning and emotion, are seen as having internal causes. This is tied to the move from the seduction theory to the Oedipal theory:

Obviously seduction is not required in order to arouse a child's sexual life; that can also come about spontaneously and from internal causes (Freud, 1950, pp190-1).

The disastrous consequences of this assumption are clear in interpretations such as the case of Dora, which has provoked due outrage from feminist writers. Where Dora reports her revulsion at the sexual advances of her father's friend, Freud sees hysterical psychopathology, because any physical stimulation should be experienced as a

pleasurable release of sexual tension. This interpretation manages to completely overlook the meaning of the sexual situation, and reduces sexuality to the impersonal physiological stimulation of the organism. It disallows the more politically² significant, and rather obvious, interpretation that Dora quite simply does not like this man, has no desire for sexual contact with him, and resents the way she is being manipulated into the situation. This limitation conceals as much as it reveals about the erotic experience, particularly the interpersonal dimension in which the physical experience is structured through social meanings.

It is clear that in this model the individual is an independent unit for analysis, and the social dimension is only important as a secondary influence on the more fundamental internal processes. This tenuous connection between the individual and the social needs to be examined more closely. In Freud's terms it can be formulated as the connection between the drive and its object. Freud states that the object is "what is most variable about the instinct, and is not originally connected with it, but becomes assigned to it only in consequence of being peculiarly fitted to make satisfaction possible" (Freud, 1915, pp.122-2). This means that the drive becomes attached to particular objects which provide for its gratification.

The external world is thus important only in that it frustrates, or allows for the release of, the sexual and aggressive drives. Interpersonal relationships may be important in that they provide channels for the expression of sexual drives, whereas participation in society generally entails the repression of sexual and aggressive drives, potentially creating pathology.

My strong feeling is that this account does not adequately explain the existence of the individual as a fundamentally social being, emerging in infancy from a specific

²"Political" is used throughout in the broader sense of all the power relations that effect the individual. In fact, much of this work is devoted to showing just how broad the use of this term can be.

nurturing relationship into a particular social environment. As Freud's psychoanalytic followers (particularly the object relations theorists) moved on from extrapolating developmental experiences by analyzing adults, and began to investigate early childhood and infancy directly, this question of the nature of the ties that bind people together came to the fore. What I will do here is contrast two examples of different strategies used to deal with this problem.

Object-relations theory covers a broad range of differing theories united by a psychoanalytic approach to understanding early psychological development. The innovation of much of this area arises from the observation and analysis of young children, something which Freud avoided. The range of theories reflects a complex interaction of both the differences in belief as to what axioms constitute the essence of psychoanalytic theory, as well as different strategies for integrating the new findings with traditional theory.

A common theme is the realisation that one cannot speak of the infant without speaking of it's relation with it's world, and this is where the term "object-relations" becomes significant. Here the word "object" needs to be divorced from it's conventional associations of inanimate impersonality, and seen as a usefully ambiguous term covering both the notion of the target of a drive, and the idea of relationships with partial aspects of the self and others, which occur before the idea of a whole and integrated person has been achieved.

MELANIE KLEIN

Klein broke away from the orthodox Freudians (led by Anna Freud) with her belief that young children could be analyzed using the same principles of transference and interpretation used for adults (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983). Although children have underdeveloped verbal skills, Klein found a rich discourse symbolised in their play, and used this as basic analytic material.

One of Klein's most important contributions is her notion of psychological development as essentially involving the move from the paranoid-schizoid to the depressive position (Klein, 1964). The paranoid-schizoid position is the earliest way of organising experience and can be understood in terms of the intense and unstructured world of the infant. The infant has not yet developed a sense of itself or others existing as separate and integrated individuals. Its experience oscillates between extremes of deprivation and gratification, largely in relation to the emergence of physiological needs such as hunger, and environmental provisions such as feeding. These good and bad experiences are experienced as totally separate from each other. The bad experiences are felt as attacks from the outside by bad objects, while good experiences are felt to be internally created (Klein, 1964). The term "schizoid" thus refers to the splitting of experience into good and bad objects, while "paranoid" indicates the projection of negative experience onto external persecutors.

This structure of experience is transformed as the infant begins to recognise both the mother and itself as separate, whole, and integrated individuals. This entails the realization that the bad object, which was the victim of the infant's overwhelming frustration, rage, hatred and destructive urges, is the same person as the good object

which was loved and idealised. This brings a new basic anxiety. Whereas in the paranoid-schizoid position, the infant feared annihilation by the attacking bad objects, it now fears that the good object may have been irretrievably damaged by its hatred and rages. This depressive anxiety may lead to attempts at reparation, to heal the damaged object, or if the anxiety is overwhelming, regression to the paranoid-schizoid position (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983).

For Klein (1975), the Oedipus complex thus develops out of the depressive position, with jealousy arising from the realization that the mother is a whole person with her own life, and the phantasy that the parents are giving each other the gratification that the child desires. In contrast to Freud, who sees the Oedipal conflict as a desire for prohibited sexual pleasure and the fear of punishment, Klein sees it as a struggle to keep the good object, and a fear of retaliation. The basic anxiety does thus not arise from sexual guilt, but from aggressive phantasies.

This account of the infant's experiential world must be understood in the light of Klein's (1964) notion of unconscious phantasy. Freud viewed phantasy as an imaginative process whereby gratification was mentally created as a defence against the experience of actual physical deprivation. Klein's notion is far more radical and all-encompassing. She sees unconscious phantasy as a continuous process underlying all emotional experience. It allows for primitive thinking by providing a spectrum of phylogenetically inherited unconscious images. The infant can thus phantasize destroying the bad object with images of biting and defecation, and can idealise the good object with images of sexual gratification.

The notion of inherited unconscious images also changes the way Klein understands the nature of drives. The reduction of psychological events to drives is even more pronounced in Klein's theory than in Freud's. In her early writing (Klein, 1964) she is inclined to see sexual drives at work in every possible phenomena, and later increasingly extends this thinking to include the aggressive drives (Klein, 1975). In her

zeal to extend drive theory to explain more and more aspects of psychological life, she subtly changes the original Freudian formulation. Freud argues that drives become attached to specific objects because of actual experiences of gratification, whereas for Klein the drives possess *a priori* images of their objects. The drives are then no longer necessarily linked to anything beyond the unconscious mind. The social world is thus of less significance, because the whole inner psychodynamic life can play itself out without any reference to external experience. Thus Greenberg and Mitchell (1983, p131) conclude that "Klein argues that perceptions of real others are merely scaffolding for the projections of the child's innate object images." Klein herself (1936, p251) is able to claim that "external reality is mainly a mirror for the child's instinctual life".

Experiences of the external world are therefore only significant in that the infant's projections can be internalised in a slightly softened and modified form if, for instance, the caregivers are not destroyed, or do not retaliate in response to the infant's phantasized attacks. But psychopathology is still interpreted more in terms of the infant's own aggression than the actual social experiences. Although Klein's drives are more psychological than Freud's - she deals with love and hate rather than sexual and aggressive instincts - and these drives do provide the infant with an interpersonal connection, it is a unilateral connection, proceeding from the infant to the social world rather than vice versa. Thus according to the Kleinian model, social experience is shaped by internal psychodynamics, not internal psychodynamics by social experience.

DONALD WINNICOTT

Winnicott may be said to formulate his object-relations theory from the opposite side of the internal/environmental dichotomy to Klein. Although both claim to be simply extending Freud's own ideas, and despite the use Winnicott makes of Klein's concepts, his theory implies a totally different notion of the self in the social world.

Winnicott began his career as a paediatrician, and later became interested in psychoanalysis because it offered potential explanations for certain clinical problems where medical science failed (Davis & Wallbridge, 1983). Most of his work was done with very young infants with the mother present, and it is perhaps this environment, as opposed to the usual psychoanalytic investigation of infancy through the recollections of an older patient, that led to his innovative ideas. This approach is captured in his provocative assertion that:

There is no such thing as a baby. Meaning that if you set out to describe a baby, you are describing a baby and someone. A baby cannot exist alone, but is essentially part of a relationship (Winnicott, 1958, p39).

For Winnicott it is a simple fact that a human infant cannot exist independently, either physiologically or psychologically, and his theory grapples with the emergence of the person through the transition from the absolute dependency of infancy to the relative independence of mature adulthood. In the stage of absolute dependency, the mother must protect the infant from trauma, be it external, such as physical injury, or internal, such as an intense hunger. The infant is in an unintegrated state and relies on the

mother's integrated perception of him/her to bring structure to experience. (Winnicott, 1958)

At this early stage the mother normally undergoes a state of merging with the infant which in another context would be considered pathological. This primary maternal preoccupation with the baby allows the mother to empathically anticipate and respond to the baby's needs as they arise. It is the ongoing repetition of these responses, such as the provision of the breast when hunger arises, that gradually enables the infant to differentiate and identify with its own experience. The feeding transforms the hunger from an overwhelming threat to the infant's well-being (or, more accurately, to the infant's existence) into a comprehensible and manageable experience.

Without the mother's response the infant simply experiences undifferentiated states of acute disturbance, with no way of understanding or attempting to alleviate the discomfort. The mother's repeated responsiveness makes the disturbance comprehensible and bearable by providing that which is necessary to restore well-being. In so doing, the mother shows the nature of the disturbance by demonstrating what is needed to relieve it, as well as creating the confidence that relief is available, thereby reducing the 'primitive agony' (Winnicott, 1968) caused by these disturbances. The mother is thus a mirror, giving structure to the infant's chaotic experience, and meaning to the bodily functions and impulses. This allows the child to mature into a position where it can eventually experience and safely attempt to satisfy its own internally arising needs, without having to repress those needs as presenting a terrifying threat to the self.

Winnicott (1965) clearly emphasises that the important issue is not simply the gratification of the instincts. Feeding, for example, can be provided in such a way that, although it meets the nutritional needs of the organism, it actually harms the development of the infant as a person. The essential thing is not that the child is fed,

but that the feeding flows as an immediate empathic response to the arising hunger in the infant:

Imagine a baby who has never had a feed. Hunger turns up, and the baby is ready to conceive of something; out of need the baby is ready to create a source of satisfaction, but there is no previous experience to show the baby what to expect. If at this moment the mother places the breast -where baby is ready to expect something, and if plenty of time is allowed for the infant to feel around, with mouth and hands, and perhaps sense of smell, the baby 'creates' just what is there to be found. The baby eventually gets the illusion that this real breast is exactly the thing created out of need, greed, and the first impulse of primitive loving. Sight, smell and taste register somewhere, and after a while the baby may be creating something like the very breast that the mother has to offer. A thousand times before weaning the baby may be given just this particular introduction to external reality by one woman, the mother. A thousand times the feeling has existed that what was wanted was created, and found to be there. From this develops a belief that the world can contain what was wanted and needed, with the result that the baby has hope that there is a live relationship between inner reality and external reality, between innate primary creativity and the world at large which is shared by all (Winnicott, 1958, p42).

The essential thing here is the responsiveness of the environment to the infant's arising needs, and the way in which this allows the infant to identify, and identify with, its own internal processes. Winnicott extends this theme with his idea of "holding", which includes not only this responsiveness, but also the mother's provision of ongoing non-demanding support which allows the infant to exist safely in a formless and unintegrated state, from which needs and spontaneous gestures can emerge.

Such support can be contrasted with impingement, where the environment/mother interferes with the infant, forcing a response. This causes the infant to orient itself prematurely to external demands, at the expense of its own needs and gestures. Thus if feeding occurs according to the mother's timetable, rather than the infant's need, the infant must organise its world around these external events, instead of its inner processes. This entails a suppression of the inner processes, which become profoundly threatening and disorienting in the absence of sympathetic gratification, and a compulsive identification with the external demands as the framework for organising experience.

Here Winnicott (1965) introduces the notion of the True and False self, ideas which I believe have a massive yet unrecognised importance for a critical understanding of the individual in society. The True self comes into being when the maternal responsiveness outlined above allows the infant's personality to emerge from a grounding in its inner experience and mature into a relationship between this interiority and the external world. Where there is impingement rather than responsiveness, this interiority is lost and is replaced by survival through compulsive adaptation to the demands of the environment. This adaptation may be highly efficient, enabling the individual to perform their social roles extremely effectively, but, Winnicott asserts, this is simply appearance of a self, which conceals an inner absence. Here the person struggles to find themselves in the external demands of the environment, rather than in the working out of the relationship between the inner processes and the limits of external reality.

