

**Between drones and al-Shabaab: United States extra-judicial  
killings in Somalia, sovereignty and the future of liberal  
intervention**

By

**Mojalefa Koloko**

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Supervisor: Dr. Siphokazi Magadla

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## **List of Abbreviations**

AIAI.....	Al-Ittihad Al-Islamiya
AMISOM.....	African Union Mission in Somalia
AU.....	African Union
AUMF.....	Authorisation for Use of Military Force
CIA.....	Central Intelligence Agency
DRC.....	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOWAS.....	Economic Community of West African States
GWT.....	Global War on Terror
ICU.....	Islamic Courts Union
IGAD.....	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
ISS.....	Institute for Security Studies
IR.....	International Relations
JSOC.....	Joint Special Operations Command
NATO.....	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
SFG.....	Somali Federal Government
SNM.....	Somali National Movement
SPM.....	Somali Patriot Movement
TFG.....	Transitional Federal Government
UN.....	United Nations
UNDP.....	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF.....	United Nations Children’s Fund
UNSC.....	United Nations Security Council
UNISOM.....	United Nations Operations in Somalia
US.....	United States
USC.....	United Somali Congress
WoT.....	War on Terror

## Abstract

This study examines the nature of the United States intervention in Somalia, specifically the use of drone strikes that first targeted the militant Sunni Islamist transnational group, al-Qaeda, which claimed responsibility for the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States, and now target the Somali organisation, Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahidin, commonly known as al-Shabaab. The use of drone strikes in the US led war on terror has raised concerns about sovereignty as the extra-judicial killings are conducted without the consent of the concerned states. Furthermore, drone strikes also raise questions about the processes of liberal intervention as the US conducts them without the approval of the United Nations Security Council. It is argued in this study that what is understood to be the “golden era” of liberal interventionism is a legacy of the post-Cold War unipolar dominance of the United States in global governance and security. It is argued that US unipolarity was accompanied by a shifting perception regarding the security position of weak states, whose weakness becomes understood as a source of global insecurity. This perception that so called “weak” and “fragile” states are sources of threats is a departure in International Relations theory, because the discipline is historically preoccupied with studying the actions of powerful states and their consequence for the global order. It is argued that the discourse on the war on terror, and its focus on “failed states” as breeding grounds for alleged terrorists, represents the height of the repositioning of less powerful states from a peripheral status in IR analysis and practice, to their current position that are now being represented as core sources of threat to international peace and security. Through life history interviews with Somali nationals in Grahamstown, Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage, South Africa, the study examines the consequences of US actions from the eyes of Somali people. The findings of this study show that despite all the controversy surrounding the legitimacy of the war on terror, the manner in which it is conducted, as well as the tactics that it employs, the majority of Somali participants showed an overwhelming support for the US intervention. Participants expressed support for the US extra-judicial killings because they are understood to undermine al-Shabaab strength which is a major source of insecurity. The study also shows that the lack of necessary collaboration between the US intelligence and the Somali ground forces has resulted in high numbers of civilian deaths, which participants fear can be used by al-Shabaab to recruit and radicalise more Somalis. The study also shows that most Somalis resent the presence of the African Union Mission in Somalia because Kenya and Ethiopia are seen as

pursuing national interests that are not invested in Somali peace and stability. The study concludes that US extra-judicial killings have failed to constrain the actions of al-Shabaab. Somalis expressed that the leadership of current president, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed Farmaajo, holds the unique possibilities of creating national unity that rises above clan divisions and the radical Jihadist ideology of al-Shabaab.

**Key Words:** Al-Shabaab, weak states, state sovereignty, US intervention, Liberal Peace, Responsibility to Protect, extra-judicial killings, Somali diaspora, drones

# Chapter One

## Introduction

### 1.1 Introduction

Somalia was colonised towards the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century by the western colonial powers which are France, the United Kingdom (UK) and Italy (Norberg, 2007:8). They divided Somalia into five parts including; the French Somaliland (Djibouti), colonised by France (1888), Italian Somaliland, which comprised of the Southern Somalia, colonised by Italy and the Northern Somalia, which became a protectorate of the United Kingdom (Norberg, 2007:8; Abukar, 2015:19). In the aftermath of the Second World War, Somalia gained independence on the 1<sup>st</sup> of July 1960.

Somalia's conflict can be traced as far as the year 1969 when the former commander of the Somali Army Major General Mohamed Siad Barre overthrew the democratically elected government of Abdirashid Ali Shermarke (Leeson, 2007:692; Norberg, 2007:8). In defence of the coup and efforts to seek authenticity and regain trust of the Somali people, Barre rationalised the coup as the "necessary evil" that had to take place in order to overthrow the government that he deemed illegitimate (Norberg, 2007:8). His contention was framed around the protection of the rights of Somali people, national interests and securing the newly found independence (Leeson, 2007:692).

Barre kick-started the government with a seismic shift in foreign policy, economic policy and aggressive investment strategies which called for the nationalisation of all foreign owned companies such as the "Italian-Somali sugar industry, the Italo-Somali Electric Society and four major international banks" (Abukar, 2015). The immediate short term benefits of this radical change such as; economic growth, incentivised Barre to initiate more changes including the substitution of colonial languages with Somali languages, the total banning of the clan system which included the abolishment of the clan norms and practices.

It is important to understand that generations of people who have inhabited this area who are now referred to as Somalis are made up of different groups of clans that further divide into sub-clans. The main groups of clans include; the Dir, Hawiye, Darood, Isaaq and the combined Digil and Mirifle. The sub clans include; the Bantu, Benadiri, Bajuni, Yibri, Midgan and Tumal (Verhoeven, 2009:410; Abukar, 2015:17). Somalis are affiliated with the

Cushitic speaking family made up of people in Djibouti, the Awash Valley and the Oromo people in Ethiopia (Norberg, 2007:9). The Somali clans have a common denominator in that they relate to each other ethnically by belonging to related clans and religiously by sharing similar Islamic beliefs and linguistically by speaking or understanding the same language. Abukar (2015) notes that in order to understand the politics of Somalia one needs to understand its “clan structure”.

Barre restructured the whole system such that even the eight traditional provinces were divided into eighteen regions, and those with traditional names were changed (Abukar, 2015:20). In order to eliminate any traces of clan legacy, Barre’s regime downgraded then clan leaders and chiefs to the roles of being peace-keepers.

All these overwhelming developments were not executed in a peaceful manner of collective consultation, negotiations, deliberations and consensus as the local system of *Xeer* would require, but were enforced through a system of coercion and violence by the Somali military (Norberg, 2007:8). Any form of opposition was neutralised, from the media personnel, to individual groups of clans. Thus, Barre’s oppressive military dictatorship relied heavily on the use of coercive force and presided over the “...killings, arbitrary arrest, detention in squalid conditions, torture, rape, crippling constraints on freedom of movement and expression” (Africa Watch Committee, 1990:9). This miscarriage of justice prevailed under the guise of the Supreme Revolutionary Council established by Barre’s regime in replacement of the National Assembly and the Cabinet. Abukar (2015) notes, “the National Assembly and Cabinet were dissolved, the constitution was suspended and the political parties of the time were abolished”. In addition, Barre’s “ethnic favouritism” in the distribution of resources resulted in the contest for “self-determination” among the clans of Ogaden, Isaaq and Hawiye (Verhoeven, 2009:410). Against this background, it is sufficient to suppose that Barre’s system of violence created some sort of a social-time-bomb with the grievances of the people brewing up and as a result, the alienated clan groups began mobilizing against Barre’s regime by forming rebel military groups.

The first armed movement formed was the Somali National Movement (SNM) made up mainly of Isaaq clan members but also comprised of non-Isaaq members (Norberg, 2007:9). They started expressing their grievances towards Barre’s regime which responded with indifference. Having realized that their efforts became futile, and that Barre’s regime has failed dismally to respond to their grievances, the SNM resorted to a military attack against

Barre's regime (Abukar, 2015:23). Even though it wasn't victorious, it somehow created a pretext for more opposition to take place which witnessed the birth of other opposition movements that severely weakened Barre's regime. Other movements included the Somali Patriot Movement (SPM) made up of Ogaden clan members, and the United Somali Congress (USC) made up of Hawiye clan members (Leeson, 2007:694). The USC became one of the biggest armed groups which later played a major role in overthrowing Barre's Regime. Eventually, the clan based movements gathered together and successfully coordinated a coup d'état that led to the collapse of SiadBarre's Regime in 1990 (Norberg, 2007:10; Abukar 2015:23; Verhoeven, 2009:410).

The collapse of Barre's regime created a "power vacuum" that left Somalia without a central government. In November 1991, conflicts erupted in Mogadishu among the armed movements especially the dominant two, SNM and USC contesting over the installation of the interim president (Abukar, 2015:25). This tension revealed the fact that the two only collaborated to overthrow Barre's regime but had different visions about how to restore peace and stability in Somalia (Norberg, 2007:4). The USC appointed Mr. Ali Mohamed Mahdi as the interim president over General Mohamed Farah Aideed. This decision was highly opposed by the SNM which was the dominant movement in the Northern part of Somalia (United Nations/Somalia UNOSOM I Background).

In response, the Northern clans re-established the boundaries and formed the Republic of Somaliland which became comparatively stable although its sovereignty is not recognised by the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU) (Cohn, 2010:1). In the South, war broke among different warlords competing for power and claimed thousands of civilians' lives and resulted in internal and external displacements of people. The main government institutions in Major cities such as Mogadishu and Kismayo were shut-down with health and education sectors highly affected in the process. As the situation escalated, extreme famine resurfaced due to the displacement of farmers and the ongoing war and this claimed even more lives (Abukar, 2015:25). It was becoming apparent to the international society that the Somali state had collapsed which triggered discussions about intervention in order to protect the rights of the Somali people. Abukar (2015) summarizes it in this way;

...police stations, hospitals, banks, army bases, shops and even museums were robbed...Mogadishu became the stage for killing, looting and other criminal activities...Somalia witnessed

a period of violence, lawlessness, power struggles, clan clashes and chaos(Abukar, 2015:25).

In the end an estimation of 4.5 million people were exposed to starvation and malnutrition, while approximately 2 million were displaced (United Nations/Somalia UNOSOM I Background).

## **1.2 Attempts to restore peace and establish stability in Somalia**

Given the prevailing horrific circumstances in Somalia that had attracted the attention of the international society, it became critical for Somalia to seek foreign intervention to mitigate the calamities the state had endured. At this juncture, the two rivals, the interim president Ali Mahdi and General Aideed decided to bury a hatchet and endorsed the “Agreement on the Implementation of a ceasefire” which among others; authorized the United Nations Security Council to initiate humanitarian assistance on the 3<sup>rd</sup> March 1992 (Cohn, 2010:1). The UNSC then adopted resolution 751 (1992) which initiated United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM). Thus, to protect civilians and restore peace, the UN Security Council (UNSC) authorised the first United States-led intervention in 1993 (Cohn, 2010:1).

For the US, the main problem in Somalia that led to the state collapse was the faction clan groups which resisted the established Interim president and started waging war against the central government. Thus, in addressing this problem, the US began targeting members of these clan movements which were fighting against the appointed interim president (Kretzmer, 2005). These rebelling groups were designated as terrorists by the international society since they were opposing the government and used extreme means such as the attack of civilians in order to get their point across the government. The US asked for permission from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to play a major role in this conflict and the UNSC agreed. Approximately 25 000 American troops were sent to Somalia in December 1992 to provide security and guarantee safety in the supply of humanitarian assistance in the form of food and shelter (Snyder, 2011 quoted in Abukar, 2015). However, owing to some of the challenges that UNOSOM encountered, such as; continued violence in all areas, increased risk towards relief operations, failure to secure trade routes and humanitarian assistance (Snyder, 2011 quoted in Abukar, 2015), it was later replaced by the United Taskforce (UNITAF) which focused more on protecting routes for humanitarian relief against warlords. However, as

conflicts continued in March 1993, the UNSC introduced UNOSOM Phase II which was endowed with powers to engage more aggressively with the pressing challenges through processes of disarmament and reconciliation (Abukar, 2015:26).

However, this was opposed by warlord Muhammad Farah Aideed resulting in a confrontation between UNITAF and Aideed armed forces that lasted from 3<sup>rd</sup> October 1993 to 4<sup>th</sup> October 1993 and culminated in the loss of 18 US troops and hundreds of Somalis. In this brutal fire-fight known as the “Black Hawk Down” that took place in Mogadishu, two of the American helicopters were shot down by Aideed forces (Cohn, 2010:1). The confrontation and loss of lives led to the decision by then US president Bill Clinton to withdraw US troops from Somalia towards the end of 1994. In 1995, the UN withdrew the rest of the soldiers who were deployed in Somalia and this allowed the situation in Somalia to degenerate into extreme chaos, starvation with shocking statistics of deaths (Cohn, 2010:1).

### **1.3 Somalia and the war on terror**

The term Global War on Terror (GWT) was first used by the US President George W. Bush on the 20<sup>th</sup> September 2001 in reference to the US military campaign that was launched against al-Qaeda terrorists who were believed to be the perpetrators of the 9/11 attack (Schmitt &Shanker, 2005). This campaign was given legal grounds by the Authorisation For Use of Military Force (AUMF) act which was passed earlier on the 14<sup>th</sup> of September 2001 (Schmitt &Shanker, 2005).

Following the terrorist attacks of the September 11, 2001, and the announcement of the war on terror by George W. Bush, the US started conducting extra-judicial killings in Somalia (Masters, 2012:2). These are premeditated acts of lethal force employed by states to eliminate specific individuals outside their custody either in the form of drone strikes or covert operations (Masters, 2012:2). The Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency have been using extra-judicial killings to pursue terrorists in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia (Masters, 2012; Emory, 2013). Somalia has, for a long time, been the battlefield where the war on terror was conducted through extra-judicial killings of al-Qaeda and members of the Somali group, Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahidin, commonly known as “al-Shabaab”, since its announcement by George W. Bush. The Obama administration, having inherited the on-going war on terror from Bush’s administration, continued with a more

aggressive approach than that of Bush which saw the launch of more strikes in Somalia (Masters, 2012:2).

There are competing studies with regards to the origins of al-Shabaab with some tracing it as far back as the 1960's as in the works of (Jones et al, 2016) while others trace it back to 2006 such as (Masters &Sergie, 2015). However, the origins of al-Shabaab can be traced back to early 1990s during the time of its predecessors such as Al Ittihad Al Islami or Islamic Union (AIAI) and the Union of Islamic Courts (ICU) (Vidino et al, 2010: 218). Indeed, Al-Shabaab arguably reflects a combination of the mission, strategies and tactics of its predecessors, as well as incorporated elements of tactics from Taliban in Afghanistan and al-Qaeda (Vidino et al, 2010:218).

In establishing a background to al-Shabaab, it is imperative to look at its predecessors. AIAI was formulated under the governance of ex-Army colonel Shaykh Hassan at the termination of SiadBarre's regime with the mandate of, "the establishment of an Islamic state in Greater Somalia, [and] the lands of the Horn of Africa inhabited by ethnic Somalis" (Vidino et al, 2010:218). It could be said that AIAI was formed just at the right time in 1991, while the recently established al-Qaeda was gaining momentum and looking for opportunities to emancipate its threat as it endorsed the presence of AIAI (Masters &Sergie, 2015). What became more appealing to al-Qaeda was America's declaration for intervention in Somalia in an attempt to restore order and peace. For al-Qaeda, this immediately became the platform for provocation of the US and Somalia's peace or lack thereof, was used as the bone of contention. Vidino (2017) quotes Osama Bin Laden, then leader of al-Qaeda marvelling at this opportunity;

The American Army now they came [sic] to the Horn of Africa...and we have to stop the head of the snake...the snake is America, and we have to stop them. We have to cut the head and stop them (Vidino et al, 2010:218).

AIAI played a major role in the history of al-Shabaab by establishing ties with al-Qaeda and in training and recruitment. As a result, al-Qaeda senior members reportedly went to Somalia to forge relationships with warlords. For instance, a report provided by al-Qaeda's official propaganda wing, the As-Sahab Media Foundation testifies that a delegation of four al-Qaeda's senior members working as instructors in "advanced combat tactics and weapons" was sent to Somalia by the military wing commander Abu Hafs (Vindino,

2017:219). However, Vindino (2017) notes that the views brought by these al-Qaeda seniors were not well received as they did not bode well with the clan system. Regardless of this challenge, the military army commander of al-Qaeda convinced ShaykAweys and they managed to undertake trainings and recruitments against the US (Vidino et al, 2010:219). This relationship between AIAI and al-Qaeda proceeded even after the withdrawal of US armies in 1996.

In the aftermath of a 2004 conference in Nairobi, the Transnational Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia was established led by Abdulahi Yusuf Ahmed. However, the rise of Ahmed to presidency led to disagreements that split AIAI into factions and led to the establishment of ICU (Vidino et al, 2010:220). ICU gained momentum by promising security, law and order, bringing an end to the reign of warlords and the spread of sharia. Perceiving ICU as a threat after dominating Mogadishu, Baidoa and other key places, the Transnational Federal Government asked for help from Ethiopia which in turn conducted a few strikes backed by the US against the ICU and managed to tear it into factions. However, this victory generated some negative views of the TFG. As Vindino et al (2017) explain;

The invasion by Ethiopia, Somalia's historical enemy, was seen as a humiliation from both a nationalist and Islamist perspective. Many Somalis perceived Ethiopia as acting as a proxy for the United States and America's involvement was itself widely seen as a desire to avenge the 1993 'Black Hawk' incident or as part of a larger plan to attack Muslim countries (Vidino et al, 2010:220).

This narrative set the pretext for the birth of a new movement of the youth formed in 2006 referred to as "al-Shabaab". The group was formed in retaliation to the US and Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia, pioneered by ex AIAI leaders Aweys and Ayrow (Vidino et al, 2010:221).

The word al-Shabaab is an Arabic phrase which refers to "the Youth" or "movement of the Youth". Abukar (2015) defines Al-Shabaab as, "a terrorist organisation striving to build an Islamic state in Somalia, through the use of violence against the Somali government, diaspora and western countries and organizations" (Abukar, 2015). It has a military strength estimated between 7000-9000 troops (Chiaramonte, 2014). The members are made up of

native Somalis, Somalis from the Diaspora and volunteers from all over the world including non-Muslim people (Vidino, 2017).

Being one of the biggest Islamist extremist groups in Somalia, al-Shabaab has carried out strikes not only in Somalia but also in countries like Uganda and Kenya. Although the central objectives of al-Shabaab are understood to be a desire to oust African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), the Transnational Federal Government (TFG) and to impose Islamic Sharia across the region (Masters &Sergie, 2015); there are fears by the US that “the group, which has successfully recruited members of the Somali Diaspora in the United States, may strike on U.S. soil” (Masters &Sergie, 2015).

Al-Shabaab’s threat perception for the US grew at an unprecedented rate after al-Shabaab formerly declared its alliance with al-Qaeda in 2012. Al-Qaeda is one of the most transnationally connected Salafi Jihadist groups, whose self-proclaimed enemy is the US (Mwangi, 2012:515; Masters &Sergie, 2015). The risk assessment conducted by the US was based upon the discovery of al-Qaeda training camps in RasKamboni which were thought to offer advanced skills on guerrilla warfare, explosives and assassinations to members of al-Shabaab (Cohn, 2010). Moreover, the formation of an alliance between al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda presented a paramount shift in terms of the battlefield as al-Shabaab’s focus was widened to include the US and its allies (Masters & Sergie, 2015). This meant that al-Shabaab members had transitioned from being a locally based group that attacks the Somali government and all those in support of it, to being an international/trans-national group that is fighting a “global Jihad” against what they called the “global crusade” -- which is understood to be the Christian attack aimed towards the extinction of the entire Muslim community on the planet (Vindino, 2010:222). This meant that al-Shabaab posed a threat to the security of the US and the main challenge for the US became the question whether it can hunt the members of this group wherever they are under any jurisdiction without consultation of the UNSC and the concerned state. The battlefield had changed with the rise of transnational terrorism raising issues of state sovereignty.

Some of the reasons that positioned the group as a threat to the US included its being funded by al-Qaeda, its aggressive fundraising campaign through racketeering, piracy and extortion, which means that it has sufficient financial muscles to recruit Somali members in its diaspora (Seiff, 2017).

Before leaving office, former US President Barack Obama declared that he has officially, “added Somali militant faction al-Shabaab into the “perpetrators of 9/11” war authorization” (Ditz, 2016). In January 2017, new US President Donald Trump released Executive Order 13769, which aimed to ban refugee admissions in the US, and banned entry to people from Somalia, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen (Seiff, 2017). Known as the “Muslim Ban”, the actions of the Trump administration demonstrate the extent to which the US and its allies, majority Muslim countries, such as Somalia, constitute the spaces in which terrorism manifests with the threat of destroying American security.

#### **1.4 Context of extra-judicial killings in Somalia**

Extra-judicial killings, also known as targeted killings, are described as premeditated acts of lethal force employed by states to eliminate specific individuals outside their custody either in the form of drone strikes or Special Forces operations such as ground raids and cruise missiles (Masters, 2012:2). The US began these targeted extra-judicial killings in Somalia in 2003, when the US government extended the battle-field to all countries suspected to be harbouring members of al-Qaeda. The US government then resolved to the adoption of a new drone technology that is based on google maps and enables the US government to fly unmanned vehicles over the desired territories at any time of the day or night; to spy the targets, obtain information about their whereabouts and to execute strikes on them whenever convenient as depicted on Figure 1.2 below (Masters, 2012).

### **Figure 1.2**

- A picture that shows a U.S drone executing strikes in Somalia.

**Reference:** The Bureau of Investigative Journalism



Some of the advantages of drones include the fact that they can last for extended periods in space, unspotted by the alleged terrorists relative to conventional fighter jets and are claimed to have “surgical precision” which captures the target’s biographical data to ensure that the right target is hit without mistake (Masters, 2012). This comes in handy given the fact that alleged al-Qaeda terrorists are said to hide themselves among civilians. The drone strikes are authorized by the US government hierarchy and all this is done from the comfort of a US military base (Crawford, 2004).

These drones have been used by the US in Somalia along with ground raids and cruise missiles depending on the given scenario. The first suspected terrorist to be apprehended by the US in Somalia as part of its war on terror on Saturday 1<sup>st</sup> November 2003 in Banaadir, Mogadishu, was Suleiman Abdallah. Abdallah was a Tanzanian citizen who was mistaken for being one of the terrorists responsible for launching 9/11 terrorist attacks as well as the bombing of American embassies in Africa. He was arrested by the CIA and severely tortured in three secret “extra-judicial detention sites” including those in Afghanistan and Djibouti.

