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Where leaders learn

Chipangano: Vigilantism and Community responses in Mbare District,

Zimbabwe, c.2000-2013

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When the true history of this decade shall be written in other and less troubled times; when facts not hidden come to light in details now rendered vague and obscure; truth will show that on some recent date, some score of powerful politicians met with vigilantes in secret conclave and plotted the repression of political dissents and exploitation of the general populace. Today details are obscured... truth, before it can speak, is strangled by power. Yet the big fact looms up, like a mountain above the morning mists; vigilante groups backed by unscrupulous politicians conspired to enforce their will...they stop at nothing, not even midnight murders and wholesale slaughter...power hungry politicians laughed at law, subverted the state structures and spread networks of protected villains from coast to coast.

-Harrison George.¹

¹ Harrison George, *Is Freedom Dead?* (IWW Publishing Bureau, Chicago, 1918), p. 5

DEDICATION

For MR & MRS S. V. Mukwarami

ABSTRACT

This study examines an aspect of Zimbabwe's political history, namely the emergence and operations of Chipangano vigilante group in Mbare (2000-2013) and how the community responded to the scourges of this vigilante group. This study shows that Chipangano, which means a pact, was formed with the intention to extend ZANU-PF patronage system, canvassing support and regain control of Mbare district from the MDC. The group consolidated itself as a shadow militia group for ZANU-PF that intimidated the opposition parties and coerced the general populace to attend ZANU-PF functions. It also shows that the vigilante group seized Harare City Council's duties, such as collecting gate-takings from local and long distance public transport at Mbare Bus Terminal; controlling allocations of market stalls and collecting rents from market stalls, for personal benefits. The group also politicised the access to local state property. Chipangano's collusion with ZANU-PF and state structures licensed it to engage in criminal activities with impunity, thus this thesis seeks to understand the relationship between the vigilantes, ZANU-PF and state structures. The activities of Chipangano such as abduction, intimidation, beatings, killings and displacement of people resulted in social trauma. This thesis will also explore how this phase of violence is remembered today by the research informants.

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CONTENTS

DEDICATION.....	ii
ABSTRACT.....	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	iv
ABBREVIATIONS.....	vii
GLOSSARY.....	viii
MAPS.....	ix
CHAPTER 1	1
INTRODUCTION	1
Chapter synopsis.....	13
CHAPTER 2	15
Understanding vigilantism	15
Introduction.....	15
Vigilantism and State Sanctioned Vigilantism.....	15
Theoretical Perspectives on the emergence of vigilantism.....	20
Vigilantism and Politics.....	26
The Vigilantes and their Constituency.....	29
Conclusion.....	31
CHAPTER 3	33
The Emergence, Development and Operations of Chipangano in Mbare	33
Introduction.....	33
Background to Mbare and the Genesis of Chipangano Group.....	33
The dynamic forces behind the emergence of Chipangano.....	40
Comply or get Vanquished: Chipangano crusades in Mbare.....	46
Chipangano and intra-party violence.....	55
Conclusion.....	58
CHAPTER 4	57
The State, ZANU PF and Chipangano	57
Introduction.....	57
The relationship between ZANU-PF and Chipangano.....	57
The relationship between Mbare Police and Chipangano.....	63
The relationship between the Council and Chipangano.....	70
Reaction of the ZANU-PF government to Chipangano violence.....	76
Conclusion.....	79
CHAPTER 5	81
Chipangano Vigilantism and Community Responses	81
Introduction.....	81

The Community Responses to Chipangano Vigilantism	81
Silence and Conformity as a response to Chipangano crusades	82
Confrontational retort to Chipangano vigilantism	87
Bewitchment as a response to vigilantism	94
Conclusion	95
CHAPTER 6	97
Reminiscences of Chipangano violence	97
Introduction	97
Memories of vigilantism, terror and impunity in Mbare	97
In search of Closure: the role of ONHRI and JOMIC in healing the residents of Mbare	106
Memory and Silence in Mbare District	113
The relationship between former Chipangano members and the community	114
Conclusion	116
CONCLUSION	118
BIBLIOGRAPHY	122
APPENDIX	135

ABBREVIATIONS

AIPPA	Access to information and Protection of Privacy Act.
CCJPZ	Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe
CHRA	Combined Harare Residents Association.
CZC	Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition.
DCC	District Coordinating Committee.
HCC	Harare City Council.
HRT	Harare Residents Trust.
HRW	Human Rights Watch.
GNU	Government of National Unity.
GPA	Global Political Agreement.
JOMIC	Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee.
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change.
MDC-T	Movement for Democratic Change- Tsvangirai.
MP	Member of Parliament.
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations.
ONHRI	Organ for National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration.
PAGAD	People Against Gangsterism And Drugs.
PCC	People's Caretaker Council.
POSA	Public Order and Security Act.
SADC	Southern African Development Committee.
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund.
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union- Patriot Front.
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African Peoples' Union.
ZRP	Zimbabwe Republic Police.
ZPP	Zimbabwe Peace Project.

GLOSSARY

Chipangano - a pact or covenant.

Gacaca court - is a system of community justice inspired by Rwandan tradition where gacaca can be loosely translated to “justice among the grass.”

Harari – the name of Mbare during the colonial era. It was derived from the name of a local Shona chief who used to rule the place in pre-colonial era.

Kombi – commuter omnibus/ a taxi.

Majega – porters found at Mupedzanhamo Flea Markets and Mbare Bus Termini whose job is to carry people’s bags and other loads.

Majubeki – a Shona name for Jo’burg Lines Flats in Mbare.

Makoronyera – shady dealers or thieves.

Mandimbandimba – enforcers or hatchet men, also known as rank marshals at Mbare bus terminal. Their main function was to collect protection fees from both long-distance buses and local transports.

Musika- a market place.

Vakomana wezvingoro – young energetic boys who ferry people’s luggage using pushcarts.

Vatengesesi – sellouts/ traitors.

Vigilante group - an organised extra-legal movement whose members takes over the roles of the state, in a particular area, especially its monopoly of violence with or without the blessings of the state.

Zanufication - is a pejorative term used by the independent media to describe the social and political process of adopting authoritarian practices and policies identified with President Robert Mugabe's ZANU-PF.

Zhii – vigilante violence which occurred in Bulawayo in 1960s under the influence of nationalist leaders like Micheal Mawema and Sketchley Samkange.

Zhanda – means destroy something into debris. It was a name of a vigilante group which vandalised infrastructure of the colonial government.

MAPS

Figure 1: The map of Mbare District



Source:

<https://www.google.com/maps/place/Mbare,+Harare,+Zimbabwe/@-17.8605775,31.0147096,14z/data=!3m1!4b1!4m5!3m4!1s0x1931a47d965abab5:0x79d1060caff9c17f18m2!3d-17.8642611!4d31.0363768>

Figure 2: An Ariel Map of Mbare District



Source:

www.maphill.com/zimbabwe/harare/harare-urban/mbare/location-maps/physical-map/

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Recently, there has been growing interests in the study of vigilantism around the world, particularly in political studies. Such studies have, however, not been sufficiently done in Zimbabwe. This thesis examines the rise and the operations of Chipangano; a vigilante group that has operated in Mbare District, Harare in Zimbabwe since 2001. It explores how Chipangano has operated over the years; examining the nature of its relationship with the ruling party structures and the state and the way in which ordinary people on the receiving end of vigilante violence and exploitation have tried to cope with this scourge. The vigilante group has operated with impunity, assaulting people whom they accused of supporting opposition parties; illegally setting up road-blocks and collecting gate-takings from local and long distance public transport at Mbare Bus Terminal; controlling allocations of market stalls; collecting rents from such stalls for personal use and many more. It seems to be that Chipangano vigilantism occurred with the tacit approval of the police and other state security structures. None of the Chipangano leaders were arrested for their crimes.

Although Chipangano vigilantism was visible in many low-income suburbs of Harare such as Mabvuku, Highfields, Budiro and Hatfield, this thesis focuses on the activities of Chipangano in Mbare District. Mbare is a high-density suburb in Harare and is the oldest African suburb in the capital, built around 1907 during the colonial regime. It consists of areas such as Magaba, Jo'burg lines, Matererini Flats, Mbare Flats, the main bus terminus, Mbare Musika and Rufaro Football Stadium. According to Harare City Council officials, the population of Mbare is approximately 800 000 making it the most densely populated suburb in Harare and the entire country.¹ Mbare is a hub of informal economic activities particularly vending which started during the colonial period with people travelling from as far as Mahusekwa, Domboshawa and Goromonzi came to and trade at an open space called Mbare Musika.² Informal trading became the backbone of the Mbare economy. This economy is partly characterised by market stalls along roadsides, shop pavements and footpaths. Mbare also houses the largest farm produce market in the country known as Mbare Musika; a shopping area for middle class hipsters known

¹ *The Zimbabwean*, 14 August 2012.

² E. K. Makombe, *A Social History of Town and Country Interactions: A study on the changing social life and practices of rural-urban migrants in colonial Harare and Goromonzi, 1946-1979*, PHD in History, University of Witwatersrand, (2013), p. xvii.

as Mupedzanhamo; a market place for metal goods and craft work known as Magaba; a small scale industrial zone called Mukuvisi Industrial Park or Siyaso and a bus terminal connecting all the buses to different destinations in Zimbabwe. Mbare was also an important township during the liberation struggle as places like Mai Musodzi and Stodart Hall were used for political gatherings before the ban of successive African political parties in the 1960s. After independence, the ZANU-PF government continued to use the Stodart Hall for political and social occasions and whenever it accords a person national hero status his or her body passes through the lobby before burial.³

The emergence of Chipangano vigilante group resulted in the usurpation of the functions of Harare City Council and the politicisation of the distribution of market stalls as well as access to other economic opportunities in the district. The ZANU-PF regime realised that it was losing political relevancy in Mbare as the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), founded in 1999, became a protagonist in political arena especially in urban areas. Owing to its desire to regain the district and to monopolise the economic opportunities, the ZANU-PF regime resorted to vigilantism, retribution and exclusionary activities. As this thesis will demonstrate, Chipangano was an extension of ZANU-PF patronage system meant to eliminate oppositions by denying them access to council property and business zones. For one to operate in Mbare business zones, a ZANU-PF membership card was a pre-requisite.⁴ Since the emergence of the group in 2001, Mbare experienced all forms of violence ranging from intimidation, abductions, displacement, detention to murders. The residents had nowhere to report Chipangano violence as the group had the backing of top ZANU-PF politicians and senior police officers who guaranteed their immunity from prosecution.⁵ Studies of vigilantism in Mbare, it is hoped, will help us understand the politics of ZANU-PF as a post-liberation movement in a context in which its relevance is on the wane.

Although the term 'vigilantism' is widely invoked to refer to behaviour deemed to be 'deviant', and outside the purview of the official justice system, there is no consensus among scholars on what exactly vigilantism is, especially in regard to the nature of its relationship with the state.⁶

³ Ibid; See also Pacesetters Youth Network Trust & Deaf Zimbabwe Trust, *Mbare District*, <https://pacesetternetwork.wordpress.com/>, Accessed on 31 September 2017.

⁴ 'Comment: ZANU-PF to blame for Mbare Investment fiasco', *NewsDay*, 13 February 2015; See also L. M. Sachikonye, *Zimbabwe's Lost Decade: Politics, Development and Society*. (Weaver Press, Harare, 2011), p.58.

⁵ Human Rights Watch, *"Our Hands Are Tied" Erosion of the Rule of Law in Zimbabwe*, (New York: HRW, 2008), p.40.

⁶ M. L. Fleisher, "Sungusungu": State-Sponsored Village Vigilante Groups among the Kuria of Tanzania, Africa', *Journal of the International African Institute*, Vol. 70, No. 2, (2000), pp.209-228.

Taking a cue from Brown, a vigilante group is an organised extra-legal movement whose members takes over the roles of the state, in a particular area, especially its monopoly of violence with or without the blessings of the state. Vigilante groups tend to have running battles with the state, as the state tries to curtail their activities and restore order. However, there are also state sponsored vigilante groups, which operate with the state in a certain way, usually with the blessings of powerful politicians or state structures. State-sanctioned vigilantism refers to illegitimate and clandestine endorsement of vigilante activities by the state in the various forms, including but not limited to militancy or bigotry against the populace which is perceived as threats to the status quo/ enemies of the government. The state allows vigilantes to engage in some measure of illicit activities so long as the ruling parties or its key leaders benefit politically from the vigilantes' quasi-political activities. Pointing to the relationship between state collapse and vigilantism, Huggins holds that vigilantes operate in the shadows rather than the bright lights of consensus and legitimate authority.⁷ Due to the connections between the vigilantes and the state, state security structures usually turn a blind eye to vigilante activities or even deny the existence of such vigilante groups.⁸

The roots of vigilantism in Zimbabwe can be traced to the later colonial era when African nationalist movements formed such groups to make the country ungovernable. The colonial state was responsible for the emergence of vigilantism in Rhodesia due to its discriminative policies. A vigilante group called *Zhanda*⁹ emerged in 1964 to complement the role of nationalist parties – Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU). The group made Rhodesia ungovernable by increasing political sabotage in certain localities.¹⁰ The *Zhanda* vigilantes intimidated, stoned, burnt the blacks who were rightly or wrongly suspected of supporting the colonial regime. There were other vigilante groups which were affiliate ZANU and People's Caretaker Council (PCC)/ ZAPU, involved in vandalising the colonial state property just like the *Zhanda* group.¹¹ The *Zhii* violence which occurred in Bulawayo in 1960 was also an instance of vigilantism.¹²

⁷ M. K. Huggins, 'Introduction: vigilantism and the state: a look south and north', in M. K. Huggins (ed.), *Vigilantism and the State in Modern Latin America: essays on extra-legal violence*. (Praeger, New York, 1991), p.1-18.

⁸ HRW/CLEEN, *The Bakassi Boys: The Legitimatization of Murder and Torture*, (Human Rights Watch, New York 2002).

⁹ *Zhanda* means destroying something into debris.

¹⁰ H. Ellert, *The Rhodesian Front War: Counter- insurgent and Guerrilla War in Rhodesia 1962-1980*. (Mambo Press, Gweru, 1989), p.2.

¹¹ *Ibid*, p.44.

¹² *Zhii* means devastating action or complete destruction. It was a protest which was organised on 24 July 1960 in Bulawayo against the imprisonment of nationalist leaders. See T. O. Ranger, 'The meaning of urban violence

Zimbabwe had a multi-party democracy since its attainment of independence in 1980, but the environment was not conducive for democratic politics. The ZANU-PF regime inherited a violent system of governance from the colonial regime. The ruling party has acted and postured as the only legitimate political organisation for Zimbabweans.¹³ The ruling party tends to become too sensitive to criticism whenever it gets accused of misrule, hence the tendency to rely on manipulating and enforcing acquiescence on the part of the citizens so as to protect its waning fortunes.¹⁴ Since independence, the incumbent regime has been using its supporters, police and the military to indulge in political violence against the opponents. Kriger asserts that ZANU-PF has been ruling the country through violence, intimidation and repression against the opposition in government, civil society opponents and patronage.¹⁵ In urban spaces however, ZANU-PF organised clandestine, informal groups to do the work for them, Chipangano being one of them, and notorious in Mbare. Noteworthy is the fact, the opposition parties responded to this through creating their own vigilante groups for instance the MDC had its vigilante groups called the Democratic Resistance Committees (DRCs)¹⁶.

The Gukurahundi¹⁷ of 1980s is a good example of the misuse of state institutions and human rights violation by the ZANU-PF government when it faces serious political opposition. The ZANU-PF government commanded its North Korean-trained Fifth Brigade to eliminate those who were opposing the state in Matabeleland and Midlands, wiping out nearly 20,000 people within five years.¹⁸ ZANU-PF supporters, together with state sponsored vigilantes, operated as reinforcements to the army, the Police Internal Security Intelligence Unit (PISI) of the Home Affairs Ministry and the police.¹⁹ The vigilante groups took part in the indiscriminate beatings

in Africa: Bulawayo, Southern Rhodesia, 1890-1960', *The Journal of the Social History Society*, Vol. 3, Issue 2, (2006), pp.193-228.

¹³ T. M. Mashingaidze, 'Guardians of the nation or unruly disciples? A critique of youth participation in post-colonial Zimbabwe's contested political spaces.' R. Bowd & A. B. Chikwanha (eds.) *Understanding Africa's contemporary conflicts Origins, challenges and peacebuilding*, Monograph 173, (2010), pp.115-142.

¹⁴ Human Rights Watch (HRW), "Bullets for Each of You" *State-Sponsored Violence since Zimbabwe's March 29 Elections*, (Human Rights Watch, New York, 2008).

¹⁵ N. Kriger, 'ZANU (PF) Politics under Zimbabwe's "Power-sharing Government', *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 30, 1, (2012), pp.11-26.

¹⁶ The DRCs were made up of MDC youths and their aim was to defend MDC supporters from ZANU-PF vigilante groups.

¹⁷ Gukurahundi is a Shona word loosely translated to 'the early rain which washes away the chaff before the spring rains'. It was a chain of massacres of Ndebele civilians done by the Zimbabwe National Army in the period between 1983 and 1987. The Gukurahundi was meant to eliminate dissidents (discontented former guerrillas and ZAPU supporters).

¹⁸ 'The U.S. Institute of Peace and the Centre for Victims of Torture', *Zimbabwe: The Mugabe Government and the Politics of Torture*, (2002).

¹⁹ S. Gatsheni-Ndlovu, 'Dynamics of the Zimbabwean crisis in the 21st century Africa', *Journal on Conflict Resolution*, Vol.3, No.1, (2003), p.116.

of the civilians, murders, tortures and property burnings that occurred in the areas during the crisis.²⁰

In the 1985 elections ZANU-PF deployed its vigilante groups before and after the elections against its opposition supporters. Although the ruling party won the election with a margin of 64 seats, its vigilante groups and supporters ran amok against the opposition enthusiasts. This violence was incited by then Prime Minister, Robert Mugabe, who publicly announced to his supporters to ‘go and uproot the weeds from your garden.’²¹ ZANU-PF enthusiasts, predominantly women and youths in urban areas assaulted and expelled the supporters of lesser political parties from their houses. In Harare, the vigilantes hewed a ZAPU contestant to death using axes and many others were killed including pregnant women.²² Whilst this violence was occurring, the police did not intervene to save the victims as they were under austere instructions to not intervene. This ‘watch and do nothing’ approach has become the Zimbabwe Republic Police’s (ZRP) trademark reaction to political violence instigated by the ruling party.²³

During the 1998 food riots in Harare, the ZANU-PF government also dispatched its partisan ZRP, army units and vigilante groups to deal with the leaders of civic organisations who had started the insurrection.²⁴ Violence has intensified since 1999 due to the emergence of MDC as a forceful political contender and the primary targets were the members and supporters of the MDC. As ZANU-PF continued to lose its ground, it sanctioned vigilante groups countrywide to petrify and chastise commercial farm workers, journalists and university students to cow them into submission.²⁵ Successive election periods particularly in the years 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2008, were characterized by widespread political violence mainly perpetrated by ZANU-PF and its allies.²⁶

²⁰ The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe, *Breaking the silence: Building true peace. A report on the disturbances in Matebeleland and the Midlands 1980-1988*, (CCJP, Harare, 1997), pp.62–63.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² *Ibid.*

²³ E. Masunungure, ‘The travails of opposition politics in Zimbabwe since independence’, in David Harold-Barry (ed.), *Zimbabwe: The past is the future*. (Weaver Press, Harare, 2004), p.159.

²⁴ Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, *A Consolidated Report on the Food Riots 19-23 January 1998*, 1998.

²⁵ L. M. Sachikonye, *Zimbabwe’s Lost Decade: Politics, Development & Society*. (Weaver Press, Harare, 2012).

²⁶ Human Rights Watch, *All Over Again: Human Rights Abuses and Flawed Electoral Conditions in Zimbabwe’s Coming General Elections*, Vol.20, No.2(A), (2008).

<http://www.hrw.org/reports/2008/zimbabwe0308/>, Accessed on 27 July 2017.

Amnesty International, “*Terror tactics in the run-up to elections*,” June 2000,

<http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAFAR460142000?OPEN&of=ENG-ZWE>, Accessed on 29 July 2017.

The ZANU-PF government realised that youth were a potential opposition force (they figured out that the grievances of the youth also helped in triggering the food riots and demonstrations which occurred in the late 1990s) as well as a potent weapon to serve its own interests. It, therefore, created state-sanctioned vigilante groups made up of youths and these groups comprised of Chipangano and Boko Haram in Mbare, *Upfumi kuvadiki* in Epworth, Al Shabab in Kwekwe, *Jomochocho* in Hurungwe and *Jambanja* in Uzumba-Maramba-Pfungwe.²⁷ These state-sanctioned vigilante groups rallied support for ZANU-PF and violated the MDC supporters. Other state-sanctioned vigilante groups, parallel to the ones previously mentioned, sprouted around the country and enabled the incumbent government to regain its power through terror.

In the post-2000 era, vigilante politics intensified with Chipangano group stationed in Mbare. Chipangano, which literally means ‘a pact’, emerged between 1999 and 2001 as ZANU-PF panacea to counter the growing support of Movement of Democratic Change (MDC) in Mbare Constituency and elsewhere. The group however gained momentum in 2001²⁸ when it actively canvassed support for ZANU-PF and increasingly consolidated itself as a shadow militia group that intimidated the opposition and coerced individuals to support ZANU-PF, particularly targeting women through rape and torture.²⁹ The group sprouted its bases around Mbare District. These vigilantes were involved in perpetrating some forms of state-sponsored violence (under various state-initiated operations code-named *Mavhoterapapi*, and Operation Red Finger)³⁰ which plagued the inhabitants of Mbare. The vigilantes controlled the Mupedzanhamo Flea Markets and the bus terminal. The group could raid the market stalls at Mupedzanhamo, Siyaso and other places to punish those who evaded paying the mandatory US\$1 per day to the leader Jim Kunaka.³¹ Kunaka amassed wealth for himself and for ZANU PF party leaders to which Chipangano was answerable.³²

²⁷A. M. Oosterom and L. Pswarayi, *Being a born free. Violence, Youth and Agency in Zimbabwe*. (Institute of Development Studies, Brighton, 2014), p.20.

²⁸ *Daily News*, 21 July 2013; See also *Standard*, 24 September 2012.

²⁹ L. Sachikonye, *When a State Turns on Its Citizens: Sixty Years of Institutionalised Violence in Zimbabwe*. (Jacana Media, Johannesburg, 2011), p. 64.

³⁰Operation Mavhoterapapi was a ZANU-PF campaign to chastise those who allegedly voted for the MDC during the 2008 Presidential election. Operation Red Finger was also a ZANU-PF campaign of finger inspection to make sure that everyone visited the polling station. Those who were found without red ink on their fingers were perceived as the enemies of President Mugabe. The Operation mainly targeted the stall owners in Mupedzanhamo Markets. Also see ‘Zimbabwe election: Robert Mugabe’s Operation Red Finger’ Causes terror’, *The Telegraph*, 28 June 2008.

³¹ ‘Zimbabwe: ZANU-PF Chipangano Gang Block Construction in Mbare’, *SW Radio*, 26 June 2012.

³² *Ibid.*

Only few scholars like Mutongwizo and Maunga *et al* researched on Chipangano vigilantism, but insufficient attention was directed towards the events that enabled the emergence of the group in Mbare. The existing literature does not explain the background of the group and how it developed over time. Pertinent issues such as the formation and leadership of the group, its recruitment and membership have been overlooked in these studies. Their studies were limited to the period between 2010 and 2012. These studies were too brief and they were based on mere desktop research. They lack empirical data from the contemporaries or witnesses of Chipangano vigilantism. This study seeks to examine how Chipangano emerged and consolidated its powers in Mbare district and to unearth its crusades in Mbare business zones. It will also examine why the group had become an intimidating force in Mbare. This study will show how the people of Mbare were terrorised by Chipangano vigilantes.

The activities of the group have created a state of trepidation in Mbare District with many people being injured, displaced, disappearing and losing their loved ones. The residents of Mbare responded to Chipangano violence in many ways, including general acquiescence. Some resorted to selling their products at night to avoid paying rents at the market stalls. Due to a combination of fear, economic hardships and search for safety, some unemployed youths joined the Chipangano group. Those who tried to fight back were usually unsuccessful as the police ended up arresting the victims themselves whenever they reported cases of Chipangano violence.³³ Consequently, the Mbare populace developed an intense repugnance towards the ZANU-PF government as a result of the work of Chipangano. Thus, this thesis intends to examine and evaluate the responses of Mbare residents to the scourges of Chipangano vigilantes.

There was a covert and deniable relationship between Chipangano group, ZANU-PF and state structures. This study will explicitly explain the relationship between Chipangano and ZANU-PF revealing the politicians who were backing and bankrolling the group, demonstrating how ZANU-PF and Chipangano benefitted from each other. Another interesting aspect of this study is the relationship between Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) in Mbare and Chipangano. The police showed partiality towards the group by apprehending the victims and leaving the Chipangano perpetrators scot free.³⁴ According to the Police Act, the members of police force

³³ Human Rights Watch, “*Our Hands Are Tied*” *The Erosion of the Rule of Law in Zimbabwe*, (HRW, New York, 2008), p.41.

³⁴ SW Radio, *Chipangano*, 23 December 2003, www.swradioafrica.com/News_archives/files/2003/December/Tuesday%2023%20Dec/vg-chipangano.html, Accessed on 23 December 2017.

should not be partisan. Like other ZRP Departments, Mbare police contravened the Police Act countless times and the state turned a blind eye.³⁵ Hence there is a need to ask questions why the government took a non-interventionist stance in these issues. It is also surprising that there was a sudden change of the relations between the state and Chipangano especially late 2012. This change made the government to launch a crackdown against the vigilante group.³⁶ This raised the question why the government only intervened in 2013, having allowed the group to operate since 1999. This study will also examine the responses of the state to Chipangano vigilantism.

Chipangano violence is remembered and interpreted differently by the people of Mbare. This study examines how vigilante violence is remembered today by the residents. The activities of Chipangano vigilantes such as abduction, intimidation, beatings, killing and displacement of people resulted in severe trauma. Robben argues that a traumatic event is repressed or denied and registers only belatedly after the passage of a period of latency.³⁷ Erikson, Neal, Sztompka and Watson concur that trauma ruptures social bonds, destroys group identities, undermines the sense of community.³⁸ In the last chapter of this thesis, I will engage memory studies in order to understand how Mbare citizens remember and interpret Chipangano vigilantism today.

This study used a qualitative research method and its data was collected through in-depth interviews with individuals, primarily politically active citizens across the political spectrum who were willing to speak out these issues, former members of Chipangano who were openly dissociated with it, civil society organisations who have helped victims, and willing Mbare council officials. Taking a cue from Liamputtong et al, qualitative techniques enabled me to discover the experiences and interpretations attached to Chipangano vigilantism from the viewpoint of the contemporaries (victims, medical personnel, politicians and former members

³⁵ HRW, “*Our Hands are Tied*” *Erosion of the Rule of Law in Zimbabwe*, (HRW, New York, 2008), p.41.

³⁶ ‘Police launch crackdown on Chipangano linked gang’, *The Zimbabwean*, 14 September 2012.

³⁷ A. C. G. M. Robben, ‘How Traumatized Societies Remember: The Aftermath of Argentina's Dirty War’, *Cultural Critique*, No. 59, (2005), pp. 120-164.

³⁸ K. Erikson, ‘Notes on Trauma and Community’, In C. Caruth (ed.), *Trauma: Explorations in Memory*. (The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1995), pp. 183-99.

See also A. C. Neal, *National Trauma and Collective Memory: Major Events in the American Century*. (Armonk, M. E. Sharpe, New York 1999).

P. Sztompka, ‘Cultural Trauma: The Other Face of Social Change’, *European Journal of Social Theory* 3, No. 4 (2000), p. 449

R. S. Watson, ‘Memory, History, and Opposition under State Socialism: An Introduction’, in R. S. Watson (ed.) *Memory, History, and Opposition under State Socialism*. (University of Washington Press, Washington), p.19.

of Chipangano).³⁹ Strauss argued that qualitative methods enable an interpretive and contextualised approach, and a sustained focus on the complex creation and maintenance of meaning.⁴⁰ Hence, a qualitative approach provided a pellucid explanation of Chipangano vigilantism in Mbare district through its oral history sources.

Since the topic was politically sensitive, this study used snowball sampling because I was working with a population which was not easily identified or accessed. It was difficult to identify who was and who was not Chipangano. Snowball sampling was important as it ensured the safety of both the researcher and research informants. It involved building a sample through referrals and it began by identifying someone from the targeted population who was willing to participate in the study. In this case, I identified a man called Tapiwa Chideme⁴¹, a former researcher at Amani Trust, who referred me to two participants who also referred me to other participants. He warned me not to go any person whom I was not introduced to because it was dangerous. All in all, I managed to conduct twenty-one out of twenty-four scheduled interviews. Attempts to reschedule the meetings with the remainder were not successful as the informants claimed to be busy always. The snowball sampling method had its limitations and these included interviewing a network of friends, some interviewees failing to provide the next participant(s) and there was no guarantee of the representativeness of the sample. To overcome these limitations, I asked the participants to encourage others to contribute in order to avoid what is called 'cold-calling.' This proved to be effective as most participants were full of zeal and enthusiasm to make a contribution to this study.

Personal in-depth interviews played an important role in probing for bottomless, ironic and anecdotal stories of the vigilantes in Mbare District. This study used semi-structured interviews with series of open-ended questions. Kvale argued that good interview questions should thematically contribute to knowledge production.⁴² I designed and aligned my interview questions to the main goal and secondary goals of the study. In Patton's words, semi-structured interviews enabled me to gather what is called in the research literature 'thick description'.⁴³

³⁹ P. Liamputtong, *Researching the Vulnerable: A Guide to Sensitive Research Methods*. (Sage Publications, London, 2006); See also D. E. Lorey, and W. H. Beezley, *Genocide, Collective violence and popular Memory: The Politics of Remembrance in 20th Century*, (Library of Congress, Wilmington, 2002).

⁴⁰ A. Strauss, *Basic Considerations in Basics of Qualitative Research: Grounded Theory Procedures and Techniques*. (Sage, California, 1990).

⁴¹ Tapiwa Chideme is very knowledgeable about Chipangano vigilantism in Mbare because he was born and bred in the area and his parents are still staying there. As an academia, he is factual and objective, thus I could not doubt the participants whom referred me to.

⁴² S. Kvale, *Doing Interviews*. (SAGE, Wiltshire, 2008).

⁴³ M. Patton, *Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods*. (SAGE Publications, London, 2001).

This type of interview allowed me to prepare questions for each respondent and pursue in more depth particularly in areas that the respondent happened to be acquainted with. Hence it gave me freedom to vary the sequence of the questions and probe others in greater depth. One-on-one conversations with the interviewees enabled me to observe some non-verbal cues such as gestures, emotions, facial expressions and body posture. Non-verbal cues simultaneously detailed the spoken narrative or express some ideas that are not easily verbalised. For example, continuous sounds like 'nxaaaaaa' (an expression of sorrows, anger and frustration) and head shaking which punctuated Baba Chimhutu's interview session, gave an elaborate picture on the horrific situation that was created by Chipangano in Mbare.

This study also used the narrative or story-telling method to get a picture of Chipangano crusades in Mbare. This technique allowed the respondents to recount their experiences of Chipangano violence. According to Connelly and Clandinin, "humans are story-telling organisms who individually and collectively lead storied lives."⁴⁴ The study of individual meanings attached political-organised violence derives some meaning from, and unavoidably compels one to locate it within biographical, historical and social context.⁴⁵ To acquire sufficient data for this study, there was a need for a methodological approach which sit at the crossroads of biography, history and society. Taking a cue from Andrews, this technique allowed me to acquire both event-centred narratives (biographies) and experience-centred narratives (history and society) of the victims of Chipangano vigilantism.⁴⁶ The narrative method was fundamental because it unravelled individual experiences and the realities of Chipangano vigilantism in the district. Young observed that the narratives of first person experience are valuable for their power to refute and demystify collective historical narratives which often homogenise and subordinate individual perspectives and experiences.⁴⁷

Moreover, the use of story-telling or narrative approach was instrumental in disclosing how Chipangano vigilantism is remembered and interpreted today in Mbare. Like in-depth interviews, the narrative approach contains an interpretive inclination and this helped the researcher to have a brighter picture about vigilantism in Mbare. Non-verbal cues make stories a rich source of interpretation. Noteworthy is the fact that narrative method clarifies ambiguous

⁴⁴ F. M. Connelly and J. D. Clandinin, 'Narrative and Story in Practice and Research', *Educational Researcher*, Vol.19, No.5, (1990), pp.2-14.

⁴⁵ B. Hamber and R. A. Wilson, 'Symbolic closure through memory, reparation and revenge in post-conflict societies', *Journal of Human Rights*, Vol. 1, No.1, (2002), pp.35-53.

⁴⁶ M. Andrews, C. Squire and M. Tamboukou (eds.), *Doing Narrative Research*. (SAGE, London, 2008).

⁴⁷ J. E. Young, *The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning*. (Yale University Press, Yale 1993).

issues as it draws explanation from parallel present situations. In Halbwachs' words, it lends itself to a presentist approach where past experiences are reconstructed in the context of the present.

The researcher successfully conducted ten of the interviews using the interviewee's local language (ChiShona) while those conducted in English were as per interviewee's discretion. The advantage of using the local language was that the interviewees were more articulate, eloquent and comfortable to reveal their experiences, hence they were able to give detailed and context-specific stories. I conducted an average of three interviews per day due to many variables such as the delays caused by public transport, the respondents decided the time to conduct the interview and some of them had to take time off to rush to their *musika* (vending) businesses

Almost half of the interviews were recorded and this was done after reaching a consensus with the interviewees. Recording enabled me to capture the exact interview content perfectly and during analysis phase I was constantly referring to the transcribed interviews. These interviews were transcribed to ensure easy accessibility and reference during data analysis phase. All the interviews conducted using the vernacular language were translated into English during the transcribing phase.

The researcher used various case studies undertaken in other African countries. Taking cue from Zainal, the case of the Mungiki group in Kenya, the Sungusungu in Tanzania, the Bakasi Boys in Nigeria, vigilante groups in Western Cape Province of South Africa helped me to closely examine Chipangano vigilantism within a specific context.⁴⁸ A comparative analysis of Chipangano and other vigilante groups in Africa broadened and enlightened me hence my findings were not mere generalisations.

This study also used primary documents such as Harare City Council reports, newspaper reports, video records, magazines and pictures. These were accessed from the Archives such as SW Radio Africa, Kubatana Archives, Nehanda Radio and Sokwanele. These sources deepened my understanding of Chipangano vigilantism. Reports and videos complemented the interview narratives hence this helped to prove the objectivity or subjectivity of oral sources. Newspapers provided dated information and many occasions of Chipangano violence. Other

⁴⁸ Z. Zainal, 'Case study as a research method', *Jurnal Kermanusiaan*, bil 9, (2007); See also R. K. Yin, *Case study research: Design and methods* (2nd Edition), (SAGE Publications, Calif, 1984).

useful sources such as journals and NGO reports were also used and they helped to shape my observations and analyses. The fusion of primary documents and other methods strengthened this study.

To analyse the collected data, I employed three methods namely narrative analysis, thematic analysis and discourse analysis. Narrative analysis was used to analyse all the data which was collected through narrative or story-telling approach. Relevant information from transcribed interviews and interview notes were identified and re-transcribed. This was attained through playing the audios repeatedly, identifying the way in which the respondents narrated their stories.⁴⁹ To strengthen the narrative analysis, I employed the Labovian approach. Narratives were extracted from the interviews and parsed into numbered clauses.⁵⁰ Labovian approach is a six-part model (abstract, orientation, complication, evaluation, resolution and coda) and each clause was assigned each component of the model. The abstract component analysed the subject or main idea of the story while orientation was part of the story that provide background or context of the events (what, who, when). The complication component analysed part of the narrative with events that are focal to the plot. At the evaluation stage, the researcher analysed the impact of the experiences or events to people of Mbare. Resolution occurred after evaluation, this was the stage the researcher wanted to see what finally happened in the story. Resolution stage was important as it gives the story a sense of completion.⁵¹

This study used thematic analysis which is a grounded theory type of analysis.⁵² The researcher meticulously reviewed the interview notes and interview transcripts several times with an aim to identify relevant themes infused in these texts. Inductive or open coding was then used to organise data into various themes. Pile-sorting was also used to generate or yield broader themes from the interviews. This also involved finding useful quotes which represents the themes. The divergences and complementarities of themes were noted and this helped me to come up with coherent theories. The discourse analysis complemented thematic analysis. Discourse analysis enabled me to deconstruct texts with a view to find underlying discourses and ideologies. Discourse analysis was used to locate complementarities, tensions and

⁴⁹ C. K. Riessman, *Narrative Analysis (Vol. 30)*, (SAGE, London, 1993).

⁵⁰ W. Patterson, 'Narratives of Events: Labovian Narrative analysis and its Limitation', in M. Andrews, C. Squire and M. Tamboukou (eds.), *Doing Narrative Research*. (SAGE, London, 2008), pp. 28-40.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² J. A. Gliner and G. A. Morgan, *Research Methods in Applied Settings: An integrated approach to design and analysis*, (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc, Publishers, Mahwah, 2000).

contradictions within the field notes and interview transcripts. Using these methods, I was able to analyse the text with respect to the original interview.