Winnicott's understanding of the relationship between inner and outer worlds is clearly seen in two of his most popular concepts: transitional space, and play. Winnicott (1965) argues that if one is going to use bipolar terms of inner and outer, it becomes necessary to introduce an intermediate concept that describes the meeting of these two worlds. The transitional space is thus the area of experiencing, which synthesizes the internal process with the external structure. Play involves the ability to bring these

worlds of inner phantasy and external reality together in experience, without fleeing either to the internal world in psychosis, or the external world with the false self.

Winnicott has thus proposed two extremely important principles. In the first case, he clearly implicates the environment as crucial to the development of the person. The second crucial point, often overlooked, is that Winnicott does not simply see healthy development as the successful subordination of the internal processes to the demands of the external world, but as a creative personal integration of inner and outer. The essential insight here is that pathology can lie in over-adaptation just as much as the traditionally recognised adaptive failures.

Although both Klein and Winnicott claim loyalty to Freud, it is clear that their formulations are not simply different pieces of one jigsaw puzzle, but quite different ways of dealing with the problem of the individual and the social world. As such, they could be taken to represent two opposite poles of this problem: Klein taking the Freudian reduction of all phenomena to internal process to its logical extreme, and Winnicott attempting to reintroduce the social environment as a crucial factor in psychodynamic thinking. This leads to the question of evaluating these contrasting orientations and their usefulness in psychological thinking.

PART TWO:

The Judge who disturbed the neighbours

Freud's unwitting but notorious patient, Schreber, was convinced that God had chosen him to bring the new Messiah into the world, and that his body was therefore being turned into that of a woman. He also believed that everyone he met had died, that what he saw and heard was only fleeting images of people, ghostly apparitions sent by God to taunt and tempt. When he could no longer bear the ceaseless teasing of aggressive voices, he screamed as loud as he could, which annoyed the neighbours, especially at night, and meant that he had to be restrained.

J.J Lecercle Philosophy Through the Looking Glass

In rejecting the seduction theory and adopting the Oedipal model and drive theory which it entails, Freud created for himself an interpretative framework which structured his perception of clinical phenomena with which he then dealt. Various thinkers, from phenomenologists to philosophers of science to the current avalanche of post-structuralists, have made clear that the conceptual framework chosen tends to determine the phenomena that are perceived in a largely self-validating manner (Harland, 1987; Kvale, 1993). In this case, Freud reports that he was pleased to discover the Schreber memoirs because they provided such clear confirmation of his theory, although he only became aware of them after the theory had been developed.

The task of the critic in this situation is either to show the internal contradictions in the theory, or to adopt an alternative perspective which highlights the omissions and lapses which the theory generates. The case of Judge Schreber is particularly useful in this regard because, unlike many of the others, all the original analytic material is available to us as, the entire analysis is based on Schreber's memoirs, without Freud ever having met the man. Not only do we have the memoirs, but also another literary body, the prolific writings of Judge Schreber's father on childrearing and education. The advantage here is that instead of relying on Freud's account of the clinical history, we can go directly to the sources themselves.

The Judge Schreber's memoirs, published in 1903, caused a stir in psychiatric circles because of their unique combination of bizarre delusions, and the literate, lucid and intricate way in which they are explained. In the introduction to Freud's paper the editor comments:

One of the remarkable features of the original is the contrast it perpetually offers between the elaborate sentences of official academic nineteenth century German and the outre extravagances of the psychotic events which they describe (Freud, 1953, vol 12 p (i)).

The memoirs were in fact specifically written by Schreber to explain to those around him that, although his experiences were unusual and disconcerting to those who did not understand them, they were in fact highly intelligible and not any indication of psychopathology within himself. They were rather, he explained, divine interventions, and he launched a scathing and quite lucid attack on the doctors who rejected the validity of these experiences because of their narrow empiricism. This strikingly well-argued position is contrasted with evidently psychopathological reports of an enormous variety of bodily pains, voices, internal damage, death, decay and the experience of being transformed by God into a woman in order to redeem the world (Schatzman, 1976).

Schreber's unusual experiences led to his confinement in mental institutions on two occasions. It was during the second confinement, when his condition was more severe, that he wrote his autobiography, Memoirs of a Nervous Patient, after which he remained in the institution until his death.

Freud on Schreber

Several years elapsed between the publication of the memoirs and Freud's commentary, the Psycho-analytical notes on an autobiographical account of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides) (1911). Freud had already indicated at the time of the seduction theory that he believed that paranoia was a defense that entailed projection, but by 1911 the Oedipal theory was firmly established and he was tracing pathology back to innate sexual and aggressive drives. Freud focused on the sexual aspects of the case and noted that Schreber had a significant dream prior to his second, more severe, crisis:

Once, in the early hours of the morning, moreover, while he was in a state between sleeping and waking, the idea occurred to him 'that after all it really must be very nice to be a woman submitting to the act of copulation' (Freud, 1953, vol 12, p5).

At the time of this crisis Schreber's wife was away for several days, and things began to go awry one night after he had "a quite extraordinary number of emissions". Schreber began to be afflicted by "miracles" in which parts of his body were tormented, creating the impression that his internal organs were often damaged or absent, only to be restored at arbitrary moments. Voices repeated his thoughts and mocked him, while "little men" interfered with his body and "celestial beings" recorded his thoughts. He was in direct communication with God and experienced miraculous apparitions and holy music, sometimes believing he was in another world.

The communication with God was not as pleasant as one might have anticipated, and Schreber complained that He failed to understand humans at all:

This state of things.. I am convinced may be brought into connection with the fact that God was if I may so express it, quite incapable of dealing with living men, and was only accustomed to communicate with corpses (ibid, p25).

Schreber explained that people were made up of bodies that constituted their physical being, and nerves that constituted their mental being. God was made up only of nerves, and because of the excited state of Schreber's nerves, they exerted a powerful attraction on God from which He could not free himself, and they became rivals:

...for every time my intellectual activities ceased, God jumped to the conclusion that my mental faculties were extinct and the destruction of my understanding (the idiocy) for which he had been hoping, had set in (ibid, p25).

Schreber suffered no end of torment at the hands of this rather dense and brutal God, and had to remain constantly vigilant against further attacks. God would even repeatedly conjure up in Schreber the urgent desire for a bowel movement, only to ensure that all the lavatories were occupied at the time:

And thereupon comes the question: "why don't you sh-?" to which the brilliant repartee is made that I am "so stupid or something". The pen well nigh shrinks from recording so monumental a piece of absurdity as that God, blinded by His ignorance of human nature, can positively go to such lengths... (ibid, p27).

Schreber also felt persecuted by his former psychiatrist, Dr Fleschig, who wished to commit "soul murder" against him. He was particularly concerned that Fleschig was trying to turn him into a woman in order to sexually abuse him. Later he realised that God was in on the conspiracy:

Later the idea forced itself upon my mind that God Himself had played the part of accomplice [to Fleschig], if not instigator, in the plot whereby my soul was to be murdered and my body used like a strumpet (ibid, p19).

On occasions he found himself dead and decomposing, or the only man left alive after some apocalypse. Gradually Schreber came to see that God was turning him into a woman in order to impregnate him and create a new race to save humanity and restore it to a state of bliss. This state of bliss is described as an extension of sensual pleasure, and Schreber is called upon to develop his "spiritual voluptuousness" for this union with God. Freud comments that:

God Himself demands that He shall be able to find voluptuousness in him, and threatens him with the withdrawal of His rays if he neglects to cultivate voluptuousness and cannot offer God what He demands (ibid, p30).

Freud pointed out that "the sexual enjoyment which he had won for himself was of an most unusual character. It was not the sexual liberty of a man, but the sexual feelings of a woman (ibid, p30).

Freud focused on Schreber's gender transgressions, noting that he took to cross dressing and described how, while admiring himself in the mirror wearing women's clothing and jewellery, it seemed that his body was actually shaped as a woman's, with a woman's breasts. Schreber further repeatedly imagined himself to have female buttocks and fantasised being a woman having sex. Freud thus discovered a homosexual sexual drive at the root of Schreber's condition. This interpretation is made more compelling by the way in which Freud links it to Schreber's other main cluster of symptoms, the paranoid delusions.

Schreber initially experienced himself as being persecuted by his psychiatrist, Dr Fleschig, but later believed that God himself lay behind the conspiracy to torment him physically and destroy his mind, as well the plot to turn him into a woman. Freud asserts that:

The relation between the patient and his persecutor can be reduced to a simple formula. It appears that the person on whom the delusion ascribes so much power and influence, in whose hands the threads of the conspiracy converge, is, either identical with someone who played an equally important part in the patient's emotional life before the illness, or is easily recognised as a substitute for him. The intensity of the emotion is projected in the shape of external power, while its quality is changed into its opposite...The person who is now hated and feared for being a persecutor was at one time loved and honoured. The main purpose of the delusion is to justify the change in the emotional attitude (Freud, 1953, p41)

Schreber initially reported positive feelings towards Fleschig after his first illness, but during the second illness, began to fear sexual abuse at the hands of the doctor. Recalling Schreber's dream of being a woman having sex which preceded the second breakdown, Freud asserts that Schreber specifically wanted to be a woman in relation to Fleschig:

The exciting cause of the illness, then, was an outburst of homosexual libido; the object of this libido was from the very first his doctor, Fleschig (ibid, p41).

Freud suggests that it is significant that the second breakdown occurred while Schreber's wife was away, as she would have protected him from his homosexual desires. The relation to Fleschig is also seen as the projection of an earlier homosexual

desire, the doctor providing a substitute for the brother or father. The figure of God in the paranoid delusions is also explained:

If the persecutor Fleschig was originally a person whom Schreber loved, then God must also be the reappearance of someone else whom he loved, and probably someone of greater importance... this person must have been his father (Freud, 1953, p40).

Freud concludes that "the feminine fantasy thus had its roots in a longing, intensified to an erotic pitch, for his father and brother" (ibid, p50). He observes that the father was a respected pedagogue and civic leader and comments that "such a father was by no means unsuitable for transfiguration into God in the affectionate memory of the son" (ibid, p 51). The fact that Schreber's attitude towards God is antagonistic rather than affectionate is explained as a reflection of the rebelliousness of young boys towards their fathers.

Freud uses Schreber as an example of a general theoretical link between homosexuality and paranoia. He breaks the unconscious components down into a simple formula. The statement "I love a man" is unacceptable to the conscious mind, so it is denied by the assertion "I do not love him - I hate him". This inversion of emotion requires a justification which is offered in the explanation: "I hate him because he persecutes me". Paranoid delusions are seen as a defense against homosexual desire. Freud comments:

"The most striking characteristic of symptom-formation in paranoia is the process which deserves the name projection. An internal perception is suppressed and, instead, its content after undergoing a certain kind of distortion, enters consciousness in the form of an external perception."
(ibid, p 42)

According to Freud, Schreber's feelings of persecution do not arise from any actual torments in the external world, but rather from an inner process - his homosexual sexual drive - which is intolerable to his conscious self-perception. This case thus offers us an interesting example of the way in which Freud dealt with the explanation of psychopathology in terms of inner process rather than external conditions.

Schreber on Schreber

In his analysis of Schreber, Freud draws exclusively on Schreber's memoirs, to the exclusion of other biographical material available. Perhaps he did not consider it to be important because, having abandoned the seduction theory and with it the significance of early traumatic experiences, all he now sought to do was trace psychopathology back to drive conflicts by analyzing current symptoms. But such material was available to Freud, as it is to us now, particularly in the form of Schreber's father's prolific writing on childrearing and education, and a closer examination of it casts interesting light on the Schreber case.

The father, Daniel Gottlieb Schreber, was an eminent physician and pedagogue who devoted himself to opposing what he saw as laxity in the education and discipline of children. He published 18 books, mainly concerned with childrearing, and mentions that he developed these techniques on his own children. He sired two sons: the elder, Daniel Gustav, went mad and committed suicide, and the younger, Daniel Paul, is the subject of this study. It is striking that both the sons suffered extreme emotional breakdown, which perhaps reflects rather poorly on the father's childrearing methods. Commenting on the links between the father's techniques and the son's symptoms, Morton Schatzman drily asks the fundamental question:

It would be of value to know if parents and societies that adopt obedience and discipline as pre-eminent goals of child education are more, or less, or equally likely to drive children crazy than other parents or societies (Schatzman, 1976, p3).