After being tortured for five years, the CIA's intelligence discovered that he was innocent (Gonzalez, 2012). Evidence shows that he was arrested by the CIA, Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) Task Force Orange along with the alleged Somali warlords and later released in 2008 (International Security, 2016).

Since 2003, the US government has been targeting members of al-Qaeda alone in Somalia until 2008, when they shifted their focus from al-Qaeda towards al-Shabaab, upon discovering that al-Qaeda training camps in RasKamboni as mentioned in the previous section, offer trainings to al-Shabaab (Cohn, 2010). The last US strike against al-Qaeda took place on the 2<sup>nd</sup> March 2008 in Dhobley in Gedo, where Hassan Turki and Saleh Nabhan were targeted and killed resulting in the deaths of six civilians and about twenty more people injured (International Security Report, 2017). From this period onwards, the US shifted its drone campaign from al-Qaeda and started targeting al-Shabaab. The first US attack against al-Shabaab was on the 1<sup>st</sup> May 2008 when the US targeted Aden Hashi Ayro, a top commander of al-Shabaab and Sheik Muhidin Mohamud Omar, along with other top lieutenants (International Security Report, 2017.) This airstrike resulted with about 30 casualties including the targets. One could speculate that the loss of a top commander and top lieutenants of al-Shabaab triggered a restructuring programme within al-Shabaab which among other things, resolved to forming an alliance with al-Qaeda in 2012 (Mwangi, 2012:515; Masters & Sergie, 2015).

Over a period of ten years from 2007 until 2017, there have been a total of 75 strikes in Somalia and the estimated number of people killed is between 568 and 708, of which 49 to 58 of them were innocent civilians and between 509 and 621 of them were alleged militants (International Security, 2017). Ever since its inception in 2006, al-Shabaab seems to be experiencing an exponential growth with its military strength estimated to be between 7000 and 9000 troops in 2016 (International Security, 2017). It has been launching attacks against the US troops responsible for planning raids in Somalia, the government of Somalia, Somali civilians as well as the neighbouring countries, such as Kenya, regardless of the aggressive drone programme against them.

In October 2017, al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the truck bomb attack in Mogadishu that killed over 300 people and injured hundreds of others. This attack has been described as the worst terrorist attack to ever take place within Somalia's capital. It raised

questions about al-Shabaab resilience and resurgence in spite of the presence of AMISOM, and the ongoing extra-judicial killings undertaken by the United States.

Within politics of extra-judicial killings, there is controversy whether to consider targeted killings as extra-judicial executions or legitimate acts of war (Kretzmer, 2005). For those who consider them as extra-judicial executions, the main ethical argument raised is the issue of “collateral deaths” (Kretzmer, 2005; Hudson, et al, 2011; Prasow 2015; Tayler 2016). Moreover, Kretzmer (2005) argues that these killings raise issues such as the right to life, the right to a due process of law and the defiance of state sovereignty. In defence, the US government considers targeted killings as legitimate acts of the GWT, justified under the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) as a form of self-defence. (Masters, 2012:2).

In Afghanistan, President Hamid Karzai required US troops to withdraw from conducting covert missions with the reasoning that they amount to a violation of human rights (Masters, 2012:7). In Pakistan, the targeted killings have been articulated as amounting to a breach of sovereignty. For instance, the Navy Seal that killed Osama Bin Laden in Abbottabad has been regarded as defying Pakistan’s territorial integrity. Moreover, in April 2012, the Pakistani Parliament voted unanimously in demanding an end to US drone strikes on its territory (Prasow 2015, Tyler, 2016). The ambassador of Pakistan to the UN, Zamir Akram, “called for international legal action to halt the totally counterproductive attacks by the US in his country” (Guardian, 2012).

The AU, through AMISOM, has also criticised the US intervention in Somalia on grounds that it contradicts with the Constitutive Act article 4 of the AU, which prohibits forceful intervention. The Somali government spokesperson, Abdul Rashid Hidig, stated that US drones have killed innocent civilians while in the process of pursuing Al-Qaeda, and indicated that the government does not condone such acts (The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 2012). There is a sharp contrast between the 1992 Black Hawk Down and the 2001 (continuing) US intervention. The former was authorized by the UNSC and involved face-to-face confrontation of the US troops with the Somali warlords, while the latter is neither authorized by the UNSC nor consented upon by the SFG and involves targeted killings.

This seems to be a new terrain of intervention not sufficiently covered in the literature, in which the US seems to undermine the authority of the UN and the sovereignty of

weak states, such as Somalia. This thesis attempts to examine US extra-judicial killings in Somalia and its implications for the future of liberal humanitarian intervention.

### **1.5 Objectives of the study**

The main objective of the study is to examine the US intervention, specifically the use of drone strikes that first targeted the militant Islamist transnational group, al-Qaeda, which claimed responsibility for the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States, and now target the Somali organisation, Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahidin, commonly known as al-Shabaab. The sub-goals of the thesis are:

- To understand the nature of current US intervention and its implications for the sovereignty of Somalia
- To understand the local consequences of US intervention in Somalia
- To examine the implications of US extra-judicial killings for the future of liberal humanitarian intervention

### **1.6 Research Questions**

- What is the nature of the current US intervention and its implications for the sovereignty of Somalia?
- What are the local consequences of US intervention in Somalia?
- What are the implications of US extra-judicial killings for the future of liberal humanitarian intervention?

### **1.7 Thesis outline**

The thesis is made up of six chapters. This introductory chapter provided a history of the conflict in Somalia that led to the emergence of groups such as al-Shabaab. The chapter provided a context of how Somalia and al-Shabaab become actors in the discourse of the US

led war on terrorism. It then provides a historic account of the use of extra-judicial killings in Somalia, firstly targeting al-Qaeda and then al-Shabaab. The chapter then provided the objectives of the study and the chapter outline.

Chapter two will provide a theoretical frame work and literature review of the thesis by placing extra-judicial killings within IR practice and theory. The chapter will argue that what is understood to be the “golden era” of liberal interventionism is a legacy of the post-Cold War unipolar dominance of the United States in global governance and security. The chapter will argue that US unipolarity was accompanied by a shifting perception regarding the security position of weak states, whose weakness becomes understood as a source of global insecurity. The chapter will then show how other theories of IR such as realism have failed to explain this shifting perception in security dilemmas by the US in which, instead of perceiving other super powers as threats towards US power, the US launches the war on terror which is predicated on the threats raised by weak and illiberal states. The chapter argues that the discourse on the war on terror, and its focus on “failed states” as breeding grounds for alleged terrorists, represents the height of the repositioning of less powerful states that are now being represented as core sources of threat to international peace and security.

Chapter three will argue for the use of life histories approach in IR in order to examine extra-judicial killings in Somalia. The chapter will show that this approach allows for the privileging of the experiences of Somali participants in order to understand the local consequences of war. The chapter will argue that IR scholars can learn from other disciplines such as Sociology and Anthropology which emphasize the importance of understanding war as an experience whose impact is felt most profoundly by those in the front lines. It is argued that displaced populations continue to experience the realities of the war in their home country even as they negotiate safety and new livelihoods in their host country. The chapter will use the cases of South Sudan and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to demonstrate the continuing impacts of violent displacement, and to draw from the studies that have used the diaspora populations of these countries as a window from which they can study South Sudan and DRC. The chapter then discusses the interview process, justification for four research sites, negotiating access to the Somali community, researcher positionality, limitations of the study and data analysis procedures.

Chapter four will present the findings of the study and provide an initial analysis of the themes that emerged from the participants. The chapter will highlight the importance of

privileging the voices of Somali participants in this research. The first theme will show that despite all the controversy surrounding the legitimacy of the war on terror itself, the manner in which it is conducted as well as the controversial tactics that it employs, majority of Somali participants support the US intervention and the extra-judicial killings. The chapter will show that the participants highlighted that the effects of extra-judicial killings include the loss of lives and injuries of innocent people and the destruction of properties. The chapter will show that the participants identify the motives behind the neighbouring countries in Somalia along with their troops as informed by the previous border and territorial disputes as well as personal interests. The chapter will also present the theme that presidents are important in the Somali politics as they influence decision making and have the capacity to influence the policies that directly deal with the civil war.

Chapter five will provide a detailed analysis of the themes established in chapter four by placing them within the conceptual framework established in chapter two. It is argued that the support for the use of drones by the US suggests that the Somali participants interpret the nature of the US intervention as liberal and based on the notions of peace and the fight against global terrorism. Under the theme of displacement, the chapter will show that the Somali participants do not really manage to escape the war and that its far reaching transnational impacts affect them wherever they are. The chapter will show that the regional interests and personal interests of peacekeepers also undermine the project of state-building in Somalia. The chapter will argue that the actions of President Donald Trump and President Mohamed Farmaajo have foreign policy implications in the Somali war.

The concluding chapter will show that surely the Somali participants support the US intervention and its actions in Somalia by claiming that the motive behind the US is to restore peace and stability. However, the chapter will show that the participants are concerned about the essentialisation and criminalisation of Muslims in the war on terror that has resulted with among other things; the withdrawal of refugee funding and the attempt at an indefinite ban of Muslims from entering the US. The chapter will also show that the US intervention is not entirely effective because it is undermined by lack of cooperation with the Somali forces and false intelligence data leading to the loss of lives.

## **Chapter Two**

### **The triumph of liberalism, reconfigured threat and sovereignty**

#### **2.1 Introduction**

This conceptual chapter locates extra-judicial killings in IR practice and theory within the evolution of liberal interventionism, which has been accompanied by a dramatic reconfiguring of the principle of sovereignty that is historically based on the principle of non-interference and non-intervention. It is argued that what is understood to be the “golden era” of liberal interventionism is a legacy of the post-Cold War unipolar dominance of the United States in global governance and security. It is argued that US unipolarity was accompanied by a shifting perception regarding the security position of weak states, whose weakness becomes understood as a source of global insecurity. Political realists argue that the security dilemma, under conditions of a presumed anarchic international system, is a struggle for power. Therefore, the focus of IR scholars is to study the strategies that states use in order to achieve and maintain power in the international order. In this realist logic, those in power determine the extent to which peace and order is possible in the international order. Yet, the discourse of “weapon states” and “illiberal states” repositions less powerful states by portraying their weakness as the threat to global peace and security. It is argued in this chapter that the discourse on the war on terror, and its focus on “failed states” as breeding grounds for alleged terrorists, represents the height of the repositioning of less powerful states that are now being represented as core source of threat to international peace and security. As Ikenberry (2004: 618) argued, “the United States and the other great powers are not worried about war between them. They are now worried about global terrorism – that is, they are worried about threats that emerge from failed and hostile states in the periphery”.

#### **2.2 Unipolar moment and the triumph of liberalism**

Throughout the years, the challenge for IR scholars has been to study the course of world events and predict what will happen in the next era of international relations in order to suggest implications of stability, peace and security.

Based on their ability to predict different periods, certain IR theories have triumphed over others and dominated the study of IR. For instance, realism became dominant after the

World War II because realists believed that the war, and the Cold War power competition between the US and Soviet Union, emphasized the anarchic nature of the international system (Dunne & Schmidt, 2011: 43). Similarly, the challenge for IR scholars at the end of the bipolarity of the Cold War period was to predict the next form of international order that would follow after the demise of the Soviet Union. ArmitavArchaya (2014) notes that the contested world orders ranged from; “multipolar”, “polycentric”, “non-polar”, “apolar”, “post-American”, “G-zero”, and “no-one’s world” (Archaya, 2014:1). Writing in the aftermath of the Cold War, Charles Krauthammer (1991) argued that the next international order would be unipolar. He argued that “the immediate post-cold war world is not multipolar. It is unipolar. The center of world power is the unchallenged superpower, the United States, attended by its western allies” (Krauthammer, 1991: 23). Unipolarity is defined as the “distribution of power in which there is one state with most of the cultural, economic and military influence” (Patil, 2012:1).

More forcefully, Francis Fukuyama (1989) argued that the end of Cold War symbolized the end of history and the emergence of the US as the most powerful state in the world (Fukuyama, 1989:4). Pointedly he argued:

What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s (sic) ideological evolution and the universalization of western liberal democracy as the final form of human government... the triumph of the west, of the western idea, is evident first of all in the total exhaustion of all viable systematic alternatives to western liberalism (Fukuyama, 1989:3-4).

The social constructivist, Stephen Walt (1990) argued that the Cold War was fundamentally a competition about ideas, norms and values. The US “understood itself as the anticommunist protector of a particular set of values both at home and abroad.” The collapse of the Soviet Union did, therefore, represent the triumph of the liberal worldview that the US represented. Ikenberry (2004) argued that the post-Cold War era represented the possibility of two logics:

Today the US does face a choice between two logics of order. One logic is unipolar order organized around liberal characteristics. This is order built around multilateralism, alliance partnership, strategic restraint, and institutional and rule-based relationships. The other logic is unipolar order

organized around imperial characteristics. This is order built around American unilateralism, coercive domination, divide and rule strategies, and reduced commitment to shared rules of the game (Ikenberry, 2004:610).

Reflecting on these two logics, Ikenberry argues that the US's unipolarity is based on liberal characteristics which he saw as representing global peace and stability. Ikenberry argues that, "stability and peace are guaranteed by the wielding of power by a single superstate" because the "disparities of power are so great that counterbalancing by the other great powers is impossible" (Ikenberry, 2004:610). Arguing in similar vein, Stephen Walt (2009:18), in the paper "*Alliances in a Unipolar World*" argued that "unipolarity implies that the single superpower faces no ideological rival of equal status or influence; even if ideological alternatives do exist, they do not pose a threat to the unipolar power's role as a model for others."

Furthermore, Fukuyama argued that in the unipolar order, "the state that emerges at the end of history is liberal insofar as it recognizes and protects through a system of law man's (sic) universal right to freedom and democratic insofar as it exists only with the consent of the governed" (Fukuyama, 1989:5). In this regard, liberalism was argued to provide a domestic solution to political governance based on democracy and the autonomy of the individual, who consents to the state's actions domestically and externally.

Ideas that frame what has become known as liberal peace are premised on the idea that liberal democratic states do not go to war with one another. Michael Doyle (1986) holds that liberal states do not attack each other because they "exercise peaceful restraint" and have created what he calls a "separate peace". Doyle (1986) reckons that this separate peace "provides a solid foundation for the United States' crucial alliances with the liberal powers" such as those of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Doyle maintains that "it also offers the promise of a continuing peace among liberal states, and as the number of liberal states increases, it announces the possibility of global peace." In this regard, liberalism to IR represented a solution for domestic governance and international peace and security.

Therefore, the post-Cold War era triumph of liberalism also represented the link made between liberal democracy and capitalism. Doyle argued that "...capitalism produces an unwarlike disposition; its populace is democratized, individualized, rationalized. The people's energies are daily absorbed in production. The disciplines of industry and the market

train people in economic rationalism” (Doyle, 1986). Moreover, Dunne (2008) argued that “Liberal states tend to be wealthy and therefore have less to gain and more to lose by engaging in conflicts than poorer authoritarian states.” Dunne (2008) expanded that “liberal states tend to be in relations of amity with other liberal states (Dunne, 2008). In this regard, for example, war between Canada and the United States is unthinkable perhaps because of their liberal democratic constitutions, because they are friends” (Wendt, 1999:298-9 in Dunne, 2008).

In a paper in *Foreign Affairs* magazine, Mandela (1993: 3) argued that “just and lasting solutions to the problems of humankind can only come through the promotion of democracy worldwide”. With its lauded expansive liberal constitution and commitment to democratic peace, post-apartheid South Africa’s re-entry into international life was marked by a commitment to an international order that is guided by political and economic liberalism. Its overtures in conflict settlement and peacekeeping in Africa and elsewhere, has been to entrench the values of liberal democratic peace and development.

As Doyle (1986) and others argue, while liberal states do not go to war with one another, liberal states have gone to war with non-liberal states in the past. The post-Cold War era, under the dominance of the United States, set the tone for the battle between so called liberal states and illiberal states. The section below argues that while Fukuyama and others proclaimed a secured liberal future, there were already in the 1990s, arguments about the threat to US dominance and liberalism that were shrouded in talk about a “clash of civilisation” and the rise of “weapon states, among others. The section provides a historical overview of the language that has come to frame the discourse on the war on terror which has come to be understood as an attack on the “west”, liberalism and US power.

In the book, *The Post-American World* (2008:14), Fareed Zakaria argues that “if the Iraq War and George W. Bush foreign policy had the effect of delegitimising American military-political power in the eyes of the world, the financial crisis has had the effect of delegitimising American economic power”. What is in question today is the future of the US as a global power, and the marriage between liberal democracy and capitalism. It is argued below that the discourse on the war on terror, seen as an attack on the future of liberalism, also marks a turning point on ideas of liberal intervention. It is argued that the post-Cold War triumph of liberalism was accompanied by the acceptance of a liberal peacebuilding discourse that led to the profound redefinition of the historic understanding of the principle of

sovereignty in IR. Do extra-judicial killings represent the extension or perversion of liberal peace in the war on terror?

### **2.3 Reconfigured threat: weapon states and fragile states**

The section above argued that the end of the Cold War represented the end of bipolarity, unchallenged dominance of the US and claims that Western liberalism was to become the core organising ideology within states and instruments of global governance. Yet, this time also saw growing discussions about future sources of threat to global peace. For instance, writing with reference to Iraq's invasion to Kuwait, Krauthammer (1990) argues that, "the rise of a hostile power fueled (sic) by endless oil income, building weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them regionally and eventually intercontinentally (Saddam has already tested a three-stage rocket) can hardly be a matter of indifference to the United States" (Krauthammer, 1990:28). Krauthammer argued that the new post-Cold War world represents, "the emergence of a new strategic environment marked by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction" (Krauthammer, 1990:30). Krauthammer gives a rough estimation and claims, "...it is certainty that in the near future there will be a dramatic increase in the number of states armed with biological, chemical and nuclear weapons" (Krauthammer, 1990:30). Krauthammer defines a weapon state as,

...an unusual international creature marked by several characteristics: It is not much of a nation state. Iraq for example is a state of recent vintage with arbitrary borders whose ruling party explicitly denies that Iraq is a nation. It refers to Iraq and Syria as regions, part of the larger Arab nation for which it reserves the term. In the weapon state, the state apparatus is extraordinarily well developed and completely dominates civil society. The factor that permits most weapon states to sustain such a structure is oil. The current weapon states have deep grievances against the west and the world order that it has established and enforces (Krauthammer, 1990:30-31).

Samuel Huntington (1993) argued that the post-Cold War era, was to be characterized by conflicts different from those experienced in the past due to a combination of factors such as globalization that has compressed the world giving rise to heightened rate of interaction among civilisations. Huntington (1993) puts it this way, "it is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural" (Huntington, 1993:23). Contrary to the conflicts that have featured in the past, Huntington observes that the conflicts of civilisations will not be among states or

be fuelled by ideology. “Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilisations” (Huntington, 1993:23). Huntington concludes that, “the clash of civilisations will dominate global politics [and] the fault lines between civilisations will be the battle lines of the future. These will be the latest phase in the evolution of conflict in the modern world” (Huntington, 1993:22). Given the definition of Weapon states as provided by Krauthammer in which one of its characteristics is having deep grievances against the West and the world order it established, it becomes clear that these civilisations will have a clash with the western civilisations that could result in terrorist attacks. In this way, Westerners are being “othered” and vice versa.

In this regard, the post-Cold War era represented the time in which oil rich “illiberal states”, mainly in the Middle East, gain a changed image in IR as the core spaces that will represent conflict between states. Their illiberalism is also read in “cultural” terms by the likes of Huntington setting the scene for tensions between these nations and the “West”.

The aftermath of 9/11 has seen less emphasis on weapon states and more emphasis on fragile states. State fragility seems to be a combination of authoritarian rule, lack of physical security, lack of legitimate political institutions, poor economic management and failure to provide social welfare (Patrick, 2006:7). As Patrick (2006: 2) argues, “it has become common place to assert that the gravest dangers to US and world security are no longer military threats from rival great powers but transnational threats emanating from the world’s most poorly governed countries” (Patrick, 2006:2). Indeed, as Patrick states (2006), 9/11 marks an important shift in the perception of weakness of other states by a big power like the US. As he notes importantly:

Before 9/11, U.S. policymakers viewed states with sovereignty deficits primarily through a humanitarian lens: [however]...Al Qaeda’s ability to act with impunity from Afghanistan changed this calculus, convincing the Bush Administration that the United States today is threatened less by conquering states than we are by weak and failing ones (Patrick, 2006:2).

In this frame, weak and failing states are perceived as primary bases of operations for most US-designated foreign terrorist organizations, including al-Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad and Jaish-I-Mohammed (Wyler, 2008:7). It was in this context that Somalia

was included into the list of fragile states harbouring al-Qaeda as the US advanced the battlefield to fragile states through the war on terror.

It is important to state that the fragile state thesis has been challenged by some of the scholars that claim that not all fragile states are security threats (Wylter, 2008:6). This is grounded on the fact that it is only fragile states that are strategic to transnational terrorists with access to information and access to funding that are threats (Wylter, 2008:6). For instance, Somalia being located strategically at the horn of Africa through its long unguarded coastline and the gulf of Athens is considered to be a strategic fragile state as it provides the terrorists with an exit into the Middle East.

Thus, the post-Cold War era sees states that would historically be viewed as spaces of humanitarian crisis, in need of liberal intervention, as states that threaten the national security of global peace. This perception of so called weak and “fragile” states as sources of threats has implications for the understanding of sovereignty and the liberal interventionism in the twenty-first century.

#### **2.4 From non-interference to non-indifference: Sovereignty and liberal interventionism**

The end of the Cold War also coincided with the change in the nature of warfare. While the twentieth century was characterised by the crisis of the state and nationalism in Europe, which culminated in the First and Second World Wars, the end of the twentieth century saw a marked decrease in inter-state wars and a significant increase in intra-state wars, especially in Africa and Eastern Europe. Sovereignty, which governs relations between states in the Westphalian state system, based on the principle of non-interference and non-intervention made it difficult for the international community to respond to the changing nature of war.

As Hedley Bull (1977) argues, one of the goals of the society of states formed by the Westphalian state system was “maintaining the independence or external sovereignty of individual states” guided by the principle of sovereignty. This is because “from the perspective of any particular state what it chiefly hopes to gain from participating in the society of states is recognition of independence from outside authority, and in particular of its supreme jurisdiction over its subjects and territory” (Bull, 1977: 17). Bull maintains that the states differ in so many things, but they all agree when it comes to sovereignty. Indeed, the often-quoted declaration by Former Zimbabwean President, Robert Mugabe, “[Tony] Blair,

keep your England, and let me keep my Zimbabwe”, is testament to the entrenchment of sovereignty to states and their leaders. As Clapham points out:

What matters about sovereignty is not mere formal recognition of independent statehood, but rather the power which it confers on the rulers of states, through its denial of the right of other states and external agencies to interfere in their own exercise of domestic power (Clapham, 1999:525).