This study abided by the principles of informed consent, anonymity, safety and confidentiality in line with the Ethical Standards required for this research. As I mentioned earlier, the issue of Chipangano vigilantism was politically sensitive thus there was a need to uphold the non-maleficence principle to secure the safety of the participants from persecution or state agents at any stage of the research.⁵³ In a bid to protect the respondents, interviews were conducted in safe places where I could meet them. Some interviews were conducted in food outlets such as Chicken Slice and Chicken Inn and it was not easy for a mere bystander to know what we were discussing. Some were conducted indoors. Again, I did not seek any official permission from Harare City Council or Mbare police to carry out the research. It is common knowledge that some of the council officials and Mbare police officers were involved in Chipangano operations. I guaranteed the protection of the interviewees through the use of pseudonym (which they chose for themselves) except for the few particularly NGOs officials, MDC politicians and activists who opted to use their real names.

Chapter synopsis

Chapter 2 examines the theories of vigilantism with a view of trying to reach at a clearer understanding of the concept. Generally, there is no consensus among scholars on the definition of vigilantism. The study of vigilantism is broad and there is no universal definition of vigilantism, but the definitions are rather peculiar to each and every scenario. Rosenbaum, and others have shown that there are many types of vigilantism such as regime control vigilantism, social group vigilantism, crime control vigilantism and others. However, this thesis will focus on state-sanctioned vigilantism which many scholars do not usually document because of the assumption that vigilantes are predominantly anti-state. State-sanctioned vigilantism refers to the state's illegitimate and clandestine endorsement of vigilante activities such as militancy, bigotry and engaging in illegal and extortionist operations against a targeted populace, especially those who are perceived to be enemies of the government.⁵⁴ Drawing from case studies of different countries, this chapter examines different views about the emergence of

⁵³ J. F. Gubrium and J. A. Holstein, *Handbook of Interview Research: Context and Method*. (Sage Publications, California, 2002).

⁵⁴ N. Sundar, 'Vigilantism, Culpability and Moral Dilemmas', *Critique of Anthropology*, Vol 30, No.1, (2010). pp.113-121.

vigilantism, vigilantism and politics and vigilantism and the society. Such an analysis, I hope, will help me to draw comparative perspectives and theoretical insights.

Chapter 3 discusses the emergence, development and crusades of Chipangano in Mbare. Furthermore, the chapter interrogates the multifaceted factors or conditions that helped the group to emerge and what made it to survive that long. In the course of this chapter, I will discuss the operations of Chipangano vigilantes with a view to show the mechanism used by the group to punish its perceived enemies. I will also deal with issues of how Chipangano got to involve themselves in politics and its role in political violence, intra-party conflicts and the creation of a culture of lack of governability in Mbare.

Chapter 4 discusses the relationship between Chipangano, ZANU-PF and State structures. The purpose of this chapter is to know the reasons behind the relationship between ZANU-PF and Chipangano; how the council and the vigilantes related to each other; the relationship between the law enforcement agency and the vigilantes as well as the reaction of Government to the activities of Chipangano.

Chapter 5 investigates the responses of Mbare inhabitants to the scourges of Chipangano violence. This chapter will examine the actions that were taken by the community against the vigilante group, detailing their survival strategies in the fact of this vigilantism. It will show the reactions of the ordinary people who worked at Mupedzanhamo, Siyaso and Mbare bus terminal and the responses of the people to electoral violence which was unleashed by the vigilantes, as well as the efforts of the town council officers to deal with this vigilante group.

Chapter 6 will focus on memories of Chipangano violence in the Mbare. It will also examine the roles of governmental organisations such as the Organ of National Healing Reconciliation and Integration (ONHRI) and Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC) in helping the victims of vigilante violence. It will also examine the role of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in dealing with the victims of Chipangano violence, and also the relationship between the community and the former members of Chipangano in post-violence period.

CHAPTER 2

Understanding vigilantism

Introduction

Generally, there is no consensus among scholars on the definition of vigilantism. The study is broad and there is no universal definition of the concept, but the definitions are rather peculiar to each and every scenario. Existing studies of vigilantism have focused on other types of vigilantism such as regime control vigilantism, social control vigilantism, crime control vigilantism and others.¹ This chapter examines the theories of vigilantism with a view of trying to reach at a clearer understanding of the concept. However, this thesis will focus on state-sanctioned vigilantism which many scholars do not usually document because of the assumption that vigilantes are predominantly anti-state rather than state initiatives. This chapter will draw comparative perspectives and theoretical insights from case studies of different countries. This chapter will start by examining different scholarly conception of vigilantism and state-sanctioned vigilantism. It will go on to examine different views about the emergence of vigilantism and the relationship between vigilantism and politics. Lastly, it will deal with the relationship between the vigilantes and their constituencies.

Vigilantism and State Sanctioned Vigilantism

There is no consensus among scholars on what exactly vigilantism is, especially pertaining to the nature of its relationship with state.² Pratten argued that ‘it is necessary to explore vigilantism as a practice rather than as an object of analysis with clear-cut conceptual and empirical boundaries.’³ Taking a cue from Brown, vigilantism can be defined as an organised extra-legal movement whose members takes over the roles of the state, in a particular area, especially its monopoly of violence with or without the blessings of the state.⁴ Although

¹ See L. Fourchard, ‘A New Name for an Old Practice: Vigilantes in South-Western Nigeria’, *Journal of the International African Institute*, Vol. 78, No. 1, (2008), pp. 16-40; L. Buur, and S. Jensen, ‘Introduction: Vigilantism and the Policing of Everyday Life’, *South Africa Journal of African studies*, Vol. 63, No. 2, (2004), pp.139- 152.

S. Heald, ‘State, Law, and Vigilantism in Northern Tanzania’, *African Affairs*, Vol. 105, No. 419, (2006), pp. 265-283.

² M. L. Fleisher, ‘Sungusungu: State-Sponsored Village Vigilante Groups among the Kuria of Tanzania, Africa’, *Journal of the International African Institute*, Vol. 70, No. 2 (2000), pp.209-228.

³ D. Pratten, ‘Introduction: The Politics of Protection: Perspectives on Vigilantism in Nigeria’, *Journal of the International African Institute*, Vol. 78, No. 1, (2008), pp.1-15.

⁴ R. M. Brown, *Strain of Violence: Historical Studies of American Violence and Vigilantism*. (Oxford University Press, New York, 1976), pp.108-109.

vigilante groups are outright criminal organisations, they are different from other groups, such as private militias, gangsters mafias and others, in that they can claim an explicit legal status and they enjoy tolerance from the law enforcement agents. In most cases, their operations involve their own private interests rather than the state's interests. Some of the activities which the vigilantes are involved in have nothing to do with state-sanctioned operations against 'enemies of the state' Unlike private militias or para-militias, vigilante groups do not resemble regular armed forces in any way be it training, mission, organisation or equipment. Taking a cue from Conway, vigilante groups are ritualistic in nature, they recruit through indoctrination and they have a tendency of punishing their fellow community members for dissenting from their beliefs.⁵ State-sanctioned vigilantes owe allegiance to the state rather than private persons or groups.

Rosenbaum and Sederberg defined vigilantism as '...the establishment of violence perpetrated in furtherance of conservative ends and designed to create, maintain or recreate an established socio-political order.'⁶ This definition is too broad because the phenomenon was defined without using specific contexts. Rosenbaum and Sederberg used 'the concept to describe a wide range of apparently heterogeneous behaviours.'⁷ Heald also concurs that 'the accounts of vigilantism should be located within a particular context of social change.'⁸ Equating vigilantism with 'establishment violence' produces a concept which covers everything and, therefore, nothing.⁹ Their definition does not clearly delineate state-sanctioned vigilantism because it is too inclusive so, meaning is shrouded in the mist of ambiguity. Therefore, I propose to use the following definition: vigilantism is an organised extra-legal movement whose members take advantage of the weakness of the state to stake control over certain geographical portions of the state, without totally usurping the political powers of the same state.

Fourchard argued that in Africa, the word vigilantism has been used to describe movements that differ in nature and composition as well as geographical local locations.¹⁰ To articulate his

⁵ P. Conway, *The Informal Justice System in Northern Ireland*, Paper presented to the British Criminology Conference, (University of Cardiff, Cardiff, 1993).

⁶ J. H. Rosenbaum and P. C. Sederberg, 'Vigilantism: An Analysis of Establishment Violence', *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 6, No. 4, (1974).

⁷ L. Johnston, 'What is Vigilantism?', *British Journal of Criminology*, Vol. 36, No. 2, (1996), pp.220-236.

⁸ S. Heald, 'Mafias in Africa: The Rise of Drinking Companies and Vigilante Groups in Bugisu District, Uganda', *Africa*, Vol.56, No.4, (1986), p. 4

⁹ L. Johnston, 'What is Vigilantism?', *British Journal of Criminology*, Vol. 36, No. 2, (1996), p.222.

¹⁰ L. Fourchard, 'A New Name for an Old Practice: Vigilantes in South-Western Nigeria', *Journal of the International African Institute*, Vol. 78, No. 1, (2008), pp. 16-40.

argument, Fourchard cited movements such as white farmers in the Orange Free State in South Africa in the 1910s and 1920s, movements to counter cattle raiding in Tanzania in the 1980s and 1990s, state-sponsored groups fighting ANC members in South Africa in the 1980s, the Mungiki group in Kenya and the O’odua People’s Congress (OPC) in South-western Nigerian cities, as instances of vigilantism.¹¹ He went on to argue that vigilante groups interrogate the relationships between the society and law enforcement agents and in many African countries they are tolerated by the state despite being a threat to the state monopoly of legitimate violence. This was not applicable to case of Zimbabwe as the vigilantes worked hand in glove with the state structures and they engaged in violence on behalf of the state.¹² Fourchard perceives vigilantism as an anti-state movement which seize the duties of the state structures especially the duties of law enforcement agents. Therefore, his work did not delineate vigilantism within the purview of state-sanctioned vigilantism.

Brown’s analysis of vigilantism contains two different definitions of vigilantism. In his first definition, Brown argued that vigilantism is ‘an organised extra-legal movements whose members take the law into their own hands.’¹³ Little and Sheffield, in their comparative study of American and English vigilantes, shared the same view with Brown, asserting that the “essence of vigilantism is private citizens taking the law into their own hands from start to finish”¹⁴ This definition is confusing as it does not explain the cases of vigilantes who engaged in illegitimate acts and were always exonerated by the courts of law. His second definition says vigilantism refers ‘to associations in which citizens have joined together for self-protection under conditions of disorder.’¹⁵ Brown mentioned that vigilante groups appear to control criminal behaviour but at the same time they are driven by economic or political agendas which overshadows their aim to stop crime and disorder. His definition does not include state-sanctioned vigilantism because he was referring to the activities of various citizen patrol groups that emerged in the USA in 1960s. Brown defined vigilantism in the context of traditional crime control groups in America. This is evident in his argument when he asserted that

¹¹ L. Fourchard, ‘A New Name for an Old Practice: Vigilantes in South-Western Nigeria’, *Journal of the International African Institute*, Vol. 78, No. 1, (2008), pp. 16-40.

¹² J. Mc Gregor, ‘Surveillance and the City: Patronage, Power-sharing and the Politics of Urban Control in Zimbabwe’, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol.39, No.4, (2013), pp.783–805.

¹³ R. M. Brown, *Strain of Violence: Historical Studies of American Violence and Vigilantism*, (Oxford University Press, New York, 1975), pp.95-96.

¹⁴ C. B. Little and C. Sheffield, ‘Frontier and criminal: English private prosecution societies and American vigilantism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries’, *Am. Social. Rev.* 48, (1983), p.797.

¹⁵ R. M. Brown, *Strain of Violence: Historical Studies of American Violence and Vigilantism*, (Oxford University Press, New York, 1975), p.130.

American vigilantes felt no less “public spirited” in participating in vigilantism than they did in supporting legal responses to criminal behaviour.¹⁶ Brown believes that vigilantism is a phenomenon which emerges as a result of “the absence of effective law and order.”¹⁷ Caughey supported Brown’s argument asserting that the San Francisco committees “rose up alongside regular courts and defiance of them.”¹⁸ Brown’s approach emphasizes the criminological orientations of vigilantes, hence his work did not include the political orientation of the phenomenon. Therefore, Brown’s definition of the phenomenon did not cover state-sanctioned vigilantism.

Many scholars tend to agree and disagree on numerous rudimentary elements of vigilantism, such as what, why, who, how, when and against whom. Some scholars, maintained that vigilantes are always private citizens¹⁹ whereas others put forward that vigilantism is carried out by the state agents.²⁰ Rosenbaum and Sederberg noted that vigilantism consists of (threat of) violence but Hine also included non-violent operations like that of Neighbourhood Watch Committees.²¹ Hine’s conception of vigilantism does not include state sanctioned vigilantism. The goals of the vigilantes also vary widely, for instance securing an established socio-political system; enforcing law in an anarchistic state; ending a repugnant situation, apprehending and punishing suspected lawbreakers.²² Some professed that vigilantism is always a premeditated act²³ while others also recognise more spontaneous forms.²⁴ Victims of vigilantism also differ widely in the literature; these consist of perpetrators of crime, law enforcement officers, minority groups, whalers and even witches.²⁵

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ R. M. Brown, *Strain of Violence: Historical Studies of American Violence and Vigilantism*. (Oxford University Press, New York, 1975), p.96.

¹⁸ J. W. Caughey, ‘Their Majesties the Mob: Vigilantes Past and Present’, *Pacif. Hist. Rev.* 26, (1957), p.221.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ T. Doomsday, ‘On cheering Charles Bronson: The ethics of vigilantism’, *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* Vol. 47, Issue 1 Spring (2009), p.p.49–6; See also M. Huggins, ‘Vigilantism and the State in Modern Latin America’, *Essays on Extra-legal Violence*, (Praeger Publishers, New York, 1991).

²¹ J. H. Rosenbaum and P. C. Sederberg, ‘Vigilantism: An Analysis of Establishment Violence’, *Comparative Politics* 6, no. 4, (July 1974); See also K. D. Hine, ‘Vigilantism Revisited: An Economic Analysis of the Law of Extra-Judicial Self-help or why can’t Dick shoot Henry for Stealing Jane’s truck?’ *American University Law Review*, Vol. 47, (1998), p.1223.

²² A. Alvarez and R. Bachman, *Violence: The enduring Problem*. (SAGE, 2007); See also F. Zimring, *The Contradictions of American Capital Punishment*. (Oxford University Press, New York, 2003).

²³ T. Dumsday, ‘On cheering Charles Bronson: The ethics of vigilantism’, *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* Vol. 47, Issue 1 (Spring 2009), p.p.49–6; See also L. Johnston, ‘What is Vigilantism?’, *British Journal of Criminology* 36, no. 2, (1996).

²⁴ M. Adinkrah, ‘Vigilante Homicides in Contemporary Ghana’, *Journal of Criminal Justice*, (2005). See also L. Shortland and L. I. Goodstein, ‘Role of Bystanders in Crime Control’, *Journal of Social Issues*, Vol. 40, Issue: 1, (1984), pp.9-26.

²⁵ J. Z. Rubin and B. R. Brown, *The social psychology of bargaining and negotiation*. (Academic Press, Cambridge, 1975).

Häefele argued that vigilante is the name given to self-appointed law enforcement groups which appeared occasionally in communities where law officers and courts could be said to be either non-existent, or so muzzled that they are inefficient or corrupt; where municipal institutions were disorganized, or where established authorities seemed unable or unwilling to cope with lawlessness and disorder.²⁶ This delineation clearly clarifies the situation of Mbare and Chipangano vigilantes. The law enforcement agencies in Mbare were very corrupt and inefficient to the extent that they made unwritten agreements with the ZANU-PF officials such as Tendai Savanhu to allow the Chipangano to administer justice and maintaining order at Mbare Bus Terminal and other surrounding places such as the retail and wholesale markets, flea markets and the industrial areas.²⁷ The main intention was to curtail the growing support of the opposition parties, especially the MDC, in Mbare.

Various scholars have used the word "vigilante" as an umbrella of quite diverse groups, ranging from self-organized, unarmed and generally law-abiding groups, but state-sanctioned vigilantism has been documented and included in the definition by only few scholars.²⁸ Many authorities (such as Kagwanja, Fleisher, Heald, Fourchard and others) have concentrated on crime control vigilantism using different cases of Community Oriented Police such as the Sungusungu of Tanzania, the Bakasi Boys of Nigeria, People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) and Mapogo-a-Mathamaga of South Africa.²⁹

Johnston tried to define vigilantism vis-à-vis its relationship with the state structures. In his definition, there is no collusion between the law enforcement agents and the vigilantes. He mentioned that the state was 'highly critical of the phenomenon'.³⁰ However, Shearings refuted this when he argued that, the public was unconvinced by the protection guarantee given to the vigilantes by the state agents.³¹

²⁶ B. Häefele, *Vigilantism in Western Cape*, Provincial Government of the Western Cape: Department of Community Safety, (2002).

²⁷ Human Rights Watch, 'Our Hands are tied' *Erosion of the Rule of Law in Zimbabwe*, (Human Right Watch, Washington, 2008), p.39.

²⁸ Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (LCHR), *Vigilantes in the Philippines: A Threat to Democratic Rule*. (LCHR, New York, 1988).

²⁹ The Sungusungu is a Tanzanian crime-fighting vigilante group established in 1981 by the Nyamwezi and Sukuma ethnic groups in order to protect their cattle and property from theft. The Bakasi Boys is a Nigerian anti-crime vigilante group which operate in Igbo area. PAGAD is a South African anti-crime organisation which was established in 1996 in the Cape Flats area in order to fight violence and drugs in the area. Mapogo-a-Mathamaga is a South African vigilante group founded by John Magolego to fight crime.

³⁰ L. Johnston, 'What is Vigilantism?', *The British Journal of Criminology*, vol.36, no.2, 1996, p.234

³¹ C. D. Shearing, 'The Relation Between Public and Private Policing', in M. Tonry and N. Morris, (eds.), *Modern Policing: Crime and Justice: A Review of Research*, Vol. 15, (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1992), pp.399- 434.

However, more recently Huggins popularised the notion of state sanctioned vigilantism. He argued vigilante groups that are backed by the state to act as the custodians of its interests and vanguards in reasserting its autonomy and power in the state.³² Huggins' conception of vigilantism is, however, insufficient to explain Chipangano vigilantism in Mbare. After having tried to grapple with the various definitions, I hereby propose a working definition of state sanctioned vigilantism for my thesis. State sanctioned vigilantes refers to illegitimate and clandestine endorsement of vigilante activities by the state in the various forms, including but not limited to militancy or bigotry against the populace which is perceived as threats to the status quo/ enemies of the government. In the case of Chipangano in Mbare, the ZANU-PF government sponsored the group to engage in its struggles for political control aiming at weakening the oppositions. Its collusion with the state made all the state security structures to turn a blind eye on its activities or even denying the existence of such phenomenon in the state. The following section presents the views of different scholars on the emergence of vigilantism in different countries.

Theoretical Perspectives on the emergence of vigilantism

Vigilantism is not a recent phenomenon because it existed from time immemorial. Prior to 1900, vigilante groups existed in the United States of America. Between 1851 and 1856, vigilante communities were organised in San Francisco in order to forcibly restore peace and order.³³ The work of Fourchard indicated that vigilante groups emerged in Africa before colonialism as an alternative to curtail crimes in the communities.³⁴ In Tanzania, the operations of the vigilante groups followed the lack of state capacity to ensure effective law enforcement.³⁵ The rise of the vigilante groups in South Africa was justified as covering the policing gap due to inefficiency of the police, corruption and conspiracy with criminals and the failure of the

³² N. Sundar, 'Vigilantism, Culpability and Moral Dilemmas', *Critique of Anthropology*, Vol 30, No. 1, (2010), pp.113-121.

³³ H. J. Rosebaum and P. C. Sederberg, 'Vigilantism: An Analysis of Establishment Violence', *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 6, No.4, (1974), pp.541-570.

³⁴ L. Forchard, 'A new name for an old practice: vigilante in South-western Nigeria', *Africa*, Vol 78, No.1, (2008), pp.16-40.

³⁵ S. Heald, 'State, Law, and Vigilantism in Northern Tanzania', *African Affairs*, Vol. 105, No. 419, (2006), pp. 265-283.

criminal justice system.³⁶ Some vigilante groups in Tanzania (like the *Sungusungu*) and Kenya, (like the *Mungiki*) were initiated by the state with the aim to punish oppositions.³⁷

Many scholars, such as Adigwe, Prattern, Martin and Fleisher, have interrogated the issues that resulted in the rise of vigilantism in Africa and concluded that vigilantism emerged as a way to reinforce oppressive political structures and to decentralize repression.³⁸ In many African countries, the ruling parties are using state sanctioned vigilante groups to coerce the populace to vote for them. According to Prattern contemporary vigilantism in Nigeria has been at the forefront of contests over state authority, and that political leadership has often used vigilante groups as a machinery to entrench state rule as well as state authority.³⁹ Martin asserted that political influence also contributed to the rise of vigilantism in South Africa because the African National Congress (ANC) government permitted this form of violence in its local structures.⁴⁰ Yet other scholars, such as Maunga *et al* avers that various political players in Zimbabwe used the predominantly unemployed youths to form vigilante groups such as Chipangano, to coerce people in Mbare to vote for them.⁴¹ This implies that the emergence of vigilantism in different countries (including Zimbabwe) was prompted by politicians who wanted to get into powerful positions or clinging to posts. Many vigilante groups emerged and thrived because they were state repression apparatus created by politicians to garner support and put the oppositions in obscurity.

According to the state collapse hypothesis, breakdown of good governance, law and order can lead to a situation in which basic state responsibilities such as the provision of security would fall into the hands of the vigilante leaders.⁴² Rotberg interpreted the increasing vigilantism in

³⁶ L. Buur and S. Jensen, 'Introduction: Vigilantism and the Policing of Everyday Life', *South Africa Journal of African studies*, Vol. 63, No. 2, (2004), pp.139- 152.

³⁷ S. Heald, 'State, Law, and Vigilantism in Northern Tanzania', *African Affairs*, Vol. 105, No. 419, (2006), pp. 265-283.

³⁸ A. F. Adigwe, 'Crime, Vigilantism, and Electoral Violence in Nigeria', *International Journal of Humanity and Social Science Invention*, Vol 2, Issue 9, (2013), pp.46-50; D. Pratten, 'Introduction: The Politics of Protection: Perspectives on Vigilantism in Nigeria', *Journal of the International African Institute*, Vol. 78, No. 1, (2008), pp.1-15; M. L. Fleisher, 'Sungusungu: State-Sponsored Village Vigilante Groups among the Kuria of Tanzania, Africa', *Journal of the International African Institute*, Vol. 70, No. 2 (2000), pp.209-228; J. Martin, 'Vigilantism and state crime in South Africa', *State Crime Journal*, Vol. 1, No. 2, (2012), pp. 217-234.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ J. Martin, 'Vigilantism and state crime in South Africa', *State Crime Journal*, Vol. 1, No. 2, (2012), pp. 217-234.

⁴¹ M. Maunga, I. Mugari and M. Tundu, 'Perspectives on Vigilantism in the Republic of Zimbabwe', *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*, Vol. 6, No.5, (2015), pp. 323-334.

⁴² W. Zartman, *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*. (Lynne Rienner Publishers, London/ Boulder,1995), pp. 7-8.

Brazil and South Africa as an indicator of state failure.⁴³ Rotberg's argument is not applicable to Zimbabwe because the rise of vigilantism was not a result of the state's failure to provide security. It was a ZANU-PF deliberate decision to outsource help from the vigilantes in a bid to regain electoral support in MDC constituencies. Minnaar's study divulged that most of South African citizens were not happy with the judicial process, especially lengthy trial proceedings, granting of bail and light sentencing and that is why some resorted to vigilantism as an option.⁴⁴ Gopge also concurred that the emergence of vigilantism in Western Cape's Khayelitsha suburb was out the feeling that many cases were being withdrawn on flimsy grounds like inadequacy of evidence and the perpetrators would return to their criminal activities.⁴⁵ Due to the failure of the judicial system to prosecute criminals, the people in Khayelitsha had no alternative but to engage the vigilante groups. Maunga also pointed that in Zimbabwe, the competency of the judicial system is now doubted by the citizens as it is marred by high levels of corruption and in a way, this contributed in the emergence of the Chipangano group.⁴⁶ The state collapse hypothesis does not convincingly explain the emergence of vigilantism in Zimbabwe because the ZANU-PF government was not anaemic but was responsible for the invention of the vigilante groups for the sake of protecting its interests. The Zimbabwean police and the military had the capabilities of curbing the activities of vigilantes in the state, but they could not do it when the groups are backed by ZANU-PF top officials. It can be argued that in states like Zimbabwe vigilantism can only emerge with the blessings of the state.

Schuberth rebutted the state collapse hypothesis as an explanatory concept for the emergence of vigilantism. Schuberth said that the evolution of vigilantism cannot be presented as an inevitable product of the given conditions, but rather as a direct and indirect outcome of deliberate policy choices.⁴⁷ He has shown that vigilante groups are partly initiated and sustained by the state. They often develop their own political agenda and turn into lawless organisations terrorising the citizens and in some cases, the state itself. He put forward that the absence of the state in stigmatized parts of towns is a direct outcome of political decision to

⁴³ R. Rotberg, 'The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States: Breakdown, Prevention, and Repair', In: R. Rotberg (ed.) *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*. (Princeton University Press, Princeton 2004), p. 6.

⁴⁴ A. Minnaar, 'The new vigilantism in post- April 1994 South Africa: Crime Prevention or an expression of lawlessness?', *Institute for Human Rights and Criminal Justice Studies*, (2001). p.49.

⁴⁵ M. Gopge, 'Vigilantism: A crime or call for Justice?', *Cape August*, Vol. 1, (2003), p.1-4.

⁴⁶ M. Maunga, I. Mugari and M. Tundu, 'Perspectives on Vigilantism in the Republic of Zimbabwe', *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*, Vol 6, No.5, (2015), pp. 323-334.

⁴⁷ M. Schuberth, 'Challenging the weak states hypothesis: Vigilantism in South Africa and Brazil', *Journal of Peace, Conflict and Development*, Issue 20, (2013), pp.38-51.

turn a blind eye on the activities of the vigilantes as some of them are a creation of the state itself.⁴⁸ This argument clearly correlates with the case of state sanctioned vigilantes which are the products of the state, hence it can stop at nothing to protect them.

Stanislawski provided a clear explanation of the emergence of vigilantism using his concept of Black Spots (areas which the state has ceased to be the dominant actor, but illegitimate organisations control what has become a criminal commune).⁴⁹ The concept of Black spots corresponds with the Schubertan argument mentioned above. Vigilantism surfaces in areas or situations in which the state is unable or unwilling to provide safety to a certain group.⁵⁰ The state may pretend as if it is not aware of the vigilante activities occurring in some areas because it is a beneficiary of those activities. However, in areas of limited statehood and low levels of policing, informal activities flourish, state officials prey on public resources and there will be a direct abuse of power.⁵¹ Many scholars subscribed to the notion that vigilante groups in Africa closely resemble criminality through their clientelism and corruption practices.⁵² It needs to be highlighted that under Chipangano's reign, Mbare had become a Black spot whereby the government structures have no influence, not because they could not influence but because the state had deliberately emasculated its own structures and allowed the vigilantes to illegally take over the jurisdiction of the district. The work of Mutongwizo and Maunga *et al* indicated that the state had ceased to be principal actor in Mbare as the local council and the police could not make decisions without the knowledge of Chipangano.⁵³

Another theory which explains the emergence of vigilantism is the Youth Bulge Theory which was propounded by Garry Fuller and Jack Goldstone. The theory put forward that economic and social anomalies provide a foundation for the emergence of vigilantism.⁵⁴ Heinsohn maintained that an excess in young adult male population can, unavoidably, lead to social

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ B. Stanislawski, 'Para-States, Quasi-States, and Black Spots: Perhaps Not States, But Not "Ungoverned Territories", Either', *International Studies Review*, Vol. 10, No. 2, (2008), pp. 366-396.

⁵⁰ M. Gross, 'Vigilante violence and forward panic in Johannesburg's townships', *Theor Soc*, (2016), pp.239–263.

⁵¹ P. Chabal, *State and governance: The limits of decentralisation*, SNV publications. (H0702-01: SNV. Netherlands Development Organisation, 2007).

⁵² *Ibid*; P. Chabal and J. P. Daloz, *Africa works: Disorder as political instrument. African issues*. The International African institute, (James Curry and Indiana University Press, Oxford, 1999); See also J. F. Bayart, S. Ellis and B. Hibou, *The criminalization of the state in Africa*, (James Currey and Indiana University Press, Oxford, 1999).

⁵³ T. Mutongwizo, *Contours of non-state governance: encountering state in South Africa and Zimbabwe*, PHD Thesis, University of Cape Town, (2014).

⁵⁴ J. A. Goldstone, *Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World*, (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1991).

unrest, vigilantism and terrorism, as the "third and fourth sons" that find no prestigious positions in their existing societies rationalize their impetus to compete by political ideology.⁵⁵ This assumption is synonymous to the Zimbabwean situation. The emergence of vigilante groups may have to do with the prevailing high rate of unemployment. According to International Futures, the largest youth bulge was found in Zimbabwe which has a population structure with 56.57% between the ages of 15 and 29.⁵⁶ The theory asserts that the youth especially males, are connected with risk-taking. Demographically, young people constitute about sixty seven percent of Zimbabwe's population.⁵⁷ The largest percentage of youths are found in urban areas and unemployment is widespread. The unemployed youths are easily co-opted into violent vigilantes because of the promise of money.⁵⁸

In tandem with the foregoing, some scholars propounded that economic challenges can result in the rise of vigilantism. Marginalised people are particularly prone to being mobilised and attracted by alternate authority structures.⁵⁹ Societal factors such as high cost of living and high unemployment can lead to mass frustrations, and people become distraught, to an extent that any situation (for example, criminal activity), that threatens their precarious position is met with abrupt reaction such as vigilante activity.⁶⁰ Masese and Mwenzwa confirmed that the Sungusungu vigilantes in Kenya developed as a result of high unemployment and poverty levels.⁶¹ It is clear that politicians in Africa are taking advantage of unemployment to organize the youths as intimidating and coercive mechanisms to assist them to gain allegiance from the citizens.

The greed and grievance theory also clearly expound the emergence of vigilantism in Zimbabwe. It is a theory which was propounded by the scholars of conflict on the causes of civil war, but the argument was later broadened to explain other forms of violence. This argument can also explain the emergence of vigilantism in Zimbabwe. Greed is based on the argument that combatants in an armed conflict are motivated by the desire to better their

⁵⁵ G. Heinsohn, *Terror in Aufstieg und Fall der Nationen*. (Orel Fissli Press, Zurich, 2003).

⁵⁶ International Futures Forecast, 2012

⁵⁷ T. Mude, 'Political Violence: Major Socio-Political Consequence of Urban Youth Unemployment in Zimbabwe', *Review of History and Political Science*, Vol. 2, No. 1, (2014) pp.107-139.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ S. Levitsky and V. M. Murillo, 'Variation in institutional Strength: Cause and Implications', *Annual Review of Political Science*, (2008), p.16-30.

⁶⁰ M. Maunga, I. Mugari, and M. Tundu, 'Perspectives on Vigilantism in the Republic of Zimbabwe', *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*, Vol 6, No.5, (2015), pp.323- 334.

⁶¹ E. R. Masese, and E. Mwenzwa, 'The Genesis and Evolution of Sungusungu Vigilante Group Among the Abagusii Ethnic Group of Kenya', *Journal of Elixir Social Sciences*. Vol. 42, (2012). pp.6485-6492.

situation and perform an informal cost-benefit analysis in examining if the rewards of joining a rebellion are greater than not joining.⁶² Grievance is premised on the argument that people rebel over issues of identity such as ethnicity, religion, social class among others rather than over economic issues.⁶³ This is pertinent to the scenario of Zimbabwe, where both greed and grievance motivated the vigilantes to partake in political violence. Greed, through the incentives and economic opportunities offered by the ZANU-PF officials, persuaded the vigilantes to take part in political violence. The vigilantes can indulge in political violence out of greediness in order to dominate other citizens, hence controlling the means of production. It needs to be noted that the collusion between the vigilante groups and the state (was driven by greediness of both parties) abetted perpetrators of violence to escape prosecution. Grievance motivated the vigilantes in the sense that they were exasperated by unemployment and lack of economic opportunity and thus resorting to violence to create opportunities for themselves. Therefore, it can be argued that the vigilantism can emerge as a result of greediness or selfishness but at the same time the vigilantes may have their own grievances.

Gecaga maintained that the Mungiki (a vigilante group in Kenya) arose out of the economic hardships and exclusion generated by the ethnic clashes in the 1990s.⁶⁴ Researches on the Mungiki consistently refer its members as hitherto underemployed or unemployed youths from the Kikuyu tribe who belonged to urban slums or urban underclass.⁶⁵ The Chipangano and Mungiki membership had some striking similarities because their members were redundant youths, school drop-outs or impecunious young men from the marginalised populace; disillusioned poor who fill the fringes of urban sprawl. The difference between the two vigilante groups is the issue of ethnicity which shaped the Mungiki group. The Mungiki recruited underprivileged youngsters with absent fathers and brought them into what was billed as a family.⁶⁶ It needs to be highlighted that the rise of vigilantism in Zimbabwe and Mbare in particular does not have an ethnic explanation.

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴ M. C. Gecaga, 'Religious Movements and Democratisation in Kenya: Between the Sacred and the Profane', in G. R. Murunga and S. W. Nasong'o (eds.), *Kenya: The Struggle for Democracy*, (Codesria Books, Dakar, 2007), pp.58-89.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ E. Totolo, 'Kenya: The Mungiki mess', *Swiss Federal Institute of Technology website*, 17 November 2008 <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?id=93861&lng=en> – Accessed 13 March 2017; See also *The First Post*, 9 July 2007 <http://www.thefirstpost.co.uk/7652,features,kenyasmafia> – Accessed 13 March 2017; 'The Mungiki: Cult, Street Gang or Political Force?' *Safer Access website*, July 2007 <http://www.saferaccess.org/documents.html> – Accessed 13 March 2017.

The Centre for Law Enforcement Education (CLEEN) alluded that the combination of political, economic and social factors in Nigeria (including high unemployment, poor relations between the police and local communities, widespread corruption, and absence of confidence and trust in the state and its institutions) has made it easy to recruit people into vigilante groups, and for these groups to flourish.⁶⁷ These set of circumstances have been exacerbated by powerful political figures, comprising of several state governors, who sought to count on armies of thugs to intervene whenever events do not go in their favour.⁶⁸ The ZANU-PF government tolerated vigilantism and has been unenthusiastic in taking conclusive action to dismantle it or call its patrons to account. The ZANU-PF officials in political positions with the opportunities for self-enrichment and patronage, exuberantly safeguarded them. Therefore, even if the vigilantes harm persons or property, they escape justice due to governmental inefficiency, corruption, or the leniency of the system and above all protection from the politicians. The following section examines how different scholars perceive the collusion between vigilantism and politics.

Vigilantism and Politics

There is a divergence of ideas among scholars concerning vigilantism and politics, some believe that vigilantism is carried out by private citizens whilst others purported that it involves some state agents.⁶⁹ The later argument is a truism vis-à-vis the case of Chipangano vigilantes in Mbare. Buur and Jensen concur that state representatives can tap into the gamut of illegally sanctioning the use of violence by using vigilante organisations.⁷⁰ The distinction between the state and what is outside the purview of the state becomes blurred when, for instance, the police officers are linked to a vigilante group, at the same time as having to police transgressions. Most of the vigilante groups operate in ‘black spots’ where they are involved in a perpetual negotiation and contestation over what is state and what is not; what is moral and what is not; what is legitimate exercise of authority and what is not.⁷¹ This resonates with what Lund referred to as twilight institutions, where it becomes problematic to distinguish unequivocally between what is state and what is not.⁷² Sachikonye argued that violence is institutionalised in

⁶⁷ HRW/CLEEN, *Nigeria: The Bakasi Boys, the legitimisation of murder and torture*, Vol. 14, No. 5(A), (2002).

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹ L. Johnston, ‘What is Vigilantism?’, *The British Journal of Criminology*, vol.36, no.2, 1996, p.234

⁷⁰ L. Buur and S. Jensen, ‘Introduction: Vigilantism and the policing of everyday life’, *South African Journal of African Studies*, Vol. 63, No. 2, (2010), pp.139-152.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² C. Lund, ‘Twilight Institutions: Public Authority and Local Politics in Africa’, *Development and Change*, Vol. 37, No. 4, (2006), pp. 687-705.

ZANU PF party structures and they use vigilante groups as their quasi-military wings for party aggrandisement.⁷³

A body of scholars agreed that vigilante groups can operate in tandem with the state and use violence to maintain the established order or the status quo. Jarman argued that in Northern Ireland, there is no absolute gap between the state and those who challenge its monopoly on violence.⁷⁴ He went on to say that, many vigilante groups depend on the support of the state for their acts.⁷⁵ Scheper- Hughes argued that the state can legitimise the operations of vigilante groups by merely ‘closing an eye’ or more directly by supporting the actions publicly.⁷⁶ Mireanu who carried out research on vigilantism in Hungary and Italy maintained that there was an ambiguous relationship between the state and vigilantes, sometimes the vigilantes act independently of the state’s approval and in other cases, groups seemed to reinforce the state’s oppressive policies, by committing acts of violence against undesired individuals or groups.⁷⁷ Mc Gregor and Mutongwizo confirmed that Chipangano vigilantes were used as the state apparatus to coerce the people to vote for the incumbent ZANU PF government.⁷⁸ Hence this resonates with Scheper- Hughes’ argument that the state illicitly sanctions the operation of the vigilante groups.