This opens up many interpretative possibilities which are excluded from the Freudian version.

In contrast to Freud's account of him, Schreber's own book reveals him to be lucid and perceptive in many ways:

I have decided to apply for my release from the Asylum in the near future in order to live again among civilized people and at home with my wife. It is therefore necessary to give those persons who will then constitute the circle of my acquaintance, an approximate idea at least of my religious conceptions, so that they may have some understanding of the necessity which forces me to various oddities of behaviour, even if they do not understand those apparent oddities (ibid, p5).

He criticised the hospital psychiatrist whom he points out "only became acquainted with the pathological shell, as I would like to call it, which concealed my true spiritual life" (ibid, p29). Schreber attributes his breakdown to times of enormous stress in his work situation, and understands quite clearly that his experience is bizarre to others. The question he raises is whether a person can be classified as insane simply because his experience differs from those around him, and he advances sophisticated arguments against the narrow empiricism of the doctors, and attacks their hypocrisy in accepting traditional religion while rejecting his religious experience.

The psychiatric interpretation of Schreber's unusual experience dismisses it because it transgresses certain social norms of acceptability and comprehensibility, and then attributes this difference to pathological organic processes that interfere with the proper functioning of the brain. In other words, Schreber is mad because he has a brain disease. The experiences themselves are assumed to be meaningless except in that they indicate the presence of a disease. The Freudian account goes a little further by attributing meaning to certain of the symptoms and explaining them as manifestations

of conflicts between drives, in this case specifically a repressed homosexual drive. This raises the possibility of looking at the strange experiences as symbols which can be interpreted to uncover the concealed origin and meaning of the emotional disturbance.

I have chosen to reject the psychiatric approach, which dismisses the experiences as meaningless, as well as the Freudian approach which attributes them to innate biological drives. Instead I will use the Freudian assumption that the experiences can be seen as symbols, but then offer a different interpretative framework for decoding these symbols, one which looks to actual traumatic experiences and the affects that these may have on the psyche. This entails the adoption of a perspective closer to the original seduction theory than to Oedipal theory.

William Niederland, in several psychoanalytic journal articles³, investigated Schreber's biographical background and his father's writings, and pointed out the similarities between many of Schreber's specific physical symptoms and the actual childrearing practices which his father had advocated. He showed, for instance, the correlation between Schreber's physical aches and pains and the bizarre restraining apparatus devised by his father for controlling children. Niederland saw his work simply as additional to the Freudian reading, illuminating the specific form taken by the symptoms, rather than offering an alternative aetiology. He still sees Schreber's pathology as rooted in the repressed homosexual libido hypothesised by Freud, but sees the details of Schreber's psychotic delusions as being related to the father's childrearing practices. Schatzman (1976), on the other hand, reviews this material and concludes that it presents a totally different framework for understanding Schreber's

³Niederland, W.G. (1959a) "The 'Miracled-Up' World of Schreber's Childhood" *Psychoanalytic Studies of the Child*, 14, pp343-413

Niederland, W.G. (1959b) "Schreber: Father and Son" *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, 28, pp151-169

Niederland, W.G. (1960) "Schreber's Father" *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association*, 8, pp492-499

problems, one that views his ailments as symbolic expressions of earlier traumas which he suffered.

The historical background certainly casts interesting light on the case. In his writing, the father is revealed as an authoritarian personality, obsessed with discipline and regimentation, with a deep antipathy to spontaneity and permissiveness:

The noble seed of human nature sprout upwards in their purity almost on their own if the ignoble ones, the weeds, are sought out and destroyed in time. This must be done ruthlessly and vigorously. It is a dangerous error to believe that the flaws in a child's character will disappear by themselves (Schatzman, 1976, p19).

He encouraged religious devotion and physical health through gymnastics (he is in fact the person responsible for the introduction of physical education in schooling), and believed that child care should be strictly supervised by the father:

If one wants a planned upbringing based on principles to flourish, the father above anyone else must hold the reins in his hands (ibid, p17).

Schreber's father had strong views on what he considered appropriate childrearing:

One must look at the moods of the little ones that are announced by screaming without reason and crying... If one has convinced oneself that...the screaming is simply the expression of a mood, a whim, the first appearance of self will...one has to step forward in a positive manner: by quick distraction of the attention, stern words, threatening gestures...or bodily admonishments consistently repeated until the child calms down (Schatzman, 1976, p30).

and

...even the allowed desires of the child should only be fulfilled if they are expressed in a friendly, harmless or at least quiet manner (ibid, p32).

Not only should the child be denied any expression of emotion or need, but severity and violence are the methods by which this should be done. He laments the affection and gentleness which mothers so recklessly express towards their children:

If the child is lifted from the bed and carried around each time he makes noises... and is calmed by gentleness of one kind and another, this may lead to the appearance of the emotion of spite later in the life of the child. I wish mothers and nursemaids would recognise the importance of this point (ibid, p31).

The father was vehemently opposed to what he perceived as weakness, sensuality, indolence, softness, and cowardice. He believed that discipline should start early and continue into adulthood, encompassing all aspects of the child's experience. From as early as five months the parents are advised to:

... suppress everything in the child, keep everything away from him that he should not make his own, and guide him perseveringly toward everything to which he should habituate himself (ibid, p20).

It is hardly surprising that a child brought up according to these principles should be confused regarding it's inner experience and have to resort to elaborate metaphors to account for this experience. Schreber's father also believed that the parents should maintain absolute control over the child, to the extent that the child should have no will of its own:

The thought should never occur to the child that his will could be in control, rather should the habit of subordinating his will to the will of his parents or teachers be immutably planted in him (ibid, p22).

In later life we see this process reflected in Schreber's experience of being controlled by higher powers. Significantly, God attempts to control Schreber at every turn, and is so lacking in empathy and understanding that Schreber concludes that He is only experienced in communicating with dead people and thus completely fails to understand the living. God sees Schreber as a threat and persecutes him continuously, while Schreber exerts some strange attraction over God which makes it impossible for God to leave him alone. This image offers us a powerful metaphor for the narcissistic parent who, while failing to establish an empathic relationship with the child, obsessively persecutes his own split-off aspects in the child.

Schreber regularly complains that he is the victim of a "soul murder". Freud, surprisingly, cannot make sense of this claim and manages to infer that it refers to some sort of incestuous situation. In the memoirs, however, Schreber makes it quite clear what he is talking about. He refers to the belief "widespread in folklore and poetry of all peoples that it is somehow possible to take possession of another person's soul", and continues with the idea that it is:

...impermissible that a person's system should be so influenced by another's to the extent of imprisoning his will-power...In order to express fully that this was a malpractice it was called 'soul murder' (ibid, p37).

Soul murder thus involves one person possessing another so as to make them lose their autonomy and self-awareness and be reduced to a zombie in the service of the other person's more powerful will. This is surely exactly what the father had planned. The child should have no thoughts, desires or needs of its own but rather exist solely under the will of the parents.

Schreber's delusions of persecution are in fact quite specific metaphors for the actual persecutions of his childhood. For instance, he complains that:

Books or other notes are kept in which for years have been written down all my thoughts, all my phrases... by creatures given human shape on celestial bodies (ibid, p35).

Schreber's father advocated and implemented the use of a punishment board on which every one of the child's misdeeds was publicly recorded and admonished. Not only was each offence displayed, but an elaborate ritual of gathering the family together and reading out the offenses and punishments to shame the offender and destroy any possible hope of concealment, was implemented. It is thus hardly surprising that Schreber became confused about his boundaries and the privacy of his own thoughts.

The individual physical symptoms have their correlates in the father's childrearing practices; he was obsessed with physical posture and training of the body as an essential aspect of proper moral development. This morality was developed within his paediatric framework and many of his books are quasi-medical expositions of the moral virtues of gymnastics and physical discipline.

One of the physical symptoms that grieved Schreber the most were the so-called miracles of heat and cold, causing him to experience sudden and unendurable changes in temperature. His father had been a great believer in the virtues of exposure to cold, and recommended cold rubbings and cold baths for children from the age of three, and advised that bedrooms should not be heated after the age of six or seven years. He insisted on a programme of gymnastics, bathing and swimming before work and it is reported that occasionally in winter the ice had to be broken to permit the swimming.

Another strange affliction were the little men who tormented Schreber's eyes and the muscles of his eyelids. These torments are similar to those prescribed for children in

The Systematically Planned Sharpening of the Sense Organs, (Schreber, 1859, quoted in Schatzman, 1976) where he outlines a series of eye exercises and forced distractions while concentrating, in order to improve the child's perception.

Schreber also reports the coccyx miracle, which made sitting and lying painful, and prevented relaxing in one position for any length of time. It seemed to him that he was deliberately being prevented from resting in any position, and led him to comment that "the rays did not appreciate at all that a human being who exists must actually be somewhere". In the book The Harmful Body Positions and Habits of Children (1853, quoted in Schatzman, 1976) Schreber senior suggested various devices to prevent relaxed postures, such as a set of shoulder straps for tying the child to its bed to prevent sleeping too much on one side, which might cause uneven development.

The "compression of the chest miracle" is another complaint that seems to have its roots in one of the father's ingenious orthopaedic devices. He invented an iron crossbar that clamped to the desk to prevent children leaning forward over their work. The bar would press against the child's chest if anything except the most rigid upright posture were adopted, causing precisely the symptoms which later plagued Schreber. A similar complaint was the head compressing machine, which caused unbearable headaches. Here again we find Schreber senior introducing one of his gimmicks, a helmet-like device to ensure the proper growth of the jaws and teeth. Then there is the 'Kopfhalter', a device which ties to the hair and clothes, preventing head movements. Not surprisingly, we find Schreber complaining of sudden head pains accompanying any distracting sound or movement. The father forbade many activities which he believed damaging for the correct posture, including such pernicious activities as playing the violin, which might cause uneven physical development. This explains the hospital records which detail, amongst other symptoms, Schreber's rigid gait and posture, and stiff and angular movements (Schatzman, 1976). His catatonic behaviour is the result of having learned that, after a certain point, it was easier for him not to move at all.

Schreber also had eating problems, which he expresses as follows:

For a time the miracles were in preference directed against my stomach, partly because the souls begrudged me the sensual pleasure of taking food... I existed frequently without a stomach... Sometimes before meals a stomach was so to speak produced ad hoc by miracles (ibid, p70).

Schreber senior had been extremely strict in controlling eating habits, both what was eaten and when, and as usual the regime is imposed without any respect for the needs and desires of the child. He refers to an illuminating incident:

The nurse of one of my children, generally a very sweet person, once gave a child something between meals even though having been told explicitly not to... It was a piece of pear she herself was eating... She was without any other reason dismissed from the service at once because I had lost the trust of her unconditional correctness (Schatzman, 1976, p68).

Thus Schreber would have been forced to repress and deny any identification with even his most basic physiological processes such as hunger, and it can be understood how his stomach seemed to disappear and reappear at the whim of external agents.

Even Schreber's unusual language and religious imagery become less bizarre when viewed in the light of the father's work:

The child should be brought to accustom himself to stepping before God at the end of every day alone and in his own mind... in order to reflect his inner self in the pure rays of the concept of God...

Once the childlike mind is completely penetrated by love and respect and the warm rays which gush forth from them, the will of the child is ruled

more and more from this perspective and is led gently towards the pure and noble direction (ibid, p100)

This seems to provide the basic concepts for Schreber's later articulation of his experience:

I receive light and sound sensations which are projected onto my inner nervous system by the rays; for their reception the external organs of seeing and hearing are not necessary (ibid, p93).

The father not only introduced the notion of God's rays, but developed the imagery of children being required to be God's bride, to be penetrated, wed, and receive the seeds of Godliness. Small wonder then that Schreber concluded that God was turning him into a woman for His own sexual ends. Schreber felt himself required to develop into a desirable object for God's attentions:

God demands constant enjoyment... It is my duty to provide him with it in the form of highly developed soul-voluptuousness (ibid, p73).

We could go on at length itemizing the specific paranoid symptoms and their similarity to actual childhood experiences and trauma, but I think by now the point is adequately made. There is evidence of early traumatising and there is a connection between the structure of this trauma and the later symptoms. This observation immediately undermines the assumption that Schreber's psychological state is simply a gratuitous by-product of some neurological dysfunction, as asserted by his physician. It also weakens the Freudian interpretation that the problem is reducible to a conflict of innate drives, in this case specifically a homosexual drive. But while detracting from the Oedipal theory as an appropriate explanatory framework, it reinforces a more basic Freudian observation, the fundamental insight that symptoms have concealed meaning, and that this meaning can be uncovered by investigating the repressed aspects of earl

experience. It is thus possible to use this case to show how the Freudian drive theory fails to deal with certain actual traumatic experiences, and to go on to explore an alternative approach that is at once psychodynamic and able to theorise the effects of the social on the individual psyche.