Throughout its practice, the Westphalian sovereignty has undergone through different criticisms by scholars of IR. The Westphalian conceptualization of sovereignty has also been challenged owing to developments in the nature of war, especially in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The disaster of the two world wars and the post-Cold War decline of interstate war and the increase of civil wars in Africa and Eastern Europe, have contributed to the redefinition of state-centric conceptions of sovereignty that acknowledge that sovereignty is not absolute (Bellamy, & Williams, 2011; Seay, 2007; Krasner, 1999:24). Bellamy and Wheeler (2011: 512) note, “immediately after the holocaust, the society of states established laws prohibiting genocide, forbidding the mistreatment of civilians, and recognising basic human rights”.

Responding to the civil war of the Democratic Republic of Congo, former United Nations Secretary-General, Boutros-Boutros Ghali, in his report, “*Agenda for Peace*” (1992), argued that “the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty...has passed; its theory was never matched by reality” (Ghali, 1992). However, Ghali (1992) maintains that the state must remain as the primary unit of analysis although its authority is not absolute. He argued that “respect for its fundamental sovereignty and integrity are crucial to any common international progress” (Ghali, 1992). Finally, Ghali submitted that “the way to resolve the rival claims of sovereignty and self-determination was through respect for human rights, particularly the rights of minorities, on the one hand and democratization on the other” (Ghali, 1992).

Writing in the aftermath of the Rwanda genocide and the war in Kosovo and calls for clearer and quicker international instruments for humanitarian intervention, United Nations Former Secretary General, Kofi Annan (1999), argued that in the post-Cold War eras, “state sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined—not least by the forces of globalisation and international co-operation”. Annan (1999) called for the redefinition of sovereignty to mean “two concepts of sovereignty”, that recognises state and individual sovereignty. Farmer (2012) argues for “Popular sovereignty” which focuses more on

individual “human security” instead of “state security”. This definition holds that “all human beings ought to receive the same basic rights and that a state’s authority is earned through respecting and protecting these rights” (Farmer, 2012:95).

Bellamy and Wheeler (2011: 515) argue, “...it has become common to describe the immediate post-cold war period as something of a ‘golden era’ for humanitarian activism”. The reconceptualization of liberal intervention to encompass peacebuilding instead of just peacekeeping, has seen the United Nations involved in some of the longest and most expansive peace missions in Africa in countries such as the DRC and Liberia, for example. The botched US intervention in Mogadishu in 1992 is an example of the early experiences of liberal intervention in war-torn countries that were to be later known as fragile states.

The AU’s changed relationship with sovereignty provides an example of the seriousness of intra-state war in Africa, reconfigured sovereignty and the acceptance of ideas of liberal peacebuilding. Williams (2007) argues that the AU, formed in 2002, marked its departure from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) by changing its relationship with sovereignty. In its Constitutive Act, the AU speaks to a new principle of “non-indifference” which acknowledges that sovereignty is limited, and allowed intervention in cases where member states threatened human rights (Williams, 2007). Through this Constitutive Act, the AU was able to intervene in Darfur, Sudan, and its current mission in Somalia.

In redefining sovereignty, the AU also adopted the principle of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) which recognized that sovereignty is not absolute (Bellamy, & Williams, 2011; Seay, 2007; Krasner, 1999:24). This new understanding of sovereignty acknowledges that each state retains sovereignty provided it protects its people against both internal and external threats. Thus, instead of sovereignty being absolute, it is checked and balanced by R2P and as Gartner (2011) argues, “R2P is an expression of change in the norms of state sovereignty” (Pg: 7).

The principle of Responsibility to Protect is a concept formed by the Independent International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Gartner, 2011:2). It was adopted by the UN in the 2005 World Summit motivated by the UN Secretary General Banki-Moon based on his 2001 report on necessary collective action on intervention against; genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity (Gartner, 2011:2). The acceptance of R2P represents the climax of the golden era of liberal peace, and a foundational transformation of sovereignty in the twenty-first century. It provides further evidence to the

extent to which intra-state wars are now understood to be a matter of international security and global governance.

The US and its allies in the war on terror purport to be continuing the logic of liberal intervention and peacebuilding. Yet, some of the methods used, such as torture and now extra-judicial killings, raise questions about the extent to which these methods represent a perversion of liberal intervention and sovereignty. The section below examines how the use of torture and its legitimisation set a pretext to the pervasive practice of extra-judicial killings and the implications it has for liberal intervention.

## **2.5 Perversion of liberal peace? Torture and the criminalisation of Islam**

The war on terror has exposed continued tensions between intervention and the principle of sovereignty as some weak states see the US invasion of Iraq as the “potential for the norm to be abused by the powerful to justify interfering in the affairs of the weak” (Bellamy and Wheeler, 2012: 519).

While “torture” had been a practice which seemed outfaced by the advance of democracy in American politics, Dershowitz (2002) reports that its debate resurfaced briefly after 9/11 “when some detainees who were suspected of complicity in al-Qaeda terrorism, [failed] to provide information necessary...” to prevent future terrorist attacks. This generated debate about the use of torture in the hypothetical case of a ticking time bomb scenario which has been discussed by different philosophers such as Michael Walzer, Jean-Paul Sartre and Jeremy Bentham, (Dershowitz, 2002) as to whether torture can be used in such cases to save the lives of innocent people. After the introduction of the Global War on Terror (GWT), the US through the CIA and the FBI, has been reported to have used torture against the suspected terrorists in places such as the Guantanamo Bay prison, Iraqi prisons such as Abu Ghraib and Camp Bucca, for example, to divulge information that they claim could potentially save the lives of thousands of Americans at the cost of using non-lethal techniques of torture on one individual.

The US has often invoked the utilitarian argument from the work of Jeremy Bentham to justify torture in the case of the ticking time bomb scenario and emphasized the need to take preventive action against the launch of future strikes on American soil by terrorists (Bellamy, 2006: 134). In this scenario, the US argues that they are running out of time and

that "...torturing suspected terrorists is a legitimate means of extracting information about the rebel's chain of command vital for the protection of US citizens" (Bellamy, 2006:143). The justification behind the use of torture lies in the fact that on certain occasions, torture has worked to save people's lives. As Baylis (2014) notes; "the tragic reality is that torture sometimes works, much though many people wish it did not. There are numerous instances in which torture has produced self-proving, truthful information that was necessary to prevent harm to civilians" (Baylis, 2014:137). These include; a "1995 instance in which Philippine authorities tortured a terrorist into disclosing information that may have foiled plots to assassinate the pope and to crash eleven commercial airliners carrying approximately four thousand passengers" (Baylis, 2014:137).

The use of torture by the US as a liberal state that advocates for democracy is complicated by the fact that it contradicts with the Fifth Amendment of its constitution which holds that, "...statements elicited by means of torture may not be introduced into evidence against defendant who has been tortured" (Baylis, 2014:135). Moreover, the US is a signatory to the Geneva Convention Against Torture (GCAT) which prohibits all forms of torture and provides for no exceptions (Baylis, 2014:135). However, the use of torture by the US in the GWT has been criticized on grounds that, innocent people are often tortured, while there is limited intelligence data that links them to any criminal activity.

As Mamdani (2002) argues, in certain cases, innocent people are suspected purely on the grounds that they are Muslim (Mamdani, 2002). A case in point where an innocent person was mistakenly tortured, is when Suleiman Abdallah, the first al-Qaeda suspected terrorist was arrested by the CIA and the JSOC task force as part of the war on terror in Somalia 2003 who was tortured severely and released in 2008 on grounds of innocence (International Security, 2016). This is where the criminalisation of Islam began as the countries which were labelled as fragile states were mostly Islamic states in the Middle East and certain parts of Africa. This singling out process of Muslims and Islam which culminated with among other things an indefinite ban of seven countries, majority of which are Islamic by the Donald Trump administration sets the tone for a clash of civilisations that Huntington talks about.

Mamdani holds that there is a risk of overgeneralization of all Muslim people that takes place in the war on terror as the US conducts strikes in the fragile states (Mamdani, 2002: 766). Mamdani holds that, by virtue of being Muslim, one becomes the primary target of the US. Writing about the war on terror and the way in which Muslims are theorized in this

war, Mamdani (2002) notes that it seems the al-Qaeda terrorists responsible for hijacking the September 11 aeroplanes did not just hijack aeroplanes but also hi-jacked Islam as a religion since the entire Muslim community has inherited the blame and continues to be primary suspects in the war on terror (Mamdani, 2002: 767).

Mamdani (2002) argues that, "...by equating political tendencies with entire communities defined in nonhistorical cultural terms such explanations encourage collective discipline and punishment - a practice characteristic of colonial encounters" (Mamdani, 2002: 767). Mamdani continues to argue that "This line of reasoning equates terrorist Muslims, justifies a punishing war against an entire country (Afghanistan) and ignores the recent history that shaped both the current Afghan context and the emergence of political Islam." This criminalisation of Muslims exacerbates the prevailing tension between Islam and the West. Mamdani concludes by submitting that "if there are good Muslims and bad Muslims, [then] there must also be good westerners and bad westerners" (Mamdani, 2002: 766). Mamdani holds that "scholars of Islam have been in pains since September 11 to explain to a non-Muslim reading public that Islam has rules even for the conduct of war: For example, Tala'Asad (n.d) points out that the Hanbali School of law practiced by followers of Wahhabi in Saudi Arabia outlaws the killing of innocents in war " (Mamdani, 2002: 766).

It can be argued that the use of torture by the US has raised questions about how powerful states can manipulate ideas about state fragility and liberal intervention. The line between self-interest and intervening on behalf of human rights is becoming more blurry. It has also raised questions about the extent in which self-proclaimed liberal states are willing to act in illiberal ways for their survival. This thesis examines the implications of extra-judicial killings for the future of liberal peace.

## **2.6 Extra-judicial killings and the future of liberal peace and sovereignty**

While liberals believe that there are certain instances in which extra-judicial killings can be justified especially in cases where extra-judicial killings are conducted as a form of self-defense, they have criticized the US government of a high-level of secrecy in which the extra-judicial killings are conducted (Clark, 2012:32). The main argument is that US extra-judicial killings as a liberal state which advocates for liberal democracy contradict with the fundamental principle of transparency which is central to democracy. This is how Clark (2012) puts it:

In a liberal democracy, such as the United States, the government is accountable to the people. Yet the lines of accountability to citizens in the United States have continued to blur as states are granted more unquestionable authority under the State Secrets doctrine (Clark, 2012:32).

The same argument of lack of transparency in conducting extra-judicial killings has been invoked to criticize the secretive use of torture against suspects in the Guantanamo bay prison by the US. Clark concludes that:

The issue of transparency goes beyond the theory of liberal democracy; it also has very practical applications. The lack of transparency creates a credibility gap between what the United States is doing and how other countries perceive its actions (Clark, 2012:32).

Liberals have in the past accused Barack Obama of “extra-judicial murders” (Clark, 2012:17). For instance, some scholars consider the murder of the former president of Libya, MuammarGadaffi, as an example of extra-judicial killings undertaken by Obama’s administration which also represented the breach of sovereignty by the US. In his last speech, Gadaffi’s words carried the connotations of a breach of sovereignty by the US in Libya:

Now I am under attack by the biggest force in military history. Obama wants to kill me, to take away the freedom of our country, to take away our free housing our free medicine, our free education, our free food, and replace it with American style thievery called capitalism, but all of us in the third world know what that means, it means corporations run the countries, run the world, and the people suffer (Gadaffi, quoted in World Future Fund, 2011).

While the 9/11 event shocked the world, attracted wide spread sympathy and left many IR scholars devising theories that could account for its occurrence and meaningful ways to respond, the subsequent announcement of the war on terror sparked fierce controversy among IR scholars as to whether the US can target the al-Qaeda terrorists beyond its jurisdiction and without authenticity from the UNSC. The war on terror was criticised by scholars and some of the officials. For instance, Masters (2017) submitted that the Navy Seal that killed Osama Bin Laden in Abbottabad has been regarded as defying Pakistan’s territorial integrity.

In Afghanistan, President Hamid Karzai required US troops to withdraw from conducting covert missions with the reasoning that they amount to a violation of human rights (Masters, 2012:7). In Pakistan, the extra-judicial killings have been articulated as amounting to a breach of sovereignty. Moreover, in April 2012, the Pakistani Parliament voted unanimously in demanding an end to US drone strikes on its territory (Prasow 2015, Tyler, 2016). Ultimately, the ambassador of Pakistan to the UN, Zamir Akram, “called for international legal action to halt the totally counterproductive attacks by the US in his country” (The Guardian, 2012). Based on the above, it could be argued that the continued use of extra judicial killings could threaten the future of liberal peace and sovereignty.

## **2.7 Conclusion**

The chapter has attempted to locate extra-judicial killings in IR practice and theory within the evolution of liberal interventionism. It was argued that what is understood to be the “golden era” of liberal interventionism is a legacy of the post-Cold War unipolar dominance of the United States in global governance and security. The chapter made a case for the use of the theory of liberal peace by criticizing the inconsistencies prevalent in other theories such as realism, which argues that the security dilemma, under conditions of a presumed anarchic international system, is a struggle for power. This position fails to account for the rise of illiberal states and the security dilemmas that they pose towards the US as well as the subsequent attack launched by the US against these states. The significance of the theory of liberal peace was emphasized through the work of Doyle (1986) as it provides a better explanation of the reasons why liberal states attack illiberal states. The chapter argued that the discourse on the war on terror, and its focus on “failed states” as breeding grounds for alleged terrorists, represents the height of the repositioning of less powerful states that are now being represented as core sources of threat to the international peace and security. The chapter also highlighted the contradictions that arise from the US as a liberal state in the use of tactics in the war on terror. It was shown that torture and extra-judicial killings contradict with the principles of liberal democracy as represented by the US.

## Chapter Three

### The social life of war: Understanding war experiences of Somalis

#### 3.1 Introduction

The Chapter provides a motivation for the methodological tools that informed this study. Located within qualitative methods, the study makes a case for the use of life histories in order to examine extra-judicial killings in Somalia. The chapter locates life history interviews within the discipline of IR. It draws on feminist literature in order to argue that war needs to be studied as an experience, whose impact is felt most profoundly by the individuals and communities. The Somali community in South Africa is argued to be part of the legacy of post-colonial wars in Africa, whose key feature is massive population displacement. It is argued that displaced populations continue to experience the realities of the war in their home country even as they negotiate safety and new livelihoods in their host country. The cases of South Sudan and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are used to demonstrate the continuing impacts of violent displacement, and to draw from the studies that have used the diaspora populations of these countries as a window from which they can study South Sudan and DRC.

This chapter then discusses the interview process, justification of four research sites, negotiating access to the Somali community, researcher positionality, limitations of the study and data analysis procedures.

#### 3.2 Locating Life histories in IR: the stories of war

What may be the most powerful aspect of studying war is not merely the deconstructive violence that attends to it but the creativity the people on the front lines employ to reconstruct their shattered worlds (Nordstrom & Antonius, 1995: 143).

The emergence of critical theories, such as social constructivism and especially feminist theory of IR, has challenged the discipline to reconsider how it studies war and its historic object of analysis. In his six principles of political realism in the influential text, *Politics*

*among nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (1948), Hans Morgenthau argued that the “Politics’, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature”. Therefore, the role of the IR theorists was to discover the objective laws of the political domain. This focus on objective laws was accompanied by the use of positivist research methods that sought to offer scientific explanations about the behaviour of states and the phenomenon of war among them. As IR feminist Tickner (2003) argues, the tools used by political realists were a focus on “statistics and quantitative methods [that are] part of patriarchal cultures monolithic of hard facts” (Tickner, 2003). The war anthropologists, Carolyn Nordstrom & Antonius Robben(1995), argue that positivist analysis of war is linked to historical ideas about reason which presume that it is possible to find a universal explanation, an objective truth, about the occurrence of war. As Nordstrom& Antonius (1995: 138) argue further, “a concern with the reasons of war comes dangerously close to a concern with making war reasonable”. The recognition in the discipline that civilians account for the highest number of war casualties contributed to the shift about the impact of war on everyday life. Qualitative methodologies of research have made an important contribution in excavating war as a social experience. Indeed, Appandurai’s term, “the social life of things” (1986) placed commodities within the cultural contexts that give them meaning; qualitative research has enabled IR scholars to narrate the social life of war. As Nordstrom& Antonius (1995: 48) argue, “Violence unmakes the world at large both for those who experience it and for those who witness it” (Nordstrom& Antonius, 1995). As they further argue, correctly, “on entering the [research] field, we enter the domain of lived experience” (Nordstrom& Antonius, 1995: 48). Similarly, Christine Sylvester argues that it is important for IR “to pay more attention to war as experience” because “war cannot be fully apprehended unless it is studied up from people” (Sylvester, 2012: 484). Importantly, she argues that war transforms people’s lives, individuals must be studied as “units that have war agency and are also prime targets of war violence and war enthusiasms” (Sylvester, 2012: 484).

Tickner (2003) argues that to consider war as a social experience, allows IR scholars to ask new questions and take note of other actors in the war effort. For instance, Tickner (2003) makes reference to Katherine Moon’s study “Sex Among Allies”. In this case study, Tickner holds that, “the challenge for Moon is to show how prostitution, a private issue normally considered outside the boundaries of international politics, is linked to national security and foreign policy” (Tickner, 2003). This task requires her to ask, “...questions not normally asked in IR such as, what factors helped create and maintain military

prostitution and for what ends?” (Tickner, 2003: 18). The second feminist that Tickner features in her work is Christine Chin, from the case study entitled, “In Service and Servitude”. Tickner holds that Christine’s text examines the importation of Filipina and Indonesian female domestic workers into Malaysia, beginning in the 1970s, and how their labor supported a Malaysian modernization project based on an export-led development model in the context of the neoliberal global economy (Tickner, 2003:15). Tickner explains that Chin “asks two basic questions of her study both of which are linked to women’s lives” (Tickner, 2003:15). Tickner concludes that “both case studies use ethnographic methods and participant observation to conduct indepth case studies, methods not typical of IR” (Tickner, 2003).

This study used life history methods to capture the social experience of US extra-judicial killings in order to understand their impact on the everyday lives of Somalis. The chapter will show that the “social life of war” means that its impact is beyond those who are in the immediate physical space where the US is undertaking the killings. As Etherington (cited in Gagura and Paradza, 2007: 23) argues,

if stories that are elicited as a result of the life history approach, are reconstructions of a person’s experiences, remembered and told at a particular point in their lives, to a particular researcher/audience and for a particular purpose: all of which will have a bearing on how the stories are told, which stories are told and how they are presented or interpreted.

Even in the case of war, researchers must be aware that the social life of war means that “everyone has a story, complete with vested interests, and all the stories collide into contentious assemblages of partial truths, political fictions, personal foibles, military propaganda and cultural lore” (Nordstrom& Antonius, 1995: 132). Life histories are important because they allow us to understand war through the window of the individual as a person instead of seeing the individual as part of a group. Nordstrom& Antonius (1995) maintain that, “The louder the story, especially when it comes to violence and war, the less representative of the lived experience it is likely to be” (Nordstrom& Antonius, 1995). Furthermore, “in the midst of wars of propaganda and justification, the most silenced stories at war’s epicentres are generally the most authentic” (Nordstrom& Antonius, 1995: 132). Indeed, as Nordstrom& Antonius argue, “individuals do not make up a generic group of “combatants”, “civilians” and casualties but an endlessly complex set of people and

personalities, each of whom has a unique relationship to the war and a unique story to tell” (Nordstrom& Antonius, 1995: 137).

Lastly, to understand war from the eyes of the individuals allows us to understand people’s forms of resistance and survival. Nordstrom& Antonius hold that qualitative methods that focus on the understanding of war as an experience are important to IR because they provide victims with creative powers to re-imagine stories. Nordstrom& Antonius expand that,

Traditional western approaches to violent conflict do not often recognize the creative strategies people on the front lines employ to survive the war... I was little prepared for the way in which people tried to reconfigure the destructive violence that marked their lives and to rebuild worlds so wrenchingly taken away from them by violence...It was only when I was in the middle of Mozambique that I began to appreciate the creativity of the average people caught in the traumatic contingencies of warfare (Nordstrom& Antonius, 1995: 143).

Building on the work of feminist scholars in IR, this study shifts the gaze of the Somali and the war on terror from the actions of the US and al-Shabaab, to consider the experiences of Somali people on the other end of the grand story of the war on terrorism.

### **3.3 “Scattering to other lands”: displacement as the legacy of post-colonial wars**

The previous section argues that war has an overarching impact on everyday life because it reconfigures social relations. A key legacy of all wars is displacement, whether internally or externally. Since the fall of SiadBarre, the Somali community constitutes one of Africa’s biggest diasporas across the continent and outside, with an estimated population of 1,010000 individuals outside Somalia (Saad, 2016). The Somali community outside the country can often be found living together in places that become colloquially known as “little Somalia”. In the article, “Diasporas and Nation States” (1996: 16), Robin Cohen defines diaspora as “the dispersal of a people from its original homeland”. The biblical text Deuteronomy defines Diaspora as “scattering to other lands”. Cohen argues that the use of diaspora was referring to the dispersal of Jews, the Trans-Atlantic slave trade of Africans and the dispersal and genocide of Armenians as constituting what is understood to be “catastrophic or victim diasporas”. Sheffer (2003: 16) argues that the concept of diaspora has evolved and is “metaphoric designation” that today refers to a variety of people that live outside of their

home country including, “expatriates, expellees, political refugees, alien residents, immigrants and ethnic and racial minorities”

A key feature of post-colonial intra-state wars has been the displacement of millions of Africans to other lands. Indeed, the transnational impacts of population displacement seen in the Somali case are not unique in Africa or elsewhere. The literature reveals that other countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), South Sudan and Liberia, among others, have witnessed the same crisis where multitudes of people have been displaced due to civil wars.