Adigwe researched on vigilantism in Nigeria and concluded that vigilante groups are willing tools in the hands of the politicians.⁷⁹ The Bakassi Boys, as well as other vigilante groups in Nigeria gradually became convenient tools for politically-motivated violence and were used by powerful local politicians to silence voices of opposition.⁸⁰ The Bakassi Boys have enjoyed the support of their state government, which provided them with offices, uniforms and vehicles, as well as paying their salaries.⁸¹ These groups were ready to generate a conducive situation

⁷³ L. M. Sachikonye, *Zimbabwe’s Lost Decade. Politics, Development and Society*, (Weaver Press, Harare, 2012).

⁷⁴ N. Jarman, ‘The Challenge of Peace Building and Conflict Transformation: A Case Study of Northern Ireland’, *Kylv-Mohyla Law and Politics Journal*, Vol. 2, (2016), pp.117-128.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶ N. Scheper- Hughes, Alistair Cooke’s bones: A morality tale, *Anthropology Today*, Vol. 22, Issue 6, (2006), pp. 10-15.

⁷⁷ M. Mireanu, *Vigilantism and Security: State, Violence and Politics in Italy and Hungary*, PHD dissertation, 2014.

⁷⁸ T. Mutongwizo, *Contours of Non-state governance: Encountering State in South Africa and Zimbabwe*, PHD Thesis in Public law and criminology, University of Cape Town, (2014); See also J. Alexander and K. Chitofiri. "The consequences of violent politics in Norton, Zimbabwe." *The Round Table* 99, no. 411 (2010): 673-686.

⁷⁹ A. F. Adigwe, ‘Crime, Vigilantism, and Electoral Violence in Nigeria’, *International Journal of Humanity and Social Science Invention*, Vol 2, Issue 9, (2013), pp.46-50.

⁸⁰ HRW/CLEEN, *Nigeria: The Bakasi Boys, the legitimisation of murder and torture*, Vol. 14, No. 5 (A), (2002).

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

for effecting rigging/manipulating election results. Therefore, it is rational to argue that vigilantes act as goons, who do the dirty work on behalf of politicians and their patrons safeguard them from prosecution.

Otieno, researched on the Sungu Sungu vigilantes in Tanzania, and alluded that:

...during elections, the relationship between the government and Sungu Sungu changes. Politicians give money to these vigilantes for political support and some members of this group occupy elected public positions. The Sungu Sungu became a political group for hire and were being used to protect a particular political group, as they are seen as a security enforcer for political rallies. They would not kill opponents, but only threaten them and make their campaigns difficult to conduct. Sungu Sungu leaders at this time would have a direct link to politicians during campaigns. In Tanzania, the government is aware of Sungu Sungu's criminal activities. Both, mutually benefit from each other's activities and are usually always aware of what the other is doing.⁸²

Otieno's observation reinforces Adigwe's argument that vigilante groups are willing tools in the hands of the politicians.

Human Rights Watch avers that the victims of state-sanctioned vigilantism have developed a profound distrust of the state and the police for being ineffective, corrupt and often complicit in vigilantism.⁸³ In Nigeria, these vigilante groups have been officially endorsed by state governments, and have been used not only to fight crime, but also to target political opponents.⁸⁴ The vigilante groups in Nigeria have murdered and tortured with impunity, under the protection of state authorities. There is evidence that vigilante groups such as the Bakassi Boys and Odua People's Congress (OPC), took their instructions directly from the state government and in rare cases where members of these groups were arrested, state government officials have intervened to ensure that they were released within a short time and were not tried with any criminal offence.⁸⁵ The vigilante groups in Nigeria are different from those in Zimbabwe (including Chipangano) because they are crime control groups and they were publicly endorsed by the state. The following section presents the perceptions of various scholars on the relationship between the vigilantes and their constituency.

⁸² C. M. A. Otieno, 'Children and Youth for Hire: A Case Study of the Sungusungu in rural Kenya', *IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science (IOSR-JHSS)*, Vol 19, Issue 7, Ver. IV, (2014), pp.161-167.

⁸³ HRW/CLEEN, *Nigeria: the Bakasi Boys, The legitimisation of murder and torture*, Vol. 14, No. 5 (A), (2002), p.5.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

The Vigilantes and their Constituency

There is a dearth of information concerning the issue of how communities responded to vigilantism and how it is remembered. Many scholars tended to focus on the emergence of vigilantism and its relations with the state structures, hence overlooking its relations with the people from which it operates. Vigilante groups use different methods of action from area to area and from situation to situation. Minnaar posited that in South Africa, the vigilante groups use the necklace method (burning tyre filled with petrol around the victim's neck), which apparently originated in Uitenhage and Port Elizabeth in the Eastern Cape in 1985, to get rid of political opponents.⁸⁶ In Tanzania, the Sungusungu used "whippings, beatings, and legeza (which means the unlocking or breaking of the ankles).⁸⁷

Toloto argued that vigilante organisations are parasitic groups that extort money and resources from communities for their own benefit.⁸⁸ Masese and Mwendwa posited that vigilante groups have tendencies of turning against their own communities when they become more established in the territory and gained economic and political power and their behaviour tantamount to being above the law or in most cases being the law themselves.⁸⁹ The fact that most of the vigilante activities impact negatively on the general populace, make the groups very unpopular in the society.

The reaction of the people to vigilantism differs from situation to situation. The community responses towards the vigilante groups have been typified by contradiction and shaped by a combination of despair, helplessness and fear. Human Rights Watch argued that given all the atrocities that have been committed by the vigilante groups in Nigeria, few people appeared to question the legality of their actions. Large sections of the public and some politicians have applauded them.⁹⁰ This also applies to the scenario of Zimbabwe where the general populace has no audacity to challenge the state sanctioned vigilante activities. The reality that vigilante groups work on behalf of the state, further complicate the situation as the group members

⁸⁶ A. Minnaar, 'The New Vigilantism in post- April 1994 South Africa: Crime Prevention or An Expression of Lawlessness?', *Institute for Human Rights and Criminal Justice Studies*, (2001), p.49.

⁸⁷ S. Heald, 'State, Law, and Vigilantism in Northern Tanzania', *African Affairs*, Vol. 105, No. 419, (2006), pp.265-283.

⁸⁸ E. Totolo, *Kenyan vigilantes unleashed*, Centre for Security Studies, <http://www.css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/100755/pdf>, Accessed on 30 August 2017.

⁸⁹ E. R Masese and E. Mwendwa, 'The Genesis and Evolution of Sungusungu Vigilante Group Among the Abagusii Ethnic group of Kenya', *Elixir Soc. Sci.* 42, (2012), pp.6485-6492.

⁹⁰ HRW/CLEEN, *Nigeria: the Bakasi Boys, the legitimisation of murder and torture*, Vol.14, No.5 (A), (2002)

cannot face any trial, conviction or retribution. However, Human Rights Watch indicated that in Nigeria there were a divided political loyalties and attitude towards the vigilantes.⁹¹

Das and Kleinman aver that daily interface between the malefactor and the victim, without any form of arbitration, truce, recompense or simply some forms of hope for them, deepens and precipitates feelings of hatred, despair, resentment, mistrust and betrayal.⁹² Radstone and Hodgkin also agreed that when the perpetrator and victim inhabit the same space during or after the act of violence, the mere sight of the perpetrator by the victims may evoke, in the victim, some symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder such as recollections or intrusive memories of the gruesome details of the atrocious act.⁹³ This is synonymous with the scenario of victims who constantly remain fixated with a strong conviction that ‘justice must be done’ to the wrongdoer whom they have to face or somehow inevitably interact with on a daily basis.⁹⁴ Basing on the above arguments, it is rational to maintain that mere close proximity to a fellow resident who ruined one’s source of livelihood, who murdered or abducted one’s loved one, has lifelong socio-psychological impacts on the victim. Many people who lost their valuables and their loved ones have developed a strong hatred against the vigilantes and the state hence there will be high possibilities of victims turning into perpetrators in a bid to revenge. This will be discussed in Chapter 4.

Scholars of vigilantism tended to overlook how the community remembered vigilante violence, yet, it is important to interrogate this issue because remembering is an active reconciliation of past and present.⁹⁵ Wang contends that memory is important as a therapeutic practice for a community and its members, as it encompasses a lively constructive process in which the members of a community take part in interpreting and processing shared past experiences (particularly traumas) into eventual memory representations, often in such forms as narratives, dramatizations, arts, and rituals.⁹⁶ The significance of the past vis-à-vis the present is what is at stake; memories are imperative as they bring our changing sense of who we are and who we

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

⁹² V. Das and A. Kleinman, *Violence and Subjectivity*. (University of California Press, California, 2000).

⁹³ K. Hodgkin and S. Radstone, ‘Review: Memory, History, Nation: Contested Past’, *The Public Historian*, Vol. 28, No.4, (2006), pp.93-95.

⁹⁴ W. Mvundura, *Memory and violence: Displaced Zimbabwean rural communities reliving the memories of the March 2008 political violence*, Master’s Thesis, African Centre for Migration and Society, University of Witwatersrand, (2014).

⁹⁵ Q. Wang, ‘Being American, being Asian: The bicultural self and autobiographical memory in Asian American’, *Cognition*, Vol.107, No.2, (2008) pp.743- 751.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

were, comprehensibly into view of one another.⁹⁷ Remembering is thus not just an articulation of individual psychologies, but a performance rooted in lived contexts.⁹⁸ Using Radstone's words, Zimbabweans have continuously faced past hurts in the present. The vigilante violence is remembered differently; through permanent scars inflicted on their bodies, loss of their loved ones, destitution, loss of property and loss business opportunities. This leads to what is going to be discussed in the last chapter of this study, where I will evaluate the role of the governmental commissions such as the Joint Monitoring and Implementation Commission (JOMIC) and the Organ of National Healing Reconciliation and Integration (ONHRI) in helping the victims of vigilante violence. Hoelscher & Alderman argue that, "the study of social memory unavoidably comes around to questions of domination and the uneven access to a society's political and economic resources".⁹⁹ In other words, "individuals and groups recall the past not for its own sake, but as a tool to bolster different aims and agendas"¹⁰⁰ State sanctioned vigilantes have a tendency of dominating the control of all the means of livelihood and victimising the locals, a good example is the Mungiki group of Kenya. The local state resources were discriminatively distributed basing on political affiliations. For this study, the collection of memoirs of Chipangano violence, is an endeavour to make things right in future.

Conclusion

In conclusion, vigilantism is defined as an organised extra-legal movement whose members take over the roles of the state, in a particular area, especially its monopoly of violence with or without the blessings of the state. State-sanctioned vigilantism refers to illegitimate and clandestine endorsement of vigilante activities by the state in the various forms, including but not limited to militancy or bigotry against the populace which is perceived as threats to the status quo or enemies of the government. The differences between state sanctioned vigilante groups and other criminal groups, like para militias, militia, mafias and others, is that they enjoy tolerance from the state. In most cases, they engage in their private interests which is not possible with private militias or mafias who owe allegiance to a person or a group.

⁹⁷ E. Keightley, 'Remembering Research: Memory and Methodology in the Social Sciences', *International Journal of Social Research Methodology*, Vol. 13, Issue 1, (2010), pp. 55-70.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹⁹ S. Hoelscher and D. Alderman, 'Memory and place: Geographies of a critical relationship', *Social & Cultural Geography*, Vol.5, No.3, (2008), p.349.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

Various scholars have come up with many theories on the emergence of vigilantism. These theories indicate that unemployment, economic hardships, the partiality of the police and judiciary and the culture of political violence have resulted in the rise of vigilantism. However, in the case of state-sanctioned vigilantism, state collusion does not happen in a vacuum, the state is taking advantage of the availability of unemployed and poor youth who have nothing else to do. It is clear that vigilantism thrives in areas like Mbare where there was high possibility of state collusion in vigilante operations. The emergence of vigilantism in most of African countries (including Zimbabwe) was an outcome of deliberate policy decision.

Many scholars such as Adigwe, Pratten, Fleisher and Heald have shown that politicians are using vigilantes to attain their political ends. Vigilante groups are paid to intimidate, injure, abduct or kill those who were perceived as enemies of state. This resultantly compromised the relationship between the vigilantes and people. Their extortionist activities caused social trauma and hatred against the vigilantes. The ensuing Chapter examines the emergence, development and the crusades of Chipangano in Mbare. It will trace the background of the group, factors that helped the group to emerge, its operations, the mechanism used to punish the perceived enemies of the incumbents and its involvement in intra-party violence.

CHAPTER 3

The Emergence, Development and Operations of Chipangano in Mbare

Introduction

Mbare witnessed the rise of Chipangano vigilantism at the start of the millennium and the phenomenon was exported to other areas in Zimbabwe. Chipangano was part of ZANU-PF's patronage system which was meant to repel the infiltration of opposition parties in Mbare through the use of violence and exclusionary distribution of local state resources. There are many factors which contributed to the emergence and development of Chipangano vigilantism in Mbare. These include the emergence of vibrant MDC youth movements, the inaction of the police on political violence, selective application of law, culture of violence and economic challenges. In the first part of this chapter, I present the background of Mbare and the genesis of the Chipangano group. The second part examines the forces which facilitated the establishment of the group in Mbare. In the course of this chapter, I will also examine how Chipangano terrorised the inhabitants of Mbare and its involvement in ZANU-PF intra-party violence.

Background to Mbare and the Genesis of Chipangano Group

During the colonial period, Mbare was known as Harari Township. The area was renamed after independence and the word 'Mbare' was derived from the name of a precolonial Shona chief who used to control the area.¹ Mbare is the oldest township in Harare, built in 1907 (during colonial rule) closer to the city centre particularly, for the migrant labourers from the rural areas and immigrants from around Southern Africa. Mbare has many flats which were designed for unmarried males namely, Nyenyere, Shawasha, Matapi, Matererini and Mbare Hostel. The colonial local government wanted to maintain a limited population in the city. Most of the hostels were built as result of industrialisation, to accommodate the employees of the nearby companies such as Swift, Coca Cola, tobacco firms and others.²

During the decolonisation period, Mbare became a political hotbed with African nationalists using places such as Mai Musodzi and the Stodart Hall for political meetings. The Zimbabwe

¹ E. K. Makombe, A Social History of Town and Country Interactions: A study on the changing social life and practices of rural-urban migrants in colonial Harare and Goromonzi, 1946-1979, PHD Thesis, History University of Witwatersrand, 2013, p. xvii.

² 'Mbare: From pioneers to overpopulation', *The Zimbabwean*, 14 August 2012.

African National Union- Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) leadership have a strong attachment with Mbare. It is a policy of the party that anyone accorded a national hero status should pass through Mbare before burial. Noteworthy is the fact that, many prominent politicians had at one time lived in Mbare and some were born and bred in this district.

Mbare settlement provided many economic opportunities to the people since the colonial period. Some people could travel with ox-drawn carts from as far as Goromonzi, Domboshawa, Mahusekwa and other places to sell their agricultural products at an open space known as Mbare Musika.³ Some Africans who were not willing to work for the whites started their own informal settlements in Mbare for instance the Magaba settlement.⁴ They survived on informal economic activities such as scrap metal trading and some followed their craftmanship talents at Siyaso Industrial Park.

After independence, Mbare witnessed a sharp increase in population due to relaxation of local governance laws. Chirisa *et al* argue that houses designed for single families ended up being occupied by more than intended.⁵ The government's adoption of Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes (ESAP) in 1990s further impoverished the inhabitants of Mbare. The continuum of economic hardships led to the emergence of lodger accommodation which contributed in the upsurge of the population. The unkempt apartment blocks, which had not been renovated since the 1940s, were subdivided into smaller sections, using cardboard boxes, old bedsheets, or curtains, with each subsection inhabited by one or more families.⁶ Hence, this made Mbare to become the most densely populated district in Harare with a population of about 800 000.⁷

In effectual local governance policies and the failures of the council to enforce the city by-laws, lured many people to engage in informal economic activities. Informal livelihoods are diverse owing to the Magaba, Siyaso, Mbare Musika, and Mupedzanhamo flea markets, where backyard industries have created an assortment of sources of livelihood for the various artisans and market stallholders.⁸ However, the inhabitants of Mbare can be perceived as a

³ *The Zimbabwean*, 14 August 2012.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ I. Chirisa and N. Mlambo, *Situating morality in the housing debate in Harare: Case of Matapi Hostels*, p.7 <http://www.researchgate.net/publication/4513937>, Accessed on 29 July 2017.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ <http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/zimbabwe-population/>, Accessed on 29 July 2017.

⁸ T. Mutongwizo, 'Chipangano Governance: Enablers and Effects of Violent Extraction in Zimbabwe', *African Peace and Conflict Journal*, Vol.7, No.1, (2014), pp.29-40.

microcosm of Harare's poverty-stricken population. The residents are facing an avalanche of problems such as shortage of shelter, competition for market stall space, unemployment, poor service delivery, high rentals, interferences by ZANU-PF Chipangano in their businesses, transport and livelihoods and the area has meagre formal state infrastructure.

Chipangano is a Shona word which literally means an agreement or a covenant. Chris Masango (a ZANU-PF supporter) said, Chipangano was an agreement 'to be obedient to our President Robert Mugabe, where he goes we will go and when he dies we will also die'⁹ Jim Kunaka defined the name Chipangano as, "an idea of a person who believed in a single party and that is ZANU-PF."¹⁰ This corresponds with Precious Shumba's argument that the name Chipangano emerged after unconfirmed defections to the MDC by ZANU-PF youths ahead of 2002 presidential election.¹¹ The ZANU-PF leadership in Mbare then vetted those believed to be genuine party supporters and formed Chipangano as a gesture of total commitment to ZANU-PF.¹²

The Chipangano group was founded by the late Ali Khan Manjengwa, who was a member of Harare ZANU-PF Provincial Executive Committee, between 1999 and 2001.¹³ The *raison d'être* the establishment of Chipangano group was to create an auxiliary force which could help him in conducting his campaigns in Mbare against the vibrant MDC which had taken over Mbare. Manjengwa's main intention was to integrate redundant youths who were involved in touting, he managed to identify few of these persons and created a small clique which aimed at building the ideological issues and operations.¹⁴ It was through these individuals that an unwritten or a tacit agreement which incorporated the Chipangano into ZANU-PF system was reached. The Chipangano group was bequeathed with the control of Mbare on the condition that they defend ZANU-PF.¹⁵ An insider who chose anonymity confirmed that, "*Chipangano chakanga chiri chekurova vatengesi*" (Chipangano was created to beat the sell-outs [MDC supporters]). When ZANU-PF lost Mbare East seat to MDC in the 2000 parliamentary elections, the Chipangano vigilante unit became visible and it was associated with terror against residents. Hill confirmed that Ali Khan Manjengwa was the face of ZANU-PF violence in

⁹ *The Zimbabwean*, 14 August 2012.

¹⁰ *The Standard*, 14 June 2015.

¹¹ Interview with Precious Shumba (Director of Harare Residents Trust) by the author, Harare Residents Trust (HRT), 44 years old, 27 July 2017.

¹² *Daily News*, 29 March 2003.

¹³ Interview with Precious Shumba by the author, Harare Residents Trust (HRT), 27 July 2017.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

Mbare during the run-up to the 2002 presidential election.¹⁶ At the time of Manjengwa's murder, the MDC allegedly had evidence that he and his Chipangano were planning to murder Tichaona Jeter Munyanyi, the then Member of Parliament (MP) for Mbare East constituency.¹⁷ Thus the group was perceived as a campaign force which was meant to deal decisively with the robust MDC.¹⁸

Chipangano was an underground movement which regenerated itself through assimilating new people.¹⁹ Ali Khan Manjengwa was shot dead on 22 August 2002 and Tichaona Munyanyi was suspected to be the mastermind of Manjengwa's assassination. It is alleged that there was an irreconcilable rivalry between Munyanyi and Manjengwa and the control of Mbare District was the born of contention. Undoubtedly, Manjengwa was killed because he was very violent and the people of Mbare described him as 'a warlord who lived by the sword'.²⁰ After the death of Manjengwa, the late Amos Midzi, who was a ZANU-PF Harare provincial chairperson (2001-2014), became the godfather of the vigilante group. His connections with the group was exposed by Didymus Mutasa, then ZANU-PF secretary for administration, when he publicly told Midzi to stop Chipangano activities as he was the one of the leaders.²¹ Midzi used the Chipangano vigilantes in 2003 to sabotage his rival Elias Mudzuri, the then MDC Harare Mayor (2002-2005). On this occasion, the Chipangano group force-marched the inhabitants of Mbare to Town House to demand the ouster of Mudzuri.²² Since 2003, Midzi was also using the vigilante group in every campaign in Epworth. The Chipangano vigilantes consolidated their powers during the time of Midzi, and they became a social control group which was involved in every facet of people's lives as they monitored people's movements and speeches.

In 2005, Tendai Savanhu, who was a ZANU-PF politburo member, also joined Amos Midzi to become one of the patrons of the Chipangano group. His connection with the group is evident in his hate speech against Ian Kay, the then MDC-T MP for Marondera, in 2012 when he said, "Please allow me and Chipangano Youths a week's stay here and we would eliminate Kay

¹⁶ G. Hill, *The Battle for Zimbabwe: The Final Countdown*. (Zebra Press, Cape Town, 2003), p.247.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ SW Radio, Chipangano Becoming More Independent of ZANU-PF, 17 September 2012, <http://www.swradioafrica.com/Documents/Chipangano%20190912.pdf>, Accessed on 23 March 2017.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ 'Zimbabwe: Schoolboy Brutally Assaulted following Manjengwa's Death', Daily News, 29 August 2002.

²¹ *The Zimbabwean*, 24 July 2012. www.thezimbabwean.co/2012/07/chipangano-zanu-pf-product-dydmus/, Accessed on 14/12/12.

²² *The Daily News*, 25 March 2003; Interview with Precious Shumba by the author, Harare Residents Trust (HRT), 27 July 2017.

without any problem... Down with all whites.’²³ A former Chipangano member asserted that Tendai Savanhu and Amos Midzi were the patrons of the group. He further said that Savanhu was responsible for the sprouting of Chipangano bases in Mbare.²⁴ One of the insiders, Nyasha, interviewed by *The Zimbabwean* confirmed that Savanhu created a training camp where Chipangano members were taught to hate MDC and white people. Nyasha said Savanhu used to tell the vigilantes in the camp that, ‘it is our patriot duty to remove anyone who hinders the progress of ZANU-PF’.²⁵ Tendai Savanhu used the group in his campaigns to be the MP for Mbare East Constituency. Savanhu lost the elections several times and he only won in 2013.²⁶ Interviewees confirmed that Chipangano gained total control of the Mbare business zones through Tendai Savanhu, who was one of the City Commissioners for Harare from 2004 to 2008.²⁷

Jim Kunaka who was part of Chipangano since its genesis became the leader of the group when he became a ZANU-PF Youth Chairperson for Harare Province in 2008. His confession in 2015 confirmed that he was the leader of the vigilante group and he ‘admitted being the face of ZANU-PF violence.’²⁸ He said, “I was the political violence master... while in ZANU-PF and Chipangano...”²⁹ A former Chipangano member confirmed that Kunaka’s political career was influenced by both Amos Midzi and Tendai Savanhu.³⁰ Noteworthy is the fact that, the group was also loyal to other ZANU-PF top officials like Ignatius Chombo (former Minister of Local Government, Public Works and Urban Development from 2000 to 2015) who used go to Mbare and meet them not as Chipangano under the guise of Mbare District.

The organisational structure of the Chipangano group consisted of prominent people who were within ZANU-PF structures.³¹ In tandem with this, Precious Shumba mentioned that the coordinators of the Chipangano activities included Alfonso Gobvu, Namion Modern Chirwa (the Chairperson of the Joshua Nkomo District), Douglas Mutyoramwendo (who operated from Mbare District 3) Nathan Mapuranga, and Elizabeth Madzimure (commonly known as Mai

²³ Nehanda Radio, Savanhu says ‘I would eliminate whites’, nehandaradio2012/03/12, Accessed on 11 December 2017.

²⁴ Interview with a former Chipangano member by the author, Paground Flea market, Mbare, 25 July 2017.

²⁵ *The Zimbabwean*, 02 August 2011, www.thezimbabwean.co/2011/08/inside-chipangano-hungry-thug-reveals/ Accessed on 14 December 2017.

²⁶ Pindula, *Tendai Savanhu*, https://www.pindula.co.zw/Tendai_Savanhu, Accessed on 12 December 2017.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ *News day*, 16 October 2015, www.newsday.co.zw/2015/10/ex-chipangano-leader-jim-kunaka-apologises/ Accessed on 12 December 2017.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ Interview with anonymous by the author, Mbare Post Office, 20 July 2017.

³¹ Interview with a former Chipangano member by the author, Majubeki, Mbare, 02 August 2017.

Bwanya) who was among the influential players of the Women's Affairs in the party's District Coordinating Committee (DCC) and also a former ZANU-PF provincial member and her husband Cornelius Mandizvidza Bwanya was a ZANU-PF Central Committee member.³²

The Chipangano membership was made up of energetic young men and women, mostly drawn from Mbare's different hostels and Jo'burg Lines.³³ A former Chipangano member, who chose anonymity, confirmed that Chipangano members were politically indoctrinated in three localities in Mbare that is Jo'burg lines, Mbare Musika and Mbare flats.³⁴ The newly joined members could spend most of the time singing liberation songs and chanting slogans. They engaged in fitness training, were taught how to use guns and not to question the orders from their leaders. They were taught to develop a pro-ZANU-PF thinking and to be anti-opposition. The senior members of the group could beat people in front of the new members to show how they deal with those who breach the covenant.³⁵ It is said that the Carter House Flat³⁶ was the headquarters of this group.³⁷ Many people who were kidnapped or abducted were put in that flat.

Most of the members of Chipangano were between the ages of 20 and 40, and they joined the group for different reasons. Some became members because they wanted to secure themselves and their families from the Chipangano's reign of terror while others were pushed by economic hardships and lack of employment. In support of this Precious Shumba argues;

When you further interact with these people, they are not necessarily ZANU-PF. The majority are just people who want to live. What they get out of ZANU-PF is probably, protection from prosecution... as the police will develop hands off approach, allowing them to do what they want.³⁸

A former Chipangano member stated that some of the members were not residents of Mbare. They were individuals from other communities such as Mabvuku, Highfields, Epworth, Chitungwiza and Budiro who went to Mbare to exploit some financial opportunities.³⁹ Some were lured by residential stands in Harare peri-urban that were given to the group members

³² *The Zimbabwean*, 02 November 2011, <http://www.thezimbabwean.co/2011/11/chipangano-a-business-outfit-hiding/>, Accessed on 28 July 2017.

³³ *Ibid*; See also *The Zimbabwean*, 02 July 2011.

³⁴ Interview with a former Chipangano member by the author, Paground Flea market in Mbare, 25 July 2017.

³⁵ Interview with anonymous by the author, Mbare Post Office, 20 August 2017.

³⁶ For the location of the Carter House see figure 2

³⁷ *The Standard*, 18 February 2012.

³⁸ Interview with Precious Shumba by the author, Harare Residents Trust (HRT), 27 July 2017.

³⁹ Interview with anonymous by the author, Mbare Post Office, 25 August 2017.

through the ZANU-PF's Ushehwekunze Housing Cooperative. This will be clearly elucidated in the ensuing section of this Chapter.

The Chipangano group was bankrolled through the money collected from vendors, touts and the stallholders. The group collected 'protection fees' from these informal traders and bus touts and it was shared amongst the top leaders.⁴⁰ From its early days, this vigilante outfit was structured in such a way that different wards and branches could finance themselves with the money collected from council buildings, car parks, markets and ranks.⁴¹ In its operations, the group used violence against those who failed to pay the extortion fees.

The Chipangano vigilantes were found all over Mbare District and were labelled with various names. Those found at the wholesale and retail markets were known as *Makoronyera*. Some of people who used pushcarts to carry people's luggage at flea markets were called *Wezvingoro* or *Majega* (porters) belonged to the vigilante group. Those who hassled people at the bus termini were called *Mandimbandimba* (rank marshals). The group had some spies all over the district who observed the language and movement of people.⁴² At each level there was leadership to which the vigilantes reported to. The Mandimbandimba, Wezvingoro, the vendors, the stall holders in flea markets and the wholesale and retail markets were all under one structure, with an efficient reporting system.⁴³

The Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition maintained that Chipangano was a localised militia that received support from the state.⁴⁴ Endy Mhlanga, former Secretary General of the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA) from 1999 to 2003, was quoted saying that Chipangano was a watchdog group for ZANU-PF which was formed by party officials.⁴⁵ Kriger argued that this vigilante group was evidence of how ZANU-PF parallel structures take the form of personal network of senior party figures.⁴⁶ However, the ZANU-PF government together with the patrons of the vigilante group had, in countless instances, denied

⁴⁰ Interview with Pineal Denga by the author, Fantasyland (Harare CBD), on 27 July 2017.

⁴¹ *The Zimbabwean*, 02 November 2011, <http://www.thezimbabwean.co/2011/11/chipangano-a-business-outfit-hiding/>, Accessed on 27 July 2017.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, *Deal with Chipangano*, (CZC, Harare, 2012).

⁴⁵ *Daily News*, 29 March 2003.

⁴⁶ N. Kriger. 'ZANU (PF) Politics under Zimbabwe's Power-sharing Government', *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, Vol.30, No.1, (2012), pp.11-26.

the existence and their connections to the group⁴⁷ because its horrific activities could further ruin the reputation of the party.

Even though the group was reported to be present in other high-density areas such as Highfields, Mufakose, and others, Mbare was the main arena for Chipangano crusades. The group operated in money-spinning zones such as the Mupedzanhamo Flea Markets, Mbare Musika, Mbare Bus Terminal, Magaba Industrial Area and Siyaso. The group sought to regain support for the ZANU-PF government through pushing the activities of the MDC into obscurity. As mentioned above, ZANU-PF was not ready to lose Mbare because of its historical significance for instance places such as Stodart Hall and Mai Musodzi were very important during the time of Liberation struggle. The Chipangano vigilantes acted as custodians of the historical values of Mbare. The ZANU-PF regime wanted to control all the revenue-generating places in the district with an aim to incapacitate the MDC administration in Mbare. The ensuing section discusses the dynamic factors which led to the emergence of Chipangano in Mbare.

The dynamic forces behind the emergence of Chipangano

Many informants concurred that the intensification of political violence in Mbare was concomitant to the emergence of the MDC in 1999 as a resilient opposition party which vigorously contested the ZANU-PF regime since independence. The populace was allured to the MDC's manifesto of change and Mbare became a stronghold of the opposition party. Since 2000, ZANU-PF repeatedly lost both parliamentary and local government elections in the district. McGregor argued that the continuous defeat of ZANU-PF turned urban governance into a battlefield as government engaged in recentralisation of powers over the local authorities, developing parallel party structures and using vigilante groups to control central markets and the urban land.⁴⁸ Mude avers that urban youths like Chipangano vigilantes became the weapons of political violence.⁴⁹ On several occasions, the group force-marched the inhabitants of Mbare to ZANU-PF rallies or meetings, as part of their efforts to buttress ZANU-PF's shrinking support.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ *Daily News*, 21 July 2013.

⁴⁸ J. McGregor, 'Surveillance and the city: Patronage, Power-sharing and Politics of Urban Control in Zimbabwe', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol.39, Issue 4, (2013), pp.783-805.

⁴⁹ T. Mude, 'Political Violence: Major Socio-Political Consequence of Urban Youth Unemployment in Zimbabwe', *Review of History and Political Science*, Vol. 2, No. 1, (2014), pp. 107-139.

⁵⁰ Interview with Precious Shumba by the author, Harare Residents Trust (HRT), 27 July 2017.

The progressive growth and vitality of MDC youth movements prompted Ali Khan Manjengwa to create a youth group which defends the ideology of ZANU-PF. ZANU-PF politicians realised that they were losing political grip in Mbare and therefore, there was a need to use new strategies and the formation of Chipangano proved to be a lucrative idea. This is parallel with Mashingaidze's argument that the incapacity to withstand competition and manage diversity in Zimbabwe's political spaces has resulted in some leaders embracing violence as an instrument of electoral mobilisation and political control.⁵¹ In a bid to regain Mbare, it was the duty of Chipangano vigilantes to make Mbare ungovernable through threatening MDC candidates and supporters. The emergence of state sponsored vigilantism in Mbare is similar with the case of Nigeria where the state governments are involved in arming the vigilante groups in local communities in the Niger Delta to eliminate oppositions.⁵² Many scholars like Young, Raleigh, Bates and Reno have attributed the emergence of vigilantism in Africa to state failure. However, the case of Zimbabwe and Mbare District in particular shows that the state was suffering from functional failure rather than structural collapse.⁵³ Noteworthy is the fact that vigilantism was survival tool since the ZANU-PF government was surviving on violence since independence.⁵⁴

Chipangano emerged as an extension of ZANU-PF patronage system. Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum avers that, "the level of political control desired by the ruling incumbents involved the moral imposition of irrational beliefs on others that work against their own capacity for freedom of thought, as in the case of forcing people to belong to certain political parties."⁵⁵ This was substantiated by Wadzai, interviewed by *The Standard*, when she argued that, the emergence of Chipangano was an issue of patronage, because for one to operate or stay freely in Mbare, one had to tow the ZANU- PF line. Edknowledge also concurs that Chipangano emerged as a result of the patronage system which ZANU-PF had developed in the country.⁵⁶ Chipangano was one of the groups of young people who benefitted in the

⁵¹ T. M. Mashingaidze, 'Guardians of the nation or unruly disciples? A critique of youth participation in post-colonial Zimbabwe's contested political spaces.', R. Bowd and A. B. Chikwanha (eds.), *Understanding Africa's contemporary conflicts Origins, challenges and peacebuilding*, Monograph 173, (2010), p.116.

⁵² K. Nyiayaana, 'Arming Community Vigilantes in the Niger Delta Implications for Peacebuilding', in J. Idriss and T. Lyons (eds.), *African Frontiers: Insurgency, Governance and Peacebuilding in Postcolonial States*, Ashgate Publishing, (2015), pp.131.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ See M. Sithole and J. Makumbe, "Elections in Zimbabwe: The ZANU (PF) hegemony and its incipient decline." *African Journal of Political Science/Revue Africaine de Science Politique* (1997), pp.122-139.

⁵⁵ Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, *Structural violence and organised violence and torture in Zimbabwe*, (2014), p. 14.

⁵⁶ Interview with Edknowledge (a researcher at Heal Zimbabwe Trust) by the author, Heal Zimbabwe Trust, 38 years, 21 July 2017.

patronage system particularly in terms of getting business opportunities in the informal sector and this is how the group started coalescing together because they were there to defend their economic interests.⁵⁷ For them to be able to succeed and continue to exist they had to be seen defending political interests because it was political interests that seemed to protect their economic interests. This correlates with Shefter's theory of patronage which asserts that when the ruling party faces strong opposition 'it may distribute divisible benefits (patronage of various sorts) or opportunities to the individuals who support the party.'⁵⁸ Hence, these individuals will guard their benefits by helping the ruling party to stay in power. It is rational to argue that ZANU-PF adopted patronage oriented politics due to incessant decline of its popularity in Mbare.

The institutionalisation of violence by the ZANU-PF government also enabled the surfacing of vigilantism in Mbare. In Zimbabwe, violence is a continuum rather than an episodic happening and it is facilitated by the politicians who take pride in it.⁵⁹ Harris researched on the emergence of vigilantism in South Africa and argued that vigilantism can be interpreted as a symptomatic of a culture of violence.⁶⁰ This notion was sustained by Pineal Denga when he asserted that state-sanctioned vigilantism has gotten a place within the Zimbabwean political culture because of the frequent use of violence by the state to suppress individuals and organisations contesting against it and its reluctance to discontinue it.⁶¹ In addition to this, the perpetrators of violence have been given immunity by the ZANU-PF government. Resultantly, this has generated a culture of violence and drastically undercut the process of democratic development. One of the informant who chose anonymity commented;

The Chipangano group became perpetrators of violence because of outright manipulation and normalisation of violence by ZANU-PF leaders. The group was created in a way that brings an impression that violence was enigmatic and difficult to clamp down. The vigilante group became hoodlums of violent political games.⁶²

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ M. Shefter, *Patronage and its opponents: A theory and some European cases*. Research article, (1977), p.22, https://projects.iq.harvard.edu/files/gov2126/files/shefter_ch2.pdf, Accessed on 12 December 2017.

⁵⁹ S. G. Ndlovu, *Do Zimbabweans Exist? Trajectories of Nationalism, National Identity Formation and Crisis in a Postcolonial State*. (Africa in Development, Oxford, 2009), p.190.

⁶⁰ B. Harris, 'As for Violent Crime that's our Daily Bread': Vigilante violence during South Africa's period of transition, *Violence and Transition Series*, Vol. 1, (2001).

⁶¹ Interview with Pineal Denga by the author, Fantasyland Chicken Inn (Harare CBD), 27 July 2017.

⁶² Interview with anonymous by the author, Mbare Post Office, 20 July 2017.