The Judge's Case

So Judge Schreber has a problem. Not a malfunctioning brain, nor the frustration of a socially unacceptable genetically programmed sexual drive, but the residue of past traumatization. But to say this only highlights another interpretative problem. Schreber does not experience himself as a person carrying the psychological scars of past damage; he finds himself in the present, persecuted by a conspiracy of God and his psychiatrist, his body all aches and pains, his thinking constantly interfered with. If he is suffering from a breakdown, it is a breakdown of self-understanding, as manifested in his adoption of extraordinary metaphors and explanations to account for his experience. The question we must ask is how it is that Schreber came to be so confused (and to so confuse others) about his experience, that he was diagnosed as psychotic.

Freud deals with this lack of self-insight in explaining the transformation of the repressed homosexual desire into paranoia. As previously mentioned, he shows how the unacceptable notion "I love a man" is transformed, through various defenses, into the version "I hate him because he persecutes me", which forms the basis of the paranoid delusions. But if we take the reality of traumatization, rather than libidinal drives, as our starting point, we could analyze the situation differently. The realization "He persecutes me" must be repressed (both because it is denied and punished by the father, and because of the child's need to retain idealised good objects), and can thus be replaced by two possible denials:

i)"Nobody persecutes me." Here the trauma itself is denied and repressed in the unconscious, and instead a self-denying compliance with the external demands may be

attempted. This can be understood with reference to Winnicott's (1956) idea of the false self, where the absence of sympathetic care has made self awareness so traumatic that it is replaced instead with compulsive adaptation to the regime imposed by the caregivers on whom the child is dependent.

ii)"Somebody else persecutes me." The trauma is acknowledged, but a clear grasp of its structure and origins is not available for consciousness, so there is confusion and an attempt to generate an alternative explanation of the experience. Where this explanation veers away from consensually validated versions of the persons experience, it is labelled as psychotic delusion.

As we have seen, Winnicott (1965) locates the development of the false self and psychosis within the early interpersonal environment. Although we have no direct reports of the personality of Schreber's mother or the psychodynamics of the early maternal environment, certain inferences can be made from the father's writing. The passages quoted above show that the father believed that all the childrearing and management decisions should be his own. His whole programme is built on the belief that the child should be made to submit to a highly-structured, externally imposed regime, and specifically warned mothers and nursemaids against the intuitive desire to respond to the child's expressions of need, rather than forcing it to adapt itself to the father's disciplinary framework.

The father is thus directly advocating the suppression of empathic responsiveness which for Winnicott is the basis of the development of the true self. The father requires absolute obedience, that is, adaptation to external environmental demands, and the suppression of internal needs. This is the prototypical pattern for the development of the false self, and indeed, had this been the outcome, the father might have succeeded in his goal of creating a hardworking and law-abiding citizen out of his son. The elder son, who suffered depression (but not psychosis) and committed suicide, probably fitted this type. Winnicott (1965) draws attention to the emptiness and sense of pointlessness

that the false self personality organisation can create, and perhaps it was this that drove the elder brother to his death.

In Judge Schreber's case however, the psychotic aspects indicate a failure even of the attempt to build a false self based on compliance to environmental demands. The impingements of the tyrannical environment may have been so violent and irregular, without offering even the seduction of gratification through submission, and the inner trauma so acute, that in the times of stress, he collapsed back into his internal world and all its horrors. Here he found the memories of all his suffering, but lacking a coherent framework with which to articulate this experience, he resorted to the imaginative elaborations which formed his psychotic delusions.

Faced with this situation, the psychoanalytic theories offer different responses. Freud's drive theory, already writing the psychotic off as incurable, tells Schreber that he is a victim of his homosexual libido. Klein, more sympathetic and insightful into acutely disturbed states, explains the splitting of good and bad objects, and the failure of integration that creates his persecutors. But even here the analysis and therapy is limited to interpretation of drive conflicts within the patient.

Winnicott, on the other hand, looks back to the environment, and enables us to discover the psychological abuses that were present in early experience. He offers other therapeutic possibilities, the idea of "holding" the psychotic patient in a supportative environment, without the persecutory impingements of interpretation, until they can discover a basis for identifying with their inner needs, and move into a stage where the actual traumas of early deprivation can be brought to consciousness through speaking and interpretation. The focus on the environmental provisions and deprivations has a twofold advantage. Firstly, it allows the individual patient to discover the trauma and work towards an awareness and articulation of the primitive emotions attached to these experiences, without being damaged again by the imposed demands of the external environment in the form of the therapists explanatory framework. Secondly, on a social

level it allows the psychologist to identify and describe those social processes which may be damaging to individual development, and comment on the consequences of certain forms of social organisation, such as parenting styles and family structures. This type of approach thus avoids many problems of a purely intrapsychic or drive-based theory, which abstract the individual from the social world, thus misunderstanding both and assisting neither, but another issue remains.

Porter (1987) goes one step further than Schatzman in his analysis of Schreber's environment. While Schatzman (1976) follows the traditional psychoanalytic framework by examining Schreber's childhood, Porter asks whether many of Schreber's experiences can not be understood by looking at his real life situation. The asylum conditions could certainly have contributed to many of Schreber's perceptions. Certainly his fear that his doctor, Fleischig, wanted to "unman" him, is supported by the fact that Fleischig had practised castration on several of his patients as a cure for their psychotic symptoms.

Schreber's occasional belief that he was the last person alive might reflect the acute isolation he experienced when confined to padded cells for extended periods. He reports abusive treatment by asylum attendants, and this may have contributed to his feelings of persecution. His confinement without company or intellectual stimulation may have contributed both to his retreat in delusions and the specific content of those delusions. Unfortunately, we have little knowledge of the asylum conditions apart from Schreber's reports of loneliness, desolation and persecution, and we have not developed a theory which assists us in understanding the impact of social experiences in later life.

Psychoanalytic theory, with its discovery of the importance of early experience, has implied that later life is of little psychological significance. Where it is acknowledged, it is usually only the function of acute trauma in precipitating breakdown that is noted, and this breakdown is in any case understood in terms of early development. This once

again leads to the trivialising of the social world and the exclusive focus on internal processes. It is perhaps this failure to address current social processes that needs most urgently to be addressed in contemporary psychoanalytic thinking.

In conclusion I would like to extract three themes that have arisen so far, and offer them for further development:

- i) The importance of the environment in early development.
- ii) The problem of the availability of means of organising and comprehending experience in psychological development.
- iii) The question of the importance of later experience.

These questions will form the basis of this attempt to confront the current failure of psychology to adequately deal with the problem of the person in society.

PSYCHOLOGY LEAVES HOME

*In adjusting to the mad whole, the disturbed
individual becomes really sick.*

T.W. Adorno

The criticism of Freud's theories as focusing on drive-based intrapsychic processes to the exclusion of the social dimension is not new. As early as 1911, Alfred Adler had broken with Freud over precisely this issue. Adler, a self-styled socialist, was concerned with the question of why people do not live in a harmonious and mutually co-operative manner. He moved away from Freud's drive theory, and instead emphasised social learning in the formation of personality, attributing anti-social behaviour to negative learning experiences and failure to adapt to the demands of society (Adler, 1918). Adler clarifies these principles in the introduction to a later work:

The purpose of this book is to point out how the mistaken behaviour of the individual affects our social and communal life; further to teach the individual to recognise his (sic) own mistakes, and finally to show him how he may affect a harmonious adjustment to the social life (Adler, 1969, pix).

These themes were further developed by several neo-Freudians, notably Erich Fromm (1955, 1963), Karen Horney (1937) and Clara Thompson (1957). The weakness of all their formulations, however, in spite of their social awareness and liberal intentions, lies in the fact that they tended to abandon precisely what was radical in Freud's thought. In attempting to account for the influence of the social dimension, they adopted a superficial ego-psychological framework, invoking the autonomous individual as a moral agent, and focusing on social learning in the formation of the personality. This rediscovery of the personality emphasised the ego, consciousness and agency, ultimately referring social problems back to the values, morality and goals of the individual. This entailed the loss of Freud's most significant contribution to radical theory, what in current poststructuralist parlance is referred to as the decentering of the subject.

Jacoby (1975) articulates this revolutionary core of Freudian theory as follows:

If Freud was 'conservative' in his immediate disregard of society, his concepts are radical in their pursuit of society where it allegedly does not exist: in the privacy of the individual. Freud undid the primal bourgeois distinction between private and public, the individual and society; he unearthed the objective roots of the private subject - its social content. Freud exposed the lie that the subject was inviolate; he showed that everywhere it was violated (Jacoby, 1975, p26)

Freud's notion of the unconscious has critical potential in that it reveals that individuals are under the sway of forces outside of their consciousness and control. This exposes the humanist notion of the autonomous, rational individual as an illusion which conceals the other supra-individual forces which influence human existence. The would-be progressive formulations of the neo-Freudians downplay this insight and turn too quickly to accounts of social learning and conscious behaviour, glossing over a deeper understanding of the hidden structures of the society and the psyche and how they are related. In looking at the influence of the social, they assume that personality already exists as a prior unproblematic entity which is only secondarily influenced by external processes. This is an important assumption to review because it implies that social influence, being secondary, is in some sense superficial, affecting only specific aspects of the otherwise independently existing personality. This then supports the optimistic belief that these influences are easily remedied with psychotherapeutic interventions, and sustains the idea that psychology is an adequate cure for the ills of a damaging society.

This tendency has subsequently dominated the field and still has an overwhelming influence on progressive psychological practice. In community psychology today, for example, we are surrounded by every type of cognitive and behavioral project, developing pragmatic interventions into social problems from family violence to racism to AIDS awareness, but there remains a notable lack of developed theory for understanding the individual in society.

A more marginal tradition of radical thought has existed alongside this tendency. Dating back to early work of Wilhelm Reich (1970), and developing through the Frankfurt School of critical theory, these theorists have sought to combine these aspects of Freud's theory with critical social theory to articulate an integrated understanding of the psychological and social processes. Adorno (1973) contrasts the conservative implications of the typical neo-Freudian position with a critical psychoanalytic framework:

While they unceasingly talk of the influence of society on the individual, they forget that not only the individual, but the category of individuality is a product of society. Instead of first extracting the individual from the social process so as then to describe the influence which forms it, [the task of] an analytical social psychology is to reveal in the innermost mechanism of the individual the decisive social forces (Adorno, 1973, p30).

It is this theoretical tradition which I wish to recover and revitalise in the light of subsequent developments in social and psychoanalytic thinking. By tracing several themes in critical theory and showing how they can be developed using more recent psychoanalytic theory, I will attempt to develop a revised understanding of the notion of the unconscious as a crucial concept in psychoanalytic and social thought.

THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL

The Frankfurt School is a name given to a loose collection of radical theorists sharing a common approach to the problems of psychology and social theory. The group formed around the Institute for Social Research at the University of Frankfurt in 1923, with Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, and later continued through Herbert Marcuse to the more contemporary work of Jürgen Habermas (Bottomore, 1984). Their work is particularly interesting for contemporary South Africa because it emerged at a time of enormous social transition, when the decline of a previously authoritarian social system offered the hope of a more humane society. This hope, however, was subsequently betrayed with the rise of National Socialism and Fascism leading into the Second World War.

The Frankfurt School drew on Marxism and psychoanalysis as the dominant intellectual theories of the day. In the 1920's conditions seemed ripe for the socialist revolution predicted by Marx. The conditions following the First World War had destabilised the power of the ruling classes and the opportunity for the exploited working classes of industrial capitalism to demand a just and democratic social order seemed to have arrived. Yet at exactly this historical moment, rather than choosing an economic system rationally organised in their self interest, the oppressed masses threw their weight behind Nazi and Fascist power (Jay, 1973).