In the case of South Sudan, Blanchard (2016), Africa’s youngest state that came into existence in July 2011, following twenty-one years of war between the North and South, has been marred with violence since 2013, when relations between President Salvar Kiir and Deputy President Riek Machar collapsed. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) reports that “three years after the outbreak of civil war in December 2013, South Sudan has been experiencing some of the world’s biggest population movements. Many people have crossed into neighbouring countries, particularly Uganda, which is home to one of the largest refugee camps in the world” (IDMC, 2017). Moreover, the IDMC submits that about 163 000 new displacements caused by conflict were registered in the first half of 2017. Conditions in displacement sites are poor, with many lacking adequate space and infrastructure. All this information highlights the extent to which war affects civilians through internal and external displacements. In his article, “South Sudanese Diaspora In Australia And New Zealand: Reconciling The Past with The Present”, Stefanie Seiler (2017), uses the South Sudanese diaspora to learn about the war in South Sudan. This shows that factoring the diaspora in understanding war is instructive. Moreover, Marzalik (2013) in the “United Nations Missions in Sudan and South Sudan: Diaspora Community Engagement” argues that a key component of UNMISS strategy is diaspora community engagement [since] an estimated 1.2 to 1.7 million people with Sudanese origin live abroad, participating actively in economic development, lobbying activities, humanitarian aid, and media awareness programs” (Marzalik, 2013).

Similarly, the Democratic Republic of Congo also witnessed massive displacements after “ethnoregional groupings directly killed at least 12 000 persons, cumulatively displaced 860 000, systematically looted civilians, raped hundreds, if not thousands, of women (Englebert& Ron, 2004). According to the UNHCR report (2015), the number of displaced

people in Congo is estimated to be 3.9 million (UNHCR, 2015). Moreover, Stearns (2013) reports that "...there are now over 2.6 million people displaced in Congo, over 30 different armed groups and thousands of killings and rape each year" (Stearns, 2013). The Congolese diaspora has been used as a window in which to understand the complexities of the Congolese states.

In Congo also, there are studies conducted on its diaspora in order to understand the conflict that is going on there. For instance, Sumata's (2002, in "Migradollars and Poverty Alleviation Strategy Issues in Congo (DRC)," work focuses on "the Congolese immigrants in France, UK and Belgium and their contribution to the development of their country" (Sumata, 2002). The above-mentioned civil wars are to a large extent similar to the Somalian civil war in that they all have multitudes of people displaced as a result of war. The subsequent studies done on their displaced population elucidate the experiences of war as reflected by the diaspora in ways that demonstrate the transnational social impact of war.

### **3.4 Disposable lives: Somali settlement in South Africa**

This section focuses on the extent of Somali precarity in South Africa. The precarity encountered by Somalis in South Africa is best described by Michultka (2009) as "Triple Trauma". Michultka (2009) explains "Triple Trauma" as a challenge experienced by new immigrants in which they find themselves "in the midst of a chronological interaction of three distinct traumatic periods" (Michultka, 2009). Michultka (2009) explains that migrants are overwhelmed by the "trauma of the country of origin", the "trauma of the escape process or journey of immigration" and the "trauma of the relocation process" (Michultka, 2009).

Furthermore, Michultka (2009) explains that the country of origin traumatises them through oppression, discrimination, targeting and torture. The escape journey traumatises them through forced journey without saying goodbyes, "extreme travel conditions" and finally the relocation process subjects them to "hostile legal system", "loss of family identity" and "anti-immigrant attitudes" (Michultka, 2009).

The three traumatic periods outlined by Michultka have been undergone by the Somalians I interviewed. Their interviews reveal stories of misery, of high levels of violence and irrevocable damage to their properties while in their country of origin. Their journeys also attract the same sentiments. Some participants were imprisoned in foreign countries along the way; they experienced harassment and unsympathetic attitudes. Some had to cross

rivers and walk long distances on feet. Finally, their arrival in South Africa is met with harsh attitudes and they realize that South Africa does not offer the safety that they have travelled far to seek.

The xenophobic attacks that took place in South Africa testify to this fact. Steinberg (2011) argues that anti-immigrant attitudes such as xenophobic attacks in South Africa as mentioned by Michultka (2009) are triggered by perceptions that people attach to foreigners such as; “they bring diseases”, “they steal our jobs”, “they bring drugs” and “they increase crime” (Steinberg, 2011). In Grahamstown, the xenophobic attacks took place in the form of looting of Somali shops and death threats to Somalis. This xenophobic violence targeted foreigners from Pakistan, Ethiopia, Bangladesh and Somalia (Quinn, 2008). Quinn (2008) writes that these xenophobic attacks could be attributed to a “cultural shock” and “cultural gap” between the local people and the foreigners since the foreigners subscribe to a different religion, wear different clothes and speak a different language (Quinn, 2008).

Judith Butler attributes the game of shifting blames towards the foreigners by the local people as part of a structural problem. In her thesis about “disposable lives” Butler (2013) holds that “neo-liberal economics increasingly structures public institutions, including schools and universities as well as public services, in which people are losing their homes, their pensions, and their prospects for work in increasing numbers, we are faced with the idea that some populations are considered disposable” (Butler, 2013).

For example, it is shown that between mid-1997 and late-1998, the South African Migration Project (SAMP) conducted a survey which revealed that “South Africans as a whole, carry strong anti-immigration sentiments, with fully 25% of the population calling for a complete ban on migration into the country and approximately 45% in 1997 and 53% in 1998 calling for a strict limit on the number of foreigners allowed into the country. Only 6% adopted an open immigration position in 1997 by saying that the government should let anyone in who wants to enter” (Steinberg, 2011). Moreover, the findings of a 2004 study conducted by the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVSR) show that 87% of Police officers in Johannesburg believe that majority of the crimes are caused by foreigners without proper documents (Masuku, 2006). Domestic insecurity caused by structural inequality creates conditions that place immigrants in vulnerable conditions that can be used by political elites as targets that are used to explain the failure of the state to deliver public goods to the local population. The debt crisis in Greece has been accompanied

by growing anti-immigrant sentiments, and seems to be the case in much of Western Europe, ever since the 2008 financial crisis. Many of those seeking refuge in Europe come from war torn countries like Syria. The case of Somalis in South Africa is, therefore, not unique. The precarious livelihoods in South Africa also mean that this is a difficult population to access as a researcher.

### **3.5 Interviews: Four Sites**

#### **3.5.1 The interview process**

Given the difficulty associated with recruiting Somali nationals along with the student research budget constraints, I proceeded with data analysis after securing 13 participants because, although this was a small sample, both genders, males and females were fairly represented as well as majority of the clans both major clans and sub clans. The list of clans included amongst others; Darod, Dir, Hawiye, Isaaq and Rahanweyn. Since the objective of this research was to privilege the voices of the Somali nationals that continue to experience the consequences of war but are often left out by mainstream media, I chose to limit the number of expert respondents to three, so that they do not overshadow the voices of these Somali nationals. The contacts of two expert respondents were provided by the Institute for Security Studies, while the contact of the Political Affairs Officer was provided by the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Somalia in Pretoria, South Africa.

The research consisted of 16 in-depth structured interviews, which were set to last for an average of 30 to 45 minutes guided through a semi-structured questionnaire which comprised of 25 questions. In these interviews, I allowed the participants to take their time and gather their thoughts as they recall and narrate their experiences of living in and leaving Somalia which required delving into their sensitive past. Sunday (2015) writes that during an in-depth interview the role of the interviewer is to be fully involved in the process and become a good listener (Sunday, 2015). While majority of the interviews ran smoothly for a reasonable length of time with some slightly exceeding the allocated time, three of the interviews were notably very short due to the English language barrier as some of the participants had a below average command of the English language and therefore, could not express themselves to the full extent even where there was room for them to give more details.

The problem of language is a key one and Mhajne (2015) argues that it carries the blame for poor field- relations thus compromising the quality of the research. From what I observed, the lack of English language is also a direct consequence of the ongoing war since it has affected the education system resulting in Somalians fending for themselves to learn English on the streets for purposes of survival.

Some of them learned English in South Africa. In two of the critical cases of English language I had to get a Somali translator who translated the questions in Somali language as I asked them and translated the answers back to me in English. The translator was one of the Somali women I had asked to contact interviews with in Port Elizabeth who was able to fully comprehend my request to conduct interviews with her fellows and explained to the two who struggled to understand English. Upon realizing the interest of her colleagues to participate in the interviews, she then volunteered to be a translator and this seemed to provide them with comfort and confidence that in cases where they may run out of English words while trying to express themselves.. I used a recorder to record these interviews while I also used a pen and note book to jot down some notes to emphasize the body gestures, body language and to interpret certain movements they made to denote words they had no vocabulary for. Sunday (2015) identifies the activity of taking field notes as vital for purposes of data analysis.

This was also useful for certain names, pronunciations which I would not otherwise be able to pick up from the audio. Also given the limitations case of the English language, I could not use other audio supported soft-wares for transcription since they are designed to pick a western English accent and not that of most Somali participants. This carried the risk of losing data.

### **3.5.2 Research sites and names**

Primarily the interviews were planned to take place in Grahamstown since there is a considerable number of Somali nationals around this town. Due to the difficulty in recruiting participants, I used a snowballing method in which one participant recruits future participants. However, the disadvantage was that the participants shared the same views on many questions and this would compromise the quality of the research. Given the need to diversify data, I then extended the research field to the nearby cities of Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage. In order to get data from research experts and government representatives, I travelled to Pretoria. Factoring research experts and government representatives in this

research was important since unlike Somali participants, who simply narrate their experiences as they are directly affected, the experts look at the Somali war and its consequences and consider the subject within broader continental and international politics. The government representative was crucial in speaking to the legality of the US intervention on behalf of the Somali government.

### **3.5.3 Grahamstown**

Grahamstown is the first field of study where I started collecting data. Contact was made with one shop distributor I came to know as a friend who comes from the same country (Lesotho) as myself. This shop distributor introduced me to the Somali Shop Manager who then introduced me to other participants who were working in different shops. A total of three interviews were conducted in Grahamstown in different shops. The problem I experienced is that while interviews were conducted during the low traffic shopping hours of the Somali shopkeepers, there were notable instances where interviews had to be paused because the customers had arrived and made inquiries that had to be attended to by the shop keeper.

### **3.5.4 Port Elizabeth**

Contrary to Grahamstown, Port Elizabeth had plenty of Somali nationals. The only challenge was that majority of them had very busy schedules that did not allow them to participate in research during work hours. All the interviews were organised individually with participants in Tradonna Mall, which houses majority of Somali Shops while the interviews were conducted during the night between 19:30 and 21:00 hours in the house holds of these Somali participants. The fact that interviews took place in the houses made it easy for more participants to be recruited as some had neighbours that had visited. In Port Elizabeth, I was also able to get a large sample of women, majority of which were unemployed and working as house wives. In total, there were six interviews collected from Port Elizabeth.

### **3.5.5 Uitenhage**

In the same way as in Grahamstown, the interviews in Uitenhage were conducted in Shops during low traffic hours. These were all arranged individually with the participants themselves without any introductions. For the first time in Uitenhage, I was able to meet and interview female Shopkeepers which broke the trend from Grahamstown where I did not meet any female Somalis at all and Port Elizabeth where I only interrupted with male Shop

keepers and unemployed women working as housewives. A total of three interviews were collected in Uitenhage, of which two of them were women and one man.

### 3.5.6 Pretoria

This was the final research site for my field-work. Despite having a broader experience of field work after conducting interviews at the above sites, Pretoria presented challenges different from all the above research sites. I had to go through formal procedures of applying to have an interview with the participants through proper channels. This process took a long time, with the maximum waiting period in one site going for as long as two weeks. In the case of the Somali Embassy, my visit coincided with the unfortunate event of a truck bomb in Mogadishu, Somalia that challenged the embassy to carry out security upgrades and this also delayed the field-work.

**Table 1.1: Details of Somali participants**

<b>Pseudo Name</b>	<b>Gender</b>	<b>Place of Origin in Somalia</b>	<b>Place of Settlement in South Africa</b>	<b>Occupation</b>
Aaminah	Female	Mogadishu	Port Elizabeth	House wife
Gargaaro	Female	Kismayo	Port Elizabeth	House wife
Xoriyo	Female	Mogadishu	Uitenhage	Shopkeeper
Fawzia	Female	Kokane	Uitenhage	Shopkeeper
Nasteexo	Female	Kismayo	Port Elizabeth	House wife
Barre	Male	Kismayo	Port Elizabeth	Shop Manager
Dalmar	Male	Mogadishu	Grahamstown	Shop Manager
Diric	Male	Kismayo	Port Elizabeth	Distributor
Geedi	Male	Mogadishu	Grahasmtown	Shop Manager
Cawil	Male	Kismayo	Port Elizabeth	Distributor
Cilmi	Male	Mogadishu	Port Elizabeth	Shopkeeper
Magan	Male	Mogadishu	Grahamstown	Shopkeeper
Ishmael	Male	Kismayo	Uitenhage	Shopkeeper

**Table 1.2: Details of Research experts and Government Officials**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Gender</b>	<b>Duration at work</b>	<b>Company</b>	<b>Position</b>
Willem Els	Male	<b>+25 years</b>	<b>ISS</b>	Training Coordinator Counter terrorism
Omar Manhood	Male	<b>Over 6 years</b>	<b>ISS</b>	Researcher- Peace and security
Ahmed Kheirra	Male	<b>Over 10 years</b>	<b>Somali Embassy</b>	Political Affairs Officer (Head of employees)

### **3.5.7 Names**

It has been shown in the previous sections that political research is highly dangerous, more so when it involves one of the most sensitive topics of terrorism, because it deals with people's lives. This fact manifested itself in the difficulty associated with recruiting participants, as they feared that by virtue of participating in this research they could be singled-out and become future targets of terrorist attacks. As a result, the participants who took a risk despite all the risks and participated in this research were given a guarantee that their names would be substituted with pseudo names to ensure confidentiality and anonymity. This was well articulated to them verbally before they participated and in writing on the consent forms. This made for a smooth flow of the interviews as the participants had the faith that whatever information they provide cannot be used against them.

The pseudo names were carefully selected from a list of general Somali names with corresponding meanings of each name and were matched with respective participants based on the interpretation of their character traits as reflected during the interviews. 'Aaminah' is the Somali version of the name 'Aminah' which means, 'feel safe'. This name was originally the name of prophet Muhammed's mother who died when he was a young boy. I assigned it to my first participant, who was orphaned at a very young age as a result of civil war in Somalia. Throughout her life, she has been on the run seeking for safety and has finally settled in Port Elizabeth with her Aunt where she feels safer. 'Gargaaro', is the name given to my second participant, which means, 'the one who helps'. It symbolizes the second

participant who looked out for other women by translating for them. ‘Xoriyo’, which means “freedom” is the name given to my third participant, who described the process of migrating to South Africa as a move towards freedom from al-Shabaab and all her problems in Somalia. ‘Fawzia’, which means ‘victorious’ is the name given to my fourth participant who manifested spiritual victory against al-Shabaab. ‘Nasteexo’, which means ‘advice’ is the name given to Aaminah’s aunt, who was the oldest of all my participants. In a home away from home, she seemed to have assumed a parental role of checking on the young Somali women, advising them. ‘Barre’, which means ‘teacher’, is not anywhere close to the notorious SiadBarre. This name is given to the sixth participant who worked as a teacher in Somalia before state collapse. He boasted a wealth of knowledge and was very eloquent in outlining the Somali precarity. ‘Dalmar,’ refers to ‘adaptable’. This was portrayed by the seventh participant who has managed to integrate into the Xhosa culture and even speaks Xhosa fluently. ‘Diric’, which means ‘fearless’ was reflected by the eighth participant who went back to Somalia to rescue his family members. The ninth participant, ‘Geedi,’ means ‘traveller’ given to babies born while travelling; having travelled to Kenya while a few months old, Geedi offers a different perspective to Somalia. ‘Cawil’, which means replacement, is given to the tenth participant who lost his older brother in the midst of war. ‘Cilmi’, which means ‘learning’, represents the eleventh participant who seemed relentless towards studying. Ishmael, which means, ‘God will hear’, is the name given to the twelfth participant who showed an unwavering trust in God claiming Somali prayers will be answered. The quality of ‘protector,’ captured by the name Magan, was manifested by the thirteenth participant who provides employment to his fellow Somalians.

### **3.5.8 Negotiating language: transcription**

During transcription of the interviews, I cut out and omitted certain parts of words for precision purposes because they were either in-audible or repetitive and obstructed the message of the interviews. I undertook transcription manually, going word by word and not using any external soft-wares since they can exaggerate the details of the conversation or misrepresent the views of the participants. Moreover, disadvantages of the soft-wares include, lack of the ability to pick up certain words (accuracy) since they have been made to pick up a UK accent. They are not designed to pick up heavy African accent of most Somali participants who speak broken English that they learned in the midst of war without any formal training. The interviews were transcribed by myself as the chief investigator of this

research. I was able to pick up certain gestures that they made, especially in cases where they could not express themselves or in cases where they said the one thing while they meant another.

### **3. 5.9 Access: Outsider studying outsiders**

This section focuses on how I negotiated access to have interviews with the Somalis. The harsh acts such as xenophobic attacks by the local citizens on foreigners, have created what some scholars have come to describe as “insider-outsider” problem (Karen, 1994). This refers to a situation in which the local citizens treat foreigners as “outsiders” while considering themselves as “insiders” (Karen, 1994). It therefore, becomes increasingly challenging for a researcher to gain access to the Somali community, as this tension makes it hard for them to open up to any stranger. Karen (1994) notes that this insider-outsider problem is fuelled by “...differences of ethnicity, age and class between the researcher who is considered an outsider and the insiders, members of the group being studied” (Karen, 1994).

In many studies on Somali diaspora that I observed, under different disciplines such as Nursing, Psychology, Sociology and Education, some researchers resolved this insider-outsider problem by recruiting other Somalis to perform the interviews on their behalf as in (Johnson et al, 2000; Fisher, 2009 & Liempt 2011). Accordingly, other studies relied on the use of Somali interpreters as in the works of (Wallin et al, 2007) & (Essen et al, 2000), to translate between the interviewers and Somalis. In these cases, the Somali interpreters negotiated access on behalf of these researchers. However, this approach has the potential of incurring extra costs and may not be realistic for students with a low research budget.

In my case, however, the insider-outsider problem was resolved by the fact that I am also a foreigner from Lesotho which makes me an outsider in South Africa, although admittedly, not to the same degree as Somalians, because Lesotho is within South Africa. On the first day of conducting my research, I was fortunate enough to meet a Mosotho distributor working at a Somali shop. This gentleman recognized my car’s registration number that I am from Lesotho and introduced me to the Somali Shopkeeper.

The informal introduction done by this Mosotho distributor developed a certain level of trust between the Somali Shopkeeper and myself and thus, exempted me from all the scepticism about my place of origin and the company I represented. The fact that I am also a foreigner from Lesotho exempted me from the insider-outsider problem as it created a

common denominator between the shopkeeper and me. As a foreigner, I can relate to some of the experiences they encounter in South Africa and also have an imaginative access into what they are going through. I am tempted to believe that this environment negotiated for a better environment to begin having a conversation with him about the work that I am doing and the expectation of his participation in the research. I then started conducting interviews as an outsider studying outsiders, from which point, other Somali participants were recruited via snowballing method.

### **3.6 What brings me to this research?**

Growing up as a “movie junkie” who has watched anything from “Once upon a time in Hong Kong” to “Tears of the sun”, I never knew that my love for movies could one day propel me into a serious research trajectory. It was not until I watched the “Black Hawk Down” (2002), a movie which has been described as a “fast-paced trip through blood and guts” that my perception about movies changed forever. Directed by Ridley Scott, the movie follows the fate of two US humanitarian helicopters that unexpectedly got attacked by Somalian forces in Somalia.

The movie portrays a life of misery, of a state plagued by warfare with tensions among warlords, and civilians fearing for their lives. This movie generated a certain interest in me especially having learned that it is based on a true story. This interest gained momentum when I started doing an Honours course entitled “Africa: Changing IR” at Rhodes University, in which we dealt extensively with African civil wars including the Somalian civil war. The controversy surrounding the use of US drones in Somalia, and the curiosity to know about the use of international instruments such as the UNSC, inspired me to embark on the journey of this research.

### **3.7 Limitations of the Study**

The main objective of this study is to privilege the voices and experiences of Somalis that are often left out in pre-existing war studies and mainstream media coverage conducted about the current US intervention in Somalia. Existing war studies have focused on the perpetrators of war such as al-Shabaab by studying extensively its genesis, its objectives and its mission while in that process abandoning the victims that suffer the consequences of this war on a daily basis. Thus, in order to avoid duplication of knowledge already produced, the study

does not go into details of what al-Shabaab is and what it represents. In the same way, the study does not focus on the consequences that the war has had on Somali government institutions as well as its officials.

Moreover, in order to provide the context in which the participants experience the consequences of war and how they experience them, the study briefly discusses tactics of war used in the war on terror. It shows that there has been a significant change from the traditional use of torture in which the suspects were severely tortured to the use of drones which amount to extra-judicial killings. However, given the limited scope of the study, it does not engage it's self in the critical examination of each of these tactics of war such as torture and drones.

### **3.8 Data analysis: thematic analysis**

I used a qualitative data analysis method which draws on the experiences of the Somali refugees in South Africa, research experts of the Institute for Security Studies as well as the government representative from the Somali Embassy gathered through life histories interviews. Christopher Sunday (2015) defines Qualitative Data Analysis as “the range of processes and procedures whereby we move from the qualitative data that have been collected, into some form of explanation, understanding or interpretation of the people and situations we are investigating” (Sunday, 2015). I employed the deductive approach which capitalizes on the use of research questions that I prepared for different participants Somalis, Research experts and the government official to organize the data and spot similarities and differences. I used thematic analysis, which Braun & Clarke (2006) define as a method for “identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within the data. It minimally organizes and describes your data set in (rich) detail” (Braun & Clarke, 2006:78).

I collected my data by conducting life histories in-depth audio recorded interviews and writing field-notes simultaneously, from which I later transcribed them into transcripts. These transcripts were read closely several times, back to back, paying attention to every sentence, every little detail and analysing every paragraph in order to make sense of the point driven by the participant involved and to capture any hidden meaning. For purposes of data coding, I started off by using first-circle coding methods which are “initial coding” and “in vivo coding” (Saldana, 2009:46). Saldana describes “initial coding” as a first-circle coding method used to capture contextual meaning using the researchers words while in “invivo

coding” is the first circle method of coding recommended for interview transcripts as a way of attuning one’s self to participant language, perspectives and worldviews (Saldana, 2009:46).

These codes were further coded using second-cycle coding methods in trying to categorize them into different sections that emerge from the first cycle coding methods. Saldana (2009) holds that second-cycle methods are used for categorization of coded data as an initial analytic strategy (Saldana, 2009:46). The established categories of codes were then developed into meaningful themes which then formed the basis of my findings for this research. Box et al, (1978) claim that “data analysis serves a small but critical function in empirical research-that of separating information in the data from noise” (Box, et al, 1978).