The ZANU-PF system of governance was marred with some facets of criminality and highly corrupt institutions (formal and informal) which prey on public resources.⁶³ The ruling party established 'extractive' informal political institutions which were predatory in nature and supported by state structures. Chipangano emerged as a devious ZANU-PF wing with a grabbing hand rather than the normative helping hand. This issue of corruption and lack of efficacy led many people to join the Chipangano group. This was clearly substantiated by one of the residents, Zivayi Mashayamhanda who said;

...corruption was one of the factors which enabled the emergence and the survival of Chipangano. The group was working in collaboration with the state structures that is why the members of the group were never imprisoned. The police officers could watch the Chipangano terrorising the populace without any actions. I heard that some police bigwigs were also benefitting from the Chipangano activities. While some police officers were stall owners at Mupedzanhamo flea market, others accepted bribes from the Chipangano group. The ambiguous relationship between the group and the police resulted in the ballooning of Chipangano membership and intensification of its levels of cruelty and criminality.⁶⁴

The foregoing remarks are analogous to Loader's argument that, "across the developed and the developing world there is a broad and diverse network of vigilantes that only work through government but, above, below and beyond government"⁶⁵ The issue of corruption created an enabling environment for the vigilantes to work harmoniously with Mbare police. The Chipangano group thrived because the police were turning a blind eye on its activities, denying its existence and giving the perpetrators immunity whenever they were about to face justice. This will be clearly explained in the next chapter where I will examine the relationship between the vigilante group and the police.

The malignant duplicity and unscrupulousness of the law enforcement agents also enhanced the emergence of the Chipangano group. The residents of Mbare complained countless times, in vain, that the police were partisan, they were supportive to ZANU-PF and Chipangano, thereby shunning their duties of defending the defenceless people. The Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum argued that there was a selective application of law and limited access to

⁶³ T. Mutongwizo, 'Chipangano Governance: Enablers and Effects of Violent Extraction in Zimbabwe,' *African Peace and Conflict Journal*, Vol. 7, No.1, (2014), pp.29-40

⁶⁴ Interview with Mr Zivayi Mashayamhanda by the author, at his homestead in Mbare National, 03 August 2017.

⁶⁵ I. Loader, 'Plural policing and democratic governance', *Social Legal Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 3, 2000, p.328.

redress mechanisms for victims of violence and torture, thereby this encouraged a culture of impunity for perpetrators.⁶⁶ One of the interviewees said that the vigilante group made an agreement with Mbare Police and was granted the responsibility of watching and policing all the crime in the district.⁶⁷ This is in parallel with Stanislawski's Black Spot theory which states that vigilantism emerges in areas or situations in which the state is unable or unwilling to provide safety to a certain group. It is rational to argue that Mbare had become a Black Spot whereby the state structures had no influence, not because they could not influence but because they were captured by ZANU-PF politicians, hence they allowed the vigilantes to illegally take over the jurisdiction of the district.

From the late 1990s onwards, Zimbabwe was besieged with many complexities and foremost among these was the economic plunge. Economic hardships made many people to resort to self-reliance as many companies were closing down or retrenching workers. Simone Knapp in KASA report mentioned that lucrative businesses materialised in Mbare, even during the economic crisis, when shops in the cities remained empty, fresh vegetables, maize and other local foods were found there. Cars were repaired, furniture produced and everything possible was recycled. Whereas the formal economy was breaking down, Mbare remained functional because of its historical competitive edge.⁶⁸ The Chipangano, as a self-serving group, aimed at benefiting out of these flourishing businesses. Like the Mungiki vigilante group of Kenya⁶⁹, the Chipangano vigilantes extorted money from market stalls and buses, and they continuously forced informal traders to conform to newly invented rules in order to squeeze money out of them.

The growing rates of unemployment in Zimbabwe also contributed to the emergence and development of Chipangano. Aning argued that, 'the issue of unemployment in the country is a motivating factor to activities of vigilante groups.'⁷⁰ In this respect, Guess et al concurred

⁶⁶ Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, *Structural violence and organised violence and torture in Zimbabwe*, (2014), p.13.

⁶⁷ Interview anonymous by the author, Mbare Post Office, 20 July 2017.

⁶⁸ Ecumenical Service on Southern Africa (KASA), Mbare's new rulers, (2012), www.woek-web.de/cms/front_content Accessed on 02 September 2017.

⁶⁹ J. Servant, Jean-Christophe 'Kenya's righteous youth militia', *Le Monde diplomatique*, 07 January 2005, <http://mondediplo.com/2005/01/07kenya> – Accessed 24 December 2017.

⁷⁰ K. Aning, 'Unemployment cause of political vigilantism', A presentation at the 3rd Edition of the Accra Dialogue under the theme 'The Scars of vigilantism: A legal of political question?', (2017), <http://mobile.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewArchive/Unemployment-cause-of-political-vigilantism-Dr-Aning-diagnoses-603036>, Accessed on 05 December 2017.

that ‘unemployment and low income are major sources of current instabilities in most of the world.’⁷¹ A former Chipangano member stated that;

After finishing my degree, I failed to get a job because of the situation in our country. I had no choice but to join the Chipangano group. My friend who was a group member persuaded me to join the Chipangano. At first, I was against the idea but due to the complexities of life, I gave in to his advice. Joining the Chipangano group opened many economic opportunities for the members as the group was the sole controller of all means of production in Mbare.⁷²

Moreover, one informant, who chose anonymity, mentioned that she saw countless educated youths (university graduates), partaking in political violence during the June runoff elections of 2008 and she laid the blame on youth unemployment.⁷³ She argues that these graduates joined Chipangano due to the worsening economic situation in the country. This implies that unemployment also played a fundamental role in blossoming the activities of Chipangano. More recent figures indicate that out of the country's 15 million people, only 430,000 were formally employed in 2012, dropping down from 3.6 million in 2003.⁷⁴ Most of the youths in Mbare were unemployed, and consequently the political leaders took advantage of them to create agents of political violence.⁷⁵ This correlates with Fuller and Goldstone's Youth Bulge theory which asserts that social animalities such as unemployment can also play a role in the emergence of vigilantism. It also says that unemployed youths can be easily co-opted into violent vigilantes because of the promise of money.⁷⁶ The increase in the population of redundant youths created a pool of youths who could be easily exploited by unscrupulous ZANU-PF politicians. It is believed that unemployed youths especially males can venture into anything in order to get money for beer, drugs and basic necessities. Therefore, these youths became responsible for torturing, intimidating and killing civilians who did not share their political affiliations.⁷⁷

⁷¹ G. M. Guess and T. Husted, *International Public Policy Analysis*, (Routledge, New York, 2017), p.30.

⁷² Interview with a former Chipangano member by the author, Paground Flea Market, 25 July 2017.

⁷³ Interview with anonymous by the author, Mbare Post Office, 20 July 2017.

⁷⁴ *Africa Check*, <http://africacheck.org>. Accessed on 16 September 2017.

⁷⁵ Interview with Precious Shumba by the author, Harare Residents Trust (HRT), 27 July 2017.

⁷⁶ H. Urdal, 'A clash of generations? Youth bulges and political violence', *UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, Expert Paper no.2012/1*, (2012), p.1.

⁷⁷ T. Mude, 'Political Violence: Major Socio-Political Consequence of Urban Youth Unemployment in Zimbabwe,' *Review of History and Political Science*, March 2014, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 107-139.

In relation to the above the Chipangano group lured many disciples because of the benefits attached to membership. Many unemployed, uneducated and underemployed youths were inspired to seek membership as an option to accumulate resources. The benefits of being a member, included the absence of prosecution and ‘economic rewards dangled by incumbent regime.’⁷⁸ Precious Shumba pointed out that, many people joined the Chipangano group not because they supported ZANU-PF, but they wanted to benefit from the public purse since they did not have sources of income.⁷⁹ Some were attracted by the residential stands given to the group members by ZANU-PF through its Ushehwekunze Housing Cooperative Scheme. Thus the line between being a member of Chipangano and an individual seeking to further his business prospects was blurred. Since it was profitable to be part of Chipangano, anyone who was unemployed was obviously enticed to join Chipangano.⁸⁰ The next section discusses the operations of Chipangano in Mbare district.

Comply or get Vanquished: Chipangano crusades in Mbare

From its formation, Chipangano was associated with perpetrating violence and torture against members and supporters (including those perceived to be) of the opposition party. The Human Rights Watch confirmed that the group tormented the people of Mbare since 2001, but no prosecutions or arrests of its members were ever made.⁸¹ There had been a total onslaught of torment after ZANU-PF lost Mbare to the MDC in 2002, and in a bid to retain it and to cement its grip on power, they aimed at subduing the MDC. The torture of the people always intensified when elections were about to be held. Before the March 2002 presidential elections, Mbare witnessed the rise in torture cases caused by the Chipangano vigilantes, from 2 to about 5-10 people per day.⁸² Surprisingly, the reports of torture did not decrease after the election (because ZANU-PF lost control of many urban constituencies including Mbare) but, they noticeably increased by the end of March. Most of the people who were targeted by the vigilantes were those who had exhibited some anti-ZANU-PF tendencies such as wearing MDC t-shirts, attending MDC rallies and failing to do ZANU-PF slogan.⁸³ Anyone who failed to comply with Chipangano’s re-establishment of ZANU-PF hegemony became a target and was vanquished

⁷⁸ Interview with Precious Shumba by the author, at Harare Residents Trust (HRT), 27 July 2017; See also Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition (CZC), *Zimbabwe Briefing: A crisis in Zimbabwe regional office weekly report*, Issue 59, pp.1-7 (February 2012), p.2.

⁷⁹ Interview with Precious Shumba by the author, at Harare Residents Trust (HRT), 27 July 2017.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸¹ The Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Political Violence Report May 2004.

⁸² Interview with a nurse by the author, at Mbare Polyclinic, 05 August 2017.

⁸³ The Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Political Violence Report May 2004.

by the group. The group also targeted the members of the legislature, teachers and trade unionists.

The Chipangano group created a climate of terror in Mbare through assaulting, intimidating, and displacing perceived MDC supporters.⁸⁴ On 16 May 2004, the Chipangano vigilantes invaded the venue of an MDC rally in Mbare East constituency and attacked the MDC supporters who had gathered for the rally, following those delegates to their homes where the attacks continued.⁸⁵ An interview conducted by the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum alluded that Amos Nyakudya, Makuwatsine and Gonzo were mentioned in several occasions by the victims of Chipangano violence as main perpetrators of violence.⁸⁶ The Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum revealed that other MDC supporters were beaten by the vigilantes because they were seen putting up MDC posters. The group visited them at night, destroying their property, and forcing them to leave, saying that ‘Mbare was not a place for MDC supporters’.⁸⁷ The activities of Chipangano group are in parallel with that of ‘political party vigilante groups’ in Ghana -such as the Invisible Force and Delta Force, linked to the governing New Patriotic Party (NPP)- which are always involved in electoral politics with high level of violence before and after the election.⁸⁸ In this respect, Kreuzer argued that politicians involve vigilante groups in political competition to carry out a huge number of dirty tricks including the use of violence.⁸⁹ The Chipangano group had some similarities with the Bakasi Boys of Nigeria, which was used as a ‘convenient tool for politically-motivated violence’ and to silence voices of the opposition.⁹⁰ Similarly, Chipangano was ZANU-PF’s political tool which was used to maintain the hegemony of the incumbent government.

The Chipangano group came to play a key role in upholding ZANU-PF’s urban patronage system. The group appropriated council’s properties and duties with the help of ZANU-PF politicians. When Mbare markets were rebuilt after the demolitions of Operation Murambatsvina in 2005, Savanhu (who became one of the members of the Commission which run Harare City Council) dismissed scores of Harare City council employees with influential

⁸⁴ The Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Political Violence Report May 2004, p.9.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁸ Coalition of Domestic Election Observers (CODEO), The menace of political party of vigilantism in Ghana: Reflections from Roundtable discussion held in Bolgatanga, Upper East Region, 15 July 2017.

⁸⁹ P. Kreuzer, ‘Private Political Violence and Boss-Rule in the Philippines’, *Behemoth A Journal on Civilisation* 1, 2009, p.47.

⁹⁰ HRW/CLEEN, *Bakasi Boys: The legitimatisation of murder and torture*, Vol. 14, no.5(A), (2002), p.3.

positions. He also called the Harare City Council to reallocate market stalls in Mbare business zones.⁹¹ However, this reallocation involved expelling known MDC enthusiasts in business zones, and distributing market stalls preferentially to ZANU-PF supporters. The people who lived in council houses were reallocated through the manipulation of waiting lists and evictions of MDC-T enthusiasts. Noteworthy is the fact that in all these activities, Jim Kunaka, who was also under the employ Harare City Council as a market attendant, was at the forefront.⁹² In so doing, Savanhu helped Chipangano to consolidate its powers. In return, the Chipangano was supposed to generate income for the party (through selling membership cards and collecting extortion fees), maintaining partisan access to municipal resources and above all to eliminate the oppositions. Thus, the group had a tendency to force visitors and residents to identify themselves and to prove their loyalty to the ruling party through chanting ZANU-PF slogans and displaying membership cards.⁹³

Complementing the above, the Chipangano group established illegal cartels that took possession of many council flats, the cities' main trading hubs, with farmer's markets, flea markets, large home industrial areas, a concentration of businesses of various sorts, fleets of commuter omnibuses and the central transport terminus for long distance buses.⁹⁴ The vigilantes demanded extortion fees from public transport operators, touts and vendors; those who failed to pay were beaten and pushed out of business.⁹⁵ One of the informants confirmed that;

The kombi operators were forced to pay ranking fees in order to operate from the industrious market place. There are more than 6 000 commuter omnibuses operating in Harare and the Chipangano group used the rank marshals or *Mandimbandimba* to collect the protection and ranking fee. A commuter omnibus which ferries 18 passengers paid US\$1 and a 75-seater paid US\$6 per trip. Those who failed to comply were viciously barred from operating from the ranks. Kunaka was the only one who vetted and recruited the rank marshals of almost every rank.⁹⁶

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

⁹² Pindula, Jim Kunaka, <http://www.pindula.co.zw>>Jim_Kunaka, Accessed on 23 December 2017.

⁹³ Interview with Precious Shumba by the author, Harare Residents Trust, 27 July 2017.

⁹⁴ J. Mc Gregor, 'Surveillance and the City: Patronage, Power-sharing and the Politics of Urban Control in Zimbabwe.' *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 39, Issues 4, (2013), pp.783-805.

⁹⁵ 'ZANU-PF's gangs spin out of control', *Mail and Guardian*, 04 October 2012.

⁹⁶ Interview with a Kombi driver by the author, Copa Cabana (Harare CBD), 20 July 2017.

Shumba substantiated this when he mentioned that the ‘kombi’ people knew that if one would come to Njere (in Magaba area) they would pay, and for one to operate around Rufaro Stadium or Stodart Hall as a vendor or tout one would need to pass through the ZANU-PF system.⁹⁷ The group also involved itself in commandeering commuter omnibuses that operated in Mbare to ferry ZANU-PF supporters to the rallies or other meetings.⁹⁸ The drivers of public transport were harassed on a daily basis.

The Chipangano group became a coercive instrument of social control after ZANU-PF had failed to maintain its hegemony in both political and social circles. Like the American vigilante groups of 1860s such as the American Protective League and the American Legion⁹⁹, Chipangano acted as a vanguard of reactionary social movement. Primarily, the group helped the ZANU-PF regime to repress the inhabitants of Mbare thus, Haysom perceived vigilantism as a contemporary form of repression.¹⁰⁰ The inhabitants were ruthlessly treated if found reading the *Daily News* because the newspaper was considered as an instrument of the MDC. The group violated people’s freedom of expression, association and the rule of law as it was using terror to anyone who was suspected of using the language of opposition.¹⁰¹ SW Radio confirmed that;

The violent ZANU-PF youth clique that has terrorised residents of Mbare suburb in Harare has been campaigning for the party, forcing innocent civilians to reveal their personal details and ordering them to vote for Robert Mugabe in the following election. The Chipangano vigilantes ... have been regularly forcing local residents, vendors and passers-by to attend ZANU-PF rallies held on open grounds in the area. There is an incident where people with no identity documents were told to reveal their details to the group, on the promise that Chipangano would approach the Registrar General for help in registering them to vote and they were supposed to vote for ZANU-PF.¹⁰²

This shows that people’s fundamental rights were taken away by the Chipangano as it forced the people to conform to its selfish requirements. Like the Bakasi Boys in Nigeria,¹⁰³ no one

⁹⁷ Interview with Precious Shumba by the author, Harare Residents Trust (HRT), 27 July 2017.

⁹⁸ Interview with a Kombi driver by the author, at Copa Cabana (Harare CBD) 20 July 2017.

⁹⁹ M. Cohen, *The Ku Klux Government: Vigilantism, Lynching and the Repression of the IWW*, JSR Vol. 1, (2006), p.32.

¹⁰⁰ N. Haysom, *Vigilantes: A contemporary form of repression*. Paper presented at the Centre for Study of Violence and Reconciliation, Seminar No. 4, (1989).

¹⁰¹ Interview with Tapiwa Chideme by the author, at his homestead in Mbare, 02 August 2017.

¹⁰² SW Radio Africa, ‘Violent Chipangano gang campaigning for ZANU PF’, 13 April 2012

¹⁰³ HRW/ CLEEN, *The Bakasi Boys: The legitimisation of murder and torture*, Vol 14, no.5 (A), (2002), p.3.

had the capability of asking the legality of the operations of Chipangano because of its ruthless methods of punishing the perceived oppositions.

Since Chipangano was there to canvass support for the incumbent government, the vigilantes obligated everyone who owned a market stall to attend ZANU-PF meetings or rallies. The markets were regularly closed, and traders were forced to go to ZANU-PF gatherings with attendance being monitored using registers. An instance which clearly explains this, is the one which occurred on 24 March 2003, when the Chipangano group, under the instruction of Amos Midzi, compelled all the vendors from Mupedzanhamo flea market and Mbare home industries, popularly known as Siyaso, to take part in the protests against the then MDC mayor, Elias Mudzuri (who was a rival of Midzi).¹⁰⁴ In tandem with this, Tapiwa Chideme said that whenever a national hero died, all the market stalls were closed down by Chipangano and everyone was forced to attend the burial at the National Heroes Acre (this is still the case).¹⁰⁵ The group could compile lists of names, keeping registers of attendance at ZANU-PF events, monitoring movement and activity, making regular demands for ZANU-PF cards, and keeping particularly close watch on any suspected MDC activists.¹⁰⁶

In 2008, harmonised elections were held and the Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai (MDC-T)¹⁰⁷ won the March 29 elections with 48% margin failing to reach the required 50% plus hence a presidential re-run was held on 27 June 2008. During the period that led to the re-run, Chipangano intensified its activities in Mbare and it inhibited the MDC-T activists including the MPs, councillors and civic organisation officials from entering the area.¹⁰⁸ The vigilantes complemented the instruments of the state (the police, military and prison service) by engaging in an operation code-named *Mavhoterapapi* (Where did you place your X?/ Who did you vote for?). This operation claimed many lives and injured a lot of people. The vigilantes created an imbalanced political landscape in Mbare because the campaigns and activities of MDC-T were vehemently pushed down to become underground. Supporting the opposition party was perceived as traitorous and treasonous. The group took over all the means of livelihood in Mbare in order to create an acquiescent populace in Mbare. The group even

¹⁰⁴ *Daily News*, 25 March 2017.

¹⁰⁵ Interview with Tapiwa Chideme by the author, Mbare, 02 August 2017.

¹⁰⁶ J. Alexander and J. McGregor, 'Introduction: Politics, Patronage and Violence in Zimbabwe', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol 39, No.4, (2013), pp.749-763.

¹⁰⁷ MDC-T is a political party and currently main opposition party in the House of Assembly of Zimbabwe. It was name so due to the sprouting of many MDCs i.e. under Ncube and Mutambara

¹⁰⁸ The MP and councillor have repeatedly reported to the press over 2011-12 that they cannot go to Mbare. See also *The Zimbabwean*, 14 August 2012

seized the control of newly drilled boreholes, asking ZANU-PF membership cards for access to water.¹⁰⁹ The former MDC MP for Mbare Pineal Denga said that during this time countless ZANU-PF bases were established around the boreholes (drilled using the constituency development fund given to the MPs).¹¹⁰ These boreholes belonged to the whole community but they were later invaded by the Chipangano vigilantes, who fenced and camped around them. Known MDC supporters were not allowed to fetch water.

During the period of the Inclusive Government (2009-2013), Chipangano progressively exerted a stern supervision of Mbare markets, apportioning them into sections and creating a cell structure to monitor the activities. The Chipangano vigilantes continued to collect fees from stall owners at Mupedzanhamo and Siyaso flea markets for their ‘protection service’.¹¹¹ The Combined Harare Residents Association (CHRA) revealed that Harare City Council was receiving only 1% of proceeds from market stalls while the Minister of Local Government, Public Works and National Housing, Ignatius Chombo and ZANU-PF Women’s League National Secretary, Oppah Machinguri and other top-ranking ZANU-PF figures owned multiple stalls and were profiting from illegal subletting.¹¹² Former Mbare councillor Friday Muleya explained;

After Operation *Murambatsvina* (Clean up the city), the City of Harare had pegged the markets, many stall holders received about 2 metre tables and they tended to subdivide these tables. You would find out that the person recognised by the original pegging was paying about \$23 per month for the table to the council, and the sub letters were charged up to \$100 per month for their tiny subdivision of the table. When the City council attempted to intercede with the aim to officially scale down the size of the tables to stop the extortion of the sub-letters, this action was met with violence. The council truck was burnt down by Chipangano. The group then ran amok extorting from traders and business people, eating and drinking every day.¹¹³

Following the above extract, it is clear that Chipangano group also played a watchdog role which involved protecting the business interests of ZANU-PF dignitaries. This resonates with the popular notion (approved by Adigwe, Heald and CLEEN) that politicians use vigilante

¹⁰⁹ Interview with Pineal Denga by the author, Fantasyland Chicken Inn, 27 July 2017

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹¹ *Daily News*, 21 July 2013.

¹¹² CHRA, On partisan allocation of stalls, ‘Breaking news on Harare market stalls’, 18 September 2009.

¹¹³ Interview with Friday Mleya by the author, Harare City Council, Mbare Branch, 29 July 2017.

groups to protect their private interests. The back up from the politicians gave Chipangano vigilantes the audacity to attack the Council whenever it tried to interfere with its business.

In early 2011, Chipangano consolidated its power when it seized the Carter House and Paget House and scorched down the MDC-T office in Mbare.¹¹⁴ The group grabbed many council blocks, expelled assumed MDC-T members from Mbare markets and undertook another round of evictions from flats.¹¹⁵ The MDC-T claimed that over 1000 people were displaced and moved into safe houses, and human rights organisations dealt with 140 victims.¹¹⁶ This displacement of many people in Mbare shows clearly that this was achieved with the full support of the Mbare police and pundits in the echelons of the force.¹¹⁷ In the course of this occasion Paul Gorekore (who was an MDC-T councillor of Ward 3) was terrorised by the group and his flat was burnt down, they looted his property and injured his brother who was also among those hospitalised.¹¹⁸ This clearly shows that the group became so powerful to the extent that it began to control all the facets of life in Mbare township.

The Chipangano group was narcissistic or self-regarding in nature, this is evidenced by its monopolisation of employment opportunities and its expulsion of US\$5 million donor projects which could have benefitted the people of Mbare.¹¹⁹ In 2011, the group discontinued the construction of residential flats in Mbare by Bill and Melinda Foundation, despite the approval of Harare City Council.¹²⁰ The project was meant renovate the dilapidated flats in Mbare including the Matapi flats. They threatened to use violence against the construction workers demanding a 51 percent stake of the project and the employment of the members of the group.¹²¹ Similarly, in South Africa, KwaZulu-Natal contractors approached the eThekweni Municipality and KwaZulu-Natal government after a vigilante group stopped their employees from commencing construction demanding the companies to employ the members of the group

¹¹⁴ J. Alexander and J. McGregor, Introduction: Politics, Patronage and Violence in Zimbabwe, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol 39, No.4, (2013), pp.749-763.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ *The Zimbabwean* 23 February 2011; See also CCJP 'Violence in Mbare: Testimonies from the victims', 18 July 2011, <http://www.swradioafrica.com/pages/ccjptestimonies180711.htm>, retrieved 31 July 2017.

¹¹⁷ CCJP, *Vendors diary*

<http://catholiccomforjusticeandpeaceinzimbabwe.wordpress.com/2012/03/27/vendors-diary-displacementsintimidation-and-violence-in-mbare/>, Accessed on 10 July 2017.

¹¹⁸ *The Zimbabwean*, 09 February 2011.

¹¹⁹ Chipangano kills \$5m house scheme, *Newsday*, 5 November 2011.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ T. Mutongwizo, 'Chipangano Governance: Enablers and Effects of Violent Extraction in Zimbabwe', *Africa Peace and Conflict Journal*, Vol. 7, No.1, (2014), pp.29-40.

and a share of the tenders.¹²² The difference between Chipangano and the South African instance is that Chipangano was backed by corrupt ZANU-PF politicians and they stopped the Bill and Melinda project under the guise of ZANU-PF's indigenisation policy. In its endeavours, the group also buttressed Mugabe's anti-west ideology thus, it ended up scathing the project alleging that it was being funded by the enemy (referring to western countries). The group went on to destroy all the boreholes that were funded by western donors.¹²³

Another surprising event was the terrorisation of Alex Mashamhanda who proposed to fund the construction of an electrical substation to power his business and his food outlet near Matapi Police station.¹²⁴ Although the council had approved the proposal, Tendai Savanhu, Jim Kunaka and Alfonso Gobvu requested a bribe but after he failed to comply with the demands of the trio, he and his workers were physically assaulted by Chipangano vigilantes hence the project was stopped.¹²⁵ The vigilantes accused Alex Mashamhanda of being funded by the MDC-T. It is clear that the vigilantes had power to overturn the council's decisions. The Chipangano group seized all the business opportunities from supposed MDC-T enthusiasts and preserved them for themselves and ZANU-PF supporters only. Another businessperson called Sten Zvorwadza (who was a political activist and a member of MDC-T) was also victimised by the vigilantes. He was beaten up and tortured at Mbare Police Station after he had gone to file a report against Chipangano for disrupting the installation of his paraffin tanks.¹²⁶ The vigilantes wanted a cut in profits of all the businesses in Mbare. The partiality of Mbare police also helped the endeavours of the group to thrive.

The Chipangano vigilantes created some financial opportunities for themselves. The group also got involved in allocating residential stands. Jim Kunaka was the man behind the allocation of 400 residential stands at Magaba home industry.¹²⁷ Stand owners were supposed to pay an amount of between \$120 and \$160 per month as rentals.¹²⁸ The fact that the area is not serviced and does not have any toilets seemed not to bother the new home owners and local

¹²² *Business day*, 21 September 2016, www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2016-09-21-contractors-complain-to-kzn-council-after-vigilante-group-stops-construction/, Accessed on 31 December 2017.

¹²³ *Daily News*, 26 February 2012; See also *Zimbabwean*, 3 November 2011; SW Radio Africa, Violent Chipangano gang campaigning for ZANU-PF, 14 April 2012; Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, Deal with Chipangano, 30 March 2012; *Standard*, 02 September 2012.

¹²⁴ 'Zimbabwe: Human Rights Report- Zimbabwe', 19 April 2013, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201304230975.html>, Accessed on 22 October 2017.

¹²⁵ 'Chipangano: An organised criminal network', *Daily News*, 21 July 2013.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*

authorities.¹²⁹ The group had some similarities with the Mungiki group in Kenya which established a constituency of squatters in areas such as Londiani, Molo and Laikipia.¹³⁰ Like the Mungiki, Chipangano became an informal regulator of a shantytown.¹³¹

The victims of Chipangano violence also mentioned the issue of politically motivated rape.¹³² The group used rape as means of political torture against women who were not treading along the party lines. Cases of Rape, which Reeler dubbed as “political rape,” by the vigilantes were rampant. The victims were women who supported MDC, were married to MDC members, or related to them. Blessing Mafuta said that in 2009, about twelve of Chipangano members raped a woman, who is now popularly known as Mbuya Nehanda, and she is now HIV positive.¹³³ In 2013, Jim Kunaka was also accused for raping a vendor (who was selling t-shirts) without using any protection and he boasted to her saying, “*Chero ukandirepotera handisungwe cause tisu varidzi venyika*” (even if you report me to the police, I will not be arrested because we are the owners of this country).¹³⁴

In tandem with the above, Sachikonye argued the surfacing of Chipangano group in Mbare was associated with an upsurge in cases of rape against MDC women activists and supporters.¹³⁵ Many victims of politically-motivated rape mentioned Naimon Chirwa, one of the leaders of Chipangano, as the most notorious figure who raped scores of women in Mbare. Chirwa controlled and collected rentals from several flats in Mbare District. He took advantage of women who were desperately searching for accommodation in Mbare by sexually abusing them. Merjury Zambuko confirmed that;

Women who lived in the flats controlled by Chirwa were vulnerable to sexual harassment and rape. Chirwa could come anytime and increase the rentals and those who failed to pay in time were compelled to surrender their sexual rights.¹³⁶

¹²⁹ *Daily News*, 21 July 2013.

¹³⁰ *Daily Nation*, 21 April 2008, allAfrica.com website <http://allafrica.com/> – Accessed on 11 December 2017.

¹³¹ J. Servant. ‘Kenya’s righteous youth militia’, *Le Monde diplomatique*, 07 January 2005, <http://mondediplo.com2005/01/07kenya>, Accessed on 12/11/17.

¹³³ Interview with Blessing Mafuta by the author, Harare CBD, 19 July 2017.

¹³⁴ SW. Radio Africa, Chipangano gang leader Jim Kunaka allegedly raped Harare woman, 10 June 2017. <http://nehandaradio.com/2013/06/10/chipangano-gang-leader-jim-kunaka-allegedly-rapes-harare-woman/>, Accessed on 28 July 2017.

¹³⁵ L. M. Sachikonye, *Zimbabwe’s Lost Decade: Politics, Development and Society*, (Weaver Press, Harare, 2011), p.58.

¹³⁶ Mrs Merjury Zambuko, at Majubheki/ Jo’burg Lines, 58 years old, 04 August 2017.

Many informants confirmed that the Chipangano group could organise compulsory ‘pungwes’ (night vigils) with the intention to rape young girls and women. The next section examines the involvement of Chipangano group in intra-party violence.

Chipangano and intra-party violence

The victims of Chipangano violence were not only supporters of the opposition parties, but it also even targeted members of ZANU-PF and party supporters owing to factionalism (to succeed Mugabe). Msindo argued that this factionalism was a huge issue that laid at the roots of ZANU-PF formation itself.¹³⁷ Taking a cue from Beller and Belloni, the ZANU-PF factionalism was an ‘elite factionalism’ which was restricted to elite groups in the party, but its repercussions affected all the party structures.¹³⁸ The issue of factionalism resulted in the sprouting of other vigilante groups which were affiliated to certain factions, for instance, the Boko Haram group in Mbare which was affiliated to Grace Mugabe’s Generation 40 (G40) faction or the ‘Young Turks’. Zimbabwe Peace Project confirmed that a group nicknamed ‘Boko Haram’, formed late 2011, is a vigilante group modelled along Chipangano lines.¹³⁹ It needs to be noted that there were also other ZANU-PF groups, not necessarily vigilantes, which were against Chipangano and they wanted to outmanoeuvre it. These included the war veterans and ordinary ZANU-PF youth movements led by Godwin Gomwe, Jim Kunaka’s rival, who was fighting to take over Kunaka’s Chairmanship position. The Chipangano group remained dominant in Mbare District because it was long established, hence it had a bigger membership than any other group. The group had power to cow many people into submission compared to its rivals. Although, these groups tried to compete with Chipangano, they feared to confront group directly because of its capabilities.

The Chipangano group got involved in intra-party violence on the basis, that the group was led by individuals [Amos Midzi, Tendai Savanhu and Jim Kunaka] who were perceived as sailing the party in a wrong direction and people started fighting them.¹⁴⁰ Amos Midzi, Tendai Savanhu and Jim Kunaka were aligned to Joice Mujuru’s faction (code named Gamatox faction) which was a rival to Mnangagwa and Grace Mugabe who, at that point, were appearing

¹³⁷ E. Msindo, ‘Factionalism and Robert Mugabe’s leadership in Zimbabwe’, in E. Obadare & W. Adebaniwi, *Governance and Crisis of Rule in Contemporary Africa: Leadership in Transformation*, (Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2015), pp.147-172.

¹³⁸ F. P. Belloni and D. C. Beller. (eds.) *Faction Politics: Political Parties and Factionalism in Comparative Perspective*, (Santa Barbara and Oxford 1978b).

¹³⁹ *Harare24*, 26 May 2017, harare24.com/index-id-News-zk-60566.html, Accessed on 13/12/17.

¹⁴⁰ Interview with Edknowledge by the author, Heal Zimbabwe Trust (HZZT), 21 July 2017.

to be both in the Lacoste group, which later splintered. In the late 2014, the anti-Mujuru faction allegedly sent six men who abducted Jim Kunaka, at the behest of Emmerson Mnangagwa, the then Minister of Defence.¹⁴¹ They were not fighting Kunaka only because of factionalism but also to control of the structure of violence.

In relation to this Edknowledge had this to say;

What I also observed is that Mbare was divided into two rival camps with vigilante groups affiliated to different factions. Intra party violence surfaced because Chipangano controlled a particular part of the area with business opportunities and market stalls whereas Boko Haram did the same. It was then difficult to have people who were perceived to be in one camp to have market stalls in other areas and that could actually trigger violence in one way or another.¹⁴²

Following the above extract, the Boko Haram group was a product of factionalism which was believed to be a panacea to replace the Chipangano group. The group was not only created to take over the business zones, but also to agitate for ascendance of youths in ZANU-PF and elevating the name of Grace Mugabe. In this respect, Tapiwa Chideme said that, the group also victimised and discredited other members of ZANU-PF who were against Grace Mugabe.¹⁴³ In 2013 the group rallied people to vote for Godwin Gomwe (who was affiliated to the G40 cabal) as the provincial youth chairperson to replace Jim Kunaka. Gomwe replaced Kunaka in 2013 but it did not take long before he was ousted from the party (with a vote of no confidence) for disrespecting senior party members.¹⁴⁴ Thus, the realist scholars, such as Thomas Hobbes and Hans Morgenthau, concluded that the perpetual power struggle results in some individuals gaining power at the detriment of others.

In 2014, Jim Kunaka and Tendai Savanhu were expelled from ZANU-PF and Amos Midzi mysteriously died on 9 June 2015. The ZANU-PF regime used these events as a justification that the Chipangano group was no longer in existence. Nevertheless, the reality is that Edison Takataka (who was also aligned to the G40) who succeeded Godwin Gomwe, as ZANU-PF Harare provincial youth chairperson, together with Kuda Mavhaza, who was Mbare Ward 4

¹⁴¹ *Newsday*, 13 November 2014.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*

¹⁴³ Interview with Tapiwa Chideme by the author, Mbare, 02 August 2017.

¹⁴⁴ 'The rise and fall of Godwin Gomwe', *The Standard*, www.thestandard.co.zw/2015/06/14/the-rise-and-fall-of-gomwe/, Accessed on 23 December 2017.

chairperson, revived the Chipangano group.¹⁴⁵ One of the former members of Chipangano said that some group members who refused accept this change of leadership found themselves in jail.¹⁴⁶ Even Jim Kunaka himself faced some difficult times with the judiciary and central intelligence officers after he was discharged from ZANU-PF.¹⁴⁷ Taking a cue from Friedrich, factionalism is a sensation which falls under the category of ‘pathologies of politics’ as it alienated the fundamental meaning of ZANU-PF politics, serving the interests of individuals.¹⁴⁸ Therefore, it is clear that this was a battle to control the Chipangano violence structure.

Sachikonye argued that in Zimbabwe, intra-party violence often reared its ugly head during party primary elections.¹⁴⁹ During the ZANU-PF party primary elections, the Chipangano vigilante group had a tendency of unleashing violence against the members and supporters of ZANU-PF, this is clearly exemplified by the group’s campaign against war veterans whom it denied the right to contest in party’s primary elections. An insider revealed what Jim Kunaka told the Chipangano group in 2012;

War veterans should not be allowed to partake in the impending elections. Who is a liberation war veteran? Any person who will support the war veterans will be punished very hard ... If the war veterans failed to accumulate wealth during the war, there is nothing for them now ... there is a need now to deal callously with those who do not toe the party line.¹⁵⁰

This implies that the group also indulged in intra-party violence. The Chipangano group was obstreperous and domineering to the extent that they personalised Mbare as their sphere of influence. The group eliminated all forms of competition from all the angles. The Chipangano group wanted their leader Jim Kunaka to become the councillor in Mbare under a ZANU-PF ticket. The group, consequentially, terrorised and intimidated the supporters of ZANU-PF against voting for the war veterans. The group feared that if leadership was going to change in Mbare, their illegitimate businesses and hegemony was going to be jeopardised.

¹⁴⁵ ‘Police must deal with ZANU PF terror gangs’, *Dailynews*, 20 July 2017.

¹⁴⁶ Interview with a former Chipangano member by the author, Majubeki, Mbare, 02 August 2017.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁸ C. J. Friedrich, *The Pathology of Politics*, (Harper & Row, New York 1972).

¹⁴⁹ L. M. Sachikonye, *Curse of Political Violence: Time to break the cycle of terror*, 2012, pp.40-42.

¹⁵⁰ Interview with a former Chipangano member by the author, at Paground flea market in Mbare, 25 July 2017.