These developments represented a crisis for Marxist theory, which had predicted that the condition of the workers under capitalism would deteriorate until they rose up against this injustice and replaced it with a democratic system organised for the general

good, rather than simply the interests of the ruling group. Instead, however, there was a upsurge of support for violent and authoritarian leaders who did not even represent the most narrow and immediate interests of the working class. This was a blow not only to marxist thought, but the enlightenment view of 'man' as a rational creature who acted according to calculated self-interest. A deeper understanding of human motivation was required:

-In the fateful months after November 1918, when the organised power of the bourgeoisie was smashed, and outwardly there was nothing else in the way of the transition from capitalism to socialism, the great chance was not seized because the socio-psychological preconditions for it's seizure were lacking (Korsch, 1970, pp9-10).

As marxism presented this problem, psychoanalysis offered a solution in theorising the irrationality of the individual:

That men (sic) preserve economic relations which they have outgrown in force and need, instead of replacing them through a higher and more rational form of organisation, is possible only because their actions... are not determined by cognition, but by an instinctual motive force that falsifies consciousness (Horkheimer, 1932, pp19-20).

Freud's notion of the unconscious displaced the idea of conscious rationality as the primary motivating force in human behaviour, and revealed a powerful underworld of drives, passions and hidden meanings. The task presented to the Frankfurt School was to articulate the relationship between the forces of the unconscious and social processes, so as to explain mass irrational behaviour in society.

The Frankfurt School thus set themselves the task of bridging the gap (which still exists today) between the methodological individualism of psychology, which explained experience and behaviour in terms of internal causes, and the social determinism of Marxism which dismissed any reference to psychology or subjectivity as bourgeois individualism and mystification. Against psychologism, which abstracts the individual, and sociologism, which abstracts society, they delved into the social processes which are at work in the individual below the level of self-awareness:

Critical theory, drawing upon psychoanalysis, sinks into subjectivity until it reaches rock bottom: society (Jacoby, 1975, p79)

A major problem, which was explored in some detail earlier, was that Freud had moved away from understanding the unconscious in terms of social experiences, to a drive-centred, intrapsychic formulation. While the notion of biological drives may be used to explain certain irrational forms of social behaviour, as is often done in sociobiological arguments, this approach undermines any attempt to theorise the effects of social processes on the individual. One of the arguments advanced against this problem was that the drives observed by Freud had social rather than biological origins:

The sub-individual and pre-individual factors that define the individual belong to the realm of the archaic and biological; but it is not a question of pure nature. Rather it is second nature; history hardened into nature... It is history so long unliberated... history so long monotonously oppressive - that it congeals (Jacoby, 1975 p31).

What appeared to Freud as biological drives were in fact reified effects of social processes. This allowed apparently innate personality structures to be investigated as effects of the social forces. The failure of the predicted Marxist revolution could thus

be explained in terms of the processes by which social structures create psychodynamic structures, which, in turn, perpetuate, or even outlive them.

The details of this relationship between psychology and society were developed along differing lines by the various members of the Frankfurt School, and while it is impossible to cover the full range of their thinking in this context, for the purposes of this argument it will be useful to examine two of the most significant theorists: Adorno and Marcuse.

ADORNO

Adorno is best known in psychology for the least theoretically interesting of all his works, the joint project The Authoritarian Personality (1950). It was produced in America, where several of the Frankfurt school had sought refuge from Nazi persecution. The work was commissioned by the American Jewish Committee as part of the series Studies in Prejudice, in response to concern caused by the antisemitism of the holocaust.

Unlike Adorno's other major works, such as Negative Dialectics (1973a) and The Jargon of Authenticity (1973b), The Authoritarian Personality is influenced by the dominance of empirical research in American psychology. The theoretical formulations, while basic to the entire project, form a relatively small and unobtrusive part of the overall text, and have resulted in it being treated as "a nine hundred and ninety page test manual" (Billig, 1976, p49). Emphasis has been placed on the development of the F-scale as a scientific tool for measuring the "potentially fascistic personality type". Most of the response to the book has been research testing the correlation between the F-scale and racial prejudice, with widely varying results (Pettigrew, 1958), (Niewoudt & Nel, 1975), (Mynhardt, 1980), (Heaven, 1980), (Duckitt, 1992)⁴. The criticisms of the original theory, aside from methodological technicalities, tend to dismiss it because of a failure to establish empirical correlations between versions of the F-scale and racial prejudice, and to conclude that racial prejudice is more dependent on socio-cultural factors than personality type.

⁴ It is instructive (not to mention amusing) to note that most of the South African research has been devoted to either proving or disproving that Afrikaners are more authoritarian and/or racist than English-speaking white South Africans (see references cited). Of course, each interest group tended to find results in their own favour.

These criticisms reflect the tendency to focus only on the empirical aspect of the project, as they assume that problems with the development of the F-scale necessarily negate the underlying theory, and presuppose that there should be a simple correlation between authoritarianism and racial prejudice, a conclusion which the original authors quite specifically warn against⁵. What is overlooked is the basis of the theory in psychoanalytic and social theory, grounded in clinical interviews and observations.

Adorno states that the F-scale was only introduced after the theory had been developed from cultural and clinical observations:

Most of what has gone before [the general theory] was either known or thought about before construction of the F-scale began... in devising the scale we did not proceed in a strictly empirical fashion (Adorno, 1950, p224-5).

The test items themselves were chosen to reflect the clinical observations, rather than because of any empirically established correlation with other factors, and may be individually attacked without collapsing the theory. But instead of delving into the psychometric problems of the F-scale, as has already been done, I would like to consider the underlying theory as a useful explanatory account of clinical and cultural observations, and to investigate how it may be extended using new developments in psychoanalytic and social theory.

The notion of an authoritarian personality rest on the psychoanalytic assumption that:

⁵The authors are at pains to point out that the authoritarian personality is not necessarily racist, but rather is easily recruited to racism where it is socially prescribed. Several of the later researchers (Pettigrew, 1958) then hail this as their own conclusion and claim that it represents an advance on the original theory.

... the political, economic, and social convictions of an individual often form a broad and coherent pattern... , this pattern is an expression of deep-lying trends in the personality (Adorno, 1950, p1)

Given that certain identifiable patterns of thought and behaviour are related to psychological structures, the task was to identify the origins and existence of the "potentially fascistic individual, one whose structure was such as to render him (sic) particularly susceptible to anti-democratic propaganda" (Adorno, 1950, p1). The question did thus not only concern the psychological preconditions that had allowed mass support for Nazi and Fascist power, but the individual differences which could allow one person to be more easily manipulated into this support than another. The authors believed that as fascism did not reflect popular economic interests, its support needed to be explained with reference to emotional needs. They were careful, however, to point out that these psychological factors should not be taken as explanations for the existence of fascism, but merely for the widespread irrational support which it received.

These issues were explored in extensive clinical interviews in which a specific authoritarian syndrome was identified, which was tabled as follows:

- i) Conventionalism: Rigid adherence to conventional, middle-class values.
- ii) Authoritarian submission: Submissive, uncritical attitude toward idealized moral authorities of the ingroup.
- iii) Authoritarian aggression: Tendency to be on the lookout for, and to condemn, reject, and punish people who violate conventional values.
- iv) Anti-intraception: Opposition to the subjective, the imaginative and the tender-minded.
- v) Superstition and stereotypy: The belief in mystical determinants of the individuals fate; the disposition to think in rigid categories.

vi) Power and "toughness". Preoccupation with the dominance-submission, strong-weak, leader-follower dimension; identification with power figures, overemphasis on the conventionalised attributes of the ego; exaggerated assertion of strength and toughness.

vii) Destructiveness and cynicism: Generalised hostility, vilification of the human.

viii) Projectivity: Disposition to believe that wild and dangerous things are going on in the world; projection outwards of unconscious emotional impulses.

ix) Sex: Exaggerated concern with sexual "goings-on".

(Adorno, 1950, p228)

This personality type was found to be associated with conventional and rigid family structures. The parents had typically been severe but also arbitrary in their discipline, demanding subservience and respect from the children. It was thus theorised that this experience would create a structure of intrapsychic conflicts where fear, resentment and hostility towards the disciplinarian parents could not be expressed. This repressed emotion then remained unconscious until it emerged displaced and projected onto other sources. In later life this structure of relating continued into the social world, with a submissiveness to authority figures:

Authoritarian submission was commonly a way of handling ambivalent feeling towards authority figures: underlying hostile and rebellious impulses, held in check by fear, lead the subject to overdo in the direction of respect, obedience, gratitude and the like (Adorno, 1950, p232).

These repressed feelings then emerge in relation to other groups and individuals, particularly those towards whom the society encourages a negative attitude or holds in low esteem:

Hostility against the ingroup authorities, originally the parents, has had to be repressed; the "bad" aspects of these figures... are then seen as existing in outgroups (Adorno, 1950, p232).

The fearful preoccupation with obedience is later manifest in a anxious concern with conformity, conventionality and social approval. Thus any threat of disruption to this orderliness, whether arising from internal feelings or behaviour of others, invokes severe outrage and condemnation:

As the emotional life which this person regards as proper and part of himself (sic) is likely to be very limited, so the impulses, especially sexual and aggressive ones, which remain unconscious and ego-alien are likely to be very strong and turbulent. Since in this circumstance a wide variety of stimuli can tempt the individual and so arouse his anxiety (fear of punishment), the list of traits, behaviour patterns, individuals and groups that he must condemn grows very long indeed (Adorno, 1950, p233).

In addition to the external phenomena which are threatening, the individual's feelings, particularly vulnerable and tender emotions, themselves become problematic, as they expose the individual to the threat of punishment and rejection originally experienced at the hands of the parents. This is worsened by the fear that any experience of emotion will lead to a loss of control, and results in a general cynicism towards emotional expressiveness and the despising of weakness and vulnerability. This can create the desire to recreate the severe and disciplinarian relationship experienced in childhood as it provides the security of rigid limits on emotion and behaviour.

It is clear that conservative and authoritarian political leadership serves definite psychological needs for this personality type. Not only can such leaders win support while remaining abusive of their supporters, but they can even strengthen it by

channelling the repressed frustrations of individuals onto selected socially accepted target groups:

It goes without saying that undifferentiated aggressiveness could easily, by means of propaganda, be directed against minority groups, or against any group the persecution of which was politically profitable (Adorno, 1950, p239).

The creation of outgroups for persecution - Jews, Blacks, communists, homosexuals - can provide a stabilising influence on the authoritarian system by providing a dynamic structure of repression and displacement. This society can become self-reproducing in that the entrenchment of authoritarianism tends to create precisely the type of personality which it can most easily exploit, and mobilises the aggression necessary to defend itself against any threat to its existence.

While the notion of the authoritarian personality has a certain intuitive appeal, in that the psychological profile which it describes seems familiar in everyday experience, there has traditionally been a reluctance to accept the psychodynamic aspects of the theory within social psychology (Foster, 1991). On the one hand it offends the experimental standards of American social psychology, and on the other, progressive psychologists have been concerned that it lapses into the psychologistic error of explaining social processes in terms of individual psychology. This latter critique seems to rest on a narrow reading of the original text in the context of American social psychology rather than Adorno's tradition of critical theory. The strength of these critiques, however, rests on a definite weakness in the text. While reference is made to the notions of the unconscious, repression, displacement and projection, the underlying Freudian metatheory is nowhere clearly articulated and defended.

While passing reference is made to sexual and aggressive drives, the crucial psychodynamic process described is the repression of the fear and rage of the child

towards the authoritarian parents, and its later projection and displacement on the social world. The psychodynamic processes are thus definitely related to social experience rather than innate drives, although no general theory is described.

In looking at these formulations, I am immediately struck by the similarity between the clinical observations and psychodynamic theorising in The Authoritarian Personality, and certain aspects of Winnicott's previously outlined object-relations theory. Specifically, there is a marked overlap between the aetiology and structure of the authoritarian personality and Winnicott's concept of the False Self. Winnicott's theory, however, has the advantage of being clinically far more detailed and sophisticated, while providing a more economical and inclusive general theory.

Where Adorno implicates a severe and disciplinarian family structure, Winnicott (1958) delves right into the formative experiences of the infant⁶. He shows how, in the total dependency and vulnerability of infancy, the person only comes into being from an initial undifferentiated state through the empathic support of the primary caregivers. In a rigid and authoritarian family structure we may find that, rather than being offered this essential empathic support, the infant is imposed upon by the demands of parent's world. In Winnicott's words there is "impingement" rather than "holding". Instead of developing a secure sense of self from having its arising inner needs understood and met by the responsiveness of the caregivers, the infant instead has to adapt itself to the demands of the external world. There is not simply repression of the inner processes, but a total failure to recognise and integrate them at all. The False Self instead involves a compulsive identification with external demands as a substitute for the absent self. The unresolved needs of infancy remain unconscious in all their intensity and chaos, constantly threatening to overwhelm the False Self in what amounts to an annihilation of the individual. Thus all the psychological defenses must work to protect the

⁶The reader is referred back to the earlier section on Winnicott. (Possible Futures)

individual against this inner catastrophe, and provide an externally defined framework in its place.