They argue that “Violation of ethical principles in the analysis of data result in additional noise. This noise is attributed, not to the experiment itself but to the treatment of the data in the process leading to induction.” Gipson (1973) speaks against the risk of misinterpreting or misrepresenting the views of the participants during the process of data analysis and in cognisance of this caution, I tried to be as objective as possible and allowed the data to speak instead of leading it even if it disproves the hypothesis I had. In addition, Robinson and Moulton (1985) have spoken against “the falsification of results, the theft of ideas and credit and the problem of plagiarism” (Robinson and Moulton, 1985). Bearing these in mind, I refrained from modifying the data and acknowledged in cases where I have used the words of my participants as themes and sub-fields in the findings chapter.

### **3.9 Conclusion**

The chapter made a case for the use of life histories in order to examine extra-judicial killings in Somalia. Locating life history interviews within the discipline of IR, the chapter has argued that war needs to be studied as a social experience whose impact is felt most profoundly by individuals and communities. The chapter has shown that a legacy of post-colonial wars has been the displacement of millions of Africans, who are scattered across lands, who continue to live the reality of war in their home countries. The chapter discussed the precarious conditions in which the Somali community lives in South Africa. It outlined the four sites that constituted the research on the lived experiences of Somalis in SA about the impact of US extra judicial killings in their lives. The chapter also discussed data analysis procedures that

were adopted in order to make sense and organise the data. Using thematic analysis, the next chapter discusses the findings of this study.

## **Chapter Four**

### **Growing up with fear and the sound of bullets**

#### **4.1 Introduction**

As outlined in the introductory chapter of the thesis, the goals and objectives of this research are to examine the local consequences of US intervention in Somalia, the assessment of the nature of this intervention, its implications for liberal intervention, and its implications for the sovereignty more broadly and specifically for Somalia. The purpose of this chapter is, therefore, to outline the findings made by this research in response to the above-mentioned research goals and objectives by presenting emerging themes which were identified as dominant and significant. The first theme identified was support for US extra-judicial killings and the war on terror. Despite all the controversy surrounding the legitimacy of the war on terror itself, the mannerism in which it is conducted as well as the controversial tactics that it employs, the majority of Somali participants showed an overwhelming support for the US intervention. Somali participants support the US extra-judicial killings because they are understood to undermine al-Shabaab strength which has become a major source of insecurity in Somalia. However, the data shows that the support of US strikes comes with some moral conditions. That is, the Somali participants support the extra-judicial killings so long as they do not harm innocent civilians. This leads us to the second dominant theme. Loss of life emerged as a theme when Somali participants emphasised the effects and local consequences that extra-judicial killings have in Somalia. The participants, of which some are immediate victims of extra-judicial killings through members of their families, highlighted that the effects of extra-judicial killings include the loss of lives and injuries of innocent people and the destruction of properties. There seems to be a tacit agreement across all participants that loss of life cannot be justified and that it undermines the effectiveness of extra-judicial killings.

The third theme that was identified was about displacement. Due to the intensifying conflict in Somalia, especially the state's failure to provide public goods such as security and social welfare, a lot of people have been displaced both internally and externally leaving Somalia towards other destinations. Building on the definitions provided by Williams (2011) about sovereignty, the chapter argues that these massive movements that witness multitudes

of people moving from one place to another are responsible for further weakening the sovereignty of Somalia.

The chapter then moves to the fourth theme of peace-keeping economics which came out frequently as participants discussed the effectiveness of AMISOM. Under this theme, the participants suggest that the motives behind the neighbouring countries in Somalia along with their troops, are informed by the previous border and territorial disputes that the Somali government had with them as well as personal interests respectively. Participants argue that the neighbouring states are pursuing their national interests while the troops are also pursuing their own personal economic interests resulting in the delay of solving the Somali predicament.

The fifth theme is about the role of presidents. It emerged from the data that presidents are important in Somali politics as they influence decision making and have the capacity to influence the policies that directly deal with the civil war. The two presidents whose importance is outlined in this theme are Donald Trump, representing the US and Somali President, Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo. The final theme speaks to the overgeneralisation and the criminalisation of Muslim people that seems to be prevalent in the war on terror. The participants voice their opinions on how they feel about the way in which they are theorized. The main argument here is that the majority of Somali people, who are also Muslim, do not support terrorism and, therefore, speak against being essentialised in the war on terror.

#### **4.2 Support for US drone strikes and the war on terror: “If they killing al-Shabaab we are supporting”**

One of the biggest challenges that Somalia faces today is the alarming growth rate of al-Shabaab, which threatens the security of civilians. Despite concerted efforts taken by AMISOM troops and the US to attack al-Shabaab, its military strength seems to be growing and its attacks are intensifying. The rate at which the attacks are launched against al-Shabaab seems to be the rate at which it is growing and launching more strikes. As previously shown, its military strength was estimated to be between 7000-9000 troops in 2014 (Chiaramonte, 2014). Since its presence, al-Shabaab has been launching attacks not only against the Somali armed forces and the peace-keeping troops from AMISOM, but they have also been targeting innocent people. Their attacks are responsible for the deaths of thousands of people, and the

subsequent displacement of millions of people. One of the examples is the recent truck bomb attack that took place on the 14<sup>th</sup> October 2017 (Human Rights Watch, 2017) which has been described as the worst al-Shabaab attack in Somalia that killed at least 358 people in Central Mogadishu and injured over 500 hundred others (CNN, 2017).

There seemed to be a tacit agreement among the participants that the actions of al-Shabaab call for aggressive measures to be taken against al-Shabaab in order to halt the merciless killings that claim lives and threaten the future of Somalia. However, given the fact that the Somali Federal Government does not have the capacity to fight al-Shabaab on its own, due to multiple limiting factors such as; lack of resources, lack of manpower and insufficient funding, the Somali participants claimed that they fully support US extra-judicial killings against the members of al-Shabaab.

For some, al-Shabaab is seen as the stumbling block in the necessary process of state building in Somalia. When asked about her impressions on US actions in Somalia since 9/11, one of the participants, Xoriyo, a Somali house wife based in Uitenhage, whose interview was translated by another Somali woman because she does not fully comprehend English language, claimed to support US actions:

**XORIYO:** She is supporting USA because they are doing the right thing. And she say, if they are not killing innocent people, they only killing al-Shabaab people, we are supporting, but, if they killing innocent people we are not supporting.

Similarly, Geedi, a Somali Shop Manager based in Grahamstown also emphasised his support for the US actions in Somalia by claiming that the actions of al-Shabaab constitute actions of terror, and that the US is only fighting terrorism which then justifies its attack against al-Shabaab. What is fundamental about Geedi's viewpoint, is the fact that contrary to the findings of what can be called the "criminalisation thesis" in which some IR scholars consider the war on terror as framed around the criminalisation of Muslim people and the attack on Islamic ideology as discussed in the works of Mamdani (2002) in chapter two, Geedi views the war on terror as informed by the responsibility to protect. For Geedi, the war on terror represents the ultimate initiative taken by the US government to ensure the safety of both the Somalian and US civilians from the jaws of terror that threaten their security. This is briefly how Geedi argues his point:

**GEEDI:** Al-Shabaab is...you know...terrorism, international terrorism you know. So US and other powers of the world, they are fighting terrorism international, so that's why always they are attacking al-Shabaab.

Moreover, Fawzia, a Somali house wife also from Uitenhage, claimed to support the use of extra-judicial killings against al-Shabaab in Somalia. Initially, Fawzia's main argument, which is informed by her strong religious background and the parental teachings of her grandmother was that the murder of any human being is not justified at all. However, after a few minutes of deliberation, Fawzia argued that given the extent to which al-Shabaab has killed the lives of many innocent people and the magnitude by which al-Shabaab continues to threaten peace and stability in Somalia, she supports the use of drone strikes against al-Shabaab: Fawzia's contention is as follows:

**FAWZIA:** [I support US drones] because they are trying to fight al-Shabaab, it's better to fight against al-Shabaab because they kill innocent people.

While Dalmar, a Shop Manager in Grahamstown also shared the same sentiments as the above participants by supporting drone strikes in Somalia, he however, cautioned that US drone strikes alone are not a sufficient measure to defeat and undermine the threats of al-Shabaab. Instead, Dalmar calls for cooperation between the US intelligence forces, the CIA and the FBI with the Somali ground forces. Dalmar contends that this will be helpful since Somali ground forces are likely to know the perpetrators of terrorist attacks more than the US troops and most importantly, Dalmar reckons that this will also alleviate loss of life as the right targets will be targeted.

In favour of Dalmar's viewpoint, the literature shows that operations done in collaboration with the Somali armed forces have been the most effective in killing the most members of al-Shabaab. For instance, the International Security (2018) reported that "...a U.S. airstrike targeted and killed more than 100 al-Shabaab militants on Tuesday, November 21, 2017. The International Security also highlighted that, "the strike was conducted in cooperation with Somali ground forces on al-Shabaab camps in the Bur Elay area of Bay region" (International Security, 2018). Thus, Dalmar's argument seemed to reiterate the necessary cooperation between both the US intelligence and Somali's forces. This is how Dalmar puts it:

**DALMAR:** If they are eager to establish a Somali government which is proactively strong, because I don't think if the US...when they come up with the drones, African peace keeping soldiers, they send them to Somali...They can do anything, only Somalis they knows Somalis, so if they build the Somali military or Somali government as strong as it was before and they help it, may courage that president in Somalia but otherwise they are making worse the situation if they still use the drones and their actions rather than helping the Somalis.

However, quite a small number of the participants seemed to have little knowledge or no clue at all about drones when asked what they think of US actions in Somalia since 9/11. What caught my attention though, was the fact that whenever I mentioned the US, all they knew was that the US is associated with providing humanitarian assistance in the time of crisis. This could mean that the US drone strikes are not as publicised as one would think if there are still Somalis who are not aware of them or maybe they are referred to in a different way within Somali language. Also the denial could be a form of self-protection because if Somalis claim to know, they could be linked to al-Shabaab. For instance, when asked how he feels about the fact that the US has introduced the use of drones as part of its war on terror and that Somalia is the main country in Africa in which the US conducts drone strikes, Diric claimed that he does not know.

**DIRIC:** I don't know that about...I don't know nothing about that yah.

Moreover, Gargaaro also claimed that she does not know a lot about the use of drones. She understood the US government as playing a key role in the humanitarian assistance.

**GARGAARO:** It's like people who help others people, so it's like they are...they are like helpers of other people who are suffering or who are in need of helping you see? So I don't know them.

An Official of the Embassy of the Federal Government of Somali Republic in South Africa, Mr. Ahmed also claimed that he supports the US drone strikes conducted in Somalia to hunt members of al-Shabaab along with the war on terror in general. This is how Ahmed put it:

**AHMED:** Yah, I support the Global War on Terror, yes, yah, yes Global War on Terror, yes why not? I am supposed to, I don't understand. Global War on Terror, the war is there facing, the problem is that, whether is the Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, Somalia a little bit and this is the...to solve it because it's not good for the people, it's not for the people, all of the world like...the last 7 years or 8 years in Nigeria, you see them, Boko Haram, it's not good everywhere it's not good, but if the...all of the world come one line or against them, it should be kill' em.

Ahmed's account of his support for the US drone strikes in his capacity as a representative of the Somali government is interesting for two reasons; First of all, it comes in the midst of an ongoing debate among IR scholars as to whether the US intervention and the use of drones to hunt members of al-Qaeda in fragile states such as Pakistan, Afghanistan and Libya can be considered as a breach of sovereignty or not (Kretzmer, 2005).

This is based on the fact that these interventions are not authorised by the UNSC and the states concerned. Some scholars have argued that drone strikes are counter-productive and amount to a breach of sovereignty as they exacerbate state collapse instead of facilitating the possibility for peace in a weak state (Prasow, 2015; Tyler, 2016). Secondly, while the views of Ahmed do not necessarily represent those of the Somali Government, his support for drone strikes is interesting given the reactions of other governments, such as Pakistan, towards the conduct of US drone strikes in their countries. For instance, the ambassador of Pakistan to the UN, ZamirAkram, "called for international legal action to halt the totally counterproductive attacks by the US in his country." (The Guardian, 2012).

#### **4.3 Loss of life: "If the two bulls fight some people will get destroyed"**

Like many other technologies of war, the drone technology has been developed over the years, including in the period after its adoption in the war on terror, as a convenient way of fighting transnational terrorism. The transition from the Bush administration to the Obama administration witnessed the implementation of many checks and balances in an attempt to minimise the loss of life, understood to mean the accidental deaths of innocent civilians. However, what has become a concern for some scholars of IR is the fact that despite the checks and balances implemented in the Obama administration, drones still continue to

contribute to the loss of life, and thus undermine their own effectiveness. At the height of this debate, some scholars have argued that drone strikes are counter-productive and, therefore, should be abolished (Holzer et al, 2009 & Mwangi, 2012).

They base their arguments on several case studies where the US has conducted its drone strikes such as Pakistan, in which a target of 41 alleged terrorists resulted in the killing of 1,147 civilians (Akerman, 2014:1) and a US drone strike that hit 41 civilians at the funeral (Friedersdorf, 2016). Another case study is Afghanistan where the use of drones attracted wide spread protests after reports that civilians have been killed. Thus, writing at the beginning of Donald Trump's administration, the findings of this thesis also show that the loss of life continues to undermine the effectiveness of drones. The argument is based on the data that emerged, in which the participants interviewed revealed that while they support US drone strikes as shown in the above section, they do not support the loss of life. Two participants in particular opened up that their families are victims to the loss of life that came as a result of the US drone strikes.

**CAWIL:** My father is dead, my mother get bombed in the house. My brother now is going like this [Limping], he don't have this leg. My father is dead after something...one year something...peoples fight again, my brother get some and my mother get that bomb coming zoo one time nqooo!

Other participants also testified that US drone strikes do affect innocent people and mentioned cases in which civilians have been affected. Xoriyo even reported that sometimes the US troops while in the process of conducting their intelligence programme arrest women and children.

**XORIYO:** Several times yes they attack and arrest them people like children and you see but now she say she don't know about it.

In a different account, Barre attests that it is true that the US drone strikes sometimes hit innocent people but also explains why. Barre explains that sometimes those in control of the US drones do not know that al-Shabaab members are hiding amongst innocent civilians or sometimes that they are keeping civilians with them as hostages who then become loss of life when the US strikes.

**BARRE:** Sometimes when they throw the drones it land on and this people they hiding the people so it is lack of knowledge kill them a lot innocent people that way some people say no its better than killing more people and they don't know who is al-Shabaab who is destroying them. It's difficult.

When asked about which places are mostly vulnerable to be taken over by the al-Shabaab in a manner that exposes them to the risk of being stricken by the US drones, this is how Barre responded:

**BARRE:** Those areas there are farmers people who went to do their farming and then these people they got a big base there called Marka in that way while they are fighting with their server if the two bulls fight so you know some people will get destroyed. That's how and there is no way they complain, you die you die.

Moreover, Barre also highlighted that the drone strikes have resulted with the destruction of property:

**BARRE:** We talking about property destruction. Yah there was every minute and every time. You shower there the...what do you call the bullet and everything you hear gugugu everywhere some people they don't care.

It is interesting to note that one of the participants, Gargaaro pointed out that it is difficult to identify the perpetrator responsible for the loss of life between the US and al-Shabaab. This task becomes even more difficult especially due to the fact that the US conceals its information, especially regarding the statistics of drones since they consider it as classified information.

**GARGAARO:** my father was killed by unknown people and when he went to mosque, he went to pray and then after other people came and told us the sad story like even my brothers it's the only person who [is] alive now is only me and my mother decide to leave me not my uncle decide to take me there because she had the sad story you see.

You see there is a fight, no one only come to kill you, but there is a fight. And then people are sleeping, maybe you see, it's like bombing house and then... so my mother only have me and then my uncle decide to take me at my brother of my mother.

These accounts emphasise the need for the US to improve their intelligence services in order to avoid the increased loss of life. One way of improving intelligence is through consultation with the Somali ground forces in locating targets as well as forging relationships with the participants as they could provide valuable information about the whereabouts of al-Shabaab. Given the sensitivity around the loss of life and how it undermines intervention as shown above, the data suggests the need for the US to guard against its continuation as this could result in the US losing all the support they have from the civilians

#### **4.4 Displacement from Somalia: “everyone is scattered”**

One of the main objectives of this study is to understand the local consequences of the ongoing war in Somalia. The theme of displacement has emerged from the data as one of the major consequences of the Somalian conflict. This is because all the participants interviewed are in fact the victims of displacement themselves. The participants describe the current situation in Somalia as a state of chaos, with no job opportunities, lack of medical services, high levels of famine, critical security conditions, human rights violations and countless murders, among many others. They told me that, contrary to other peaceful states such as South Africa, where people are preoccupied with making a living for themselves, they claimed that the Somali predicament is such that Somalians are concerned with surviving the next bullet.

The participants identified the Somali precarity as the main reason that forced them to leave Somalia. From their accounts, it is apparent that living in Somalia is highly risky especially for the civilians with no weapons or skills. They narrated emotionally charging experiences they encountered as they were forced by circumstances beyond their competences to leave their beloved country to a destination they do not know. It was an emotional journey they had no visa for, one of leaving their properties, their loved ones, including friends and family members behind without saying the goodbyes. Through life histories interviews, Somali participants drew vivid images that offer an imaginative access into the journeys they travelled, from the countries they passed, the rivers and lakes they crossed, to getting arrested in foreign countries due to lack of documentation as well as having to walk long distances.

The whole experience made them undergo three stages of “Triple Trauma” as discussed in chapter three. While the chaotic experiences they had in Somalia seemed to be the order of the day as violence seems to be normalized by al-Shabaab military in Somalia,

for most Somali participants, despite going through a series of dramatic experiences, they identified one particular event that served as a wakeup call and forced them to leave Somalia. One of the participants, Gargaaro, claimed that the loss of her parents as well as the loss of close relatives and neighbours compelled her to leave Somalia. Gargaaro told me that having suffered such a tragic loss, her next priority in life became the pursuit of peace and happiness especially after being exposed to such a terrible life at a young age.

**GARGAARO:** My father was killed by unknown people and when he went to Mosk, he went to pray and then after, other people came and told us the sad story like even my brothers, it's the only person who live now, is only me and my mother decide to leave me and my uncle decide to take me there because she had the sad story you see? So that's why I ran away.

Moreover, another participant, Xoriyo, recounts a similar tragic experience of losing her husband and brother, which has left her with a burden of four children. Thus, in the midst of this highly unpredictable war her next priority became the need to move the children to safety and to save her life. This then became the reason why she ultimately decided to come to South Africa.

**XORIYO:** They kill my father, my brother...so and I have four children there and take father four children for me and that is why I...I feel stressed. **TRANSLATOR:** It's like she feel sad, sadness so she run away from ...after what happened.

For one sales manager, Barre, based in Port Elizabeth, above all the terrible experiences that he had endured throughout the war, including the loss of many family members, it was the near-death experience that finally compelled him to leave Somalia. Not only did Barre not know that by leaving Somalia he was setting himself up for fresh challenges in South Africa, but also that the process of escaping itself would certainly be unbearable. Barre narrates how his journey unfolded and the tragedies he encountered along the way as he was displaced:

**BARRE:** There is one time that you know, they are some group they are fighting each other, because they are...each one is saying, follow my rules, they fighting each other and then they throwing those bombs and what...and I see while I was walking there...there was a big...I don't know that things they throwing is blowing in front of me. The place entertain is there, is their area, they are there so those people throw something bomb and already

the big house blast and it was in front of me. So I run to the nearest place, a prayer place, and then I was...the whole day I was there...scaring when you gonna die. That was my worst since and then so every morning, you see, so and so died, so and so died, so and so died, what are you waiting for? The people you know have already died and property is destroyed. At last, we tried to smuggle, you can't say I am going out. If they heard that so and so is leaving, they will look after you and they will search for you and if they get you....

Given the prevailing circumstances in Somalia, one would think that it is important for the Somalis to remain connected with their families for emotional and moral support as a way of survival and dealing with the effects of war. However, contrary to that assumption, Barre's account shows that in the process of escaping, familial connection becomes secondary to survival. When asked whether one leaves without their family members in the process of escaping, this is how Barre responded:

**BARRE:** The family must go...they flee, when you going together is when there is peace but when there is no peace everyone is scattered, one is going to Ethiopia, the other one is going there, the other one is going there, the other one is going there...don't care who is there...So there is no...and...and then especially when you're from...your clan is not the majority, other one is also ruling you. So, it becomes a problem. It's becoming like a dilemma. You can't stay...you can't go...what you gonna do? And there is no money.

With reference to the latest developments in Somalia especially in the period leading to the general elections that saw president Farmaajo win the elections, another participant, Fawzia, narrates an overpowering life that awaits the people staying in Somalia which is also highly intolerable. Fawzia emphasized that words alone cannot even begin to describe the kind of life that they go through in Somalia and highlighted that the circumstances will force anyone to leave Somalia.

**FAWZIA:** I came here on 2016. The experience you see if you stay there....you see you had some people there, bomb suicide you see when you stay that place is in Somalia....Ok yah its was...yah...I can't say that do you remember...that life is very pain, you can't stay even for one day if you go there.

Accordingly, Aaminah, who is an unemployed Somali woman based in Port Elizabeth also shared the same sentiments as Fawzia including lack of job opportunities:

**AAMINAH:** You know there is too much fighting, people you gonna fight every time there is not good place that place, every time...aha people killing every time, is so much stress you don't have the job, is like that the whole week. I leave you know, there my country hurt...hurt...hurt you see? If you don't want to go that people is gonna give the relative the job because nobody is gonna know you.

Moreover, Geedi, a Somali shopkeeper based in Grahamstown, shares how his journey took place from Somalia to South Africa. Geedi outlines the difficult process

**GEEDI:** By car, by car I using by car, from Somalia to South Africa, I using by car. I come from straight Somalia, that time I was have some money to call out...you know...thanks. I come in Kenya, and when I come Kenya, I call some of my relatives living in America, Europe what...what...what and then they collecting me some money and then Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, straight to South Africa. Some countries they are disturbing us you know, because we are not have you know...any document to allow me to live in their country so you know...conduct, that someone you knows they are talking hours, they are giving some money, they are allowing me sometime, we are making like you know...we are not going straight, we are making... [Meandering] Sometime, we are using by foot longer time maybe four hours...walking by foot. Even you know river? Sometime we are crossing the river by foot. Coming here...hard...hard!!! It was very difficult at that time. Serious. It was 2012. Aaaaah...I was, Kenya to here maybe 1 and half months, one and half month maybe 42 days. Zambia we were there maybe 8 days we are waiting someone to carry in Zimbabwe. When that guy is coming Zimbabwe maybe we are walking maybe seven days.

Furthermore, another Grahamstown Somali Shopkeeper, Dalmar speaks of a life of peace and tranquillity that he endured prior to the state collapse, with tears almost cascading from his face.