Conclusion

In other countries such as Philippines, South Sudan and Nigeria and other west African countries, state sanctioned vigilantism emerged as alternative to fight insurgents. Others cases like the Sungusungu of Tanzania and the Bakasi Boys of Nigeria showed that the state sanctioned vigilante groups emerged as crime-fighting groups. The case of Chipangano group is unique and different from the aforementioned cases because the group was not hijacked by the state but it was a product of ‘state engineering’, created to act as a defender of ZANU-PF ideologies and to revitalise the position of the party in Mbare district. Unlike Tadtad, a vigilante group of Philippines, which was overtly endorsed by Corazon Aquino’s government, the relationship between the state and Chipangano remained cryptic, this will be explained further in the ensuing chapter.

The emergence of a vibrant MDC youth movement provided a justification for the creation of a youth group like Chipangano under the guise of youth empowerment. The emergence and operations of Chipangano group shared many similarities with the Mungiki group of Kenya in the sense that most of their members were poor and unemployed youths from urban slams. They both extorted money from urban poor. The difference between the two was that the Mungiki was founded on ethnic bases (composed of Kikuyu people only) and it was involved in quasi-religious activities. Whereas other cases especially the Bakasi Boys and the Sungusungu emerged as popular movements which were supported by their communities for their crime control role, Chipangano was very unpopular because of its activities which benefitted a few.

Like other vigilante groups, Chipangano was ruthless in its operations and no one had the audacity to ask its legality. The operations of Chipangano exhibited that vigilantism is a phenomenon based on a model of retributive justice as the group fought reactionary social movements in Mbare district. Its activities in Mbare business zones showed that vigilantism is oppressive and exclusionary in nature. The crusades of the group also show that it was a fanatical anti-MDC group supported by state agents. The Chipangano group became a model through which other vigilante groups in the country were created. The following chapter examines the relationship between the vigilante group, ZANU-PF and Mbare police. It will also examine the relationship between the group and the council and how the government responses to the Chipangano activities.

CHAPTER 4

The State, ZANU PF and Chipangano

Introduction

The relationship between ZANU-PF and Chipangano vigilantes was ambiguous. The group has been working for the cause of the ZANU-PF regime since 1999. The two organisations partnered to recoup their hegemony in Mbare which had become an MDC stronghold since 2000. The Chipangano group was a ZANU-PF key apparatus which was strategically placed in Mbare to undermine the progress of MDC through petrifying people to vote for ZANU-PF. In doing so, the vigilante group was not alone, it worked hand in glove with ZANU-PF dignitaries and the police. The purpose of this chapter is to understand the relationship between Chipangano and the ruling party, ZANU-PF. In the course of this chapter, I will also discuss the complicity of the police in Chipangano activities. The relationship between the City council and the vigilantes and the reaction of Government to the activities of Chipangano will also be examined in this chapter.

The relationship between ZANU-PF and Chipangano

The relationship between ZANU-PF and Chipangano was shrouded in secrecy. ZANU-PF and Chipangano were in a mutually beneficial pact. In as much as the ZANU-PF officials tried to distance the party from Chipangano, the activities of the group cannot be discussed without mentioning its collusion with the incumbents. The Chipangano group was within the structures of ZANU-PF. The group was founded by a ZANU-PF official, Ali Khan Manjengwa with the intension of revitalising and invigorating the position of his political party through terror. To this effect, Precious Shumba had to say;

Chipangano cannot be viewed outside the ZANU-PF structures but should be critically examined as an instrument, once acceptable within the ranks and files of the revolutionary party. In my discussions with people of influence, what outsiders call Chipangano are in fact some executive members of the disbanded District Coordinating Committees (DCCs), especially those holding influential portfolios like transport and security. There were 12 districts in Mbare with each having 34 members in each wing namely the Men wing, the Women's league and the Youth wing before the disbandment of DCCs. So, when they deny any links to the shadowy group, they mean they do not

know their district leadership positions, executing a political mandate, on behalf of ZANU-PF. People in the know say Chipangano was like a ‘spirit of bondage among cadres’ and it was extremely dangerous to acknowledge its existence given the widespread condemnation of its activities by civil society organisations and other political parties.¹

A former Chipangano member substantiated Shumba’s inferences, asserting that the activities of the group were co-ordinated by Elizabeth Madzimure (commonly known as Mai Bwanya), a former DDC member, and Naimon Modern Chirwa, former ZANU-PF Chairperson of the Joshua Nkomo District, who took orders from Tendai Savanhu and Amos Midzi.² In this respect, the Coalition of Domestic Election Observers (CODEC) argued that, ‘political parties (in Ghana) are aware of the existence of the party affiliated vigilante groups, and indeed some of them endorse their activities but hypocritically deny their conduct and activities in public.’³ This is synonymous with what the ZANU-PF regime was doing, yet the activities of Chipangano vigilantes in Mbare cannot be discussed without mentioning ZANU-PF, nor can one deliberate about the activities of ZANU-PF in Mbare without mentioning Chipangano.

The leaders of the Chipangano vigilante group were integrated into the structures of ZANU-PF, for instance Jim Kunaka, was made the Chairperson of Youths for Harare Province and others such as Alexio Mudzengerere and Alfonso Gobvu were also incorporated. This is similar to the case of Apartheid South Africa when the National Party incorporated Mangosuthu Buthelezi, the leader of Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), into the state structures with an aim to control his IFP ‘Amabutho’ or warriors (a vigilante group).⁴ Buthelezi was made the ‘Chief Minister of KwaZulu Natal in 1972 and later a Minister of Police as well.’⁵ The Apartheid state used the IFP warriors to punish political oppositions especially African National Congress (ANC) supporters. The IFP warriors had the backing of the law enforcement agents.⁶ In this regard, some scholars like Rotberg interpreted the sanctioning of vigilante groups by the state

¹ SW Radio Africa, Chipangano Becoming More Independent of ZANU-PF, 12 September 2012 <http://www.swradioafrica.com/Documents/Chipangano%20190912.pdf>, Accessed on 27/07/17.

² Interview with a former Chipangano member by the author, Majubeki, Mbare. 02 August 2017.

³ CODEC, The menace of political party of vigilantism in Ghana: Reflections from roundtable discussions held in Bogatanga, Upper East Region, 15 July 2017.

⁴ Deadly Marionettes: State-Sponsored Violence in Africa, www.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/cis/omalley/OMalleyWeb/031v02424/041v03275/051v03294/061v03331.htm Accessed on 17/12/17.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*

as an ‘indicator of state failure.’⁷ Although Zimbabwe performed ‘poorly across the board in all of Rotberg’s indicators of state failure (which comprise security, ability to adjudicate conflict, political participation and social service),’⁸ Chipangano vigilantism was not an inevitable outcome of given conditions. Since Chipangano was a ZANU-PF creation, it is rational to argue that it was a direct outcome of political decision. The incorporation of Chipangano leaders into the structures of the party is an indication of ZANU-PF’s deliberate decision to join the vigilante group with party structures to serve its political interests.

Although many ZANU-PF politicians have denied the connection between Chipangano and the party’s structures, the link was exposed by the then party Secretary for Administration, Didymus Mutasa, who instructed Amos Midzi to end the Chipangano crusades as they were tarnishing the image of the party.⁹ Midzi denied his connections with the group but Mutasa told him publicly that, “if you tell me that you don’t know that group, I will tell you that you are lying ... I want to know why you are not ending it.”¹⁰ Furthermore, Jim Kunaka’s confession also clearly reveals the connection between the Chipangano and ZANU-PF;

I was the political violence master when I was in ZANU-PF, but what I want people to know is that when you join a cult, you behave like the people in the cult, the “bad” things I did under the ZANU-PF terror group, Chipangano, were unintentional.¹¹

Since 2000, the ZANU-PF regime made sure that all civil service and major parastatal posts (also on local level) were being occupied by the party appointees. The Harare City Council’s payroll has been bloated to accommodate the Chipangano members and other ZANU-PF supporters so as to trivialise vocal MDC councillors such as Paul Gorekore and Friday Muleya.¹² Using Kibble’s words, ZANU-PF regime admitted the Chipangano group to establish a parallel state engaging in quasi-state functions: for instance controlling the ability to work in the informal economy by demanding ZANUPF cards and money in order to operate in markets.¹³ An additional element is that some ZANU-PF officials interfered in the council

⁷ R. Rotberg, ‘The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States: Breakdown, Prevention, and Repair’, in R. Rotberg (ed.), *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*, (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2002), p. 6.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Newsday Zimbabwe*, 27 July 2012.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Newsday*, 19 October 2015.

¹² S. Kibble, ‘Zimbabwe between referendum and elections’, *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, Vol. 35, No. 1, (2012), p.102.

¹³ *Ibid.*

business for their own personal interests.¹⁴ Some ZANU-PF officials such as Oppah Muchinguri and Ignatius Chombo owned chains of market stalls in Mbare.¹⁵ The group also took orders from Ignatius Chombo and he protected it group through his direct interference in the council. This indicates that ZANU-PF politicians had captured the local state in order to allow the Chipangano group to surrogate for the state in Mbare business zones. A Solidarity Peace Trust report shows that ZANU-PF top officials had more than dozens of stalls each in Mbare and no money was being remitted to the council.¹⁶ Chabal and Daloz indicated that African politicians are usually blameworthy for being the engineers in the business of violence.¹⁷ Chabal and Daloz added that there is a thin line between violence and business. The vigilante group was very important to the ZANU-PF government as it played revenue generating roles and repressing the non-ZANU-PF supporters. It is imperative to note that the Chipangano group engaged in its illegitimate dealings and horrendous activities with the blessings of the incumbent regime, but ZANU-PF tried by all means to make their connection to the group inconspicuous.

The ZANU-PF officials have created economic opportunities for Chipangano group and in return the vigilantes were helping the incumbent regime to further its political agenda through violence and intimidation of the opponents. The group benefitted immensely from numerous housing co-operatives in the city aided by their connections to city godfathers who would regularise the construction of houses even on waterways and wetlands.¹⁸ The examples of these co-operatives include Sally Mugabe, Ushewokunze, and Ngungunyana. These stands were sold to home seekers and the money would end up in the leaders' pockets.¹⁹ The Chipangano vigilantism was an implication of social capital which involved governance through violence and the state acting as a bystander.²⁰ Noteworthy is the fact that, in Zimbabwe the state structures were captured by the dominant ZANU-PF with the aim to manipulate the state's decision-making processes for their political ends. In this respect, Meagher avers that the

¹⁴S. Kibble, 'Zimbabwe between referendum and elections', *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, Vol. 35, No. 1, (2012). p.102.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ Solidarity Peace Trust, *Hoping without hope: Murambatsvina- Ten years on*, Bulawayo, 06 October 2015; See also *NewsDay*, 03 November 2015

¹⁷ P. Chabal and J. P. Daloz, *Africa works: Disorder as political instrument. African issues*. The International African institute, (James Curry and Indiana University Press: Oxford and Bloomington. 1999), p.80.

¹⁸ *The Standard*, 14 June 2015, <http://www.thestandard.co.zw/2015/06/14/could-this-be-the-end-of-chipangano/>, Accessed on 23 December 2017.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ T. Mutongwizo, 'Chipangano Governance: Enablers and Effects of Violent Extraction in Zimbabwe', *Africa Peace and Conflict Journal*, Vol. 7, No.1, (2014).

success of vigilante groups is not determined by their autonomy from the state but is shaped more by their relationship with the state.²¹ In support of this, Arias and Rodrigues argued that when vigilante groups benefit from a 'political system, they will actually support its persistence.'²² Thus, the ZANU-PF government engaged in the normalisation of disorder²³ in order to create an enabling atmosphere for the state and the vigilantes to work together secretly and exploiting the general populace whilst pursuing personal interests.

Theresa Makone (the Minister of Home Affairs during the Inclusive Government) posited that the police were so helpless that they could not even use tear gases or arrest Chipangano vigilantes because they were getting instructions from ZANU-PF headquarters.²⁴ The Home Affairs Ministry was ostensibly in charge of the police, but Makone admitted that the situation was entirely out of control and she was incapable of acting. In tandem with this, CODEO asserted that the vigilante groups are conscious of illegality of their activities, but they are encouraged to engage in such activities because their political leadership guarantee their protection.²⁵ Lyon interpreted scenarios similar to this using the 'weak states hypothesis.'²⁶ He delineated state weakness as, 'the erosion of state capacity- a condition characterised by gradations of a regime ability to govern effectively, which, in most extreme form, results in the complete collapse of state power and function.'²⁷ However, this approach does not explain the relationship between Chipangano and ZANU-PF. The police force was captured by ZANU-PF regime hence, it could not clampdown the vigilante group without the blessings of the government.

The ZANU-PF regime controlled the council housing facilities in Mbare through the Chipangano group and in so doing the MDC councillors were incapacitated as they failed to provide this. To access housing facilities, ZANU-PF loyalty was a prerequisite. The people of

²¹ K. Meagher, *Identity Economics: Social Networks and the Informal Economy in Nigeria*, (James Currey, Woodbridge and Suffolk, 2010).

²² E. D. Arias and C. D. Rodrigues, 'The Myth of personal security: A discursive Model of Local legitimation in Rio's Favela', *Latin American Politics and Society*, Vol. 46, No. 1, (2006), pp.1-38.

²³ P. Chabal and J. P. Daloz, *Africa works: Disorder as political instrument*. African issues. The International African institute, (James Curry and Indiana University Press: Oxford and Bloomington. 1999), p.xix.

²⁴ S. Kibble, 'Zimbabwe between referendum and elections', *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, Vol 35, No 1, (2012).

²⁵ CODEO, The menace of political party of vigilantism in Ghana: Reflection from roundtable discussions held in Bolgatanga, Upper East Region, 15 July 2017.

²⁶ T. Lyons, 'Transforming the Institutions of War: Post conflict Elections and the Reconstruction of Failed States.' In: R. Rotberg (ed.), *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*. (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2004), p.269.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

Mbare lived directly under Chipangano's control because the group had powers to grant access or evict people from the flats. In 2011, the MDC-T supporters have been denied access to council properties.²⁸ Those who were given accommodation by Chipangano were supposed to attend ZANU-PF functions in Mbare and elsewhere in Harare. To this effect, Schubeth argued that vigilante groups and political elites regularly work together in pursuit of their own interest, but to the detriment of the poor.²⁹ In this case, politicians and Chipangano were capitalising all the means the means of production with the intention to regain Mbare district.

During the constitution drafting process (2009-2013), the Chipangano vigilantes were mandated to force people to vote 'yes' for the clauses that were favourable to ZANU-PF. This was explicitly elucidated by Precious Shumba when he stated;

...they (Chipangano) assisted the ZANU- PF structures in drilling people on how to respond to questions and you would realise that the same ZANU-PF approach in Mbare was used across the rest of Zimbabwe. The people were told what to say, how to say it, to speak after what has been said, what to do when there is dominance of MDC and how to disrupt meetings. They even controlled attendances. Some people were stopped from attending just because they were known to be oppositions.³⁰

Douglas Mwonzora also confirmed that during that time of the constitutional referendum, Mbare was volatile.³¹ The vigilantes engaged in political coaching of participants along the lines of the ZANU-PF. There were serious cases of violence during the meetings, one case resulted in the death of a participant at Mai Musodzi Hall in Mbare.³² The referendum was conducted under the same conditions of repressive laws such as Public Order and Security Act (POSA), thus discouraging open discourse among the people of Zimbabwe.³³ Douglas Mwonzora attended the funeral of one of MDC supporters in Mbare, who was allegedly beaten to death by the Chipangano vigilantes.³⁴ This gained explanation in the work of Perlman who

²⁸ N. Marongwe, "Scoping Study: Governance of Urban Land Markets in Zimbabwe", August 2011, Urban Land Mark. (Available <http://www.afresnet.net/market/Governance%20of%20urban%20land%20markets%20in%20Zimbabwe.pdf>. Accessed on 28 September 2017.

²⁹ M. Schubeth, 'Challenging the Weak States Hypothesis: Vigilantism in South Africa and Brazil,' *Journal of Peace, Conflict & Development*, Issue 20, (2013), p. 48.

³⁰ Interview with Precious Shumba by the author, at Harare Residents Trust (HRT), 27 July 2017

³¹ Independent Lens | Democrats | Political Violence in Mbare, Zimbabwe | PBS <https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=C013L1M8u4w> , Accessed on 04 August 2017.

³² ZESN, *Ballot Update*, 15 September 2010.

³³ *Newsday*, 15 March 2013. Accessed on 04 July 2017, <https://www.newsday.co.zw/2013/03/15/vote-no-to-draft-constitution-madhuku/>, Accessed on 28 July 2017.

³⁴ Independent Lens | Democrats | Political Violence in Mbare, Zimbabwe | PBS, www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLcV-C_7441ThWITz69EkzLxuyx1V9IpHy, Accessed on 04 August 2017.

argued that authoritarianism breeds vigilante groups whose task is to carry out murder in a bid to send a message to political opponents.³⁵ The activities of Chipangano intensified during the constitution making process because ZANU-PF wanted the process to produce a pro-ZANU-PF constitution. Research also confirmed that the ruling party made sure that there was not much coverage of incidents in the mainstream media.

The ZANU-PF regime cannot deny their connections with the Chipangano youths because there are more than three ZANU-PF offices surrounding Mbare Musika. The vigilantes used these offices as their bases for instance the one near Koffman plot.³⁶ Other political parties do not have offices in the area. MDC-T used to have one but it was burnt down and its officials were beaten and banned from Mbare. In this respect, Schuberth argued that, ‘vigilantism and politics are deeply interwoven phenomena that should not be analysed separately.’³⁷ It is clear from the above that Chipangano vigilantes were collaborating with ZANU-PF politicians. The next section examines the relationship between Mbare police and Chipangano group.

The relationship between Mbare Police and Chipangano

Although, Mbare police and Chipangano often tried to dissociate themselves from each other (the former more than the later), many researches have disclosed that the police always provided backing to the vigilantes. The connection between the two was very clear even though it appeared hidden or cryptic whenever the official picture is being presented. The Police Act of Zimbabwe says that the Police Force should not be aligned to any political organisation, but it should be a professional force that will apply the law uniformly to all the citizens. The Police force should renounce active participation in politics so as not to be perceived as politically aligned in the way in which they execute their duties.³⁸ Therefore, if Mbare Police was following the Police Act, it was supposed to be a transgression for police officers to actively participate in politics. The collusion between Mbare Police and Chipangano was not surprising because in January 2001, the then Commissioner of Police, Augustine Chihuri, violated the Police Act when he said, “I support ZANU-PF because it is the ruling party and I will resign if

³⁵ J. Perlman, ‘Megacity’s Violence and its Consequences in Rio de Janeiro’, in: K. Koonings and D. Kruijt (eds.), *Megacities: The Politics of Urban Exclusion and Violence in the Global South*, (Zed Books, New York/London 2009), pp.52-68.

³⁶ ‘Inside Mbare’s Opaque economy: Privatisation of the public infrastructure, thriving of terror gangs and breeding ground for political violence’, *The Zimbabwean*, n.d.

³⁷ M. Schuberth, ‘Challenging the Weak States Hypothesis: Vigilantism in South Africa and Brazil’, *Journal of Peace, Conflict & Development*, Issue 20, (2013), p. 48.

³⁸ The Police Act [Chapter 11:10], Zimbabwe Legal Information Institute, <http://www.zimlil.org/legislation/act>, Accessed on 23 October 2017.

another political party came to power.”³⁹ On 9 January 2002, the security services chiefs, including the Police Commissioner, made a joint statement at a press conference to the effect that they would not recognise or salute anyone as President who did not have liberation war credentials.⁴⁰ There have been regular reports that the Police Force has purged police officers considered to be sympathetic to the opposition or who have continued to carry out their duties without political bias, and that police officers who have tried to enforce the law on a non-partisan basis have been transferred or demoted.⁴¹

In Mbare, members of Chipangano illegitimately engaged in ‘policing duties’, carrying out investigations, arbitrary arresting and at times punishing MDC supporters. Human Rights Watch uncovered that there was an unwritten agreement between the police and Chipangano which gave the vigilantes absolute control over many areas of Mbare where police was not venturing any longer.⁴² One of the informants interviewed by Human Rights Watch divulged;

We reached a cordial agreement with the police in Mbare through Matapi officer-in-charge, that police will let ZANU-PF Chipangano... be responsible for administering justice and maintaining order at the main bus terminus at Mbare Musika, and the surrounding... markets at Mupedzanhamo. Our job is to make sure that the area is free of MDC people; no MDC supporter is allowed to become a trader at Mupedzanhamo or at Mbare Musika. We also patrol all blocks of flats... to make sure that all occupants have ZANU-PF membership cards. If a crime is committed in our area, a report is made to us and we deal with the matter, not the police. Only two days ago, a man was caught stealing from a bus and we arrested him and took him to Mbare 3 base. We beat him and “sentenced” him to clean our offices for two weeks as punishment.⁴³

Following the above extract, it is evident that there was a strong collusion between the Police and Chipangano group as the force had sanctioned the vigilantes to operate in their shadows. The Human Rights Watch also buttressed that the police were held responsible for prevalent violations such as torture, harassment and threats against the MDC supporters.⁴⁴ The illegitimate endorsement of Chipangano activities by the police in Mbare is in parallel with the South African apartheid government’s action of sanctioning vigilante groups (such as the A-

³⁹ *The Daily News*, 16 January 2001.

⁴⁰ *Mail & Guardian*, 01 August 2013.

⁴¹ Human Rights Watch, “*Our Hands are tied*” *Erosion of the Rule of Law in Zimbabwe*, (2008b), p.24

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ Human Rights Watch interview with ZANU-PF Chipangano member, Harare, 29 August 2008.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, Country summary, January 2009, p.3.

Team, Ama-Afrika, Pakatis, Mabangalala, Amadoda, Witdoeke, Amasolomzi, Amabutho and the Green Berets) to operate in black communities ‘enjoying varying degrees of police support.’⁴⁵ Huggins positioned ‘vigilante acts on a continuum between a formal and an informal pole according to their degree of state involvement, organisation and spontaneity.’⁴⁶ In this respect Schuberth argued that vigilante groups sanctioned by state ‘often develop their own political agenda and lawless organisations terrorising citizens and the state itself.’⁴⁷ In case of Mbare, the Chipangano group engaged in anti- MDC campaigns but with the backing of Mbare police. Thus, Haysom argued that, ‘vigilantism operates in tandem with other repressive practices.’⁴⁸

The connection between Mbare Police and Chipangano is palpably clear in the fact that whenever Chipangano was implicated in violence, they conjured to appear feeble and helpless. On 25 June 2008, the Chipangano vigilantes expelled sixty-three Mbare families from their residences. The vigilantes evicted them because they suspected that they were supporters of MDC-T who contributed to the defeat of ZANU-PF in the first-round of 2008 elections.⁴⁹ On 26 June three family members went to Matapi Police Station in Mbare to open a case. When the report was made, the officer-in-charge allegedly first phoned the ZANU-PF Youth Leader in the area before directing complainants to go and meet him at Mudyadzo Bar in Shawasha Flats, Mbare.⁵⁰ One of the complainants interviewed by Human Rights Watch said;

When the Chipangano youths came at Mudyadzo, they said, “We now want to teach you that we are above the police—they can do nothing about us, they cannot help you.” Then they proceeded to beat us using hosepipes, iron bars, knobkerries and sjamboks from 9 a.m. until 1 p.m., after which they let us go. They remained in their office laughing. We ... reported the assault at Mbare Police Station. Since that day no arrests have been made and yet I know the people who evicted and beat us and these people are also known to the police in Mbare. Even now, ZANU-PF activists are staying in our homes from where they evicted us.⁵¹

⁴⁵ H. Haysom, *Vigilantes: A contemporary form of repression*. Paper presented at the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, Seminar No. 4, (1989).

⁴⁶ M. Huggins, *Vigilantism and the State in Modern Latin America: Essays on Extra-legal Violence*. (Praeger Publishers, New York, 1991).

⁴⁷ M. Schuberth, ‘Challenging the Weak States Hypothesis: Vigilantism in South Africa and Brazil’, *Journal of Peace, Conflict & Development*, Issue 20, (2013), p. 38.

⁴⁸ H. Haysom, *Vigilantes: A contemporary form of repression*. Paper presented at the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, Seminar No. 4, 25 April 1989.

⁴⁹ Interview with Takura Maphosa by the author, at Trade Centre (along Ardbennie rd.), 29 July 2017.

⁵⁰ Human Rights Watch interview with victim, Harare, 23 August 2008.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

The foregoing extract is a clear indication of the hypocrisy of Mbare Police which on countless times had contravened the Police Act, the rule of law and involved in extrajudicial activities. The Mbare Police had ceased to be the custodians of the law in the district, but rather bystanders as the Chipangano was indulging in punitive or retributory activities. This is analogous with, Stanislawski's concept of Black Spots which avers that vigilantism occurs in areas where the influence of the state is minimal for instance the favelas of Rio de Janeiro and some vigilante controlled areas in Los Angeles.⁵² In the case of Mbare, the state agents had given Chipangano the responsibility to police because it was defending the political interests of the ruling incumbent. The police in Mbare were there to protect Chipangano and not the general populace.

Pineal Denga, who was the MDC-T Member of Parliament for Mbare Constituency (2008-2013) revealed how the Mbare police and Chipangano related to each other;

...I went to Mbare Police Station to launch a complaint to the officer-in-charge, a lady, but I am now forgetting her name. When I was looking at the chats on the walls, I saw some telephone hotlines chats and I thought those are the hotlines for police officers but I started to see names from those who are in ZANU-PF, there was Jim Kunaka, Munyoro, Gomwe and Mudzengerere. So, I realised that I was in a wrong office and the officer in charge was a war veteran. I also realised that I used to see her, sometimes, dishing out ZANU-PF t-shirts in my presence, this means these people were well connected.⁵³

It can be argued that the relationship between the Chipangano and Mbare police was a marriage of convenience because the police also wanted to be seen working against the opposition in order to secure their jobs. If Chipangano come with someone whom they alleged to have caused political violence or problems in the district, the police would be happy to deal with that, in favour of ZANU-PF.⁵⁴ The police found themselves less powerful than Chipangano in Mbare because in some instances they would not interfere in matters they deemed political. The law enforcement agents could see the offence that was committed but still felt that they would not address the issue, thereby proving being partisan. Tapiwa Chideme corresponds with Pineal Denga when he said the senior police officers were fanatic supporters of ZANU-PF who sometimes coerced junior officers in their camps to wear ZANU-PF t-shirt whilst they are on duty.⁵⁵ He also mentioned that the police were no longer calling each other by their ranks

⁵² B. Stanislawski, 'Para-States, Quasi-States, and Black Spots: Perhaps Not States, But Not "Ungoverned Territories," Either', *International Studies Review*, Vol. 10, No. 2, (2008), pp. 366-396.

⁵³ Interview with Pineal Denga by the author, at Fantasyland Chicken Inn, Harare CBD, 27 July 2017

⁵⁴ Interview with Edknowledge by the author, Heal Zimbabwe Trust, 21 July 2017

⁵⁵ Interview with Tapiwa Chideme by the author, Mbare, 02 August 2017.

because they were instructed to use the title ‘comrade’ (a political term solely used by ZANU-PF members and supporters).⁵⁶ Thus, CODEC asserted that in Africa ‘the police service is not independent enough, and it always give preferential treatment to parties in power and their supporters.’⁵⁷

The police and Chipangano complemented each other in unleashing political violence and contravening human rights. Some high-ranking police officers were directing or pushing their subordinates to engage in politically motivated violence. Boyson Muthema (then Officer Commanding Harare Province, Law and Order Police) purportedly called for meetings, dubbed as “Police Project Meetings,” and the message sent to all the police camps was the same, ‘MDC-T leader Morgan Tsvangirai would never rule this country’ and that ‘the police should be ready to go to war if Tsvangirai wins a second round of election’ [2008 Run-off election].⁵⁸ In these meetings senior officers intimidated the lower ranking officers and they were warned not to vote for MDC-T. The police officers were told to cooperate with ZANU-PF and to eliminate all the opposition in their areas of operations. Given this scenario, Lindholt argued that ‘police repression represents an extension of legitimate function of the police for partisan political purposes.’⁵⁹ He also argued that, owing to their discretionary powers and their potential as a coercive apparatus, authoritarian governments can influence the police force to engage in ‘police vigilantism.’⁶⁰ Tapiwa Chideme confirmed that in Mbare, when elections were nearing, ‘if one escaped the wrath of Chipangano vigilantes, would fall prey to rampaging police.’⁶¹ This indicates the existence of police vigilantism in Mbare. In this respect, Alemika argued that, ‘police repression and vigilantism reflect the character of governance in the society and is not limited to totalitarian societies.’⁶² Using Bowden’s words, the police were overtly

⁵⁶ Interview with Tapiwa Chideme by the author, Mbare, 02 August 2017.

⁵⁷ CODEO, The menace of political party of vigilantism in Ghana: Reflection from roundtable discussions held in Bolgatanga, Upper East Region, 15 July 2017.

⁵⁸ Human Rights Watch, “Bullets for Each of You” *State-Sponsored Violence since Zimbabwe’s March 29 Elections*, 2008.

⁵⁹ E. E. O. Alemika, ‘Police, policing and rule of law in transitional countries’, L. Lindholt, P. Neto, D. Titus and E. Alemika (eds.), *Human Rights and the Police in Transnational Countries*. (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2003), pp.78-79.

⁶⁰ Police vigilantism occurs when police act as judges and executioners, or engage in reprisal killing or form of uniform vendetta; E. E. O. Alemika, ‘Police, policing and rule of law in transitional countries’, L. Lindholt, P. Neto, D. Titus and E. Alemika (eds.), *Human Rights and the Police in Transnational Countries*. (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2003), pp.78-79

⁶¹ Interview with Tapiwa Chideme by the author, Mbare, 02/08/17.

⁶² E. E. O. Alemika, ‘Police, policing and rule of law in transitional countries’, L. Lindholt, P. Neto, D. Titus & E. Alemika (eds.), *Human Rights and the Police in Transnational Countries*, (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2003), pp.78-79.

politically partisan and they connived with the Chipangano group ‘to mount offensives against those elements in political and social life deemed to be beyond the pale.’⁶³

The Chipangano group worked in connection with some individual policemen at Matapi Police Station, Stodart Police Station and other police bases across Mbare. The Chipangano group gave certain police officers money as inducements to make them stay out of their way and when members of the public reported harassments by the group, the police would overlook the cases. Many interviewees put forward that some of the vigilantes who had been arrested were easily released without trial.⁶⁴ The police either took part in the violence and looting or watched passively. MDC-T supporters reported torture by police and Central Intelligence Officer (CIO) at Carter House, which was appropriated by Chipangano from Harare City Council and was used as a torture base.⁶⁵ The actions of the law enforcement agents prompted Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum to ask a question, “Who guards the guards?”⁶⁶ In addition, Stanford Nhau (a member of Chipangano) who was a son of ZRP Inspector Nhau, used his connection with police (in fact his father’s position in the police force) to control the sale of vegetables at Mbare Musika. The vendors accused Stanford Nhau of demanding a share of their profits.⁶⁷ He also cut into the profits of the farmers who were bringing their products to the market.⁶⁸ This shows that there was a strong relationship between the police and the vigilante group and they both benefitted immensely from exploiting the vendors and the stall owners in Mbare.

There are some allegations that the vigilantes had accumulated power to the extent that they became more powerful than the police. Theresa Makone admitted that the Chipangano group became so formidable that the police and MDC-T were not able to stop them as long as they were promoting the ZANU-PF agendas.⁶⁹ The Chipangano group could assault minibus operators in the full glare of the police. Makone said, “if instructions are given not to arrest them you can do nothing”.⁷⁰ This implies that the police were instructed by their superiors who

⁶³ T. Bowden, *The Breakdown of Public Security*. (Sage, London, 1977).

⁶⁴ Interview with Precious Shumba by the author, at HRT, 27 July 2017.

⁶⁵ N. Kriger, ‘ZANU-PF politics under Zimbabwe’s ‘Power-sharing’ Government’, D. Moore, N. Kriger, B. Raftopoulos (eds.), *‘Progress’ in Zimbabwe? The Past and Present of a Concept and a Country*, (Routledge, New York, 2013).

⁶⁶ Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, *Who guards the guards? Violations by law enforcement agencies in Zimbabwe, 2000 to 2006*, (2006).

⁶⁷ *The Zimbabwean*, 2 November 2011, <http://www.thezimbabwean.co/2011/11/chipangano-a-business-outfit-hiding/>, Accessed on 28 July 2017.

⁶⁸ SW Radio Africa, Chipangano divisions, 21 October 2003, [www.swradioafrica.com>file>october](http://www.swradioafrica.com/file/october), Accessed on 16 September 2017.

⁶⁹ *Ibid*, Minister Makone admits MDC-T powerless over ZANU- PF youths, 21 September 2011, <http://www.swradioafrica.com/news210911/ministermakone210911.html>, Accessed on 28 July 2017.

⁷⁰ *Ibid*.

were affiliated to the ZANU-PF regime to provide a status of immunity to the vigilantes. The Mbare police have proved to be inefficient and helpless due to their failure to attend to the grievances from the victims, civic organisations and residents.⁷¹ The group could engage in heinous acts even nearer the doorsteps of the Matapi Police Station but were never imprisoned. This prompted Makone to say that there was an unwritten law that was understood by ZANU PF that their members cannot be arrested.⁷² Using Schuberth's words, the police's hands-off approach to Chipangano vigilantism was an outcome of ZANU-PF's political decision to deny Mbare district their right to state protection with an intention to achieve its political ends.⁷³

In many occasions the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) protected the Chipangano group in Mbare. The police claimed that it knew nothing about the group and its activities.⁷⁴ Research confirmed that ZRP knew the Chipangano group members, leaders and benefactors.⁷⁵ James Sabau, the then Harare Provincial Police Spokesperson sided with the Chipangano saying;

... some unruly individuals had taken advantage of the name Chipangano to engage in unlawful activities, such as extorting money from vendors... victims were not coming forward with specific reports of victimisation, making it difficult for the police to act. We are prepared to deal with any cases of violence or victimisation of residents. We will deal with the individuals perpetrating the violence because if we say we want to deal with Chipangano we don't know who exactly we should be arresting." So, we will deal with individuals. Members of the public who have a case to report should make sure they report it to the police. "The problem is that the issue of Chipangano is being generalised. We do not have any specific cases that have been reported to us but we just hear people saying Chipangano is doing this and that. So, I think anyone who has a case should come to the police and we will take the necessary corrective measures."⁷⁶

This clearly denotes that police were unsympathetic to those who tried to report the vigilantes and in so doing, they sanctioned political violence and delinquency. Mbare police shielded the

⁷¹ *The Zimbabwean*, 10 July 2012, <http://www.thezimbabwean.co/2012/07/police-must-act-on-chipangano/>, Accessed on 27/07/17.

⁷² SW Radio Africa, Minister Makone admits MDC-T powerless over ZANU- PF youths, 21 September 2011, <http://www.swradioafrica.com/news210911/ministermakone210911.html>, Accessed on 28 July 2017.

⁷³ M. Schuberth, 'Challenging the Weak States Hypothesis: Vigilantism in South Africa and Brazil', *Journal of Peace, Conflict & Development*, Issue 20, (2013), p.43.

⁷⁴ *Financial Gazette*, 31 May 2012.

⁷⁵ *The Zimbabwean*, 10 July 2012, <http://www.thezimbabwean.co/2012/07/police-must-act-on-chipangano/>, Accessed on 28 July 2017.

⁷⁶ *The Zimbabwean*, 15 August 2012, <http://www.thezimbabwean.co/2012/08/report-chipangano-offences-zrp/>, Accessed 28/07/17.

Chipangano group from the people who endeavoured to file lawsuits against them. using Schubert's words, when both police and the vigilantes 'are politicized, they radicalise their own agenda.'⁷⁷ The police engaged in creating false evidence or cases against the perceived enemies of the vigilantes. Many participants argued that the police created fictional cases in a bid to rationalize the arrest and detention of those who attempted to seek justice. This is explicitly explained in the case of Mashwede Diesel Company employees (in 2012) who sued the Chipangano group leader for disrupting their construction of service station and soliciting bribe.⁷⁸ The police build up evidence against the Mashwede employees arguing that they wanted to bribe Jim Kunaka in a bid to get a construction site. Jim Kunaka won this case because he got help from Superintendent Chrispen Makedenge (from the Criminal Investigation Department) and Assistant Inspector Shoko.⁷⁹ Therefore, shows the police's complicity in Chipangano activities.

Since 2000, Mbare police neglected to carry out investigations of extrajudicial killings done by the Chipangano group in all previous elections for instance nothing was done over the murder of Shepherd Bandau, who was an MDC Branch Treasurer in Mbare. Countless atrocities were committed by the group but the perpetrators were not held accountable. One of the victims claimed that police reports were filed and the names of the perpetrators were supplied but Mbare police did not bother to conduct even rudimentary investigations nor arresting.⁸⁰ The victim added that those who were arrested were set free with the help of their ZANU-PF patrons. Pineal Denga argued that Mbare police were not cooperative, they had become incessantly partisan and reluctant in executing their duties in crimes committed by Chipangano.⁸¹ This indicates that the police was captured by the ZANU-PF government hence, no efforts were made to investigate the ZANU-PF officials implicated in organising and sanctioning the Chipangano vigilantes.

The relationship between the Council and Chipangano

The relationships between the Harare City Council and Chipangano was tainted with antagonism and rivalry as most councillors were from the MDC-T. The group's onus was to disempower and to hamper the progression of the Council. They wanted the Council to look

⁷⁷ M. Schubert, 'Challenging the Weak States Hypothesis: Vigilantism in South Africa and Brazil', *Journal of Peace, Conflict & Development*, Issue 20, April 2013, p.50.