It can be seen how the False Self psychological structure explains many of the tendencies described by Adorno. Authoritarian submission, conventionality and anti-intracception are part of the need to identify with a rigid external structure. Winnicott's theory is in turn deepened by Adorno's account of authoritarian social behaviour. Individuals and groups that threaten this structure may invoke anxiety and persecution from authoritarian individuals. Adorno further shows how political leaders can manipulate the need to identify with authority figures to gain irrational support, as well as channelling unconscious frustration and rage towards selected target groups for political ends. Together the theories can explain how authoritarian social and psychological structures can become mutually supportive, creating a self-reproducing system. A vicious circle of mutual influence can be seen in the way that certain psychological types support a given social structure, while that very social structure serves to help create precisely those psychological types. This is neither psychological nor social determinism, but an interpenetration of different levels of influence.

Here we have an example of the way in which clinical theory can be enhanced by revealing its broader social implications, and critical social theory can be deepened by exploring the psychological structure of the individual. But inasmuch as it attempts to synthesise different levels of theory, it highlights the difficulty of escaping from the linear, reductionistic, single-cause explanations that typify social science, and of moving not only to combining different levels of explanation, but into the realm of interactive causality.

But now all this is getting a little ahead of the central argument, so back to the Frankfurt School.

MARCUSE

Marcuse developed the social criticism of the Frankfurt School in America from the Fifties to the Seventies, becoming hailed as an intellectual leader of the Sixties counter-culture. Eros and Civilization (1955), innocuously billed as a philosophical enquiry into Freud, tackled the problem of the absence of the psychological dimension in Marxist social-thought. Here Marcuse developed aspects of Freud's thought into a theory of the psychological aspects of liberation, and theorised the unconscious as a site of revolutionary hope. Marcuse combined Marx, Freud and utopian socialism (especially Fourier) to go beyond reductionist economic theories and explore sexuality and cultural radicalism as a basis for social change.

Eros and Civilization must be understood in the context of Freud's formulations concerning the individual in society, most clearly articulated in Civilization and its Discontents (1961). Freud depicts a basic antagonism between society and the individual. Society is absolutely necessary because of the poor adaptation of human beings to survive individually in a natural environment. People require organised collective existence in order to meet their basic material needs. But the sexual and aggressive instincts asserted in the drive theory are inherently antisocial, and threaten to run rampant and destroy the social fabric unless they are kept in check. Civilization thus requires repression of the instinctual drives, and the price of repression is neurosis (Freud, 1961). Freud's social vision is thus pessimistic, offering only therapy as slight relief.

Marcuse tackles Freud's account by showing that it is ahistorical, and ignores the socially specific nature of repression. The repression specific to a particular society is not just that which is necessary for peaceful mutual coexistence, but that which is necessitated by the forms of domination, exploitation and social injustice, and the

protection of the interests of those in power. To Freud's concept of repression Marcuse adds the critical idea of surplus repression:

Specific interests of domination introduce additional controls over and above those indispensable for civilized human association. These additional controls arising from the specific institutions of domination are what we denote as surplus repression (Marcuse, 1955, p34).

Marcuse further develops the idea of the reality principle to show that the demands of the external world placed on the individual are also socially specific. He coins the term "performance principle" to refer to the particular form taken by reality principle in contemporary society. As opposed to Freud's idea of a universal reality principle, the performance principle is a function of the values, gender relations, economic structure, ideology and other power relations of the society.

For Marcuse, the most important organising principle of contemporary Western society is its capitalist structure. Having introduced this term, I think it's important to warn against a knee-jerk dichotomising of capitalism and communism and all the conceptual baggage that has come to entail. Capitalism should rather be understood as a particular form of society that develops with industrialization. Its essential feature is a new organisation of work - rather than achieving their subsistence by labouring as part of a self-sufficient community, people are forced to earn a living by selling their labour to an external organisation. In the place of cottage industries where traditional skills are transmitted through families and communities, we have impersonal factories where labourers have to compete for salaries. This results in a particular social structure where the workers remain relatively impoverished and powerless, while wealth and power accumulate in the hands of the employers and owners of industry.

Where Marx argued that the sheer economic impoverishment of the workers would cause them to revolt, Marcuse looked to the revolutionary potential of sexuality and

the unconscious. He asserted that the sexual instincts rebel against the brutal and alienated working conditions in which people find themselves:

The unpurified, unrationalised release of sexual relationships would be the strongest release of enjoyment as such for its own sake. No human being could tolerate the tension between labour as valuable in itself and the freedom of enjoyment. The dreariness and injustice of work conditions would penetrate explosively the consciousness of individuals and make impossible their peaceful subordination to the social system of the bourgeois world (Marcuse quoted in Kellner, 1984, p155).

Marcuse criticised Freud for depicting heterosexual genital sexuality as the ultimate goal of the sexual drives. He drew instead on Freud's idea of the polymorphous perversity in the infant, and portrayed Eros as a far broader libidinal desire for a totally eroticised social existence. Eros was not a compulsive sex drive, but rather a desire for a sensually gratifying existence in a more all-encompassing aesthetic sense. The organisation of labour, however, subordinated and desensualised the body, reducing it to a tool, and introduced competitive social relations, limiting Eros to the genitals, monogamous heterosexuality and the context of reproduction.

Marcuse (1955) also took Freud to task for limiting his description of unconscious memories to negative and traumatic experiences. He pointed to the profound positive aspects of the unconscious - euphoric experiences and images of blissful gratification in the womb and early nurturance, as well as later peak experiences. In the face of an oppressive social reality, these memories provided revolutionary images of a utopian state of gratification without need or conflict.

Marcuse used play and artistic creativity as examples of the expression of Eros in society. He upheld cultural radicalism - the refusal to subordinate oneself to the demands of labour, the devotion to creativity, and hedonism - as oppositional moments

in the face of the repression of Eros, although he did not imagine these moments could in themselves remove the existing social structure. The release of Eros would, however, entail a society of sensitivity, non-violence and freedom, where human experience was valued for its own sake.

Marcuse made it clear that the liberation of Eros was no utopian dream, but an existing historical choice made possible by the massive advances in technology which could be used to free people from the necessity of labour. Material scarcity was no longer the motivating force in human labour; it was now organised instead around the economic interests of those in power. What was required was a radical social restructuring in which the social system was redesigned to serve the interests of all its members, not just the ruling elite, in a way that would give individuals autonomy and freedom, beginning with freedom from unnecessary, oppressive conditions of work.

To describe the forces society exerts on the individual, Marcuse introduced the term "domination", which usefully encompassed both the sociological concept of oppression and the psychological notion of repression:

Domination is in effect wherever the individual's goals and the means of striving for and attaining them are prescribed to him (sic), and performed by him as something prescribed. Domination can be exercised by men (sic), by nature, by things - it can also be internal, exercised by the individual on himself (Marcuse, 1970, p1).

Domination is neither simply externally imposed by brute force, nor does it arise internally as a purely psychological matter. It is the process by which society comes to control, or even to constitute, the individual through the internalization of norms, values and prohibitions. This provides the crucial link between individual consciousness and social processes which Marcuse explores more fully in his later work One-Dimensional Man (1964).

In One-Dimensional Man, subtitled "Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society", Marcuse explored the psychological impact of Western capitalism, focusing particularly on the changes in the social structure which had not been predicted by earlier critical theorists. While Marxist theory predicted the increasing impoverishment of the working classes leading to rebellion, it was clear that quite the opposite had happened. There had been a marked rise in the general standard of living, and capitalist society seemed more stable than ever. But while material conditions had improved, Marcuse detected a new, more subtle and ominous form of domination. As capitalism became more entrenched and monolithic, the means of mass manipulation advanced and there was a decrease in the freedom of the individual to think and act outside the prescribed social possibilities.

One alarming feature was the disappearance of opposition that was the flip side of the increasing stability of capitalist society. While the multi-party democratic system offered the illusion of choice, it was choice between nearly identical options, all operating within the same social structure. All moral and ethical questions were reduced to technical problems within the system, and what was lost was the possibility of evaluating this system against any other (Marcuse 1964). Two dimensional thinking, which could imaginatively compare things as they were with things as they might possibly become, had collapsed into one-dimensionality, where monolithic socialization overpowered critical self-consciousness, and the social construction of thought and experience replaced individual authenticity.

Marcuse (1964) argued that the mass media and social institutions had largely replaced the family as agents of socialization. This not only changed the content of socialization, but the psychological processes through which it occurred. Traditional socialization was mediated through interpersonal relationships and entailed the psychological process of identification and introjection, which allowed a critical distance between self and other. Exposure to the impersonal mass media, such as television, encouraged the direct assimilation of social roles and values, and mimesis replaced introjection:

It is as though the free space which the individual has at his disposal for psychic processes is greatly narrowed down; it is no longer possible for something like an individual psyche with its own demands and decisions to develop; the space is occupied by public, social forces (Kellner, 1984, p238).

An important historical change in the administration of capitalism at this point needs to be studied. Whereas previously those in power had generated their profit by exploiting the labour of the working classes, advances in industrial technology had greatly increased productivity and made this labour less important. The key to profit now became the ability to get the public to consume the products which were being produced. This dovetailed neatly with the rise of communications technology and the mass media, to create new forms of social manipulation to control consumption. Over and above the basic material needs, it became necessary to create an ever increasing array of false needs for the available commodities. The emergence of the advertising industry is just the most obvious example of the technology of manipulation that resulted. Advertising clearly does not simply work by offering the public information on available products to enable them to make rational choices, but by manipulating people into a state where their well-being is psychologically dependent on the ownership of certain commodities. Most often it plays on the alienation created by competitive capitalism and makes social acceptance available through the correct purchases:

The spectator-buyer is meant to envy herself as she will become if she buys the product. She is meant to imagine herself transformed by the product into an object of envy for others, an envy that will then justify her loving herself. One could put this another way: the publicity image steals her love of herself as she is, and offers it back to her for the price of the product (Berger, 1972, p134).

Thus alongside the rise in the standard of living was this more sinister form of domination - it was no longer necessary to retain social control by brute force, but to enter and manipulate the consciousness of the consumer and create a voluntary servitude which was experienced as freedom:

The people recognise themselves in their commodities, they find their soul in their automobile, hi-fi set, split-level home, kitchen equipment. The very mechanism which ties the individual to his (sic) society has changed, and social control is anchored in the new needs that it has reproduced (Marcuse, 1964, p9).

But it was precisely that fact that this new system seemed so benevolent that most concerned Marcuse:

The concept of alienation seems to become questionable when the individuals identify themselves with the existence which is imposed upon them and have in it their own development and satisfaction. This identification is not illusion, but reality. However, the reality constitutes a more progressive state of alienation... The subject is swallowed up by its alienated existence. There is only one dimension, and it is everywhere in all its forms (Marcuse, 1964, p11).

The individual seemed to have freedom of choice, but it was choice within a rigged system - the choice to work or starve, the choice between identical products. What was not available was the choice not to work under alienated conditions, not to be manipulated by the mass media, not to be forced into competitive social relations. The development of the private motor car serves as an example. Ostensibly it offers a great improvement to the individual's quality of life - expanded horizons, new liberty through freedom of movement, and a wide range of commodities to choose from to suit one's individual needs and tastes. But a social system is created where the individual must have a private vehicle in order to participate in the society - to travel the

increased distances to work, shopping and entertainment. The individual must thus participate in an industry that is wasteful, environmentally destructive, dangerous, stressful and costly. The dependency on a car also means dependency on a certain income to support it, which of course ties one to certain conditions of work and competitive striving for higher income. The choice that is hidden is the possibility of reliable, safe, efficient and economical public transport, which is just as possible with the available technology, but would bring less profits to the manufacturers. This could in turn free the individual from their dependency on their existing organisation of work, allowing for reduced income without lowering the quality of life, and offering less working hours and greater leisure time.