**Dalmar:** By the time I was young, we grow up a good life cos there was no civil war in our time when we were youth. But we grow up with...eh...when the situation was changing and everywhere was like the fear of fighting and the situation was very bad, when I chose grow up and I remember something I was twelve years old 1991 and then you can feel when the child is 12 years old how his life is becoming. So I grow up and when I feel just understanding as a person, I grow up with a fear and the

sound of bullets. I was just carry on studying that is when the civil war broken up, then after that we fled from our place.

Diric who works as a shop distributor at a mall in Port Elizabeth recalls his childhood memories as riddled with bomb explosions and guns firing.

**DIRIC:** No, I will go together to run away all the family to come to Kenya. That time, I am not sure, that time I'm too young and you see here you are if you go outside and you see the bomb noise and if you are...you see if the night you sleeping there your housing is coming the bomb something, I can't remember that time I'm leaving Somalia.

These narratives of the participants highlight the importance of understanding war as an experience which profoundly changes the social life. The Somali war was, in a sense, deconstructing their families as Barre claims that they were scattered. The loss of contact and the process of leaving one's family with no prospects of seeing them again in future really affects one's social life. These narratives are a testament to the legacy of the non-resolution of the Somali question, almost thirty years later. These experiences, show as Sylvester argues, that human bodies must be brought into focus as bodies with war agency

#### **4.5 Al-Shabaab's ideology is un-Islamic**

The previous chapters have alleged to the possibility that America's war on terror could be unjustified as it rests on a fallacious misconception that Islamic religion is responsible for the spread of terrorism around the world as part of its global jihad. The reasoning behind this misconception is the fact that the unfortunate events of 9/11 were masterminded by Muslim such as Osama Bin Laden and as a result, the entire generation of Muslims is generalized as terrorists. The subsequent ban of 7 states, majority of which, are Muslim, including Somalia by America's new president, Donald Trump, only strengthen this generalisation about Muslims and Islam. There are studies that support the claim that Islam is responsible for the spread of terrorism. For instance, Bar (2004) argues that; "while terrorism, even in the form of suicide attacks – is not an Islamic phenomenon by definition, it cannot be ignored that the lion's share of terrorist acts and most devastating of them in recent years have been perpetrated in the name of Islam" (Bar, 2004). Arguing in similar vein, Venkatraman (2007) holds that, "extreme religious interpretations of the Quran and the movement of Islamic revivalism influence the emergence and progression of violent Jihad in contemporary times"

(Venkatraman, 2007). On the other hand, some scholars have argued that the above arguments amount to fallacious misconceptions, claiming that Islamic religion is not responsible for global terrorism. For instance, Dowd & Raleigh (2013) contend that, “violent Islamist groups emerge in and are shaped by distinct domestic contexts and issues, a feature that is obscured by a totalizing narrative of global Islamic terrorism.” Moreover, in a survey carried out by Fisher et al (2007) in Germany, it was revealed that the Muslims were not different from Christians in aggression and more importantly did not support terrorism (Fisher et al, 2007).

The findings of this research show that that the majority of Muslim people do not support al-Shabaab’s ideology and by extension, the ideologies of other affiliated terrorist groups such as al-Qaida and Boko-Haram because they are irreconcilable with their religion. All the participants including Somali refugees, research experts and government officials argued that the events of al-Shabaab are in no way representative of the entire generation of Muslims. In fact, their main argument was that the terrorists only constitute a minute statistic of Muslims around the world which are currently estimated to be over a billion people.

Moreover, participants claimed that it is really unfair for them to be essentialised as terrorists in the war on terror as they do not support the ideology of al-Shabaab because it is un-Islamic as it involves cold blooded killing, torture, rape, forced marriages, illegal taxation, confiscation of property, among others, which are not supported by their religion. Majority of the participants distanced themselves from the ideology of al-Shabaab claiming that it is irreconcilable with their cultural upbringing and the dictates of Allah, who is used as the point of reference and moral guide in their lives and the book of Koran. Participants voiced their opinions as shown below: Ahmed begins by speaking against overgeneralization and states that 99% of Muslim are not terrorists:

**AHMED:** Muslim people, yah...everybody suspects our country, you are from here or from Pakistan ah...everybody...very...very problem for the Muslims, if someone Muslim drive and come, they are the problem for the Somalia, the same Somalia, the people of Somalia chasing for these terrorists ah...for the terrorists requisitely, you know, they can’t go to the USA today but there is a reason for that, they are thought to be terrorists, yah it’s not good for us. Yah, everybody is...yah it’s not good that, it’s not everybody. Muslim, 95 percent, 99 percent, they are not the terrorists.

Aaminah starts off by speaking against the way in which Muslims are theorised in the war on terror in which they are seen as monsters to which human lives are secondary to their religion. In the following text, she seeks to prove that besides the guidelines, there are no fundamental differences between Christianity and Islam.

**AAMINAH:** I think you are Christian neh? And me, I am Muslim neh? If you are Christian, you...you are Christian. If you mean Muslim, I have my religion and you have your religion, my book is Koran and your book is Bible, one, not...is only difference is for...for the Koran and the Bible and God is one.

Aaminah continues to claim that by virtue of the actions they commit, al-Shabaab members ideology is totally against their religion and what they represent as Muslim people:

**AAMINAH:** I can't believe because people is coming to kill someone, you know, even God you say, you can't kill...you can't kill me because you are person, me, I'm person. You know, that people, I can't believe over my life because is people that are dangerous, too much dangerous, killing people easy you know. If he catch for me, he Can't say this is lady, he gonna kill me, he gonna do for me whatever I [he] want, you know, exclude people good, I hate all of them, Al-Qaida and Boko Haram and al-Shabaab, I hate.

The same sentiments were reiterated by Gargaaro:

**GARGAARO:** What I think is they' [Americans] doing good job because in our religion is not accepting to kill a human being, you see? So, even to kill or to do a bad in our religion is not accepting. So, they doing the right thing to finish al-Shabaab I'm supporting them.

In a detailed manner, Barre explains the fundamentals of al-Shabaab which disqualify it from the Islamic religion at large. He also speaks to its practices:

**BARRE:** [Al-Shabaab] They are a group of people who claim themselves as religious but they are not, they got their own movement but they are covering under the umbrella of.....saying we are a religious group. They are using that umbrellas. And sometimes, they take it from other people from other countries. White people from America.... They take it from...they got many people in different countries, but the majority of them, they are those that stay there. So, what they do is, they got their own, they working like their own rules and

then, they are not allowed to go out of their rules. One of the rules is that if they say...ah your house...we need your house...you can't tell them that I can't give you, you have to go out. Yah I want your house. I want your car, I want this...so there is no life. If they say we gonna take your daughter, there is no otherwise that you can claim them or defend them.

Willem a training coordinator from the Institute of Security Studies (ISS) weighs in on the explanation given by Barre and clarifies the ideology of al-Shabaab while in the same process establishing a link between al-Shabaab and other terrorist groups.

**WILLEM:** If you look at the war on terror I think...my opinion on that is...a war of terror is basically a war of two ideologies not religion because I believe that what al-Shabaab is advocating, what ISIS is advocating is not religion its...ideology based on...they take it back on the back of religion and what happened with the war on terror is that what these guys want is they want the crusaders, the Christians to attack their religion and then they want to make it as [if] it's a battle, it's a holy war between Islam and the Christians which is not.

At the end of his contention, Willem suggests the way in which this problem of terrorism could be solved, which ensures that Muslims are not essentialised and that this war is not misinterpreted to be a war between Christianity and Islam.

**WILLEM:** I think if the Americans and the free world would have been more wise if they could have mobilised the Muslim countries or traditional Muslim countries to take the lead in the fight against terror or in the war against terror, instead of the Christians or the Christian countries, that would have taken away that recruiting factor and that factor of these terrorists to promote their ideology and then promote it as being a Jihad and it's a fight to protect our religion because it's not protecting religion, religion is protecting their ideology

#### **4.6 Peace-Keeping Economics: Ethiopia and Kenya**

The roles played by Ethiopia and Kenya also kept emerging from the data. As neighbouring countries to Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia have been involved in the Somali conflict in an attempt to try and alleviate the conflict in Somalia. These neighbouring countries have contributed in terms of providing their own troops to the Somali Federal government in support of the manpower of troops that fight al-Shabaab. This is because, one of the challenges that the Somali government had was the fact that as a result of the state collapse,

majority of the Somalian territory was controlled by al-Shabaab military leaving less room for the Somali government to run the country.

However, some scholars argued that the intervention of Ethiopia and Kenya in Somalia was clouded and informed by their individual national interests and their long-standing history of border and territorial disputes with Somalia. They claimed that these states have prioritised their national interests instead of the “peace interest” of Somalia and restoring peace and stability in Somalia. They then conclude from this point that this prolonged the conflict. For instance, Throup (2012) argues that Kenya intervened in Somalia for different reasons including personal economic and political interests. These interests included; “...to gain personally from the stabilization of trade in cattle and other commodities, to capture the port of Kismayu (sic) and to establish a Kenya-dominated buffer zone south of the river Juba”(Throup, 2012). Similarly, Menkhaus (2003) holds that, “[among other] numerous external actors who possess the interests and capacity to spoil political initiatives they do not like (Ethiopia is the most obvious but not the sole example)” (Menkhaus, 2003).

Moreover, the Human Rights Watch Report (2017) claims that, according to UNSOM, AMISOM and other foreign forces were responsible for a significant number of civilian casualties during ground operations against al-Shabaab and in airstrikes” (Human Rights Watch, 2017). The interviews revealed different views about the roles played by the neighbouring countries. However, it is worth noting that majority of the Somali participants claim that Ethiopia and Kenya are pursuing their individual interests in Somalia. Also noteworthy is the fact that, while there are claims from different participants that the AMISOM troops delay peacekeeping processes because of their personal interests, there are no official UN reports (including the recent report released by Michael Keating) that support these claims. In his capacity as UN Secretary General’s Special representative for Somalia, Keating’s report that covers the period from, 1<sup>st</sup> January 2016 to 14<sup>th</sup> October 2017 claims that “there is not enough being done by parties to the conflict” (OHCHR, 2017).

Some of the Somali participants told me that, Kenya in particular, initially helped Somalia but later on the government of Kenya started pursuing its interests. Some participants also mentioned that Ethiopia and Kenyan troops deployed in Somalia are also pursuing their own individual interests. They claimed that some of these troops are responsible for the human rights violations in Somalia instead of protecting the Somali

civilian society. Moreover they explained that the reason behind the Somali conflict lasting for so long is partly due to these soldiers who intentionally prolong their stay in order to enrich themselves by getting huge salaries provided by the UN. Geedi identifies the intervention by Ethiopia and Kenya as clouded by the border dispute that Somalia has with the two countries. Geedi notes that this tension makes the motives of these two countries questionable:

**GEEDI:** They have never...they have never support us. You know, the first enemy of Somalia is Ethiopia. How can you support...how can you support your enemy? Never happened!!! So...can you support your enemy? No!!! Never happened. So, I don't think Somalia think Kenya and Ethiopia, we are brothers, you see? Always we are fighting the borders, "borderland", you know? Ethiopia is like so. So, they have no making peace in our neighbour. They have no making peace in our neighbour.

Moreover, Ahmed who restricted himself from providing a detailed explanation about the intervention in Somalia due to the calibre of his office, briefly alluded to the fact that Kenya has its own vested interests in Somalia and so does its troops.

**AHMED:** No, it's not guaranteed...some people may sell their reason behind and they think Kenya is helping and it's not eh, I can't say...I can't say...

However, Dalmar's account shows that it is not only the neighbouring countries that have a vested interest in Somalia, but that America also could be pursuing its national interests in Somalia.

**DALMAR:** every nation has got an interest in Somalia, but I don't know if they've got other interests rather than what's...the al-Shabaab or the other links...the other groups which is linked to terrorists, but I don't know any interest but every nation in the world has got an interest in Somalia and I feel that America also has got their own interest in Somalia because we have got a strategic place like the "Bara-Bara" which is a sea-port which is lying at the golf of Athens.

However, Gargaaro acknowledged that Kenya used to help Somalia before but then after some time things changed and Kenya seemed to be pursuing its own interests to the detriment of the Somali people:

**GARGAARO:** Kenya they give support, so it means you see...that refugee camp in Kenya now they support those people there before, but now, I heard they want to remove them go back to Kenya [Somalia]. They want them to go back...I don't know why they...but, before they were supporting them.

In addition to the prevailing national interests that prolong Somali conflict, is the personal interests exhibited by the troops that are deployed by the African Union who seem to benefit from the status quo of Somalia. Some of the participants highlighted this as one of the challenges. This is captured by the accounts of Fawzia and Geedi as follows:

**FAWZIA:** No, they are not helping anything. What I only think it's only they...they...go to...to...build the...the... maybe the houses or what...there is no peace, because how many countries are there in Somalia? It's like Rwanda...how many, how many peace keepers and there is no peace you see? No peace, they just go by their own self. ..So I don't know what they are doing guys we must ask them.

**GEEDI:** You know Uganda and Burundi...and they are staying there and they are always fighting al-Shabaab, they are supporting that and Somalia and troops. They are together Somali troops and these African troops, they are together. They are fighting al-Shabaab. They help but they don't want to...that troops they don't want to give Somalia peace you know...they don't want to...they are keeping that interest. Each soldiers...now each soldiers his salary \$1200.00. Each soldiers is \$1200.00...and Somalia soldiers you know his salary? R100.00. and these ones they are taking \$ 1200.00. So these soldiers from Africa they don't want to get...they don't want to restoration in Somalia they don't want to give Somalia peace so that they can keep getting their salaries. Yah salaries. They are building now houses in their countries. You see? They can...you know...al-Shabaab if they want to...if they are honest and they are wanting to fight al-Shabaab they can finish a few days, all of the country they can hunt all of the country a few days but they don't want. Because that you know contract is finish and that money if the...if it's finished that contract that money is finished, if they are staying in their country they are not getting this money. This money is from UN. When they are in their countries they don't get \$1200.00.Aaaa never!

In addition to all these accounts, one of the participants, Cawil claimed that in addition to the pursuit of their personal interests, Ethiopia and Kenya's troops also take advantage of Somalia's political instability and commit sexual offences to the Somalis knowing that there is no justice system there:

**CAWIL:** The soldiers for Ethiopia? Yoh! if they see Somalian they kill finish.... and he rubs and he rubs...ladies rubbing...rubbing...grabbing kiss for ladies, no one saying anything because there is no human rights that side. No one can say anything if you say why you do like that people shoot you nquuuuu!!!

However, contrary to all the negative feedback about the work of AMISOM troops from Kenya and Ethiopia by the Somalian participants, Omar Mahmood who is a regional expert from the Institute for Security Studies, brought a different view about the role of these troops. Omar argues that in as much as these troops have been criticised about a lot of things, one has to acknowledge that they had a tremendous contribution to the rebuilding of the state. Omar argues that this contribution was most evident about ten years ago when they were able to reclaim some of the territory lost to al-Shabaab military and helped establish administration of the federal government. This is how he puts it:

**OMAR:** Yeah it's definitely helped by far, I mean if you look at where we were ten years ago, the government couldn't even set foot in Somalia and especially not in Moqadishu. I mean,- none of that wouldn't be possible without AMISOM and I think that AMISOM takes a lot of criticism but some of that I feel it's unfair, it's clearly helped the situation. Yeah absolutely none of that would have been possible without AMISOM, it has played a key role.

The narratives of the participants show that personal and national interests as conveyed by peace-keeping troops and the governments of neighbouring countries respectively, are central in hampering the effective project of restoring peace and stability in Somalia. It is apparent from these accounts that for Somalis, the longer the peace-keepers remain in Somalia is most likely the worse the situation will become. Whether or not peace-keepers actually pursue their interests as claimed is not important in this instance as it is the Somalis' perceptions that inform the way in which the peace keepers are received and the driving force behind the recruitment of others into al-Shabaab.

#### **4.7 Roles played by presidents in the Somali conflict: “The Wrong President”**

One of the themes that emerged from the data is the roles played by the presidents in the Somali conflict. From the data gathered, it became apparent that presidents also have a critical role to play in this war since they are in charge of the state apparatus and have

considerable influence in agenda-setting, foreign policy decision-making and most importantly, the use of military and state forces. For instance, the shift from the George W. Bush's administration towards Barack Obama's administration has been key to Somalian politics as it witnessed an increased use of drones in Somalia although this was also balanced by the institution of more checks and balances to regulate the rate of loss of life.

Moreover, Donald Trump's administration came with more stringent rules which included among other things; the indefinite ban of seven states, majority of which are all Muslim including Somalia. All these decisions highlight the roles that the US presidents have played in Somali conflict and how their decisions have affected the Somali state. In the same manner, the data also showed that the Somalian president also has a critical role to play in the conflict as Somalia is currently a much divided state. For instance, the choice of the Somali president has implications on the future of al-Shabaab since al-Shabaab is based on the grievances of some of the minority clans that claim to be disregarded by the Federal government. In reaction to the triumph of the new president of the US, majority of Somali participants reflected feelings of sadness and exhibited the loss for hope in terms of the future of US intervention in Somalia.

The participants conveyed a particular dislike and disapproval towards the current US president and this has changed the way in which they view America and its role in Somalia. The perception of American president in Somalia is critical for two reasons: First of all, this could be exploited by al-Shabaab as a recruiting factor for more Somalis as it ties up with their global Jihad and the theorisation of the West as an imperial leader. Secondly, this could result in the increased use of drones in Somalia. This is how some of the participants reacted:

**CAWIL** At least the United States he help Somalians, he give...its not now. Before is Barack Obama is president, is helping the Somalians. But now he is there, wrong President [Donald Trump], what's his name? Yoh! He say he don't want to see Somalians, Sudans, he don't want to see Muslims. United Nations before, people he was helping, before people was going...going...now he stop it because of him. ...Me I go interview two times for United Nations and he stop it that time my son, my wife was pregnant, here is my wife. Until now, he didn't phone us anymore, because of Donald Trump. You see number? I gave number to the United Nations and now everything stopped, no one calls.

Similarly, Diric also had something to say about president Trump:

**DIRIC:** I think the Somalian, this president of United States is not like the Somalian and what...what...what...These African people is not like...but before Barack Obama, you [was] helping the Somalian. Because Donald Trump, I [he] can't help the Somalian I [he] can't change the something. Because Somalian you stay there in America, he say you must go your country.

Contrary to the negative comments that I found about the newly elected president of the US, most participants showed overwhelming support for the new President of Somalia and seem to be hopeful for the future. This is interesting for Somalian politics because ever since the collapse of Barre, the incoming presidents have been subject to controversy with their credentials highly questioned by different clans. However, the data shows that Farmaajo, is supported fairly across all different clans that I interviewed. This is how participants responded:

**AAMINAH:** I hope Farmaajo is gonna do things for many years, I think maybe two years we gonna see sometimes we can see its coming you know already is the 8<sup>th</sup> Month.

**DIRIC:** Somali government now is the new government, is not like long time now is the small peace the people is not like long time now is better so because we got the nice president [Farmaajo] you say this president you make the small peace the country you are serve nicely you say this the militaries of the country I will give me the salary because long time the military I can't get the salary because the country is poor.

**DALMAR:** Our President is Muhammed Barre Farmaajo. Muhammed Barre is the best man until... from 1991 he is honest. He will try always to postulation for the Somali peace you know. He makes more efforts more efforts. So the situation of Somali now is nice before... yah is nice before...yah is better than before because of the new president. Yah Farmaajo

However, Dalmar raised serious concerns of possible state capture about the recently elected Somali President indicating that he is also vulnerable to be captured by the governments of the neighbouring countries:

**DALMAR:** [Ethiopia and Kenya] always you know, they always making...I don't know what to call it, when somebody is running...yeah they cut [Trip] our feet because some of our parliament, they are calling the phone you know...even the president is not alone. They are contact [captured]. They are

making make and this...this...this, they are contact...they are making do like this like this, they are making like remote control...they always interfere our situation. So I don't believe so. I will like to stop that interfere [Intervention] in our Somalia.

#### **4.8 Conclusion**

This chapter has attempted to discuss findings of the research by outlining the themes that emerged from the data according to the frequency at which they kept recurring and their particular importance in answering the research questions. These themes included the support for drone strikes, loss of life, peace keeping economics and the roles played by Kenya and Ethiopia, the Misinterpretation of Islam in the war on terror and the roles played by the presidents. The chapter argued that despite all the controversy surrounding the legitimacy of the war on terror itself, the mannerism in which it is conducted as well as the controversial tactics that it employs, the majority of Somali participants showed an overwhelming support for the US intervention. Somali participants support the US extra-judicial killings because they are understood to undermine al-Shabaab strength which has become a major source of insecurity in Somalia. The thesis argued that extra-judicial killings are not effective as they only alleviate Somalia's sovereignty from further weakening but do not strengthen it. The findings show that this could be improved advancing the technology of drone strikes and engaging the Somalia military. The chapter has argued that loss of life and displacement speak to the continued and real impact of the war on everyday lives of Somalis. The chapter also highlighted how al-Shabaab manipulates Islamic people to get them to support al-Shabaab. It was shown that al-Shabaab members theorize the US intervention and the war on terror as an attack towards Muslims and Islam by Christianity.

## **Chapter Five**

### **Perception of US power, human costs and the future of Somalia**

#### **5.1 Introduction**

The previous chapter has identified the key themes arising from the data through privileging the voices of the participants central to this discussion. This chapter seeks to provide a deeper understanding, interpretation and analysis of the themes established in chapter four by looking at how they respond to the initial research questions that guide this study. Firstly, the chapter will discuss in detail the theme of rationalization for the use of drones to pursue al-Shabaab in Somalia as held by the participants. Under this theme, it is argued that the support for the use of drones by the US suggests that the Somalis interpret the nature of the US intervention as liberal and based on the notions of peace and the fight against global terrorism. This is important as it shows that Somalis do not view the war on terror as an attack on Islam as al-Shabaab members perceive it. Secondly, the chapter discusses the theme of loss of life as a local consequence of drone use in Somalia. The chapter notes the sensitive rejection from the Somali participants regarding the casualties that have resulted from the actions of the US. It will be argued that the human losses can be used by al-Shabaab to recruit more members. Thirdly, in the theme of displacement, it is shown that the Somalis do not manage to escape the war and that its impacts affect them daily. It is also argued that the massive loss of population further weakens the sovereignty of Somalia. Under the theme of peace-keeping economics, it is shown that the national interests and personal interests of peacekeepers also undermine the project of state-building in Somalia. The following section discusses the implications and the manipulation of Islamic ideology by al-Shabaab and how this could be countered in the fight against terrorism. Finally, the chapter discusses the role played by the two presidents, MuhamedFarmaajo and Donald Trump in the Somali civil war. The chapter argues that their actions have foreign policy implications in this war.