⁷⁸ 'Chipangano's links to the top exposed', *The Zimbabwean*, 31 October 2012.

⁷⁹ *The Zimbabwean*, 31 October 2012.

⁸⁰ Interview with Aaron Nyatsimba, at Chicken Slice (Harare CBD), 29 July 2017.

⁸¹ Interview with Pineal Denga by the author, Fantasyland Chicken Inn, Harare CBD, 27 July 2017.

like it was failing on service delivery in Mbare, hence the opposition would lose popularity in the area. The Council was incapable of challenging the Chipangano vigilantes because of its infamous victimisation of oppositions. The Harare City Council failed to carefully watch its properties and consequentially it retained about 13% of the total expected revenue with the other 87% being taken by Chipangano.⁸² The Chipangano vigilantes overran Harare City Council, and took over Mbare and collecting considerable amount of revenues generated by nearly all council profit-making properties. The group created an informal parallel council in Mbare which controlled the area through extortion. The group also caused pandemonium, seizing flea markets, extorting money from transport operators and mugging political opponents. As previously discussed in Chapter 2, vendors at the Mupedzanhamo Flea Market, Mbare Bus Terminus, Mbare Market and Carter House, were forced to pay between \$1 and \$5 to the vigilantes daily. The Chipangano group was involved in illegal open markets without the approval of the local authority.⁸³

The Chipangano leader, Jim Kunaka, was an employee of the Council, but he appeared to be above the Council. He worked as a market attendant, whose duties included monitoring the running of the markets, rent collection and inspection of tickets. Kunaka was domineering because he could override the council's decisions. Precious Shumba said, the council lost control over its properties, area of jurisdiction and sources of income, like Siyaso, to Chipangano and individuals, like Jim Kunaka and Naimon Modern Chirwa, became excessively rich through running the council properties.⁸⁴ The then Deputy Mayor, Thomas Muzuva was cited saying;

The money from Mbare is going into the pocket of one individual – Jim Kunaka – while council is not getting a cent. He (Kunaka) has the power to hold town clerk, Tendai Mahachi, and tell him that he needs money. We have a town clerk who just sits there in his office while some people are abusing council resources. We have so many council properties, so many market stalls in Mbare not bringing anything to council. Every day over 400 buses use Mbare termini and are charged \$10 each but council is not getting anything. Honestly, we can't allow an individual like Kunaka ... to take \$4000 on a daily basis at the bus termini when council is not getting, anything. This is an offence which

⁸² T. Mutongwizo, *Contours of Non-State Governance: Encountering states in South Africa and Zimbabwe*, PHD Thesis, University of Cape Town, Department of Public Law, (2014), p.98

⁸³ 'Top Chipangano militia leader dies', *Nehanda Radio*, 7 May 2012, <http://nehandaradio.com/2012/05/06/top-chipangano-militia-leader-dies/1346471215000/>, Accessed on 29/07/17.

⁸⁴ Interview with Precious Shumba by the author, Harare Residents Trust, 27 July 2017.

lands some to be fired because it is his duty to push his directors to work and bring money.⁸⁵

The council tried to dismiss Kunaka for swindling about US\$4 000 daily at Mbare terminus, illegally collected from buses.⁸⁶ The council was losing more than US\$100 000 to Chipangano vigilantes. His superiors decided to transfer him to another station. Kunaka refused and he went with Chipangano youths to his superior's offices at Remembrance Building in Mbare, wearing shorts to protest the decision to transfer him.⁸⁷ However, the decision was unsustainable and this proved that the Council superiors feared Jim Kunaka.

The Chipangano group was a real threat to the implementation of the council budget in Mbare. The vigilante group created a bewilderment in Mbare as ZANU-PF enthusiasts were using council's land without paying anything to the local authority. They disempowered the council when they became the collectors of rent and overseers of business zones in Mbare. Therefore, it became difficult for the council to implement its budget for Mbare because all the coffers were being taken by the Chipangano overlords.

The Chipangano group had blocked the community development projects. As already mentioned in the previous Chapter, the group halted the construction of a filling station. The Mashwede Diesel Services (a fuel company) had already used nearly US\$300 000 to buy the equipment necessary for the project, but the development was disrupted as the group daunted the workers, scourging all those who resisted. The Chipangano also impeded a US\$5 million housing project under the sponsorship of Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. This project would have helped to refurbish Mbare flats and building houses for poor people in Mbare. The group was reportedly demanding a 51% share of the houses, supposedly under the controversial indigenisation policy.⁸⁸ Henceforth, the relationship between the Council and the Chipangano was marred with intricacies because the group had taken over the role of the council.

The Chipangano vigilantes were involved in disruption the council meetings. The participants confirmed that the group could create nerve-wrecking situations to the councillors who tried to hold meetings. The Combined Harare Residents Association (CHRA) confirmed that, each

⁸⁵ *Newsdzezimbabwe*, 15 January 2015.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁸ 'Chipangano blocks US\$ 1M project', *The Standard*, 28 January 2012, <https://www.thestandard.co.zw/2012/01/28/chipangano-blocks-us1m-project/>, Accessed on 29/07/17.

time council officials tried to go and attend to an issue in Mbare, more often than less, they would be vilified and chased away by the vigilantes.⁸⁹ Pineal Denga said;

...the councillors had no voices ... we tried to hold meetings for development, but ZANU-PF through Chipangano would come and say your resolutions are rubbish, what we are going to implementing are our own resolutions. Whenever ZANU-PF saw that MDC was trying to come up with its policies, ZANU-PF would come and disturb.⁹⁰

The main agenda of this group was to sabotage the council as it was dominated by MDC councillors. During that time, the state controlled media indicated that Harare City Council had dismally failed to deliver fundamental services in Mbare.⁹¹ However, this was ZANU-PF propaganda to deform the image of the MDC dominated local authority, yet it was ZANU-PF members and Chipangano who were responsible owing to their illegal activities.

In tandem with the above, Clement Chimombe, who was a MDC-T Councillor for ward 11 in Mbare, is on record resisting to join a tour of Mbare led by the mayor, Muchadeyi Masunda, arguing that lives could be lost.⁹² This was a stark outlay of how bad the situation was in Mbare. ZANU-PF politicians found it important to support Chipangano because it helped them to keep the activities of the oppositions in obscurity from the people and the group's exclusionary activities also benefited party enthusiasts.

The Council blamed the outbreak of waterborne diseases in Mbare to Chipangano group. The Chipangano was incessantly disturbing MDC-T councillors from engaging in development programmes and service delivery for instance, the group frustrated the Council's efforts to refurbish the flats and sewer system. Gomba (one of the former councillors) said "I need to tell this truth that the Mbare typhoid was caused by Chipangano which refused to accept Mayor Masunda's Bill Gates funding to replace the old sewer system and flats."⁹³ This clearly shows that the relations between the Chipangano and the council were unfriendly.

⁸⁹ Combined Harare Residents Association (CHRA), Chipangano mutates into Mbare Residents Association, 09 November 2012.

⁹⁰ Interview with Pineal Denga by the author, Fantasyland Chicken Inn, on 27 July 2017.

⁹¹ Combined Harare Residents Association (CHRA), Chipangano mutates into Mbare Residents Association, 09 November 2012, http://archive.kubatana.net/html/archive/locgov/121109chra.asp?sector=POLACT&year=2012&range_start=1, Accessed on 10 October 2017.

⁹² *Ibid.*

⁹³ <http://263chat.com/harare-councilor-blames-chipangano-typhoid-outbreak/>, Accessed on 10 September 2017.

The Chipangano vigilantes persecuted the Council workers as they were perceived by the group as hindrances to its activities. There was continued incidences of violence against the council employees by members of Chipangano group. The Solidarity Peace Trust confirmed that the attempts to register vendors in Mbare by the Council officials were discontinued by Chipangano space barons who intimidated them and ran after them.⁹⁴ The employees from the Corporate Services and Housing Departments stationed at Mbare Musika faced challenges in conducting their duties and this resulted in halting the process of upgrading Mbare Bus Terminus. The Harare City Council gave in to the pressure that had been exerted on it by the vigilantes, hence ended up transferring some of its workers from Mbare as their security could not be guaranteed. Councillors, however, deployed the employees to other stations while at the same time trying to engage various stakeholders to curb violence in Mbare.

The Chipangano group also demanded money from the Mbare residents who wanted to fetch water from boreholes owned by the City Council. Many of the boreholes were donated by the United Nations through United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), after cholera outbreaks gripped the area, and others were drilled using the MPs' development funds.⁹⁵ These boreholes were even maintained by the council and no action was taken to deal with the vigilantes who were profiting from the water. Water shortages intensified in Mbare especially after the burst pipe at the Morton Jaffrey Water Treatment Plant. The Mbare residents confirmed that it was the same people who were collecting security fees from the vendors at the flea markets and bus terminus who had taken over the local boreholes.⁹⁶

However, there was a section of Harare City Council employees who supported the Chipangano group and these included Tendai Mahachi, Modern Chirwa and Believer Mupawaenda. Tendai Mahachi, the then Town Clerk, connived with Chipangano group in stopping Alex Mashamhanda's construction of 'a 1.2 million service station and food court in Mbare,' after he refused to give Kunaka a bribe.⁹⁷ Mahachi wrote a letter to stop the project without the consent of the Council or the Mayor.⁹⁸ Modern Chirwa, who worked as mortuary attendant at Nazarene Clinic, misrepresented and abused the council authority.⁹⁹ He used the

⁹⁴ Solidarity Peace Trust, *Hope without hope: Murambatsvina- Ten years on*, Bulawayo, 06 October 2012.

⁹⁵ Interview with Pineal Denga by the author, Fantasyland Chicken Inn (Harare CBD), 27 July 2017.

⁹⁶ SW Radio Africa, Zimbabwe: Gangs Charging Residents for Council Water, 09 October 2012, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201210090213.html>, Accessed on 27/07/17.

⁹⁷ *Daily news*, 30 August 2012.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹⁹ *Zimbabwe Daily*, 18 February 2011, www.thezimbabwedaily.com/news/7583-rescue-us-from-chirwa.html Accessed on 23 December 2017.

Chipangano group to intimidate, beat and expelling people from council hostels in the name of the council and ZANU-PF.¹⁰⁰ Most of Chirwa's victims were women who were forced to pay US\$500 or trade sexual favour to avoid being evicted.¹⁰¹ Tapiwa Chideme confirmed that Modern Chirwa was one of the organisers of Chipangano group.¹⁰² He worked in cohort with senior officials in the Housing Department at Remembrance Building to solicit bribes from poor residents.¹⁰³ Believer Mupawaenda, who worked in the Water Department had connections with the vigilantes who moved around collecting US\$20 from desperate residents who wanted the Harare City Council to reconnect their water systems.¹⁰⁴ The Harare City Council is blameworthy for the violence which occurred in Mbare because it took no action against those employees who were conniving with the Chipangano group. The residents stated that they complained many times to the City of Harare's Housing and Water Departments, but nothing had been done and this signals that many council officials were involved in these illicit dealings.

The Zimbabwe Peace Project (ZPP) asserted that the Harare City Council was culpable for snowballing Chipangano vigilantism in the district through its disruption and displacement of vendors and businesses at Mbare Musika.¹⁰⁵ A local trader bolstered the idea that the municipality officials colluded with the Chipangano vigilantes masquerading as if they were conducting a clean-up exercise, yet compelling the traders to pay a US\$10 fee or they closed down their businesses.¹⁰⁶ The Chipangano group capitalised on the displacement of vendors by the Council by annexing open spaces (where vendors had been displaced) and turned them into car parks. Tapiwa Chideme said the Council failed to renounce the activities of Chipangano let alone arresting the vigilantes.¹⁰⁷ Chideme and many other respondents who contributed to this study confirmed that scores of the council top officials were the owners of market stalls in Mbare and Chipangano was a tax collector.

¹⁰⁰ A phone conversation with Tapiwa Chideme, 22 December 2017.

¹⁰¹ Zimbabwe Daily, 18 February 2011, www.thezimbabwedaily.com/news/7583-rescue-us-from-chirwa.html Accessed on 23/12/17.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*; A phone conversation with Tapiwa Chideme, 22 December 2017.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁴ A phone conversation with Tapiwa Chideme, 22 December 2017.

¹⁰⁵ Zimbabwe Peace Project (ZPP), Alert: Displacement of vendors and disruption of business at Mbare Musika, 25 January 2017.

¹⁰⁶ Interview with anonymous by the author, at Paground Flea Market, 25 July 2017.

¹⁰⁷ Interview with Tapiwa Chideme by the author, Mbare, 02 August 2017

Reaction of the ZANU-PF government to Chipangano violence

The government's response to Chipangano violence in Mbare was paradoxical and exceptionally duplicitous. The ZANU-PF government asserted that the reports of Chipangano violence had been grossly overstated by civic organisations and media. It also maintained that the MDC youths were the main perpetrators of violence and Chipangano group was there to safeguard the people of Mbare. While the senior officials were covertly sanctioning the Chipangano vigilantes to unleash violence against the opposition, the government publicly tried to modulate and dissociate itself from the group.

The ZANU-PF government wanted to appear to the public as if it had nothing to do with the Chipangano group. The ZANU-PF politicians denounced the vigilante group during the day but nicodemusly went to Mbare and strategise with the group on how to canvass support for the party. Ostensibly, the government did nothing to stop the Chipangano violence in Mbare. One of the interviewee said, "if the government wanted to end Chipangano vigilantism in Mbare, it would be very easy for them, but how can the devil fight his own kingdom."¹⁰⁸ Some ZANU-PF politicians claimed that the party was against the Chipangano activities in Mbare and they pointed to the city crackdown which was launched by the government against the group as a fine display of the party's standpoint. One of the interviewees who chose anonymity revealed that;

The ZANU-PF government wanted to insert a false conviction in people's minds that the party had not condoned Chipangano vigilantism through launching the city-wide crackdown on all the groups that were linked to Chipangano. The police arrested more than three hundred people. The crackdown was caused by the incident which happened at the Charge Office Bus Terminus where many kombi drivers and some passers-by were assaulted over the fees, and one soldier was also victimised in the course of the event. ZANU PF had formerly turned a blind eye to the terror methods used by the group, which had victimised people for years. The launch of a crackdown created more questions than answers in the minds of the people, and many people think that this was an indication of ZANU-PF infighting with one faction rivalling for Chipangano leadership.¹⁰⁹

In line with the above, it is safe to argue that the attack against Chipangano was not meant to end vigilantism in Mbare but it was meant to disempower its leaders especially Jim Kunaka

¹⁰⁸ Interview with CHRA official by the author, CHRA offices, Daventry House, Harare CBD, 28 July 2017

¹⁰⁹ Interview with Dr Mutongi by the author, Rowan Martin Harare City Council Offices, 25 July 2017.

because he was now perceived as someone having ideas that are outside the purview of ZANU-PF political thinking and that he was also backing the Joice Mujuru faction.¹¹⁰ This is analogous to what recently transpired when President Mugabe discharged the Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa, ZANU-PF immediately called for the demobilisation of Al-Shabaab, a vigilante group that is supposedly sponsored by Mnangagwa which was modelled along Chipangano lines.¹¹¹ Therefore, it is clear that it was all about controlling the Chipangano structure.

One of the participants also opined;

Chipangano will never cease to exist until there is a change of government. What you have to understand is ZANU-PF is a system made up of structures and Chipangano is one of these structures. Chipangano activities have proved to be beneficial to ZANU-PF especially its role of undermining the activities of the opposition in Mbare. If ZANU-PF wanted to end Chipangano nothing would stop them because they know the leaders and the patrons of the group. ...the Chipangano group still exists. The exit of Jim Kunaka, the death of Amos Midzi and the expulsion of Tendai Savanhu from the party did not change anything, the vigilante group is still intact under new leadership. ZANU-PF is a system, it's not about individuals. Whether a policy was started by someone who has left the party, the system remains and it will continue so long as it gives them money and the expected end.¹¹²

This clearly shows that the ZANU-PF did nothing to save the people from the callous activities of the Chipangano and this shows the collusion between the two.

Some ZANU-PF members also pointed to Mugabe's June decree in 2012 as a measure of stopping Chipangano vigilantism in Mbare. The decree disbanded the ZANU-PF District Coordinating Committees (DCCs) and the measure was anticipated to haunt the Chipangano group, given the fact that the members of the DCC in Mbare were the leaders and coordinators of the group.¹¹³ The reality is that this move was meant to knockback the faction of the party under the leadership of Emmerson Mnangagwa, combating to control the party and eventually

¹¹⁰ Interview with Edknowledge by the author, Heal Zimbabwe Trust, 21 July 2017.

¹¹¹ 'Mnangagwa Terror Group Wreaks Havoc in Kwekwe', www.thezimbabweonlinenews.com/zimbabwe-18155-mnangagwa-terror-group-wreaks-havoc-kwekwe.html, Accessed on 27 December 2017; See also 'Sacked Zim VP Mnangagwa linked to terror group al-Shabaab', *News24*, 11 November 2017, m.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/sacked-zim-vp-mnangagwa-linked-to-terror-group-al-shabaab-20171111, Accessed on 27 December 2017.

¹¹² Interview with Dr Mutongi by the author, Rowan Martin Harare City Council Offices, 25 July 2017.

¹¹³ *Daily news*, 17 September 2012, <https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2012/09/17/dccs-disbandment-haunts-chipangano>, Accessed on 27 July 2017.

succeed Mugabe as ZANU-PF supremo. Some would want to point to the instance when Didymus Mutasa (when he was still the Party Secretary) confronted Amos Midzi about the issue of Chipangano, but however the bone of contention was not the callous activities of the group but it was factionalism within ZANU-PF. The same argument also applies to all the ZANU-PF official such as Tendai Savanhu who were suspended from the party and to other Chipangano youths such as Gomwe and others, who faced many charges including extorting US\$46 000 from housing cooperatives using First lady Grace Mugabe's name.¹¹⁴

The ZANU-PF government has politicised and corrupted the justice sector. it is a common knowledge that there is political meddling in the judicial sector. The Human Rights Watch Report substantiated that the ZANU PF has compromised the independence and impartiality of the judiciary judges, magistrates and prosecutors and transformed the police.¹¹⁵ The idea that judges are "influenced in the executive, and there is also use of threats, transfers and dismissal"¹¹⁶ is clearly evidenced by the case of Prince Jack's lawsuit against Jim Kunaka after he was assailed by the Chipangano group.¹¹⁷ Kunaka did not bother to respond to the summon of the court. When he was instructed to pay Prince Jack an amount of US\$4 000 for what he did, he did not respond to the court order.¹¹⁸ Therefore, it is clear that there was partisan application of law and on the part of the government there was lack of political will to tackle the problem of Chipangano violence that had troubled Mbare district since 2000.

The government deliberately neglected its duty of maintaining the neutrality of the police force in political matters. The government was not interested in handling cases which involved ZANU-PF members thus, it can be blamed for permitting the Chipangano vigilantes to operate with impunity using its name. The government responded defectively in suppressing Chipangano violence in Mbare District. Its response was very slow and ineffectual whenever the Chipangano group was involved in a conflict. In several cases, the police intervened with superfluous violence arresting or injuring innocent people. The government failed to do further investigations of political violence whenever it occurred. Moreover, the government also protected the group from being publicly criticised by the media. The issues of Chipangano

¹¹⁴ *The Standard*, 14 June 2014, <https://www.thestandard.co.zw/2015/06/14/could-this-be-the-end-of-chipangano/>, Accessed on 27 July 2017.

¹¹⁵ Human Rights Watch, "*Our Hands Are Tied*" *Erosion of the Rule of Law in Zimbabwe*. New York: Human Rights Watch, (2008), p.1.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁷ Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Chipangano leader 's property attached over assault, 08 June 2015.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, Kunaka to pay \$4k in assault damages, 15 December 2014.

vigilantism were made unmentionable in newspapers as the group targeted the journalists. The Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum asserted that the government used its repressive laws such as AIPPA and POSA and the law enforcement agents to clampdown dissenting voices.¹¹⁹ One of the participants mentioned that at one time, the state banished the Daily News for the sake of protecting its apparatus of violence. With the complicity of the ZANU-PF government, the police and Chipangano vigilantes regularly impounded some copies of newspapers published by private media companies from street traders who were selling in Mbare district.

The state was not interested in healing or rebuilding the relations of the people in Mbare community. Mbire argued that there is a close relationship between the law and reconciliation.¹²⁰ Tapiwa Chideme maintained that the government did not make any effort to punish the perpetrators of violence.¹²¹ The government turned a blind eye on this issue because most of the perpetrators belonged to ZANU-PF. This behaviour has made the Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC) and Organ of National Healing Reconciliation and Integration (ONHRI) (institutions set up during the inclusive government to heal wounds of political violence the society) to be ineffective because they lacked the support of the government. This will be explained further in Chapter 5. Although Non-government organisations like the Zimbabwe Lawyers of Human Rights (ZLHR) and Human Rights NGO Forum have been vigorously helping the victims in Mbare with legal assistance and filing lawsuits on their behalf, the government and the justice sector have shown lack of commitment to stop giving immunity to Chipangano vigilantes.

Conclusion

In Zimbabwe, vigilantism and politics is deeply intertwined and they cannot be treated separately. The manifestation of Chipangano vigilantism in Mbare was intentionally caused by ZANU-PF politicians who were pursuing their political agendas. Some scholars like Rotberg, Lyon and Zartman interpreted the sanctioning of vigilantes by the state using the concept of state collapse. Although the country is perceived as one of the most failed state in the world, vigilantism in Zimbabwe is an outcome of political choice rather than state collapse. The state

¹¹⁹ Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, *Who guards the guards? Violations by law enforcement agencies in Zimbabwe, 2000-2006*, (2006).

¹²⁰ M. Mbire, *Seeking Reconciliation and National Healing in Zimbabwe: Case of the Organ on National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration (ONHRI)*, MA Thesis, The Hague: International Institute of Social Studies, (2011), p.34.

¹²¹ Interview with Tapiwa Chideme by the author, at his homestead Mbare, 02 August 2017.

collapse explanation is applicable to the cases of Sierra Leone, Uganda's Teso region, South Sudan's former Western Equatorial State, and Nigeria's north east where vigilantes were used to tackle insurgents in areas where state control was weak.¹²² The ZANU-PF used the Chipangano vigilantes in Mbare district because it was a cheap campaigning tool. The state deliberately denied Mbare their right to security in order to facilitate Chipangano operations because the latter had a symbiotic relationship with the ruling party, ZANU-PF.

The ZANU-PF government captured and politicised the police force in order to facilitate smooth operation of its informal networks like Chipangano. As argued in this chapter, the police's hands-off approach to Chipangano activities was a political decision of the ZANU-PF government to punish political subversives. The government allowed Chipangano vigilantes to establish a parallel state and engaging in quasi-state functions because they wanted the district to be under the control of ZANU-PF by making it difficult for the opposition to consolidate their position in the area. The next chapter will examine the responses of the people to Chipangano vigilantism. This chapter will focus on the responses of the vendors, stallholders, artisans and touts as they interacted with the vigilantes on daily basis and they were affect most than other people.

¹²² <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/10/a-double-edged-sword-the-role-of-vigilantes-in-africa>

CHAPTER 5

Chipangano Vigilantism and Community Responses

Introduction

The foregoing chapters indicated that the Chipangano group used a myriad of mechanisms to cow the people of Mbare into submission. Those who tried or were assumed to be in opposition to the group found themselves in difficult situations. Scores of people were abducted, beaten, maimed, evicted or lost economic opportunities because of the group's Zanufication¹ endeavours. The Chipangano group could even terrorise family members of the targeted in a bid to achieve intended ends. Chipangano vigilantism had many negative ramifications on Mbare Community and these ranged from displacement of people, violation of people's fundamental rights, social trauma as people were being beaten to death, kidnapped or abducted, worsening the plight of women and children to family fragmentation. This chapter focuses on the community responses to the scourges of Chipangano violence. It will disclose how the Mbare inhabitants coped with Chipangano vigilantism and what survival strategies they adopted. This chapter will show the reactions of various groups (such as vendors, drivers, artisans, stallholders and touts) of people to Chipangano crusades in Mupedzanhamo Flea Markets, Siyaso, Mbare Bus Terminal and other business zones. I chose these groups because they interacted with the vigilantes on daily basis. This chapter will use the response based approach because people responded in diverse ways in the context of violence and humiliation. While some people became acquiesced to the Chipangano group, others probed its legitimacy and engaged in retaliatory violence.

The Community Responses to Chipangano Vigilantism

The attitude of Mbare Community towards Chipangano violence was confounding. Although the Chipangano vigilantism affected many people directly or indirectly, benefitting few perpetrators and opening a wide void of anarchy which the vigilantes took advantage of to commit all kinds of crimes, people's responses to the activities of the group were obvious. The community's responses towards the vigilante groups were typified by contradictions and shaped by a combination of despair, helplessness and fear, but some people adjusted and

¹ This term was first used by the MDC-T officials referring to the process of tearing apart of their support base by ZANU-PF.

developed some survival strategies. These survival strategies ranged from feigning repentance, selling their wares during the night to acquiescence. The responses to Chipangano vigilantism can be explained in three ways that is; conformity, passive resistance and active resistance. Some people accepted the legitimacy of Chipangano and showed their conformity through attending ZANU-PF functions, having party membership cards and paying extortion fees. There was a group of people who refused to accept the legitimacy of the Chipangano, therefore they passively resisted the group, engaged in retributive justice and others openly condemned it.

Silence and Conformity as a response to Chipangano crusades

Research has confirmed that there was a group of people who acquiesced to Chipangano due to fear. These people developed a supportive behaviour towards Chipangano and ZANU-PF, expressing their allegiance through participating in party activities and functions such as rallies, Heroes Day and Independence Day celebrations etc. Most of these people realised that politics was a high-risk venture as the opposition parties were banned and most of their meetings in the district had turned violent, hence the only way to survive was to adhere to the demands of Chipangano.² Kudakwashe Mazambani confirmed;

What I value most is the welfare of my family. I realised that being involved in politics was bringing nothing but death, chronic injuries and permanent scars. I lost interest in politics and focused on maintaining my family. The only opportunity that was available for me was selling bails of clothes at Mupedzanhamo and supplying *Matemba* [small dried fish] to those who were selling along the streets. I never had problems with the Chipangano group because I used to pay protection fees without quarrelling with them. I learnt some lessons from those who had tried to resist the group's orders, so I did not want the same evils to fall on my family and me. Actually, I don't want to be chased away from Mbare because that's the place I only know with greater economic opportunities. All in all, for my family's survival and their wellbeing, opposing Chipangano was not an option.³

The above interview narrative found explanation in Sherrif's theory of silence as a form of cultural censorship when he argued that people are likely to conform to state sanctioned groups

² Interview with Dr G. Mwonzora by the author, Harare CBD, 05 August 2017.

³ Interview with Kudakwashe Mazambani by the author, Mbare, 03 July 2017.

because of the terrible ordeal they had been through.⁴ It is clear that many people in the district chose to give precedence to the safety and wellbeing of their families. These people never questioned or probed the legitimacy of the Chipangano activities primarily because they dreaded evictions and losing the economic opportunities in Mbare's business zones. Therefore, the group's exclusionary policy against the dissents both silenced and made the residents to become acquiescent to Chipangano orders.

The activities of Chipangano group compelled several people to feign allegiance to the ruling party. Interviewees argued that they had been humiliated in many ways by the group and they did not want the recurrence of such episodes. The group had an effective surveillance system which reported the movements of people in Mbare. My field notes and interviewees' narratives exhibited that the people in Mbare dreaded to candidly and unreservedly talk about political matters particularly, Chipangano violence. Attending MDC meetings was forbidden and unmentionable in Mbare. Tapiwa Chideme said that the group created a climate of fear in Mbare as they chanted ZANU-PF slogans carrying coffins across the streets and telling the residents that they were going to kill Tsvangirai and his followers after the election of 2005.⁵ An interview with one of the artisans from Siyaso clearly shows the situation that existed in Mbare;

Chipangano with its spine-chilling activities made me to reserve my political affiliations to myself. My life depends on my artistic skills, making window frames and door frames is the only thing that I am good at. I did not want to lose my source of income because of attending MDC rallies. What matters is, I know the political party to vote for when election comes. Due to the economic hardships being faced by the country, you can't risk losing this lucrative opportunity of operating in this productive industrial zone. Many people who wanted to operate in Mbare business zones made their ties with the opposition invisible.⁶

As previously mentioned, Chipangano was there to convalesce the status of the ruling party in Mbare. It was one of the onuses of the group to compel the people to attend ZANU-PF meetings. The people of Mbare proved their conformity to Chipangano rule through attending all the meetings held by ZANU-PF in the district and elsewhere. Many participants confirmed

⁴ R. E. Sheriff, 'Exposing Silence as Cultural Censorship: A Brazilian Case [New Series]', *American Anthropologist*, Vol 102, No.1, (2000), pp.114-132.

⁵ Interview with Tapiwa Chideme by the author, Mbare, 02 August 2017.

⁶ Interview with an artisan from Siyaso by the author, Mbare, 03 August 2017.

that, for one to peacefully coexist with the Chipangano group, attending ZANU-PF meetings was necessary. An artisan from Siyaso validated this when he said that he never resisted the orders of Chipangano because this would cost his life and that of those around him. He added that, those who failed to tread along Chipangano path were labelled as *vatengesesi* (sellouts).⁷ This buttresses McGregor's argument that the people have been silenced incessantly by the ZANU-PF government through its devious actions of allowing vigilante groups to take over the local state.⁸ In Mbare silence, and conformity have been fostered through Chipangano's politics of exclusion and labelling. The residents feared to be labelled 'sell-outs' as the title was associated with evictions and torture.

The local transport (*Kombi*) operators exhibited their subservience by helping Chipangano to ferry people to ZANU-PF functions. Precious Shumba mentioned that in 2001, the vigilantes forced the transport operators to ferry people when they were demonstrating against Elias Mudzuri (the then MDC Harare Mayor).⁹ The same scenario also happened in 2005 when the group, in many occasions, had set road blocks and made sure that no transport was leaving Mbare to any route and they forced the drivers to carry ZANU-PF supporters to the rallies. One of the kombi drivers said, 'We followed the orders of the group because we did not want to lose our route permits or even losing the vehicles.'¹⁰ Many people opted to be passive because they feared the impact of violence they would come across therefore, they accepted the demands of the group.¹¹

The involvement of Mbare Police in Chipangano crusades put the residents in a difficult situation as they had nowhere to report their grievances. Conformity was fostered by the implication of Mbare Police in Chipangano operations. The situation in Mbare share some similarities with the case of the Mungiki group in Nairobi (Kenya) where the police in Nairobi knew the perpetrators and the patrons of political violence but they were reluctant to arrest them either because of insufficient evidence to connect them to the crime, bribery or their links with high profile politicians.¹² The situation in Mbare was convoluted by the fact that the state had proved to be the chief sponsor of violence. A vendor who contributed to this research said

⁷ Interview with an artisan from Siyaso by the author, Mbare, 03 August 2017.

⁸ J. McGregor, 'Surveillance and the City: Patronage, Power-sharing and the Politics of Urban Control in Zimbabwe', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 39, Issue 4, (2013), pp.749-763.

⁹ Interview with Precious Shumba by the author, Harare Residents Trust, 27 August 2017.

¹⁰ Interview with a Kombi driver by the author, Copa Cabana (Harare CBD), 05 August 2017.

¹¹ Interview with Edknowledge by the author, Heal Zimbabwe Trust, 21 July 2017.

¹² K. P. Njau, M. Mwagiru and O. Sana, *Facts about Majeshi ya Wazee*, Centre for Conflict Research, (2002).

that, “for one to continue to live in Mbare, you had to abide by the rules of the group because the Chipangano was the state.” A former police officer authenticated this when he said that;

The group [Chipangano] could patrol around Mbare District accusing and apprehending people for different crimes and handed them over to us at Stodart Police Station. I have personally seen this on several occasions. It was problematic because these people did not know anything about law and they ended up abusing people. The reality was that, it was beyond our powers to stop them because all the times they had the support of senior police officers.

Generally, most of the police officers were fed up with this ZANU-PF regime just like everyone else, but we were forced by circumstances to take orders to punish MDC followers. It was risky to be seen being openly professional when solving issues of political violence. If there was a minor suspicion that you were compassionate to opposition supporters, you could lose your job or be transferred. One of my friends who was an officer in charge for Matapi Police Station was given a short notice to go and work in Bindura as punishment for being kind-hearted to the opposition forces.¹³

Following the above narrative, it is perceptible that the residents had no alternative but to accept Chipangano legitimacy as the police was brazenly protecting the vigilantes. In tandem with this, the Human Rights Watch (HRW) mentioned that politicisation of the police force by ZANU-PF resulted in the systematic silencing and repression of the citizens.¹⁴ In this scheme of things, levels of human insecurity in Mbare were high because of the unreliability of Mbare police as the custodians of law and safety.¹⁵ The people lost trust in the police force as it candidly showed its bottomless alignment to the ZANU-PF government and it was working in collaboration with Chipangano vigilantes.

Conformity and silence was also cultivated by perfidy and partiality of the judiciary sector. The judiciary was blameworthy because it played a role in establishing a ‘conspiracy of silence’ through its bigoted and partisan stance on Chipangano issues. These opinions are analogous with Moyo’s assertion that the neutrality of the judiciary has been compromised since 2000.¹⁶

¹³ Interview with a former police officer by the author, Mbare, 04 August 2017

¹⁴ Human Rights Watch, “*Our Hands Are Tied*” *Erosion of the Rule of Law in Zimbabwe*. New York: Human Rights Watch, (2008b), p.1.

¹⁵ L. Sachikonye, *Curse of Political Violence: Time to break the cycle of terror*, (2012), pp.40-42.

¹⁶ R. Moyo, ‘The role of judges in addressing internal displacement A Case Study of Operation Murambatsvina (Clear the Filth) in Zimbabwe, 2005’, MA thesis. The Hague: International Institute of Social Studies, (2010).

The ruling party used diverse mechanisms to intimidate and vilify the judiciary officials who were unsympathetic to it.¹⁷ Carey et al asserted that in many countries political violence occur because the perpetrators are in positions of authority.¹⁸ One of the interviewees argued that people's efforts to file lawsuits against Chipangano had proved to be unsuccessful. The judiciary was disinclined to stamp out Chipangano crusades in Mbare because no further investigations were ever done after more than few atrocious cases associated with the group were tried. This implanted, in the minds of the residents, an impression that the group was impregnable and incontestable hence, silence and conformity was inculcated in the district.

Some people pretended to conform to Chipangano through feigning 'repentance' during the night meetings (*pungwes*) usually held at Matapi Flats. All the people who were assumed to be opposition supporter were forced to confess and repent in public. They were punished, embarrassed and scourged before they were accepted to be members of ZANU-PF.¹⁹ Owing to fear, many people made false confessions and denounced their own political parties in order to insulate themselves from Chipangano violence. Using Mvundura's words, 'repentance was motivated by the real or imagined fear and possibility' that Chipangano group was indispensable and it was a permanent ZANU-PF structure which Mbare residents were going to live with for lifelong.²⁰ Henceforth, repentance was a way to guarantee their security from violence especially for those people who were prominent supporters of the opposition parties.

The harassment, attacks and torture of lawyers taking on political lawsuits evoked what Neumann phrased as 'the spiral of silence' in Mbare district. The people could not speak up or take legal action against the group because scores of lawyers had dissociated themselves from political cases. The Law Society of Zimbabwe asserted that lawyers were uninterested to take up political cases as they dreaded the hazards connected with challenging ZANU-PF and Chipangano on behalf of MDC supporters.²¹ The Law Society of Zimbabwe also added that the police, on several occasions have proved to be unsupportive and inimical to the lawyers.²²

¹⁷ T. Reeler, *Subliminal terror? Human rights violation and torture in Zimbabwe during 2008*, Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSV), (2009), p.6.

¹⁸ S. C. Carey, M. Gibney and S. C. Poe, *The politics of human rights, The quest for dignity*, (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2010).

¹⁹ Interview with Tapiwa Chideme by the author, Mbare, 02 August 2017.

²⁰ W. Mvundura, *Memory and Violence: Displaced Zimbabwean Rural Communities Reliving the Memories of the March 2008 Political Violence*, Master's Thesis, (2014), p.55.

²¹ Comments made by Law Society of Zimbabwe President Beatrice Mtetwa, in an address to the England and Wales Law Society, London, October 2007, on file with ZLHR, reviewed August 29, 2008.

²² *Ibid.*

In so doing the Chipangano vigilantes escaped prosecution while the MDC activists became victims. Henceforth, this bigotry and partiality of the police entrenched silence and conformity in Mbare.

Despite silence and conformity that have been implanted in Mbare residents, there was a group of people who chose to take a confrontational stance against the Chipangano vigilantes. The following section examines how the people actively resisted vigilantism in the district.