Marcuse (1964) therefore argued that what appeared as new economic, social and political freedoms are in fact repressive as they help to bind people to the social system, while concealing the injustice and destructive aspects of that system. Even Eros, which he had previously viewed as having a subversive potential is now simply commodified and marketed back to the willing consumer. He coined the term "repressive desublimation" to refer to the way in which consumer society lifts the restriction on sexuality and instead allows the marketplace to proliferate with every sort of sexual commodity and service, from massage parlours to erotic romance cinema, to the use of gratuitous sexual images for advertising completely unrelated products, like motor car spares. Even artistic creativity was subsumed under the commodity system, with music, art, literature and film forming major industries to fill the leisure time of the consumer, and making the most aesthetic of experiences subject to economic transaction.

While the standard of living increased and the bleak oppressiveness of poverty was replaced by a system in which it seemed that everything was possible and everything was available, Marcuse revealed how individual freedom had actually declined as the direct social manipulation of consciousness came to the fore. He contrasted authentic individuality with the emerging one-dimensionality:

Authentic Individuality

1) Autonomy/individual capacity to think, choose and act:

- (a) freedom from domination
- (b) freedom for self-determination, choice, dissent and refusal.

2) Creative self-activity: growth and development.

3) Reflection and critical awareness of needs, assumptions and one's unique selfhood.

4) Power and will: ability for creative action.

One-Dimensional Man

1) Heteronomy/social domination of thought and behaviour:

- (a) servitude to social control;
- (b) conformity, false needs and consciousness.

2) Mimesis: mechanical reproduction of conformist behaviour.

3) Unreflective and non-critical acceptance of prevailing needs, ideas and feelings; no sense of one's own needs and potentialities.

4) Powerless/conditioned behaviour.

(Kellner, 1984, pp236-7)

Marcuse (1964) argued that this manipulation of consciousness works through the control of language, and thus the control of thought. He showed how words like "revolutionary" lose their radical meaning when used primarily to advertise new brands of toothpaste and washing powder. He revealed the Orwellian use of language by government to shape people's understanding of political process, something which certainly has proliferated in South Africa. To describe one's opposition as "terrorists", or call an electoral system which excludes 80% of the population "democratic",

portrays the situation in a highly specific and mystifying way, particularly if one can restrict the dissemination of alternative descriptions. One can have a "defence force" engaging in "pre-emptive strikes" into foreign countries, or a "Civil Co-operation Bureau" which "removes agitators from society", not to mention "independent homelands", "relocation programmes", and "security measures" under the friendly faces of the "Dept of Correctional Services" and, of course, the "Dept of Co-operation and Development". Except for the instances where this language becomes so patently ironic as to satirise itself, it performs a powerful ideological function in shaping the way people understand the world. Inasmuch as it provides the available ways for thinking about reality, the concepts are used uncritically even by the victims most exploited by these misrepresentations.

Here Marcuse is not simply developing psychodynamic theory, but examining how social structures impact on individual consciousness. He puts a powerful critical edge on Freud's notion of repression by showing it as a function of the particular social system. This crucial step allows him to explore the relationship between broader social processes and internal psychodynamics, escaping both the intrapsychic and interpersonal reductionism of traditional psychology. He further shows how the traditional psychoanalytic account of the development of the ego in the Oedipal family has been historically superseded by the influence of direct socialization by mass media and social institutions. This raises the problem of exactly how these processes of socialization operate, and it is here that Marcuse's formulation is weakest. While the relationship between the social processes and individual psychology which he describes is strikingly powerful, he fails to detail exactly how it is that these links are mediated. His discussion of the manipulation of consciousness through the control of language is highly suggestive, and begs development using more recent semiotic theory. His notion of true and false needs, while useful within the theory, has also been rendered problematic by recent anti-foundationalist theories of subjectivity, and requires re-assessment.

It is with these thoughts in mind that I turn to structuralist and post-structuralist accounts of language and subjectivity, to develop a critical account of the unconscious in society.

SOCIETY AND THE PSYCHE

The argument so far has problematised the turn to the individual as a unit of analysis and explanation, and appealed to the importance of the social dimension in understanding individual psychology. This entailed a specific re-evaluation of Freud's contribution, focusing on the importance of the unconscious as a site of concealed meaning, but rejecting attempts to explain this in terms of biological instincts. The Frankfurt School was used to show how social process could be understood to have a far more profound effect on psychological structure than is otherwise assumed from the more common social learning perspectives.

The question of social influence has more recently been further developed by structuralist and post-structuralist thinkers. This line of thought explores the relation between consciousness and language, building on the linguistic critique of Ferdinand de Saussure (1959). This critique reverses conventional thinking about language as an essentially neutral vehicle for labelling phenomena and expressing meaning. Instead it prioritises language (in the broadest possible sense, taken to refer to all symbolic codes) over thought and perception. Rather than simply reflecting the world, language provides an essential system of differentiation to organise and structure the otherwise chaotic realm of experience. Language thus provides the very medium in which thinking and experiencing can be done. It is only through the entry into the pre-existing social symbolic system that the individual is able to achieve conscious self-awareness, and this consciousness is constructed and delimited by the available codes.

A simple example (modified from Culler, 1985) may serve to illustrate this process. If we pass white light through a prism we see the seven quite distinct colours: red, orange, yellow, green, blue, indigo, violet. Now at the most basic level we assume that we see seven colours because that is what is there to be seen, and that the words with which we name the different colours emerge simply as labels for this experience. A quick cross-cultural comparison problematises this assumption. A traditional Nguni person will look at the same spectrum and observe five distinct colours. Blue and green


are experienced as a single basic colour demarcated with the word *luhlasa*, and the same process is true of indigo and violet.

Here two explanations are often invoked. It is asserted that Nguni people are colour blind, implying some sort of biological cause for perceptual differences, but this argument is easily refuted by showing how assimilation into Western culture cures the underlying defect. Alternatively it is argued that the Nguni person does really see different colours, but simply describes them as one because of limitations in the available language. The problem here is that the difference between shades of the same colour is not experienced in the same way as the differences between colours. While the Nguni speaker can clearly see the difference between blue and green, it is perceived as the same kind of difference as, for example, the difference between olive green and lime green, which is (if we can avoid getting tongue-tied here) a different difference to the difference between *luhlasa* and another colour.

Similarly a Russian speaker is surprised to find that we describe two quite obviously different colours as being simply different shades of blue. The essential point here is that although the human eye is sensitive to the linearly increasing frequencies of light across the visible spectrum, it is the particular cultural symbolic system that imposes a system of differences which determines how these stimuli are experienced.

Harland (1987) gives another example of the priority of linguistic categories in structuring experience. He shows a typical child's drawing of a person. The picture "presents a kind of visualized taxonomy: 1 head, 2 eyes, 1 body, 2 arms, 2 legs, 2 sets of 5 fingers. The child has drawn not what he or she sees, but what he or she knows. The child has drawn formally differentiated conceptual units, enclosed in surrounding separating boundary lines and divided absolutely and unnaturally between the head and the body, the fingers and the body, etc (Harland, 1987, p30)." The child's drawing is not so much a naive depiction of a natural experience as a representation of the linguistic categories which define and structure perception.

Not only does the acquisition of language structure perception of external phenomena, but it also, in exactly the same way, structures internal perceptions such as emotion and identity (Shotter and Gergen, 1989). This assertion offends the humanist assumption that self-awareness involves direct and unmediated understanding of a true inner nature, independently existing and awaiting discovery. From this (the humanist)



viewpoint, problems of self-awareness are generally understood as blockages, perhaps cognitive or psychodynamic, preventing self-recognition. When these blockages are therapeutically removed, true self-recognition is achieved.

From a psychodynamic perspective neurotic and psychotic disorders can be understood as being, in some sense, failures of self-recognition. The notion of the unconscious then provides a location of both the unrecognised true self, and of the processes hindering its full discovery. Psychoanalysis works with this repression, exploring the individual's personal history to identify the defense mechanisms and underlying anxieties, in order to facilitate self-insight. As the patient becomes aware of these hidden forces, they lose their determining power over consciousness, and the patient moves from being a victim of unrecognised processes to a position of relative autonomy, if not actual happiness.

In Freud's formulations, several different reasons for the exclusion of experience from consciousness are offered. Before Freud abandoned the seduction theory he argued that "the basis for repression itself can only be a feeling of unpleasure, the incompatibility between the single idea that is repressed and the dominant mass of ideas constituting the ego" (Breuer and Freud, 1895, p 116). He made it clear that the dominant ideas are

those that allow the individual to maintain a positive sense of self in a particular society or social situation by fitting into the norms and values of that situation. Repression of the unacceptable aspects of the self is thus a function of the social values internalised by the individual.

From the outset there is a link between society and the unconscious, articulated most clearly in the observation that a sexually repressive society creates neurosis. Later, however, as Freud moved towards the physiologically based drive theory, he attempted to explain repression as an internally arising instinctual phenomenon. These largely unsatisfactory attempts were in constant revision, ranging from the assertion that individual ontogenetic repression replicated the historical phylogenetic repression of the species, to the idea that the repression resulted from conflicts between innate drives (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983, pp 35-37). Even this latter more popular view was an unhappy formulation, requiring extensive reworking of the Freudian metapsychology, including the introduction of problematic concepts such as the death instinct in order to maintain theoretical consistency.

While rejecting the physiologically based accounts of repression for reasons outlined earlier in this work, Freud's original social version remains highly suggestive and opens into a deeper development from a post-structuralist viewpoint. Returning to the idea that repression is created by the incompatibility between a single idea and the "dominant mass of ideas constituting the ego", this dominant mass requires theoretical elaboration. It seems to play into current post-structuralist formulations of identity as taking form within culturally available linguistic and narrative codes.

From the post-structuralist viewpoint the sense of self ("I", or "ego") is not something that springs forth from the inner being, but a position which the individual comes to occupy within the existing symbolic codes. I would thus like to explore the idea that the unconscious can be considered as the site of that which is excluded from consciousness because these symbolic codes do not allow for its representation.

The typical Freudian hysteric provides a clear example. The female patient found herself positioned within a particular cultural narrative of femininity, and was able to achieve self-consciousness only inasmuch as it was facilitated by this symbolic structure. This discourse of femininity unfolded domains such as romantic love, moral purity, submissiveness, kindness and gentleness, and a constellation of features around dependency, fragility and vulnerability. By the same token it excluded aspects such as assertiveness, independence, anger and violence, and more importantly for Freud, sexual desire. To achieve a stable and acceptable identity within the social system, the individual Victorian woman thus had to embody the discourse of femininity, with the identifications and exclusions which it entailed.

In Freud's crucial assertion that the hysterical symptoms were meaningful in a hitherto unrecognised way (Breuer & Freud, 1895), we can begin to explore the hysteria as a reaction against the exclusions enforced by the dominant symbolic codes. The forbidden sexual desire of the hysteric seeks alternative forms of expression, creating its own symbolic code, the language of the symptom, to infiltrate the dominant discourses.

This assertion immediately raises certain major theoretical issues for the post-structuralist perspective. These problems centre around the nature and location of that which is outside of discourse, and exactly how and why it seeks to represent itself. The extreme form of the post-structuralist argument of the priority of language over experience seems to imply a linguistic determinism, a position where the symbolic structures are the only factor shaping experience. This position makes it impossible to speak of the domain on which language is acting (the linearly increasing light frequencies or the functionally different body parts of the earlier examples) because nothing is outside of, or prior to, language. In wanting to stress the under-recognised ways in which culture shapes experience, the material world is banished as an influencing factor in the formation of the cultural categories.

At worst, this allows a would-be cultural materialism to collapse into a kind of philosophical idealism, where abstract categories have ontological priority, and "the world" has a secondary and derivative status. While showing, in the previous example, that the categories determining the perception of colour are provided by culture rather than intrinsic qualities of the object, it must also be said that this process operates within the physiological limits of the sensitivity of the human eye to certain light frequencies. It must further be pointed out that certain material factors influence the dispersion of cultural categories, as illustrated by the fact that the cultural categories of tropical rain forest pygmies differentiate primarily between types of green and brown (Culler, 1985). This relation between material conditions and cultural categories is often expressed in the observation that Innuits have at least twenty different categories for snow, whereas the warmer European climates have only one.

In the same way the child's drawing of the person reflects culturally provided categories, but these cultural categories are surely influenced by the physiological structure of the human body. For instance, the legs and arms are actual sites of physiological mobility with respect to the body, which the linguistic system would need to represent. On the other hand, a different culture might overlook the question of physiology, and represent the person in terms of, say, auras or chakras. Here one might want to look at the ways in which these cultural differences in the representation of the person were not totally arbitrary, but rather related to the underlying technological/materialistic or psycho-spiritual values, history and social structure of the cultures concerned.