#### **5.2 Perceptions of US power, intervention and sovereignty**

One of the objectives of this research, as outlined in chapter one, was to understand the nature of the current US intervention in Somalia and its implications for the future of humanitarian intervention. The findings of the research under the theme of rationalisation and

legitimation of drones in chapter four reveal that there was an overwhelming support for the use of drone strikes in Somalia by the Somali participants. The support for the use of drones suggests that majority of the Somali participants believe that the nature of the US intervention is a peaceful one which is also based on the notions of liberal peace. For these Somali participants, the world order that the US seems to be advancing is understood to be a liberal order which means no harm but good to the project of state building and the establishment of sustainable peace in Somalia.

The belief held by these Somalis is in line with the one reflected in the work of John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan (1990) in *“The Legitimation of Hegemonic Power”*, in which they argue that the US domestic political system emphasizes its liberal democratic nature. This also ties up with the work of Christopher Laynes (2006) in his article, *“The Unipolar illusion Revisited”* when describing the US as a “benevolent hegemon” based on the fact that as a powerful state, the US seeks to protect weaker states (Laynes, 2006:19). However, in order to further clarify this point, the section will benefit from a discussion of the meaning attached to the US intervention that is based on the notion of liberal peace. An intervention based on liberal peace refers to one that is informed by the goal to restore peace and stability in a collapsed state, the establishment of the rule of law, the fight against global terrorism, the spread of democracy and liberal ideas. This intervention is often characterized by the provision of humanitarian assistance in the form of public goods which could not otherwise be provided by the failed state to its own civilians and this could include among other things; security of civilians, the provision of food, shelter, emergency medical services and in some cases, basic education.

Thus, according to this view espoused by the Somali participants, the US intervention in Somalia is not interpreted as the breach of sovereignty since Somalia’s sovereignty had already declined paving way for the international community to intervene. Moreover, the support for drone strikes by Somali participants, as reflected in the findings chapter, means that they do not interpret the intervention as an imposition of the liberal order but rather as a necessary step in protecting civilians against terrorism. The Somalis I interviewed perceive the US as a humanitarian assistant which provides them with food, medical services, education and security from al-Shabaab. Although the decline of US power has been heavily contested, with other scholars such as Archaya (2014) suggesting that we are now living in a “Multiplex world”, it is important to note that for these Somali participants, the US is still considered the sole surviving super-power in charge of making world order.

This is grounded on the fact that there seemed to be a general sense of idolisation, admiration and respect for the US echoed from their interviews. For instance, Cawil and Aaminah considered the US as an alternative to South Africa especially after surviving the tragic xenophobic attacks they experienced in South Africa. Relying on feedback they got from their friends and relatives and the knowledge they have about the US from watching television, Cawil and Aaminah painted an image of the US as a place of relative freedom and recognition of people's rights. Moreover, Cawil claimed that he was even making plans to relocate to the US and had already gone through a series of interviews with the UNHCR in Port Elizabeth, which is responsible for the movement of refugees until Donald Trump took over and stopped refugee funding programs.

This level of idolisation is suggestive as to why the Somali participants would view the US order as a liberal one. Moreover, when asked how she feels about the actions of the US in Somalia such as drone strikes, Gargaaro argued that she supports the conduct of US drone strikes in Somalia because the US government is conducting them with the primary intention of protecting innocent civilians against future attacks from al-Shabaab. Gargaaro even compared the US as a state to a "Good Samaritan or an individual who is committed to the cause of helping other people that are suffering and in need of help.

However, the interpretation of the nature of US intervention by Somali participants as liberal interventionism contradicts with the realist view held by the members of al-Shabaab which views the US agenda as one based on imperialism and state expansion. While majority of the Somali participants consider the conduct of drone strikes under war on terror as a way of protecting innocent civilians from transnational terrorism, the members of al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda have theorized America's intervention as the imposition of US liberal Order and the forced universalization of western democracy to the detriment of Muslims. Hence, the terrorist attacks launched against the US and innocent civilians are interpreted by al-Shabaab as part of a global jihad in defense of Muslims and Islamic ideology.

This is also reflected in the work of Mamdani (2002) which speaks to the criminalisation of Muslims in the war on terror. According to this view the US is masking behind the notion of liberal interventionism while instead it seeks to advance its own agenda understood to be the attack on Muslims and Islam and the exploitation of natural resources such as oil in the Middle-East and majority of Muslim states. For some scholars the 9/11 attack and the subsequent war on terror were used as a pretext to target the rich oil states

theorised as weapon states, failed states or illiberal states, majority of which are Muslim. It was argued in chapter two that any comprehensive study of the tension between the US and al-Qaeda linked terrorist groups should not begin its analysis after the 9/11 catastrophe as there was already a clear projection of tension between the US and these rich Muslim states prior to the 9/11 attack. According to the prediction of Fukuyama (1989) the fight of the US against the rich Muslim states could be understood as a response to new security threats posed by illiberal states with nuclear capacity.

However as shown above, the findings reveal that majority of Somali participants, do not share the same view as al-Shabaab. For instance, Geedi's opinion rejected the claim that the war on terror is predicated on the criminalization of Muslim people as he viewed it as a way of fighting global terrorism. These participants chose to support US drone strikes instead of al-Shabaab's jihad because they claimed that al-Shabaab's ideology is irreconcilable with their religion. Aaminah made it explicitly clear that they are firm Muslim believers who believe in Allah and subscribe to Islamic rules and regulations as reflected in the book of Koran used as the moral campus in Islam, which forbids the killing of fellow human beings. Aaminah explained that on the contrary, al-Shabaab breaches this fundamental law and proceeds to kill mercilessly, thousands of innocent brothers and sisters just because they do not believe in their own ideology. Expanding from Aaminah's point, Cawil argued that the mannerism in which the members of al-Shabaab assassinate those who oppose them is cold-blooded and heartless as it includes live broadcasts of how the victims are killed. Moreover, Cawil reported that crimes such as rape, torture, theft, destruction of property among other things are part of their actions. Thus, based on the horrific crimes committed by al-Shabaab, majority of Somali participants argued that they support US drone strikes. They view the conduct of US drone strikes as a necessary evil to protect the rights of both US and Somali citizens.

### **5.3 Loss of life and the principle of Responsibility to Protect**

One of the objectives of the research as outlined in the first chapter was to understand the local consequences of Somali civil war by privileging the voices of Somalians. The findings chapter under the theme of loss of life revealed that one of the local consequences that participants suffer from is the loss of lives of their friends and families as Cawil indicated. Accordingly, Barre revealed that it was the near-death experience of a drone strike that compelled him to finally leave Somalia for South Africa.

While majority of the participants claimed to support US drone strikes they were also aware of the dilemma involved in this support as drone strikes often resulted in the loss of lives. The dilemma lies in the fact that the participants understood the nature of the US intervention as based on liberal ideas informed by the principle of the responsibility to protect which recognizes that a state's sovereignty is not absolute but limited (Bellamy, & Williams, 2011; Seay, 2007; Krasner, 1999:24). Moreover, the principle prioritizes the safety of civilians against human rights violations, crimes against humanity and war crimes (Bellamy, 2007). Thus, the contradiction lied in the fact that while providing safety, the US drone strikes also seemed to be resulting with loss of life which undermines their responsibility to protect.

As shown in the above section, the evidence provided suffices to show that the Somali participants I interviewed think very highly of the US and understand it as having the responsibility to protect the world and its citizens. In their narratives, they have portrayed the US as a global leader and a sole-surviving super-power which is preoccupied with the cause of bettering people's lives, especially those from war torn states such as Somalia who are left stranded and vulnerable at the collapse of their governments. The participants understand that the war on terror is centred on the objectives of fighting global terrorism around the world as a whole and not just in Somalia but that given the fact that Somalia has undergone through state collapse, it constitutes part of the states that are vulnerable.

Thus, the war on terror that capitalizes on the use of drone strikes, is aimed at providing security for both Somalians and American citizens against future terrorist attacks. Geedi explained to me that global terrorism is a general problem not only peculiar to Somalia as it exists in other states such as Afghanistan, Syria and Pakistan. Geedi concluded that the US is only performing its duty of protecting innocent civilians from being victims of terrorism. In this sense, the issue of casualties appeared to be a problem as it contradicts the responsibility of the US to protect innocent civilians from terrorism.

Somali participants seemed to be concerned about loss of life and made it very clear that they do not support it. During the interviews, Cawil disclosed that his immediate family members constitute part of the loss as they became victims of US drone strikes. Cawil recalled a state of living in constant fear where one keeps looking at the sky whenever they hear the sound of drones while simultaneously watching out for al-Shabaab members. What is critical to note about this data, is that it represents a small sample of a broader statistics of people.

Their complaints form part of a wider public outcry against the use of drones by the US in countries such as Libya, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Yemen (Kretzmer, 2005). What this means is that human loss undermines the effectiveness of drones.

The findings chapter highlighted that despite all the checks and balances instituted by the US government, drone strikes still result in colossal damage understood as collateral deaths and the destruction of property. For instance, the US government instituted stringent rules on drone use that require among others; extensive intelligence data gathering on suspected terrorists and the request for authorization to proceed with the strike from the US government upon locating targets. Moreover, the technology of drones itself has been improved drastically from the use of Lockheed Martin RQ-170 Sentinel in 1998 whose functions included; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance to the recent use of the “U.S arsenal of armed drones” which consist of Predator and Reaper drones (Zenko, 2013:6).

Today’s drones are faster, can hover the aerospace for prolonged periods of over 15 hours under hostile environments without risking the safety of pilots because they are unmanned. As Micah Zenko (2013) reports, “a drone fired missile travels faster than the speed of sound, striking a target within seconds” (Zenko, 2013:6). Moreover, Zenko holds that “Drone fired missiles can be –and have been diverted at the last moment if non-combatants enter the likely blast radius” (Zenko, 2013). This indicates the level of sophistication within the technology of drones. However, despite all these improvements, drones still result in large numbers of human and environmental losses. The damage brought about by the drones has even been acknowledged by the former president of the US, Barack Obama as quoted by The Associated Press:

In the past, there was legitimate criticism that the legal architecture around the use of drone strikes wasn’t as precise as it should have been. There’s no doubt that civilians were killed that shouldn’t have been. In situations of war, you know we have to take responsibility when we’re not acting appropriately (Associated Press, 2016)

Zenko argues that one of the limitations of drones is that their precision is limited by the correctness of information they obtain from the intelligence. “In states without a vast network of enabling intelligence, the CIA or Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) have significantly less situational awareness and precise targeting information for drones.” (Zenko, 2013:7). The lack of correctness spoken of here also emphasizes the point raised by

Geedi when he mentioned that in order for the US drone strikes to be effective, they have to be conducted in collaboration with the Somali troops. Geedi argued that Somali troops have a better chance of identifying the terrorists than the CIA, hence this would improve the effectiveness of drones and lessen the loss of lives. Moreover, Omar from the ISS also argued that given the lack of research on who constitute as terrorists, the drone strikes cannot be effective. Thus, this shows that loss of life undermines the effectiveness of drone strikes. Furthermore, extensive human losses undermine the effectiveness of drone strikes in the sense that the members of al-Shabaab use it as an excuse to recruit new members.

#### **5.4 The legacy of Somali Civil war: Surviving story tellers**

It has been argued in chapter three that there are no established frontlines or battlefronts during war, which means that the experience of war and its impacts are not confined to geographical boundaries but are transnational. The chapter made a case that as long as the war continues, those who have experienced war continue to suffer from its consequences wherever they go. This means that the experience of war affects civilians both internally and externally and that in order to study war, one has to pay attention to events and experiences inside the countries involved and outside, in the diaspora. The findings of the research under the theme of displacement have proven this to be true. The consequences of war are far reaching and continue to affect the civilians in many ways wherever they are.

War brings drastic changes in one's life. In the previous section, it was mentioned that Cawil suffered the loss of his family members due to the ongoing civil war in Somalia. One of the risks which were anticipated from the interviews that participants were cautioned of prior to their participation was the risk of having a possible break down due to the sensitivity surrounding the issues to be discussed. During the interview with Cawil, one could tell that he was really affected judging from a long pause of about 3 minutes that he took after sharing information about the loss of his parents as a result of the Somalian war. Cawil disclosed that his mom was struck by a bomb in the advent of an attack. Even though he was still young, Cawil still remembers vivid details about how it happened. It is such memories that survivors of war cannot escape from. They are part of them, they shape their everyday lives and sometimes haunt them forever. Similarly, Gargaaro also shared that her father was killed by unknown people.

Moreover, the activity of displacement as a result, also comes with a lot of negative consequences that have an impact on one's social world. It disrupts one's familial connections as each and everyone is preoccupied with survival. For instance, as discussed in chapter four, Barre explained the difficulties associated with the process of escaping which included not having to tell anyone including one's close family members for safety reasons. Barre mentioned that one leaves without saying the good byes because they do not know who al-Shabaab is and who is not. In a similar way, Geedi mentioned that upon leaving Somalia, he had to call his brothers in Europe and other countries to finance his escape trip from Somalia. What this means is that, as a result of the consequences of war, relatives are scattered all over the world and may not be able to reunite again as in many cases they lose contact with each other.

This highlights the extent to which war affects the civilians and shows that there are really no front lines. This means that they have to settle in a foreign place in which they do not even know the neighbours. Perhaps the most touching account was the one provided by Nasteexo, Aaminah's aunt who moved to South Africa in 1998 and lost contact with her son a year later. Nasteexo told me that until today, she doesnot know whether her son is still alive or dead. Nasteexo said everyday she pictures him in the same clothes and said she wonders how he would look like if he was still around.

These findings justified the three stages of trauma as mentioned by Michultka (2009). The whole experience of displacement made the participants undergo three stages of "Triple Trauma" in which migrants are overwhelmed by the "trauma of the country of origin", the "trauma of the escape process or journey of immigration" and the "trauma of the relocation process" (Michultka, 2009). For instance, Barre mentioned that the near-death experience was the one which compelled him to leave Somalia for South Africa. Other participants such as Aamina explained how difficult it is for one to live in Somalia especially when one has no political networks. Aaminah holds that one cannot find any employment because the Somalian political system is based on nepotism and corruption. The other participants also narrated touching stories of how they left Somalia to come to South Africa. The problems they encountered along the way included getting arrested because of lack of documents. The same applies in South Africa where they are continually abused and discriminated against. For instance, after inviting me to his home in Costin Port Elizabeth, Diric informed me that the Costin area is highly risky and that Somalians get attacked numerous times by the men from the area who constantly kill his fellow Somalians. Diric told me that his wife had two

miscarriages during her pregnancy as a result of being attacked. Above all, Diric highlighted that the Port Elizabeth police do not take any action when they report the perpetrators because they are their brothers and friends. The point being made here is that all these troubles that Somalis are still experiencing, come as a result of the war.

### **5.5 Regional and personal interests**

The findings of this research under the theme of peace-keeping economics indicated that one of the critical problems that are delaying a successful intervention in Somalia is the AMISOM troops. It was argued that the AMISOM troops deployed in Somalia have masked behind the intervention to pursue their own personal interests in Somalia. A number of participants such as Dalmar and Gargaaro argued that the troops get generous salary packages from the UN given the fact that they are working under a high-risk zone which threatens their lives.

The data provided overwhelming evidence from different participants showing that the troops are taking advantage of this sizeable income to focus on bettering their own lives and therefore, intentionally delay the mission of getting rid of al-Shabaab so that they could get as much as they could from their stay in Somalia. While the primary intention of the research was not to establish the veracity of these claims made by the participants, it is important to note that the perceptions held by Somalis with regard to AMISOM troops are significant as they govern their relationship with the Somali troops. In this case, Somalis' perceptions are that AMISOM troops are in Somalia only to enrich themselves and not to fight al-Shabaab. Gargaaro and Dalmar claimed that the soldiers of Ethiopia and Kenya are building houses in their countries with the money that they make from the Somali conflict. In what seemed to be a more exaggerated view, Dalmar argued that the AMISOM soldiers have the capacity of finishing the members of al-Shabaab in one day if they like.

The importance of these perceptions regardless of whether they are true or false is that they could hinder the necessary relationship between AMISOM troops and Somali locals through which useful information about the whereabouts of al-Shabaab and other affiliated terrorist groups could be exchanged to enhance the effectiveness of the fight against terrorism. This is grounded on the argument presented by Dalmar that US-led drone strikes that are based on US intelligence alone while excluding the Somali military are not sufficient to get rid of the problem of al-Shabaab. As shown in the previous sections, Dalmar argued

that if the US seriously wants to address the problem of al-Shabaab, then it must collaborate with the Somali military. Thus, collaboration is significant in this war as the implications of this poor relationship between the local people and AMISOM troops could delay the successful and the timely response of the troops in fighting al-Shabaab.

Moreover, in the case that the troops are really pursuing their personal interests, this could present a different problem altogether. This opportunistic mentality of AMISOM troops of being driven by greed and personal interest is dangerous as it reduces them to business acumen whose loyalties could be bought depending on who has a better offer between al-Shabaab and the UN. This could pose an increased risk as al-Shabaab could have a greater access to the plans of the troops and could easily plan counter attack strategies. Moreover, this delay made by the AMISOM troops also tends to waste UN resources as they are being paid a lot of money while they are delaying the process of peace-keeping.

The participants also revealed that the intervention in Somalia is clouded by the national interests exhibited by the involved countries, including the US and the neighbouring countries such as Kenya and Ethiopia. This was highlighted by Geedi who mentioned that Somalia has a long history of border disputes with Kenya and Ethiopia as the neighbouring countries and that the collapse of Somali's state has made it possible for the two states to capitalize on Somalia's weak sovereignty and gain the contested territories. For instance, Dalmar claimed that Kenya is fighting for a certain part of the sea at the golf of Athens because massive gas fields have recently been discovered and because this is a strategic position into the Middle East. This was also raised by Willem who claimed that more often than not states are driven by their national interests even though they may claim to be helping.

This pursuit of national interests at the expense of a state which is experiencing a civil war is wrong due to a number of factors; it further weakens the sovereignty of the state concerned and it negatively affects foreign relations which could provide the potential for future conflicts. The pursuit of national interests weakens Somalia's sovereignty in the sense that the Somali government, which is already struggling to deal with the problem of al-Shabaab, is overwhelmed with problems from other states. The discovery of the massive gas fields and gaining control of the Kismayo port could help the Somali state generate some income which could help in the process of state building. However, the loss of this port further weakens the Federal government's capacity to take care of its people.

Moreover, Dalmar mentioned that the Ethiopian government is involved in the internal affairs of Somalia to the detriment of the AU's Constitutive Act and the UN Charter. Dalmar argued that the government of Somalia is captured by Ethiopia with its officials influencing Somali parliamentarians to their own advantage. Thus, the performance of national interests by neighbouring states in Somalia affects its foreign relations with the involved states, and sets the stage for future tensions with Somalia. For instance, the dispute between Somalia and Kenya with regards to the coast-line will create a rift which could translate into a confrontation in future.

### **5.6 Manipulation of Islamic ideology: Al-Shabaab's recruitment tactics**

The findings of the research show that majority of Somali participants do not support al-Shabaab's ideology and by extension the ideologies of other affiliated terrorist groups such as al-Qaida and Boko-Haram because they are irreconcilable with their religion. This was mentioned by Fawzia and Cilmi who argued that al-Shabaab's ideology clashes with the teachings of Koran as the members of al-Shabaab kill their fellow brothers and sisters just because they are against their ideology. Fawzia and Cilmi made it clear that Islam does not support murder but that al-Shabaab uses global jihad and the need to defend Muslims and Islam against Christianity as an excuse.

This means that they are manipulating Islamic ideology to suit their own interests. They note that this has been used as an excuse by al-Shabaab to recruit more participants. Moreover, in a more radical argument, Ahmed contended that majority of Muslim people are not terrorists and do not support terrorism. As shown in chapter four, Ahmed claimed that 99 percent of Muslim people are not terrorists. These arguments are critical in the sense that they point to the possibility of winning the war against transnational terrorism. However, they caution that victory requires an understanding of the stance taken by the general majority of the Muslim community because the extent to which they are excluded and essentialised as terrorists, increases the possibility of them being recruited by al-Shabaab.

Writing about the war on terror and the way in which Muslims are theorized in this war, Mahmood Mamdani (2002) acknowledges that there is a risk of criminalisation of all Muslim people that takes place in the war on terror as the US conducts strikes in the fragile states (Mamdani, 2002: 766). Mamdani (2002) maintains that, by virtue of being Muslim, one becomes the primary target of the US without being given the benefit of the doubt. One

valuable suggestion as to how this problem could be resolved came from Willem who suggested that it would be ideal for the US to mobilize Muslim countries in the fight against transnational terrorism as this would take away the recruiting factor of attack on religion that is heavily used by al-Shabaab.

Evident from this argument, is the fact that in order to win the war against terrorism, the US needs to revisit some of its policies that criminalise Muslim people as terrorists. For instance, the first place to begin could be the lifting of the policy which bans indefinitely, majority of the Muslim citizens from seven Muslim states including Somalia, from crossing the US borders. Although this looks like a minute issue, it could play a major role as a grievance in terms of generating more recruitment for al-Shabaab. The participants argued that the majority of the people from the banned states do not support terrorism at all and also cautioned that the act of banning their states is highly critical as terrorists could use this as the justification that the US is fighting against their religion. Thus, out of anger, many people could end up joining terrorist groups even though they did not initially support them and would not otherwise have joined them. This is also highlighted by Willem who pointed out that the war between al-Qaida linked terrorists and the US is not a war of religions but the war of ideologies even though the terrorists manipulate people into thinking that it is a global jihad for purposes of recruitment. It has been argued that ISIL was founded in the Iraqi prison, Camp Bucca, where many of its leaders were arrested and tortured by the US. The legacy of torture contributed to the radicalisation of many due to the brutal tactics of the US in the war on terror. The use of drones risks similar results.

## **5.7 Leadership and stability**

The findings about the role of presidents came unexpectedly as they were not part of the research question. However, the information about the presidents kept coming up frequently to the extent that I decided to include it as part of my findings because although not expected, it seems to be important in this discussion. The findings indicate that the president of Somalia Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed Farmaajo and the president of the US Donald J. Trump play important roles in understanding the US intervention and the war on terror in Somalia.

### **5.7.1 Farmaajo is the future of Somalia**

Given the long list of leaders classified as dictators in African states, it is befitting to make a claim that we have a leadership crisis in Africa. Majority of the leaders are classified as

dictators that do not want to leave power while serving their own personal interests such as the recently resigned president of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, Paul Kagame of Rwanda, Yoweri Museveni of Uganda amongst others. These leaders are known to commit many offences including human rights violations that weaken the sovereignties of their states.