Confrontational retort to Chipangano vigilantism

Some people of Mbare developed a deep hatred towards the ruling incumbents and Chipangano. This hatred is clearly revealed in the utterances of one of the participants who blissfully said that most of the notorious group members who engaged in violence faced God's wrath and died mysteriously because they were taking advantage of the situation to have sex with even HIV positive women.²³ The vigilantes took advantage of any slight opportunity of disorder to extort money from the public, plunder property, kill or maim supposed enemies of the ZANU-PF. Some also took advantage of the situation to rape women. The case of Mai Praise is one of the best examples which clearly shows that the group capitalised all the opportunities which enabled them to make money. The Chipangano vigilantes endeavored to control Mai Praise (a prophetess) because she had a lot of clients from different parts of Harare who were flocking to her shrine which was located in proximity to Mbare Bus Terminal. The vigilantes wanted to benefit out of her works and earn a living. One of the local vendor said, "The prophetess was charging only \$1 for one to get her service whilst the vigilante members charged up to US\$20 for one to jump the queue" in order to access the prophetess quicker. This angered the prophetess and she threatened to curse the Chipangano members for illicitly overcharging her clients. The prophetess was forced to leave Mbare because of Chipangano pressure. Some people said that the group threatened to kill her if she was going to continue to reside in Mbare.²⁴ Interviewees indicated that they detested the group's proclivities for benefitting out of every activity in the community. In all the occasions that I discussed with the participants, they divulged their resentment towards the group and the ruling party.

There is a group of people who resisted the Chipangano rule in the district. Most of these people were not business people and they were not benefitting from partisan business activities taking

²³ Interview with Merjury Zambuko by the author, at Majubheki/ Jo'burg Lines, 04 August 2017.

²⁴ Interview with Spiwe Ncube by the author, Alpha Media House (Harare CBD), 03 August 2017.

place in Mbare. Others were victims who had lost their business prospects merely because they were not ZANU-PF or failed to pay extortion fees. Some of traders challenged the group by refusing to pay the protection fees. One of the informants who chose anonymity said;

...when I was still operating in Mbare, the Chipangano vigilantes came to collect the protection fees and I plainly refused to pay because that I had not sold anything that day. The group took my stock which comprised of bags, shoes and clothes and they banned me from operating in Mbare. Some people who also challenged the group tried to involve the Harare City Council, but this did not solve anything. The Council appeared to be powerless in face of the vigilante group. ... My question is why were we paying protection fees in a free country like this? Protection from what? I felt very discontented because this group was taking advantage of the chaotic situation in the country to benefit economically. The group was committing injustices against the poor people of Mbare, so resistance was justified.²⁵

Edknowledge argued that some people disparaged the activities of the vigilantes in the area and declined to accept the legitimacy of Chipangano in the area. The main agenda of these people was to promote the observance of local council by-laws.²⁶ By-laws are an important part of running a city and in their absence, result in chaos and mayhem. Looking at the current state of Zimbabwe's capital, Harare, it is clear that the existence and adherence to city by-laws is now a thing of the past.²⁷ The critics of Chipangano wanted the Harare City Council to implement the city by-laws as they control the activities and modes of behavior in urban areas. They argued that cities with bylaws are characterized with a systematic way of operation and you hardly find individuals engaging in any activities which stimulates disorder as the law would not allow it.²⁸ One of the interviewees argued that chaos multiplied in the area because of the Harare City Council's reluctance to enact effectual regulations to bring back order in Mbare district. He went on to say;

The institution which legitimately controls Mbare is the Harare City Council. Chipangano claimed to be the rulers of Mbare but we don't know them. How can an area be controlled by thugs who don't even understand the law or development? The people

²⁵ Interview with Claud Mazarura by the author, at Matapi Hostels, 04 August 2017.

²⁶ Interview with Edknowledge by the author, Heal Zimbabwe Trust (HZT), 25 July 2017.

²⁷ Urban Councils Act, 2015 [Chapter 29:15], <http://www.zimllii.org/legislation/act>, Accessed on 08 November 2017.

²⁸ Interview with Tapiwa Chideme by the author, Mbare, 02 August 2017.

of Mbare witnessed the group taking over the duties of the council and they kept quiet and that's when the problem started. We wanted to end the Chipangano terror by bringing back the city by-laws. We clearly objected the rule of the Chipangano in Mbare.²⁹

These people wanted the Harare City Council to implement some regulations like the Harare (Hawkers) by-laws of May 2013, which was never put into action. Some argued that the by-laws were the only panacea to stop Chipangano vigilantism in the area. However, as alluded in the previous chapter, some of the council officials were accomplices in Chipangano activities and they profited enormously from extracting vending fees from the traders.

Some scholars argue that political violence or possibility of its occurrence lead to emigration especially during elections.³⁰ In the event of an outbreak of political violence most of the residents would migrate from the affected areas if it is a permanent or long-lasting conflict.³¹ Chipangano vigilantism made apprehensive citizens to relocate to other places which were relatively peaceful or safe. More than a few MDC-T supporters relocated other places like Harare South and Epworth after the 2008 elections due to fear and threats. The group's criminal proclivities such as property pillaging and rent seeking tendencies, were found to be burdensome by other people and they opted to move to other places free from Chipangano interferences. The vigilante violence injured and killed many opposition supporters and innocent persons, hence other people who were on target fled to the neighbouring countries.³² In support of this Claud Mazarura says;

I used to operate in Mbare but I left the place because of Jim Kunaka and his Chipangano youths who used to terrorise us and force us to pay protection fees. I am now staying in Budiro and doing business in town [Harare CBD] where there is less threats of Chipangano vigilantes. If you are to ask many people who formerly operated in Mbare who are now here in town, their response would be they were either chased away because of failing to pay protection fees or they made their own choices to leave. Not only the vendors and stall owners were affected by the Chipangano operations, but also those who lived in Mbare Hostels. I know many people who escaped from Mbare when they became the targets of the group. The hostel dwellers were paying rents to both Chipangano and the council. There were so many conditions attached for one to stay in these hostels and

²⁹ Interview with an MDC activist by the author, at his homestead in Mbare National, 02 August 2017.

³⁰ K. P. Njau, M. Mwangi & O. Sana, *Facts about Majeshi ya Wazee*, Centre for Conflict Research, (2002).

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² T. Reeler, *Subliminal terror? Human rights violation and torture in Zimbabwe during 2008*, Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSV), (2009).

the violation of these set of rules was perceived as undermining the rule of Chipangano. Many people left Mbare as a result of Chipangano operations.³³

The Solidarity Trust asserted that political and economic violence against MDC supporters had stimulated some forms of retribution by some people.³⁴ MDC supporters established some youth groups known as Democratic Resistance Committees (DRCs) with the intention to defend themselves. This was instigated by their leaders who encouraged them to fight back whenever they were attacked by ZANU-PF groups. This resonated with Martin Luther King Jr's words that, '... violence begets violence.'³⁵ Merjury Zambuko said that, "I witnessed many occasions where the MDC youths had confronted Chipangano vigilantes over unjust evictions of MDC enthusiasts... they tried to repossess properties taken by the vigilantes."³⁶ In support of this, Sachikonye asserted that in urban centres, the repossession of property, including housing, flared up into inter-party violence in which youths played a leading role.³⁷ It is alleged that the MDC-T youths assaulted Jim Kunaka (the leader of Chipangano) at a food court in Harare CBD.³⁸ In February 2011, MDC youths detonated a petrol bomb at Mbare's Siyaso market stalls and this was a clear sign of indignation triggered by the activities of the vigilantes in the district. In this respect, Mashingaidze confirmed that that the MDC youths adopted various strategies to avoid conceding all political space to the ruling party.³⁹ These strategies included engaging in 'collateral violence' which involved arson, destroying property, and beating ZANU-PF enthusiasts.⁴⁰ This is exemplified by the MDC youths' act of burning down ZANU-PF's Joshua Nkomo District Offices in Matapi which resulted in the destruction of property.⁴¹ This shows that the youths were being driven by the desire to revenge as the Chipangano vigilantes had burnt the MDC constituency office and harassed the party officials.

The MDC youths had adopted a Fanonian philosophy of violence for violence. Fanon, cited in Arendt, argued that violence is necessary to political action.⁴² MDC aligned youths believed

³³ Interview with Claud Mazarura by the author, Matapi Hostels, 04 August 2017.

³⁴ Solidarity Peace Trust, Punishing dissent, silencing citizens: The Zimbabwe elections 2008, Johannesburg, 21 May 2008, p.30.

³⁵ Washington State University, Martin Luther King Program, Famous Quotes on Nonviolence, mlk.wsu.edu/about-dr-king/famous-quotes/ Accessed on 16 December 2017.

³⁶ Interview with Merjury Zambuko by the author, Majubeki/ Jo'burg Lines, 04 August 2017.

³⁷ L. Sachikonye, *Curse of political violence: Time to break the cycle of terror*, (2012), p.42.

³⁸ *The Herald*, 15 February 2011.

³⁹ *Ibid*.

⁴⁰ T.M. Mashingaidze, 'Guardians of the nation or unruly disciples?' A critique of youth participation in post-colonial Zimbabwe's contested political spaces.' R. Bowd & A. B. Chikwanha (eds.) *Understanding Africa's contemporary conflicts Origins, challenges and peacebuilding*, Monograph 173, (2010), p.129.

⁴¹ *It was there for all to see/ Celebrating Being Zimbabwe, The Patriot*, 17 June 2011.

⁴² H. Arendt, *On Violence*, (Brace and World, New York, 1970).

that violence was a panacea to Chipangano violence in the district. On 14 February 2009, three days after Tsvangirai was sworn in as prime minister, the DRCs in Mbare engaged in retaliatory attacks (tit-for-tat attacks on ZANU-PF followers).⁴³ They attacked the hostel dwellers of Nenyere, Matapi, Shawasha and Tagarika Flats with the aim of repossessing their residence after being evicted by Chipangano group during 2008 elections.⁴⁴ This shows that, in Mbare, violence became a seesaw affair between MDC youths and Chipangano, although the former was always overpowered by the later which received back up from Mbare police.

Complementing the above, some events like the clash at Number 5 Ground (in February 2012) where the Chipangano group invaded the ground booked by MDC to do their rally, pushed the MDC youths to indulge in retaliatory violence. An eye-witness confirmed that;

When the MDC supporters arrived at the venue they saw the Chipangano youths playing soccer in the ground knowing that MDC had been given a police clearance to hold their rally there. The Chipangano vigilantes tried to scare away MDC supporters and violence started. On the same day, the police cancelled the MDC rally. The MDC youths were angered by this act, confronted the police arguing that ZANU-PF was holding rallies without any disturbances and many were arrested that day.⁴⁵

This clearly shows that the involvement of MDC supporters in violence was an aftereffect of Chipangano and Mbare police who repeatedly disrupted the activities of MDC. The existence of flagrant favouritism by the police force also made the MDC supporters to engage in vengeance. It can be argued that the police's partiality for Chipangano vigilantes coupled with harassment of the victims stimulated the desire to retaliate. One of the interviewees said the MDC youths learnt to engage in retaliatory violence because they could not fold their hands watching their loved ones and their elders being embarrassed and terrorised in public.⁴⁶

The public transport operators, at some point in time, also engaged in retaliatory violence. Their actions were clearly explained in the Conflict theory which asserted that some groups can dominate others and win for themselves a disproportionate share of the society's political power, which includes wealth and privileges in the society at the expense of less powerful ones. According to the Conflict theory, powerful groups incriminate the activities of the less

⁴³ C. Sithole, 'MDC Supporters Takes Revenge,' *Centre for Security Studies*, www.css.ethz.ch/article.html?pdf, Accessed on 22 December 2017.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ Interview with anonymous, Mbare Post Office, 20 July 2017.

⁴⁶ Interview with anonymous, at Jo'burg Lines Flats, 22 July 2017.

powerful groups while they protect their selfish interests and such situations create violence.⁴⁷ Chipangano vigilantes who operated at Mbare Musika took advantage of the disorder in the area and seized all the open spaces and established car parks. This action deprived many transport operators and vendors from their sources of livelihood because they were either denied access to the bus terminal or told to relocate to Highfields. Consequently, this gave rise to some violent clashes (in 2011) between the bus operators and the space barons belonging to Chipangano group. One of the drivers said, 'We had to fight back because the group had a tendency of vandalising or burning down the vehicles.'⁴⁸ Combined Harare Residents Association (CHRA) asserted that the Chipangano group were given an unregulated right to own municipal infrastructure and were provided immunity whenever they violated human rights or denied economic prospects to other residents on political basis, this was left unchecked thereby, resulting in episodes of violence.⁴⁹

There is a group of opposition supporters who lobbied the MDC-T to file a lawsuit against the members of Chipangano. One of the informants said, 'Immediately after the 2008 Runoff, we went to Harvest House and we told Mr Solomon Madzore (the then chairperson of MDC-T Youth Assembly) to help us to stop the Chipangano group in Mbare by suing it.'⁵⁰ This was done as a direct response after the group had murdered Shepherd Bandau (an MDC-T member) and beaten up many MDC-T activists. Solomon Madzore confirmed that the group had injured and traumatised a score of MDC members and it was time for the party to take legal actions as a preventive measure against further attacks.⁵¹ MDC-T chose to take the matter directly to the courts because the police was not taking any actions whenever the Chipangano group perpetrated violence.⁵²

Other victims of Chipangano vigilantism appealed to Non-Governmental Organisations such as the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum and Zimbabwe Human Rights Lawyers Association (ZHRL), for help. The case of Prince Jack cogently shows the role of Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum in helping the victims of political violence in Mbare;

⁴⁷ W. Mvundura, *Memory and violence: Displaced Zimbabwean Rural Communities Reliving the Memories of the March 2008 political violence*, M A Thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, Centre for Migration and Politics, (2014).

⁴⁸ Interview with a bus driver by the author, Mbare Bus Terminal, 02 August 2017.

⁴⁹ Combined Harare Residents Association, *Chipangano violence in Mbare*, 02 March 2015.

⁵⁰ SW Radio Africa, *Battered MDC-T youth to sue Chipangano*, 13 September 2011.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² *Ibid.*

With the help of his lawyers from Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Prince Jack filed a lawsuit against Jim Kunaka who had assaulted him on 16 September 2008, during the night, accusing him of being part of the MDC group that had marched around Mbare District the previous day. He sustained numerous injuries and suffered excruciating pain on the elbow and chin. Jim Kunaka and his Chipangano barred him from getting medical treatment and they threatened to kill him if he tried to visit any clinic or hospital. Jack, through his lawyers from the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, won a default judgment following Kunaka's failure to respond to the 2009 summons. Jack claimed \$4 000 from Kunaka for the damages and he did not bother to file a response. Recently, Jim Kunaka lost most of his household furniture for Prince Jack's case. The High Court ordered the deputy sheriff to attach Kunaka's movable property in order to settle the case.⁵³

Some Mbare inhabitants also confirmed that they sought help from Zimbabwe Human Rights Lawyers Association. They mentioned that Tawanda Zhuwarara (one of lawyers belonging to the association) was very helpful in assisting them in their court cases against the Chipangano group. Isheanesu Maribha and Gwezuva Changamire, who worked for Mashwede Diesel Services as General Manager and sales personnel respectively, also opened a court case against Jim Kunaka and Chipangano for deterring the construction of their service station. Kunaka had sent gunpowder to Maribha and Changamire demanding a protection fee so as to allow them to proceed with the construction.⁵⁴ Stendrick Zvorwadza also took his case to the court after being unfairly arrested and assaulted by Mbare Police. He had gone to report a case against Chipangano members who disrupted him while installing paraffin tanks in the area, and the police victimised him.⁵⁵ This shows that the people of Mbare reacted differently to Chipangano vigilantism.

The activities of Chipangano vigilantes discouraged many people from participating in elections. The group was mandated to disrupt the electoral and democratic processes through intimidating and disempowering of political dissents. Tapiwa Chideme said that, "we could not

⁵³ Nehanda Radio, 'Zimbabwe Lawyers takes on Chipangano thugs,' 13 September 2012. <http://nehandaradio.com/2012/09/13/zimbabwe-lawyers-take-on-chipangano-thugs/>, Accessed on 03/09/17. Also see Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, *Chipangano leader's property attached over assault* 08 June 2015.

⁵⁴ 'Jim Kunaka demanded money,' *Daily News*, 30 November 2012, <https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2012/11/30/jim-kunaka-demanded-money>. Accessed 03 September 2017.

⁵⁵ Restoration of Human Rights Zimbabwe, *Report 2008*.

go and vote because elections in Zimbabwe are meaningless owing to violence perpetrated by state sanctioned Chipangano and whoever wins we lose.”⁵⁶ During the 2008 elections, Chipangano youths stationed at Matapi Flats close to a polling station, singing ZANU-PF songs. This was a violation of electoral laws that prohibits campaigning within a 100-meter radius of a polling station.⁵⁷ Scores of people decided not to take part in ballot process hence the voters turnout decreased in Mbare. One informant said that she wanted to work at a polling station, but she deserted the job because of Chipangano violence.⁵⁸ The operations of Chipangano vigilantes in Mbare frustrated the residents as the MDC (the rightful winner of the Mbare constituency) was denied its right to absolutely control the district.

Passive resistance against Chipangano vigilantism was also evident in Mbare District. This was mainly done by some vendors who wanted to avoid paying protection fees to the group. Street vendors adopted new strategies like the use of clandestine languages (e.g. whistling, use of sign language etc.) when the group came to collect protection fees in their areas of operation. One of the vendors attested that when they heard or saw the signal they would run with their wares and hide until the group left the area.⁵⁹ Some pretended to be disabled for instance, feigning to be deaf, so as to get sympathy from the vigilantes.⁶⁰ In some places where there was tight security during the day, the vendors would go and do their business during the night when both the vigilantes and council police had finished their duties. It is clear that people resisted the jurisdiction of Chipangano in diverse ways.

Bewitchment as a response to vigilantism

Clark avers that to rebuild a community after violence there is a need to punish the perpetrators, but the healing of victims requires much more than punishment.⁶¹ Some victims of Chipangano violence sought to avenge Chipangano injustices by appealing to the spiritual world. Merjury Zambuko revealed that family ‘A’ involved a witchdoctor (*Godobori*) to make the perpetrators mentally disoriented or die. The witchdoctor invoked the spirit of the deceased so as to make him avenge his death. She confirmed that this action worked because many of the notorious

⁵⁶ Interview with Tapiwa Chideme by the author, Mbare, 02 August 2017.

⁵⁷ Government of Zimbabwe, *Constitution of Zimbabwe*, www.parliamentofzimbabwe.gov. Accessed 03 September 2017

⁵⁸ Interview with anonymous by the author, Mbare, 02 August 2017.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ P. Clark, ‘Hybridity, Holism, and Traditional Justice: The Case of the Gacaca Courts in Post-Genocide Rwanda’, *George Washington International Law Review*. Vol. 39, No.765, (2007), p.48.

vigilantes who had killed 'X' from family 'A' died mysteriously.⁶² This form of response has been explicitly explained in Hamber and Wilson's notion on retributive justice when they postulated that punishment and retribution can also be a means of laying the wandering spirits of those who have been brutally killed to rest.⁶³ In Zimbabwe, seeking revenge through bewitchment is an appropriate and rightful act which the revenging family cannot be prosecuted for and 'it is within the realm of the dead and it links the living survivors with the dead.'⁶⁴ It also makes the perpetrator's family seek recourse with the wronged family and do the required rituals and paying reparations for the tormenting spirit to be exorcised from the wrongdoer.

Moreover, in Zimbabwe accusing anyone of witchcraft is forbidden by the law, therefore, this is regarded as a safest way of revenging as the bewitcher cannot be charged with any criminal offence. Since the bewitcher is not made accountable, bewitchment is less likely to invite some counterattack from perpetrators. In line with this, in 2008, the then Vice President of Zimbabwe, Joice Mujuru advised the perpetrators of violence who had been bewitched to go and seek spiritual recourse with the offended family as the state could not fight the avenging spirits.

Conclusion

The process of Zanufication and monopolisation of public sphere by Chipangano was met with diverse responses which range from conformity, passive resistance to activism. The enigmatic nature of Chipangano vigilantism and its connection with the ZANU-PF government forced scores of people to insulate themselves from violence through conforming to the vigilantes. Conforming to Chipangano entails having pro-ZANU-PF thinking and participating in all party activities. Known opposition enthusiasts feigned repentance and allegiance to the group. Simultaneously, people devised survival techniques to avoid the vigilantes and protection fees in Mbare business zones and these comprised of feigning allegiance, doing business during the night when the vigilantes were gone, use of clandestine languages and feigning to be disabled.

The callousness of Chipangano vigilantism made the victims or relatives of the victims to engage in retribution. Continuous attacks on MDC supporters forced the victims to involve in

⁶² Interview with Merjury Zambuko by the author, at Jo'burg Lines Flats, 04 August 2017.

⁶³ B. Hamber, B., and R. A. Wilson, 'Symbolic closure through memory, reparation and revenge in post-conflict societies'. *Journal of Human Rights*, Vol.1, No. 1, (2002), pp.35-53.

⁶⁴ W. Mvundura, *Memory and violence: Displaced Zimbabwean Rural Communities Reliving the Memories of the March 2008 political violence*. M A Thesis, Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand, Centre for Migration and Politics, 2014, p.80.

acts of ‘collateral violence’ which included arson, vandalising property and beating ZANU-PF enthusiasts. The Case of Mbare showed that vigilantism can result in forced migrations. It also revealed that state sanctioned vigilantism can also discourage people from engaging in electoral process. The next chapter examines how Chipangano violence is understood and interpreted today. It examines the government’s efforts in trying to heal the victims of Chipangano and the relationship between former Chipangano members and the community.

CHAPTER 6

Reminiscences of Chipangano violence

Introduction

The preceding chapter focused on the responses of Mbare inhabitants to Chipangano vigilantism. This section broadens the discussion and reflects on the reminiscences or memories of Chipangano violence. Memory studies help us to examine the ‘various issues at the forefront of contemporary political debate particularly, the effects of the past hurts in the present.’¹ Chipangano vigilantism entailed humiliation, undermining human worthiness and chronic injuries and this made it difficult to be easily forgotten. This chapter is based on interpretive and retrospective reflections on Chipangano vigilantism and it seeks to know how Chipangano violence is remembered and interpreted today by the residents of Mbare. This chapter will go on to examine the role played by government organisations such as the Organ of National Healing Reconciliation and Integration (ONHRI) and Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC) in healing the victims of Chipangano violence. The relationship between the community and the former members of Chipangano will also be interrogated.

Memories of vigilantism, terror and impunity in Mbare

According to Amadiume and An-Naim, “A people who do not preserve their memory are people who have forfeited their history”.² My field notes and the interviewees’ narratives were indicative that Chipangano violence was still vivid in the minds of the residents of Mbare. The group’s perturbing deeds such as abductions, maiming, killings, beatings and intimidations cannot be forgotten easily unless one has suffered a brain tumour.³ In other words, the group’s activities were so disquieting that they continuously affected people psychologically.

In the District, the Carter House and Paget House (the organising points) were considered as symbols of Chipangano rule. All kinds of acrimonious activities ranging from rape to torture were committed in these buildings. One of the interviewees pronounced that, “As long as the Carter House and Paget House still exist the memories of Chipangano’s atrocities are difficult

¹ S. Radstone, ‘Memory studies: For and against’, *Memory Studies*, Vol. 1, No.1, (2008), pp.31-39.

² I. Amadiume, and A. An-Na’im. *The Politics of Memory –Truth, Healing & Social Justice*. (Zed Books, London 2000), p.31.

³ Interview with Kudakwashe Mazambani by the author, Mbare, 03 August 2017.

to erase.”⁴ The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCPJ) alluded that this area is adjacent to the place where a number of people, particularly those who were HIV positive, collected their anti-retroviral drugs (ARVs).⁵ The place was so unapproachable and inhospitable that some of the victims of violence were afraid to go and collect their drugs.⁶ Scores of people lost their loved ones due to this climate of fear created by the vigilantes. A cross examination of this issue revealed that, ‘a sight of the Carter House brings back the memories of oozing blood, tortured people and cries of agony.’⁷ This is a clear indication that Chipangano violence was still etched on the minds of the residents.

Undeniably, the victims of politically-motivated rape lucidly remember Chipangano violence. The participants revealed that the Chipangano crusades that engulfed Mbare District fuelled the spreading of HIV/AIDS. A hawker commonly known as Mbuya Nehanda⁸, a victim of Chipangano rape, was sexually abused by twelve members of the group and plainly attested to the public that she became HIV positive. The way Mbuya Nehanda recalled Chipangano vigilantism is embedded in the following interview extract;

I will never forgive those chaps who raped me for my political affiliations. They destroyed my life. The atrocity which they committed against me is unforgivable even in heaven. Look! I am now surviving on medication and I am no longer able to do what I used to do for the well-being of my family. Chipangano took away my happiness and good health and inflicted a permanent scar in my life.⁹

Following Mbuya Nehanda’s remarks, it is clear that the heart-rending activities of the vigilantes cannot be forgotten and forgiven easily. The victims of politically motivated rape were suffering from the lifelong effects of rape. Mbuya Nehanda showed that she was being devastated by physical, emotional and psychological effects of rape. Taking a cue from Mayhew *et al*’s argument, it is clear Chipangano violence had several intangible costs which included pain, loss of quality of life and suffering.¹⁰ Thus, an unnamed victim in Eastaer argued

⁴ Interview with Tapiwa Chideme by the author, Mbare, 02 August 2017.

⁵ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, A Plea to Politicians: Respect Human Rights and Dignity for Mbare Residents, Statement on Mbare Violence.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ Interview with anonymous by the author, at Paground Flea market in Mbare, 25 July 2017.

⁸ She was called Mbuya Nehanda because she was punished for her political affiliations and the desire to liberate Zimbabwe from the ZANU-PF government.

⁹ Interview with Mbuya Nehanda by the author, Harare CBD, 20 July 2017.

¹⁰ P. Mayhew and G. Adkins, ‘Counting the costs of crime in Australia’, *Trends and Issues Paper No. 247*, (2003).

that, 'rape is not just physical violence, it is also mental violence and it is not easily forgotten.'¹¹ Incontrovertibly, the group members have inflicted excruciating scars in the lives of the victims.

Edknowledge pronounced that the residents of Mbare were having traumatic memories and they needed a symbolic closure or healing. The magnitude of violence that was found in Mbare was terrific, as Chipangano would destroy anything they considered unacceptable. The Human Rights Watch (HRW) argued that Mbare was volatile because of the punitive activities of Chipangano vigilantes who made the district unapproachable and uninhabitable to known opposition supporters.¹² The residents have been traumatised by the acts of destroying the market stalls, their loved ones being killed, people being taken to Carter House, abducted and beaten for days without being known of their whereabouts, and some being tortured then surrendered to the police.

The involvement of the police in Chipangano activities and their unspoken approval of the group's activities, created a terrible situation to the citizens as they had nowhere to get protection. The victims argued that they were disturbed and distressed when the state structures especially the police clearly showed some duplicities through working hand in glove with the vigilante group. The residents lived in despair as the public protectors had neglected their duties to serve the interests of ZANU-PF politicians. In connection with this Edknowledge said;

I remember when I went to rescue people who had been beaten by Chipangano. Instead of arresting the perpetrators, the officer in-charge wanted to arrest me and other JOMIC officials. The police, that day, arrested many victims of violence leaving the perpetrators to go scot-free.¹³

Generally, a family house is the securest place that can offer a haven for individuals, but in Mbare it became a trapping snare. The Chipangano vigilantes had some capabilities of forcing their way into private property of those with alternative political mind-sets, confiscating household goods and other personal properties.¹⁴ Scores of people who were assumed to be

¹¹ P. Eastal, *Voices of the Survivors*. (Spinifex Press, North Melbourne, 1994), p.99.

¹² HRW Human Rights Watch, "*Our Hands Are Tied*" *Erosion of the Rule of Law in Zimbabwe*, (Human Rights Watch, New York, 2008), p.25.

¹³ Interview with Edknowledge by the author, Heal Zimbabwe Trust (HZT), 21 July 2017.

¹⁴ CCJP, *A Plea to Politicians: Respect Human Rights and Dignity for Mbare Residents*. Statement on Mbare Violence.

opposition supporters were evicted from their homes and replaced with ZANU-PF supporters. The following extract distinctly exhibits how other victims remembered Chipangano vigilantism;

When we deliberated about Chipangano, I remember the moment when the group broke into my house, assaulted me and my children and threw my possessions outside the house. I was saddened and frightened by such inhumane action because it was raining and I had nowhere to go. I slept in the street with my children for more than few days. We had nothing to eat nor cover ourselves with, the group had stolen some of my property and provisions.¹⁵

Drawing from the foregoing remarks, the group had pushed some people into destitution and indigence. Therefore, it is pellucid that the victims of Chipangano vigilantism cannot easily forget the afflictions that have been perpetrated on them by the group.

As already mentioned in the preceding chapters, the economic hardships faced by the country have made the residents of Mbare to hinge on vending opportunities. The Chipangano group availed all economic opportunities in the district and distributed them on partisan basis. Amidst tense but implicit political violence, the group politicised the vending positions and flea market tables. Tapiwa Chideme mentioned that, ‘2005 is a memorable year because that is when the Chipangano took full control of the vending sites and the flea markets with the help of Tendai Savanhu (the then City Commissioner).’¹⁶ Many people who were alleged to be opposition enthusiasts lost their businesses. The group’s politics of exclusion made many families suffer from poverty. The increase in unemployment rate in the country made people to become hopeless, but they were salvaged by informal economic activities that proved to be lucrative in the district. Most of the interviewees whom I questioned how they remember the Chipangano vigilantism, pointed to the group’s action appropriating their economic prospects and reallocating them to ZANU-PF supporters.

The Chipangano violence also caused family fragmentation. Families have broken down due to the death of the father (who is, especially in Zimbabwe, the breadwinner). The absence of the father also contributed in the emergence of immoral behaviours such as thuggery and prostitution in a bid to earn a living.¹⁷ Some families were forced to separate as the father (in

¹⁵ Interview with a victim of Chipangano violence by the author, Mbare, 02 August 2017.

¹⁶ Interview with Tapiwa Chideme by the author, Mbare, 02 August 2017.

¹⁷ Interview with Merjury Zambuko by the author, Jo’burg Lines, 25 August 2017.

most cases) was chased away from the district. This is evident in the CCPJ report which asserted that, families have broken due to violence, and some men had to go and see their families at night to avoid being caught by the politically dogmatic groups like Chipangano.¹⁸ This assertion was reinforced by Tapiwa Chideme who said there are some individuals who were banished from Mbare and they left their families.¹⁹ This slackened the family bonds as others did not come back for their families. One of the interviewees confirmed that her husband was given a ban by the group and she is wondering whether he is still alive or dead because they lost contact. She added, “the vigilantes destroyed the future of my innocent children and I cannot stop thinking about this kind of cruelty they did to me.”²⁰ The above confirmations clearly divulge that the activities of the vigilantes had far reaching and perturbing consequences particularly on the stability of the families in Mbare. Henceforth, it can be argued that the devastation of the future of many families is indubitably difficult for the victims to forget.

According to the participants, there is nothing painful and nerve-wrecking as having no information about the fate of, and anticipating and wishing for their disappeared loved ones to come back and re-join them. Suarez-Orozco has given an interestingly illuminating case study of politically motivated disappearances in Argentina and proven how disappearances and the absence of corpses to be buried generates an ontological uncertainty amongst the survivors and a psychosomatic experience termed by Freud as ‘uncanny.’²¹ This conception encapsulates the general difficulties undergone by the survivors who grieve without a corpse, ‘the uncanny feeds on uncertainty (Is he/she alive? Is he/she dead?).’²² Suarez-Orozco stated that in Argentina, following disappearances, the offices and bedrooms of the victims were maintained as they were at the time of the incident, while the survivors expect their reappearance.²³ Correspondingly, in Northern Ireland, several families that experienced disappearances did not tidy the apartments of their disappeared relatives.²⁴ The above scenarios share some similarities with a case which occurred in Mbare. An anonymous interviewee recounted that her brother disappeared in 2005 after he had an altercation with Chipangano vigilantes and he did not come

¹⁸ CCPJ, A Plea to Politicians: Respect Human Rights and Dignity for Mbare Residents. Statement on Mbare Violence, 2012.

¹⁹ Interview with Tapiwa Chideme by the author, Mbare, 02 August 2017.

²⁰ Interview with a victim of Chipangano violence by the author, 02 August 2017.

²¹ M. Suarez-Orozco, ‘The Heritage of Enduring a Dirty War: Psychological Aspects of Terror in Argentina’, *The Journal of Psychohistory*. Vol 18, No.4, (1991), p.491.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ B. Hamber, and R. A. Wilson, ‘Symbolic closure through memory, reparation and revenge in post-conflict societies’, *Journal of Human Rights*, Vol 1, No.1, (2002), pp.35-53.

back till now. Since his disappearance no one was allowed to touch his belongings and in 2010 a funeral service without a corpse was held after overhearing some rumours that he was dead.²⁵ She said that despite all these rumours, her family still believes that he is still alive and he will show up one day and re-join them. Therefore, it is clear that the relatives of the disappeared were left in a difficult situation in which they were still optimistic that their loved ones would re-join them one day. Using Hamber and Wilson's inferences, some of the victims in Mbare were living in a state of denial (still in a liminal space) as they were failing to accept and incorporate loss into the functioning of everyday life.²⁶

An MDC-T activist asserted that Chipangano vigilantism cannot lapse in the minds of Mbare residents as the group had undermined human dignity and worthiness.²⁷ The victims of Chipangano violence mentioned that they were punished for their democratic rights of partaking in political associations of their choice. Zimbabwe Peace Project (ZPP) confirmed that people's constitutional rights were violated and they were punished for their beliefs and choices.²⁸ An MDC activist asked some questions, "Do you think a person (and his relatives, family, friends etc.) who had his jaw broken during Chipangano violence would ever forget what the group has done to him? Or does he forget the face of the person who injured him?"²⁹ He went on to say people did not forget what Chipangano and ZANU-PF did to them. To him the repeated defeat of ZANU-PF in Mbare since 2000 is attributed to people's remembrance of the reign of terror caused by ZANU-PF and Chipangano in the district since Ali Khan Manjengwa's time. He concluded by saying that people's silence about Chipangano vigilantism is because of fear but it does not mean that they have forgotten.

Noteworthy was the reinvention of the liberation-war like *bases* or camps in Mbare District during the 2008 presidential run-off. Pineal Denga said that several bases were created in Mbare in a bid to intimidate and to assault defectors who had voted for the opposition party.³⁰ Precious Shumba also agreed that, people were divided into segments, bases were created all over the district and people will never forget that they slept at these bases, chanting slogans, singing revolutionary songs and marching in the streets.³¹ Interestingly these bases were called

²⁵ Interview with anonymous by the author, Jo'burg Lines Flats, 22 July 2017.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ Interview with an MDC activist by the author, at Matapi Hostel, Mbare, 02 July 2017.

²⁸ Zimbabwe Peace Project (ZPP), *Monthly Monitor*, February 2012.

http://www.kubatana.net/docs/hr/zpp_monthly_monitor_feb_2012_120330.pdf, Accessed on 18 August 2017.

²⁹ Interview with an MDC activist by the author, at Matapi Hostel, Mbare, 02 August 2017.

³⁰ Interview with Pineal Denga by the author, Fantasyland Chicken Inn, Harare CBD, 27 July 2017.

³¹ Interview with Precious Shumba by the author, Harare Residents Trust (HRT), 27 July 2017.

re-education camps but in reality, they were torture camps. The Chipangano group behaved outrageously during the re-education meetings usually held during the evening and it was as brutal as Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) guerrillas.³² Baba Chimhutu recounts that, “The actions of the group evoked the memories of how my father was killed by the ZANLA forces in 1976.”³³ A liberation war-like situation was created by the group with the aim of coercing the people to vote for Mugabe in the presidential run-off. The horrors that were witnessed by the people at a base that was near Matapi Flats left many people in trauma. One of the participants pronounced;

We watched helplessly when our loved ones were being assaulted and tortured by the group. We saw blood and tears of innocent people, young and old, oozing. The imageries of shredded human flesh and broken joints are still embedded in my mind. Whenever I reminisce about the 2008 run-off election, the cries of guiltless and harmless people overwhelm me.³⁴

The interviewees argued that the most difficult thing to forget is the gruesome and harrowing situations caused by the group. There was still plenty of living proof of people who have been injured or abducted and the scenes where violence was taking place and this always invokes the memories of Chipangano violence.

Precious Shumba argued that the Chipangano violence remained vivid in the memories of Mbare residents, particularly what happened during the 2008 presidential runoff election. He said the residents remember that some people were beaten up, picked up from their houses early in the morning, during the day or evening and people who would have gone to the shops were forced to clean the shopping centres.³⁵ During the night, people were forced to run from Mbare Musika to Mupedzanhamo, from Mupedzanhamo passing by the police station along Adbennie Road getting into Seventh Street, across Mhlanga past Rubatika, turning into Phiri, going up to Runyararo, get into Daniel Street and then into Simon Mazorodze. They would then go to Mbirimi, chanting and singing the revolutionary songs and there were bases throughout.³⁶ The Majubeki people would know that they would go to Gwinyai Primary School to the offices during the night singing and chanting slogans. People from Third Street just facing Harare High would spend the night camped at Carter House where they would be

³² Interview with Baba Chimhutu by the author, Magaba Hostels, 02 August 2017.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ Interview with a witness of Chipangano violence by the author, Matapi Hostels, Mbare, 05 August 2017.

³⁵ Interview with Precious Shumba by the author, Harare Residents Trust (HRT), 27 August 2017.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

chanting slogans and dancing and receiving people who were supposedly defecting from the MDC.³⁷ During this time, the residents were deprived of sleep. All this was being done to bring the people of Mbare in to submission through coercion. Therefore, it is clear from the above evidence that the dreadful situation that was created by the group would remain difficult for the residents to put out of their minds.