A major problem with the extreme linguistic determinist position is that in negating material factors, it makes it difficult to locate any oppositional point from which the existing categories may be problematised. If everything is simply determined by the available categories, then in what sense can we speak of "the forbidden sexual desire of the hysteric seeking alternative forms of expression, creating its own symbolic code, the language of the symptom, to infiltrate the dominant discourses"(ibid). This

assertion implies firstly that there is a domain outside of language, and secondly that there is some pressure from forces in this domain to seek representation within the available linguistic codes. Failure to achieve this representation is then associated with various forms of psychopathology from hysterical symptoms to psychosis. From this perspective the therapist thus works as a kind of translator, decoding the unrecognised/unrepresented aspects of the patients experience and recoding them into a socially viable discourse.

In the case of the Freudian hysteric, the domain outside of language was located in the biological- the sexual (and later aggressive) drives. The demands of stable human society not only denied physical expression to these drives, but even, through the imposition of morality, denied them recognition as part of the individual's self-experience. But, with the return of the repressed, they manifested themselves in other forms: the hysterical symptoms which could be interpreted by the therapist, allowing the patient the relief of true self-insight. The key to psychological well-being could thus be understood as resting in the possibility of undistorted self-representation, allowing conscious awareness of all aspects of the self.

Several different psychological theories can be understood as confronting these problems from their particular perspectives. Bateson's (1956) double-bind hypothesis, for example, relates the development of schizophrenia to the patient's being situated within a set of contradictory and irreconcilable demands. While Bateson argues that the schizophrenic loses the capacity to distinguish the logical status of thoughts as a defense against confusion and ambivalence, these clinical phenomena could be explained from a post-structuralist perspective. In the double-bind situation the individual is denied a coherent position within the symbolic codes. The narrative rules which allow for stability and consistency of identity are undermined leaving the schizophrenic adrift in the linguistic system, to use language outside of the discursive structures which stabilise its socially accepted meanings.

Laing and Esterson (1970) develop similar ideas, particularly in opposition to the psychiatric medicalisation of the idea of schizophrenia. Following the interpersonal and systems theorists, they argued that the patient should be examined not as an individual unit, but as part of a social network. They showed that the apparent unintelligibility that characterises the diagnosed schizophrenic became highly intelligible when placed in its interpersonal context. Following Bateson, Laing and Esterson found that schizophrenia emerged as a response to a particular type of family system. The outstanding feature of these systems was the ongoing negation of the schizophrenic child's experience by the parents. Psychodynamically, it could be said that the parents displayed narcissistic features and failed to recognise the child as an independent person. In terms of the interpersonal communication, the parents constantly told the child what he or she was thinking and feeling, and simply denied and contradicted any differing accounts by the child.

In linguistic terms it may be argued that this places the child in a position where the terms necessary to represent his or her experience are made inaccessible. The language offered by the parents to give their accounts of the experience are so dissonant with the child's situation that it must resort to highly elaborate and circuitous attempts at self-representation. Typically, then, aspects of the self which are denied by the parents are attributed to disembodied voices or external agencies controlling the patient's thoughts. Alternatively, negated aspects of the personality may be expressed by identifying with a historical figure who symbolised these qualities. It is not the content of these elaborations which offends conventional language usage, as much as the breaking of rules governing aspects such as literal and symbolic representation and narrative structures. This is a function of the parent's improper use of language in misrepresenting the child's experience, rather than the result of a breakdown in the child's cognitive apparatus.

For Laing and Esterson (1967; 1970) the schizophrenic's alleged symptoms were a sign of hope, evidence of an attempt to struggle with meaning, and the crisis lay as much

in the rest of the world's failure to hear properly as in the schizophrenic's difficulties in speaking. This might be reformulated as a struggle to achieve self-representation within the available linguistic codes, where the problems encountered are created as much by the inadequacies of these codes as the cognitive failure of the patient.

Returning to the case of Judge Schreber, it becomes possible to see these processes clearly at work in the relation between the father and the son. The father's fanatical childrearing regime placed severe restriction on a wide range of experiences. He inflicted physical and emotional suffering, encoded in a discourse of care which denied the suffering of the child as well as the cruelty of the father. It became impossible for Schreber to recognise his own pain, anger and frustration and its origins in the abuse he suffered, as the available discourses rationalised his experiences in terms of love and concern.

In his confusion he (mis)appropriated the bizarre religious language of his father, particularly the idea of penetration by God's rays. He attempted to grapple with the experiences of omnipresent observation and persecution, as well as the physical pains inflicted by the father. He distanced himself from discourse of masculinity with its emphasis on invulnerability and authoritarian control, and instead positioned himself within a feminine role which allowed him to disavow these qualities. In a relentless process of creative ingenuity he articulated all these problems within his elaborate psychotic delusions: his extraterrestrial tormentors, a malevolent God's strange plans, his sexual transformation. For his efforts, Schreber found himself unable to function in society, and died a lonely death in a mental institution. The professional discourses which spoke over his life and death invoked concepts of brain dysfunction and repressed sexual desire, to no benefit of the patient.

Presumably, if he had access to interpretative therapy which had allowed him to recognise the nature of his experience and its origins in the father's abusive practices, he may have reached a point of insight, integration and emotional relief, and been able

to live a more acceptable life. An essential precondition would have had to be met before this could become possible. It would be necessary to problematise the father's childrearing practices and the discourse of care in which they were constructed. This requires not simply a psychological, but a critical social approach.

Psychology can (and does) happily observe violence and account for it in mystifying discourses such as inherent female masochism or the necessity of childhood discipline in the shaping of the personality. A critical distance from the dominant discourses is required so that psychology can avoid simply becoming delimited by the existing social accounts of reality. Unless it has this distance, it simply reinforces these discourses and the damage they have caused to the individual, further obstructing any possible recovery of the self. Worse yet, it may substitute professional discourses of pathology, such as the psychiatric and psychodynamic explanations applied to Schreber, which even more powerfully deny the already mystified and inaccessible experience of the patient. In other words, a critical social theory is absolutely crucial in order to give psychology the self-insight necessary to pursue its project of emotional healing.

This involves not merely recognising the social operation of discourse in terms of the negation of experience as depicted in Bateson (1956) and Laing and Esterson (1970), but also how it is related to forms of social organisations and the relations of power and material practices which they entail. In Schreber's case, the problem is not simply that he lacks the conceptual tools to understand his experience, but that he has suffered actual physical harm. The essential question for the psychologist is how both the physical harm and the exclusions of discourse impinge as psychological damage.

I believe that Winnicott's (1965) theory is of enormous importance in showing the connection between childrearing experiences and how they influence the psychological positioning of the person within discourse. Going back to the previous account of Winnicott's work, it may be recalled that he locates healthy development in relation to maternal responsiveness. The infant periodically falls into a state of distress as a

result of some physiological need, typically hunger. This situation may be repeatedly met by the responsiveness of the mother who provides the infant's material needs, perhaps in this case the breast. Through the ongoing repetition of this experience the infant is able to identify its state of distress as hunger which can be satisfied by the breast, with the comforting knowledge that the world contains the necessary provisions to alleviate its anguish and provide comfort. This lays the basis for healthy psychological development as it allows the infant to identify with its inner processes, and embark on the developmental task of acquiring the skills to master its environment so as to represent and meet its needs in the material world.

In the absence of maternal responsiveness at the moment of distress, Winnicott (1965) maps two developmental possibilities. In the extreme case the child is offered no means at all of rendering its experience coherent, and remains in a psychotic state of dysfunctional non-self-recognition, unable to reconcile its inner needs with the limits of the external world. In the second case the infant strives for coherence by identifying with the mother's gestures, such as a regularly imposed feeding timetable, although these are unrelated to its arising physiological needs. The infant is routed on a developmental path which entails identification with external social demands rather than recognition of inner processes. This creates what Winnicott refers to as a false self, which may display all of the coherence and functional competence of the true self described initially, but conceals an inner absence.

Although this false self may successfully meet the social demands placed on it, the person presents not only the clinical problems of emotional emptiness, and the threat of breakdown under acute stress, but is also implicated in the social processes described in Adorno's theory of the Authoritarian Personality. Lack of self-recognition and over-identification with social demands allow this personality type to be manipulated into participating in, and sustaining, violent and authoritarian social systems.

Winnicott's model is important in that it can be seen as the prototype of the relation between individual consciousness and discursive practices. It is particularly useful because it locates the construction of meaning not simply in the availability of language in the narrow sense of spoken words; but in discourse as a set of material practices, such as nurturance. It further tackles the post-modernist theoretical problem of how to locate a domain outside of, or prior to, discourse, in reasserting the physiological basis of psychological development as a standpoint for the evaluating discursive practices.

This model can be used to link psychological ideas of development and integration to linguistic arguments about the social construction of consciousness. It makes sense of the problem psychological problems created by the exclusion of certain domains from conscious representation by relating psychological well-being to an integration of inner needs and the demands of the social and material world.

The previously mentioned concern, that psychology requires a critical social theory to distance it from the discourses in which it is already embedded, must be invoked here as well. The material nature of discourse and its psychological effects must be viewed from a perspective which problematises the way in which discourse functions in relation to power in society.

The notion of ideology is useful in examining the relation between knowledge and power. Without wanting to enter into the sophisticated debates around this contested concept (Althusser, 1971; Billig, 1982; Therborn, 1980; Williams, 1976), a simple working definition may be proposed. Marx (1970) initially developed the idea to describe how, in a society divided into a ruling class and a disempowered working class, the rulers managed to dupe the workers into believing a system of explanation which justified the ruler's position of privilege.

As a general phenomenon it may be extended to explain how in situations of unequal distribution of power, particular discourses which justify the inequality come to dominate all group's perception of the situation. This does not have to be understood as a conscious conspiracy, but rather a combination of two processes. Firstly, the dominant group seeks to maintain a positive self-perception by generating an explanatory system which justifies, rather than problematises, their privilege. Secondly, this group, almost by definition of being dominant, have the power to control the dissemination of discourses within their social system. The subordinate groups thus tend to internalise these discourses, both through lack of alternatives and through authoritarian identification with those in power.

The danger for psychology in this type of situation is that it will simply map out its theoretical understanding within the prevailing discourses, becoming another facet of the dominant ideology. It may be argued that, in this society, psychology has already taken up ideological stances towards disempowered groups such as women, children, and marginalised racial groups, to name but a few. For the subordinate groups this practise often adds insult to injury: the harm they have suffered is typically depicted to be a result of their own failings and inadequacies. Historically, psychology has abounded with narratives of the sadomasochistic woman who needs abuse, the inferior native who seeks subservience, the naughty child who provokes punishment, or the libidinous girl who entices sexual aggression.

Quite apart from this double negation, psychology, failing to understand the ideological nature of the dominant discourses, cannot assist the individual in recovering those aspects of the self that have been excluded by these systems. Psychology needs, rather, to theorise these exclusions and illuminate perspectives made marginal by virtue of their opposition to the dominant ideologies.

This critical examination needs to look beyond discourse as simply interpersonal linguistic systems, but at material practices and social structure. The error of exclusive

internal explanation of psychological phenomena is replicated in the focus on the family and narrow interpersonal nexus. Psychological theorising needs to explode into the social dimension, as depicted in the work of Marcuse (1964), extending the concepts used to describe construction of the psyche to cover the influence of the broader social domain.

Ideas such as the facilitating environment (Winnicott, 1965) need to be extrapolated from infancy onto the later social world. Not only is there the issue of the negation of self-representation within the dominant discourses, in the sense of the unavailability of the conceptual tools for stable and coherent self-understanding, but also self-representation in the sense of being empowered to meet one's needs in the material and social world. This immediately invokes the psychological dimensions of poverty, powerlessness, marginalisation and a host of social questions traditionally excluded from the domain of psychology.

In conclusion it may be stated that psychology needs to integrate critical theories of society with understandings of the social construction of the individual, in order to tackle the problems of human existence. Psychological symptoms and the realm of the unconscious can become not only individual concerns, but sites of social criticism, revealing the impact of social process on the psyche. In this way psychology can become broadly transformative, not simply a marginal professional enterprise, but part of a fundamental social process, advancing the quality of human life at this historical moment, the promised liberation of South Africa.

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