Somalia has not been an exception to the problem of leadership that has plagued many African states with a list of presidents that have been central to controversy since the collapse of Siad Barre such as; Ali Mahdi 1991-1997, Abdiqasim, Hassan 2000-2004, Abdullahi Ahmed, 2004-2008, Sharif Ahmed, 2009-2012, Hassan Mohamud, 2012-2017. These presidents are claimed to have perpetuated and fuelled the civil war in Somalia, thus, further creating factions among militant-groups and fights among warlords by playing into tribalism, favouritism of certain tribes and discrimination. However, the findings of the research indicate that for the first time in Somalian history since the collapse of Siad Barre, the Somalians seem to be hopeful about the recently elected president H.E Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed Farmaajo.

Majority of the participants that I interviewed from different research sites; Grahamstown, Port Elizabeth and Uitenage and from different tribes including; Haawiye, Isaaq, Dirwood & Hausa all showed great support for the recently elected president of Somalia. They argued that he is a man of integrity with a proven track-record of selflessly serving the Somali people during his time as the Prime Minister of Somalia in 2010. Some of his main character traits that they identified included; impartiality, patriotism, honesty, loyalty & determination to the Somali people. In order to clearly understand the importance of the role played by Farmaajo in his capacity as the president in Somali's politics, it is important to understand the driving factors behind the Somali conflict.

Somali's civil war could be understood as the struggle between the traditional cultural system of tribes and the imposition of the democratic system which has resulted with the contest for political leadership among clans. As it was mentioned in chapter one, clans are important in Somalia as the state was ruled by the traditional legal system called "Xeer" for years, in which kings took authority. Thus, the high level of honesty possessed by Farmaajo as claimed by the participants, means that, contrary to his predecessors, he will serve all different clans equally without any discrimination. This equal treatment is important as it takes away the recruiting factor of discrimination that motivates those discriminated to rebel against the present government by joining militant groups such as al-Shabaab because the

government is not catering for their needs. This was mentioned by the participants who contended that minority clans that were discriminated in Somalia end up joining the existing terrorist groups to fight against the discriminatory system of the government. For instance, one of the participants, Aaminah emphasized a serious concern for the lack of job opportunities in Somalia.

While unemployment is already an issue to most African states, she contended that the prospects of getting employed in Somalia if one belongs to the minority clans are almost zero to none. Thus, she identified this as one of the reasons why she decided to come to South Africa. This is the point where instead of leaving the country, some Somalis decide to join militant groups such as al-Shabaab. In another interview, Abdi, claimed that al-Shabaab capitalizes on the high rate of unemployment in Somalia to recruit Somalis and pay them \$40. He reckons that a lot of these young people consider al-Shabaab as an alternative employer in the midst of a high rate of unemployment and carrying the war against the Somali government as a post. Thus, perhaps the rise of Farmaajo to presidency, who is supported by a lot of people across different clans including the minority groups, could mean that there will be a decreased recruitment of the people into al-Shabaab since the people's hopes have been rejuvenated by the fall of a discriminatory system of nepotism and corruption.

Moreover, Farmaajo has been described as a patriotic individual towards Somalia, and this means that he will do whatever it takes within his power to ensure that Somalia's Foreign Policy represents the best interests of Somalia. This will come in handy especially when dealing with sensitive issues that were mentioned previously such as border disputes with Kenya and Ethiopia in which the territory of Somalia is threatened because of the recently discovered gas fields in the golf of Athens. The successful handling of such cases will result in the strengthening of Somalia's sovereignty since the state could then exercise ultimate control over its territory. On the contrary, a president who is not patriotic about Somalia could easily sell out Somalia because all they would be interested in would be their personal interests or such a president could fuel war through favouritism as shown at the beginning that the predecessors of Farmaajo did not improve the country but focused on themselves and their clans instead of the majority.

All the other character traits mentioned also add to Farmaajo's credentials and project him as the suitable candidate to lead Somalia.. For instance, loyalty means that he will not engage in the embezzlement of public funds like his other predecessors or even if he does, it

will not be at the same rate as them. Determination is also intrinsic for confronting such a difficult task especially when inheriting a state which is in chaos and financial debts such as Somalia. The resulting successful combination of the above-mentioned factors will have positive local implications in Somalia, but more importantly, will help restore stability of Somalia. Therefore, Farmaajo could be understood as the future of Somalia and a unifying block in possession of the building tools for Somali's sovereignty and this shows that he plays a very important role as the president of Somalia.

However, given the circumstances in Somalia, Farmaajo's position comes with a lot of challenges. For instance, majority of Somalis are interested in seeing if Farmaajo will be able to rise above current clan divisions that are responsible for the ongoing war in Somalia. Moreover, they are interested on how he will engage in the distribution of the scarce resources that are present in Somalia. Farmaajo also has a mammoth task of re-establishing peace and stability that are needed for the Somali diaspora to consider returning to Somaliawhich.

### **5.7.2 Trump and the continued criminalisation of Islam**

The findings of the research show that the current president of the US has foreign policy implications on the war on terror conducted in Somalia which in turn has local implications. For purposes of clarifying this point, this could be traced back to all the presidents of the US since the announcement of the war on terror by George W. Bush and then Obama administration that followed. During the term of Bush, there were more Somalis who were against his campaign and as a result, this caused more recruitments into al-Shabaab as they disliked him as president of the US because they felt as if he was fighting against them instead of fighting for them. During the time of Obama, this negative perception changed since Obama's Foreign Policy and the way in which the GWT was theorized in Somalia changed drastically from the office term of Bush. For instance, Obama changed the terminology from "war on terror" (World News, 2017) which gave the idea that he is more lenient towards the Somalis and wants to protect them against al-Shabaab military.

Dalmar explained to me that although there were still drone strikes during Obama's time, these were not frowned upon as during the time of Bush and the amount of recruitments due to the dislike of the US president declined. The number of Somalian refugees that were accepted in the US increased significantly and many Somalians visualized the US as their

destination in terms of exile from Somalia and there were more movements of refugees from Somalia to the US.

However, during the time of Donald Trump, the findings of the research reveal that there is a dislike of the president due to a number of reasons. As the participants outlined, one of them has been mentioned in the previous sections which is that of overgeneralizing Muslim people as terrorists in the war on terror. This is based on the grounds that Trump has closed borders for more Somalian refugees, he has cut funding which was initially allocated for the Somalis through UNHCR and above all, he has banned indefinitely 7 countries, majority of which are Muslim including Somalia from entering the US. This has attracted a lot of criticism from many people around the world but in particular, the Somali participants interviewed in this research.

This could have implications on America and on Somalia itself. For instance, as in the case of President George W. Bush, this could be used as an excuse by the militant groups to recruit more Somalis to fight against Trump's campaign by portraying him as an unjust president whose initial plan is to impose the rule of democracy over Somalia, the exploitation of the state's resources and the attack against Islam by claiming that they must fight in defence of their religion. This could exacerbate the ongoing situation in Somalia since the Somali government is already struggling with the existing al-Shabaab members that are present currently. For the US, this could mean the intensification of the conflict between the US and the militant groups such as al-Shabaab which could increase the likelihood of a planned strike on US soil. Thus, the findings of this research show that the roles played by these two presidents, Farmaajo and Trump are important in understanding the ongoing war in Somalia.

## **5.8 Conclusion**

The chapter discussed in detail the theme of rationalization for the use of drones to pursue al-Shabaab in Somalia as held by the Somali participants. Under this theme, it was argued that the support for the use of drones by the US suggests that the Somali participants interpret the nature of the US intervention as liberal and based on the notions of peace and the fight against global terrorism. The importance of this was identified as the fact that Somali participants do not view the war on terror as an attack on Islam as al-Shabaab members perceive it. The chapter then discussed the theme of casualties as a local consequence of drone use in Somalia. It was noted that the sensitive rejection from the Somali participants

regarding loss of life could be exploited by al-Shabaab to recruit more members. Thirdly, under the theme of displacement, it was shown that the participants do not really manage to escape the war and that its impacts affect them daily. It was also argued that the massive loss of population further weakens the sovereignty of Somalia. Under the theme of peace-keeping economics, it was shown that the national interests and personal interests of peacekeepers also undermine the project of state-building in Somalia. Moreover, the implications of the manipulation of Islamic ideology by al-Shabaab and how this could be countered in the fight against terrorism were also discussed. Finally, the chapter looked at the role played by the two presidents, MuhamedFarmaajo and Donald Trump in the Somali civil war. It was argued that their actions have foreign policy implications for possible stability or the worsening of the current situation.

## **Chapter Six**

### **Conclusion**

The goal of this study was to examine the current nature of US intervention in Somalia that takes place in the form of extra-judicial killings. In order to provide the reader with the context in which the war on terror is occurring, the study moved from the general to the specific, briefly examining the use of extra-judicial killings elsewhere in other states such as; Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq and Yemen, thus showing that Somalia is not the only state in which the US is undertaking its extra-judicial killings. It was argued that in all the above-mentioned states, none of them decisively benefited from the use of US extra-judicial killings in the sense that, extra-judicial killings contributed to the restoration of peace and stability. In fact, it was shown that the officials of these states have shown serious concerns about the US intervention and also called for the US to halt its interventions as they often result in alarming numbers of loss of life. Based on the concerns raised by these officials as well as accounts provided by the participants, the thesis argued that the continued practice of un-coordinated extra-judicial killings threatens the future of liberal intervention. This means that the war on terror and US-led future interventions could be misinterpreted as attacks against the sovereignty of weak states instead of peaceful interventions informed by the principle of Responsibility to Protect.

The approach of the study was to establish the historical and political context in the post-Cold War period that positioned so called illiberal states theorized under the contested concept of fragile states, failed states and weapon states as the main sources of threat in the late twentieth century. It was shown that the tension between the US and these states does not begin in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 event as there was already a clear projection of the tension prior to this period. Thus, the war on terror was traced back to the Cold War period in which the US under the desperation to win the ideological war against the Soviet Union radicalized certain Muslims including Osama Bin Laden.

Using lessons from other disciplines such as Sociology and Anthropology, the study argued that in order to understand war in IR, it is critical to involve the experiences of civilians who are at the frontlines of war. Drawing on feminist theory of IR, the study challenged traditional conceptions of IR which focus on the state as the primary unit of

analysis. The study showed that there has been a shift from realist perspectives that used to be dominant in IR. One of the examples used is the emergence of al-Shabaab as a non-state actor in Somalia that is dominating the political space through the control of borders, the institution of illegal taxation, the establishment of al-Shabaab rules and regulations as well as engaging in global terrorism. The study showed that the existence of al-Shabaab and other non-state actors highlight the necessity of factoring non-state actors within the study of IR. Therefore, it was important to privilege the chosen participants as they provided insights vital in understanding the Somalian civil war. As part of the findings, the thesis has shown that despite all the controversy surrounding the legitimacy of the war on terror, the manner in which it is conducted, as well as the controversial tactics that it employs, the majority of Somali participants showed an overwhelming support for the US intervention.

The thesis showed that, although it is important to know that some people support the intervention, it does not mean that the intervention on itself is effective. It was shown that other participants believe that there are other limiting factors to the effectiveness of the intervention such as the lack of necessary collaboration between the US intelligence and the Somali ground forces. This lack of collaboration resulted in human losses that further undermine the conduct of extra-judicial killings against members of al-Shabaab. Moreover, the support for US intervention is important as it shows that not all Muslims are terrorists as they are overgeneralized in the war on terror.

The study revealed that participants support the US extra-judicial killings because they are understood to undermine al-Shabaab strength which has become a major source of insecurity in Somalia. However, the data showed that the support for US strikes comes with some moral conditions. That is, the participants support the extra-judicial killings so long as they do not harm innocent civilians. The study also showed that the extra-judicial killings have detrimental effects in Somalia. The participants, of which some are immediate victims of extra-judicial killings through members of their families, highlighted that the effects of extra-judicial killings include the loss of lives and injuries of innocent people and the destruction of properties.

The study showed that due to the intensifying conflict in Somalia, especially the state's failure to provide public goods such as security and social welfare, a lot of people have been displaced both internally and externally. It was argued that these massive movements that witness multitudes of people moving from one place to another are

responsible for further weakening the sovereignty of Somalia. The continued displacements of Somalis mean that important skills which could be used to improve the state are being transported to other parts of the world leaving the Somali state without critical skills.

Moreover, the study showed that the participants blamed neighbouring countries in Somalia along with their troops, as informed by the previous border and territorial disputes that the Somali government had with them as well as personal interests respectively. Participants argued that the neighbouring states are pursuing their national interests while the troops are also pursuing their own personal economic interests resulting in the delay of solving the Somali security situation.

The study has argued that indeed without understanding the causes of war the US intervention cannot be effective since the problem will continue to exist. Regardless of whether the technology of drones is improved or the number of strikes is intensified, the problem will remain the same. Instead, there is a likely-hood that this could even exacerbate the situation. This study concludes that understanding the problem for the US means forging relationships with Somalis that are at the epicentre of war who could help in terms of exchanging useful information and providing constructive advice regarding the conduct of extra-judicial killings, and other strategies that are more suitable for the Somali context. Collaboration between the US and Somalis could, therefore, decrease the number of lives lost and remove the impression that the US is an invader whose purpose is to fight Muslims.

## Appendix One

### CONSENT FORM FOR SOMALI CITIZENS

My name is MojalefaKoloko, I am a student in the Political and International Studies Department at Rhodes University, and the Principal Investigator of this project, entitled, “**An examination of US targeted killings in Somalia**”

This interview is conducted in order to understand your experiences about the actions carried out by the United States in Somalia as part of the Global War on Terrorism. I would like to know how these actions have affected you, your community and country as well as how they have shaped your views.

With your permission, I would like to audio-record this interview so I can capture the details accurately. The tape will only be heard by myself and the supervisor. All information gathered will be kept strictly confidential, and will be stored in a locked file cabinet, to which only I, and my supervisor, will have access. At any time you can refuse to answer any questions or end this interview.

The risk involved in this study is that you may feel uncomfortable discussing some of your experiences during the interview due to the effects of US actions in your community/country, and should this happen; please know that you can stop at any time. The benefit of your participation is that what you share with me might help us understand the consequences of US actions for Somali people and the necessary steps to be taken in restoring peace and stability in Somalia.

I may publish results of the study, due to the sensitivity of this issue, I will not use your name in the study. I will make use of pseudonyms. If you would like a copy of the study, please provide me with your address and I will send you a copy in the future.

If you have any questions about this research, you can contact me at 0769753083

[jayafter@gmail.com](mailto:jayafter@gmail.com) ,or my advisor Dr SiphokaziMagadla, [S.Magadla@ru.ac.za](mailto:S.Magadla@ru.ac.za).

Thank you for your participation in the study. I will give you a copy of this form to take with you.

I agree to have this interview audio-recorded

Yes      No

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

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By signing below, you are agreeing that:

- you have read this consent form (or it has been read to you) and have been given the opportunity to ask questions and have them answered
- you have been informed of potential risks and they have been explained to your satisfaction.
- you understand Rhodes University has no funds set aside for any injuries you might receive as a result of participating in this study
- you are 18 years of age or older
- your participation in this research is completely voluntary
- you may leave the study at any time. If you decide to stop participating in the study, there will be no penalty to you and you will not lose any benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.

Signature \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

Printed Name \_\_\_\_\_



## Appendix Two

### CONSENT FORM FOR RESEARCHERS

My name is MojalefaKoloko, I am a student in the Political and International Studies Department at Rhodes University, and Principal Investigator of this project, entitled, “**An examination of US targeted killings in Somalia.**”

This interview is conducted in order to understand the nature of current United States intervention in Somalia as part of its Global War on Terror. It looks at its implications on the sovereignty of Somalia and studies the local consequences it has on Somalia’s statehood. It also attempts to examine whether this could be the emergence of a new terrain of humanitarian intervention which will shape future interventions.

In the interview, I will ask you questions about how your extensive research in Somalia have shaped the way you understand US intervention. I will enquire your views on the role to be played by institutions such as IGAD, ECOWAS and the AU in responding to US targeted killings in Somalia, and what the implications may be for other African countries.

With your permission, I would like to audio-record this interview so I can capture the details accurately. The tape will only be heard by the supervisor and myself. All information gathered will be kept strictly confidential, and will be stored in a locked file cabinet, to which only I, and my supervisor, will have access. At any time you can refuse to answer any questions or end this interview.

The risk involved in this study is that you may feel uncomfortable discussing some of your hard-core views due to the controversy and sensitivity surrounding the issue of targeted killings. While there is ultimate confidentiality in this interview, please know that you can stop at any time. The benefit of your participation is that what you share with me might help generate knowledge about necessary steps to be taken in restoring peace and stability in Somalia and propose ways on how to deal with future interventions.

I may publish results of the study, due to the sensitivity of this issue I will not use your name in the study. I will make use of pseudonyms. If you would like a copy of the study, please provide me with your address and I will send you a copy.

If you have any questions about this research, you can contact me at 0769753083

[jayafter@gmail.com](mailto:jayafter@gmail.com) ,or my advisor Dr.SiphokaziMagadla, [S.Magadla@ru.ac.za](mailto:S.Magadla@ru.ac.za).

Thank you for your participation in the study. I will give you a copy of this form to take with you.

I agree to have this interview audio-recorded

Yes      No

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By signing below, you are agreeing that:

- you have read this consent form (or it has been read to you) and have been given the opportunity to ask questions and have them answered
- you have been informed of potential risks and they have been explained to your satisfaction.
- you understand Rhodes University has no funds set aside for any injuries you might receive as a result of participating in this study
- you are 18 years of age or older
- your participation in this research is completely voluntary
- you may leave the study at any time. If you decide to stop participating in the study, there will be no penalty to you and you will not lose any benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.

Signature \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

Printed Name \_\_\_\_\_

## Appendix Three

### CONSENT FORM FOR SOMALI AND US REPRESENTATIVES

My name is MojalefaKoloko, I am a student in the Political and International Studies Department at Rhodes University, and Principal Investigator of this project, entitled, “**An examination of US targeted killings in Somalia.**”

This interview is conducted in order to understand the nature of current United States intervention in Somalia as part of its Global War on Terror. It looks at its implications on the sovereignty of Somalia and studies the local consequences it has on Somalia’s statehood. It also attempts to examine whether this could be the emergence of a new terrain of humanitarian intervention which will shape future interventions.

In this interview, I will ask you questions about how your deployment in the government delegation has shaped the way in which you view US intervention in Somalia. I will also enquire about the challenges you have encountered in trying to restore peace and stability in Somalia and how institutions such as IGAD, ECOWAS and the AU can contribute in restoring peace and stability in Somalia.

With your permission, I would like to audio-record this interview so I can capture the details accurately. The tape will only be heard by the supervisor and myself. All information gathered will be kept strictly confidential, and will be stored in a locked file cabinet, to which only I, and my supervisor, will have access. At any time you can refuse to answer any questions or end this interview.

The risk involved in this study is that due to the strict information policy of the delegation you may feel uncomfortable discussing some of the things during the interview, and should this happen; please know that you can stop at any time. The benefit of your participation is that what you share with me might help generate knowledge about necessary steps to be taken in restoring peace and stability in Somalia and propose ways on how to deal with future interventions

I may publish results of the study, due to the sensitivity of this issue I will not use your name in the study. I will make use of pseudonyms. If you would like a copy of the study, please provide me with your address and I will send you a copy.

If you have any questions about this research, you can contact me at 0769753083

[jayafter@gmail.com](mailto:jayafter@gmail.com) ,or my supervisor Dr.SiphokaziMagadla, [S.Magadla@ru.ac.za](mailto:S.Magadla@ru.ac.za).

Thank you for your participation in the study. I will give you a copy of this form to take with you.

I agree to have this interview audio-recorded

Yes      No

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By signing below, you are agreeing that:

- you have read this consent form (or it has been read to you) and have been given the opportunity to ask questions and have them answered
- you have been informed of potential risks and they have been explained to your satisfaction.
- you understand Rhodes University has no funds set aside for any injuries you might receive as a result of participating in this study
- you are 18 years of age or older
- your participation in this research is completely voluntary
- you may leave the study at any time. If you decide to stop participating in the study, there will be no penalty to you and you will not lose any benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.

Signature \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

Printed Name \_\_\_\_\_

## **Structured Questionnaire for Somali and US Government Representatives**

### **Biographical**

1. Please tell me your name, and the position you hold at the embassy
2. How long have you held your position?

### **Somali history/present**

3. In your view, what is the political and governance situation in Somalia today?
4. How has the past affected the current political and governance situation in Somalia?
5. Do you think neighbouring countries, such as Ethiopia and Kenya, have been supportive in trying to find a resolution to the political situation in Somalia?
6. Has the presence of the African Union peace mission helped to restore peace?

### **Targeted Killings and the Global War on Terror**

7. How is the United States viewed in Somalia?
8. What do you think of US actions in Somalia since 9/11, such as the drone strikes?
9. Does US presence and actions facilitate peace or worsen the political condition in Somalia?
10. What do you think of the Global War on Terror?
11. What do you think of the way Muslims and Islam are viewed in the GWT?
12. Do you think it is accurate for the US and others such as people in South Africa, to believe that a group like al-Shabaab is the same as al-Qaeda or Boko Haram?
13. Is the US correct to target al-Shabaab members?
14. What do you think needs to be done in order to achieve peace in Somalia?
15. What are the consequences of targeted killings for African states and the role of regional organisations such as the UN, AU and IGAD

### **Semi-Structured Questionnaire for researchers**

### **Biographical**

1. Please tell me your name, the organization you work for and the position you currently hold
2. Could you briefly explain your area of research?
3. When was the last time you were in Somalia?

### **Somali history/present**

4. In your view, what is the political and governance situation in Somalia today?
5. How has the past affected the current political and governance situation in Somalia?
6. Do you think neighboring countries, such as Ethiopia and Kenya, have been supportive in trying to find a resolution to the political situation in Somalia?
7. Has the presence of the African Union peace mission helped to restore peace?

### **Targeted Killings and the Global War on Terror**

8. How is the United States viewed in Somalia?
9. What do you think of US actions in Somalia since 9/11, such as the drone strikes?
10. Does US presence and actions facilitate peace or worsen the political condition in Somalia?
11. What do you think of the Global War on Terror?
12. What do you think of the way Muslims and Islam are viewed in the GWT?
13. Do you think it is accurate for the US and others such as people in South Africa, to believe that a group like al-Shabaab is the same as al-Qaeda or Boko Haram?

14. Is the US correct to target al-Shabaab members?
15. What do you think needs to be done in order to achieve peace in Somalia?
16. What are the consequences of targeted killings for African states and the role of regional organizations such as the UN, AU and IGAD?

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