The situation in Mbare was further complicated by the reality that the victims shared a physical and social space with the alleged perpetrators who did not face any trial, conviction or retribution because of assumed collusion with the state and high-ranking politicians. Das and Kleinman substantiated this when they maintained that one of the most disquieting features of political violence is when it has occurred between social actors who live in the same social worlds and know or thought they knew each other.³⁸ A daily interface between the wrong-doer and wronged, without any form of mediation, truce, reparation or simply some hope for them, deepens and precipitates feelings of hatred, despair, resentment, mistrust and betrayal.³⁹ One of the interviewees argued that the Chipangano violence cannot fade in people's minds because there are some victims who have developed an obsession that justice should take its course to the perpetrator whom they unavoidably interact with every day. Radstone and Hodgkin aver that when a victim and perpetrator reside in the same locality during or after the violence, a mere sight of the perpetrator may evoke, in the victim, some symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder such as recollections or intrusive memories of the gruesome details of the atrocious act.⁴⁰ Following the above scholarly views, it is plausible to assert that, some victims in the district were suffering from socio-psychological effects because they were inevitably seeing and mingling with the vigilantes who had taken them hostage, murdered their loved ones or destroyed their sources of livelihood, almost every day.

According to Durkheim's anomie theory, political violence that involves community member versus community member makes the victims feel absolutely betrayed and disenchanting especially given that they initially had the belief that they were brought together by shared

³⁷ Interview with Precious Shumba by the author, Harare Residents Trust (HRT), 27 July 2017.

³⁸ V. Das & A. Kleinman, 'Introduction' in V. Das, A. Kleinman, M. Ramphela and P. Reynolds (eds.) *Violence and Subjectivity*. (University of California Press, London 2000).

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ L. Passerini, 'Memories Between Silence and Oblivion', in K. Hodgkin and S. Radstone (eds.) *Memory, History, Nation: Contested Pasts*. (New Brunswick/ London 1987). See also M. Q. Patton, *How to Use Qualitative Methods in Evaluation*. (Sage Publications, New Delhi, 2006).

values such as justice and preserving life.⁴¹ In line with the above argument, an extract from an interview with Baba Chimhutu clearly divulges how the people of Mbare remember the Chipangano violence;

Most of the Chipangano youths are younger than my first born. To me it feels like we begat these children to torment us. These children have betrayed us because instead of enhancing our lives through new ideas, they turned out to be the enemies of the community. They only need *Chibuku* (opaque beer) for them to commit all these atrocities on behalf of the ZANU-PF officials. The most excruciating thing is that most of these perpetrators are not outsiders, they are from here [Mbare] and we see each other every day. We interact with them especially at funerals or in the Rufaro Stadium when there is a match.⁴²

Consequently, a sense of community spirit can be broken due to the emergence of deep hatred, mistrust and feelings of betrayal. In this respect, Precious Shumba said, “I know people who were coming from churches who were assailed by the people whom they know.”⁴³ Therefore, it is logical to argue that it is difficult for the victims to easily forget the violence they encountered because most of the perpetrators were not strangers and they interacted with them every day. To the victims, it feels like they were betrayed by their fellow family members.

There were other victims who regarded Chipangano violence as an unfinished business and there was a need for reprisal. Some victims (and relatives and families) were fixated in the spirit of vengeance because no catharsis or closure was done to solve the differences between the perpetrators and the victims. Tapiwa Chideme said that since the government was not interested in resolving the issue of Chipangano violence, individuals would think of settling these issues on their own.⁴⁴ Most respondents stated that they experienced mortifications in the various acts of the Chipangano vigilantes. One of the respondents gave a horrid experience of the humiliation which he went through as the group physically assailed him and he was left nude in the public. Mvundura argued that it is often easier to forget physical pain than to forget humiliation.⁴⁵ Interviewees have confirmed that the group humiliated the residents in countless

⁴¹ S. R. Marks, ‘Durkheim’s Theory of Anomie’. *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 80, No. 2, (1974), pp. 329-363.

⁴² Interview with Baba Chimhutu, Magaba Hostel, 02 August 2017.

⁴³ Interview with Precious Shumba by the author, Harare Residents Trust (HRT), 27 July 2017.

⁴⁴ Interview with Tapiwa Chideme by the author, at his homestead in Mbare, 02 August 2017.

⁴⁵ W. Mvundura, *Memory and violence: Displaced Zimbabwean Rural Communities Reliving the Memories of the March 2008 political violence*, M A Thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, Centre for Migration and Politics, (2014), p.45.

occasions using diverse methods. One of the interviewees said there was a couple which was forced to do copulation in public.⁴⁶ The group could beat parents in the sight of their own children. During the *pungwes*, (night meetings) usually held near Matapi Flats, those who were perceived as defectors were beaten and scorned in public and forced to confess and repent.

During my fieldwork, there are some people who found a way to circumvent deliberating about Chipangano violence arguing that they did not want to evoke the nightmares of the past. Cabera confirmed that those who resist remembering may be hesitant of re-opening the wounds of the past.⁴⁷ Still, it is not a foregone conclusion that negating the past may lead to the closure of the wounds. One of the participants who wanted to contribute to this study told me that;

I wanted to help you with my experiences but I can't because if I cogitate about the Chipangano group, what they did to me when I wanted to do vending near Carter House and what they did to my family, I feel disheartened. I lost my loved ones because of this group. I can't help you my son, I don't want to think about the ghosts of the past.⁴⁸

According to Cabrera, forgiving and forget is always a tantalising option (given by the major role players of violence) but sooner or later, it may prove to be unsustainable in the long-term.⁴⁹ Most of the respondents agree with Tapiwa Chideme who said the vigilante activities in the district were tear-jerking, and like a stone in the eye, it was unbearable and hard to forget.

In search of Closure: the role of ONHRI and JOMIC in healing the residents of Mbare

The Zimbabwean society and Mbare district in particular has been traumatised and polarised because of ZANU-PF's culture of violence thus there was a need for an effective reconciliation framework. According to Assefa, 'reconciliation provides a social space for the acknowledgement of past trauma, expression of grief, anger and loss that is entrenched in the memory of injustice.'⁵⁰ The Mugabe regime wanted reconciliation without truth-telling and this was visible since the attainment of independence when he implemented his 'forgive and forget' type of reconciliation. This was encapsulated in Mugabe's speech in 1980 when he said,

⁴⁶ Interview with Baba Chimhutu by the author, at Magaba Hostels, 02 August 2017.

⁴⁷ R. Cabrera, 'Should we Remember? Historical Memory in Guatemala, in Hamber', B. (ed.) *Past Imperfect: Dealing with the Past in Northern Ireland and Societies in Transition*, (INCORE/University of Ulster, Londonderry, 1998), pp 25-30.

⁴⁸ A conversation with anonymous, at Construction Building, 23 July 2017.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ H. Assefa, *The meaning of Reconciliation*, (European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation, Utrecht, 2006), p.26.

“we should forgive and forget what happened in the past...”⁵¹ Most of the complexities that were faced by the nation in the post-independence era can be attributed to Mugabe’s reconciliation concept of 1980s. Yet, the same mistake was repeated during the Gukurahundi⁵² and the time of the Government of National Unity (GNU), the ZANU-PF politicians learnt nothing and forgot nothing. In this respect, Crowley asked the questions; ‘Can the past be dealt with by disposing of it? What would it mean to handle it effectively?’⁵³ The regime should have drawn some lessons on reconciliation and justice from other countries like South Africa, El Salvador, Rwanda etc. Goredema *et al* argued that, ‘reconciliation is not a practical concept especially where issues that have to be addressed covers decades, or centuries back.’⁵⁴

Many scholars concur that truth-telling is a prerequisite of reconciliation and justice as it seats at the crossroads of the past and the future. CCJPZ argues that the evils committed to humanity should be acknowledged and as far as possible corrected to avoid the recurrence of such events.⁵⁵ The case of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and Rwandan *gacaca* system were successful because of the idea of truth telling, practicability and therapeutic qualities which were associated with them.⁵⁶

Nietzsche depicted that a gloomy violent past is an imperceptible burden that prevents the victims and survivors from wholly living in the present.⁵⁷ Nietzsche’s observation can be considered as groundwork for the hypothesis of remembering and forgetting which specifically focuses on the significance of suffering and pain via-a-vis the connection between past and present. It is imperative to argue that harrowing and perturbing events like Chipangano violence required a closure of the past for the perpetrators, victims and survivors to move on. As Mbire points out, reconciliation occurs through an exchange of the truths.⁵⁸ Many participants confirmed that Mbare District was fervently anticipating an opportunity which

⁵¹ ‘Mugabe on reconciliation’, Politicsweb, www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/mugabe-on-reconciliation, Accessed on 23 December 2017.

⁵² There was a genocide and more than 20 000 people were killed. The state did nothing to bring closure to these issues and it remained an unfinished business.

⁵³ T. Crowley, ‘Memory and Forgetting in Time of Violence: Brian Friel’s Meta-History Plays’, *Estudios Irlandeses*, No. 3, (2008), pp.72-83.

⁵⁴ D. Goredema, P. Chigora and Q. P. Bhebe, ‘Reconciliation in Zimbabwe: Where, When and How?’ *Journal of Global Peace and Conflict*, Vol. 2, No. 1, (2014) pp. 207-223.

⁵⁵ CCJPZ, *Breaking the silence, Building True Peace*. Report on the Disturbances in Matebeleland and Midlands, 1980-1989, (CCPJZ, Harare, 1997), p. iv.

⁵⁶ K. Brouneus. ‘Truth-telling as talking cure? Insecurity and realisation in the Rwandan Gacaca Courts’, *Security Dialogue*, Vol.39, No.1, (2008), pp.55-76.

⁵⁷ F. Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. (Penguin. London, 1969).

⁵⁸ M. Mbire, *Seeking Reconciliation and National Healing in Zimbabwe: Case of the Organ on National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration* (ONHRI), MA Thesis, The Hague: International Institute of Social Studies, (2011), p.12.

would enable them to reveal their experiences in public forums. The participants maintained that the issue of truth telling in public forums would be poignant, but at the same time it is therapeutic and cathartic to the victim. This is in parallel with Carey *et al's* argument that restorative justice rebuilds community relationships through resolving the past differences.⁵⁹ The primacy of remembering through giving testimonies in public was encapsulated in the opinion of one interviewee who enunciated that the act of sharing one's story with the public would have a healing effect and hence lessening the dead-weights of a dark past.⁶⁰ People were expecting a South African model of truth and reconciliation which could identify the origins, nature and the degree of political violence.⁶¹

In relation to the above, I discerned that Mbare inhabitants had a strong desire for a closure or healing because individual and community relations were fractured. Reconciliation was fundamental as it reshaped the relations and lay foundation for peaceful coexistence in future. In this respect, Mbire argued that what brings people together is the acknowledgement that a wrong was done and that needs to be worked on in the form of reconciliation.⁶² Many interviewees welcomed this research as a step towards the healing process as they regarded my engagement with them as salutary and curative in some ways. From the interviews, I deduced that the state was not serious concerning the issue of healing the victims of political violence. Edknowledge argued that the people wanted a form of truth and reconciliation process with a bottom-up approach, starting from the grassroots level to the state level.⁶³ For that reason, people wanted the state to consult them, hence their perceptions would be influential in decision-making processes.

In 2008, ONHRI was formed under the leadership of three presidents from ZANU-PF and two MDC formations with the aim of ensuring the restoration of dignity to all Zimbabweans regardless of age, communities, organisations and the country as a whole.⁶⁴ It was a groundbreaking development hoped to possibly open up prospects for the first national discourse on transitional justice. Thus, the victims of political violence became anticipative that their

⁵⁹ S. C. Carey, M. Gibney and S. C. Poe. *The politics of human rights, The quest for dignity*. (University Press, Cambridge/ New York 2010).

⁶⁰ Interview with Takura Maphosa, at Trade Center (along Ardbennie rd), 29 July 2017.

⁶¹ The Truth and Reconciliation Commission, *Truth in translation-The "truth" behind the play*, http://www.truthintranslation.org/educational_materials.pdf Accessed on 26 December 2017.

⁶² *Ibid*, p. 11.

⁶³ Interview with Edknowledge by the author, Heal Zimbabwe Trust (HZT), 25 July 2017.

⁶⁴ ONHRI, Organ on National Healing Reconciliation and Integration Concept Paper. Harare: Organ on National Healing Reconciliation and Integration, 2009; *Ibid*. What is the Organ on National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration in the Office of the President?

grievances and sorrows would be reflected. Research revealed that it was an exclusive bureaucratic institution which was trapped in the snares of powerful ZANU-PF politicians. The ONHRI was in actual fact the opposite of people's expectations, it was a top down oriented process and wilfully or unwittingly it contrived to silence the people at grassroots level because it was exclusionary in nature. One of the interviewees argued that the ONHRI was not serious about the problems of the residents of Mbare, hence there was a need for a more serious reconciliation mechanism. Like the Chilean Rettig Commission which was captured and manipulated by Augusto Pinochet (a Chilean military dictator),⁶⁵ the ONHRI was devised to serve the interests of the powerful politicians at the detriment of the victims especially in Mbare where help was critically needed. Unlike the South African TRC and the Rwandan Gacaca system, ONHRI also lacked the notion of truth-telling as the ZANU-PF politicians vied for reconciliation without truth. The process of truth-telling was detrimental to ZANU-PF's reputation because of its complicity in vigilante activities and other political atrocities.

According to Mbire many Zimbabweans were either unacquainted with the existence of the ONHRI or were uninformed about its mandate; its mechanism lacked legal and institutional framework; it was politicized; and that its relevancy ended with the end of the GPA after the 2013 elections.⁶⁶ This was done deliberately by the ZANU-PF politicians to ensure that only handful public forums would be held. Taking a cue from Sarkin, the ZANU-PF feared that if the organ was autonomous, it could counter their extensive propaganda about Chipangano violence as they always blame the MDC aligned youth for all the violence that occur in the district.⁶⁷ Many interviewees also stated that they were not aware of this organisation therefore, it is surprising that this institution was meant to serve these same people. The roles of ONHRI are cogently summed up in the ensuing extract from an interview with Precious Shumba;

...that organ did not do much. That organ with Sekai Holland and John Nkomo? It was a good initiative especially in bringing the youths together across Zimbabwe. They tried to bridge the gap, between the people, caused by political tensions. They even tried to introduce soccer games but you would find that it was at high level. In Mbare community,

⁶⁵ P. J. Campbell, 'The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC): Human Rights and State Transition—The South Africa Model', *African Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 4, Issue 3, (2000), pp.41-63.

⁶⁶ M. Mbire, *Seeking Reconciliation and National Healing in Zimbabwe: Case of the Organ on National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration (ONHRI)*, MA Thesis, The Hague: International Institute of Social Studies, 2011; M. Bratton, 'Violence, partisanship and transitional justice in Zimbabwe', *The Journal of modern African Studies*, Vol. 49 No.3, (2011), pp 353-380.

⁶⁷ J. Sarkin, 'The Necessity and Challenges of Establishing a Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Rwanda', *Human Rights Quarterly*, Vol. 21, No. 3, (1999), pp. 767-823.

the people know each other, that this one persecuted us but they could not mention it because they were afraid. The impact of ONHRI's intervention was very minimal because people are still labelling each other *mutengesesi* (sell-out), ZANU-PF and those who belong to the opposition are referred to as MDC. The organ did not resolve the cause and effects of declining social cohesion between MDC and ZANU-PF enthusiasts. The issue of Chipangano violence and norms of opportunism in Mbare was left untouched. During the period of its [ONHRI] duration political violence was still persistent.⁶⁸

In line with the above, some interviewees said the advent of ONHRI did not change the status quo in Mbare as Chipangano vigilantes remained in control harassing the residents every day. There was an upsurge of Chipangano violence, politics of exclusion and labelling, intimidation and suppression of free political activities and violation of the rule of law. Unlike the Rwandan *gacaca*, ONHRI failed to make the vigilantes to account for their deeds. The continuation of Chipangano violence during its time of ONHRI clearly shows that a model of reconciliation without truth-telling does not work. In tandem with this, Tapiwa Chideme said no public testimonies were held by the organisation in Mbare, thus some people were still having anger and this can lead to retribution.⁶⁹ . Therefore, the ONHRI did not address the key issues that had caused the suffering of many people in Mbare, especially impunity of perpetrators and marginalisation of the majority. Hence its mandate and significance remained shrouded in the mist of ambiguity.

Pineal Denga argued that ZANU-PF was a dominant player in the ONHRI's endeavours hence the process of transitional justice was sailed in the wrong direction.⁷⁰ Taking a cue from Raftopoulos *et al*, ZANU-PF is a party which thrives on silencing political dissent through violence⁷¹ therefore, the issue of truth telling was not compatible with the party. A former ONHRI official said that there was a lot of intimidation by the ZANU-PF politicians that is why the issue of Chipangano remained unmentionable.⁷² The organ had no powers and could not impeach anyone or enforce penal measures on any reprobate. Its code of conduct followed the country's traditional ways of dealing with disputes. This evoked the question; which of the traditional ways of dealing with disputes could handle Chipangano and ZANU-PF? Mbire

⁶⁸ Interview with Precious Shumba by the author, Harare Residents Trust (HRT), 27 July 2017.

⁶⁹ Interview with Tapiwa Chideme by the author, at his homestead in Mbare, 02 August 2017.

⁷⁰ Interview with Pineal Denga by the author, Fantasyland Chicken Inn, Harare CBD, 27 July 2017.

⁷¹ B. Raftopoulos, and T. Savage, *Zimbabwe Injustice and Political Reconciliation*, (Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, Cape Town, 2004), p.xi.

⁷² Interview with former ONHRI official, Harare CBD, 08/08/17.

argued that the organisation had forsaken its mandate and concentrated on bringing together three warring political parties in the GNU.⁷³

ONHRI chose to engage in restorative justice through forgive and forget mantra without holding the perpetrators of political violence accountable. Cunnen and Hoyle argued that one of the preconditions which is necessary for healing and reconciliation to take place is stopping the perpetrators of various atrocities from committing crimes and make them participate in rebuilding the community.⁷⁴ This resonates with the argument of Cabrera who propound that the ‘forgive and forget’ or ‘reconciliation without truth’ seems favourable to those who played a role in violence. Subsequently, ZANU-PF as a major political role player implemented a ‘forgive and forget’ ideology for its aggrandisement, thus the Zimbabwean society and Mbare in particular remained polarised.

The Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC) was a multi-party body (which was composed of four members from ZANU-PF and four from each of the two MDC formations) which was mandated to monitor the implementation of the provisions of the Global Political Agreement (GPA).⁷⁵ This liaison committee appeared to be a panacea to the glitches and teething problems that would affect the Inclusive Government which was a coalition of strange bedfellows. In reality, JOMIC was nothing but a paper tiger because its twelve-member body lacked legal basis and the muscle to coerce parties to act in accordance with the agreement. Pineal Denga maintained that the Inclusive Government did not give JOMIC the execution powers, as a result it was feeble and ineffective.⁷⁶ The committee could not stop the Chipangano youths from plundering property, evicting and beating up alleged MDC enthusiasts in Mbare.⁷⁷ The residents divulged that they doubted JOMIC, as a true initiative towards ending political violence, because its Chairpersons, on several occasions, tried to refute the collusion between Chipangano group and ZANU-PF. JOMIC failed to coerce ZANU-PF to confess on their connections with the Chipangano group. Tapiwa Chideme said that JOMIC was just a mere spectator as the political climate, epitomised by sadism, unfair arrests and uncertainty and timidity was incessantly worsening in Mbare.⁷⁸

⁷³ M. Mbire, *Seeking Reconciliation and National Healing in Zimbabwe: Case of the Organ on National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration (ONHRI)*, MA Thesis, The Hague: International Institute of Social Studies, 2011.

⁷⁴ C. Cunnen and C. Hoyle, *Debating Restorative Justice*, (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2010).

⁷⁵ Global Political Agreement (GPA), Section 22.3, www.kubatanaarchives.com. Accessed on 27/10/17.

⁷⁶ Interview with Pineal Denga by the author, Harare CBD, 27 July 2017.

⁷⁷ *The Standard*, 08 May 2011

⁷⁸ Interview with Tapiwa Chideme by the author, at his homestead in Mbare, 02 August 2017.

Edknowledge (a former JOMIC official) mentioned that the cross-party body did in some way contribute to conflict mitigation and management and to some extent transformation. He said it was able to establish ward based liaison political committees in Harare and Mbare in particular. This is where the perpetrators of violence would be met and discussed with and were able to give their own side of the story. They were able to be taught about the need to coexist and tolerate other people with different political affiliations. Edknowledge said, “I remember Jim Kunaka attending some of the meetings and he was able to start interacting with the members of the opposition party.”⁷⁹ However, Edknowledge admitted that the committee was not as effective as was thought it was going to be because it lacked legal framework and there was no political will. Dumisani Nkomo argued that although the body tried to reach out to the people, its efficacy and value was affected as it became part of a political gravy train that the inclusive government turned out to be.⁸⁰ Therefore it can be argued that the formation of JOMIC was a noble initiative which could have stopped violence in Mbare but it was poisoned by the incessant conflicts and divergence of ideas between ZANU-PF and MDCs during the inclusive government.

Scores of people in Mbare stated that they did not know JOMIC. Some who had an idea about the committee said they only saw cars written JOMIC during the time of the inclusive government but they never had an engagement with the committee. This parallels with Dumisani Nkomo’s assertion that, “It was not effective. Besides purchasing state-of-the-art vehicles, there was not much to show for their work.”⁸¹ He also attributed the failure of JOMIC to other actors such as the police and government ministers. In support of this, Edknowledge said that the Mbare police, on one occasion, arrested JOMIC officials when they were trying to rescue the victims from Chipangano violence.⁸² He added that the political environment in Mbare was too polarised with ZANU-PF officials like Amos Midzi and Savanhu influencing Chipangano to sabotage some of the inclusive government’s policies. Tapiwa Chideme and other interviewees agree that Ignatius Chombo could be blamed for enhancing the activities of Chipangano during the GPA in a bid to undermine the work of MDC councillors in the district.

The Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition concurred that the GPA was haunted by the failure of the Southern African Development Committee (SADC) to deploy

⁷⁹ Interview with Edknowledge by the author, Heal Zimbabwe Trust, 25 July 2017

⁸⁰ *Financial Gazette*, 08 July 2012.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁸² Interview with Edknowledge by the author, Heal Zimbabwe Trust (HZZT), 25 July 2017.

officials to monitor and demand accountability from political leaders.⁸³ Although JOMIC tried to hold workshops in Harare and Mbare in particular, all the efforts were in vain because it failed at compelling the political leaders, stop Chipangano violence, help the victims to heal after the horrid violence of 2008. Some interviewees believed that the intervention of SADC Troika officials could have brought changes in Mbare. Therefore, it is clear that JOMIC did not do much for the people of Mbare and some of the people were not even aware of its existences and its mandate. The incessant bickering between ZANU-PF and the two MDCs over administrative and policy issues created a quagmire for the body hence its ineffectiveness.

Memory and Silence in Mbare District

Brockmeier asserted that silence is relative as there is a dominant ideology that causes other ideologies to be silent; as power plays a significant role in what is remembered collectively or what is silenced.⁸⁴ My field notes and interviewee's narratives revealed that the eyewitnesses and victims had a hysterical fear and were disinclined to unequivocally and unreservedly discuss the Chipangano vigilantism. The Mugabe regime instilled fear in the citizens through its actors like Chipangano in Mbare and this fear was palpable at the personal, household, community level. The issues of Chipangano violence was unmentionable in Mbare as the residents feared the group's collusion with the police and ZANU-PF politicians. The police and Chipangano mutually worked together in suppressing the residents. Therefore, this repression or suppression has made it difficult for the victims or witnesses of Chipangano vigilantism to freely remember politically motivated violence.

Brockmeier argued that memory is perceived as a politically motivated representation of the past, that requires collective forgetting. He went on to say silence may not always signal lack of knowledge about an issue, but it may be an adaptation to power by less powerful groups whose ideology is not accepted by those in power who are able to silence any views divergent from their own.⁸⁵ In light of Brockmeier's argument, some MDC enthusiasts were systematically silenced through arbitrary arrests, ineffective courts and protection given to Chipangano vigilantes. Carey opines that the perpetrators are the major political role players

⁸³HRW, *Race Against Time: The Need for Legal and Institutional Reforms Ahead of Zimbabwe's Elections*, 2013, p.14. Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, *The Military Factor in Zimbabwe's Political and Electoral Affairs*. (Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, Harare 2011).

⁸⁴ J. Brockmeier, 'Remembering and Forgetting: Narrative as Cultural Memory', *Culture & Psychology*, Vol 8, no. 15, (2002), pp.15-43.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

and they hold influential offices.⁸⁶ The politicians influenced the judiciary thus the courts had some hypocritical tendencies through giving the vigilantes immunity and light sentences. Owing to this, many victims of Chipangano vigilantism have been silenced and silence was the only guarantee of their security.

Many interviewees confirmed that they chose to be silent because they wanted to preserve and maintain their economic prospects. Borrowing from Mvundura, many people in Mbare have remembered to forget as a way of moving on with a new way of life.⁸⁷ One of the participants mentioned that their silence was a choice and perpetrators should not account it as a victory. The harrowing nature of Chipangano violence has made it difficult for some victims to remember their experiences or what they witnessed. One of the victims mentioned that remembering about the horrors of the Chipangano violence makes him feel disheartened and indignant.⁸⁸ The psychological trauma that has been caused by the group's activities has made the victims to become reserved or silent about the issue due to either anger or fear.

The relationship between former Chipangano members and the community

Interviewees stated that their relationship with the former Chipangano members was marred with antipathy. The activities of the group have caused untold suffering, injuries and loss of loved ones. The victims and witnesses of Chipangano vigilantism claimed that they have been traumatised by the actions of the group, hence the former members of the group cannot be forgiven till justice has taken its course. Most of the interview narratives show the anger and hatred that the people had towards the group. Some of the people even wished them to be devoured by misfortunes and adversities. The following direct quotation from one of the interviews clearly reveals people's sentiments towards them;

The Chipangano vigilantes thought that they would never face justice, until God hearkened to our prayers. I remember three of the notorious guys died mysteriously, and everyone saw them deteriorating health-wise because they were taking advantage during that time of just having sex with even HIV positive people and some survived on drugs

⁸⁶ S. C. Carey, M. Gibney, M. and S. C. Poe, *The politics of human rights, The quest for dignity*. (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2010).

⁸⁷ W. Mvundura, *Memory and violence: Displaced Zimbabwean Rural Communities Reliving the Memories of the March 2008 political violence*, M A Thesis, Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand, (2014).

⁸⁸ Interview with a victim of Chipangano violence by the author, Mbare, 02 August 2017.

and other substances, therefore ended up dying quickly. This was the hand of God which dealt with them.⁸⁹

Following the above quotation, it is evident that some residents were still having deep resentment towards the former vigilantes because justice had not been done. One victim of Chipangano violence claimed that, ‘It hurts to see people who have caused suffering in our lives living freely as if they have never committed any crime.’

The lack of a closure and healing have made the community to be in a state of detestation and indignation against the Chipangano vigilantes and even those who have dissociated from the group. There was a need to rebuild the community bonds through the truth telling public testimonies and in a way, this would have simmered down the anger in the community. One of the victims said;

The problem here is that people know who has harmed their loved ones, but nothing has been done to them. As for my case, I know the former Chipangano thugs who stole my property, by their names. There is nothing I can do because all the cases against Chipangano members have been overlooked by the courts and the police. My other fear is anyone who joined the Chipangano group will remain in the group.⁹⁰

The indignation with people has created, to certain extent, a scenario whereby victims have been turned into perpetrators. Smith opined that victims could easily become perpetrators because every human being is capable of attack if sufficiently provoked.⁹¹ A witness confirmed that MDC supporters confronted a former Chipangano member, who was accused of being part of the group which evicted the MDC members who lived at Matapi Flats, and assaulted him at his house.⁹² This incidents buttress Smith’s argument that assault lies dormant within us all and it requires only circumstance to set it in violent motion.⁹³ The victims were discontented by the group’s extortionist activities, terror and suffering that had been inflicted on the residents. Tapiwa Chideme agreed that if some victims get a clear-cut chance to revenge, vengeance was unavoidable due to the fury that was still burning in them.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁰ Interview with Anonymous by the author, at Paground Flea market in Mbare, 25 July 2017

⁹¹ A. Smith, *The Monster in all of Us: When Victims Become Perpetrators*, (Georgetown University Law Faculty Publication, Georgetown, 2005), p.p. 367-394.

⁹² Interview with a witness by the author, Mbare, 04 August 2017.

⁹³ *Ibid.*

Conclusion

The inhabitants of Mbare did not find it easy to deal with memories of Chipangano vigilantism, barely a few years after its 'disbandment'. The people of Mbare remembered the Chipangano violence differently. Some have permanent scars inflicted on their bodies. Others lost their loved ones and their property destroyed. Some were driven into destitution as they lost business opportunities. The inhabitants' failure to forget the activities of Chipangano was also fuelled by the actions of ZANU-PF politicians who frustrated the hopes for transitional justice at all societal levels. ZANU-PF has shown lack of political will to make the healing programmes vibrant because most of the perpetrators were ZANU-PF enthusiasts. Thus, ZANU-PF wanted reconciliation without truth-telling. In this respect, the district was still in a state of detestation and indignation against the former Chipangano members as they wanted them to face conviction or retribution.

Recently, Robert Mugabe was ousted from power by the military. The rebranding of ZANU-PF in post Mugabe era made the populace to be optimistic about the future. However, there are slim chances that the new regime under Emmerson Mnangagwa will break away from the past. The militarisation of the government and his supposed connections to a terror group called Al Shabab in Kwekwe reflects the possibility of state-sanctioned vigilantism and political violence in future.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this study was to examine the emergence, development and operations of Chipangano vigilantes in Mbare district (2000-2013). This study was based on an interpretive and retrospective reflection of Chipangano violence in Mbare. To this effect, the conclusions drawn from this study cannot be universally applied (generalised) as they are specifically for state sponsored vigilantism in Mbare. Hence, these conclusions are context-specific. Nonetheless, some of the arguments put forward in this study can be used in analysis of similar phenomena elsewhere.

In this thesis, I defined a vigilante group as an organised extra-legal movement whose members take over the roles of the state, in a particular area, especially its monopoly of violence with or without the blessings of the state. State-sanctioned vigilantism refers to illegitimate and clandestine endorsement of vigilante activities by the state in the various forms, including but not limited to militancy or bigotry against the populace which is perceived as threats to the status quo/ enemies of the government. Chipangano fitted these definitions because it was a product of ZANU-PF engineering and the group had a symbiotic relationship with the state structures. The research findings speak to the conclusion that Chipangano group involved in extra-judicial activities and the ZANU-PF government always turned a blind eye and tried to create an impression that Chipangano violence was enigmatic or difficult to clampdown.

Various scholars (like Heald, Adigwe and Schuberth) whose studies were focused on the emergence of vigilantism, indicated that unemployment, economic hardships, the partiality of the police and judiciary and the culture of political violence have resulted in the rise of vigilantism. This notion was sustained in the case of Chipangano as its members were either unemployed or underemployed. Most of Chipangano members were driven by poverty to join the group for the sake of the privileges attached to membership i.e. economic opportunities and the ability to venture into illegal activities without prosecution. The Chipangano group emerged and thrived as a result of outright manipulation and normalisation of violence by ZANU-PF politicians who took pride in it. Chipangano shared many similarities with the Mungiki vigilante group of Kenya in their operations as they both extorted money from the urban poor, they operated in poor urban slums. Like the Bakasi Boys of Nigeria, Chipangano vigilantes enjoyed tolerance from the state apparatus. In the case of Chipangano, the state took advantage of the availability of unemployed and poor youth who had nothing else to do. State security forces allowed Chipangano to engage in acts of lawlessness so long they helped ZANU-PF to

keep the opposition Movement for Democratic Change under check. Whereas some cases such as the Bakasi Boys of Nigeria, the Tadtad of Philipines and the Sungusungu of Tanzania were hijacked by the state to work in tandem with the state, Chipangano was created by the ruling party ZANU-PF to silence the opposition parties. Unlike Tadtad which was overtly endorsed by the Philippines government, this thesis proved that Chipangano operated on the basis of covert state support. Unlike the Mungiki, Sungusungu, Bakasi Boys etc., Chipangano was not a popular movement but it was an infamous group of which benefitted few individuals. The previously mentioned groups were appreciated by their communities for their crime control functions though sometimes they were implicated in state sanctioned violence.

Some scholars like Rotberg, Lyon and Zartman interpreted the sanctioning of vigilantes by the state as an indication of state collapse. Vigilantes are said to emerge due to the failure of the state to guarantee the delivery of everyday, basis services to the citizens. My findings are different. State sanctioned vigilantism in Zimbabwe was an outcome of political choice rather than state collapse. The state collapse explanation is applicable to the cases of Sierra Leone, Uganda's Teso region, South Sudan's former Western Equatorial State, and Nigeria's north east where vigilantes were used to tackle insurgents in areas where state control was weak.¹ I argued that the state deliberately denied Mbare the right to security and politicised the police in order to facilitate Chipangano operations because it was beneficial for the ruling party to promote such disorder as a way to break one of the key strongholds of the opposition political movement. The Zimbabwean state was still in a position to police Mbare District without the need for Chipangano, just like they have done even in the most rural parts of the country that would have been difficult to police because of lack of public infrastructure. The state apparatus especially Mbare police arbitrarily arrested and threatened anyone who according to Chipangano was challenging the ZANU-PF government and they protected the vigilantes. As previously mentioned, the police arrested MDC supporters or civil society officials who attempted to report the Chipangano vigilantes. It is clear that both at repressive and ideological levels, the ZANU-PF government, and its formal and informal arms have silenced the inhabitants of Mbare through ignoring the voices of the victims and inculcating fear in people through forcing them to stop deliberating freely about Chipangano activities.

¹ 'A double-edged sword – the role of vigilantes in Africa', International Security, World Economic Forum, 2017 <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/10/a-double-edged-sword-the-role-of-vigilantes-in-africa>, Accessed on 23 December 2017.

Chipangano vigilantism elicited mixed responses from Mbare residents ranging from conformity, to passive resistance and activism. The suppressive nature of Chipangano vigilantes and state apparatus cultivated silence and conformity in Mbare district. Nevertheless, this did not stop other people (especially opposition supporters) from engaging in retaliatory violence. The opposition supporters did not want ZANU-PF to take all the political space thus they adopted 'collateral violence' which entailed arson, vandalising property, repossessing their accommodation by force and beating ZANU-PF enthusiasts. I also argued that, in face of Chipangano's exclusionary activities, some people adopted new strategies to avoid clashes with the group and paying protection fees in Mbare business zones which included feigning to be disabled, use of clandestine language and gestures and running away when group approaches the area of operation as well as doing business during the night when the group is gone.

Some Mbare residents used spiritual strategies to avenge for the deaths of their loved ones by engaging traditional healers to invoke the spirits of the dead to come back and fight the perpetrators. This was a safer strategy because the evil spirits would supposedly haunt the perpetrator of violence until the he either dies or gets mentally disturbed or look for the victims' families for compensation. This served the families of the victims well because it did not involve physical confrontation, which would have opened the victims and their families to further violence.

The inhabitants of Mbare did not find it easy to deal with memories of Chipangano vigilantism, barely a few years after its 'disbandment'. The people of Mbare remembered the Chipangano violence differently. The activities of Chipangano vigilante group benefitted a few and the majority of people in Mbare suffered many things under the oppressive rule of the group. Some have permanent scars inflicted on their bodies. Others lost their loved ones and their property destroyed. Some were driven into destitution as they lost business opportunities. The inhabitants' failure to forget the activities of Chipangano was also fuelled by the actions of ZANU-PF politicians who frustrated the hopes for transitional justice at all societal levels. During the time of the Government of National Unity (GNU), ZANU-PF sabotaged the process of national healing and they denied ONHRI and JOMIC to be autonomous because most of the perpetrators of violence were ZANU-PF officials and supporters. Moreover, truth-telling process was going to counter official denial that there was political violence in the country. The kind of transitional justice which ZANU-PF advocated for was in contrast to South

Africa's truth and reconciliation model, as the former wanted healing without truth. Consequentially, the victims had to contend with social and psychological effects of intermingling almost every day with unpunished perpetrators as most of them were Mbare dwellers. Noteworthy is the fact that most of these vigilantes showed no sign of remorse and as a result the inhabitants felt betrayed and frustrated hence they wanted revenge. Because these legacies of violence have not been dealt with, the relationship between the former vigilante members and the community remained sour.

The ousting of Mugabe from the presidency gave the citizens a sigh of relief and a hope for change. However, the reality is that the new government is just 'new wine in old wine skins' because they cannot break away from their past. There is very little hope that state sanctioned vigilante groups will be demobilised and disbanded as the current president himself is alleged to be a patron of the AL-Shabab vigilante group in Kwekwe. Concerning the issue of corruption and violence, the Mnangagwa government is dealing with these issues with partiality to factions and political affiliation. If this is the nature of the new government then the road ahead is as difficult as the road the country has travelled before.

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Appendix

Photo Narration of life in Mbare District



A commuter omnibus (Kombi) with a tout calling travellers



Mbare flats



Market stalls in Mbare Bus Terminal



Vakomana wezvingoro and a vendor selling chips at Mbare bus terminal



Paground Flea market.



A vendor at Mbare Bus Terminal.



Mbare market: source: file:2010 market Harare Zimbabwe 5866074969.jpg-wikimedia.org



Source: NewsDay, *Exleader of Chipangano terror group Jim Kunaka apologises*, <https://www.newsday.co.zw/wp-content/uploads/2015/...>
Accessed on 28/10/17